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CHARTER 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo

On the eve of December 10, 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, over 300 Chinese citizens signed and posted online a document titled "Charter 08," calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. Signers included leading intellectuals, lawyers, writers, farmers, and workers. Over the past week, many hundreds more people in China have signed, with some reports placing the number of signers in the thousands. Chinese abroad have signed the Charter as well.

Liu Xiaobo, one of the original signers of the Charter, and a prominent intellectual and dissident, has been detained, apparently for expression protected under international human rights standards that the Chinese government has recognized. Specifically, Mr. Liu's activities are protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression," and a similar provision in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998 and has committed to ratify. Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide for the right to freedom of association. Articles 35 and 41 of China's Constitution, which provide the right of citizens to free speech, free association, and to criticize their government, also should protect Mr. Liu's activities. As of December 17, Mr. Liu's wife reportedly had not received an official notice of his detention, as required under Article 64 of China's Criminal Procedure Law. At the time of this writing, Mr. Liu's whereabouts remain unknown. In addition, at least 48 members of the group that initially signed Charter 08 have reported being questioned or harassed by authorities.

Charter 08 contains 19 recommendations, including, among other things, a call for guarantees of human rights and respect for human dignity, direct elections of legislative bodies and administration officials, an independent judiciary, separation of powers, and the guarantee of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. The Charter urges Chinese citizens to work together "for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional country . . . to bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization."

The reported treatment of signers of Charter 08, including Mr. Liu, around the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, raises questions about recent statements made by Chinese officials with regard to China's human rights record. In November, China announced that it would release its first National Human Rights Action Plan. On December 5, China submitted its national report to the UN Human Rights Council under the Universal Periodic Review process. In a section titled "Speech, News Media Freedoms," the report highlights China's constitutional protections for freedom of speech and the freedom to criticize government officials, and notes that "criticizing the government" has become an important feature of Chinese life. President Hu, along with other top leaders, consistently have called for ensuring citizens' rights to "participation," "expression," and "oversight" as a check on government abuses.

CECC Recommendations:

Press the Chinese government to release Liu Xiaobo immediately.
Urge the Chinese government not to permit the intimidation or harassment of individuals who sign Charter 08, or who solicit new signatures.
Call on the Chinese government to protect unconditionally signers' rights to free expression and free association.

Commission Resources on Charter 08, freedom of expression, and political imprisonment in China:

Commission Analysis: "Over 300 Citizens Issue 'Charter 08'; Several Activists Detained"; "United Nations' Human Rights Day";
Section II-Freedom of Expression in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report;
U.S. Department of State Press Statement, "Harassment of Chinese Signatories to Charter 08";
Search for Liu Xiaobo's record in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database;
Partial List of Political Prisoners Known or Believed To Be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 31, 2008 (1,088 cases, including case summaries in English).

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-17 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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New Science and Technology Plan for Ethnic Minorities Raises Questions About Ethnic Minority Rights

The Chinese central government has issued direction on advancing science and technology development among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas, combining potentially beneficial provisions with those that may clash with the protection of ethnic minority rights. The Opinion Concerning the Increased Strengthening of Science and Technology Work Among Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Minority Regions (Opinion)--issued November 3 by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, and the China Association for Science and Technology--builds off of two national programs on science and technology as well as China's first "five-year" program devoted specifically to ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas. The Opinion describes the promotion of science and technology development as an extension of Communist Party and government policy toward ethnic minorities and links it to strengthening "ethnic unity," the "unity of the motherland," and security in China's border areas. Noting that development of science and technology work has been "delayed" among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas, the Opinion designates the first 20 years of the 21st century to accelerate development. Article 6 of the Opinion describes five broad goals for the science and technology work:

Strengthening training of ethnic minority science and technology personnel and personnel in ethnic minority areas;
Improving science and technology infrastructure and services;
Spreading scientific knowledge;
Increasing science and technology investment, including funds for materials in ethnic minority languages; and
Strengthening the science and technology work force and building a long-term mechanism for science and technology work.

Some provisions have potential to bring benefit to ethnic minority communities, though their overall impact remains unclear amid China's past failures to implement development projects that adequately protect ethnic minority rights. Article 8 calls for greater research on diseases occurring in ethnic minority areas and among ethnic minorities, as well as strengthening disease prevention and increasing support for the development of ethnic minority medicine. It does not specify steps for ensuring ethnic minority communities maintain oversight and gain benefit from the development of ethnic minority medicine. Article 11 promotes multi-lingual materials to popularize science and follows earlier efforts to provide multi-lingual materials on health issues. Outside the area of materials to promote government development and health campaigns, however, the government has taken steps in some regions to curb the use of ethnic minority languages, calling into question the government's commitment in this area. (See, for example, past Congressional-Executive Commission on China analyses (1, 2, 3) for more information.) Article 13 details the Opinion's aim of training ethnic minority personnel, including through vocational training, but as noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, some areas have taken steps to reduce higher education in ethnic minority languages, placing linguistic assimilation pressures on ethnic minorities and undercutting legal protections for the use of ethnic minority languages. In addition, while article 14's call for infrastructure and personnel support from the interior of China has potential to bring benefit, such measures may also continue longstanding government policies to promote migration to ethnic minority areas, resulting in broad demographic changes and assimilation pressures. Finally, it is unclear if efforts to promote "scientific thought" and to raise the "scientific cultural quality" of ethnic minorities and residents of ethnic minority areas, as called for in article 10, will respect ethnic minority beliefs and traditions.

As noted in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, the central government has increased support for development projects in ethnic minority regions, with mixed results. Aid projects, including the Great Western Development program launched in 2000, have increased migration, strained local resources, and furthered uneven allocation of resources that favors Han Chinese. Given this track record, coupled with the Chinese government's failure to fully implement broader protections for ethnic minority rights and solicit ethnic minority input for development projects, it remains unclear whether the new Opinion will result in improvements for ethnic minorities' livelihoods and will safeguard ethnic minority rights.

For more information, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, as well as the Special Focus on ethnic minorities in the 2005 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-11 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Government Improves Anti-Domestic Violence Efforts; Victim Protection Remains Limited

In order to provide better protection to domestic violence victims, four Ministries (Public Security, Civil Affairs, Health, and Justice), one Party-controlled organization (All-China Women's Federation), the Party's Central Propaganda Department, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate jointly issued the Opinions on Preventing and Deterring Domestic Violence (Opinions) on July 31, 2008. Highlights in the Opinions include: requiring public security officers to respond to complaints made through the "110" telephone emergency hotline (Article 8); requiring hospitals and healthcare workers to undergo training programs to prevent and curb domestic violence (Article 11); and requesting All-China Women's Federation offices to establish domestic violence hotlines (Article 13). The Opinions appear to increase the government's responsibility in handling domestic violence cases, according to an article published by the organization West Women on September 9.

To ensure the safety of domestic violence victims involved in cases pending before a court, the Institute of Applied Laws under the Supreme People's Court also issued the Court Guidance on Cases Involving Domestic Violence in Marriage (Guidance, partially reprinted on Divorce Net) in May. Article 27 of the Guidance advises courts to issue protection orders to "prohibit offenders from beating, threatening, harassing, or stalking victims, or having unwelcome contact with the victims and their children," and if necessary, to require offenders to receive psychological therapy. Such protection orders can also order offenders to "temporarily move out of their residences, if necessary and if the cases meet qualifications." In addition, the Guidance provides that "during the effective period of the protection order, no party should handle valuable marital properties."

According to reports in the Legal Daily (reprinted in Xinhua) on August 18, the People's Daily (English translation by All-China Women's Federation) on October 10, and the Chongqing Times (reprinted in the Chongqing Municipal People's Government Web site) on October 23, the Guidance has resulted in at least six protection orders issued by courts to prohibit spousal intimidation in the provinces of Jiangsu and Hunan, and Chongqing city in August, September, and October of this year. According to these reports, these are the first court orders issued to protect personal safety in civil cases.

According to All-China Women's Federation, the number of domestic violence complaints averaged 40,000 per year from 2005 to 2007, up from 20,000 in 2000, as reported in China Daily on November 25. One-third of China's 267 million families have witnessed domestic violence, and 94 percent of domestic violence victims are women, according to the same report.

Current laws regulating domestic violence appear to be incomplete and inconsistent, and appear to reflect the government's reluctance to intervene in domestic violence disputes, according to experts' analysis that appeared in a November 27 Women's Watch-China article. The revised Marriage Law in April 2001 was one of the first legal documents with references to domestic violence, according to the November 27 article. Article 46 of the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, as amended in 2005, mandates that "the state take measures to prevent and deter domestic violence." Domestic violence offenders are punishable under Articles 234, 236, and 260 of the Criminal Law, and Article 43 of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law. China's Civil Procedure Law also allows victims to file civil lawsuits against offenders. At least 69 local regulations contain references to the prevention and prohibition of domestic violence, according to the People's Daily (English translation by All-China Women's Federation) on October 10. Nevertheless, scholars indicate that current laws and regulations are difficult to implement because laws and judicial interpretations are too abstract or narrow, and do not assign clear and concrete legal responsibilities, according to a May 16 article in the Shenzhen Lawyer's Net (reprinted in Women's Watch-China).

Advocates continue to call for national legislation on domestic violence. The Party-controlled All-China Women's Federation has expressed its support for an anti-domestic violence law during the 2009 National People's Congress, as reported in the Legal Daily (reprinted in the Guijing Net) on October 8. A proposal reportedly was submitted to the National People's Congress in March 2008, according to a March 16 report in the Procuratorial Daily (reprinted in China News).

For more information about the discussion on domestic violence, see Section II - Status of Women in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-11 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained

More than 300 Chinese citizens--including scholars, writers, lawyers, and activists--issued Charter 08 (English / Chinese), an open statement calling for greater rights and political reform in China on the eve of December 10. The date coincides with the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Human Rights Day. The prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo has been detained under suspicion of "inciting subversion" in connection with Charter 08, according to a December 10 Independent Chinese Pen Center article (in Chinese). Several other activists also have been detained in advance of Human Rights Day.

In a December 9 statement issued by Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), CHRD describes Charter 08 as a declaration for "bold political reforms, including an end to one-party rule and replacement of the current political system with one based on human rights and democracy." The signatories propose a 19-point plan, which includes direct elections of legislative bodies and administration officials, the establishment of a federated republic, an independent judiciary, separation of judicial, executive, and legislative powers, environmental protection, and the safeguarding of human rights, including the freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and speech. According to Professor Perry Link, who translated Charter 08 into English, the signatories intend the document "to serve as a blueprint for fundamental political change in China in the years to come." Inspired by the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia, the signatories will form "an informal and open group" dedicated to advancing human rights and democracy in China, according to the CHRD statement. Charter 08 calls on Chinese citizens to work together "for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic and constitutional country . . . to bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization."

Chinese authorities detained Liu Xiaobo and another prominent Beijing-based intellectual, Zhang Zuhua, for their involvement with Charter 08, according to a December 9 Associated Press (AP) article (via Newsvine). The AP reported that authorities released Zhang Zuhua after holding him for 12 hours and warned him to cease his involvement with the charter. Zhang's home was searched and his computer, notebooks, and passport seized, according to the December 9 statement issued by CHRD. Zhang said that the police informed him they are conducting a formal investigation and they have confined him to his home, according to a December 9 Telegraph article. The South China Morning Post (subscription required) reported that Liu Xiaobo's wife, Liu Xia, said that at least 10 police searched their home and confiscated computers, articles, and books. The Committee to Protect Journalists issued a statement on December 9 calling for Liu's release, as did Reporters Without Borders.

Chinese authorities have detained and harassed other activists in advance of Human Rights Day. On December 4, in Guizhou province, authorities detained two human rights activists, Chen Xi and Shen Youlian, who were organizing a symposium and other events to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to a Human Rights in China press release. Three other symposium organizers, Liao Shuangyuan, Huang Yanming, and Du Heping, reportedly "disappeared" before December 4. All five of the Guizhou activists signed Charter 08.

For more information on the arbitrary detention of activists and restrictions on freedom of expression, see Section II - Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants and Freedom of Expression in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-09 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Propaganda Head Liu Yunshan Calls for Positive Spin on Economy

Liu Yunshan, head of the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD), called on propaganda officials to prioritize "economic propaganda work" to deal with the current economic downturn, according to remarks he made on November 18, 2008, as reported in a Xinhua article (in Chinese) of the same date. Liu, speaking to directors of local propaganda bureaus and "persons responsible for news media," said that "positive propaganda" should be the "guiding principle." He urged officials to "create a positive public opinion environment in order to achieve economic stability and faster growth" and "guide the people to a correct understanding of the difficulties faced," and told them that "political consciousness at the front lines of propaganda ideology must be strengthened." Liu's comments are significant because the CPD imposes restrictions on the Chinese media's reporting of topics perceived to be sensitive by the Party.

Praise Central Party and Government Handling of Economy. Liu, who is also a Party Central Committee member and secretary of the Secretariat, said propaganda should stress that "under the strong leadership and scientific policies of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, our nation will completely be able to overcome the difficulties before us, and continue to maintain the trend of healthy development for the national economy." He said propaganda should showcase the central leadership's major policy responses to the crisis and the "positive results" from such policies.

Link to Overall Propaganda Strategy. Liu said that the propaganda initiative on the economy should be tied to propaganda regarding the thirtieth anniversary of China's reform and opening up, relief efforts following the Sichuan earthquake in May, the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games in August, and the nation's manned space flight program, which most recently launched in September.

Even before Liu's remarks, officials had been ordering Chinese media to not report "negative news" as China's economy has slowed. In September 2008, propaganda officials ordered major financial Web sites to remove "negative" reports regarding China's stock markets. In some cases, newspapers who publish "negative" financial news have been punished. In September, for example, the Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau ordered the three-month suspension of the China Business Post after it published a report in July critical of the Agricultural Bank of China, which at the time was preparing for a stock offering. Such restrictions not only violate international standards regarding freedom of expression, but also prevent citizens from accessing important information because the Party deems it to be "negative," and thus unsuitable for public consumption.

Liu's remarks also follow a major June speech by President Hu Jintao, in which he said journalists' "first priority" is to "correctly guide public opinion."

For more information on how the government and Party censor China's media, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-08 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau Suspends China Business Post

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Press and Publication Bureau (Inner Mongolia PPB) ordered the China Business Post (Caijing Shibao) on September 8 to suspend publication for three months after the financial newspaper published a July 11 report (reprinted in Sina.com) critical of the Agricultural Bank of China, according to a September 25 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article (subscription required). The newspaper has halted publication in protest of the suspension, and the author of the report has filed a lawsuit against the Inner Mongolia PPB, which issued the paper's license, according to an October 30 SCMP article (subscription required).

The July 11 report alleged, among other things, that the bank's branch in Changde city, Hunan province, had transferred bad assets to another company for a fraction of their value using forged government documents. The bank denied the allegations, according to a July 16 International Finance News report (reprinted in Xinhua). The China Business Post responded with a statement, reprinted in Sohu.com on September 27, saying that four sources at the bank had confirmed the report's facts.

The China Business Post issued a September 25 statement on its Web site saying "higher-level officials" punished the paper for violating:

"standard reporting procedures that must be followed for news reporting"

"the requirement that significant and sensitive news stories must be verified with the party being reported on before publication"

a ban on "extra-territorial reporting," the practice of a newspaper from one area publishing critical investigative reports about another area, on matters that officials in the investigated area are preventing their local news media from reporting. (Some Chinese media have engaged in extra-territorial reporting as a way to issue more critical reports, but in recent years Communist Party officials have sought to clamp down on this practice.)

The suspension order said that by violating such restrictions, the report, which was published as the bank was preparing for a public stock offering, was "inappropriate" and had an "adverse influence," according to the September 25 SCMP article.

According to the SCMP article, the suspension order also cited previous China Business Post articles, some published more than five years ago, as reasons for the suspension. These included:

a June 2003 article (reprinted in Boxun) about the noted economist Wu Jinglian's support for Jiang Yanyong, the doctor who publicized the coverup of the SARS epidemic; and

a June 2003 article (reprinted in Finance World) on Shanghai tycoon Zhou Zhengyi's financial and legal difficulties.

Cui Fan, the author of the July 11 report, filed a lawsuit against the Inner Mongolia PPB on October 29, according to a November 4 Associated Press (AP) article (reprinted in Yahoo!). According to a purported copy of Cui's complaint posted on Legal Advisor Net, Cui filed the suit with the Xincheng District People's Court in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region capital of Hohhot. As reported in the AP and the October 30 SCMP articles, the lawsuit alleges that the Inner Mongolia PPB defamed Cui and lacked the authority to suspend the publication. According to the copy of the complaint, the lawsuit also alleges that the Inner Mongolia PPB failed to follow the Administrative Punishment Law's provisions requiring the bureau to:

provide the newspaper with prior notice of the "facts, grounds, and basis" of the penalty and an opportunity to defend itself (Arts. 31, 32). The lawsuit alleges that the bureau did not notify the newspaper of the facts, grounds, and basis for the penalty or afford it the right to defend itself and state its case.

conduct a "comprehensive, objective, and fair" investigation including the collection of evidence (Art. 36). The lawsuit alleges that the bureau never investigated Cui or approached her for evidence that would help determine the truthfulness of the article.

notify the newspaper of its right to request a hearing (Art. 42). The lawsuit alleges this did not occur.

Article 3 of the Administrative Punishment Law provides that an "administrative penalty that is not imposed in accordance with law or in compliance with legal procedures shall be invalid."

The lawsuit demands revocation of the suspension, an apology from the Inner Mongolia PPB, and one yuan in monetary damages. A court official surnamed Li told AP, "Right now, it is roughly decided that the case will not be placed on file." Asia Times issued a report about the case on November 19 which did not indicate whether the court had accepted the case. Under Article 112 of China's Civil Procedure Law, a court must decide whether to accept and hear a case within seven days of a lawsuit being filed.

Lawsuits challenging China's media censorship are rare. Cui's lawyer told AP, "No one before has questioned the administrative legality of the press and publications management." A Reporters Without Borders spokesperson said the organization was not aware of any similar lawsuit filed by a Chinese newspaper in the past, AP reported. An official at the Inner Mongolia PPB told SCMP that any lawsuit brought by Cui should be directed against the national press and publication bureau instead of the Inner Mongolia PPB because the decision to suspend the paper came from higher-level officials. Chinese citizens have attempted to sue the national-level General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) in the past, with little success. After GAPP reportedly ordered eight books banned in January 2007, one of the book's authors filed a lawsuit to overturn the ban. Both the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court and Beijing High People's Court refused to hear the case. [For more information on the ban, see "Censoring Publications" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report.]

China's restrictions on the media continue to prevent or delay publication of stories officials perceive to be negative. According to a September 29 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report, a news story about milk tainted with melamine was not published in July because of a ban on "negative" news stories before the start of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. In September, Party propaganda officials ordered major financial Web sites not to publish "negative" reports regarding China's stock markets amid an economic downturn, according to a September 10 SCMP article (subscription required).

For more information on how the government and Party censor China's media, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-04 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Local Governments Target "Illegal" Worship Sites and "Illegal" Religious Activities Throughout Fall

Local governments in China reported in fall 2008 on measures to prevent "illegal" religious gatherings and curb other "illegal" religious activities, continuing longstanding controls over religious practice in China. As noted in Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Annual Reports (see, for example, reports from 2007 and 2008), religious communities must apply to register with the government and must submit to state control over their affairs. Registered groups must receive government approval to establish sites of worship. Religious and spiritual groups that do not meet registration requirements and groups that choose not to submit to government control through registration risk harassment, detention, closure of sites of worship, and other abuses. At the same time, variations in government implementation of its policy toward religion have enabled a number of unregistered and unrecognized religious communities to operate in China. Reports from fall 2008 indicate, however, that such groups remain vulnerable to negative repercussions, as does any religious activity deemed illicit by implementing officials. Recent reports include:

Authorities in Hechuan district, Chongqing municipality have taken a series of measures aimed at curbing "illegal" religious sites, according to an October 14 report on the Hechuan district government Web site. The report outlined a series of "problems" spurring a six-month campaign starting in October to root out "illegal" venues for worship. Noting the district had 364 "illegal" Buddhist sites, 15 "illegal" Daoist sites, and 88 "illegal" Protestant sites, the report said that the people connected to "illegal" sites were mainly rural residents with a "low level of culture" and who lacked the capacity to differentiate the character of religion. The report also expressed concern about "anti-China political forces" using Christianity to infiltrate, and it criticized "superstitious" aspects of Buddhism and Daoism. The report outlined a five-point plan to address "illegal" sites:

Merge unapproved religious sites with religious activity sites compliant with the rules. In cases of illegal sites, channel religious believers to legal sites.
Carry out "transformation through reeducation" of members of unauthorized Protestant meeting places. Self-proclaimed preachers who meet certain requirements, such as willingness to submit to government oversight, may be channeled into the management sphere for volunteer religious preachers.
For illegal sites not granted permission to become legal, demolish or change their use within a set time period.
Ban Buddhist and Daoist temples and statues constructed without permission by "superstitious" figures and ban unauthorized Protestant meeting places. Have public security and other offices "strike hard" against those who persist in their activities and commit crimes.
Approve sites that meet certain conditions.

The Wuhan municipal government in Hunan province has drafted legislation on religion that includes a provision aimed at curbing citizens' freedom to gather for worship in private homes, according to a November 21 report on the Wuhan Municipal People's Congress Web site. As noted in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, although the central government states there are no registration requirements for religious gatherings within the home, public officials continue to target private gatherings and worship sites for closure, including house churches and unauthorized Buddhist and Daoist temples, mosques, Catholic meeting sites, and other worship sites. Some local government regulations have included provisions allowing citizens to "live a religious life" within the home but have not explicitly guaranteed the right of religious communities to hold worship services in homes and other private sites. In order to "solve" the problem of unauthorized religious gatherings, the Wuhan draft legislation stipulates that religious "members of the family" may engage in religious activities in the home, thereby excluding the possibility of wider participation.

Work to "transform" and "expand the patriotism" of "underground Catholic forces" is one of the most important tasks of the Fuzhou city, Jiangxi province United Front Work Department (UFWD), according to a September 25 report from the Fuzhou Party Committee UFWD Web site. The UFWD is the Communist Party department that oversees religious communities in China. Noting that the problem of activities by "underground Catholic forces" is particularly acute and exerts a "severe negative impact on the social stability" of the city, the report also expressed concern about unauthorized Protestant preaching, the unauthorized construction of Buddhist temples, and the presence of "superstitious beliefs." The report called for strengthening the "united front" between the Communist Party and religious figures.

The director of the central government's 6-10 Office, which monitors and suppresses organizations deemed to be "heretical" or "cults," called for strengthening the suppression of "cults" and increasing control over unauthorized Protestant sites during a visit to Siyang county, Suqian city, Jiangsu province, according to a December 8 report from the Suqian Party Committee UFWD Web site. A report on Suqian city's work to regulate religion, posted October 20 on the Jiangsu Ethnic Affairs Commission and Religious Affairs Bureau Web site, cited government statistics stating that 90 percent of participants in "cult" activities have a background in believing in Protestantism. (Elsewhere, government officials have equated some Muslim activity with cults, while continuing to apply the same label to Falun Gong. See a 2007 report from Jing (Jinghe) county, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), posted on the Jing Peace Net, calling for "striking hard" against the "infiltration and sabotage" activities of such "cults" as Falun Gong and the "Islam Liberation Party." See a CECC analysis for more information on recent repression of religion in the XUAR.)

The reports from local governments come amid overseas reports that authorities in China have carried out wide-scale closures of house churches and detained some participants. See two articles from December 3 (1, 2), and a December 4 article from the China Aid Association (CAA) for more information. Authorities have also continued their harassment of house church leaders, including Zhang Mingxuan, whom authorities detained on multiple occasions in the past year. Henan province officials gave Zhang an order issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs on November 28 that bans Zhang's Chinese House Church Alliance, according to a November 29 report from CAA. As authorities continue to link some forms of Protestant practice to "cult" activities, on October 30, authorities in Neixiang county, Henan province, sentenced house church leader Zhu Baoguo to one year of reeducation through labor after accusing him of leading an "evil cult," according to November 18 and December 2 CAA reports. He was released on medical parole on December 2, as noted in the December 2 report. Wang Weiliang, serving a three-year sentence for protesting a church destruction, received release on medical parole on November 25, according to the same report.

For more information on religious freedom in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-04 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Inner Mongolia Legal Provisions Include Focus on Ethnic Minority Women

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) government has included focus on ethnic minority women in recent legislation on women's rights, but its impact may be limited given a track record across China of weak implementation of provisions to protect both women's rights and ethnic minority rights. The IMAR implementing measures for the national Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women (IMAR implementing measures), adopted November 14, 2008, and effective March 1, 2009, include three articles with provisions on ethnic minority women. While the provisions are generally more protective than those included in national law and the implementing measures of other ethnic autonomous regions (see below for a comparison), the implementing measures do not incorporate other protections in the 1995 IMAR supplementary provisions to the national law, which the implementing measures appear to supersede.

The IMAR implementing measures include the following provisions:

Article 8 promotes the training, selection, and employment of women cadres, "especially ethnic minority women cadres," by state offices, social organizations, and enterprises, a provision similar to that in national law (see analysis below) and some other provincial-level legal measures.
Article 11 calls for special consideration in the recruitment of female ethnic minority students.
Article 15 calls for preferential job hiring for ethnic minority women, where all female candidates have the same qualifications, and preferential recruiting in exams for government jobs where candidates have the same qualifications.

In contrast, the 1995 supplementary provisions had five provisions that included mention of ethnic minority women, including a stipulation to guarantee their participation in people's congresses (article 5), a stipulation providing moderate protections for their participation in employees representative meetings (article 7), protections for the freedom of women of all ethnicities to use their languages and preserve or change their customs (article 8), and articles on the training and selection of cadres (article 6) and on preferential job hiring for ethnic minority women, where all female candidates have the same qualifications (article 15). Although the national Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law includes various protections for local languages and cultures, it lacks specific attention to ethnic minority women except in the training of cadres (article 22). As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report, ethnic minority women are among populations who face extra vulnerabilities when defending their rights.

While altering protections in the 1995 provisions, the IMAR implementing measures also include protections not present in other parts of China, including in China's four other ethnic autonomous regions. At the same time, the IMAR implementing measures lack specific provisions on ethnic minority women's participation in local people's congresses and in leadership roles at certain levels of government, present in some other regions. (For a comparison with legal measures from other autonomous regions, see articles 12 and 14 of implementing measures from the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, article 6 of implementing measures from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and article 6 of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Implementing measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region do not have provisions specifically on ethnic minority women but have several provisions that refer to "each ethnicity." See articles 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 9.) The national Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women contains one provision providing that the state "attaches importance to the training and selection of ethnic minority women cadres" (article 12), within an article devoted to training and selecting women cadres. It also notes that women's organizations in China protect the rights and interests of women of all ethnicities (article 7) and states that governments in ethnic autonomous areas can pass alterations to national law or supplementary provisions to suit conditions for women in ethnic groups in those areas (article 60). Outside of autonomous regions, some provincial-level implementing measures, such as from Guangdong and Jilin provinces, do not include any mention of ethnic groups or ethnic minority women. Other provinces, such as Sichuan (article 10) and Guizhou (article 11), have provisions on training ethnic minority women cadres. Others, such as Shanghai (article 7) and Shanxi (article 6), include general mention of women of all ethnicities.

While the IMAR implementing measures represent more detailed protections for ethnic minority women than protections in many other local legal measures--even as the IMAR measures cut back on some protections in the 1995 supplementary provisions--their potential impact remains unclear. As noted in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, vague language and weak implementation have hindered the effectiveness of legal protections both for ethnic minorities and for women. As also discussed in the reports, policies implemented in the IMAR have threatened the protection of local ethnic minority cultures. At the same time, as women in China have made some advances in using the legal system to defend their rights, stronger protections for ethnic minority women within legislation could provide a basis for stronger protections in practice.

For more information on conditions for ethnic minorities in China, including in the IMAR, and on the status of women, see Section II--Ethnic Minorities and Section II--Status of Women in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-03 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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State-Controlled Church Continues To Align Protestant Doctrine to Communist Party Policy

The state-controlled Chinese Protestant church marked the 10th-year anniversary of a program of theology that aligns Protestant doctrine to Communist Party policy, according to several November 2008 reports from the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), the state-controlled Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), which leads the registered Protestant church in China, suppresses denominational differences among Protestants and imposes a Communist Party-defined program of "theological construction" on registered churches. "Theological construction," according to one TSPM official, is intended to "weaken those aspects within Christian faith that do not conform with the socialist society."

The formulation of state-controlled theology sheds light on ongoing tensions between the Chinese government's policy of control over religion and Chinese Protestants' right to interpret their own faith. A report describing "theological construction," posted November 19 on the SARA Web site, outlined the perceived problems in Chinese Protestants' beliefs that served as an impetus for the state-led theology. Such problems included Protestants "despising the laws and regulations of the state due to 'obedience to God and not to humans'"; "unilaterally emphasizing things of the spirit and slighting rationality," leading some toward "fanaticism" and "superstition"; caring only about personal salvation and neglecting social responsibility; forms of heterodoxies and cults that "distort" Protestantism; and infiltration by foreign groups that harm the Chinese Protestant church's independence. According to the report, if not promptly addressed, these perceived problems would make it hard to raise the "quality" of Protestants and hinder the alignment of the church to socialist society. After 10 years of directing Protestant theology through "theological construction," authorities reported on the success of the theology in addressing issues such as eliminating certain "biased, backward, and parochial" viewpoints among Protestants, strengthening church members' sense of responsibility to the state and society, and "greatly heightening" Protestants' understanding of protecting social stability, ethnic unity, and the "unification of the motherland." The report concluded with plans to deepen the promotion of "theological construction."

During a speech at a 10th-year anniversary meeting on "theological construction," posted November 19 on the SARA Web site, government official Wang Zuo'an, the Deputy Director of SARA, put forth suggestions on carrying forth "theological construction." Noting that "theological construction" had already "enlightened" some believers, leading them away from focusing only on the "narrow belief" of personal salvation, Wang emphasized the importance of Protestants establishing ties to the "motherland" and to society. He also stressed the importance of sinicizing Protestant doctrine.

In late 2008, SARA officials also examined the Communist Party theories underpinning their own work regulating religion. SARA Director Ye Xiaowen, speaking at a study session advancing the concept of "exploring harmonious religious theory, establishing harmonious sites of worship," called for deepening study of Marxist and Communist Party viewpoints toward religion and "keeping tabs" on religious leaders, religious activity, and sites of worship, according to an article posted November 3 on the SARA Web site. The report comes amid other accounts of similar meetings and training sessions held by SARA officials. Like the meeting discussed in the November 3 article, these training sessions also emphasized the importance of integrating the Communist Party concept of "scientific development" into the government's work on religion. See articles from October 29, October 30, and November 24, all posted on the SARA Website.

For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-02 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Xinjiang Authorities Continue Security Measures, Propaganda Campaigns

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have continued to promote restrictive security measures and widespread propaganda campaigns throughout fall 2008, according to various reports from the region. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), repression increased in the region earlier in the year amid preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, limited reports of terrorist activity, and protests among Tibetan and Uyghur communities in China. In the aftermath of these events, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri outlined in September increased measures to "strike hard" against perceived threats in the region, casting blame on U.S.-based Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer and "western hostile forces." The same month, XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan described plans to launch regionwide anti-separatism education later in the year. (See copies of Nur Bekri's and Wang's remarks (1, 2), both posted on September 11 on Tianshan Net.) The XUAR government has long equated some expressions of ethnic identity, peaceful dissent, and religious practice with separatism or other perceived threats to stability, spurring harsh security campaigns in the region and wide-scale rights abuses. Measures reported in the fall include:

Widespread Security Measures and Anti-Separatism Campaigns
Both central and local government authorities called for intensifying security measures and promoting anti-separatism campaigns. Reports include:

In a visit to Kashgar in late September, Ismail Tiliwaldi, Vice-Chair of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, called on officials to strengthen stability work, implement preventative measures, and recognize the notion that stability "is above all else," according to a September 27 Xinjiang Daily report. At a meeting on anti-separatism reeducation held by the XUAR procuratorate on December 1, a procuratorate official also called on officials to recognize that stability "is above all else," according to a December 3 article from the Xinjiang Legal Daily.

