105TH CONGRESS
2d Session

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REPT. 105–468
Part 1

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1998

R E P O R T

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

H.R. 2786

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

MARCH 26, 1998.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

---

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

59–001 WASHINGTON : 1998

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, *Chairman*

BOB STUMP, Arizona
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
STEVE BUYER, Indiana
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
JAMES TALENT, Missouri
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD "BUCK" MCKEON, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
BILL REDMOND, New Mexico
KAY GRANGER, Texas

IKE SKELTON, Missouri
NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JANE HARMAN, California
PAUL MCHALE, Pennsylvania
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
TOM ALLEN, Maine
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JIM TURNER, Texas
F. ALLEN BOYD, JR., Florida
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ANDREW K. ELLIS, *Staff Director*

CONTENTS

105TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPT. 105–468
2d Session } { Part 1

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1998

MARCH 26, 1998.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. SPENCE, from the Committee on National Security, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2786]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2786) to authorize additional appropriations for the Department of Defense for ballistic missile defenses and other measures to counter the emerging threat posed to the United States and its allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region by the development and deployment of ballistic missiles by Iran, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Development of medium-range ballistic missiles by potential adversaries, such as Iran, has proceeded much more rapidly than previously anticipated by the United States Government.

(2) Existence of such missiles in potentially hostile nations constitutes a serious threat to United States forces, allies, and friends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region and cannot be adequately countered by currently deployed ballistic missile defense systems.

(3) It is a matter of high national interest to quickly reduce the vulnerability of United States forces, allies, and friends to these threats.

(4) Meaningful and cost effective steps to reduce these vulnerabilities are available and should be pursued expeditiously.

SEC. 3. ACCELERATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS TO COUNTER ENHANCED BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1998 for Defense-wide research, development, test, and evaluation in the amount of $147,000,000, to be available as follows:

(1) JOINT COMPOSITE TRACKING NETWORK.—$35,000,000 to be available for the Joint Composite Tracking Network program.

(2) PATRIOT REMOTE LAUNCH CAPABILITY.—$15,000,000 to be available to accelerate development of the remote launch capability for the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC–3) missile defense system.

(3) PAC–3 AND NAVY AREA DEFENSE TESTS.—$40,000,000 to be available to test the capabilities of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC–3) missile defense system, and to test the capabilities of the Navy Area Defense System, against missiles with the range of the Iranian ballistic missiles under development.

(4) EARLY WARNING ENHANCEMENT.—$6,000,000 to be available for improved integration of the various elements of the SHIELD system.

(5) PAC–3 PRODUCTION RATE ENHANCEMENTS.—$41,000,000 to be available for production rate enhancements for the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC–3) missile defense system.

(6) ISRAELI ARROW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.—$10,000,000 to be available to improve interoperability of the Israeli Arrow tactical ballistic missile defense system with United States theater missile defense systems.

SEC. 4. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER POSSIBLE ACTIONS.

(a) IDENTIFICATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall identify actions in addition to those authorized by section 3 that could be taken by the Department of Defense to counter the threats posed to the United States and its national security interests by the development or acquisition of medium-range ballistic missiles by Iran and other nations.

(b) SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN.—The Secretary specifically shall explore—

(1) additional cooperative measures between the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of Israel to further enhance Israel's ability to defend itself against the threat posed by ballistic missiles deployed by Iran and other nations; and

(2) actions within the existing Navy Theater Wide Missile Defense System program that could provide additional capabilities useful to addressing the threat posed by medium-range ballistic missiles within one to two years.

(c) INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION.—The Secretary shall undertake appropriate intergovernmental and interagency coordination that would be necessary to the conduct of any of the actions identified pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 5. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report providing—

(1) a description of the Secretary's plans for use of funds appropriated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations in this Act; and

(2) a description of possible additional actions identified by the Secretary pursuant to section 4(a) and the steps taken or planned (as of the time of the report) to carry out section 4(c).

SEC. 6. OFFSETTING REDUCTIONS IN AUTHORIZATIONS.

