The General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report critical of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state efforts to track and improve the security of radioactive sealed sources in the United States. U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii) requested the GAO report, "Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources." The report is available online at www.gao.gov. The GAO report uncovered problems in several areas: the number of sources is unknown; hundreds are lost or stolen every year; security for sealed sources is uneven; no centralized source of information to verify authorized users, locations, quantities and movements of sealed sources exists; licenses to purchase and use sources are granted without initial verification of the applicants identity; the security of radioactive sources during transport is questionable; the NRC has been slow to order security improvements; and funding for increased security measures post 9/11 may be inadequate.
In 2001, as chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senator Akaka held hearings that covered the threat posed by dirty bombs. In early 2002 he asked GAO to investigate the control of radioactive sealed sources, which are in wide use in industry, agriculture, medicine, and research and could be used in a dirty bomb. This is the third report GAO has delivered to Senator Akaka on the control of radioactive sources.
"The Secretary of Energy has made it a priority to detect and secure sources overseas," Akaka said. "But our system is so full of holes it cannot even serve as a model for others. The Secretary and head of the NRC also need to focus on the control of radioactive sources in this country."
The GAO surveyed radiation control officials in all 50 states and Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia concerning (1) the number of radiological sources in use and those that had been lost or stolen, (2) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over radiological sources, (3) and improvements which have been made since September 11, 2001. The GAO found that the number of sources is unknown because no federal or state agency tracks individual sealed sources. The NRC estimates there are some two million licensed sealed sources in the U.S.
The GAO found that even the number of holders of licenses for radioactive sources is unknown. Data exist on the number of holders of specific licenses for highly radioactive sources but not for holders of general licenses for low-level radioactive sources. General licensees usually have not been required to register. The NRC estimates there are 40,000 general licensees with 600,000 generally licensed devices. Since April 2001, the NRC has been trying to gain greater information on general licensees, but low response rates to mailed inquiries has led the NRC to hire a private investigation firm to help find general licensees.
"The NRC has focused its efforts on control of highly-radioactive sources. But many sources with low-levels of radiation could be used in a terrorist attack to cause panic and economic damage," said Akaka. "New security measures should take into account economic and psychological consequences as well health effects from terrorist attacks with radioactive materials."
The GAO found that in two accidents in New Jersey in 1997, people opened or broke luminous exit signs containing tritium. In one case a 14-year old boy took some signs from a demolition site and opened one at home, contaminating himself and the house. In the other, a patient at a state psychiatric hospital broke a tritium exit sign. It took more than $200,000 to decontaminate the hospital. "A coordinated attack with such minor sources of radioactivity could still cause major problems," said Akaka.
The GAO found that 1,300 sources have been lost, stolen or abandoned between 1998 and 2002. Many involved portable gauges used to measure moisture or density of soil at construction sites, and well-logging devices. Some are from companies that go bankrupt. Most of the sources are recovered, but dangerous amounts of radioactive sources have gone missing and not been recovered.
GAO noted that NRC's licensing process is based on good faith and allows an applicant to receive a license and purchase sources before the identity of the applicant is verified. It can take as long as 12 months before NRC conducts its first inspection.
Since 9/11, the NRC has required only 70 large irradiator facilities to take stronger security measures. Irradiator facilities pose a threat but do not have the most vulnerable sources. Ninety-three percent of Agreement State officials and licensees that responded to the survey said industrial radiographers, which are easily portable, highly radioactive, and widely available were a greater concern. (Agreement States are states with which the NRC has an agreement under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for cooperation on the peaceful uses of radioactive materials.) Portable gauges and well-logging devices are also a matter of concern. Some facilities the GAO visited have strong security measures, others do not. For example, a hospital that GAO visited kept its sources in a locked room. However, during the GAO visit the agency found the room's door propped open.
"The extent of the lack of tracking and security of sealed sources in this country is alarming. Almost one radioactive source a day is lost in the U.S. and it seems anybody can get a license to purchase radioactive sources without a background check," said Akaka. "Tighter controls are needed, but the NRC and the Agreement States are moving too slowly to improve tracking and security of sources in this country."
The GAO observed the vulnerability of sources while in transport is a major concern. State officials indicated there are weaknesses in regulations regarding the secure transport of sealed sources. A major worry are the regular shipments of Iridium-192 to the U.S. from Europe and South America using commercial freight services. 10,000 curies of Iridium-192 are shipped at a time in stainless steel shipping kegs that weigh only 150 to 200 lbs.
The NRC and Agreement States disagree over the responsibility for improving security. The NRC has responsibility for common defense and security while the Agreement States have authority for public health and safety. The NRC claims it should have control over security related efforts because of the common defense function. Eighty percent of Agreement States, however say they should have responsibility for security measures. While the NRC and states argue, the overall funding for increased security measures is in doubt. Sixty percent of Agreement States said they would need additional resources to implement new security efforts. NRC officials say they are also facing budget and staffing constraints. NRC anticipates increasing its licensees' fees and using emergency supplemental funds the NRC has received to cover costs for additional security steps.
"Congress may need to act to change the Atomic Energy Act to ensure coordination between the NRC and the states," said Akaka. "Additional funding may be needed to institute a national cradle-to-grave tracking system and assist states with their control efforts."