Authorities in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture continued to implement a prefecture-wide "Oppose Separatism, Safeguard Stability" campaign. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for earlier reports on the campaign.) Ghulja (Yining) city's mayor said the city would deepen the campaign, according to an October 15 report on the Ili News Net. In Qorghas (Huocheng) county, in Ili, authorities reported positively on stability work, noting that within the year, the government had uncovered three cases of "inciting separatism" and seven cases of "using superstition to undermine implementation of the law" and had eliminated a "holy war" training class, according to a November 4 report also from the Ili News Net. The article gave no further details on the "inciting separatism" charges, but XUAR authorities in the past have imprisoned people on similar charges based on peaceful forms of expression.

At an October 21 meeting devoted to a two-month phase of anti-separatism reeducation activities, Urumqi Communist Party Committee Secretary Li Zhi called on the government and Party to strengthen the battle against separatism and resolutely stop "illegal religious activities," according to an October 22 report on the China Xinjiang Web site.

Campaigns Targeting Students and Schools
Schools continued to enforce anti-separatism education throughout the fall, according to reports from various government Web sites. Anti-separatism education has included emphasis on the "Three Upholds, Two Opposes," a campaign calling for safeguarding the "unification of the motherland," ethnic unity, and social stability, and opposing ethnic separatism and "illegal religious activities." (See a report posted February 22, 2008, on the Turpan Party Construction Web site for a description of anti-separatism education earlier in the year and a definition of the "Three Upholds, Two Opposes.") Recent reports of measures targeting students and educational staff include:

At an October 6 meeting, XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee Member Erkinjan Turaxun described the region's education system as an "important front" against separatism and called on teachers and cadres to strengthen their sense of responsibility and urgency in work against separatism and "infiltration," according to an October 8 report from the Xinjiang Daily.

A township in Maralbéshi (Bachu) county, Kashgar district, described work to integrate the "Three Upholds, Two Opposes" into the curriculum, create guidelines for "restraining" and evaluating teachers, and promote education in topics including atheism, as part of the local school system's anti-separatism education, according to a November 11 report from the Xinjiang Peace Net. Authorities throughout Maralbéshi county have strengthened educational policies to guard against "ethnic separatism" and "illegal religious activities," according to a November 7 report from the Kashgar district government Web site. Under the leadership of the county's Communist Party secretary, authorities have prepared educational materials to advance the "Three Upholds, Two Opposes," requiring each classroom to hold at least one class per week on the topic.

In October, authorities in Qaramay city launched a six-month period of anti-separatism education activities, according to a November 13 report from the Qaramay government Web site. According to the city's education bureau, the "three forces" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism had targeted schools for infiltration in recent years, and some students had participated in "extremist" religious groups and separatists groups, the article reported.

The Communist Party branch and state-controlled labor union at a middle school in Qorghas county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, organized a ceremony on November 10 to have staff pledge loyalty to Communist Party policy on education, fight the "three forces" and resist "reactionary forces," according to a November 13 report on the Ili News Net.

Controls over Religion
Authorities have continued to ratchet up control over religious communities. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, local governments monitor sites of worship, and state-controlled Islamic Association branches throughout the XUAR align doctrine to government and Communist Party policy. Recent reports include:

XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee Member Shawket Imin called on Communist Party cadres from the United Front Work Department to take measures including strengthening "leadership" and "education" of religious people, strengthening cultivation and training of religious leaders, and curbing unauthorized religious pilgrimages and "illegal religious activities," according to an October 17 report from the Xinjiang Daily.

The Qaramay city government implemented a system requiring high-level officials to make contact with and maintain oversight of mosques and religious figures, according to a November 19 report from the Qaramay government Web site. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, other local governments also have described implementing similar programs of fixed contact and oversight of mosques and leaders. (For detailed information on the program of contact and oversight known as the "two-point system," see, e.g., a July 4 report posted on November 12 on the Awat county government Web site, describing implementation of the system and listing plans to expand it in 2009 as part of a series of measures to tighten control over religion.)

Authorities in Hoten district held anti-separatism reeducation training for Communist Party United Front Work Department officials who work on religious issues to strengthen their capacity to "manage" religious work and carry out activities to "expose and condemn" Rebiya Kadeer and the "three forces," according to an October 16 report on the Hoten district government Web site.

For more information on conditions in Xinjiang, see Section II--Freedom of Religion and Section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-02 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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China's Anti-Trafficking Efforts Remain Inadequate One Year After Government's Release of National Action Plan

The Chinese government's anti-trafficking response remains inadequate and noncompliant with international standards one year after the State Council issued the National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) on December 13, 2007, (English version via the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region's China Office, or UNIAP China).

The Chinese government has not yet ratified the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (TIP Protocol) although it has stated its intention to do so, as reported in the state-run China Daily on October 24, 2008. China's legal definition of trafficking does not reflect current conditions in China or international standards. Even though the government has been able to use Article 240 of the Criminal Law to punish traffickers and Article 244 to punish employers who use forced labor, the law does not recognize the crime of trafficking of men, who often fall victim to labor trafficking, according to the UNIAP's SIREN Human Trafficking Data Sheet in September 2008.

The International Labour Organization in 2006 found little awareness of trafficking among potential victims, their families, and the authorities, according to an April 2006 report (page 13). During 2007, reports described awareness campaigns initiated by the media and government agencies, according to China Radio International and Trafficking Prevention in China (a joint project by the International Labour Organization and All China Women's Federation to prevent trafficking in girls and young women for labor exploitation within China). In spite of these efforts, the government's limited protection mechanisms continue to pose challenges to rescued victims, as noted in the U.S. Department of State's 2008 Trafficking In Persons Report. China's weak response to human trafficking is further evidenced by lenient punishment of public officials, as the Commission previously has reported.

Although China's anti-trafficking efforts have been limited, training and capacity building in law enforcement and government offices has increased since the adoption of the National Action Plan in December 2007. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs held an international conference in Beijing on China's ratification of the TIP Protocol and strengthening China's anti-trafficking legal framework, involving high-level government officials and UN agencies, as reported by the UNIAP China on October 24, 2008. A November 2008 official document presented by the Chinese delegation in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic, China's Brief Report on Achievements During the First Year of Phase III of UNIAP Project, reported on other efforts by the Chinese government to combat trafficking, including bilateral law enforcement meetings with Burma (Myanmar) and Vietnam in February to enhance cross-border cooperation, and issuance of three provincial anti-trafficking action plans. Furthermore, the first Inter-Agency Taskforce meeting was held in November since the Taskforce's inception in December 2007, and a joint campaign was carried out by eight Ministries and Party organizations to prevent labor trafficking in June and July of this year.

It is unclear to what extent the five-year National Action Plan will strengthen the government's anti-trafficking efforts when other government policies that are root causes of human trafficking remain serious concerns in China. These policies include the household registration (hukou) system that leaves migrants vulnerable to trafficking, the population control policy, and the preference for sons that contribute to trafficking for forced or abusive marriages and false adoption or sale of infants. (See Section II-Human Trafficking in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report for the discussion of the root causes of human trafficking in China.)

See previous Commission analyses for more information on China's National Action Plan on Human Trafficking, including Infant Trafficking From the Earthquake Zone and Other Cases Reflect Anti-Trafficking Challenges, China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To Provide "Sustainable Solutions", and Section II-Human Trafficking in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-02 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Authorities Pressure Lawyers, Prevent Courts from Handling Milk Cases

According to a September 22 Takungpao article and an October 16 New York Times (NYT) article, Chinese lawyers in Beijing and the provinces of Hebei and Henan reported that officials have pressured them not to take cases related to milk powder tainted with the toxic chemical melamine, the widespread sale of which was revealed to the public in September 2008. The major dairy producer Sanlu has been at the center of the scandal, which has led to the deaths of at least four infants and sickened at least 53,000 children, according to the NYT article. While many lawyers have agreed to handle such cases, Chinese courts have been reluctant to accept them. On October 30, an International Herald Tribune article reported that courts had received submissions for at least twelve individual lawsuits, but had not accepted any of them. According to the Chinese financial news source JRJ.com on November 22, Chinese courts have yet to accept a single lawsuit related to tainted milk powder. Sichuan Online reported on October 31 that the Xinhua District Court in Shijiazhuang cited instructions from a higher court to not accept any Sanlu compensation cases for the time being. According to the article, the Xinhua District Court said it had to wait for the government's compensation plan.

Reported Incidents of Official Pressure On Lawyers

September 14 - According to an anonymous lawyer quoted in Takungpao's report, officials in Hebei province reportedly told a group of lawyers to stay away from milk cases, emphasizing the government's role in remedying the situation as well as the need to ensure stability. According to the lawyer, authorities mentioned that the consequences for taking Sanlu compensation cases would "not simply be a matter of job loss."

September 27 - According to the October 16 NYT article, Henan judicial bureau officials met with a group of lawyers and instructed them to report to the government if they decided to take a milk case, emphasizing requirements that lawyers tell the government about cases involving "many people or delicate issues." According to the NYT report, at least 24 lawyers, 20 from Henan alone, have removed their names from a nationwide volunteer list consisting of more than 100 lawyers willing to provide legal counseling to parents.

September - According to NYT, the Beijing Lawyers Association reportedly dissuaded lawyers from filing lawsuits in tainted milk cases, especially if the suits were on behalf of plaintiffs from more than one province. The association also instructed lawyers not to publish briefs online.

Despite official pressure, demand is high for legal assistance with milk powder compensation claims, and lawyers have demonstrated broad willingness to accommodate victims' needs. The October 16 NYT article, citing human rights lawyer Li Fangping, reported that volunteer lawyers already had fielded more than 1,200 calls from parents. Xinhua articles from September 14 and October 7 reported that lawyers from Beijing, Tianjin, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Shandong, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, and Ningxia carried out activities including distributing materials to answer basic legal questions and visiting local hospitals to give advice. A September 18 article on the Ministry of Justice Web site (link no longer available) reported that lawyers at a meeting of the Shenzhen City Lawyers Association called for providing free legal services to victims. According to the October 7 Xinhua article, some lawyers were considering class-action lawsuits due to the difficulties that individual families face in collecting necessary evidence. On November 13, the Washington Post reported that 15 lawyers representing nearly 100 families decided to go forward with plans for a class action lawsuit against dairy producer Sanlu. As of the November 22 JRJ.com report, the lawyers were waiting for the results of negotiations with Sanlu before filing their case with the Hebei High People's Court.

Some lawyers have attributed official pressure to the potential that large-scale legal action could uncover collusion between defendants and high-level government officials. The October 16 NYT article quoted Beijing lawyer Teng Biao as saying that the crisis "involves many officials from authorities in the city of Shijiazhuang up to the central government. It involves media censorship, the food quality regulatory system and the corrupt deal between commercial merchants and corrupt officials." Others have noted official concerns regarding a class-action lawsuit's potential for disrupting social stability. NYT quoted Professor Zhang Xinbao as saying, "They don’t want to see so many people getting involved in one lawsuit. This might threaten social stability." Official explanations have focused on the likelihood that uncertainties in China's judicial regulations and relevant product safety legislation would lead to failures in compensating the families in need. An October 20 Xinhua editorial notes that it would be "incredibly difficult to provide adequate compensation" under the 2007 draft Food Safety Law under deliberation, which places proportional limits on the damages a plaintiff can recover in a product liability suit. In addition, the editorial notes that current regulations prompt courts to split class action suits into many individual cases, making the judicial process "incompatible with class action lawsuits." One Supreme People's Court judge has argued that China's cultural environment does not allow judges to prescribe discretionary legal remedies. At a conference addressing the legal problems of the milk crisis, transcribed by China Civil and Commercial Law Net, Judge Chen Xianjie said, "In China's cultural traditions and public opinion atmosphere … it has never been permitted that judges make discretionary judgments because it appears to others that such are completely arbitrary."

For more information see Section III--Access to Justice, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report, and Section III--Impact of Emergencies: Food Safety, Product Quality, and Climate Change, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-26 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Xinjiang Work-Study Programs Continue; Cotton-Picking Activities Limited

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government continued this year to force students to participate in controversial "work-study" programs, but have restricted students in junior high school and lower grades from participating in cotton-picking activities. According to a September 19 Tianshan Net article, the XUAR Department of Education issued a circular this fall stopping all students enrolled in the state's compulsory nine years of elementary and junior high school education from picking cotton in work-study programs. The XUAR government discontinued this form of work-study because central government funding for rural compulsory education, which doubled in 2008 over the previous year, meets XUAR schools' funding needs, according to the report. As previously noted by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, work-study programs in the XUAR have been used to generate income for local schools and meet local harvesting quotas. As the CECC reported in 2006, XUAR authorities prohibited elementary school students from picking cotton starting in 2006, but did not extend the prohibition to junior high school students. Overall participation in work-study programs to pick cotton reportedly decreased in 2007. Based on information in the Tianshan Net report, the fall circular appears to leave intact other forms of work-study activities for elementary and junior high school students. The fall circular appears to leave high school, college, and technical school students to continue picking cotton in work-study programs.

Although the Tianshan Net article reported that local governments are to strictly implement the circular, its effectiveness is unclear, as at least one city in the XUAR is still making junior high school students pick cotton this year, according to information posted October 9 and 10 on a government message board in Wusu city, Tarbaghatay district. In response to a parent's complaint, the Wusu Education Bureau stated that the XUAR government permitted localities throughout the XUAR to mobilize junior high school students to help pick cotton because of a shortage of laborers. A parent in Wusu said that children in junior high school reportedly were being made to pick cotton for sixteen days, two days more than the fourteen days per school year allowed under general work-study programs, according to another message posted October 9 on the same message board. A circular issued September 16 by the Poskam (Zepu) County Education Bureau, in Kashgar district, called for local schools and education offices to strictly abide by the XUAR Education Department circular ending cotton-picking activities by elementary and junior high school students and did not mention at that time the shortage of cotton workers discussed later by the Wusu Education Bureau.

As the CECC has previously analyzed, the XUAR work-study programs contravene China's obligations as a State Party to the International Labor Organization Conventions 138 and 182 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The prohibition on young students participating in cotton-picking activities alone does not bring China into compliance with these conventions because schools may still require students to work on other labor projects in work-study programs that are not an "integral part" of their courses of study, contravening Convention 138, and that expose them to physical harm. The Poskam circular anticipates the risk of injury to students in work-study programs by requiring schools to have accident insurance and implementing accident-reporting requirements.

For additional information on work-study programs, see Section II-Worker Rights and Section IV-Xinjiang in the 2008 CECC Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-19 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Xinjiang Authorities Recruit More Teachers for Mandarin-focused "Bilingual" Education

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government recently announced steps to increase the number of "bilingual" elementary school and preschool teachers in the region, according to several reports from XUAR media. As noted by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China in its 2008 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), educational policies described as "bilingual" by the XUAR government have placed primacy on Mandarin Chinese, undercutting provisions in Chinese law to protect ethnic minority languages and promote their use in XUAR schools. The XUAR's "bilingual" education policies have affected the career prospects of ethnic minority teachers, who face Mandarin language skill requirements if their primary teaching language is an ethnic minority language. Under the government's "bilingual" programs, monolingual Mandarin-speaking teachers are not required to learn ethnic minority languages.

Among the steps to increase "bilingual" teachers is the recruitment of 15,600 "bilingual" elementary school teachers between 2008 and 2013, based on a plan issued in August by the XUAR government, according to a September 24 Xinjiang Daily article. The plan aims to address the problem of students who received "bilingual" preschool education who are unable to continue “bilingual" schooling due to a shortage of "bilingual" teachers in elementary schools, according to the report. A XUAR Communist Party official cited in the article called for authorities to ensure the "political education" of newly recruited teachers. On November 7, Xinhua reported that 10 colleges and universities in the interior of China would send students to the XUAR next spring to assist XUAR schools and address the shortage of "bilingual" teachers. Since late 2006, 13 colleges and a teacher training school inside the XUAR have dispatched 6,000 students to work in schools without an adequate number of "bilingual" teachers, the article reported.

These steps come amid plans to bolster "bilingual" teacher training at the preschool level. According to an October 7 Tianshan Net report, 573 graduates of junior high schools in the southern XUAR will receive two years of free "bilingual" teacher training. In the first year of training, the program will focus on "strengthening [students'] political quality" and Mandarin skills. Training participants will teach on-site in their second year and then take up employment at "bilingual" preschools. The training aims to address the need for nearly 11,500 preschool teachers by 2012, to serve a target of 438,200 students enrolled in "bilingual" preschool education, according to the report.

The recent steps to increase the number of “bilingual” teachers advance policies set forth in documents including a March 2008 opinion (via the XUAR government Web site) on "bilingual" teacher training and a May 2008 draft opinion (via the XUAR Education Department) aimed at bolstering "bilingual" education. The March opinion describes the structure of the government's two-year program for training "bilingual" teachers. The May draft opinion includes the strengthening of teacher training in broader plans for expanding "bilingual" education. For additional information on "bilingual" teacher training for local ethnic minority teachers, see, for example, a June 2008 circular (via the XUAR Education Department). The June circular says that teachers who receive training should "in principle be below 35 years of age." It also requires that participants have "higher" political consciousness and hold appropriate viewpoints toward religion, ethnicity, and the Marxist state, as well as hold loyalty to the Communist Party. The May draft opinion calls for giving "appropriate placements" to older teachers with poor Mandarin skills and for not allowing teachers without "bilingual" teaching skills to enter the teaching force.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on "bilingual" education, see Section IV--Xinjiang, in the 2008 CECC Annual Report, including the section's addendum on "bilingual" education.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-12 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Execution of Chinese Prisoner May Proceed In Spite of Alleged Procedural Irregularities

Wo Weihan, a Chinese citizen, was detained in January 2005 and sentenced on May 27, 2007, by the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court to execution on charges related to military espionage for Taiwan and endangering state security, according to press reports (see November 22 Reuters report, for example). On March 24, 2008, the Beijing High People's Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Under Chinese law, Mr. Wo's sentence was subject to final review by China’s Supreme People's Court. Mr. Wo’s daughter was quoted in a November 26 Agence France-Presse report as saying that she has been told by a Chinese court official that her father's "death sentence has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, so the execution could be very soon....We think it could be tomorrow (Thursday)." The Washington Post on November 26 reported word of a possible delay, but also reported that, after Mr. Wo's daughter and wife meet with him on the morning of November 27, the execution could proceed at any time.

Accused of providing Taiwan information about Chinese missiles and the health of China's senior leaders, Mr. Wo allegedly confessed, but later recanted, saying his confession was coerced, according to his family and others, as reported in the international press (see November 26 Los Angeles Times report, for example). The Chinese government regards the health of its leaders as a "state secret." The Los Angeles Times report cites claims that authorities denied Mr. Wo access to a lawyer for 10 months following his arrest, and that evidence used against him was not made available for his defense. Other reports have noted alleged procedural irregularities and questions that have been raised about whether Mr. Wo received a fair trial in accordance with international standards.

According to an April 22 report in the Los Angeles Times, a spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Beijing was quoted last April as saying: "(w)e stressed that there are serious questions regarding the proceedings used to convict Wo and urged a full and fair review of the lower court decision....The embassy has further called for any future proceedings to be conducted in a manner that is both transparent and consistent with Chinese law and international human rights norms." According to a November 26 Associated Press report, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing issued a statement saying, "(w)e have expressed repeatedly and at high levels our serious concern about the lack of transparency and due process regarding Mr. Wo's case," and further indicated that it is "deeply disturbed" by reports of the approval of Mr. Wo's execution, describing his sentence as "disproportionately severe." Diplomats from the United States, France, Austria, and the Czech Republic have urged the Chinese government to reconsider Mr. Wo's fate, the Los Angeles Times reported on November 26.

Mr. Wo's family learned on November 25 that they had been granted permission to visit him on November 27. They have been unable to visit him since 2005.

As noted in the Commission's recently-released 2008 Annual Report, the Chinese government treats the number of executions it carries out as a "state secret." For further information on the death penalty, state secrets, and related issues in China, see "Capital Punishment," "Fairness of Criminal Trials," "Access to Counsel and the Right to Present a Defense," in Section II - Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, and Section II �C Freedom of Expression in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report.

UPDATE (2008-12-02): The Chinese government executed Mr. Wo on November 28, the day after his first visit with his family since 2005, as reported in the Associated Press, Bloomberg, and the Washington Post.

According to a November 28 declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union, "(t)he European Union condemns in the strongest terms the execution of Wo Weihan." The United States was "deeply disturbed" by the execution and noted that China’s handling of the case appeared to have fallen "far short of international standards for due process," according to a U.S. State Department spokesperson as quoted in a December 1 Associated Press report.

The Chinese government expressed “strong discontent and resolute opposition” to the international reaction to the execution saying in direct response to the EU statement that "(t)he accusation against the Chinese judiciary is a direct interference in China's judicial sovereignty, tramples the spirit of the rule of law and undermines the basis of healthy development of bilateral talks on human rights," according to a statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson on December 1 and reiterated in a December 2 report in the state-run China Daily.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-26 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-19
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Authorities Restrict HIV/AIDS Activism While the Epidemic Spreads

Although the Chinese government has developed an anti-AIDS policy framework, civil society engagement remains a major challenge in the fight against the epidemic, according to an October 8 article written by the Executive Director of the United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) published in the state-run China Daily. As of October 2007, an estimated 700,000 new HIV infections reportedly had occurred in China since 2006, representing an 8-percent increase, according to Chinese and UN official statistics cited in the scientific journal Nature's new study (subscription required) released on October 2, 2008. Among those newly infected, the study reported that men who have sex with men and women in general had the highest rate of growth.

The Chinese government restricts HIV/AIDS activism through frequent harassment and crackdowns on HIV/AIDS advocates and non-governmental organization (NGO) Web sites. (See a previous Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis for more information.) Even in cases where infections resulted from official malfeasance, local officials use extra-legal detention or reeducation through labor to prevent people living with HIV/AIDS from seeking government assistance or using official grievance procedures. (See Section II-Public Health and Section III-Access to Justice-Citizen Petitioning in the CECC's 2008 Annual Report for more information.)

An October 14 Aizhixing survey (subscription required) of 106 people living with HIV/AIDS included the following findings:

Almost all of those who sought some form of redress considered filing lawsuits against the hospitals from which they received HIV-infected blood, but only 73.6 percent actually did. Petitioners, those who used the official "Letters and Visits" (xinfang or shangfang) system, cited insufficient financial means, lack of confidence in the court system, or the court's refusal to accept their application to file lawsuit as reasons for not bringing suit.

Approximately 80 percent of the petitioners indicated that officials had intercepted their visits to authorities and either forced them to return to their homes, subjected them to extra-legal detention in hotels or police stations, or placed them under house arrest. Threats against petitioners or their families, blocking meetings with officials, and the imposition of reeducation through labor sentences were also reported.

Nearly one quarter of the petitioners who took their petitions to higher-level government offices through official grievance procedures reported receiving compensation.

HIV/AIDS patients who have faced government harassment for their seeking redress include, for example:

Li Xige, Henan province: Contracted HIV/AIDS through a blood transfusion when giving birth in 1995. Li's two daughters were also infected with HIV, one of whom died in 2004. Since 2005, the Henan government has detained or harassed Li for petitioning the government for compensation. According to an October 6 Radio Free Asia report, the government resumed 24-hour surveillance of Li in September.

Zhu Bingjin, Jilin province: Contracted HIV/AIDS while selling his blood during the early 1990s. Zhu organized others who were infected through selling blood to express their grievances and seek redress from the blood collection station. According to the survey, authorities have placed Zhu under house arrest twice since 2003, sentenced him to one year of "reeducation through labor," and placed him under administrative detention for 35 days for his petitioning activities.

For more information on the Chinese government's restrictions on HIV/AIDS activism, see the CECC's previous analysis, China Continues to Crack Down on HIV/AIDS Web Sites and Activists, and the CECC 2008 Annual Report, Section III-Civil Society and Section II-Public Health.

Source: -See Summary (2008-10-23 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Message from the Chairman and Co-Chairman

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China adopted its 2008 Annual Report on October 31 by a vote of 22 to 1. The Commission also published a new compilation of case records providing details on 1,088 political prisoners detained or imprisoned in China as of the time of the Annual Report’s release.

The findings of this year’s Annual Report prompt us to consider not simply what the Chinese government and Communist Party may do in the months and years ahead, but what the United States must do differently in managing our relationship with China in light of developments over the last year. In spite of what the Chinese government has written into its laws and regulations, China’s leaders in practice have failed to keep their international commitments, including commitments to WTO norms and other international economic norms, to human rights, including worker rights, to the free flow of information and other safeguards of the rule of law.

We understand that China today is significantly changed from the China of several decades ago, and that the challenges facing its people and leaders are complex. But the Chinese government’s and Communist Party’s continuing crackdown on China’s ethnic minority citizens, ongoing manipulation of the media, and heightened repression of lawyers and human rights defenders reveal a level of state control over society that is incompatible with the development of the rule of law and the advancement of human rights. The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to equate citizen activism and public protest with "social instability" and "social unrest." China’s increasingly active and engaged citizens are its most valuable resource for addressing the myriad public policy problems China faces, including food and drug safety, forced labor, environmental degradation, and corruption. Engaging activist citizens, not repressing them, is the key to effective implementation of basic human rights, and to the ability of all people in China to live under the rule of law.

As this newsletter goes to press, new reports have emerged of child labor and other abuses, and heightened surveillance and censorship of individuals and NGOs. These developments underline how vital it is that the United States in its relationship with China pursue the issues that are the charge of this Commission: individual human rights, including worker rights, and the safeguards of the rule of law. This is not a matter of one country meddling in the affairs of another. All nations, including ours, have both the responsibility and a legitimate interest in ensuring compliance with international commitments.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-25 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Child Labor Found in Shanghai and Wuhan, Following Earlier Reports on Scandal in Guangdong

Reports of the employment of underage workers in factories in Shanghai and Wuhan emerged in October, according to October 6 reports from Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW) and Radio Free Asia, as well as an October 21 report from the Hong Kong-based China CSR and an October 9 entry from a well-known Chinese blog. In Shanghai, a 15-year-old laborer died from wounds suffered at the hands of coworkers at a pipe valve factory earlier this year, while a local blogger exposed several cases of child labor in Wuhan factories in October. These reports follow a child labor scandal in Guangdong that attracted international attention in late spring of this year. Chapter 2 Article 15 of the PRC Labor Law prohibits the employment of minors under the age of 16. The PRC Law on the Protection of Minors and the Provisions on the Prohibition of Using Child Labor also include similar protections for minors.

The Hubei provincial government now reportedly is taking steps to address the use of child labor, according to the China CSR report. However, the October 9 blog entry that reportedly prompted the Hubei government to take action, appears to have been removed from the blogger's Web site, Wang Haofeng Jujiao Zhanbao (Wang is the name of the blogger). A Web site called China Crossroads that promotes corporate social responsibility in China reported on Wang's investigation and posted a rough English translation of his original Chinese language report. Wang's blog includes another report dated June 23 that documents the use of underage workers at a business that offers traditional Chinese medical treatments in Wuhan.

The October incidents follow reports of child labor earlier in the year. In April 2008, an investigative report by the Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD) uncovered a trafficking network operating in the city of Dongguan in Guangdong province in which hundreds of child laborers were sold to factories and workshops throughout the Pearl River Delta. Minors were transported more than 1,300 miles from the Liangshan Yi autonomous prefecture, an impoverished ethnic minority region in Sichuan province, to work in the factory towns of Guangdong. SMD journalists met firsthand with child workers as young as 8 years old, though most were between the ages of 13 to 15. Traffickers who recruited the children and served as intermediaries to prospective employers reportedly admitted to falsifying the children's household registration papers to make them appear to be 18. One underage worker indicated that overseers employed death threats to deter them from trying to escape. Another alleged that some girls had been sexually assaulted by their overseers.

SMD reporters spoke with a former overseer who characterized the underground network as a well-organized and "powerful force," primarily comprised of former child workers who grew up in Liangshan. According to a May 10 New York Times (NYT) report, a primary school teacher from Erwu village in Liangshan lamented that she lost 16 of her 30 students over the past year, most of whom had left the area in search of employment. The ages of the teacher's students mostly ranged from 12 to 14 years old. More than 10 families in Liangshan interviewed by the NYT told of underage children who had left home to work in factories.

The government's response to the labor scandal was characterized by contradictory statements. The day after the scandal broke, Dongguan police reported that the initial round of their investigation had identified 167 workers from Liangshan, the majority of whom were believed to be underage, according to an April 30 SMD report (reprinted on Sohu). On May 1, Dongguan officials told the South China Morning Post (SCMP - subscription required) that around 20 officials from Liangshan had been dispatched to Dongguan to assist in the rescue of the children. In an April 30 report from the China Daily, a spokesperson for the town of Shipai in Dongguan municipality said that police had rescued "more than 100 youngsters" in his township alone and arrested several people in connection with the scandal. Liangshan authorities also claimed that 66 underage workers had returned from Dongguan following the initial investigation, according to a May 7 SCMP report. A Dongguan official quoted in a May 1 SMD report revealed that Liangshan authorities had already identified four individuals suspected of abducting children to work in Dongguan factories.

Two days after the scandal first broke, however, the SMD also reported that Guangdong authorities began to issue statements that described the scale of the child labor problem in terms that contradicted earlier reports. At a press conference on April 30, the vice mayor of Dongguan, Li Xiaomei, claimed that a two-day "preliminary investigation" of 3,629 enterprises throughout the city failed to find "large-scale use of child labor." Li allowed for the possibility that child laborers might be employed in smaller enterprises or workshops in which "underground intermediaries" are commonly used to recruit workers, but she added that no "substantial evidence" was available at present to support such a claim, according to the May 1 SMD report. The Dongguan government neither detailed the methods used in their investigation nor issued a report of its findings, which raises questions about the thoroughness and rigor with which it was conducted.

On May 2, the SMD (reprinted on Sina) reported that Premier Wen Jiabao directly ordered an investigation into the scandal, but also stressed the importance of "preventing speculation." A spokesperson for the Guangdong provincial government, Li Shoujin, was quoted in a May 7 SCMP report as saying the original SMD reports were "inauthentic." Li further claimed that police had found only six underage workers in three factories in Dongguan, none of whom had been raped or abducted, according to the Guangdong Emergency Management Office. According to a July 19 China CSR report, the Dongguan government issued an opinion on July 14 stipulating that individuals who recruit child laborers would be fined 5,000 yuan (US$733) per child, factories that employ child laborers would face the same penalty levied for each month the child was employed, and employment agencies that recruit child laborers would be shut down. An investigation of 124 employment agencies in Dongguan reportedly yielded only 10 child laborers employed by six companies.

As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 and 2007 Annual Reports, a similar pattern of conflicting accounts emerged from the May and June 2007 brick kiln scandal in Shanxi and Henan provinces. Officials involved in the brick kiln scandal were given lenient punishments such as demotion or dismissal from their posts rather than prison sentences or capital punishment, according to a February 2008 CECC analysis.

For more information on child labor and forced labor in China, please see Section II -- Worker Rights, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-21 ) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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State Council Issues New Foreign Journalist Regulations

The State Council on October 17, 2008, issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists, which became effective immediately. The new regulations make permanent the less restrictive conditions introduced by the Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period (Olympic Regulations), which took effect on January 1, 2007, and expired on October 17, 2008, the day the new regulations became effective. Prior to the Olympics Regulations, rules from 1990 required foreign journalists to obtain the approval of a local foreign affairs office before reporting outside of Beijing, a process that sometimes took days. Like the Olympic Regulations, the new regulations allow journalists to travel to much of China for reporting without prior approval and, to interview individuals or organizations, require only the consent of the interviewee.