The total amount authorized in section 201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105–85) to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Department of Defense is hereby reduced by $147,000,000, of which—

(1) $126,000,000 is to be derived from savings from the use of advisory and assistance services by the Department of Defense in accordance with section 8041 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105–56; 111 Stat. 1230); and

(2) $21,000,000 is to be derived from savings from the use by the Department of Defense of defense federally funded research and development centers in accordance with section 8035 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105–56; 111 Stat. 1227).

Amend the title so as to read:

A bill to authorize additional appropriations for the Department of Defense for ballistic missile defenses and other measures to counter the emerging threat posed to the United States and its allies by the accelerated development and deployment of ballistic missiles by nations hostile to United States interests.

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

The committee notes with deep concern that theater ballistic missile (TBM) threats have evolved much more rapidly than anticipated by the U.S. military and intelligence community. The committee believes that efforts to deploy the capability to defeat this growing threat to U.S. military forces must be significantly enhanced.

The rapid and continuing development of TBMs by nations hostile to U.S. interests would provide them with asymmetric offensive capabilities to offset current U.S. conventional superiority. Recent testimony to the committee by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Jacques Gansler described these asymmetrical strategies as including "weapons of mass destruction * * * and large quantities of low-cost cruise and ballistic missiles." TBMs, particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction, can be used to intimidate U.S. friends and allies, diminish U.S. regional influence, or deter U.S. involvement in a theater conflict.

The U.S. military and intelligence community has been surprised by the speed of the development and deployments of medium range ballistic missiles. Last year, North Korea deployed its No Dong-1 missile in significant numbers after very limited flight testing. The range of the No Dong-1 is about 1,000 kilometers, enough to threaten nearly all of Japan and the U.S. forces stationed in much of northeast Asia. Many in the national security community had previously predicted that additional system tests would precede No Dong-1 deployment. Furthermore, North Korea, in spite of its formidable economic difficulties, continues to develop the Taepo Dong-1 missile with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers.

Of particular concern within the past year is medium range missile development activity in Iran. Recent intelligence confirms that Iran is likely to achieve theater ballistic missile capabilities that could target U.S. forces, allies, and friends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf within one to two years. The policies of the current regime in Iran, including the export of terrorism, the pursuit of regional military hegemony, and the development of weapons of mass destruction, are inimical to the interests of the U.S. and its allies and friends. According to an unclassified Central Intelligence Agency study, Iran is known to have a stockpile of chemical weapons, and is actively pursuing biological and nuclear weapons. The U.S. has many allies and friends as well as vital interests in this region. In addition, tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors and airmen are presently deployed in this area and are likely to remain as the tensions with Iraq continue. The deployment of Iranian medium range ballistic missiles would pose a clear and unacceptable threat to all of these U.S. interests and forces.

Iran has two missiles under development: the Shahab-3, with a range of about 1,300 kilometers, and the Shahab-4 with a range of about 2,000 kilometers. The Shahab-3 is expected to be capable of threatening Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other U.S. friends and allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions, while the Shahab-4 is anticipated to reach deep into Europe.

There is a wide consensus within the intelligence community that the Shahab-3 will be tested shortly, and that Iranian ballistic

missile development has proceeded much more rapidly than expected. The Director of Central Intelligence recently testified that, while last year he offered the assessment that Iran would have medium range ballistic missiles within ten years, he now believed that timeline to be much shorter. Israeli officials are publicly reported to believe that Iran could test and deploy a TBM by 1999.

The speed of the Iranian development results from indigenous efforts, as well as technical assistance from several quarters, most significantly Russian sources. The U.S. government has sought to stop this assistance. However, even if such assistance is halted, given the advanced state of Iranian missile development, it is not clear that these missile programs would be delayed significantly.

While a consensus has coalesced that the Shahab-3 could be tested within a year or so, the timeline associated with substantial deployments remains unclear. The Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), in testimony to the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, predicted that deployment would lag behind testing by a considerable time. The committee notes that the North Korean deployment of the No Dong-1 after extremely limited testing suggests that such a lag is not inevitable. The committee also notes that even a limited capability based on residual test assets, in combination with chemical or biological payloads, would represent a very serious threat to small nations (such as Israel or Bahrain) and urban areas in the region, as well as deployed U.S. forces.

