Madam President, I rise today to discuss the war on terrorism and the situation in Iraq on the one year anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

I had the honor and privilege of traveling to Iraq and Afghanistan over the recent recess to visit our troops. I had the similar honor of visiting them in the medical center at Ramstein, Germany.

I want to report to my colleagues that the troops with whom I met were in good spirits. They are, of course, eager to return home to their loved ones, but they are also proud of the work they are doing to stabilize Iraq and assist the Iraqi people in building a democratic state.

As a veteran of World War II, I was proud to see in the troops the same dedication to duty, mission, and country that I remember so well from my own comrades in arms. In Ramstein I was impressed with the wonderful support our wounded were receiving from the medical staff, and I was equally impressed with the eagerness our wounded expressed to return to the sides of their comrades. In that eagerness to rejoin their units, they shared a bond with all their past brothers in uniform.

In Iraq, I visited the newly deployed Stryker brigade in Mosul. This unit is demonstrating in the field for the first time a powerful new capability. But it has also been given the difficult objective of patrolling a large area. They are still waiting for Iraqi forces to be trained and adequately equipped to supplement their effort. Clearly, one reason why the security situation still remains so tenuous is the failure to train and field sufficient Iraqi security forces. But the apparent ambush of two American civilians recently by Iraqi police indicates that even some of the newly deployed security forces cannot be trusted.

According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), we are only about 30,000 short of the approximately 236,000 security forces planned for in Iraq. This may be so in terms of absolute numbers, but it is not a reflection of how well equipped they are, how well trained they are, and how well led they are.

For example, the CPA carries about 60,000 police on payroll, but only 2,300 of those have been fully qualified. Prior to the war, the Iraqi police had a well deserved reputation for being corrupt. Reports continue to indicate that this remains a problem, and, as I mentioned, there are indications that the security forces have been infiltrated by terrorists. At the same time, many of the honest policemen are being targeted by terrorists. On Tuesday, eleven were killed in an ambush. So one should view numbers with a healthy skepticism and focus on quality.

I also had the opportunity to visit Balad, about 25 miles north of Baghdad. This will become the future center of air operations in Iraq, and we are now preparing a major air base area to service American troops for the next three to five years. Elsewhere, there is the intent to move American troops out of Baghdad and consolidate forces in fewer installations on the periphery, thus reducing the visibility of the American footprint. This is going to be a very delicate maneuver. Reducing the American presence in Baghdad has to be balanced by an increase in the effectiveness of Iraqi security forces inside the city. We could run the risk of having that city of about six million become an even safer haven for terrorists while we hunker down in bases on the outskirts.

It also means that we are planning for an extended stay in Iraq. While the Administration indicates that 33 countries are now contributing troops to Iraq, the bulk of the troops are American and, unless there is a change in strategy by the Administration or a change in attitude by the international community, those troops for the foreseeable future will remain largely American.

Will there be American troops in Iraq by the time of the next presidential election in 2008? Right now, the answer is yes.

I was able to visit Kabul as well. So much attention and money have been focused on Iraq that I believe Afghanistan has been neglected to the detriment of our goal of defeating the terrorists who attacked us on 9-11.

One example: in Iraq we hope to field an army of 27 battalions in 12 months at a cost of $1.8 billion, while in Afghanistan we hope to field an army of 15 battalions in 26 months at a cost of $569 million. Yet, in Iraq, there is a military infrastructure of garrisons, facilities, and a history of a national army that Afghanistan lacks. There are huge cultural barriers to overcome in linguistics and ethnicity that make Iraq look homogenous in comparison. Our military is doing a great job in trying to stand up an army in Afghanistan, but it is an enormous job, and so far the international community is not providing sufficient resources either to rebuild the country or create a sustainable and professional security force.

Afghanistan has an even greater problem in the lack of a civic administrative infrastructure. Without the creation of a strong local and central government, we run the risk of creating a well trained army that the government cannot pay for or sustain, further increasing the risk that the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists could return to power.

We need to give more attention and make a greater commitment to Afghanistan. In Kosovo, for example, twenty-five times more money was pledged on a per capita basis than to Afghanistan and fifty times more troops per capita were sent. Afghanistan needs an estimated $20 billion in assistance over the next five years but so far only $7 billion has been pledged and even less received. I worry that, two years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has become the forgotten war even as al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban remnants continue to make it their sanctuary and regroup their forces.

I opposed going to war in Iraq when we did. I did not think that the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction was imminent, nor did I think we had taken sufficient time to prepare for the consequences of a prolonged occupation of Iraq. I was concerned that starting another conflict before we had squashed the al Qaeda terrorist threat in Afghanistan would disperse our forces and expose us to even more terrorist problems. To be successful in both, with the least cost to the United States in terms of lives and resources, required an international coalition and consensus along the lines of the one created in the first Gulf War. We have yet to achieve that either in Afghanistan, where there is international support but insufficient resources, or in Iraq where the bulk of resources and personnel are being provided by the United States.

We need to rebuild support for American foreign policy both abroad and at home. A recent Pew Foundation poll indicates that the U.S. image abroad remains negative in most nations. This cannot be good. For Americans to be secure, we need to be respected, and, as both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, we cannot go it alone unless American citizens want to bear the full burden of sacrifice. We need international support. This does not mean sacrificing American interests to foreign interests, but it means working with other nations to gain a consensus in support of our objectives. In many we are one.

At home, too, we need to rebuild bipartisan support for American foreign policy. This has been lost in the last few years. Healthy debate requires a willingness to listen to arguments and to accept those that are valid in order to develop a consensus on American foreign policy. This ability has been lost.

Earlier this week, our former colleague, Bill Cohen, spoke before the 9-11 Commission. He talked about "the kind of poisonous atmosphere that existed then that continues today", referring to the questioning of President Clinton's motives when he launched attacks against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Sudan. Constructive criticism of strategy and oversight of its implementation are essential tools in sharpening the tip of our policy weapons. But they need to take place in an atmosphere where such debate is not just another arrow in the quiver of partisan politics.

I pray that one of the successes of the 9-11 Commission and other discussions in this very political year will be a determination to restore comity in foreign policy.

My recent travels in Iraq and Afghanistan have convinced me that, if we are to succeed in either country, we need to be prepared to remain in both countries for a long time, and we need to be prepared for additional sacrifices in terms of lives and financial resources. To accept that burden, there has to be a consensus in foreign policy. To bear that burden will require a determination to establish international support for our policies.

Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.