At an October 17 press conference Liu Jianchao, Director-General of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), said foreign journalists would still be required to obtain government permission before traveling to the Tibetan Autonomous Region and other areas closed to foreigners, as provided for in other regulations. Liu said the restricted areas are "very few" and he was not authorized to provide the names of the areas.

Key Provisions of New Regulation

1990 Regulations Abolished (Article 23).
Only Need Consent of Interviewee (Article 17). The 1990 regulations required foreign reporters to obtain permission from a local foreign affairs office to report in that area and required foreign reporters in China for six months or less to arrange their reporting activities through a Chinese host organization. The new regulations contain neither of these requirements. Article 17 requires only the consent of the unit (danwei) or individual to be interviewed. It also requires foreign journalists to carry and show their foreign journalist card or visa while reporting.
Legal Obligations of Foreign Journalists (Article 4). In addition to following China's laws and regulations, foreign journalists must "observe journalistic ethics, objectively and fairly carry out news gathering and reporting, and not engage in activities incompatible with their status as a journalist or the nature of their organization." The 1990 regulations required journalists to "observe journalistic ethics," "not distort facts, fabricate rumors or carry out news coverage by foul means," and not to "endanger China's national security, unity or community and public interests."
Punishment for Violations (Articles 20, 21). MFA may issue a warning to, stop or suspend the activities of, or revoke the journalist card or visa of journalists who violate the regulation's provisions. Public security officials may order foreigners who do not possess a valid foreign journalist card or visa issued by the Chinese government to stop reporting and may "handle" the situation "according to the relevant laws."
Enforcement of Foreign Journalists' Rights. The new regulations do not include any provisions specifying how foreign reporters can ensure their right to interview consenting individuals and organizations free from government interference. See an earlier analysis for possible legal remedies for foreign journalists.

Foreign journalists in China welcomed the new regulations but expressed concern that local interviewees could be subject to greater harassment as a result. "The easing of controls for foreign journalists should not be achieved at the expense of putting more pressure on local sources," the Foreign Correspondents Club of China said in an October 17 press release. While the Olympic Regulations were in effect, authorities reportedly intimidated Chinese colleagues of foreign journalists and local interviewees. In January 2008, Beijing police prevented foreign reporters from interviewing Zeng Jinyan, rights activist and wife of imprisoned human rights activist Hu Jia. A Beijing court sentenced Hu to three and a half years in April in part for making "subversive" comments to foreign reporters. In the lead-up to the Olympics, Shanghai public security officials reportedly barred activists, petitioners, and other "controlled" people from speaking to foreign reporters.

At the October 17 press conference, Director-General Liu denied that any persons interviewed by foreign journalists had been threatened. "The Chinese Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech of Chinese citizens," he said. "In China, no one is subjected to so-called interference and intervention for engaging in regular speech." Liu added that no matter whether someone is a business person, scholar, expert, or government official, they would be free to decide whether to grant an interview to a foreign journalist.

Liu also said that officials would not abuse their power to limit the activities of foreign journalists during emergencies. This past year, Chinese officials have interpreted provisions allowing officials to impose restrictions on foreign journalists during public emergencies broadly. Following protests in Tibetan areas that began in March 2008, officials imposed a travel ban on foreign journalists that extended far beyond reported protest sites. After the May earthquake in Sichuan province, officials prevented foreign journalists from reporting as officials forcibly broke up a protest by grieving parents.

For more information on the Olympic Regulations, see previous Commission analysis comparing the Olympic Regulations with the 1990 rules and assessing implementation of the Olympic Regulations a year after it took effect.

The new regulations do not apply to Chinese journalists, who remain subject to a wide range of government and Party regulations, policies, directives, and pressures that encourage self-censorship and hinder their ability to report freely. For more information on these restrictions, see Section II--Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-18 ) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Beijing Requires Photo Registration at All Internet Cafes by December

Beijing officials have issued a "new regulation" requiring all Internet cafes in the city to forward photographs of customers to a city law enforcement department to be kept on file for monitoring purposes, according to an October 16, 2008, Xinhua article. According to the article, by mid-December all Internet cafes will be required to install and use a machine consisting of a digital camera and ID scanner. First-time customers wishing to access computers at a cafe will be required to stand before the machine, known as the "Beijing City Internet Cafe Internet Access Registration Device," which will photograph the customer, scan his or her ID, and forward the information to the Beijing Cultural Law Enforcement Agency. The Xinhua article said that 1,500 Internet cafes in Beijing already have begun using the system, which was first introduced in 2005. Previously, customers had to show only an ID to gain entry.

A spokesperson for the agency said the new measures are intended to prevent multiple persons from using the same ID, a ploy sometimes used by young people who do not meet the minimum age requirement to enter Internet cafes, according to an October 17 Wall Street Journal article. Chinese officials blame the cafes for contributing to school absences and juvenile crime, according to a February 12 Associated Press article (reprinted in ABC News).

The new system will make it easier for Chinese officials to monitor the activities of Internet cafe customers. Under the Regulations on the Administration of Internet Access Service Business Establishments issued in 2002, Internet cafes already must examine and register a customers' identification card, keep such records for at least 60 days, and provide the information to cultural and public security agencies for examination if requested to do so. Under the new system, both the customer's photo and identification information are forwarded directly to a "monitoring platform" hosted by the Beijing Cultural Law Enforcement Agency at the time of registration. News reports did not indicate the length of time such records would be maintained.

The new measures could have a chilling effect on free expression because they make it easier for officials to identify persons who access the Web at Internet cafes. Officials continue to punish citizens for peacefully criticizing the Chinese government and Communist Party on the Internet, including, for example, Yang Chunlin, Hu Jia, and Lu Gengsong. Officials rely on information provided by Internet access providers to prosecute such cases. For example, Chinese officials submitted customer identification and e-mail account information provided by Yahoo! as evidence against the journalist Shi Tao, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2005 for illegally supplying state secrets. A People's Daily online poll found that 72 percent of the respondents were against the new measure, saying it infringed on their rights, according to an October 17 Times of London article. Chinese citizens quoted in an October 17 Xinhua article and the Wall Street Journal article called the new measures unnecessary and said they would stop going to Internet cafes, although some supported the measures as a way to prevent students from visiting the cafes to play online games.

The text of the regulation was not available at the time of this writing.

For more information on China's imprisonment of online critics and censorship of the Internet in general, see "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-18 ) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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China-Dalai Lama Dialogue Round Ends: Party Restates Hard Line, Tibetans Begin Meeting

A senior Communist Party official told the Dalai Lama's representatives during the most recent round of formal dialogue on the Tibet issue that the Dalai Lama should "face reality" and "fundamentally change his political positions," according to a November 6, 2008, Xinhua report. Special Envoy Lodi Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen arrived in Beijing on October 30 for the eighth round of dialogue with Chinese officials since such contacts resumed in 2002, and returned to India on November 5 following official meetings in Beijing on November 4 and 5, according to a November 6 statement by Gyari (Tibetan Government-in-Exile, 6 November 08). Du Qinglin, Head of the Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD) and Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, reiterated to the envoys the "four no supports," a set of four new preconditions on the dialogue that he initially pressed upon the envoys in Beijing on July 1 and 2, 2008, during the seventh round of dialogue. UFWD Executive Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun and Deputy Head Sita (Sithar) also met with the envoys during the November meetings, according to Gyari's statement.

The Chinese government sought to impose these additional demands on the Dalai Lama following an unprecedented wave of Tibetan protests that swept across the Tibetan plateau in March and April. Tibetan rioting took place in 12 counties identified in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2008 Annual Report (p. 183), but generally peaceful Tibetan political protests took place in more than 40 additional county-level areas. Officials blamed the Dalai Lama and "the Dalai Clique" for the Tibetan protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and legal system. (See Section V-Tibet, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information about factors underlying the Tibetan protests and their consequences.)

Chinese officials escorted the envoys to the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region prior to the Beijing meetings. (The Hui are a Chinese-speaking, principally Muslim ethnic minority.) Later, academics in Beijing "briefed [the envoys] on the laws, policies and practices concerning China's regional ethnic autonomy system," according to the Xinhua report. Gyari said in his statement that the Tibetan delegation presented to the Chinese leadership a "memorandum . . . on genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people," but he provided no information about the contents of the memorandum. The CECC 2008 Annual Report identified weak implementation of China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) as a factor that has exacerbated Tibetan frustration. Weak implementation of the REAL has prevented Tibetans from using lawful means to protect their culture, language and religion.

On October 25, the Dalai Lama said in a Tibetan-language speech delivered before Tibetans in India that the path Tibetans had followed "towards finding a mutually beneficial solution . . . has had no effect on our main objective, which is to improve the lives of Tibetans inside Tibet," according to an October 27 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) translation of the speech. The Dalai Lama noted that Chinese authorities continued to blame him for "instigating the March protests inside Tibet," and observed, "[I]t seems as though I am a hindrance to finding a solution for Tibet." "I have not lost faith in the people of China," he said according to the translation, "but my faith in the present Chinese government is thinning and it's becoming very difficult."

The Dalai Lama referred in his speech to an unusual meeting of Tibetan political, religious, educational, cultural, and community leaders living outside of China in communities around the world that is scheduled to take place in India on November 17-22, 2008, (see list of participants, Tibetan government-in-exile, 29 September 08). The attendees will consider the status of discussions with the Chinese leadership and the current Tibetan approach to resolving the Tibet issue. The Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach, which he adopted in 1979 and Tibetans living in exile approved in a 1997 poll according to an undated report on the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Web site, lists principal objectives that include:

Without seeking independence for Tibet, the [Tibetan government-in-exile] strives for the creation of a political entity comprising the three traditional provinces of Tibet; Such an entity should enjoy a status of genuine national regional autonomy; This autonomy should be governed by the popularly-elected legislature and executive through a democratic process and should have an independent judicial system . . ."

The Dalai Lama said in his October 25 speech, according to the ICT translation, that "there is no reason to stay the same course just because we are on it." He described the objective of the Tibetan meeting as "to understand, analyze and together think of long-term solutions based on the real, current situation." Special Envoy Lodi Gyari noted in his November 6 statement that the Dalai Lama had advised the envoys "not to make statements about our discussions before this [November] meeting." Xinhua, however, released a flurry of reports on November 10 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) that emphasized Chinese rejection of the Dalai Lama's proposal. UFWD Executive Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun denounced the Middle Way Approach as "aimed at outright Tibetan independence," and declared, "We will never make a concession."

For more information, see "Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives" in Section V-Tibet, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report; "Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama" in Section IV-Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; and "Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama" in Section VIII-Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-18 ) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Authorities Cancel Plans to Subject Uyghur Woman to Forced Abortion (Updated)

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) released from the hospital a Uyghur woman who is six months pregnant with her third child, after cancelling plans to subject her to a forced abortion for violating the region's population planning regulations, according to reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA). Unable to pay a 45,000 yuan (US$6,591) fine for exceeding the number of births permitted under the region's population planning system, Arzigul (Arzugül) Tursun, a villager from Ghulja county, initially fled home to avoid being forced to have an abortion in place of paying the fine, RFA reported on November 13. After pressuring Arzigul Tursun's family to locate her, authorities also coerced Arzigul Tursun's husband into signing papers to approve the abortion, RFA reported. After authorities took Arzigul Tursun to the hospital, hospital staff postponed the abortion from November 13 to November 17, according to RFA. Kept under guard, Arzigul Tursun fled the hospital on November 16 but was found the next day and taken to another hospital, RFA reported on November 17. Authorities later released her from the hospital without carrying out the abortion, according to a November 18 report from RFA. An official cited in the article said Arzigul was not healthy enough to undergo the abortion.

An official cited in the November 13 RFA report said Arzigul Tursun "should undergo an abortion" because she violated population planning requirements. Article 15 of the XUAR Regulation on Population and Family Planning permits urban ethnic minority couples to give birth to two children and rural couples to give birth to three. Where one member of the couple is an urban resident, urban birth limits apply. According to RFA, although Arzigul Tursun is a rural resident, her husband has urban residency status. Article 41 of the regulation requires those in violation of Article 15 to pay a fine equivalent to a multiple of a locality's average per capita income as a "social compensation fee." The regulation does not stipulate that pregnancies must be terminated if the fee cannot be paid, nor do separate procedures on paying the fees stipulate this. Item 6 of the procedures permits people facing economic hardship to apply to stagger payments of the fee. Article 39 of the national Population and Family Planning Law and Article 52 of the Xinjiang regulation provide sanctions for government officials who infringe on citizens' rights or abuse their power in carrying out population planning requirements.

As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), China's system of population planning, along with abuses like forced abortion engendered by the system, violate international human rights protections China is bound to uphold. For more information on China's population planning system, see section III--Population Planning in the 2008 CECC Annual Report. For information on conditions in Xinjiang, see Section-IV--Xinjiang. Advocacy on Arzigul Tursun's behalf by Members of the U.S. Congress has included, for example, a November 17 press release by Representative Joe Pitts and a November 13 press release by Representative Chris Smith.

Source: -See Summary (2008-11-17 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Authorities Target Religious Leaders During, After Olympic Games

Chinese authorities have continued to target religious leaders for harassment, detention, and other abuses, in the midst and aftermath of the Olympic Games. China's preparations for the sporting event ushered in a period of heightened government scrutiny and control over communities including religious groups. Recently reported cases include:

Pastor Zhang Mingxuan. Public security officers in Zhengzhou, Henan province, detained house church leader Zhang Mingxuan on August 6, according to August 6 and August 29 press releases from the China Aid Association (CAA). Authorities released him on August 29, but barred him from returning to Beijing until after the Paralympics Games, which ended on September 17. Zhang arrived back in Beijing on September 21, CAA reported in an October 1 press release. After the religious affairs bureau intervened following harassment of Zhang by public security officials, Zhang was able to resume house church services the following Sunday, CAA reported. On October 16, however, public security officers beat two of Zhang's sons, one of whom was severely injured, and detained Zhang, Zhang's wife, and his sister-in-law with the apparent aim of blocking their attendance at a ceremony for the Chinese House Church Alliance, according to October 16, October 22, and November 6 press releases from CAA. After holding them in Nanyang, Henan province, authorities released them on October 27, the November 6 press release reported. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, earlier in July authorities had forcibly moved Zhang from Beijing. Zhang said police told him they wanted him out of the city during the Olympics to prevent him from speaking to foreigners. In June, Beijing public security officers detained Zhang for two days for attempting to meet with a European Union representative and placed him under house arrest following his meeting with two Members of the U.S. Congress.

Imam Adil Qarim. Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region detained Adil Qarim, an imam at a mosque in Kucha county, Aqsu district, during a "security sweep" of Kucha in the aftermath of a reported series of bomb attacks in the county on August 10, according to a September 4 report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP). An individual accused of involvement in the August 10 incident had attended the mosque. Adil Qarim denied having any links to the attack, the UHRP reported.

Bishop Jia Zhiguo. Authorities detained Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered bishop of Zhengding diocese, Hebei province, on August 24, 2008, according to an August 25 press release from the Cardinal Kung Foundation (CFK). Authorities released him into residential surveillance on September 18, 2008, CFK reported in a September 19 press release. According to a September 19 AsiaNews report, some sources said authorities detained Jia to block his contact with media and representatives of organizations for the disabled during the Paralympic Games. As noted in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, Jia had earlier been imprisoned for approximately 20 years and since 2004 has been detained multiple times. Authorities had last detained Jia in August 2007 because he removed a sign authorities placed on his church, identifying it as affiliated with the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association. Authorities released him from detention on December 14, 2007, but placed him under confinement in his home.

For more information on religion in China and information on political prisoners, see the Political Prisoner Database and Section II, Freedom of Religion, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-09-09 ) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in Lead-up to and During Olympics

Officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) called again in August for the use of harsh security measures to crack down against the government-designated "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, according to reports from Chinese media. On August 13, Wang Lequan, XUAR Communist Party Chair, described the battle against the "three forces" as a "life or death struggle" and pledged to "strike hard" against their activities, according to an August 14 report from the Xinjiang Daily. XUAR Party Committee Standing Committee member Zhu Hailun reiterated the pledge to "strike hard" at an August 18 meeting, according to an August 19 report from the Xinjiang Daily. The announcements followed the release of limited information on terrorist and criminal activity in the region (see, e.g., Xinhua reports from August 4, 6, 10, and 12) and came amid a series of measures that increased repression in the region, including:

Wide-scale Detentions. Authorities have carried out wide-scale detentions as part of security campaigns in cities throughout the XUAR, according to a September 4 report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP). Reported measures include "security sweeps" resulting in mass detentions in the Kashgar area and Kucha county, including blanket detentions in Kucha of young people who have been abroad; the detention of non-resident Uyghurs in Korla city; the forced return of Uyghur children studying religion in another province and their detention in the XUAR for engaging in "illegal religious activities;" and the detention of family members or associates of people suspected to be involved in terrorist activity.

Restrictions on Uyghurs' Domestic and International Travel. Authorities reportedly continued to hold Uyghurs' passports over the summer, building off of a campaign in 2007 to confiscate Muslims' passports and prevent them from making overseas pilgrimages. Authorities also have coupled restrictions on overseas travel with reported measures to limit Uyghurs' travel within China. For more information on restrictions reported in recent months, see the UHRP report, a July 31 Agence France-Presse report (via Open Source Center, subscription required) and an August 8 report from the Telegraph. For more information on 2007 measures to confiscate passports, see the section on Religious Freedom for China's Muslims in the 2007 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Controls Over Religion. XUAR officials have enforced a series of measures that ratchet up control over religious practice in the region. Authorities in Yéngisheher county in Kashgar district issued accountability measures on August 5 to hold local officials responsible for high-level surveillance of religious activity in the region, according to an August 14 report from Radio Free Asia (RFA). Authorities in Peyziwat county, Kashgar district, called for "enhancing management" of groups including religious figures as part of broader government and Party measures of "prevention" and "attack," according to an August 8 report on the Kashgar district government Web site. The previous month, authorities in Mongghulküre county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, called for strengthening management of religious affairs; inspecting all mosques and venues for religious activity; curbing "illegal" recitations of scripture and non-government-approved pilgrimages; and "penetrating" groups of religious believers to understand their ways of thinking, according to July 16 reports (1, 2 (cached page)) on the Xinjiang Peace Net Web site. Authorities in Lop county, Hoten district, have been forcing women to remove head coverings in a stated effort to promote "women for the new era" according to the World Uyghur Congress, as cited in an August 27 report from RFA.

Controls Over Free Expression. Authorities in the XUAR ordered some Uyghur Web sites to shut down their bulletin board services (BBS) during the Olympics, according to an August 14 RFA report. In a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out on August 18 and 19, Congressional-Executive Commission on China staff found that BBSs on the Web sites Diyarim, Orkhun, and Alkuyi had been suspended. The BBS Web page on Diyarim contained the message, "[L]et's protect stability with full strength and create a peaceful environment for the Olympic Games[!] Please visit other Diyarim pages[.]" The message on the BBS Web page on Orkhun stated, "Based on the requirements of the work units concerned, the Orkhun Uyghur history Web site has been closed until August 25 because of the Olympic Games."

Inspections of Households in Ghulja. According to July 17 and July 23 reports from RFA, authorities in the predominantly ethnic minority city of Ghulja searched homes in the area in a campaign described by a Chinese official as aimed at rooting out "illegal activities" and finding residents living without proper documentation.

Controls Over Uyghurs Outside the XUAR. Authorities in cities outside of the XUAR also increased controls over Uyghur residents and some other ethnic minority communities leading up to and during the Olympic Games, according to an August 13 report from the New York Times, an August 5 report from South China Morning Post (subscription required), and July 30 and July 27 reports from RFA. According to an August 18 report from Bloomberg, authorities pressed Uyghurs to leave Beijing.

The measures implemented in the run-up to and during the Olympics build off of earlier campaigns to tighten repression in the region, including measures to tighten control as the Olympic torch passed through the region in June.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-26 ) \| Posted on: 2008-11-25
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Propaganda Officials Issue 21 Restrictions on Domestic Coverage of Olympics

Chinese officials recently sent an order to all newspaper editors in China banning coverage of politically sensitive topics and instructing them on how to cover other topics for the Olympics, according to August 12 articles in the South China Morning Post (SCMP, subscription required) and Telegraph. SCMP, citing mainland reporters as its source, said that the order came in the form of a 21-point directive issued in July. An August 14 Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) article said the 21-point order came from the propaganda bureau, a reference to the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) under the Communist Party. Mainland reporters told SCMP that officials from provincial propaganda departments were holding daily meetings in Beijing with reporters from their provinces to ensure compliance with the order. Wang Wei, vice-president of the Beijing Olympic Committee, denied the existence of the directive, adding: "Chinese media, according to the Chinese Constitution, are free to report on the Games," according to SMH. Reports on the directive did not indicate how long it would last. The Summer Olympics end on August 24, and are followed by the Paralympics, which will conclude on September 17.

On August 14, SMH also published a purported complete English translation of the 21-point directive, whose content matches descriptions in the SCMP and Telegraph reports. Selected instructions from the directive (as translated by SMH) include:

1. The telecast of sports events will be live [but] in case of emergencies, no print is allowed to report on it.

2. From August 1, most of the previously accessible [sic] overseas websites will be unblocked. No coverage is allowed on this development. There's also no need to use stories published overseas on this matter and [website] operators should not provide any superlinks on their pages. [See a previous Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis on the controversy between foreign reporters and Olympic officials over Internet censorship at Olympic venues.]

3. Be careful with religious and ethnic subjects.
...

7. As for the Pro-Tibetan independence and East Turkistan movements, no coverage is allowed. There's also no need to make a fuss about our anti-terrorism efforts.

8. All food safety issues, such as cancer-causing mineral water, is off-limits.

9. In regard to the three protest parks, no interviews and coverage are allowed.

10. No fuss about the rehearsals on August 2,5. No negative comments about the opening ceremony.
...

13.On international matters, follow the official line. For instance, follow the official propaganda line on the North Korean nuclear issue; be objective when it comes to the Middle East issue and play it down as much as possible; no fuss about the Darfur question; No fuss about UN reform; be careful with Cuba. If any emergency occurs, please report to the foreign ministry.
...

15. Regarding diplomatic ties between China and certain nations, don't do interviews on your own and don't use online stories. Instead, adopt Xinhua stories only. Particularly on the Doha round negotiation, US elections, China-Iran co-operation, China-Aussie co-operation, China-Zimbabwe co-operation, China-Paraguay co-operation.
...

17. In case of an emergency involving foreign tourists, please follow the official line. If there's no official line, stay away from it.
...

21.Properly handle coverage of the Chinese sports delegation:

A.don't criticise the selection process.

B.don't overhype gold medals; don't issue predictions on gold medal numbers; don't make a fuss about cash rewards for athletes.

C.don't make a fuss about isolated misconducts by athletes.

D.enforce the publicity of our anti-doping measures.

E. put emphasis on government efforts to secure the retirement life of athletes.

F. keep a cool head on the Chinese performance. Be prepared for possible fluctuations in the medal race.

G. refrain from publishing opinion pieces at odds with the official propaganda line of the Chinese delegation.

Foreign media have noted muted or centralized domestic press coverage of potential controversies that have occurred during China's hosting of the Olympics.

SCMP said that most domestic press relied on reports by the central news outlet, Xinhua, to cover the August 9 stabbing death in Beijing of an American tourist who was a relative of the coach of the U.S. men's Olympic volleyball team. Telegraph reported that Chinese journalists at a U.S. volleyball team press conference had their notebooks and tape-recorders confiscated by officials. The paper also reported that officials told local media to give the story only brief coverage and not to tie it to the Olympics. The Commission notes that the story has been covered by some domestic news outlets, including the financial magazine Caijing (See, e.g., an August 12 report in Chinese, English).

SMH said that news about an August 13 pro-Tibet rally that took place near the main Olympic stadium and resulted in the detention of six protestors and a British journalist had been "blacked out from mainland Chinese press."

According to an August 13 Agence France-Presse article (via Yahoo News), officials enforced a "virtual media blackout" of a controversy involving lip-synching at the Olympic opening ceremonies.

According to a Chinese journalist cited in an August 19 New York Times article, propaganda officials prohibited domestic news media from criticizing China's star hurdler Liu Xiang or discussing details about his withdrawal from the Olympics.

Over the past year, Chinese propaganda officials have issued a number of orders to journalists directing them on how to cover topics for the Olympics.

November 2007 - CPD issued a notice to Chinese news editors restricting coverage of topics relating to the Olympics, including air quality and food safety, to counter "unfavorable publicity" in the foreign media and to prevent foreign media from picking up story ideas from local press.

April 2008 - CPD issued another notice urging domestic media to file reports more quickly in order to beat out foreign press coverage of protests during the Olympic torch relay, according to an April 9 SCMP report (subscription required). SCMP paraphrased the order as saying reports should "stick to the official line to better make China's case" to both domestic and international viewers. The order also described the relay as "our unprecedented, ferocious media war against the biased western press." SCMP noted that while Chinese media took four days to report on disruptions at the March torch-lighting ceremony in Greece, Chinese media responded more quickly to later protests in London and Paris, launching verbal attacks against the protesters and U.S. politicians who supported the Dalai Lama and airing footage of Chinese torch-bearers being attacked.

June 2008 - President Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the People's Daily, the Communist Party's flagship newspaper, telling journalists their "first priority" is to "correctly guide public opinion" and specifically calling on them to pay special attention to their coverage of the Olympics.

China's propaganda directives violate international standards for freedom of expression. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed and has committed to ratify, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), permit restrictions on freedom of expression in a limited number of circumstances, but furthering a political agenda is not one of the permitted exceptions. While China has not publicly explained the purpose of these restrictions, much less acknowledged their existence, the reported substance of the restrictions strongly suggests that their aim is political. Furthermore, these restrictions also do not comply with the ICCPR and UDHR requirement that they be "prescribed by law" since they are issued by a Communist Party entity, rather than pursuant to legislation issued by one of the organs authorized to pass legislation under China's Legislation Law. Finally, Chinese officials have attempted to prevent the public from finding out about such directives. The Chinese journalist Shi Tao was sentenced to 10 years in 2005 for disclosing state secrets after he revealed the contents of a propaganda directive warning journalists about their reporting on the eve of the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy protests.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-22 ) \| Posted on: 2008-08-22
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Shenzhen's New Residency Permit and Its Impact on Migrants

Shenzhen city issued the new Temporary Measures on Residency Permits on May 22. The measures introduce a number of reforms to the city's household registration (hukou). (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Topic Paper and Hukou Reform chart on China's Household Registration System for more information on the hukou system). According to the China Daily's report on July 1, the new system aims to gradually remove the barriers between permanent and migrant populations. It also includes a number of innovations unseen in most other recent hukou reforms, including:

Requiring that all Chinese citizens between 16 and 60 years old register for a residency permit if they have been working in Shenzhen for more than 30 days without permanent residency status.

Granting the children of permit holders access to local schools.

Granting permit holders eligibility to apply for driver's licenses, business visas to Hong Kong or Macao, and government-subsidized low-cost housing.

According to another China Daily report on August 1, Shenzhen's new residency permit system is the "first of its kind in the country" because it aims to integrate most (90 percent) of the city's migrants by June 2009, eventually covering 12 million migrant workers. Nevertheless, the new permit system does not completely eliminate the discriminatory nature of the hukou system, according to a July 7 China Daily report. And the Measures are silent with regard to the provision of benefits in the areas of free healthcare, pensions, or unemployment insurance.

Since 1958, China's hukou system has been a foundation for discrimination and violations of the right to equality for Chinese citizens who hope to change their residence. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Topic Paper). It is inconsistent with international human rights standards such as equal treatment, freedom of residence, and right to work, as defined in arts. 2, 13(1), and 23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

For more information about the impact of household registration status on Chinese migrants, see the CECC's 2007 Annual Report, Section II - Freedom of Residence and Travel.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-20 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-08-21
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Beijing Ordered Migrants to Leave for the Olympics

According to a July 21 Reuters report and a July 24 Agence France-Presse (via Yahoo News) report, Beijing authorities launched an anti-pollution campaign that month to halt construction and close factories in the city, leaving migrants who had worked on Olympic projects jobless and forcing them to leave the city or find work elsewhere. A March 12 Human Rights Watch report documented severe exploitation of migrants who lack household registration and work for Olympic construction sites, including failure to provide insurance and social services, faulty or non-existent labor contracts, and unpaid wages.

This January, to ensure security during the Olympic Games, Beijing officials ordered public security bureaus to heighten inspections of migrants without Beijing household registration status (hukou), according to the Beijing News on January 13. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Topic Paper on China's Household Registration System for more information on the hukou system). A July 17 report from the Community TV Network said that many migrants believe that the government's intensified checks are aimed at preventing protests and incidents that Chinese authorities think could mar China's image.

These pre-Olympics actions by the Chinese government are inconsistent with international human rights standards such as equal treatment, freedom of residence, and right to work, as defined in art. 2, 13(1), and 23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They also contravene Chinese official statements promoting equal treatment and encouraging non-enforcement of restrictions on migrants during the Olympics as reported in the Southern Daily (via Sohu) on April 10 and Xinhua (via China Daily) on March 8.

For more information about the impact of household registration status on Chinese migrants, see the CECC's 2007 Annual Report, Section II - Freedom of Residence and Travel.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-07 ) \| Posted on: 2008-08-15
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Infant Trafficking from the Earthquake Zone and Other Cases Reflect Anti-Trafficking Challenges

Numerous reports of infant abductions have surfaced in the wake of the earthquake that hit China's Sichuan province on May 12. Officials, focused on resettling large numbers of people displaced by the earthquake, have not been sufficiently able to protect children, leaving some to wander around and fall into the hands of human traffickers, according to a June 2 Christian Science Monitor article. In response to these and other crimes, the Supreme People's Court issued the Circular on Completing Trial Work According to Law During the Earthquake Disaster Relief Period to Earnestly Safeguard Social Stability in the Disaster Area on May 26, which lists seven categories of crimes that courts, under the guidance of the Communist Party, must severely punish according to law. Courts, mandated with safeguarding stability, settling disputes, and promoting harmony, are advised to emphasize mediation and handle cases in different ways. Courts should have "fast docketing, fast trial, fast enforcement" for cases involving people's livelihoods in the disaster area while being cautious in accepting cases that are sensitive, involve groups, and could affect the successful completion of disaster relief and post-quake reconstruction work. The circular mentions the "trafficking of orphaned or injured children or women from the disaster area" as one of the crimes.

Recent reports of infant abductions and other cases, including the abduction and selling of children and forced labor in Shanxi province brick kilns, reveal challenges in China's anti-trafficking efforts, including:

China's legal definition of trafficking does not reflect China's current situation or international standards. The trafficking of persons, defined in Article 240 of the Criminal Law as the "abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a women or child, for the purpose of selling the victim," is prohibited in China. This definition is narrow and does not conform with the United Nations (UN) definition in Article 3 of the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, which China has not signed. China's definition does not cover all persons, such as male adults, or forms of trafficking such as forced labor or commercial sexual exploitation involving fraud or coercion, where the purpose is not to sell the victim. These forms of trafficking exist in China, as seen from Chinese media reports of forced labor (June 10, 2007, CCTV video via Xinhua) and commercial sexual exploitation involving fraud or coercion (December 21, 2007, Yangcheng Evening News article). The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) acknowledged in July 2007 that it has handled an increasing number of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation cases in recent years. Reflecting the narrow definition of trafficking, however, the MPS has stated that the official number of trafficking cases has been on the decline.

China's definition, moreover, considers the abduction and selling of children as a form of trafficking regardless if the child was abducted or sold for the "purpose of exploitation," which is a necessary component of trafficking under the UN definition. For example, abducting and selling human beings for adoption or marriage is still considered a crime, but not necessarily a trafficking crime under international standards if there is no exploitation such as forced labor present. The implication of this is that official trafficking-related data and many of the cases reported in Chinese media, which tend to highlight certain types of cases such as the abduction and selling of children, would not automatically be considered trafficking cases by international standards. They are considered forms of trafficking in China, however, with the Chinese word for trafficking literally translating into "abducting and selling."