Emerging TBM threats are not limited to Iran and North Korea. The recent U.S. build up in the Persian Gulf was driven in large part by the growing concern that the Iraqi regime secretly retains the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, and the ability to deliver them on improved SCUD-class missiles. Continued missile development in Syria and Libya remains a concern as well.

Currently deployed U.S. theater missile defenses (TMDs) are not adequate to meet the threats posed by TBM developments in Iran and North Korea. Longer range missiles are faster than those with shorter range and TMD systems now deployed are designed to meet shorter range, slower threats. The most advanced U.S. TMD system now deployed, the PAC–2 Guidance Enhanced Missile (PAC–2 GEM), has a very limited capability to defend a small area against the 1,300 kilometer threat missile. Moreover, other less modern PAC–2 variants have virtually no capability against missiles of that range.

Further, current plans to improve U.S. theater missile defense capabilities are also inadequate to meet these growing threats within the accelerated time frames now predicted. For instance, the rapid emergence of the Iranian TBM threat was not anticipated when the fiscal year 1998 budget was crafted, and consequently the programs outlined in the 1998 budget request did not address the timing of this threat. While the Patriot Advanced Capability-Configuration 3 (PAC–3), the Navy Area Defense TMD system, and the Israeli Arrow system, all now under development, were also designed against slower threat missiles, they promise improved capability against the Shahab-3. The timing for deployment of these systems, however, remains a problem. For example, the PAC–3

missile will not be deployed to an operational unit before the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999. The user operational evaluation system (UOES) version of the Navy Area Defense System is also not scheduled for deployment before late 1999. If the Shahab-3 is tested and deployed before then, U.S. forces and regional allies will face a period of vulnerability during which no deployed defenses will have any significant capability to defeat this threat.

H.R. 2786 is intended to provide the Department of Defense with additional resources to ensure that this period of vulnerability is minimized and to assure to the extent possible that deployment of improved U.S. TMD systems will keep pace with TBM deployments in Iran and elsewhere. In developing H.R. 2786, the committee ensured that the recommended program actions would be executable in fiscal year 1998, would address worldwide TBM threats, would be consistent with planned TMD systems and system architectures, and would be consistent with current international agreements.

The committee is gratified that, after initial reluctance to endorse any steps beyond its planned programs, the Administration now agrees that the additional funding recommended would make a valuable contribution to enhanced TMD capabilities.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H.R. 2786 was introduced by Representative Curt Weldon (R–PA) with 106 cosponsors on October 31, 1997. The bill was referred to the Committees on National Security and International Relations. On November 17, 1997, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development of the Committee on National Security.

On November 5, 1997, the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development held a hearing on H.R. 2786 and the Iranian ballistic missile threat.

On March 17, 1998, the Committee on National Security held a mark-up session to consider H.R. 2786. The amended version of the bill was reported favorably by a roll call vote of 45 to 0. The roll call result can be found at the end of this report.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1—Short title

This section would establish the short title of the Act as the "Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998."

Section 2—Findings

This section would establish findings: that the TBM threat has evolved more rapidly than expected, this evolution constitutes a serious threat, taking steps to reduce the vulnerability to this threat is in the U.S. interest, and that meaningful steps to do so are available and should be pursued expeditiously.

Section 3—Department of Defense measures to counter enhanced ballistic missile threat

This section would authorize specific program funding. These include:

(1) $35.0 million for the Joint Composite Tracking Network (JCTN). JCTN would link sensors from various platforms to allow earlier, more accurate cueing of TMD missiles, thus increasing the effective range of TMD systems.

(2) $15.0 million to accelerate completion of the PAC–3 remote launch capability. Remote launch allows PAC–3 missiles to be deployed at considerable distances from the PAC–3 radars and command and control equipment, in effect doubling the footprint of defended territory. PAC–3 remote launch capability had slipped a year to fiscal year 2000 because of program cuts and this funding would restore the operational capability to fiscal year 1999.

