A General Accounting Office (GAO) report, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening" (GAO-03-638), requested by U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii) is critical of U.S. and international efforts to control radioactive sealed sources. The GAO report found that problems exist in almost every dimension: a complete tally of sources worldwide does not exist; thousands of sources have been lost; many countries have weak regulations; the U.S. does not adequately monitor the import and export of sources; smuggling of sealed sources increased in the late 1990s; and U.S. and international assistance to help nations track and secure sources is inadequate.
In 2001, as chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senator Akaka held hearings into threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorists. In early 2002, he asked GAO to investigate the control of radioactive sealed sources, which are in wide use in industry, agriculture, medicine, and research and could be used in a dirty bomb. This is the second report GAO has delivered to Senator Akaka on the control of radioactive sources.
"A lot of attention has been focused on the problem of securing radioactive materials in the former Soviet Union. This GAO report shows the problem is much bigger than the former Soviet Union. There is a worldwide crisis in tracking and securing these sources," Akaka said. "Thankfully, no dirty bombs have been detonated, but there have been accidents with sealed sources that show the consequences of a dirty bomb could be serious."
GAO surveyed 127 member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about their domestic laws, regulations and practices for control and accounting of radioactive sources. Forty-nine states responded to the GAO survey in time to be included in the report, providing an unprecedented look at the problem worldwide. GAO also looked at IAEA and U.S. government assistance programs to help countries develop and implement national policies for control of radioactive materials.
The GAO found that the number of sealed sources is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. GAO estimates, however, that 10 million sources may exist in the United States and the countries that answered the survey. Many more probably are in Russia, China and other countries that did not respond to the GAO questionnaire. In the case of Russia, the European Commission estimated there may be 840,000 sealed sources in Russia. Russian officials think the number is considerably higher. Of particular concern are some 1,000 electrical generators that are powered by highly radioactive strontium-90 sources containing 40,000 to 150,000 curies that are spread around the former Soviet Union.
"The majority of sources have low levels of radiation such as those used in smoke detectors. But this is not reassuring," said Akaka. "Thousands of other sources have higher levels of radioactivity. They could cause substantial panic, disorder, and economic damage if used in a dirty bomb.
"In one accident in Goiania, Brazil, in 1987, people broke into an abandoned sealed medical source containing cesium-137, and unwittingly spread the material around their community. Four died of exposure, hundreds were injured, and some $36 million in damages resulted. An attack with a dirty bomb could bring a much worse result."
An accurate count of lost or stolen sources is lacking according to the GAO, but the number is estimated to be in the thousands. In the U.S., some 250 sealed sources are lost or stolen annually, although the majority are recovered. In the European Union, up to 70 sealed sources are lost annually. The 49 survey respondents said 612 sealed sources had been lost or stolen since 1995, 254 of which were unrecovered. A majority of the survey respondents said abandoned sources posed a problem for their country.
The report notes that the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently said that existing controls on imports and exports are minimal although international commerce in these sources is extensive. One unnamed African nation could not provide a complete count of sources because foreign companies did not notify regulatory authorities when they imported sources.
"Last December, a highly radioactive source was stolen from a Halliburton oil operation in Nigeria. Nigerian authorities weren't notified until a month after the theft. The source is very dangerous and still has not been recovered. This incident underscores the need for tighter national controls and more oversight of the import and export of sources," said Akaka.
The GAO found that national regulation of sealed sources is inadequate. As many as 110 countries worldwide do not have adequate controls over sealed sources according to the IAEA. Controls over sealed sources vary greatly and are weakest among less developed countries. Many countries have regulatory controls over sources on paper, but the controls may be weak and the implementation of the controls may be questionable.
Smuggling in radioactive sources has increased in recent years. Overall, the IAEA recorded 272 cases of illicit trafficking in sealed sources from 1993, when it established a database to track cases, to the end of 2002. Of these 272 cases, 179 involved potentially high-risk sealed sources that pose the greatest threat; cesium-137 accounted for close to 90 incidents alone. Information about smuggling is thought to be incomplete as incidents are not always detected or reported.
The GAO report recommends that the Secretary of Energy work with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to develop a comprehensive plan and program of help for other countries. The DOE also needs to take the lead in developing a U.S. government-wide plan to provide this help and increase the expenditures in the countries requiring assistance.
"The Secretary of Energy has said improving the security of radioactive materials abroad is a high priority. But the GAO report shows that DOE has spent the vast majority of its money for securing sealed sources internationally in the United States at the national labs. DOE needs to work much harder to make sure U.S. assistance goes overseas where it's needed," Akaka said.
"We have been worried about the security of sealed sources since the break-up of the Soviet Union brought the danger of loose nukes to the fore. The U.S. recently warned the U.N. that there is a high probability Al-Qaeda will try to attack with a weapon of mass destruction or a dirty bomb within the next two years. The U.S. and the IAEA need to move quickly to create strong national controls over radioactive sources around the world. The shortage of funding in many countries to set up an effective regulatory structure is a serious obstacle. We may need to institute a system with user fees such as the one employed in France that has greatly improved the tracking and recovery of sources."