Inadequate protection of trafficking victims, with links to official corruption. Treatment of victims freed from forced labor in Shanxi brick kilns reveals existing challenges in China's protection of trafficking victims. Some victims drifted between different agencies for days or were sent back to their former boss. They were then given a few hundred yuan and sent home unescorted, with a few never making it home. Civil affairs bureaus, responsible for the care of the majority of rescued victims, failed to notify parents that their child had been found. In one case, labor supervision bureau officials responsible for protecting a 14-year-old child that had been freed from a brick factory sold the victim to another brickyard instead, and withheld the 300 yuan (US$44) in victim compensation for their own use, according to a May 21 China Labour Bulletin article. The recently released National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children states that "rescued children of school age should return to school" and lists "strengthening relief and rehabilitation of rescued women and children" as an area of focus.

Need for more effective prevention efforts as many individuals remain unaware of the full scale of trafficking, and that trafficking constitutes a crime. Individuals in some provinces know that people can be trafficked for forced marriage or adoption but remain unaware that people can also be trafficked for labor exploitation and forced prostitution, according to a 2005 International Labour Organization report. In addition, a trafficker sentenced in a massive child abduction case noted that she was unaware that the abduction and selling of children was a crime. She said that she herself had been sold into marriage for 9,000 yuan (US$1,310), and that many other people in her area had "lost their children," according to a November 25, 2005, Southern Metropolitan Daily (SMD) article (via Sina.com).

A Hubei province National People's Congress representative observed in 2008 that many individuals who purchased abducted children or women did not know they were committing a crime. She attributed this gap in knowledge to inadequate awareness of the law, and called on law enforcement agencies to expand their prevention efforts. The representative, along with other representatives from Hubei, submitted a proposal in March that recommends changes to Article 241 of the Criminal Law, including increasing the punishment for buyers and abolishing the provision that exempts buyers from investigation of criminal responsibility under certain conditions. The representative mentioned that the proposal, if accepted, should be implemented after a period of large-scale awareness efforts that are aimed at farmers and other rural residents in particular, as reported in a March 10 Legal Daily article.

In order to be effective, awareness campaigns should take into consideration the viewpoint of the target audience, and prevention efforts must ultimately go beyond these campaigns to address root causes that leave individuals vulnerable to trafficking. Of particular concern are children of migrant workers who may not be in school or under the care of their parents. In several cases mentioned in this article, those abducted were children of migrant workers. In at least one case, the perpetrators deliberately targeted these children because they believed that public security officials would take such cases less seriously, according to a March 12, 2006, Washington Post article. The National Plan of Action mentions poverty alleviation and other prevention measures, but it remains to be seen how well-funded or effective these measures will be.

Disparity in punishment, including lenient punishment of public officials. Article 240 of China's Criminal Law allows punishment up to death for the crime of human trafficking. The Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Abduct and Traffic in or Kidnap Women or Children, issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 1991, lays out the punishment for traffickers in greater detail. Yet individuals involved in trafficking rings are often given criminal sentences while government officials receive lighter sentences or administrative punishments. Government officials involved in the 2007 Shanxi brick kiln incident, for example, were punished administratively while other participants in the incident were given criminal sentences, including one death sentence. Yet official knowledge of the forced labor system went back as far as 2004, and a kiln contractor reported that many kiln operators received advance notice of local police inspections and hid enslaved laborers during these inspections, according to page 72 of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report. Similarly, in an infant abduction and illegal adoption case in Hengyang city, Hunan province, a local court sentenced nine individuals to 3 to 15 years in prison in February 2006 while a state-run welfare institute director received 1 year in prison. City government agencies dismissed or censured 22 other welfare institute employees and local civil affairs officials. Employees at various welfare institutes in Hengyang knowingly purchased abducted babies and worked with local civil affairs bureaus to forge abandonment certificates in order to arrange for the babies' adoptions.

For more information on recent trafficking cases, click on "more" below. See previous CECC analyses for more information on child abductions and human trafficking in China, including the rise of child abductions in 2004, the abduction and selling of children from ethnic minority areas to predominantly Han areas, and the section on Human Trafficking in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Two cases of attempted infant abductions from the Sichuan earthquake zone:

Public security officials in Jiangyou city, Sichuan province, detained six people on May 16 who were attempting to transport five infants from the earthquake zone, according to a May 30 Jiangnan Metropolitan Daily article (via Xinhua) and a May 26 South China Morning Post article (subscription required). The individuals admitted that an unknown person gave them the babies to transport to Linyi city, Shandong province, where someone else would pick the babies up. They would have received 1,500 yuan (US$216) in "transportation fees" for each infant. The babies ranged in age from under 10 days to 2 months old. Public security officials were unable to locate the infants' parents, transferring them instead to a Jiangyou welfare institute where they received medical treatment. According to the welfare institute director, the infants were kidnapped around the time of the earthquake, with some likely taken from hospitals. The perpetrators then fed them sleeping pills to prevent them from crying.

In another case, Shandong province public security officials rescued three infants who had been transported from Sichuan province on May 29, according to a May 30 People's Daily - Photobase article (via NetEase). Four suspected perpetrators, who reportedly purchased the babies in Sichuan and had planned to sell them in Henan province, have been detained. The infants were under one month old. Shandong public security officials are coordinating with their counterparts in Sichuan to locate the babies' families, according to a June 2 Liaocheng News Net article. It is unclear what kind of care the infants are currently receiving.

Recent punishment of perpetrators involved in major cases of child abduction and selling:

On March 14, 2008, the Nanyang Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Henan province sentenced two people to death, and sentenced five others to 2 to 13 years imprisonment for abducting and selling children. Between April and December 2007, the perpetrators abducted nine boys in Henan and sold them for 12,000 to 33,000 yuan (US$1,746 to US$4,803) each in other counties in Henan and a county in Shandong province. The defendants were ordered to pay a total of 68,000 yuan (US$9,919) in compensation in a civil suit that was also filed, according to a March 20 Legal Daily article. In at least one case the child was sold into a family who already had two daughters and appeared to be raising the boy as their son, according to a January 9 Zhengzhou Evening News article (via Sina.com). A physical examination of the children revealed that they were in normal health, although many of the children experienced psychological effects after returning home, such as having nightmares and feeling withdrawn, according to a January 3 Xinhua article (via Sohu.com) and the Zhengzhou Evening News article. Besides the physical examination, it is unclear if the children received any other aftercare.

On May 15, 2008, the Qujing Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Yunnan province sentenced 16 people to prison terms ranging from three years to life, with the ringleader receiving the death sentence, according to a May 19 Legal Daily article. The individuals kidnapped and sold 15 children over the span of three months. The children were often resold several times; three of them are still missing. In at least one case the child was sold to someone who wanted to raise him as her own child, according to a February 11, 2007, Life News article (via Sohu.com). According to the Legal Daily article, the court, citing Article 240 of the Criminal Law and related provisions, handed down the following sentences:

Individual(s)	Sentence
Wang Shuhua	Death sentence, lifelong deprivation of political rights, and confiscation of all property.
Wang Yunmei, Sun Yan, and Liu Qicui	Life imprisonment, lifelong deprivation of political rights, and confiscation of 50,000 (US$7,294) yuan of personal property.
Zhou Dexiu and Wang Meitao	15 years' imprisonment, a 40,000 (US$5,835) yuan fine, and 5 years' deprivation of political rights.
Zuo (who had not reached 18 at the time of the crime), Zhou Jiafen, and Wu Qingyuan	9 years' imprisonment and a 20,000 (US$2,917) yuan fine.
Deng Bofu and Wu Shuqing	8 years' imprisonment and a 20,000 (US$2,917) yuan fine.
Guo Yongshi	4 years' imprisonment and a 10,000 (US$1,459) yuan fine.
Lu Sanqing, He Renmin, and Li Zufen	3 years' imprisonment and a 10,000 (US$1,459) yuan fine.

On June 5, 2008, the Dongguan Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong province upheld the previous ruling of the same court in 2005 that sentenced the leader of a child abduction ring to death, according to a June 9 China News article (via NetEase) and the SMD article. From March 2001 to May 2004, the ring abducted and sold 38 children who were playing in market areas without adult supervision from the Dongguan vicinity to Shantou city, Guangdong, where they were sold to other people. Each child was sold for around 10,000 yuan (US$1,459), according to the SMD article. The China News article reports that 12 children remain missing. According to media reports, a child was sold to a villager in at least one case, although it is unclear if there was exploitation involved and if the other children were sold into a similar situation.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-06 ) \| Posted on: 2008-08-15		more ...
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Hu Jintao Speech Stresses Media's Role To Serve Party

Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao's June 20 speech (via People's Daily) on the press in China highlighted the increasingly important role journalists play in maintaining the Party's ideological and political control. The speech gave little indication that China plans to grant its media greater freedom of the press. The setting and timing of the speech were significant, taking place at the offices of the People's Daily on the occasion of the Communist Party's flagship newspaper's 60th anniversary.

Hu said journalists' "first priority" is to "correctly guide public opinion." With information traveling faster today, journalism's effect on public opinion has increased. The Party's work and the country's long-term stability depend on journalists doing good "news propaganda work." He said journalists must play an active role in "consolidating a common ideological foundation for the whole Party and the people of every ethnic group in the whole country to unite in struggle," "disseminating socialism's core value system," and providing motivation and impetus to "promote the development of the causes of the Party and the state." "Comrades on the news battle line must fully recognize the great responsibility they bear," he said. Hu also emphasized the importance of political loyalty in the selection of editors, journalists, and news managers.

During his speech, Hu offered a number of justifications for why and how journalists should serve the ideological and political needs of the Party:

A Common Foe. Hu noted that one of the current challenges "especially worthy of attention" is that international public opinion still reflects a "West is strong, we are weak" pattern. He called on journalists to adopt a vigilant stance in meeting this challenge. Over the past year, China's media have attacked "Western" press coverage of the Tibetan protests and Chinese propaganda officials have ordered domestic media to issue "positive" Olympic stories to counter "negative" foreign reports.

The Earthquake and the Olympics. Hu said journalists should pay particular attention to making positive contributions in their coverage of the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake that struck in May and China's preparations for the Olympics. Following the earthquake, officials ordered China's media to play up the rescue efforts of the Party and government and sought to prevent them from covering controversial stories about shoddy construction of schools where thousands of children are estimated to have died.

Co-opting the Internet and More Assertive Print Media Outlets. Hu described "metropolitan media" and "online media" as potential resources for propaganda that needed to be integrated into a "new setup for public opinion guidance." He did not specify what "metropolitan media" meant, but the term appears to refer to city newspapers whose reporting is sometimes critical, such as Southern Metropolitan Daily. Hu said the Internet had become a significant source of information and said "we" must fully understand its influence and manage it better so that it becomes "a forward position for disseminating socialist advanced culture." In January 2007, Hu also made significant comments regarding the Internet, calling for its purification and saying the stability of the state depended on the Party successfully controlling the Internet.

There is little in the speech to suggest that Hu supports greater press freedom. Language in the speech urging journalists to "ensure the people's right to know, right to participate, right to express, and right to supervise" are consistent with government initiatives to improve transparency and encourage the press to monitor the activities of local officials so long as it does not threaten the Party.

A July 10 Open Source Center (OSC) analysis (subscription required) also noted the significance of Hu's speech. At the People's Daily's previous two decennials, in 1988 and 1998, the Party General Secretary had sent in his congratulations instead of giving an on-site address. The analysis also noted that Hu emphasized the media's propaganda role in guiding public opinion and subordination to politics more than his predecessor Jiang Zemin did in 1996, the last time a top party leader had visited the People's Daily. OSC said this suggested "heightened concern about the party's influence in the current media environment."

For more information on how the Party uses the Chinese media to serve its own interests, see "Roles the Media Is Expected to Play" in Section II--Freedom of Expression of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-07-16 ) \| Posted on: 2008-08-15
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=108644

Officials Report Release of More Than 3,000 of the More Than 4,400 Detained Tibetan "Rioters"

Chinese officials have disclosed information that, if accurate, shows that authorities have released more than 3,000 of more than 4,400 persons (nearly all Tibetan) whom security officials detained in connection with rioting in March, or who allegedly surrendered to authorities. The reports provide information only about persons whom authorities suspected of participating in rioting during a period of six days in nine county-level Tibetan areas.

Chinese officials have provided no information, however, about a large but unknown number of Tibetans whom security forces detained in connection with peaceful protests over a period of several weeks beginning on March 10. The protests spanned more than 40 additional county-level areas in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.

Chinese authorities released by June 21 a total of 3,072 of the 4,434 persons whom officials characterized as "rioters" and who had surrendered or been detained by April 9, based on Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) analysis of a June 21 China Daily report and previous reports. China's state-run media provided information (summarized in the Table below) about rioting in:

Lhasa city, Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) on March 14 (Xinhua, 9 April 08);
Xiahe (Sangchu), Maqu (Machu), Luqu (Luchu), Zhuoni (Chone), and Diebu (Thewo) counties, and Hezuo (Tsoe) city located in Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province from March 14 to March 19 (an additional Xinhua report, 9 April 08);
Linzhou (Lhundrub) county, Lhasa municipality on March 14 (Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News, 19 March 08, translated in OSC, 19 March 08);
Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province on March 18 (Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily, 25 March 08.

Official Chinese Sources: Detention, Surrender, and Release of Alleged "Rioters"

.	Lhasa city March 14 rioting Xinhua, April 9	Gannan TAP March 14-19 rioting Xinhua, April 9	Linzhou county March 14 rioting Tibet Daily, March 19	Aba county March 18 rioting Xinhua, March 25	TOTAL
Surrender: total	362	2204 (incl. 519 monks)	94	381	3041
Surrender: released	328	1870 (incl. 413 monks)	.	.	.
surrender: formal arrest	.	.	.	.	.
Surrender: remain detained	34	334 (incl. 106 monks)	.	.	.
Police detention: total	953	440 (incl. 170 monks)	.	.	1393
Police detention: released	.	.	.	.	.
Police detention: formal arrest	403	8	.	.	.
Police detention: remain detained	.	.	.	.	.
TOTAL: surrendered or detained	1315	2644	94	381	4434
TOTAL: remain detained (reports as of June)	116 China Daily, June 21	.	.	.	116
TOTAL: sentenced (reports as of June)	42 China Daily, June 21	.	.	.	42
TOTAL: released (reports as of June)	1157 China Daily, June 21	1870 Xinhua, April 9	.	.	3027
TOTAL: status unknown (reports as of June)	0	774	94	381	1249

The Table shows that Chinese officials have so far acknowledged that a court has sentenced only 42 persons for alleged criminal activity linked to rioting. The largest disclosure of such information was on the Lhasa Intermediate People's Court April 29 sentencing of 30 Tibetans to imprisonment for periods ranging from three years to life (Xinhua, 29 April 08, translated in OSC, 30 April 08). The court convicted the defendants for crimes described in the report as "arson, looting, picking quarrels and provoking troubles, assembling a crowd to storm state organs, disrupting public service, and theft." The current status of more than 1,200 alleged rioters remains unknown, based on information summarized in the Table.

The Table reveals a statistical discrepancy that may indicate either additional releases or the use of administrative instead of judicial sentencing. By June 21, authorities reportedly released 1,157 of the 1,315 persons who surrendered or were detained in connection with the March 14 Lhasa riot -- but Xinhua reported on April 9 that 403 of the 1,315 persons had been formally arrested on a criminal charge. If 1,157 persons were released, then the maximum number of persons who could have been formally arrested and faced trial would have been 158. It is unclear whether the report of 403 formal arrests was an error, or if 245 of the 403 arrests resulted in an outcome other than trial and sentencing. For example, if formal arrest on a criminal charge did not result in a procuratorate indicting a detainee on the charge, or if a procuratorate indicted a detainee but a court did not accept the case for trial, then public security officials may have released the detainee. Alternately, if either a procuratorate or a court decided not to proceed with prosecution, then public security officials could have referred the case to a reeducation through labor (RTL) committee. A RTL committee could order a detainee (without trial) to serve a period of administrative detention of up to three years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. Even though the Chinese government continues to punish large numbers of citizens administratively,the CECC has not seen reports in China's state-run media of public security agencies using administrative punishment for Tibetan rioters or peaceful protesters.

Tibetan rioting that resulted in the detention and criminal prosecution of Tibetans also took place in Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) and Dazi (Tagtse) counties on March 14 and 15 respectively, based on additional official reports (Xinhua, 29 April 08 (translated in OSC, 30 April 08); Xinhua, 29 April 08; Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 24 March 08; Xinhua, 5 April 08). Both counties are adjacent to Lhasa city and are under Lhasa municipality administration. It is unclear, however, whether or not the detention and criminal prosecution of Tibetans for participation in alleged rioting in Duilongdeqing and Dazi are reflected in the Xinhua April 9 statistics summarized in the Table because neither county is mentioned in the April 9 report.

Eighteen civilians and one police officer died as a result of the March 14 rioting, according to the June 21 China Daily report, but Chinese officials have not provided information about criminal charges and prosecution linked to the deaths. Following an amendment of China's Organic Law of the People's Courts that took effect on January 1, 2007, if a court sentences a defendant to death, the Supreme People's Court must review and approve the sentence before an execution can be carried out. Prior to the amendment, the same court that would hear an appeal against the verdict (the TAR High People's Court, in this case) also had the authority to issue final approval of the sentence.

Source: -See Summary (2008-07-09 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-08-15
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=107985

The Human Toll of the Olympics

While the financial cost of the Olympics is estimated at $43 billion, the human toll of China's preparations for the Olympics is also considerable. Seeking to ensure security and project a "positive" image, China has cracked down on groups it deems potential "troublemakers": migrant workers, petitioners, ethnic minorities, Falun Gong practitioners, activists, rights defenders, religious leaders, and others. This crackdown has intensified during the months and weeks leading up to the Games, which begin on August 8. At the same time, China has fallen short in meeting formal commitments it made to the International Olympic Committee (IOC). These commitments include increased freedom for the foreign press and progress on environmental issues.

Press Freedom

Foreign broadcasters and journalists in China have described numerous burdensome and last-minute bureaucratic hurdles thrown up by Chinese officials in recent weeks to limit uncensored, live coverage during the Olympics, according to a July 24 Associated Press (AP) article. Chinese officials claim restrictions on live coverage and broadcast sites are necessary for security. Foreign journalists, however, note that these restrictions contradict earlier promises and appear designed to give officials wide latitude to restrict reporting arbitrarily.

The Commission noted in previous analyses that China promised foreign journalists "no restrictions" for the Olympics. Officials have made frequent exceptions to this promise - including barring foreign reporters from traveling anywhere near reported protests in Tibetan areas, and detaining foreign reporters attempting to cover protests by parents following a May earthquake - suggesting that officials retain considerable discretion to deviate from this promise.

A Beijing Olympic official confirmed on July 30 that foreign reporters' access to certain Web sites, including those relating to Falun Gong, would be blocked at Olympic venues, according to a July 30 Agence France-Presse (AFP) article. Foreign journalists initially reported not being able to access the Web sites for Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Tibetan government-in-exile, those providing information about the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests and Falun Gong, Radio Free Asia, Deutsche Welle, and the Hong Kong-based Apple Daily, and the Chinese-language sites for Voice of America, and the BBC, according to the AFP article and a PC World article and Deutsche Welle article of the same date. They also said that such censorship was not evident in previous Games. In September 2006, a Chinese Olympic official said that Internet access for foreign reporters during the Olympics would be uncensored, according to a September 27, 2006, Reuters article (via China Daily). In April of this year, the IOC expressed concern to Chinese Olympic officials over Internet censorship that followed Tibetan protests that began in March, saying that China's Host City Contract (which is not publicly available) with the IOC obligated it to offer open Internet access to foreign journalists during the Olympics, according to an April 2 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article (subscription required).

On July 30, the IOC acknowledged that it had "negotiated with the Chinese that some sensitive sites would be blocked on the basis they were not considered Games related," according to a July 30 Reuters article. A day later the IOC said that "[w]e have a team working with [the Beijing Olympic Committee] to unblock sites to make it easier for reporters and to remove any concerns that sites are censored. Apart from those sites, for example, which relate to pornography, which is common to every country in the world to block, and sites which could be considered subversive, all other sites should be free to enable all reporters to properly report on the Games as they have in previous Games," according to an August 2 Australian article. The New York Times reported on August 1 that the Web sites for Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Radio Free Asia, and the Chinese language service of the BBC had become accessible at the Olympic Village, but that other sites relating to Tibet, Chinese dissidents, and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests remained blocked.

See previous Commission analyses in this area going back to 2005

China's Olympic Commitments on Media Control and Internet Access

Hu Jintao Speech Stresses Media's Role To Serve Party

China Commits to "Open Government Information" Effective May 1, 2008

Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests

Mixed Progress for Olympic Foreign Reporting Regulations One Year Later

Central Propaganda Department Restricts Reporting on Air Quality, Food Safety

Chinese Government Relaxes Restrictions on Foreign Journalists for Olympics

IOC Expresses Concern About Government Restrictions on News Media

Beijing Olympic Committee Refusing All Telephone Interviews To Avoid Falun Gong Journalists

Environment

Beijing officials point to the city meeting its 2007 target of 245 days of “blue skies” as an indicator of improved air quality, according to a December 30, 2007, Reuters article. Yet Chinese academics and other experts have criticized the government’s lack of transparency with regard to its pollution data and the temporary nature of many of its anti-pollution measures, according to a May 14 SCMP article (subscription required).

It remains to be seen if Beijing’s air quality during the Olympics �C determined by measuring the levels of four pollutants �C will meet promised World Health Organization (WHO) standards. Levels of sulfur dioxide meet current WHO standards but particulate matter 10 levels do not meet these standards, according to a July Greenpeace report. Beijing’s environmental protection bureau currently does not measure ozone or particulate matter 2.5, which have documented adverse health effects.

China's costly policy of diverting water from outer provinces to Beijing for the Olympics threatens environmental conditions in those provinces, according to a June Probe International report. Local officials reportedly harassed a group of journalists and a domestic environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) worker visiting reservoirs in Hebei province that were sending water to Beijing, according to a July 14 San Francisco Chronicle article.

See previous Commission analyses in this area going back to 2007

“Green Olympics” Commitments Raise Concerns Over Transparency and Implementation

SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental Information

Crackdown on Certain Groups and Individuals

Petitioners

A July 17 Oriental Daily report (via Open Source Center, July 17, subscription required) noted that provinces and localities outside Beijing had dispatched personnel to the capital to repatriate, sometimes forcefully, residents who had come to Beijing to petition the government. Amnesty International reported on April 1 that Beijing Public Security Bureau officers had already detained thousands of petitioners as part of an Olympics "clean up," and repatriated many of them.

Activists, NGOs, and Rights Defenders

Numerous activists, as well as the spouses of imprisoned rights defenders Hu Jia and Chen Guangcheng, have been subjected to unlawful home confinement and/or surveillance in order to prevent them from protesting or meeting with foreign journalists during the Olympics, according to a July 25 Radio Free Asia report.

SCMP reported (subscription required) on June 25 that officials monitoring the Internet in China were targeting Web sites run by local NGOs, including blocking access to one Web site serving hepatitis B sufferers. The Christian Science Monitor reported in December 2007 of an ongoing crackdown on NGOs that began earlier that year. In both cases, NGO activists believe those moves were related to the Olympics.

The Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that the Shanghai Public Security Bureau ordered activists, petitioners, and other "controlled" people not to leave the city and barred them from speaking to foreign press "for the purpose of strengthening public order during the Beijing Olympics," according to a June 25 SCMP article (subscription required).

The Commission has noted that in recent months officials have reportedly held in custody, detained, or sentenced Chinese citizens who have peacefully criticized China's human rights conditions and linked such criticism to the Olympics. These individuals include Hu Jia, Wang Dejia, Teng Biao, and Yang Chunlin.

The July 25 Radio Free Asia report also noted that Qi Zhiyong, a Beijing-based activist who lost a leg during the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, was told that he would be detained if he did not leave Beijing for the duration of the Olympics.

Migrant Workers

Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported (via Yahoo) on July 24 that authorities were ordering many of Beijing's millions of migrant workers to leave the city, a charge an official denied. In September 2006, Beijing officials said that migrant workers would not be forced out of Beijing during the Olympics, according to a September 15, 2006, Xinhua article (via Open Source Center, 15 September 06, subscription required).

Religious Groups and Falun Gong Practitioners

Some unregistered religious communities have reported increased harassment and abuse in the run-up to the Olympics. On July 18, authorities expelled Pastor Zhang Mingxuan, president of the Chinese House Church alliance, from Beijing after closing his church earlier that month on the grounds that it would be "a destabilising factor during the [Olympic] Games," according to Zhang's remarks as reported in a July 20 SCMP article (subscription required). "The crackdown on underground churches so far this year is much more intense than the past few years put together because of the Olympic Games," according to Zhang, as reported by the SCMP in another July 20 article (subscription required). Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang stated in March 2007 that the government would "strike hard" against hostile forces inside and outside the country, including religious and spiritual groups, to ensure a "good social environment" for the Olympics and 17th Communist Party Congress. For additional information, see a July 28 report from the China Aid Association.

In the months preceding the Olympics, Chinese security officials have implemented a widespread campaign to round up and intimidate Falun Gong practitioners nationwide. According to a July 8 Falun Dafa Information Center (FDIC) report, at least 8,037 adherents have been arrested since December 2007, including 208 in Beijing alone. Some of those detained were subsequently sentenced to reeducation-through-labor camps. Local police and public security officials have reportedly been making door-to-door arrests based on a previously compiled list of local practitioners, according to a March 12 FDIC report.

The central government has widely disseminated a directive urging local officials to actively detain Falun Gong practitioners and has publicly portrayed them as a dangerous threat to stability on par with "terrorism." A July 11 Xinhua article reports on a notice to Beijing residents offering a reward for what the report described as "substantial information on terrorist attacks, sabotage by illegal organizations and cults such as the Falun Gong..."

North Korean Refugees

In the year leading up to the Olympics, the government has intensified border surveillance and stepped up efforts to capture and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees, according to articles from the Sunday Times on June 29, Time Magazine on March 6, and Radio Free Asia on March 21. The Sunday Times article noted an agreement between China and North Korea to "tighten security measures to ensure 'stability' in the run-up to the Olympic Games and to stop any embarrassing demonstrations by refugees." A July 22 AP report based on South Korean intelligence sources also confirms that Chinese border security has increased, refugees are being targeted, and that even renewal of visas for North Koreans with proper documentation has been restricted.

In preparation for the Olympic torch relay's arrival in Yanji City on July 19, Chinese public security agents conducted daily inspections of the homes of ethnic Koreans living near the border since April, according to a June 18 Daily North Korea report and a June 14 report from Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (LFNKR). Residents report to LFNKR that penalties for harboring refugees now include imprisonment and fines ranging from 8,000 to 10,000 RMB (US$1,150-1,445). Interviews conducted by the Sunday Times with border residents in June found that local authorities were repatriating “several hundred” refugees per month as a result of the house inspections.

In recent months, government harassment of religious communities along the border has increased dramatically. The central government has ordered provincial religious affairs bureaus to investigate religious communities for signs of involvement with foreign coreligionists, according to an April 10 LFNKR report. In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Chinese authorities have shut down churches found to have ties to South Koreans or other foreign nationals.

Others

According to a July 12 Age article, a British citizen of Tibetan ethnicity, beggars, women used in prostitution, and the homeless have been expelled from Beijing or denied re-entry.

See previous Commission analyses in this area going back to 2005

North Korea Executes 15 Attempting Escape, China Arrests 40 Refugees

Government Grants Exit Visas to Seven North Koreans, Pressures UNHCR in Pre-Olympic Crackdown

Foreign Minister "Freedom of Speech" Comments At Odds With Arrests, Detentions

Xinjiang Authorities Target Christian-Owned Businesses for Closure

Beijing Drafts Mental Health Regulations in Preparation for Olympics

Communications Ministry Orders Push to Resolve Unpaid Migrant Wage Claims

Security Officers Detain and Release House Church Protestants

Tibet

The Chinese government has taken new measures that attempt to force the Dalai Lama to accept responsibility for the views and actions of Tibetan activist groups that seek to stage pro-independence protests against the backdrop of the Beijing Olympics, and to stop such groups from carrying out their protests. A senior Party official told the Dalai Lama's envoys when they visited Beijing on July 1 and 2 that as a precondition to continuing the dialogue the Dalai Lama must "explicitly promise" to provide "no support for activities that aimed to disturb and sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games," and that he must prove his compliance through his actions (Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 3 July 08).

The Tibetan People's Uprising Movement (TPUM), an association of Tibetan activist groups that calls for Tibetan freedom, announced on July 22 that the group would organize protests against China's role as the Olympic host during and after the Olympics at the locations of United Nations and International Olympic Committee offices in the United States and Europe, according to a statement posted on the TPUM Web site. Chinese officials have blamed the Dalai Lama (or the "Dalai Clique") for TPUM activities (Xinhua, 1 April 08), even though the Dalai Lama has continued to reiterate his explicit support for the Beijing Olympic Games (see, e.g., the Dalai Lama's April 6 statement, Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Web site).

The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), a pro-Tibetan independence group and TPUM's principal affiliate, announced separately that it would "stage [a] series of protests worldwide before and during the Beijing Games" (Phayul, 21 July 08). Chinese officials have accused the TYC (without providing substantiation) of "violent terrorist activities" and, as another new precondition on dialogue, have demanded that the Dalai Lama "concretely curb" the group's alleged violent activity (Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 3 July 08). The Dalai Lama's envoys "categorically rejected" the Chinese characterization of the TYC during the July meetings in Beijing, according to the Special Envoy's July 5 statement (reprinted on the International Campaign for Tibet Web site).

See previous Commission analyses in this area dating back to 2006

Official Information Confirms Sentence for Tibetan Nun Who Put Up Posters

Gansu Court Sentences Five Tibetan Monks and Nuns for Protest Posters

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR)

Uighurs in the XUAR and overseas groups reported that Chinese authorities increased controls in the region to prevent perceived threats to stability as the Olympic torch relay passed through the XUAR, according to a June 15 AFP article (via ABS-CBN News Online). According to sources cited in the article, officials barred some local Muslims from traveling overseas, required residents to "avoid contact with foreigners" and "report any overseas journalists operating in the area," forced Muslim religious personnel to receive "political education" on "protecting" the Olympics, and detained thousands.

According to a June 18 Radio Free Asia article, a spokesman for the German-based World Uighur Congress said torch relay onlookers would have to pass a political background check and be required to cheer.

Chinese officials have sought to justify the recent crackdown as intended to prevent terrorist activity that could disrupt the Olympics. The Commission noted in a March analysis that XUAR Communist Party Chair Wang Lequan linked a January security raid to a group allegedly planning to attack the Olympics, although he provided only limited details about the incident.

See previous Commission analysis in this area going back to 2008

Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-01 ) \| Posted on: 2008-08-04
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Officials Order Hotels To Step Up Monitoring and Censorship of Internet

Over the last year, public security officials across China have ordered hotels, guesthouses, and other places offering Internet access on a "non-commercial" (fei jingying xing) basis to comply with existing Internet regulations and install Internet security systems capable of monitoring and censoring users' Internet activities. A recent search of public documents online found official notices to that effect and reports of related public security campaigns in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province (reported July 25, 2007), Shenzhen city, Guangdong province (issued August 1, 2007), Jining city, Shandong province (issued December 12, 2007), Zibo city, Shandong province (issued December 14, 2007), Dongguan city, Guangdong province (issued December 26, 2007), Shunde district, Foshan city, Guangdong province (issued January 7, 2008), Dongying city, Shandong province (issued March 20, 2008), Xintai city, Shandong province (reported May 16, 2008), and Yiyuan county, Zibo, Shandong province (issued June 20, 2008). In a report titled "Strengthen Hotel and Guest House Internet Security Supervision, Laws To Make It Happen, Beijing Olympics Closing In, Public Security Extends Strength of Internet Security Supervision at Hotels and Guesthouses in Each Area," a Chinese technology industry Web site noted that Shanghai (May 12, 2008), Anqing city, Anhui province (beginning of 2007), Liuzhou city, Guangxi province (reported March 27, 2008), and Lianyungang city, Jiangsu province (March 17, 2008), among others, had also taken similar measures.