(3) $40.0 million for tests of PAC–3 and Navy Area Defense System. Both systems were designed against slower, shorter range threat missiles, but are thought to have some capabilities against the longer range threat potentially posed by Iranian ballistic missiles. This funding would provide for one test of each of these TMD systems to determine the extent of their capability against more demanding threats.

(4) $6.0 million for enhanced early warning. This funding would support integration of the various elements of SHIELD, to provide more accurate launch point, trajectory and impact point predictions. This early warning capability can be used to cue weapons and radars earlier and to support attack operations.

(5) $41.0 million for production rate enhancements of PAC–3. This funding would support an increased rate of production during initial low rate production, from four a month now planned to six a month; and during full rate production, from 20 a month now planned, to 30 a month. This increase would provide a hedge if missile threats are deployed in Iran and elsewhere more rapidly and in larger numbers than expected.

(6) $10.0 million for the Israeli Arrow TMD system. This funding would improve the interoperability between the Arrow system and U.S. TMD systems in a timely manner.

Section 4—Identification of other actions

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to identify other steps to counter TBM threats, including cooperative measures between DOD and the Minister of Defense of Israel. The Secretary of Defense would also be required to rapidly assess any actions that might be taken in the Navy Theater Wide defense system to address near term TBM threats. Finally, it would require appropriate intergovernmental and interagency coordination to allow for rapid implementation of those steps should they be pursued.

Section 5—Report to Congress

This section would require a report by the Secretary of Defense describing how the Secretary plans to use the funds authorized in H.R. 2786 and further actions he has identified to counter TBM threats.

Section 6—Offsetting reductions in authorizations

This section would reduce the amounts authorized to be appropriated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1998 (Public Law 105–85) by $147.0 million. This amount would offset the authorized funding in H.R. 2786. The specific reductions represent funding that was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act but for which no appropriation was provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105–56).

COMMITTEE POSITION

On March 17, 1998, the Committee on National Security, a quorum being present, approved H.R. 2786, as amended, by a vote of 45 to 0.

FISCAL DATA

Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal year 1999 and the four following fiscal years. The results of such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in this report pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(C) of House rule XI.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to section 403(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as follows:

MARCH 18, 1998.

Hon. FLOYD SPENCE,
Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2786, the Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them.

The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL, *Director.*

H.R. 2786 would authorize appropriations for 1998 totaling $147 million for programs in the Department of Defense (DOD) to counter enhanced ballistic missile threats from potential adversaries. The bill would also reduce by $147 million amounts authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105–85) for research, development, test, and evaluation.

Total authorizations for fiscal year 1998 would not change under the bill. The proposed reductions in authorizations would probably not result in savings in appropriations, however, because the reductions are in programs that were not fully funded in the 1998 appropriations bill. If the new authorizations are funded without reducing other appropriations, CBO estimates that outlays would in-

crease by $16 million in 1998 and $147 million over the 1998–2003 period. The estimate assumes appropriation of the authorized amounts by July 1, 1998. Because the legislation would not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.

Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 excludes from the application of that act any legislative provisions that are necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that all provisions of this bill fit within that exclusion.

The estimate was prepared by Raymond Hall. This estimate was approved by Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 7(a) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional Budget Office. However, it should be noted that the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 has placed an upper limit on defense discretionary spending for fiscal year 1998. Accordingly, this limit would require that new appropriations made pursuant to the authorizations contained in this bill would necessarily require corresponding reductions in other defense appropriations.

INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee concludes that the bill would have no significant inflationary impact.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this legislation results from hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.

With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 2786.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for this legislation in article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES

Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104–4, this legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates.

ROLLCALL VOTE

In accordance with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a rollcall vote was taken with respect to the committee's consideration of H.R. 2786. The record of this vote can be found on the following page.

The committee ordered H.R. 2786, as amended, reported to the House with a favorable recommendation by a vote of 45 to 0, a quorum being present.

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
105TH CONGRESS
ROLL CALL

Final Passage of H.R. 2786 **Date: 03/17/98**

Voice Vote **Ayes** **Nays**

Rep.	Aye	Nay	Present	Rep.	Aye	Nay	Present
Mr. Spence	X			Mr. Skelton	X		
Mr. Stump	X			Mr. Sisisky	X		
Mr. Hunter				Mr. Spratt	X		
Mr. Kasich				Mr. Ortiz	X		
Mr. Bateman	X			Mr. Pickett	X		
Mr. Hansen	X			Mr. Evans	X		
Mr. Weldon	X			Mr. Taylor	X		
Mr. Hefley	X			Mr. Abercrombie	X		
Mr. Saxton	X			Mr. Meehan			
Mr. Buyer	X			Mr. Underwood	X		
Mrs. Fowler	X			Ms. Harman	X		
Mr. McHugh				Mr. McHale	X		
Mr. Talent				Mr. Kennedy	X		
Mr. Everett	X			Mr. Blagojevich			
Mr. Bartlett	X			Mr. Reyes	X		
Mr. McKeon				Mr. Allen	X		
Mr. Lewis	X			Mr. Snyder	X		
Mr. Watts	X			Mr. Turner			
Mr. Thornberry	X			Mr. Boyd			
Mr. Hostettler	X			Mr. Smith	X		
Mr. Chambliss	X			Ms. Sanchez	X		
Mr. Hilleary	X			Mr. Maloney	X		
Mr. Scarborough	X			Mr. McIntyre	X		
Mr. Jones				Mr. Rodriguez	X		
Mr. Graham	X			Ms. McKinney			
Mr. Ryun	X						
Mr. Pappas	X						
Mr. Riley	X						
Mr. Gibbons	X						
Mr. Redmond	X						
Ms. Granger	X						

Roll Call Vote Total **45 Aye** **0 Nay** **Present**

VIEWS OF COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, March 26, 1998.

Hon. NEWT GINGRICH,
The Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I write to inform you that the Committee on International Relations waives the right to consider H.R. 2786, a bill to authorize additional appropriations for the Department of Defense for ballistic missile defenses and other measures to counter the emerging threat posed to the United States and its allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region by the development and deployment of ballistic missiles by Iran. H.R. 2786 was referred to the Committee on International Relations on October 31, 1997.

The Committee supports passage of H.R. 2786, as amended during its consideration by the Committee on National Security, and would not support further amendments to those portions of the bill in our Committee's jurisdiction during floor consideration of this measure.

The Committee would like to make clear that in waiving our consideration of this measure that we preserve our prerogatives with respect to any floor amendments on this bill or to any House-Senate conference and any amendments thereto, including the appointment of conferees.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, *Chairman.*

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD

Mr. Chairman, I emphatically support the substitute amendment to bill, H.R. 2786 as offered by Mr. Weldon, Mr. Pickett, and Mr. Spratt. The Theater Missile Improvement Act of 1998 is one of the most important and timely pieces of legislation to be presented before this committee. As a three-term veteran of the House National Security Committee, I have been made keenly aware of the threats posed by ballistic missile development, technology transfers and deployments around the globe. We know only too well the potential for destruction these weapons hold. In the hands of our friends and allies, these weapons are valuable tools that safeguard democracy. In the hands of our enemies, where the potential exists to arm them with chemical and biological warheads—the results are nothing short of catastrophic.

Mr. Chairman, in a world wrought with uncertainties we must remove the cloak of fear that is utilized by our adversaries. The Theater Missile Improvement Act of 1998 will insure, in no small manner, that the United States will have the technology and capability to defend her troops and citizens of every state and territory in the land. The very real danger posed by rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq compel us to prepare to defend our vital assets. I support this bill because it is the best way to ensure our friends and allies that we will not be placed in a tactically compromising situation. The credible deterrent that is afforded the United States through a robust theater missile defense system is paramount. Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 2786 because it is non-scenario, non-geographically specific. It cuts to the core of the issue—to produce for the defense of the United States a highly capable, highly robust TMD system that could be deployed anywhere our enemies pose a ballistic missile threat. Finally, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the people of Guam, I support this bill for the safety and defense of your fellow U.S. citizens who have been targeted by the North Korean military as they develop the Taepo-Dong I and II.