Though the orders do not directly refer to the Olympics, many specify that hotels and guesthouses must complete installation of Internet security systems before China hosts the games in August. The Zibo notice, for example, requires hotels and guesthouses to comply by February 2008, while other places covered by the notice have until October. The Dongying notice provides a similar requirement, with hotels and guesthouses required to comply before April 2008, while others have until October. In the case of Dongguan, hotels and other places were required to have installed network security supervision systems by May 31, 2008, before inspections that began on June 1. Shunde's notice announced that inspections would begin in March and that those found not to be in compliance could be fined or forced to close.

The notices and reports indicate that hotels and guesthouses have been ordered to do one or more of the following:

Install Internet security supervision technology and systems recommended by public security officials and that meet government standards. Such systems must be able to record users' login and logoff times, dial-up number, account number, Internet address or domain name, and registration information; send data to a reporting center run by public security officials; discover and stop transmission of "illegal information"; and retain records of users' Internet activities for 60 days, in compliance with the Provisions on Internet Security Protection Technology Measures issued in 2005.

Improve procedures to deal with Internet security incidents and trace responsibility. In some areas, hotels and other places are ordered to notify public security officials within 24 hours of discovering such an incident.

Set up departments and designate personnel responsible for the Internet security supervision system and ensure that personnel are qualified and well-trained.

Sign a pledge to implement the Internet security technology measures. At a December 7, 2007, meeting convened by the Jining City Public Security Bureau more than 20 hotels and guesthouses in attendance signed such a pledge.

These measures alone do not necessarily violate international human rights standards. The measures may help officials combat pornography, online gambling, invasions of privacy, and intellectual property violations, all of which are prohibited under Chinese regulations. The measures, however, also may further assist officials in carrying out censorship of politically sensitive information on the Internet and punishing Internet users who criticize the Chinese government or Communist Party online, in violation of international human rights standards for freedom of expression. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed and has committed to ratify, permits states to restrict freedom of expression only if necessary to respect the rights or reputations of others or protect national security, public order, or public health or morals. China's restrictions on peaceful political expression on the Internet violate Article 19.

For more information on China's imprisonment of online critics and censorship of the Internet in general, see "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-01 ) \| Posted on: 2008-08-04
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Statement on China's Olympic Commitments by Chairman Sander Levin and Co-Chairman Byron Dorgan (August 1, 2008)

China made a number of commitments in its quest to host the 2008 Olympic Summer Games. These included specific commitments to human rights, press freedom, openness and the environment. These commitments are documented and unmistakable. China plays an increasingly significant role in the international community, and it is vital that there be continuing assessment of its commitments, whether as a member of the WTO or as the awarded host of the Olympics. This is not a matter of one country meddling in the affairs of another. Other nations, including ours, have both the responsibility and a legitimate interest in ensuring compliance with these commitments.

On July 12, 2001, days before the International Olympic Committee voted to select Beijing as the site of the 2008 Olympics, Mr. Wang Wei, Secretary General of the Beijing Olympic Bid Committee, told the press, "(w)e are confident that the Games coming to China not only promotes our economy, but also enhances all social conditions, including education, health and human rights." These words could not have been clearer. Human rights and the 2008 Olympics were linked before Beijing was awarded the Games, and China itself linked them. And China was correct to do so. Let us be absolutely clear: criticism of China continues today not due to meddling, not due to "subversion," and not even because China is hosting the Olympics. Criticism continues because China's leaders refuse to live up to the international commitments they themselves publicly made.

Today, more than 800 individuals are known to be languishing at this very moment in jail cells across China simply for attempting to exercise their rights to speak, to write, to work, to organize, and to engage fully in spiritual and religious life. They are peasants, professors, parents, priests, and poets. They include those who were branded subversive for stating publicly that the protection of human rights mattered more to them than hosting the Olympic Games.

Beijing's Olympic bid documents stated "There will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games," and Beijing's Action Plan for the Olympics states that "(i)n the preparation for the Games, we will be open in every aspect to the rest of the country and the whole world." Yet the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China received reports of 160 cases of various forms of harassment against foreign journalists in China during 2007 and 110 cases just in the first six months of 2008.

Furthermore, journalists in Beijing's Olympic press facilities reported on July 30 that China blocked foreign reporters' access to foreign web sites, including those of organizations reporting on human rights issues related to the Olympic Games. Reporters in the Olympic press headquarters in Beijing today confirmed that some previously restricted sites had been unblocked, but whether these actions constitute full compliance with China's prior commitments remains to be seen.

Beijing's bid documents also stated that "Beijing promises to provide a clean environment for the athletes by 2008." Yet athletes from around the world are arriving in Beijing with anti-pollution masks, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is considering rescheduling endurance events such as the marathon to prevent health risks due to air pollution.

China's failure to meet the commitments it made in its quest for the Games ― which, as this newsletter shows, are clear, documented and unmistakable ― underscores serious questions about what China and other nations will do in the future if China's failure to meet its Olympics-related commitments continues.

To contact Chairman Sander Levin, call Douglas Grob at 202-226-3777.
To contact Co-Chairman Byron Dorgan, call Charlotte Oldham-Moore at 202-226-3798.

Source: -See Summary (2008-08-02 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-08-03
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China's Earthquake Coverage More Open But Not Uncensored

Numerous reports in foreign media of China's initial response to the May 12 Sichuan earthquake described unusual media openness and government candor when compared to previous disasters. From the beginning, however, Communist Party and government officials directed Chinese media to emphasize the government's proactive response to the disaster and to focus on positive stories that promoted national unity and stability. Furthermore, China has quickly sought to rein in press coverage of topics that could taint the public's view of China's response, including allegations of official malfeasance leading to the collapse of a large number of schools. After parents of some of the thousands of children killed in the collapses began protests, officials reportedly ordered Chinese media to curb reporting on the issue, forcibly removed parents from protest sites, and briefly held foreign reporters trying to cover the protests in custody.

In the days following the quake, the New York Times (NYT) (May 14), Wall Street Journal (WSJ) (May 14), Associated Press (AP) (May 14, May 26), and Los Angeles Times (LAT) (May 23), among other media outlets, reported that Chinese television aired extensive and graphic live coverage from disaster areas, foreign reporters had largely unfettered access to disaster areas, and Xinhua, the central government's news agency, initially issued updates by the minute. The May 14 NYT article said "the rescue effort playing nonstop on Chinese television is remarkable for a country that has a history of concealing the scope of natural calamities," and according to the May 26 AP article, "[n]ever before have the nation's leaders allowed foreign reporters so much freedom to cover a major disaster." The reports noted that China's response following the Sichuan earthquake compared favorably to the devastating 1976 Tangshan earthquake, the 2003 SARS outbreak, Tibetan protests that began in March, and a major train collision in April - instances where officials sought to conceal casualty totals or severely limit media coverage.

Nevertheless, both Chinese and foreign media reports have indicated that since the disaster struck, Chinese officials have used their control over the media to shape post-quake coverage to their advantage. Hours after the quake, the Party's Central Propaganda Department issued a directive prohibiting media from sending reporters to the disaster areas and ordering them to only run reports from the central television station and news agency, according to a May 18 NYT article and the May 23 LAT article. Li Changchun, a high-ranking member of the Politburo, called on China's press to propagandize the government's rescue efforts and emphasize positive propaganda, unity, and stability, according to May 14 and May 17 Xinhua articles. As a result, China's domestic media have largely shied away from "negative reports," according to a May 24 article in The Age (Australia). There are indications, however, that Chinese journalists are testing the boundaries. So many journalists ignored the original order not to travel to the quake zones that it was later rescinded, according to the May 18 NYT article. And progressive Chinese media have reported on protests by angry parents seeking official accountability for poorly constructed schools (Southern Metropolitan Daily, May 26), and called for better earthquake-resistance standards for schools and enhanced supervision in the construction process (Caijing, May 22).

It is unclear why China has allowed this limited openness and more recent signs indicate that China has already begun to pull back. China has sought to play up what it calls "unprecedented transparency" following the earthquake as being the result of reforms that have taken place gradually in recent years, culminating most recently in open government regulations that went into effect on May 1, according to a May 26 Xinhua special report. Other observers have argued, however, that factors outside of China's control may have played a more important role. One media observer noted in a May 23 Washington Times (WT) article that censors may have been hampered because "news was spreading too quickly through online channels and the impact of the tragedy ran too deep." Others have noted that the nature of the event made it easier for China to respond with openness. "It is important to note that this was a natural disaster. People are united behind the government rescue effort so allowing a freer flow of information is politically beneficial for the censors," said Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet Project and professor of journalism at the University of California at Berkeley, according to the WT article. China's rapid and extensive lockdown on information following the recent Tibetan protests (see previous CECC analyses: 1, 2, 3), for example, suggests that the Party's willingness to allow "openness" will depend heavily on context. The Financial Times (June 1) and AP (June 3, via Guardian) reported that officials recently ordered media to rein in coverage of the school collapses and prevented foreign journalists from reporting as officials forcibly broke up a protest by grieving parents.

For a timeline highlighting major events affecting media coverage and the free flow of information in the aftermath of the earthquake, click on "more" below.

Timeline of Major Events Affecting Media Coverage and Free Flow of Information

MAY 12

A then-reported 7.8 magnitude earthquake (later revised to 8.0) strikes Wenchuan County, Sichuan province at 2:28 p.m., according to a May 12 Xinhua article. Premier Wen Jiabao immediately flies to the disaster zone.
Within 20 minutes of the quake, officials announce its location and magnitude, and within hours death counts begin, and are frequently updated, according to a May 15 Xinhua article. Information about the quake, some in the form of rumors, spreads quickly over the Internet and cell phones, according to a May 13 WSJ article.
Just hours after the quake, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) issues an order barring media from sending reporters to the disaster areas, according to a May 18 NYT article. So many journalists ignore the order that by May 14 the CPD changes tack, saying reporters can go but must travel with rescue teams, even though many journalists have already been reporting live from the disaster areas.
Li Changchun, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, convenes a "special meeting" of propaganda officials, and calls on news media to "consciously implement the spirit of the central authorities," "firmly grasp the correct direction of public opinion," and "persist in giving priority to unity, stability, encouragement, and positive propaganda," according to a May 14 Xinhua article.

MAY 13

Xinhua reports that the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has issued an urgent circular strengthening monitoring of cell phones and the Internet to ensure "correct guidance of public opinion."

MAY 14-15

Foreign media reports note the unusual candor of Chinese media coverage. China's central television station, CCTV, issues 24-hour coverage of the quake, and newspapers devote at least half their pages to the disaster, according to a May 15 AP article. Coverage is unusually candid, showing buried bodies, wounded victims, and grief-stricken family members. Despite openness, foreign media note heavy emphasis on coverage of Premier Wen's presence in the disaster areas. Foreign reporters appear to enjoy unfettered access, according to the May 14 NYT article. A few journalists later report blocked access or harassment in quake areas, according to a May 19 Foreign Correspondents Club of China statement.
In a May 14 commentary, the official China Daily questions whether the central government had spent enough to ensure the safety of school buildings, noting that in some areas deaths in schools constituted the majority of reported fatalities.
On May 15, the MPS announces that 17 citizens were punished, including detentions in two cases, for circulating "malicious rumors" about the quake on the Internet, according to a May 15 Xinhua article.

MAY 16

Li Changchun visits the offices of Xinhua and CCTV, and outlines how reporters should be covering the earthquake, according to a May 17 Xinhua article. He said they should propagandize the important policies being implemented by the Party and central government as well as the positive actions of officials at all levels and the People's Liberation Army, and "show the great spiritual strength of the Chinese nation in uniting as one."

MAY 18

State Council declares three-day period of national mourning to be held from May 19 to 22. The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television and the General Administration on Press and Publication order movie theatres to stop showing movies, TV channels to cease entertainment programming and broadcast only quake-related programs, and Web sites to suspend online gaming.

MAY 20

Agence France-Presse reports that the Chinese press' relatively positive coverage of the government's response to the disaster stood in contrast to greater criticism circulating on the Internet.
Foreign media observe that Chinese media coverage turns less aggressive. Newspapers begin to publish more official Xinhua stories, according to a May 20 WSJ article.

MAY 22

The Communist Party's People's Daily reports the investigation and handling of 55 cases of "starting rumors" on the Internet about the earthquake.

MAY 24

An examination of Chinese media reporting following the quake by The Age (Australia) finds that most stories focused on "non-threatening storylines - extraordinary rescues, miraculous survivals...and the laudable efforts of Premier Wen Jiabao...." The article notes that Chinese analysts and journalists interviewed said "there has been little analysis of earthquake prevention measures or apparently substandard construction of schools and other buildings, and few negative reports."

JUNE 1

The Financial Times reports that sometime late in the week of May 25, Chinese journalists received a directive telling them to avoid coverage of the school collapses.

JUNE 3

AP reports (via NYT) that Chinese police forcibly disperse a protest of more than 100 parents of children killed in a school collapse in the Sichuan city of Dujiangyan and briefly hold an AP reporter and two photographers in custody to prevent them from reporting the event.

For more information on freedom of expression in China, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-06-05 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-07-30		more ...
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China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional Preconditions to Dialogue

Introduction

An unnamed official of the Chinese Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD) has outlined new preconditions that the Chinese government expects the Dalai Lama to fulfill if the dialogue between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives is to continue, according to a July 6, 2008, Xinhua report (translated in OSC, 07 July 08).

The preconditions press Chinese unsubstantiated government accusations that the Dalai Lama is responsible for Tibetan pro-independence views and activities, Tibetan violence during March rioting in Tibetan areas of China, a Tibetan NGO that the Chinese government characterizes as "terrorist," and Tibet activists' attempts to disrupt activities associated with the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The preconditions direct the Dalai Lama to take action to alter the political positions and activities of Tibetans internationally and within China. Another precondition that could impact the relationship between the Dalai Lama and India, and possibly between China and India, instructs the Dalai Lama to provide a blanket statement supporting the Chinese government position on questions of territory and sovereignty.

The Chinese government has offered to discuss with the Dalai Lama his personal future if he fulfills all of the Chinese government preconditions. Party and government officials have asserted that the Dalai Lama does not represent the Tibetan people and that he has no right to negotiate issues that address the future of Tibet or Tibetans.

The Seventh Round of Dialogue

The UFWD official detailed the new demands after the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen concluded a June 30 to July 3 visit to Beijing to conduct the seventh round of formal dialogue with Chinese officials since such contacts resumed in 2002. UFWD Head Du Qinglin led the Chinese team, which also included UFWD Executive Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun and Deputy Head Sita (or Sithar), according to the July 6 Xinhua report and a July 5 statement by Lodi Gyari. Senior UFWD officials served as the envoys' counterparts for all six of the previous rounds of dialogue, according to Lodi Gyari's statements following each round of meetings: September 2002, May-June 2003, September 2004, June-July 2005, February 2006, and June-July 2007. In 2005, the UFWD established a new bureau to handle Tibetan affairs, according to a September 12, 2006, Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 15 September 06). The Seventh Bureau's mission is "to cooperate with relevant parties in struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans." The UFWD oversees the implementation of Party policy toward ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and China's eight "democratic" political parties, among other functions. (See the official Chinese government Web site for an explanation of "democratic" parties).

The July 1 and 2 meetings in Beijing followed a cascade of generally peaceful Tibetan protests that began on March 10 in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), then swept across more than 50 additional county-level areas in the TAR and Tibetan autonomous areas located in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces. Chinese officials maintain that "the Dalai Clique"―Tibetan organizations and individuals, and their supporters, whom Chinese officials claim that the Dalai Lama controls―"organized, premeditated, and masterminded" rioting that took place in Lhasa and 10 other county-level locations, as well as international protests that disrupted the Olympic torch relay. (See, e.g., Xinhua, 1 April 08, for Ministry of Public Security (MPS) accusations, and CECC Analysis, 10 April 08, 7, for analysis of the accusations.) The Dalai Lama has continued to reiterate his support for the Beijing Olympic Games and to call on all Tibetans―wherever they live―to refrain from violence. (See, e.g., Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans, 6 April 08).

Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's envoys said after the Beijing talks concluded that continuing the dialogue is in jeopardy and depends on measures undertaken by the other side. The UFWD official said in the July 6 Xinhua report that if "the Dalai side" could not accept the government requirements conveyed to the envoys (the "four no supports") and make progress to "materialize" them, then "there would hardly be the atmosphere and conditions required for the contacts and discussions between the two sides." Lodi Gyari said in his July 5 statement that the Tibetan delegation had been "compelled to candidly convey to our counterparts that in the absence of serious and sincere commitment on their part the continuation of the present dialogue process would serve no purpose."

The envoys had traveled to Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, for preliminary, informal talks with UFWD officials on May 4. Gyari said in a May 8 statement that the envoys had stressed the importance of "ending the current repression throughout Tibet," releasing prisoners, allowing the injured to receive proper medical treatment, and providing visitors and reporters with "unfettered access" to Tibetan areas of China.

More Preconditions: Four "No's" and Three "Stops"

The "four no supports," according to the July 6 Xinhua report, direct the Dalai Lama to "give an open and explicit promise and take corresponding actions" that he would give (ordered as in Xinhua):

"no support for activities that aimed to disturb and sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games;"
"no support for and making no attempt to conspire and incite violent criminal activities;"
"no support for and taking earnest steps to check the violent terrorist activities of the 'Tibetan Youth Association' [Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC)];" and
"no support for any propositions [zhuzhang] or activities that sought to achieve 'Tibet independence' and split the motherland."

The UFWD official explained that the "four no supports" are a "concretized form" of the "three stops." He described the "four no supports" as "more operable, and more acceptable to the Dalai side," and said that they represent "a message of goodwill that we would like to send to the Dalai side, in order to ensure positive results for the contacts between the two sides." The July 6 Xinhua article did not define the "three stops," but a July 7 Xinhua report did so. The Chinese government has requested the Dalai Lama to (ordered as in Xinhua):

"stop activities aimed at splitting China;"
"stop plotting and inciting violence;" and
"stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games."

The UFWD official claimed in the July 6 Xinhua article that while the Dalai Lama's envoys were in Beijing, they "recognized the requirement as a new gist put forward by the central government, and indicated that they would accept the requirement raised by the central government." Public statements by the Dalai Lama's envoys, however, express no such acceptance of these demands, and instead reject them as without basis. Lodi Gyari observed in his July 5 statement, that "the Chinese side" is "now urging His Holiness not to support violence, terrorism, and sabotaging the Olympics." The envoys, he said, "stated in the strongest possible terms that no one needs to urge us on this as His Holiness and the Tibetan struggle are universally acknowledged and appreciated for consistently rejecting and opposing such acts," the statement said, and categorically rejected the Chinese attempt to label [the TYC] a violent and terrorist organization."

Together, the "four no supports" and the "three stops" intensify the Chinese government and Party campaign to hold the Dalai Lama personally accountable for Tibetan views and activities that he does not support and that contradict his policies and guidance. In addition, UFWD Head Du Qinglin's demand stated in a July 3 Xinhua report (reprinted in China Daily, 3 July 08) that the Dalai Lama "should openly and explicitly promise" to fulfill the requirements of the "four no supports" and "prove it in his actions" creates pressure on the Dalai Lama to take on the role of a proponent of Chinese government political objectives as a precondition to continuing a dialogue that seeks to address political issues.

Chinese government pressure on the Dalai Lama to take action against "propositions or activities" in support of Tibetan independence is important because Chinese government targets are not limited to plans or activities that include violence―Chinese targets include a point of view and the peaceful expression of it. Many of the countries where Tibetans live, including India, have constitutions that protect the freedom of speech and governments that strive to respect that freedom. China, a notable exception, has a constitution that provides the freedom of speech but a government that does not protect citizens' exercise of the right. (See, e.g., Constitution of India, Art. 19 (available on the Government of India Ministry of Law and Justice Web site; PRC Constitution, Art. 35; and U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1, (available on the U.S. House of Representatives Web site).) In China, authorities can imprison Chinese citizens who peacefully question or object to state policies by convicting them of crimes such as "splittism" or "inciting splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103, "the scheme of splitting the State or undermining unity of the country"), and "subversion" or "inciting subversion" (Article 105, "the scheme of subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system").

If the Dalai Lama were to attempt to take action to stop Tibetans from peacefully expressing support for the proposition of Tibetan independence in countries such as India and the United States, he could find himself accused of interfering with constitutionally protected rights in those countries, especially the freedom of speech. The Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach (available on the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Web site) outlines his longstanding effort to provide an alternative to Tibetan independence. (See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for information on the Middle Way Approach.)

A "No" and a "Must:" A Potential Wedge Between the Dalai Lama and India

The UFWD official also reiterated in the July 6 Xinhua report the Chinese government's five policy-related demands of the Dalai Lama. All of the demands focus on issues of territory and sovereignty. The spokesman asserted that the central government has "all along" emphasized that the Dalai Lama must (ordered as in Xinhua):

"truly give up his stance of 'Tibet independence';"
"stop all activities that aim to split the motherland;"
"recognize that Tibet is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory;"
"[recognize] that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory;" and
"[recognize] that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government that represents entire China."

The fifth demand, to uphold Chinese government positions on territory and sovereignty, could heighten the obstacles facing the dialogue, especially in cases where the government accuses the Dalai Lama of having a "splittist" role in the matter. By invoking the preconditions, China may seek to maneuver the Dalai Lama into an awkward (if not untenable) position with respect to the government of India―the country that has provided refuge to the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of other Tibetans since 1959, and continues to do so.

For example, the Chinese government claims as part of China a substantial part of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which borders the southeastern TAR. China and India engaged in armed conflict in 1962 over disputed territory along their border, including territory within Arunachal Pradesh. (See, American University, Inventory of Conflict and Environment, Case Study 161; and International Boundary Consultants, International Boundary Monitor, 15 May 98). The dispute remains unresolved―maps published by China show the disputed area of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. (Compare the location of the China-India border relative to the location of the Brahmaputra River on an Indian map available on Maps of India, with the locations shown on a Chinese map available on Maps-of-China.net.) Military tension along the China-India border has increased since June 2008, according to a June 13 India Today commentary (reprinted in OSC, 18 June 08), a June 21 Straits Times report, and a June 27 Asia Times report.

A July 8, 2008, China Daily article linked the requirement that the Dalai Lama must provide "no support" for "splitting" China directly to the Arunachal Pradesh border dispute. According to China Daily, in a June 4, 2008, interview with an Indian media organization the Dalai Lama said that a 1914 agreement (the Simla Convention, reprinted on the Tibet Justice Center Web site) is legal. The agreement established "the McMahon Line" as the boundary between Tibetan and Indian territory. A June 4 Times of India report paraphrased the Dalai Lama as acknowledging that Arunachal Pradesh became part of India under the agreement, which British and Tibetan representatives signed. The Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche, the elected head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, have made other statements in support of the validity of the McMahon Line, according to media reports (see, e.g., Samdhong Rinpoche in Rediff News, 19 March 08; the Dalai Lama in Indo-Asian News Service, reprinted in World Tibet News, 18 January 07; and Samdhong Rinpoche in Times of India, 7 December 06.) A September 1992 Chinese government White Paper (Tibet -- Its Ownership And Human Rights Situation, available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site) outlined China's objections to the Simla Conference and claimed that the government of the then-Republic of China had refused to sign or recognize the agreement.

The China Daily article, referring to the Dalai Lama's reported June 4 remarks in support of the McMahon Line, said that he "needs to take back his unreasonably wrong and traitorous remarks." Chinese officials who press the Dalai Lama to adopt Chinese government positions on issues of territory and sovereignty may do so knowing that if he conforms to China's stance on the Arunachal Pradesh dispute, he will alienate himself from the Indian government that hosts him, and potentially put at risk India's hospitality toward Tibetan refugees.

China's Offer: Discussions on a Future for the Dalai Lama, but Not for Tibetans

The Chinese government is prepared to have discussions with the Dalai Lama about his "personal future," if the Dalai Lama fulfills the Chinese government's requirements of him, the UFWD official said in the July 6 Xinhua report. Only the Chinese central government and TAR government are "the representatives of the Tibetan people," the official said, underscoring Chinese government refusal to accept the Dalai Lama as such a representative. Dong Yunhu, Director General of the State Council Information Office, said that the Dalai Lama is not "qualified to represent Tibet" and "has lost all right to negotiate on the future of Tibet," according to a July 15 Indo-Asian News Service report (reprinted in Yahoo!). The Chinese government "will never discuss the future of Tibet" with the Dalai Lama, Dong said, but is willing to discuss the Dalai Lama's future and that of "some of his supporters."

The UFWD official denied that the "contacts and discussion" with the Dalai Lama's representatives are "talks between China and Tibet" or "dialogues between the Hans and Tibetans." He emphasized that the Chinese government "will by no means hold any discussion" with the Tibetan government-in-exile, which he described as an "illegal organization." Dong said that the discussions with the Dalai Lama's representatives have made clear that their political positions were "totally contrary" to the Chinese government position.

For more information, see "Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama" in Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, and "Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama" in Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report. Special Focus for 2007 is also available as a separate reprint.

Source: -See Summary (2008-07-31 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-07-30
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Earthquakes Expose China's Urgent Need for NGO Legal Reform

The NGO Sichuan Union Relief Office (Relief Office) announced on May 31 that it would discontinue its earthquake relief work after 17 days of operation because it was unable to register with the government as an NGO, according to a June 2 Radio Free Asia report. The Relief Office was coordinating the work of over 100 NGOs in Southwestern China in the aftermath of the May 12 Sichuan earthquake. (See CECC's other earthquake related analyses: China's Earthquake Coverage More Open But Not Uncensored, and Officials To Watch for "Negative Content" in Supplements About Earthquake.) While the Relief Office said that its decision to close was not the result of government pressure, a volunteer noted that police raided the office after receiving reports that it was "illegally soliciting donations."

This case highlights the challenges that civil society organizations face when trying to address social issues, even in urgent crisis. It also underscores the need for legal reform in the governance of NGOs and charities in China. So far, the 2004 Regulations on the Management of Foundations, the 1998 Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, as well as the 1998 Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental and Non-Commercial Enterprises are the latest government regulations managing NGOs and their registration in China. All three regulations require: a sponsor organization, i.e. a government or a Communist Party organization, to support the initial registration; and a government department, i.e., the State Council's Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) or a local civil affairs department, to review and approve the registration.

The restrictive requirements for NGO registration are inconsistent with the right to freedom of association as defined by art. 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), of which China is a signatory. They also lead many organizations to operate without formal legal status, as noted in 2007 CECC's Annual Report, Section III--Civil Society. Many NGOs encounter difficulty in securing a sponsor organization and have to struggle for legitimacy, as detailed in a January 2003 Report by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing entitled Chinese NGOs--Carving a Niche within Constraints.

The Ministry of Civil Affairs is considering legal reforms to regulate the non-profit sector, according to Vice Minister Li Liguo's interview with People's Daily on May 25, 2007. A proposal to reform the dual-management of NGOs was also submitted to the National People's Congress in March 2007, according to China Law Digest. However, an October 2007 analysis by China Development Brief, an independent publication to report on social development and civil society in China, reports that the State Council and the National People's Congress have yet put the proposal on their legislative agenda.

For more information about China's civil society and NGO development, please see 2007 CECC's Annual Report, Section III--Civil Society, and 2006 CECC Annual Report, Section VII(a) Development of Civil Society.

Source: -See Summary (2008-07-21 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-07-21
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Harassment of Beijing-based Activists During the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue

According to a May 26 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) article and a May 28 Associated Press (AP) article, Beijing activists reported they were harassed, subjected to surveillance, and warned not to meet with the U.S. officials present in Beijing for the U.S.-China bilateral human rights dialogue.

On May 24, AIDS activist Wan Yanhai was contacted by the Beijing Public Security Bureau's National Security Unit and was told that he would be subjected to heightened surveillance over the next several days, according to the CHRD article. On May 25, Wan reported, in an essay circulated online (a Chinese version has been reprinted on the U.S.-based Secret China Web site; a blogger in Canada also posted an English version), that a police car was parked in front of his door and followed him wherever he went. Wan wrote: "If it were not for the police visit, I would not have known there was going to be a Sino-U.S. human rights dialogue. My neighbors heard from police that some international VIPs are coming."

On May 23 and 24, Zeng Jinyan, human rights activist and wife of Hu Jia, was reportedly told by the National Security police that they were watching her more closely and would prevent her from leaving her home because "a U.S. delegation wants to meet you," according to the CHRD article.

Human rights lawyer Zhang Xingshui declined an invitation to a May 27 working lunch with Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer after police visited his home on May 25 as reported in a May 27 USA Today article. According to the article, Zhang said: "They persuaded me not to meet the U.S. visitors. They did not say what would happen, but maybe they will give pressure to my work. . . . I am afraid, so I have to give up this opportunity."

Well-known rights defense lawyer Mo Shaoping was also warned not to accept an invitation to the May 27 lunch. According to the AP report, Mo said he went anyway.

Many other Beijing activists were also placed under surveillance in connection with the U.S.-China human rights dialogue, including a member of the China Democracy Party, religious rights activists, and veterans of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, as reported by the CHRD article.

Source: -See Summary (2008-06-25 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-07-08
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Mongolian Rights Advocate Released From Detention, Placed Under House Arrest

Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) have placed Mongolian rights activist and journalist Naranbilig under house arrest after detaining him for 20 days in March and April, according to reports from the U.S.-based Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC). Naranbilig had planned to attend the United Nations (UN) Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York when authorities intercepted his invitation letter and detained him on March 23, according to an April 28 report from SMHRIC. Authorities prevented Naranbilig from consulting with a lawyer while he was detained, and his family members were not informed of the grounds for his detention or of his whereabouts. Authorities released Naranbilig on bail on April 23 and placed him under house arrest for one year, according to the report. They also confiscated his passport.

The SMHRIC connected Naranbilig's detention not only to his plan to attend the Permanent Forum but also to his attendance in 2007 at other international forums promoting the rights of pastoralists and mobile indigenous people, according to a statement delivered by the SMHRIC at the Permanent Forum. The Chinese government does not recognize any populations within its borders as "indigenous peoples" as defined under international law. (For an example of Chinese policy on this matter, see. e.g., a 1997 statement by the Chinese delegation to the 53rd session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, via the Web site of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Switzerland.) Naranbilig's detention also stemmed from his broader activities writing articles advocating ethnic minority rights and criticizing Chinese policies toward ethnic Mongols, according to the SMHRIC statement. (For more information on government policy toward Mongols, see Christopher P. Atwood's statement at the 2005 CECC roundtable on China's Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does it Protect Minority Rights?, as well as the Special Focus section on ethnic minorities in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2005 Annual Report.) Authorities also have detained and imprisoned other ethnic Mongols who have promoted ethnic minority rights. In March, authorities detained, and later placed under house arrest, activist Tsebegjab for his interaction with overseas Mongolian activists, according to the April 28 report. Bookstore owner Hada continues to serve a 15-year sentence for "splittism" and "espionage" after he organized peaceful protests for ethnic rights in the IMAR capital of Hohhot.

Naranbilig's detention came at a period of increased government repression of citizen activism, especially by ethnic minorities, in the run-up to the Olympic Games and amid protests in Tibetan and Uighur areas of China. His detention also came amid the recent detention and imprisonment of several other fellow writers. (See, for example, CECC analyses on Lu Gengsong and Wang Dejia (1,2).) For more information on conditions in the IMAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site). For more information on restrictions against writers, see Section II--Freedom of Expression in the 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-06-03 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-06-28
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Family Questions Hu Jia's Medical Treatment; CECC Translation of Criminal Judgment

According to a June 13 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) article, authorities are reportedly denying imprisoned rights activist Hu Jia access to adequate medical care. Hu suffers from cirrhosis of the liver and his family has expressed concern over his poor health. Authorities allegedly told Hu's family that his health has improved and he is not eligible for medical parole, according to the CHRD article. Under the Measures on Implementing Medical Parole for Prisoners, issued in 1990 by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Public Security Bureau, a prisoner is not eligible for medical parole unless "there is risk of death in the short term" or until he has served one-third of a fixed-term sentence (the full Chinese text is posted on the Ministry of Justice Web site, relevant English excerpts are available on the Duihua Foundation Web site). The CHRD article states that without access to Hu's medical records, Hu's family has no way to ascertain if his current condition is life-threatening or if he has regular access to a liver specialist.

On April 3, 2008, the Beijing Municipal First Intermediate People's Court sentenced Hu Jia to three-and-one-half years's imprisonment and one year deprivation of political rights for inciting subversion of state power, a crime under Article 105 of China's Criminal Law. CHRD posted a copy of the court's decision, and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) has translated the decision into English. Upon leaving the courtroom on April 3, defense lawyer Li Fangping indicated that Hu had 10 days to appeal the decision, but did not plan to do so, according to an April 3 Boxun.com article (in Chinese). As reported on April 22 by Agence France-Presse (AFP), Hu Jia told his other lawyer, Li Jinsong, on April 4 that it would be futile to appeal. However, the AFP article also reported that Hu's lawyers were denied access to Hu on April 13, the last day to file an appeal. According to an April 23 CHRD article (in Chinese via CHRD), Li Fangping contacted the court, which notified him that it had not received a petition for appeal from Hu Jia during the 10-day appeal period.

Source: -See Summary (2008-06-19 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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China Continues to Crack Down on HIV/AIDS Web Sites and Activists

Chinese authorities have made significant progress in their efforts to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS since 2003, but at the same time continue to harass HIV/AIDS advocates. Authorities reportedly ordered the closure of the "AIDS Museum" Web site, www.aidsmuseum.cn, according its founder, Chang Kun, in a May 7 Radio Free Asia interview. Chang, an HIV/AIDS activist, said he received a phone call on May 6 from the site's Internet Service Provider (ISP) saying that the local public security bureau's Internet surveillance division reportedly ordered the site closed because it contained information about "firearms and ammunition."

Shaanxi province officials reportedly shut down another Web site, AIDS Wikipedia, also founded by Chang from February 20 to March 12, according to a Radio Free Asia interview on February 22 reported in The Epoch Times and Chang's personal Web page. In the interview, Chang said the closure by the local public security bureau's Internet surveillance division was due to his article about farmland confiscation in Anhui province.

The closure of Chang's Web sites follows other instances over the past year where officials harassed HIV/AIDS activists and curbed their online activities. These include:

Police reportedly harassed HIV/AIDS activist Wan Yanhai according to a May 27 USA Today report. Wan said he was put under 24-hour police surveillance for four days and the police followed his every move. Several other human rights activists reportedly had similar experience during the same time according to an Associated Press (AP) report (via International Herald Tribune). The crackdown took place during the weekend before the latest round of the Sino-U.S. human rights dialogue according to a May 27 press release by Human Rights in China.

Public security officials sentenced HIV/AIDS activist Hu Jia to three years and six months in prison for "inciting subversion of state power" on April 3. See CECC's news and analysis about Hu Jia's detention, formal arrest, trial, and sentence.

On March 5, Boxun reported that Beijing public security bureau's Internet surveillance division informed Beijing Aizhixing Institute (via Aizhixing's ISP) to remove illegal information, specifically sensitive information about HIV/AIDS. The illegal information was an Aizhixing statement on HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia's disappearance two years ago. Officials subsequently closed the Web site, with people in the Beijing area unable to access the site.

Officials banned a conference scheduled for early August 2007 in Guangzhou on the legal rights of those infected with HIV. The conference would have brought together fifty Chinese and international HIV/AIDS activists and experts. In a July 29, 2007, Radio Free Asia article, one of the conference organizers, the New York-based Asia Catalyst, suggested that authorities cancelled the conference because the subject matter and the involvement of foreigners were "too sensitive."

Leading HIV/AIDS experts and advocates from around the world submitted an open letter dated September 27, 2007, to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) expressing concern over Chinese government actions against the AIDS work of Chinese NGOs and advocates, including Li Dan. State security officials held Li, founder of the China Orchid AIDS Project and winner of the 2005 Reebok Human Rights Award, in custody in Beijing for 24 hours on July 27, 2007. The China Orchid AIDS Project was the co-organizer of the cancelled conference in August.

For more information on HIV/AIDS in China, see pages 117-118 and 127-129 of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-27 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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Officials To Watch for "Negative Content" in Supplements About Earthquake

Publishing regulators should ensure that magazine or periodical supplements related to the May 12 earthquake do not contain "negative content," according to a May 22 circular issued by the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), a government agency with the power to screen, censor, and ban any print, electronic, or Internet publication in China. The Circular Regarding Supporting Periodicals in Publishing Anti-Quake Disaster Relief Supplements does not define the term "negative content." The GAPP exercises tight control over the publishing industry in China and magazines generally may publish only two supplements a year with the approval of the relevant press and publication administration of the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the central government (see Article 34 of the Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing). Article 1 of the May 22 circular allows press and publication officials to approve an additional one or two supplements related to "anti-quake disaster relief" for magazines that have reached the two-supplement limit. Article 2 calls on officials reviewing applications to publish these supplements to "take strict precautions against negative content appearing in supplements" and to "attach great importance to the supplement's public opinion guidance function."

Despite the outward appearance of some initial openness in Chinese media coverage of the earthquake, Chinese officials have continued to use their control over the media to shape post-quake coverage and public opinion to their advantage. In addition to the GAPP circular, the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department and a top official of the Politburo have instructed reporters to emphasize stories showcasing the government's rescue efforts and the unity of the Chinese nation, while avoiding or downplaying controversial topics such as parents protesting over schools that collapsed in the quake.

Such state-enforced manipulation of the media to promote the Party's political agenda violates international standards for freedom of expression. Article 19 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed and has committed to ratify, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), guarantees the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. The ICCPR and UDHR permit states to restrict this freedom under a limited number of circumstances, but furthering a political agenda is not one of the permitted exceptions. In addition to the ICCPR and UDHR protections, Article 35 of China's Constitution provides that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of the press.

For more information on how the Party uses the Chinese media to serve its own interests, see "Roles the Media Is Expected to Play" in Section II--Freedom of Expression of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report. For more information on the various agencies responsible for censorship in China, click here.

Source: -See Summary (2008-06-11 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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North Korea Executes 15 Attempting Escape, China Arrests 40 Refugees

On February 20, North Korean security agents publicly executed 13 women and 2 men in the town of Juwongu in the county of Onseong in North Hamyung province near the border with China, according to unnamed sources cited in a March 10 North Korea Today report (a newsletter published by Good Friends, a Buddhist NGO based in South Korea). The executions reportedly were carried out on a bridge, as local residents were forced to observe. Local authorities notified all public institutions, enterprises, and neighborhood units that attendance was mandatory and verified attendance on the day of the executions, according to the report.

The report said that the authorities accused the people who were executed of planning to cross the border to seek economic assistance from relatives in China, or of assisting others wishing to cross the border. The report does not mention allegations common in reports of previous executions that the people executed had engaged in espionage or had worked with outside Christian groups. The report implies that authorities may have targeted individuals crossing the border in search of food. Local residents reportedly were "deeply shocked" by the executions and stressed that those who were executed were only trying to survive amid conditions of starvation.

North Korean authorities have said recent executions such as the one on February 20 were carried out in response to a rise in unauthorized crossings, according to the Good Friends' account. Good Friends quoted a North Korean official as saying, "[w]e see people moving [across the border] more busily these days....This is why we carried out the executions. We wanted the people to have the right frame of mind on this issue." On March 5, the BBC also reported on the executions, but noted that "[t]here has been no official word from North Korea on the executions and South Korea's Unification Ministry said it could not confirm the report."

Good Friends also pointed out that last year North Korea increased the sentences for refugees caught crossing the river to China or who are repatriated from China. Beginning in March 2007, the penalty for crossing the river for economic reasons, which North Korea considers a crime, increased from a maximum of three years to five to seven years in prison. According to a March 2008 report from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, penalties imposed by North Korea for refugees believed to have had contact with South Korean Christian groups are more severe, including execution in some cases. An unnamed Christian activist working along the border who was cited in a March 6 Time article said that North Korea raised the salaries of border guards in an effort to stop them from accepting bribes from refugees attempting to escape.

According to unnamed sources cited in a March 21 Radio Free Asia report, plainclothes Chinese security agents carried out a massive raid in the city of Shenyang in Liaoning province on March 17, leading to the arrest of around 40 North Korean refugees. The sources also said that Chinese authorities arrested four North Korean refugees on March 5 at a local restaurant in Shenyang and arrested two others attempting to cross the Tumen River, which marks the border between North Korea and Jilin province.

Recent actions by Chinese authorities against North Korean refugees may be part of a larger pre-Olympics crackdown. Suzanne Scholte, chairman of the North Korea Freedom Coalition, told Radio Free Asia on March 21 that Chinese authorities are conducting operations against North Korean refugees "in a manner similar to what they have been doing in Tibet." According to an unnamed diplomat quoted in the March 6 Time article, China recently has increased pressure on North Korea to halt the movement of refugees across the border. "Beijing wanted to nip in the bud, before the Olympics, any chance that the number of refugees would turn into a flood this year," the diplomat said. The diplomat added that China has also complained to Pyongyang that a recent slowing of the manufacturing sector in northeast China has produced an excessively large labor pool to which they do not want further additions. The diplomat's account echoes previous concerns voiced by Chinese authorities that North Korean refugees could pose a threat to social stability and economic growth.

Fulfilling its obligations under international law, however, would not require China to permanently absorb these refugees into Chinese society. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)seeks to resettle all North Korean refugees who enter China to third countries, and does not insist that Beijing allow them to settle permanently within Chinese territory. South Korea grants automatic citizenship to North Korean defectors under its Constitution and the United States accepts North Korean refugees for resettlement under its own North Korean Human Rights Act. These two countries provide clear alternatives to repatriation that the Chinese authorities have failed to utilize, in spite of the urging of the UNHCR to do so.

A March 2008 survey of North Koreans hiding in China conducted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea found that a large majority of refugees do not wish to remain in China. Only 14.3 percent of a sample of 1,247 refugees indicated a desire to remain in China permanently. A much larger number, 64.3 percent, preferred to resettle in South Korea while 19.1 percent expressed a preference to live in the United States. Regardless, Beijing's repatriation policy and its insistence that undocumented North Korean border crossers are "illegal economic immigrants" contravene its obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As a signatory state to the Convention, China is expressly prohibited from engaging in repatriation or refoulement of refugees and is obligated to facilitate resettlement of North Korean refugees within its own territory or to a third country. China's refusal to formally recognize North Koreans who cross the border as refugees does not diminish their obligation to treat them as such under international law.

As noted in the 2006 CECC Annual Report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea concluded in a 2005 report that the widespread detention, abuse, and execution of repatriated refugees by Pyongyang provide a clear basis under international law for the recognition of North Koreans who crossed the border in search of sustenance as "refugees sur place." In other words, although some North Koreans may not meet the definition of "refugee" at the time of crossing, the harsh punishment meted out to them upon repatriation nevertheless necessitates that they be designated as refugees. A significant portion of North Koreans cross the border in order to escape political persecution, which renders them refugees in the first instance. China bases its policy of repatriating North Koreans on a 1961 treaty with the DPRK and a subsequent 1986 border protocol rather than on international law concerning refugees that requires China to offer protection.

For more information on North Korean Refugees in China, see pages 124-126 of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-06-05 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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Government Grants Exit Visas to Seven North Koreans, Pressures UNHCR in Pre-Olympic Crackdown

The Chinese government authorized exit visas in March for seven members of a group of North Korean refugees known as the "Beijing 17," according to a Voice of America report from March 22 (as reported by the Yonhap News Agency, via Open Source Center, subscription required). The seven released refugees traveled to the United States to seek asylum on March 20. They had been living under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Beijing for more than a year due to China's refusal to grant them permission to leave the country. The exact circumstances under which their release was won are not known, but it follows on the heels of a March 18 letter from U.S. legislators urging U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to press China on the issue, according to the report. It is also not understood why Beijing allowed only 7 of the 17 to receive exit visas or how those 7 were chosen. Personal information regarding the identities and backgrounds of the refugees was not publicly released, though it is known that among them were a mother and her two children.

In a related development, the Chinese government has reportedly demanded that the UNHCR refuse services to North Korean refugees seeking asylum until after the Olympics are held in late summer, according to a February 26 article in the Korea Times. The Chinese authorities also reportedly linked the acceptance of this demand by UNHCR with the issuance of exit visas for the Beijing 17 in a quid-pro-quo fashion.

The Chinese government for many years has forcibly repatriated North Korean refugees facing starvation and political persecution in their homeland. Beijing's repatriation policy and its insistence that undocumented North Korean border crossers are "illegal economic immigrants" contravene its obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As noted in the 2006 CECC Annual Report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea concluded in a 2005 report that the widespread detention, abuse, and execution of repatriated refugees by the regime in Pyongyang provide a clear basis under international law for the recognition of North Koreans who crossed the border in search of sustenance as "refugees sur place." In other words, although some North Koreans may not meet the definition of "refugee" at the time of crossing, the harsh punishment meted out to them upon repatriation nevertheless necessitates that they be designated as refugees. A significant portion of North Koreans cross the border in order to escape political persecution, which renders them refugees in the first instance.

The UNHCR seeks to resettle all North Korean refugees who enter China to third countries, and does not require that China allow them to settle permanently within their territory. South Korea grants automatic citizenship to North Korean defectors under its Constitution and the United States accepts North Korean refugees for resettlement under its own North Korean Human Rights Act.

For more information on North Korean Refugees in China, see pages 124-126 of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-20 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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Communication Disruptions in Tibetan Areas Impede Flow of Information

Cell phone, landline, and Internet transmissions have reportedly been disrupted in Tibetan areas of western China, according to foreign media, overseas Tibetan groups, and the blog of a noted Tibetan writer in reports from mid-March to late April. The disruptions come amidst protests by Tibetans that began on March 10. It is unclear to what extent the measures are necessary to protect security in those areas, but their effect, along with other measures such as the ban on foreign journalists entering large parts of western China, have made it difficult to access and confirm information about the protests.

Both the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) and Xinhua have reported that local police have confiscated communication equipment such as cell phones, cameras, fax machines, receivers for overseas TV channels, and computers from multiple monasteries in Sichuan and Gansu provinces. (See April 1 and April 5 TCHRD articles, and March 29 and April 16 Xinhua articles.) The Xinhua articles noted that the police also confiscated various weapons and explosives from the monasteries. Woeser (or Weise, Oezer), a noted Tibetan writer who has used her Chinese blog to feature frequent updates on the protests, reported in an April 28 entry that military police confiscated cameras and cell phones from a Qinghai province monastery on April 19.

Specific Reports of Disruptions (in chronological order)

A March 15 Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGiE) report said that home telephones and cell phones had been "disconnected in many parts of Tibet" as part of "tight restrictions on communication with the outside world."

Residents in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, reported that cell phone and landline signals were intermittently disrupted, according to Radio Free Asia (RFA) reports of March 20 and March 31 (link no longer available).

Woeser reported in an entry for March 24 (Chinese, English translation by China Digital Times) that three townships in Luhuo (Draggo) County, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan were surrounded by military police and phone calls could not get through to those townships following protest activity in the area.

A March 27 Woeser blog entry reports that phone calls and other means of communication are only able to intermittently get through to the Sera and Drepung monasteries in Lhasa. The entry also reported that residents in Tibetan areas of Gansu and Sichuan avoid discussing the unrest over the phone, and that calls from overseas are quickly cut off when the protests are mentioned.

An April 3 International Campaign for Tibet report said that authorities were "targeting Tibetans with cell phones" and that one Tibetan had been detained because of text messages from the person's family.

An April 4 TGiE report said that for over a week at Lhasa's Tibet University, "mobile phones, internet and other devices have been disconnected."

An April 7 RFA article noted the difficulties its reporter encountered when trying to call sources to find out more information about reports of protests and injuries in Daofu (Tawu) County, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan. These included failed connections to landline phones and calls to cell phones that were immediately cut off. The article noted that phone lines in Gansu, Qinghai, and other Tibetan areas were not completely cut, but that calls to previous sources' telephones were answered by busy signals or the playing of a Tibetan song. The article also said that some sources whose phones were functioning were reluctant to speak with the reporter.

An April 25 Radio France Internationale article reported that no calls could get through to phones at the Drepung and Sera monasteries, so little information could be obtained about the condition of monks from those monasteries who had been detained.

For information on other measures that have impeded the free flow of information about the Tibetan protests, see previous CECC analyses on the ban on foreign journalists entering Tibetan areas to cover the protests and censorship of the Internet and foreign news broadcasts following the protests.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-19 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC Translation of Decision

On April 7, 2008, the Zhejiang Provincial High People's Court affirmed a lower court's decision to sentence freelance writer Lu Gengsong to four years in prison for inciting subversion of state power, a crime under Article 105 of China's Criminal Law. Boxun, a U.S.-based citizen journalist Web site that publishes information and commentary on current events in China, posted a copy of the Zhejiang court's decision, and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) has translated the decision into English. In February, a lower court in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang, found Lu guilty of publishing subversive essays on foreign Web sites, such as Blog.Chinesenewsnet.com (Duowei Boke), Boxun, and Future China Forum.

Article 105 provides that anyone who "incites others by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system" shall be sentenced to no more than five years. In upholding the original ruling, the Zhejiang court agreed that certain passages in Lu's writings constituted slander and incitement. Among those passages included:

"If one must find a ‘one and only legal government,’ then from a historical perspective and from the aspect of legally constituted authority, this ‘one and only legal government’ can only be the government of the Republic of China, and not the government of the People's Republic of China."
"The government established by the Chinese Communist Party is of course China's illegitimate government, just like the ‘Manchukuo’ and Wang Jingwei's Nanjing government of the past."
"No matter if it's rights defenders, members of the democracy movement, members of Falun Gong, freedom intellectuals, or religious activists, they should all join hands, work in concert, unite as one, and aim the spearhead at the vicious autocratic system. These forces should merge together within this great movement, finally forming a popular force that is sufficient to contend with the autocratic authorities on equal terms."

Lu made several arguments in his defense, including that he was exercising his right to free speech and had not harmed the national interest, according to the court judgment. The court rejected these arguments, noting that while China's Constitution grants citizens the right to free speech (Article 35), it also requires citizens to exercise such rights in a way that does not infringe upon the interests of the state and the society (Article 51). The court said Lu's essays slandered and defamed state power and the socialist system, thereby seriously infringing on the "interests of the state and society." The court did not explain how it concluded that Lu's writings constituted slander and defamation and provided no details regarding the actual harm caused to the "interests of the state and the society." Furthermore, the court did not specify who Lu sought to incite, other than to name the Web sites that his writings appeared on and to say that he sought to "incite the masses." International human rights standards allow officials to restrict freedom of expression if it poses a threat to national security. Article 105 is considered a crime of "endangering national security," but as with many other Article 105 cases in China, the court here made no attempt to show that Lu's writings caused, or were likely to cause, a threat to national security.

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Chinese defense lawyers, and human rights groups have criticized the vagueness of Article 105 and China's frequent reliance on this provision to punish peaceful expression without any showing that the expression had any actual or potential subversive effect. (See a previous CECC analysis for more information.) Over the past year, China has used Article 105 to detain and sentence numerous citizens for peaceful expression of opposition to the Chinese government, Party, and their policies. These citizens include Hu Jia, Yang Chunlin, Wang Dejia, Chen Shuqing, and Yan Zhengxue. For more information on these political prisoners and Lu, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-19 ) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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Authorities Take Measures To Prevent Pilgrimage to Catholic Shrine

Authorities in Shanghai have implemented measures to prevent Catholic pilgrims from visiting the Marian Shrine of Sheshan during the month of May, according to notices from Chinese government and state-controlled church authorities, as well as reports from overseas media organizations. May is the period during which Catholics observe Marian month, and last year, in an open letter to Catholics in China (via the Vatican Web site), Pope Benedict XVI mentioned the significance of the Sheshan Shrine to the occasion. In addition, he called for May 24 to serve as a day for Catholics throughout the world "to be united in prayer" with Catholics in China. According to the sources, Chinese church authorities advised registered church members in the Shanghai diocese, where the shrine is located, to avoid gathering at the shrine in May, while the local public security bureau instituted traffic restrictions en route to the shrine, and church authorities outside Shanghai urged Catholics not to make pilgrimages to other provinces during the month. Sources cited in an April 24 article from AsiaNews attributed the measures to government sensitivity over relations with the Vatican, while some sources also drew a link to recent protests in Tibetan areas of China. A May 5 AsiaNews article noted that the measures also aimed to block pilgrims from registered Catholic churches from interacting with those from unregistered churches.

Several notices from Chinese government and state-controlled church authorities outline instructions and measures that hinder access to the shrine. An April 23 notice posted on the Shanghai Diocese Web site states that the diocese will not invite parishioners from outside the area to visit the shrine and tells local Catholics that "it would be best not to assemble" at the shrine during May, citing concerns about overcrowding and safety. Local residents who wish to visit the shrine must contact the diocese in advance of their visit. A notice posted April 21 on the Shanghai Public Security Bureau Songjiang Branch Web site restricts traffic to the shrine to specified hours daily between April 30 and May 25, citing the need to ensure the safety and orderliness of large-scale activities. It also outlines additional restrictions at the beginning of this period, coinciding with the Labor Day holidays, and on May 24. In addition, an April 3 directive issued by the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and Catholic Bishops Conference and cited in a May 2 Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) report instructs Catholics throughout China to go on local pilgrimages during May rather than make pilgrimages to other provinces. The directive, reportedly the first of its kind to address May pilgrimage activities, also instructs prospective pilgrims to abide by appropriate requirements should they travel to other provinces. A CPA official cited in the article explained the preventative measures by observing that "if any accidents or troubles occurred, the Catholic Church would be discredited."

Sources cited by overseas media have reported receiving various instructions on visiting the shrine. One member of a registered parish in Hangzhou city, cited in a May 1 report from UCAN, was told not to visit the shrine anytime before the Olympic games in August, while another person from Hangzhou said his parish members were able to travel to the shrine before the May restrictions were imposed. Another source was instructed to avoid the shrine only on May 24. The various restrictions resulted in fewer than half the number of pilgrims visiting the shrine in early May than in the previous year, according to a May 7 UCAN report.

The restrictions reflect broader controls over religion in China and tensions over religious communities with overseas religious ties. For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-19 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-06-25
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Dalai Lama's Envoys To Begin China Visit on May 3

The Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) announced in a May 2, 2008, press release that the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen would arrive in China on May 3 for "informal talks with representatives of the Chinese leadership." The visit comes on the heels of a cascade of Tibetan protests, some violent, that began in Lhasa on March 10 and spread through at least 52 county-level areas of which approximately two-thirds are in officially designated Tibetan autonomous areas of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces. In the wake of the protests, Chinese officials have implemented aggressive campaigns of "patriotic education" targeting monasteries, nunneries, schools, and communities, according to multiple reports. (See, e.g., Associated Press (reprinted in International Herald Tribune, 21 April 08); China Digital Times, 27 April 08; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 29 April 08; New York Times, 31 March 08; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 14 April 08; and Washington Post, 6 April 08.)

The envoys' arrival will follow an April 25 Xinhua announcement (reprinted in People's Daily) that, "In view of the requests repeatedly made by the Dalai side for resuming talks, the relevant department of the central government will have contact and consultation with Dalai's private representative in the coming days." Previously, China's state-run media have not disclosed plans for such visits until after the envoys arrive in China.

On April 23, two days before the Xinhua announcement, Lodi Gyari said in prepared testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (testimony also available on the International Campaign for Tibet Web site): "Throughout the period of crisis, I have been using existing channels of communication with Chinese officials to convey our urgent concerns. What I have been hearing back is nothing but the usual rhetoric." Referring specifically to the prospects for dialogue, his testimony stated, "We cannot pretend that if our next round of discussions were held now, it would be business as usual given the scale of the crackdown and the fact that protests are continuing almost daily. The present emergency situation must be resolved before we can really talk about the future." According to the OHHDL press release, the envoys' objectives would be to "take up the urgent issue of the current crisis in the Tibetan areas," and to "raise the issue of moving forward on the process for a mutually satisfactory solution to the Tibetan issue."

During the previous six rounds of dialogue, the envoys met with senior officials of the Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), including Wang Zhaoguo and Liu Yandong at times when each served as Head of the UFWD, Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun, and UFWD Seventh Bureau Director Sithar (or Sita), according to the Special Envoy's statements issued after each round of dialogue (via ICT Web site): September 2002, May-June 2003, September 2004, June-July 2005, February 2006, and June-July 2007. In March 2008, the National People's Congress elected one of the envoys' former UFWD interlocutors, Liu Yandong, to the position of State Councilor, according to a March 18 China Daily report. The Party's Central Committee elected Liu in October 2007 to membership in the powerful Political Bureau ("Politburo"), making her the Party's highest-ranking female according to an October 22, 2007, Xinhua report.

It remains to be seen whether the envoys will meet with officials who are responsible for the principal issues underlying the recent Tibetan protests, such as regional ethnic autonomy and state control of Tibetan Buddhism, for substantive discussions that could help to ease tensions across the Tibetan areas of China. Some speculate that the Chinese government invited the envoys to China as a pre-Olympics public maneuver. (See, e.g., Reuters, 26 April 08.)

In response to recent events, both the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama have put forward new requirements. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Jiang Yu said on April 29 at a scheduled press interview that in order to "create conditions for the next consultation," the Dalai Lama should among other things “stop his violent and criminal activities with concrete actions,” and “stop his activities to interrupt and sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games,” (Xinhua, translated in OSC, 29 April 08). (See CECC Analysis, March 18, p. 7, 13-14; and CECC Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 23, for analysis of Chinese government accusations against the Dalai Lama.) The Dalai Lama, in an April 6 statement said the Chinese leadership should “immediately stop their suppression in all parts of Tibet,” and the leadership should “withdraw its armed police and troops.”

For more information, see "Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama" in Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report. Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 is also available as a separate reprint.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-05 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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Government Official Reaffirms State Controls Over Religion

Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, called for continued controls over religion to meet state goals in a March 13 interview in the Southern Weekend newspaper. (Translation cited here via Open Source Center, subscription required, April 10, 2008). "We should not expand religions," Ye said, "but strive to let existing religions do more for the motherland's reunification, national unity, economic development and social stability." The Chinese government currently recognizes only five religions for limited state protections and subjects these religious communities to stringent controls.

Although Ye stated that the government regulates only "religious affairs" touching on "social and public interests," rather than regulate "religions" or "religious belief," he stressed both here and in a 2006 interview the importance of government control over the internal practices of religious communities. In 2006 he said that government-led interpretations of religious doctrine would "convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers and direct them to practice faiths rightly." In the 2008 interview, he stressed the importance of continued state controls over a variety of religious practices, such as Tibetan Buddhists' recognition of reincarnated Buddhist lamas and the appointment of Catholic bishops. Ye also called for blocking Chinese Protestants' interaction with foreign co-religionists and preventing the establishment of private Buddhist sites of worship.

Ye's comments follow a December 2007 study session in which Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed the Party's policies for controlling religion and called on religious communities to play a "positive role" in promoting state goals and to "closely unite" around the Party. For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-05 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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China Commits to "Open Government Information" Effective May 1, 2008

In a move that Chinese officials claim is intended to combat corruption, increase public oversight and participation in government, and allow citizens access to government-held information, the State Council on April 5, 2007, issued the first national Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulation), which take effect May 1, 2008. Implementation begins at a time when the need for greater transparency in the areas of environmental health, land disputes, disease, and food, drug, and product safety has become apparent. The time lag between issue and effective date provided citizens and government departments a one-year preparatory period.

The national regulation may alter relations between citizens and traditionally protective government bureaucracies. But it is not entirely a new development. While the overall impact of the national regulation remains unclear pending implementation, over 30 provincial and city-level governments throughout China as well as central government agencies and departments have adopted OGI rules in the last several years. Guangzhou, which was the first municipality to do so in 2002 (Chinese, English translation) and Shanghai, which issued its regulations in 2004, are but two examples.

It is important to note that the national OGI Regulation is completely separate and distinct from China's commitment to press freedom for foreign journalists before and during the Olympics, as embodied in the State Council's Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period, which took effect on January 1, 2007.

As implementation of the national OGI Regulation proceeds, a number of issues merit attention, the following among them:

Two Main Features of OGI
Government agencies at all levels have an affirmative obligation to disclose certain information, generally within 20 business days. This includes information that "involves the vital interests of citizens," with emphasis on information relating to, among other items, environmental protection, public health, food, drug, and product quality, sudden emergencies, and land appropriation and compensation.

Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations (Requesting Parties) may request information and are entitled to receive a reply within 15 business days and no later than 30 business days. Requesting Parties can challenge a denial of access to information by filing a report with a higher-level or supervisory agency or designated open government information department or by applying for administrative reconsideration or filing an administrative lawsuit.

Areas to Watch During Implementation
No clear presumption of disclosure. As reported in an April 30 Xinhua article (via the Central People's Government Web site), Premier Wen Jiabao urged officials to proceed with implementation "insisting that disclosure be the principle, non-disclosure the exception." Chinese scholars and international experts, however, note that the national OGI Regulation does not set forth a clear presumption of disclosure. On this point it differs from earlier local-level OGI regulations and similar measures in other countries (see, e.g., an April 28 Caijing article and a May 9, 2007, Freedominfo.org article.)

Certain provisions may discourage officials from disclosing information. Under the OGI Regulation, officials who withhold information the disclosure of which is required under the Regulation may face both administrative and criminal penalties. At the same time, however, the OGI Regulation stipulates that officials must not disclose information involving "state secrets, commercial secrets, or individual privacy," and must set up mechanisms to examine the secrecy of information requested. This emphasis on safeguarding secrecy and the breadth and vagueness of the definition of "state secrets" under Chinese law may encourage officials to err on the side of non-disclosure. The regulation also prohibits officials from disclosing information that might "endanger state security, public security, economic security, and social stability." Agencies and personnel who fail to "establish and perfect" secrecy examination mechanisms or who disclose information later deemed exempt from disclosure under the OGI Regulation may face administrative or criminal punishment.

Requesting Parties may be denied access if the request fails to meet a recognized purpose. An opinion issued by the State Council General Office on April 29 states that officials may deny requests if the information has no relation to the Requesting Party's "production, livelihood and scientific and technological research." This reflects language in Article 13 of the OGI Regulation that says Requesting Parties may request information "based on the special needs of such matters as their own production, livelihood and scientific and technological research." This introduction of an apparent purpose test differs from earlier local-level OGI regulations and international practice, according to the May 9 Freedominfo.org article. Furthermore, another provision in the OGI Regulation which sets forth the information to be included in a request, does not instruct the Requesting Party to indicate the purpose of the request.

Requesting Parties lack an independent review channel to enforce the OGI. Some Chinese scholars have noted that the OGI Regulation's relief provisions constrain citizens from using the courts to challenge decisions that deny requests for information, according to the April 28 Caijing article. Because China's courts are subordinate to the National People's Congress Standing Committee and the Communist Party, "it can be anticipated that enforcement of emerging information rights in China, even with the adoption of the State Council OGI Regulations, will continue to face high hurdles within the existing court system," according to the May 9 Freedominfo.org article. While it is still too early to tell, one scholar notes that it may be possible, however, to achieve some independent review of non-political cases through creation of tribunals or commissions designed to handle OGI cases, the article said.