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES

The IMPACT 98 bill addresses a critical need of our military. The funds authorized by this bill will increase the capabilities of missile defense systems, allowing our air defenders to better protect our deployed soldiers and our allies.

Fort Bliss, located in my district, trains all of the soldiers who provide air and missile defense for our military. Also, and perhaps most importantly for purposes of this bill, most of the Patriot batteries are located at Fort Bliss.

As such, the increased funds for PAC–3 technologies will directly affect these soldiers. The Fort Bliss air defenders will be using these technologies to better defend our military and their allies.

Our soldiers at Fort Bliss are pleased that this Committee is working to provide the resources necessary to move PAC–3 into the field as effective as possible and as quickly as possible.

The bill includes $15 Million to accelerate completion of the PAC–3 remote launch capability. This technology will allow the Patriot soldiers to place their missile launchers further out in front of the radar and the battery—which, in turn, expands the battle space. This will allow each Patriot unit to defend a larger area.

Second, the bill provides $41 Million to allow for an increased rate of production for PAC–3. This will move PAC–3 missiles out into the field more rapidly, so every Patriot unit will have the PAC–3 capability.

At the beginning of the Gulf War conflict, our Patriot soldiers had only three PAC–2 missiles—missiles capable of defending against incoming ballistic missiles. Not only were there few PAC–2 missiles, but PAC–2 could only achieve mission kill against the incoming ballistic missile and not kill the warhead. As a result, some diverted incoming missiles caused collateral damage in civilian areas.

PAC–3 will have hit to kill capability, eliminating the fear of hitting other areas and destroying offensive missiles and their warheads which could include weapons of mass destruction. The funds we provide today in the bill will equip our Patriot units more quickly with this technology.

Third, the bill provides $40 Million for tests of PAC–3 and Navy Area. Our air defenders will feel more comfortable knowing that these technologies have been sufficiently tested with live fire tests against longer range missiles.

I want to thank Mr. Weldon, Mr. Spratt and Mr. Pickett, as well as Chairman Spence and Ranking Member Skelton for bringing this bill before our committee.

SILVESTRE REYES.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL PAPPAS

This Congress is faced with the situation of whether to stick our heads in the sand or open our eyes to see the threats to our national security. This committee has gone through several weeks of intelligence and service chief briefings on threats to our nation, interests and allies. Many of these threats are known, yet not enough concrete steps have been made to defend our interests from ballistic missile attacks.

This bill moves us from the "hand-wringing" stage into the action stage. This bill will leverage existing systems to advance missile defense for our troops. However, we cannot stop here. Passage of this bill is not the end of discussion, this is a stop gap, immediate measure to advance our immediate concerns within the present budget cycle. However, this issue will be with us for many years and this Committee must continue to raise awareness of the problem and offer solutions.

Part of the ability to leverage existing technologies is to capitalize on what has worked elsewhere. For example, Israel has an ongoing missile defense system that has demonstrated favorable results. In this age of limited defense dollars, the Pentagon cannot afford to "reinvent the wheel" or be a slave to bureaucracy to develop technology and implement systems that will protect our troops now.

Recently, 36 members of this committee signed a letter to the President circulated by myself and Congresswoman Jane Harman urging him to work with Israel and leverage existing technology to develop Arrow, Tactical High Energy Laser and Boost Phase Intercept. Many share my concern about a seeming lack of commitment by this Administration to deal with missile defense and the very real risks our troops, interests, and allies face in the Middle East, Korea and throughout the world.

This bill is a good first step and I am hopeful this committee and Congress will continue to seek to protect our troops. Failure to do so would be to shirk our duty to uphold the Constitution and provide for the common defense.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL PAPPAS.

○