Sufficiency of funding, preparedness, and public awareness. For many departments, OGI implementation may amount to an unfunded mandate. Many agencies face resource constraints or rely on funding sources predisposed to favor non-disclosure. Local governments may not favor information disclosure that could negatively impact local business. Local environmental protection bureaus, for example, which are funded by local governments, may not receive funding adequate to implement OGI effectively. (See a CECC analysis of the Measures on Open Environmental Information, the first agency implementing regulations to come out after the OGI Regulation.) Already, a number of localities failed to meet a March deadline to make catalogues and guides intended to assist parties in requesting information available to the public. As reported by Caijing on April 28, this resulted in part from inadequate funding and technical expertise. While the government has focused on training officials, it has been less active in raising public awareness, the article added.

Access to information may not apply to media, whether foreign or domestic. The national OGI Regulation applies to "citizens, legal persons, and other organizations." This suggests its applicability to foreigners remains open to interpretation during implementation. It also remains unclear whether journalists in general may request access to information under the national regulation (see an August 2007 Committee to Protect Journalists report). According to an April 29 Procuratorial Daily article (via Xinhua), some Chinese experts argue that the regulation clearly applies to news organizations, which have the status of "legal persons or other organizations," and journalists, which have the status of "citizens," although foreign journalists may not be covered because they are not citizens. Some local-level OGI regulations in existence prior to the national regulation made clear its applicability to foreigners. The Guangzhou regulation, for example, provides that foreigners, stateless persons, and foreign organizations have the same rights and obligations to request information, limited to the extent that the requesting party's country or region of origin imposes restrictions on government information access to Chinese citizens. It remains to be seen whether the national OGI Regulation will be implemented so as to trump local OGI rules that are broader in application or whether the national regulation will be interpreted in a similarly broad fashion.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-02 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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Wang Zaiqing Presumed Released From Prison, Shi Weihan Detained in Separate Bible-Printing Cases

House church pastor Wang Zaiqing completed his two-year prison sentence for "illegal operation of a business" on April 27 and is presumed to have since been released from prison, according to information from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. Authorities in Huainan city, Anhui province, initially detained Wang on April 28, 2006, after he printed and distributed Bibles and other religious materials without government authorization. On October 9, 2006, the Tianjia'an District People's Court levied the two-year prison sentence on Wang and fined him 100,000 yuan (then approximately US$12,500).

In a separate development, authorities in Beijing detained bookstore owner Shi Weihan on March 19, 2008, in apparent connection to earlier activities involving the preparation and distribution of Bibles and other religious materials, according to an April 18 report from Compass Direct News. Authorities had first detained Shi on November 28, 2007, and accused him of illegally printing and distributing religious literature. After determining they had "insufficient evidence" to proceed, authorities released Shi on bail on January 4, 2008, and detained him again in March.

The cases of Wang Zaiqing and Shi Weihan reflect tight government control over the preparation and distribution of religious publications. Click here for a CECC analysis on China's regulation of religious materials. In recent years, authorities have penalized other citizens for their activities involving religious publications. In November 2005 authorities sentenced Pastor Cai Zhuohua to three years in prison for "illegal operation of a business" after he privately printed and gave away religious literature. In July 2007, authorities detained house church leader Zhou Heng and formally arrested him the following month for his alleged involvement in plans to receive and distribute religious literature. Authorities also accused him of "illegal operation of a business," but released him on February 19, 2008.

For more information, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site) and the CECC Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-29 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests

Foreign media in mid-March reported incidents of censorship of the Internet and international news broadcasts in China following Tibetan protests that began on March 10. The Chinese government and Internet companies operating in China routinely censor political content on the Internet in China, but the recent actions indicate stepped up efforts to control access to information about the protests. About a week after the protests started, foreign news media in China noted that access to foreign Web sites had been blocked, video Web sites and search engine results appeared to be censored, and foreign news broadcasts were temporarily blacked out.

Access to the U.S.-based video sharing Web site YouTube.com was reportedly blocked on March 16 after dozens of videos about the protests showed up on the site, according to a March 17 Associated Press (AP) article (via The New York Times). AP reported that the site was "usually readily available in China." The Guardian said on March 17 that Internet users reported its site being blocked.
No footage of the protests was posted on the Chinese-based video Web sites 56.com, Youku.com, and Tudou.com, the AP article said. As reported in an earlier CECC analysis, regulations that strengthen control over audio and video Web sites went into effect on January 31.
Foreign media reported that searches on China's popular search engine Baidu and Google for news stories on Tibet turned up no protest news in the top results or inaccessible links, while sites such as Sina.com, Sohu.com, and the Chinese versions of Yahoo! and Microsoft's MSN ran only official stories from Xinhua, according to a March 17 BusinessWeek report, a March 18 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report, and a March 18 BBC report.
News broadcasts of BBC World were reportedly blocked when stories about the protests were aired and a CNN spokeswoman confirmed that its coverage of China had been censored, according to the March 17 Guardian article. Under Chinese law, foreign satellite television is generally available only in hotels, apartments, or other places specifically designated for foreigners.

The March 18 WSJ report noted that because of the state-controlled media's limited coverage of the protests, as well as "content-filtering and Internet-portal self-censorship," many Chinese at the time were unaware of the Tibetan protests or their severity. Since then, however, China's media have devoted extensive coverage to the topic, focusing on the violence associated with some of the protests (see, e.g., a March 23 Xinhua article), Chinese citizens' anger over foreign media accounts of the protests (see, e.g., an April 4 People's Daily article profiling an anti-CNN Web site), and denouncing the Dalai Lama and foreign critics of China's Tibet policy (see an April 17 Agence-France Presse article for a summary of this.)

On April 1, members of the International Olympic Committee expressed concern to Beijing Olympic officials about Internet censorship relating to the Tibetan protests and sought assurances that Internet access would be open for foreign journalists during the Olympics, according to an April 2 South China Morning Post article (subscription required). At an April 1 press conference (English, Chinese), Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Jiang Yu said China would honor its commitment for the Olympics, but added "[a]t present, our measures are in line with general international practice." She said the "main reason for inaccessibility of some foreign websites in China is that they spread information prohibited by Chinese law" and "Chinese laws have clearly stipulated which on-line activities are prohibited."

China's Internet regulations prohibit dissemination of a broad range of content, including not only information that contains pornography or violence or endangers national security, but also content vaguely defined as "harmful to the honor or interests of the nation" or "disrupting the solidarity of peoples." As noted in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report, China has blocked access to a number of foreign news Web sites and Web sites promoting human rights.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-23 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan Protests

Chinese officials have barred foreign journalists from entering large parts of western China to cover recent incidents of Tibetan protests. The closed areas include the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), about half of Sichuan province, and parts of Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces, according to a March 20 Deutsche Welle article and an April 10 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article. Foreign journalists trying to enter or leave the areas reported incidents where local police locked them in a hotel overnight or threatened to confiscate their footage, according to the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC) and an April 5 Associated Press (AP) article (via the International Herald Tribune). The Tibetan protests, many peaceful but some of which have been violent, began on March 10 in Lhasa, the capital of the TAR. The protests spread quickly to the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces, where most of the reported protests have occurred.

Foreign reporters and journalists' advocacy groups say the travel ban contravenes foreign journalist regulations intended to fulfill a commitment China made in its successful bid for the Olympics, according to a March 17 Committee to Protect Journalists statement and the April 5 AP article. According to the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) bid evaluation, China promised "no restrictions on media reporting and movement of journalists up to and including the Olympic Games." On April 10, IOC President Jacques Rogge, referring to the restrictions on travel to the TAR, said that the foreign journalist regulations are "not yet fully implemented" and that he had asked China to implement the regulations "in full" and "as soon as possible," according to an April 11 Washington Post article.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Qin Gang said at a March 25 press conference (English, Chinese) that the travel restrictions are intended to ensure the safety of journalists. He also said "it is legal and reasonable for local governments to take some restrictive measures," and noted "some foreign governments also warned their citizens against traveling to these areas." Even before the protests, China continued to require journalists to obtain a special travel permit to visit the TAR, despite the "no restrictions" nature of its commitment for the Olympics. An MFA official said this was "due to restraints in natural conditions and reception capabilities." Since the protests began, the government has organized supervised tours to Lhasa and Xiahe, in Gansu province, for a limited number of invited journalists, according to an April 10 New York Times (NYT) article. During the government-managed trip to Lhasa, AP reported that the journalists were "frequently monitored, and even followed," according to a March 26 article.

The travel ban appears inconsistent with international human rights standards. While such standards recognize that freedom of expression may be restricted in order to respect the rights or reputations of others, or protect national security, public order, public health, or morals, such restrictions "shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary." (See Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.) The ban, however, appears more than necessary for the protection of foreign journalists, the justification provided by Chinese officials, given its geographic scope and the nature of the threat. Foreign journalists indicate that the borders of the closed off areas extend far beyond reported protest sites and that the size of the closed areas is much larger than in conflicts in other parts of the world, according to the FCCC Web site and a March 18 Christian Science Monitor article. While there have been reports of violence, officials have at various times claimed that conditions in closed areas are "completely normal" or that "social order and stability has been restored." (See, e.g., a March 20 MFA press conference (English, Chinese) and the April 5 AP report.) Furthermore, during both government-supervised media tours, groups of monks used the opportunity to voice their grievances to the journalists, suggesting that instead of being targets of violence, foreign reporters might be welcomed by protesters eager to have their messages heard.

The ban also appears to be motivated by political concerns rather than the safety of foreign journalists. Widespread censorship of the Internet and domestic and Western news of the protests has been reported. (See, e.g., a March 17 Guardian article, a March 17 NYT article, and a March 18 WSJ article.) Officials and the state-controlled media have sought to discredit the Western media by focusing on their "biased" and "unfair" reporting of the protests. (See, e.g., an April 8 MFA press conference (English, Chinese) and a March 31 People's Daily article.) These actions suggest that officials are concerned about the political impact of unsupervised coverage of the protests, particularly by Western media.

Meanwhile, journalists also report problems interviewing and reporting on Tibetans in areas outside of the closed zones.

In the Sichuan capital of Chengdu, police prevented ABC News from filming in a Tibetan neighborhood on March 16, according to the FCCC Web site.
The April 5 AP article reported that on April 3 plainclothes officers followed a reporter in Danba, Sichuan, and questioned the Tibetans she interviewed.
Officials also stopped journalists from covering a small candlelight vigil by Tibetan students at Peking University on March 17, according to a March 20 Reporters Without Borders article.

In a March 26 statement, the FCCC said it was "extremely concerned about recent reports that sources in Tibetan areas and elsewhere have experienced various forms of intimidation." The FCCC said that it had received 50 reports in March of violations of the regulations that occurred as journalists attempted to cover the protests.

For more information about the foreign journalist regulations, which went into effect on January 1, 2007, and expire on October 17, 2008, and China's mixed progress in implementing the regulations in 2007, see a previous CECC analysis.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-16 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters

Authorities suppressed demonstrations by ethnic Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) who gathered on March 23 and 24 to protest human rights abuses, according to reports from U.S. media. The protests, which took place in Hoten city and nearby Qaraqash county, appear to have stemmed from a prominent businessman's death while in official custody and from general grievances over government policy in the region. Of the 1,000-plus protesters, most of whom were women, authorities reportedly detained 600 and, according to unconfirmed reports, have since released more than half.

According to a series of reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), 600 women gathered on March 23 at a bus stop in Hoten and marched to a marketplace in the city center, by which time their numbers had grown to over 1,000. (See an April 1 RFA report in English, and March 29 reports (1, 2) and March 31 reports (1, 2) from RFA's Uighur service for more information.) According to sources cited in the March 29 articles, participants called for the release of political prisoners, an end to physical abuse of prisoners, respect for Uighur customs, and religious freedom. Women also wore headscarves during the protest in defiance of admonishments against such apparel issued during a government campaign to promote stability, according to the first March 31 article.

Sources also connected the demonstrations to the death of Mutellip Hajim, according to multiple RFA reports. Authorities detained Mutellip Hajim, a jade merchant and father of eight, in January 2008 in apparent retribution for his activities supporting the families of prisoners and helping underground religious schools, as well as for violating population planning requirements, according to a source cited in a March 28 RFA article. Mutellip Hajim reportedly died in detention after being subjected to torture, and his corpse was returned to his family on March 3, with orders not to publicize his death. He had previously served a four-year sentence starting in 2003 for slander, a charge stemming from a dispute with authorities over jade prices, according to a source cited in the March 28 article.

As clashes broke out with police, authorities detained 400 protesters on the first day and 200 on the second, according to sources cited in the RFA articles. The first March 31 RFA article also reported that more than half of those detained have been released and six people died in the protests, but that it had not been able to verify either figure.

Also on March 23, a group gathered to demonstrate at a market in Qaraqash county, in Hoten district. Sources indicated to RFA that police blocked the demonstration and detained protesters, leading to clashes between the groups, according to a March 30 RFA article. The April 1 RFA article reported that a police officer said the demonstration had been "peacefully dispersed."

The Hoten government posted a statement on its Web site on April 1 describing the Hoten city demonstrations as an attempt to incite a disturbance by people carrying separatist flags who were connected to the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In the brief statement, the government also said it stopped the protestors and "dealt with them according to law." The government said no injuries or deaths occurred. An April 4 report from Tianshan Net said that Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic political movement active internationally, had instigated demonstrations in Hoten after disseminating leaflets in cities throughout the XUAR. According to the first March 29 RFA article, Hoten police earlier told local hotel workers that the demonstration was provoked by protests in Tibetan areas of China. The government elsewhere has claimed a link between alleged Uighur and Tibetan separatist organizations. (See, e.g., a March 22 People's Daily article.) In addition, a Hoten government spokesperson claimed a link to Tibetan protests in comments to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), according to an April 2 BBC report. The spokesperson also said that "most of the protesters" had been detained and some "sent for 're-education,'" according to a BBC paraphrasing of the remarks.

The demonstrations followed March announcements that authorities would crackdown against the "three forces." The government has waged a longstanding campaign against the "three forces" and has used its anti-crime campaigns as a pretext for severe rights abuses in the XUAR. Authorities made the call while providing limited details on alleged terrorist activity in January and March and as local governments reported on various efforts to promote stability. As news of the demonstrations was released, Chinese media also reported that an all-women's division of the people's armed police had been established in the XUAR, though it is unclear if the timing of the announcement of the unit's establishment is connected to the Hoten women's demonstration. According to an April 3 article from the Metropolitan Consumers Morning Report (via the China Xinjiang Web), the women's unit, which is the third of its kind in China, will focus on fighting terrorism and separatism particularly in cases where it is not "convenient" for men to be involved in the situation, according to one of the unit's instructors.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-09 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-12
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Land Rights Activist Yang Chunlin Sentenced to Five Years

Yang Chunlin, the land rights activist who organized a petition titled "We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics," was sentenced to five years in prison on March 24 by the Jiamusi City Intermediate People's Court in Heilongjiang province for "inciting subversion of state power," according to March 24 articles by the Associated Press (AP) and Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD). The court also sentenced Yang to two years deprivation of political rights, according to CHRD. Procuratorate officials claimed that the petition received heavy foreign media coverage and hurt China's image abroad, and accused Yang of writing essays critical of the Communist Party and accepting 10,000 yuan (US$1,430) from a "hostile" foreign group, according to a February 19 Reuters article (via the Guardian) and a March 25 Guardian article. The Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch Web site (CRLW), a site that supports rights defenders in China, reported on March 28 that Yang would appeal the ruling.

According to Yang's lawyer, police scuffled with Yang's son after the sentencing and shocked Yang with electric batons, the AP article reported. Yang has alleged that because he refused to confess to a crime, authorities chained his hands and feet together from August 6 to August 14, 2007, and that he was unable to move during this time, according to the CRLW report. Chinese law prohibits and punishes the use of torture to coerce a confession and China has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. A March 31 CHRD article reported the allegation that on March 5 prison cadres beat Yang for pointing out their misconduct. The article also said prison officials have refused to allow Yang any time outdoors. Article 25 of China's Regulations on Detention Centers provides that detainees should be allowed one to two hours of outdoor activity each day.

"We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics" Petition
Yang was first detained on July 6, 2007, after he and land rights activists Yu Changwu and Wang Guilin launched the petition in June, according to a March 24 Human Rights in China statement. The AP article said that Yang had gathered more than 10,000 signatures for the petition, mostly from farmers seeking redress for land that officials allegedly took from them, and that the petition was posted on the Internet. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database, officials formally arrested Yang on August 13 and held his trial on February 19.

The petition is connected to a movement by farmers in Fujin city, Heilongjiang, to reclaim land seized by the government and to challenge China's rural land policy of collective ownership. Yang's February 19 criminal defense pleading, prepared by Yang's lawyers and posted on the CHRD Web site, said the reason behind the petition was the "illegal expropriation of land from 40,000 farmers in Fujin, the failure to set up any social safeguards, and the lack of any resolution despite the farmers representatives' more than 10 years of frequent petitioning." According to a January 14 Washington Post (WP) article, farmers in Fujin have sought to reclaim 250,000 acres of land that local officials took in the 1990s and planned to sell to private agricultural businesses. The article said the farmers have also expanded their claims to include the right to own the collective land they currently lease, and that their efforts sparked similar movements in other parts of China. Both Yu and Wang were recently sentenced to reeducation through labor for two years and one and a half years, respectively, in connection with their advocacy on behalf of the Fujin farmers. (For more information on Yu and Wang, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC Political Prisoner Database).

Article 105 of the Criminal Law
The language of Article 105, Paragraph 2, the Criminal Law provision on inciting subversion of state power, is vague and overbroad and China's legal institutions have failed to provide clear guidance as to the limits on Chinese citizens' constitutionally protected right to free speech, according to Yang's lawyers. They said that Yang's peaceful expression of a different political viewpoint was protected under Article 35 of China's Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, according to the defense pleading. Article 105, Paragraph 2, restricts that right, they said, but the brevity of the provision made it impossible to determine the boundary between subversion and free speech. Furthermore, neither the Supreme People's Court nor the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress had issued any interpretations of Article 105, Paragraph 2. "So what are the boundaries of 'endangering the state'? We have been unable to find any legal principles that could be referenced in any domestic legal precedent or legal interpretations," they wrote. One of the lawyers, Li Fangping, warned that "[i]f everyone who speaks freely is accused of subverting state power, then it will be very difficult to guarantee free speech because people won't know what they can say and what they can't," according to a March 25 WP article.

In recent months a number of other Chinese citizens have been punished for "inciting subversion of state power," for peaceful expressions of dissent. These include activist Hu Jia, who was sentenced to three and a half years on April 3, freelance writer Lu Gengsong, who was sentenced to four years on February 5, Internet essayist Wang Dejia, who was released on bail on January 12, and Internet essayist Chen Shuqing, whose four-year sentence was affirmed in October 2007. (For more information on these cases, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC Political Prisoner Database). At a March 18 press conference (posted on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, Chinese, English), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao described as "totally unfounded" the allegation that China is cracking down on dissidents before the Olympics. He said "China is a country under the rule of law" and that cases such as Hu Jia's would be "dealt with in accordance with the law." Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also recently said that it is "impossible" for someone in China to be arrested for saying "human rights are more important than the Olympics."

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) and human rights groups have echoed the concern raised by Yang's lawyers that under Article 105, Chinese officials retain broad discretion to declare peaceful forms of expression "incitement of subversion." In a report on its 2004 mission to China (available on the UNWGAD's Country Visits Web page), the UNWGAD expressed concern that China's Criminal Law had not adopted a definition of the term "endangering national security" (the category of crimes which includes Article 105) and that "no legislative measures have been taken to make a clear-cut exemption from criminal responsibility of those who peacefully exercise their rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." In a January 8, 2008, report titled "Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal Tool for Prosecuting Free Speech in China," CHRD studied 41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which Article 105, Paragraph 2, had been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of expression. The report found that in such cases:

"[T]he 'evidence' often consists of no more than the writings of an individual or simply shows that he/she circulated certain articles containing dissenting views, without any effort to show that the expression had any potential or real subversive effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is interpreted as constituting incitement of subversion....[T]he text of the law fails to clearly define the key concepts, 'subversion' and 'state power,' and to precisely specify what constitutes 'subversion' and 'state power.' Thus, anything from calling for an end to one-party rule to criticizing corruption has been construed as 'inciting subversion of state power.'"

As noted in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, Yang was reportedly detained in 2006 on four occasions for his work with farmers and for taking part in a hunger strike proposed by Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng and other rights defenders. For more information on freedom of expression in China, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-04 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To Provide "Sustainable" Solutions

China's first national plan to combat trafficking of women and children formalizes cooperation among agencies and establishes a national information and reporting system. The State Council's General Office issued China's National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) on December 13, 2007. The long-awaited plan, which was submitted for approval in July 2006, went into effect on January 1, 2008, and will be implemented over the next five years. Its overall goal is to "prevent and severely crack down" on crimes of trafficking, and provide care for trafficking victims. (An English translation of the plan is available from Open Source Center (registration required), and quotes from that translation are used here.) The plan sets specific targets, and outlines measures for the prevention of trafficking, prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and strengthening of international cooperation. The plan designates the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) as the lead agency in implementing the plan, and calls for coordination among 28 agencies, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the All-China Women's Federation. According to Du Hangwei, Director of the MPS' Criminal Investigation Bureau, the plan seeks to provide "sustainable and long-term solutions to human trafficking," as reported in a December 13 China Daily article. For an overview of the plan, click on "more" below.

The MPS estimates that 10,000 women and children are kidnapped and sold each year, while the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that up to 20,000 people are trafficked annually in China, according to the China Daily article and the U.S. State Department's 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Of these, public security officials have registered a decreasing number of cases in recent years, prompting the MPS to state that trafficking-related crimes in parts of China have been effectively contained, according to a December 12 MPS article. The MPS reported 23,163 cases in 2000, 7,008 in 2001, 5,684 in 2002, 3,721 in 2003, 3,343 in 2004, 2,884 in 2005, 2,569 in 2006, and 2,375 in 2007, according to a March 10 Washington Post article and the 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 China Statistical Yearbook. In recent years, the MPS has handled an increasing number of cases involving forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation, and gang-related and cross-border components, and a decrease in the number of cases involving the trafficking of women and children for marriage and adoption, according to the plan and a July 27 China Daily article. At a press conference on December 14, MPS Vice Minister Zhang Xinfeng noted that the plan underscores China's efforts to move from "combating trafficking" to "anti-trafficking." Such a shift aims to broaden the focus from prosecution and rescue to also include prevention, protection of victims, and supporting victims' reintegration into society, as reported in a December 15 Beijing Youth Daily article.

The release of the plan fulfills an obligation made by the Chinese government to the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking (COMMIT), according to the State Department's Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment that was released on January 19, 2007, and a July 13 China Daily article. COMMIT is a government-led initiative, supported by the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), to foster cross-border cooperation between countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion, including China, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma, according to information posted on the UNIAP Web site. The plan, released on December 13, coincided with China's hosting of the COMMIT Second Inter-Ministerial Meeting in Beijing on December 12-14, 2007, according to a UNIAP article posted on January 7. The joint declaration signed at the meeting reaffirmed cooperation between the six countries and pledged for the first time to include "civil society groups" in future antitrafficking efforts.

At a recent MPS forum, public security officials identified existing challenges in combating trafficking and the next steps for implementing the plan. Individuals from local public security bureaus discussed difficulties in their everyday work, including the lack of an office and personnel that focuses full-time on combating trafficking, financial restraints, and difficulties in discovering cases, and rescuing and repatriating victims, according to the January 24 MPS article. The plan outlined challenges including the need to enhance laws and regulations, define the functions of government agencies, strengthen interagency cooperation, and improve access to funding. According to a January 30 MPS article, Zhang Xinfeng convened a meeting with representatives from the Ministry's Criminal Investigation Bureau and the Combating Trafficking Office to discuss next steps for implementing the plan, which include:

Holding a joint meeting of the 28 government agencies, confirming its members, and raising awareness of the plan;
Working with the Ministry of Finance to resolve finances associated with anticrime campaigns to combat trafficking;
Researching and investigating the current number of trafficking crimes in women and children, standardizing the way criminal case reports are received and guidelines for docketing a case, and setting up an antitrafficking hotline;
Enlarging crackdowns and strengthening punishment for traffickers;
Having each local criminal investigation unit strive to establish a special office to combat trafficking, and providing financial assistance and a subsidy to handle cases that involve gang-related crimes and major cases of trafficking in women and children.

It remains to be seen to what extent the plan will strengthen antitrafficking efforts. Implementing measures currently being formulated and cooperation on items such as funding will play a significant role in the successful implementation of the plan. The plan, with a focus on women and children, neglects male adults, who are often targeted for forced labor. The February 28 Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment stated that China's government made "modest efforts" to combat trafficking in the latter half of 2007, although it still does not provide adequate care for victims. For more information, see the section on Human Trafficking, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Overview of China's National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children

The Plan mandates:

Establishment of a ministerial-level joint meeting headed by the Ministry of Public Security and comprising of 28 agencies. Local regions should establish offices to combat trafficking, especially in areas that have a high number of trafficking cases.
Establishment of national information and reporting systems to "improve the mechanism for information collection and exchange on combating crime," and encourage the public to report trafficking-related criminal activities. A December 15 Beijing Youth Daily article notes that China will establish a database that contains DNA information of women and children who have been trafficked and a database of criminal suspects involved in the crime of trafficking women and children. This may help the Chinese government identify trafficking victims among those arrested for prostitution.
Funding for the implementation of the Plan is to be derived from national and local government sources, as well as solicited from social groups, public organizations, enterprises, institutions, individuals, and international sources.

The Plan's Main Areas of Focus Includes:

Building education and awareness among the public and law enforcement personnel, especially in key areas and with at-risk populations, in order to exchange information, learn best practices, and improve existing legislation and the current system.
Preventing trafficking-related crimes through poverty alleviation, education, and vocational training programs tailored to at-risk populations, encouraging women to participate in the community, increasing public awareness of laws and regulations related to trafficking, especially in areas such as railway and bus stations, and strengthening assistance to at-risk groups. Strengthen regulation of activities related to recruitment, professional intermediaries, and the registration system of labor contracts, and help with the successful reintegration of criminals into society. Provincial governments in key areas will sign "cooperation letters of intent" by the end of 2008, and aim to control trafficking by the end of 2012.
Combating crime and rescuing trafficked women and children, with the goal that the "ratio of cracked cases to reported cases should witness an obvious increase" by the end of 2012. Public security agencies in key areas should strengthen efforts to combat trafficking, and launch anti-crime campaigns. Agencies should "investigate and punish units illegally using child labor, and ban illegal Internet intermediaries like employment and marriage arrangement Web sites. Units or individuals who buy or introduce abducted and trafficked women and children or force them to engage in sexual acts or other forms of forced labor will be prosecuted for their administrative, civil and criminal liabilities."
Strengthening relief and rehabilitation of rescued women and children by increasing the number of women and children who receive training, aid, and medical treatment, such as by adding "institutions for relief service, transfer, and rehabilitation as well as training" to agencies and training personnel at these institutions, encouraging companies, groups, and individuals to provide financial and technical support and services, and providing legal aid and legal awareness training to rescued women and children. Rescued children of school age should return to school, while women and minors over 16 who cannot or are not willing to return to their original residences should receive vocational training and help with finding a job. Rescued women and children should be successfully reintegrated into society and agencies should "strengthen registration, management, and protection" by establishing "specialized archives," and "track the living conditions of rescued women and children." Agencies should "strengthen research on physical and mental health" of trafficked women and children, and strengthen cooperation between "different regions, departments, and institutions."
Strengthening international cooperation among police, United Nations agencies, and other international entities, strengthening border control, entry-exit certificate inspection, and "cracking down on illegal activities that involve crossing national borders." In border areas, build awareness of laws, prevention measures, and crime identification among the public and law enforcement personnel. In addition, strengthen supervision of the labor market, and "regulate the operation of overseas employment intermediaries."

While many of the initiatives are not new, the plan mandates the implementation of these initiatives nationwide or on a larger scale in key areas that have an especially high rate of trafficking, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Henan, Sichuan, and Anhui provinces. Other initiatives, such as establishing national information and reporting systems, represent government efforts to improve data collection and the standardization of policies related to trafficking.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-04 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05		more ...
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Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months' Imprisonment

The Beijing Number 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced activist Hu Jia on April 3 to three and a half years' imprisonment and one year deprivation of political rights for "inciting subversion of state power," according to an April 3 Xinhua article (no longer available via Xinhua, but reprinted via Boxun; shorter English version available via China Daily). Article 105, Paragraph 2 of China's Criminal Law makes inciting others "by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system," a crime punishable by up to five years in prison, or no less than five years for "ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes." The Beijing court found that from August 2006 to October 2007, Hu had "incited subversion" through essays he posted on foreign Web sites and telephone interviews he gave to foreign news agencies, according to the Xinhua article. Li Jinsong, one of Hu's lawyers, said it was unlikely that Hu would appeal the ruling, according to an April 3 Reuters article.

The court said that Hu's essays, including "China's Political and Legal Systems Create a Widespread Atmosphere of Fear Ahead of the 17th CPC National Congress," and "One Country Doesn't Need Two Systems," and his comments to foreign journalists, amounted to "malicious rumors, slander, and incitement, in a vain attempt to achieve the goal of subverting China's state power and socialist system," according to the Xinhua article. (Links provided for the articles are from blogs, one of which appears to be Hu Jia's.) The court also pointed out that numerous foreign Web sites had linked to or reprinted Hu's essays and interviews. The two essays mentioned above are critical of the Chinese government and Communist Party's intensified harassment of rights defenders before the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, and their "one country, two systems" approach to governing Hong Kong and mainland China. Hu writes that the government and Party's approach leaves people in Hong Kong vulnerable to the same deprivation of rights that occurs on the mainland, such as the lack of meaningful freedom of speech and the press.

The Xinhua article made no mention of the specific content of the "rumors, slander, and incitement," the potential threat Hu's essays and interviews posed to China's national security, or whether the court considered Hu's right to free speech, as provided for under Article 35 of China's Constitution. Chinese officials have insisted that cases like Hu's are handled in accordance with Chinese laws, but the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and human rights groups have criticized laws such as Article 105 for failing to protect a citizen's right to free expression.

According to the Xinhua article, the court gave Hu a lighter sentence because he "showed penitence and was willing to be dealt with according to the law" (the English article in the China Daily reported that he confessed to the crime and accepted the punishment). While Chinese media reported that Hu "showed penitence" and may have confessed, Hu plead "not guilty" at his trial on March 18. After the verdict's announcement, Hu's lawyers said that Hu had acknowledged "excesses" and accepted that some of his statements "were contrary to the law as it stands," according to the Reuters article. Li Fangping, Hu's other lawyer, maintained that the sentence was unjust, according to the same article. "The law on inciting subversion of state power doesn't have a clear boundary, but the Constitution guarantees citizens freedom of speech," he said.

The Xinhua article reported that during the trial, the court fully protected Hu Jia's procedural rights. The article said Hu's lawyer was able to present an "ample" defense and that Hu's family and others were allowed to observe the trial and sentencing. Hu's lawyer Li Fangping has said, however, that he did not have enough time to advocate on Hu's behalf. Furthermore, only Hu's mother was allowed to attend the trial, even though it appears that under Chinese law the trial should have been open to the public and other people affiliated with Hu should have been allowed to attend. Instead, some were taken into police custody and beaten. Hu's mother and Hu's wife, Zeng Jinyan, were present when the sentence was announced, according to an April 3 Chinese Human Rights Defenders article.

Hu's case highlights how China has sought to counter a regulation giving foreign journalists greater freedom to report in China by in turn targeting citizens who speak to foreign journalists. Under a regulation China issued in order to comply with a commitment for the Olympics, foreign reporters may, at least on paper, more freely interview Chinese citizens. Foreign media and human rights organizations have reported, however, that authorities have warned citizens not to speak to journalists. Internet essayist Wang Dejia was reportedly released on bail in January only after agreeing not to speak to foreign journalists. Also in January, land rights activist Yu Changwu reportedly was sentenced to two years reeducation through labor in part for speaking to foreign reporters.

For more information see previous CECC analyses on Hu's trial, arrest, and detention, and the records of detention for Hu, Wang, and Yu, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-04 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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New Internet Regulations Tighten State Control Over Audio and Video Content

New regulations, which went into effect January 31, further tighten the state's control over online audio and video content in China. Notably, the Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services (the Provisions) now require state ownership in companies providing these services (hereinafter referred to as A/V companies), although the Chinese government has said it will not impose this requirement on the mostly private companies already in operation. In addition, the Provisions reaffirm the requirement for A/V companies to obtain an "Internet Audio/Visual Program Transmission License" from the government, increase companies' obligation to maintain records of content they host, and extend liability to "major investors and managers." In conjunction with the Provisions, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) said it had recently conducted an inspection of select audio and video Web sites, according to a March 20 announcement on the SARFT Web site. As reported in a March 22 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article (subscription required), the inspection campaign, which lasted from December 20, 2007, to February 20, 2008, resulted in the closure of 25 video Web sites. Another 32 Web sites received warnings about their content. Among the "major problems" cited in the announcement were Web sites posting content containing "obscenity and pornography," "terror and violence," or which "endangered the security and interests of the state," as well as Web sites operating without a license to broadcast video and audio content.

The Provisions, issued jointly by SARFT and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), require Internet companies engaged in "producing, editing, and integrating video and audio programming and offering it to the public over the Internet" or "offering to others the services of uploading and disseminating video and audio programs" over the Internet to be "wholly state-owned" (guoyou duzi) or "state-controlled" (guoyou konggu). On February 3, however, Xinhua reported that during a question and answer session with the state-run news agency, representatives from SARFT and MII said that a company already offering these services could "re-register and continue operating" without meeting the state ownership requirement, as long as "prior to the release of the Provisions [such company] had been established legally and had broken no laws or regulations." Most A/V companies, including the popular video sharing sites Tudou.com and Youku.com, are privately run and financed by domestic and foreign venture capital, according to a January 7 Beijing Business Today article.

The Provisions' New Requirements

A/V companies had already been subject to the 2004 Measures on the Administration of Broadcasting Audio/Visual Programs Over the Internet or Other Information Networks (2004 Measures), which required the companies to obtain an "Internet Audio/Visual Program Transmission License" from SARFT, have as its sponsoring agency a radio/television, news, publishing, cultural, or propaganda unit at the local level or higher, and maintain records of audio and video content. The Provisions, while continuing to require the "Internet Audio/Visual Program Transmission License" and imposing the new state ownership requirement, also introduce a number of other changes that could have the effect of strengthening state control over A/V companies:

The Provisions increase licensed companies' recordkeeping responsibilities. The 2004 Measures required companies to maintain a record of the title of the program, summary of its contents, time and length of broadcast, and source, for at least 30 days. The Provisions now require companies to maintain a complete copy of a program for at least 60 days (Article 16).

The Provisions extend liability to "major investors and managers" of the A/V company, who are now expressly responsible for their Web site's audio and video content (Article 18). Such individuals face a fine of up to 20,000 yuan (US$2,850) for, among other things, failing to report and delete "harmful content" (Article 23); in the case of "major" violations by an A/V company, major investors and managers would be barred from investing in or providing online audio or video services for five years (Article 27).

Like the 2004 Measures, the Provisions prohibit A/V companies from disseminating politically sensitive content, including content the state considers "harmful to the honor or interests of the nation," "endangers the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the nation," or "disturbs social order" (Article 16). Even before the 2004 Measures and the Provisions, A/V companies had been subject to Internet regulations that imposed similar requirements. For example, the Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services, issued in 2000, had already required all Web sites to be licensed or registered, prohibited the dissemination of content falling within a similar enumerated list, and required maintenance of records of customers' online activity for 60 days. Furthermore, as reiterated in Article 9 of the Provisions, A/V companies that engage in "current events-type video and audio news services" must still apply for a separate "Internet News Information Service License" from the government.

Freedom of Expression Impact

Chinese and outside observers have indicated that the Provisions could lead to greater censorship of politically sensitive audio and video content. According to a January 4 Southern Metropolitan Daily editorial, the regulations "restrain the civil right of social expression in the era of the Internet." The March 22 WSJ report noted that affected businesses "have been scrambling to prove themselves" following the issuance of the Provisions. "[W]e're always working to upgrade our filtering system, to catch things that need to be caught," said Tudou's vice president of business development after his company received a warning in the recent inspection campaign. Much of the problematic content involves pornography, according to a January 4 WSJ article (subscription required), but the Provisions also require removal of politically sensitive content. Following the recent unrest in Tibetan areas of China, Tudou.com and Youku.com were reportedly devoid of any news footage of the protests, according to a March 18 WSJ article (subscription required). At the same time, China reportedly blocked access to the U.S.-based video sharing Web site YouTube.com after videos of the Tibetan protests showed up on the site, according to a March 17 Associated Press (AP) article (via New York Times). The January 4 WSJ article noted that: "Online-video technology potentially poses a major challenge to the Communist Party's control of information. Content-filtering technologies that can identify politically objectionable text on the Internet can't be used to screen videos effectively."

The Provisions' liability for investors and managers, as well as the risk that currently exempted companies may be subject to the state ownership requirement in the future, provide further incentives for A/V companies to exercise effective self-censorship. Chinese officials also continue to urge Internet companies to sign on to "self-discipline pledges" to improve online censorship. In February, at a meeting attended by representatives from more than 40 A/V companies, government officials presided over the announcement of a self-discipline pledge (via the CCTV Web site) that calls on A/V companies to "meet the standards of socialist morals" and to contribute to a database that would allow companies to share information about content they have deleted from their Web sites, according to a February 23 Xinhua article.

Commercial Rule of Law Impact

The Provisions require A/V companies to "respect copyright laws" and to "adopt copyright protection measures, and protect the lawful rights and interests of copyright holders" (Article 15). Under Article 23 of the Provisions, companies that fail to adopt copyright protection measures face warnings and fines of up to 30,000 yuan ($4,280), while major investors and managers face fines of up to 20,000 yuan (US$2,850). It remains to be seen whether these provisions will lead to better enforcement against pirated online audio and video content.

Some industry participants have praised the regulations for clarifying China's policy toward A/V companies. Tudou's chief executive, Gary Wang, said that three years ago, "we couldn't tell who the governing body was and might be" and "[n]ow this is at least clearly a joint effort," according to the January 4 WSJ article. At the same time, the state ownership requirement led some companies to seek clarification from the government over how the Provisions would be implemented, according to the WSJ article and a January 10 AP article (via Seattle Times). Even though the Provisions provide no express exemption for the state ownership requirement, analysts said that the Chinese government would let private companies sidestep the rule for business reasons, according to the AP report. Chinese officials ultimately announced the exemption, but in the form of a question and answer session with a Xinhua reporter, as opposed to a more formal legally binding document, and three days after the Provisions went into effect.

Finally, the state ownership requirement may act as a further barrier for foreign companies to invest in the industry. The Provisions expressly encourage state-owned strategic investors to invest in the industry (Article 15). Under the 2004 Measures, wholly foreign-owned companies, Chinese-foreign joint ventures, and Chinese-foreign cooperative ventures "could not engage in work to disseminate online audio and video programs," but it is not clear how widely enforced this policy was. The January 10 AP article reported that as of November, Youku.com had raised $40 million from U.S. and Chinese venture capital investors.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-31 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Beijing Court Tries Hu Jia, Official Abuses Reported

The Beijing Number 1 Intermediate People's Court tried activist Hu Jia on charges of "inciting subversion of state power" on March 18 from 9:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., according to a March 18 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article. Hu, who has advocated on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients, environmental issues, and rights defenders such as Chen Guangcheng, pleaded not guilty, according to a March 18 Reuters article. The procuratorate's evidence consisted of six essays that Hu published on the U.S.-based dissident Web site Boxun and two interviews he gave with foreign radio agencies, according to a second March 18 RFA article and a March 19 New York Times article. Although the court portrayed the trial as open, none of Hu's family and friends except for Hu's mother was allowed to attend, and Hu's lawyer Li Fangping was given a limited amount of time to present his defense, according to the first March 18 RFA article. Hu Jia's trial points to inconsistencies in Chinese law and continued criminal procedure violations by public officials, including:

Hu's supporters were not allowed to observe trial proceedings, with some held in police custody and beaten. Hu Jia's mother was the only family member allowed to attend the trial, while his father and wife, Zeng Jinyan, were prohibited from observing the trial because they were listed as prosecution witnesses, according to a March 21 RFA article. Rights defenders, members of the legal community, foreign diplomats, and media representatives were also not allowed to attend because they were not granted entry permits, although Hu's mother noted that there were four empty seats in the courtroom, according to the Reuters article, the March 21, and the second March 18 RFA articles.

Officials restricted lawyer Teng Biao's freedom of movement from approximately 8 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., and kept five lawyers, including Jiang Tianyong, Han Yicun, Li Chunfu, and Li Xiongbing, at the Babaoshan police station from the morning until 4:30 p.m, according to the March 18 RFA articles. As reported in the same articles, a public security official beat and intimidated Jiang Tianyong and another lawyer, and did not provide documentation explaining why they were being held in police custody.

Hu's lawyers had limited time to present material at the trial. Li Fangping stated that his first round of argument was restricted to 20 minutes, and that he was not done presenting the defense argument when the court requested that he conclude. Li felt that the amount of time the court allotted to the defense was too short to effectively advocate on Hu Jia's behalf, according to the first March 18 RFA article and a second March 21 RFA article.

Hu was interrogated for 6 to 14 hours at night during the first month of detention and received about 2 hours of sleep during the day. Hu was also permitted to go outdoors only three times since December 27, according to the second March 21 RFA article. Such actions are in violation of Article 25 of the Regulations on Detention Centers of the People's Republic of China, which allows for one to two hours of outdoor exercise every day and adequate sleep for detainees.

It appears under Chinese law that Hu Jia's trial should have been open, as Article 7 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China states that "All cases in the people's courts shall be heard in public, except for those involving state secrets, private affairs of individuals, and the commission of crimes by minors." The trial did not seem to involve state secrets or other exceptions noted above. A February 28, 2006, Dui Hua Foundation press statement observed that "In theory, trials of endangering state security that do not involve trafficking in state secrets are open, but the presiding chief judge enjoys considerable discretion in closing such trials if he or she thinks that state secrets might be discussed in the courtroom or if documents that are themselves state secrets are introduced into evidence."

Li Fangping, in reaction to Hu's wife and father not being allowed to attend the trial, noted that, "I personally feel that this is also a deficiency in China's laws," as officials can make a "record of inquiry" of family members that have no relation to a case. After completing a record, family members are considered possible witnesses for the case. "But the prosecution side doesn't notify [them] to appear in court, so in reality it indirectly deprives the defendant's family of the right to observe the trial," as reported in the first March 18 RFA article.

In his defense, Li Fangping discussed the conflict between the freedom of speech provision (Article 35) in the Constitution and the "inciting subversion of state power" provision (Article 105, Item 2) in the Criminal Law, and noted that cases such as Hu's touched on how to resolve this conflict, especially in the absence of legislative and judicial interpretations. In the first March 18 RFA article, Li further stated, "We also quoted international law standards, and we hope that courts will be even more careful in handling these kinds of cases that involve freedom of speech. It would be best if we could find the boundary line between freedom of speech and endangering state security. If this boundary is not clear, it will obviously violate people's freedom of speech."

Li and Hu have agreed that they would not appeal if Hu is convicted, in order to avoid further harassment of family members, according to the first March 21 article. See previous CECC analyses for additional information on Hu's arrest and detention, and Hu's record of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-28 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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House Church Leader Zhou Heng Released From Detention

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) released house church leader and bookstore manager Zhou Heng from detention on February 19 after holding him for over six months for alleged involvement in plans to receive and distribute religious literature. According to a February 21 China Aid Association (CAA) article, authorities dropped the charges against him. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, Zhou was initially detained on August 3, 2007, while picking up a shipment of books reported to be Bibles donated by overseas churches for free distribution in China. Authorities formally arrested Zhou on August 31 and accused him of "illegal operation of a business." Authorities limited Zhou's meetings with defense counsel, and officials rejected his family's request to post bail. The Saybagh (Shayibake) District People's Procuratorate in the XUAR capital of Urumqi reportedly returned the case to the public security bureau in November due to "insufficient evidence," but Zhou remained in detention until February 19. It is unclear what steps, if any, authorities took in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law to seek formal extensions for detaining Zhou beyond the normal permitted period of two months after arrest.

Zhou's release follows bookstore owner Shi Weihan's release from detention on bail on January 4, 2008. Shi was reportedly detained for "illegal printing and distribution" of religious literature, but due to "insufficient evidence" was not formally arrested. In contrast to available information on Zhou's case, Shi was released on bail, which means that his case could remain open and subject to further investigation and prosecution for up to a year. While Zhou and Shi were eventually released without facing trial, similar cases in the past have ended in prison sentences. House church leaders Wang Zaiqing and Cai Zhuohua were fined and given two- and three-year prison sentences in 2006 and 2005, respectively, for "illegal operation of a business" for printing and giving away Bibles and other religious literature without government authorization.

While the recent releases of Zhou and Shi might suggest a shift in the government's approach to such cases, there is no indication that the government is reconsidering current regulations that restrict a citizen's right to prepare and distribute religious texts. Citizens in China may not privately print and distribute religious literature. Instead, only licensed printers may print such materials, and they must comply with numerous government restrictions toward religious materials that in some cases are stricter than those that apply to non-religious publications. In addition, the government has singled out the Bible for special regulation. The Provisions Regarding the Administration of Contracts to Print Bible Texts assign responsibility for the printing of Bibles for domestic use to China's national state-controlled religious associations. Such printing jobs must be approved by the State Administration for Religious Affairs, and the publications are to be distributed internally within churches. The Provisions also specify that printing enterprises "in principle" may not contract to have Chinese-language or bilingual Bibles printed overseas. (For more information, see a CECC analysis on religious publishing in China.) Chinese citizens who wish to privately prepare or distribute religious material face the risk that Chinese authorities will characterize their activities as acts like "illegal operation of a business" that are subject to penalties under China's Criminal Law.

China's restrictions contravene international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and committed to ratifying, protects the printing and distribution of religious literature. The official General Comment 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR (available via the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library) specifies that freedom of religion includes "the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications."

For more information on religion in China, see the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), Section II--Religious Freedom.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-27 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Party, Government Launch New Security Program, Patriotic Education, in Tibetan Area

Official Chinese Communist Party and government sources in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, have published unusually detailed accounts of anti-separatism and patriotic education activity in Ganzi county, and of a pilot security initiative underway in selected villages. A January 4, 2008, Ganzi Daily article (translated in OSC, 12 February 2008) noted that the county's remote location and "historical reasons" (a reference to Ganzi's reputation for pro-independence sentiment) had made the work of "maintaining public order and safeguarding stability . . . very arduous." Ganzi, one of 18 counties in the prefecture, has been the site of more known political detentions of Tibetans (55) by Chinese authorities than any other county outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since the current period of Tibetan political activism began in 1987, based on data available in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database (PPD).

Political instructor Chun Mei of the Ganzi County Domestic Security Corps told the Ganzi Daily, "From 1999 to 2006, we solved a total of 44 cases of [ethnic] separatism and apprehended 33 suspects, thus effectively puncturing the arrogance of the national separatists." Chun referred to three separatism cases by date (May 14, 1999; February 27, 2000; May 31, 2006), but he did not name the defendants or link the dates to specific events in the legal process, such as detention, formal arrest, or sentencing. As a result, the CECC cannot match the dates with certainty to any of the PPD's 46 cases of known Tibetan political detention and imprisonment in Ganzi county between 1999 and 2006.

Security officials in Ganzi county are implementing a pilot security program in five villages to recruit rural residents to augment local police work, according to a December 24, 2007, article (in Chinese; CECC translation) posted on the Ganzi Prefecture Development Planning Committee (GDPC) Web site. Testing such a program may signal that the county's security establishment, coupled with programs such as patriotic education, have failed to achieve widespread acceptance by Tibetans of Party policies toward Tibetan culture, religion, and the Dalai Lama. (See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information.) After successful completion of the pilot project, officials intend to extend the program throughout the county, according to the GDPC. There are 220 villages in Ganzi county, according to the Ganzi Daily article.

The GDPC article outlined the experimental rural security program's principal features.

Officials will "invite" selected villagers to "assume the duties of [a] public security head." Duties include "transmission" (e.g. transmitting information about security policies to villagers), "notification" (e.g. notifying public security officials about security incidents), and "reconciliation" (e.g. seeking to mediate conflicts between villagers). The objective of such duties is to "[safeguard] public order and [promote] harmony and stability."
Public security heads must hold the position of village-level Party secretary, be "politically reliable," and "enjoy prestige among the people." Empowering village Party chiefs to perform defined support services for public security offices would strengthen the Party's capacity to utilize government police powers to promote Party interests.
Party and public security officials will travel to each village to train public security heads. Training topics include legal issues relevant to the duties of village public security heads, as well as the scope of power that they may exercise.
Local public security officials will supervise and evaluate the work of village public security heads. The purpose of oversight and review is to clarify to the public security heads the limits on the scope of their power, urge them to "develop their work according to law and in a standardized way," and address any abuses of power.
The program will offer incentives for village security heads to provide information about village activity to police. If the information helps police prevent or solve an act considered to be a crime, authorities will grant the village security head an award for each such instance. The GDPC article did not disclose details about the type or size of the awards. Incentives could, for example, encourage village security heads to inform police about villagers who possess photographs of the Dalai Lama or copies of his religious teachings, as well as about other cultural and religious matters that Chinese officials deem to endanger state security by "inciting splittism" (Article 103, Criminal Law).

Ganzi Daily reported that, along with the increased security measures, a new round of patriotic education is underway in all of Ganzi county's villages, schools, monasteries, and nunneries. Officials have used devices such as "propaganda and cultural service kits" and "mobile propaganda banners" to convey the campaign throughout the county, including to the pastoral areas where Tibetan nomads live. As a result, "100 percent" of the monks and nuns who are officially permitted to reside at the 42 monasteries and nunneries located in the county signed or thumb-printed a pledge to "firmly safeguard nationality solidarity and the unity of the motherland."

In preparation for the recent round of patriotic education, officials sent teams to every monastery and nunnery in Ganzi county to "[get] to know what was on the mind of the numerous monks and nuns," Ganzi Daily reported. Based on their findings, authorities decided to make an example of Dargye (Dajin) Monastery. Ganzi Daily placed Dargye's selection in the context of the county's "complex political background" and its "special political status . . . at the forefront of the combat against separatism and infiltration." In one incident linked to the monastery, hundreds of Tibetans converged at the county police detention center in October 1999 after authorities detained Sonam Phuntsog, a senior teacher at Dargye, according to a July 2004 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) report (p. 77). The Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment for splittism after he urged "crowds of people to believe in the Dalai Lama and recite long life prayers" for him, according to a translation of the official verdict by The Dui Hua Foundation in Selection of Cases from the Criminal Law (Volume 13, August 2003).

For more information, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section V(d), Freedom of Religion, and Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; and Section III(d), Freedom of Religion, and Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-17 / English / Subscription) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Xinjiang Authorities Pledge Crackdown Against "Three Forces"

Officials in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) renewed a pledge in early March to crack down against the government-designated "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The government has waged a longstanding campaign against the "three forces" and has used its anti-crime campaigns as a pretext for severe rights abuses in the XUAR. The pledges came as the government provided limited details on recent alleged terrorist activities in the region.

Government Pledges Crackdown
On March 7, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri announced that the "three forces" had "recently become more active in planning violent activities," according to a China Daily paraphrasing of his remarks in a March 8 article. "We should stay on high alert all the time to crush any attempt to damage Xinjiang's development and stability," he said. At a March 9 press conference for domestic and foreign reporters, XUAR Communist Party Chair Wang Lequan said that authorities would "destroy" groups plotting to disrupt the Olympics, according to a transcript of the event posted March 10 on Tianshan Net. At the same press conference, Nur Bekri described the government's policy of making preemptive strikes against separatists and maintaining a posture of "striking hard with high pressure."

The March 9 statements from Wang Lequan and Nur Bekri came as the two provided details on two recent criminal incidents, one of which official sources described as terrorist activity aimed at the Olympics and one of which government sources initially said was under investigation but later described as "sabotage" and terrorism. At the press conference, Wang Lequan referred to a January 2008 incident, also reported on by Chinese media in February, which Wang described as a raid on a cell that had manufactured weapons and conspired to attack the Olympics. At the same press conference, Nur Bekri announced that on March 7, a plane en route from the XUAR capital Urumqi to Beijing made an emergency landing after an "attempt to create an air disaster," according to the transcript of the press conference.

Government Links Alleged Terrorist Plot to Olympics
According to the transcript of the March 9 press conference, Wang Lequan made reference to the January raid while answering a question about groups in the XUAR allegedly aiming to disrupt the Olympics. "Just recently, Xinjiang security departments destroyed a gang. They made explosives and grenades in order to cause destruction, and in the process of their preparations, they were discovered by us. When we arrested them, they threw three grenades at our security officers, and seven received minor injuries," he said. In response to another question about the attack, Wang said, "We haven't fully wrapped up the case involving the incident that broke out on January 27. But concerning your questions, I can tell you...their aim was very clear, which was to destroy the carrying out of the Olympics." Official Chinese media writing in English also reported on his remarks. See, e.g., a Xinhua report posted March 9 on the China Daily Web site which quoted Wang as saying "Obviously, the gang had planned an attack targeting the Olympics."

Mainland Chinese media first reported on the January raid in February, but media reports described Wang Lequan's March remarks as the first time the event had been connected to the Olympics. (See, e.g., a March 9 report from Agence France-Presse (AFP), via Yahoo.) On February 18, the Global Times, a publication connected to the People's Daily newspaper of the Communist Party (CP), reported that on January 27, police broke up a "violent terrorist gang" operating in the Xingfu Gardens area of Urumqi's Tianshan district and discovered firearms, self-manufactured explosives, terrorist training equipment, and materials propagating religious extremism. Police killed 2 and arrested 15, according to the report. (Translation available from Open Source Center (subscription required), February 20.) The article did not explicitly describe the intended targets of the group, but a Chinese terrorism expert quoted in the report said that the "incident reminds us that Olympics security is not only limited to the Beijing area" and that "more attention should be paid to areas that have had terrorist activity break out in the past." A February 19 China Daily article that reported on the information from the Global Times said that "[t]he raid was the latest in a series of efforts by the local government to crack down on violent activities by Uygur [sic] separatists who have carried out several terrorist acts since the 1990s." Elsewhere, Chinese sources have claimed over 260 terrorist attacks have taken place in the region, but they have used shoddy evidence and inconsistent statistics to support their claims.

Outside of mainland Chinese media, information on the January raid appears to have first been reported on February 14 by the Hong Kong-based Sing Tao newspaper (via the Sing Tao Canada Web site and an English translation from the Open Source Center, February 14). It reported then that police had broken up a terrorist ring in Xingfu Gardens, confiscating firearms and explosives and killing "at least 18 terrorists," a death toll similar to that reported for a January 2007 raid. (See below for more details on the 2007 incident.) Sing Tao said the terrorist group was planning activities to commemorate that 11th anniversary of protests in the city of Ghulja, which the government responded to through a violent crackdown. In a February 19 report (via Open Source Center, February 19), AFP noted that "it was impossible to independently verify" the different accounts of the January incident, noting that "[i]ndependent information gathering is difficult in Xinjiang, made particularly hard by China's heavy security presence[.]"

In a March 11 press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Qin Gang said the case was still under investigation and did not mention its reported ties to the Olympics. (See the transcript in Chinese and English on the MFA Web site.)

March Airplane Incident First Said To Be Under Investigation, Later Identified as "Sabotage" and Terrorism
At the March 9 press conference, Nur Bekri provided limited details on an emergency flight landing in response to a reporter who asked if an incident had taken place recently involving four ethnic Uighurs who had brought gasoline aboard a China Southern flight. After presenting his view of the security situation in the XUAR and pledging a crackdown against separatists, Nur Bekri responded that on the afternoon of March 7, a Beijing-bound China Southern flight from Urumqi made an emergency landing in Lanzhou, saying that "from what is understood at present, we can confirm that this was an attempt to create an air disaster." Nur Bekri said that an airline employee detected a problem and prevented an incident from taking place. He said that after the plane had stopped for several hours in Lanzhou, it arrived in Beijing on March 8. He added that suspects were in custody but that their identities and their motives were still under investigation. Nur Bekri did not discuss whether the incident constituted terrorist activity. For reporting in English on Nur Bekri's remarks, see a March 9 Xinhua report.

Government officials openly provided few details on the attack in the days immediately following Nur Bekri's announcement. MFA spokesperson Qin Gang, speaking at the March 11 press conference, said the incident was still under investigation, which he reiterated at a March 13 press conference (on the MFA Web site in English and Chinese). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also provided limited details at a March 12 press conference (via Open Source Center, March 12). On March 11, however, a Chinese-language article from the Global Times (via the China News Net and Open Source Center, March 12), the publication affiliated with the CP-controlled People's Daily, cited an unnamed official source who described the incident as "clearly" a terrorist attack.

Roughly two weeks after the incident, Wang Lequan identified it as an act of sabotage. In a March 19 article based on an interview he gave that day with XUAR media and posted on the Xinjiang Daily Web site, Wang said that "it has now already been ascertained that this was a grave incident of sabotage instigated and implemented by 'East Turkistan' separatists from outside the country." He also described "western hostile forces" as "unceasing" in their efforts to sabotage the region and said they had "penetrated everywhere." He called for various measures, including "striking hard with high pressure" against the "three forces," to ensure stability in the region. For English reporting on his remarks, see a March 20 article from Xinhua.

The following week, on March 27, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a notice stating that police investigation had found the incident was an "organized and premeditated case of terrorism aimed at the aircraft[.]" The MPS notice identified one criminal suspect who had "confessed everything" and said the case was still under investigation. For reporting in English, see a March 27 Xinhua report on the China Daily Web site. In a March 27 press conference (via the MFA Web site in Chinese and English), Qin Gang said he had nothing to add to the MPS report.

Media Rehashes January 2007 Incident
Some reporting on the March and January incidents (see, e.g., the March 9 Xinhua report) also referred to a January 5, 2007, police raid at a location on the Pamirs plateau that Chinese officials described as a terrorist training base. Chinese media reported on the raid shortly after it took place. According to a January 8, 2007, Tianshan Net report on a XUAR Public Security Department press conference held that day, police killed 18 people, captured 17 others, and confiscated 22 homemade grenades and 1,500 partially completed grenades during the raid.

One day after the raid but two days before Chinese media reported on the event, Wang Lequan called on the XUAR government to make stability the "overriding" concern in the region and to "strike hard" against the "three forces," according to remarks at a January 6 conference reported January 7, 2007, in the Xinjiang Daily. While noting that ethnic unity and political stability were strong in the XUAR, Wang said that forces from within China and abroad had carried out infiltration and sabotage activities in the region, the article reported. Wang described the "struggle with separatist forces" as a "long and complicated task," and called for making preemptive attacks against them.

Chinese Reporting Draws Doubts, Concerns From Observers
Official reporting from China on the January and March 2008 events and earlier 2007 raid has drawn doubt from outside observers and concerns that the government is using the incidents to increase repression in the XUAR. In a March 10 AFP article (via Yahoo), scholar James Millward noted that information on the recent events was limited to Chinese press coverage. The Chinese government exerts tight controls over the press and limits the ability of both domestic and foreign reporters to do on-the-ground reporting in the XUAR. (See Section II, Freedom of Expression, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report, via the Government Printing Office Web site, and a CECC analysis on foreign journalists for more information.) Speaking of the January 2007 terrorist raid, scholar Dru Gladney said that the government had not provided clear evidence indicating the existence of a terrorist base, and that the incident could have involved another criminal, but non-terrorist, operation, according to a January 10, 2007, AFP article (via Nexis, subscription required). In a 2004 East-West Center Washington paper titled Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, James Millward similarly noted the Chinese government had not provided enough details about previous alleged terrorist crimes to prove that the acts were separatist or terrorist "as opposed to simply criminal."

In the March 10, 2008, AFP article, Phelim Kine of Human Rights Watch said that the organization was "concerned that the Chinese government may use these alleged terrorist plots as a pretext for a new campaign of repression against the Uighur population in Xinjiang and to stifle any public expressions of dissent[.]" In press releases issued on February 19 and March 11, the Uyghur American Association called for independent investigations into the January and March incidents and expressed concern that the government would use the incidents as cause for continuing repressive policies in the region.

Government Reports on Anti-Separatism Measures
Recent reporting on the XUAR details a range of measures used to address perceived security threats, both prior to and after reports of the January and March 2008 incidents.

A March 14 report from the China News Agency (via the Xinjiang News Net) described recent measures by the Urumqi Public Security Bureau to strengthen security and "strike hard and keep tight lookout against sabotage by the 'three forces'" in the run-up to the Olympics. According to the article, "the city's Olympics security and guard work has already entered into a state of actual combat."
A report posted March 7 on the Qumul district government Web site described a recent meeting aimed at "ideology reeducation work" for the "battle against separatism and infiltration," designed to heighten awareness of the issue especially among ethnic minority cadres and strengthen supervision and management of the state's work on the issue. The article stressed raising awareness of the "protracted nature, severity, complexity, and arduousness" of the anti-separatism battle.
A February 28 article posted on the Chinese Ethnicity News Web site detailed a new agreement between ethnic and religious affairs bureaus in Kashgar district and counterpart bureaus in Wuhan city, Hubei province, that includes security measures aimed at Kashgar residents living in Wuhan. "According to the principle that 'safeguarding stability is the number one duty,' Wuhan city will strengthen the intensity of its work to attack the 'three forces,' communicating in a timely manner and sharing information on conditions; Kashgar district will establish a database of information on relevant persons who violate the law and commit crimes, enjoying it with Wuhan and mutually channeling inspection and control categories, attacking in a timely manner those who violate the law and commit crimes, and safeguarding ethnic unity and the unification of the country," the article reported. It also outlined measures to strengthen education in patriotism.
Former Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang is the new leader of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Group, according to a March 11 report from the Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao (via Open Source Center, March 11). According to a source cited in an April 17, 2007, article from Sing Tao (via Open Source Center, April 18, 2007), personnel appointments for the Xinjiang group and a counterpart group on Tibetan policy have indicated "priority to handling Xinjiang affairs with an iron hand."

Rights Abuses Remain Rampant
As noted in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, the Chinese government has increased repression in the XUAR in recent years and targets the Uighur population in particular with harsh policies to squelch political dissent and control expressions of religious and ethnic identity. The government has used anti-terrorism policies to conflate the peaceful exercise of rights with terrorist or separatist activity. Uighurs remain in prison for activities including conducting historical research on the region and for writing a fictional short story. The government couples "strike hard" anti-crime campaigns with "softer" policies aimed at diluting expressions of Uighur cultural identity.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-17 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Foreign Minister "Freedom of Speech" Comments At Odds With Arrests, Detentions

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that it is "impossible" for someone in China to be arrested for saying "human rights are more important than the Olympics," a statement that conflicts with the recent arrest, detention, and questioning of a number of Chinese citizens who have publicly criticized China's human rights record in relation to the Olympics. According to a February 28 Reuters article, Yang told reporters that Chinese citizens enjoy "extensive freedom of speech." His comments followed a meeting that day in Beijing with Britain's foreign minister. "No one will get arrested because he said that human rights are more important than the Olympics. This is impossible. Ask 10 people from the street to face public security officers and ask them to say 'human rights are more important than the Olympics' 10 times or even 100 times, and I will see which security officer would put him in jail," Yang reportedly said.

Yang's statements appear inconsistent with the recent arrests of HIV/AIDS and environmental activist Hu Jia and land rights activist Yang Chunlin (no relation to Yang Jiechi). Officials accused both of "inciting subversion of state power," after each made public statements tying their criticism of China's human rights record to the Olympics. In Hu's case, Beijing public security officials detained him just one month after he criticized China's hosting of the Olympics and its human rights record before a European Parliament Human Rights Subcommittee hearing in November. Hu is set to go on trial on March 18, according to a March 14 Reuters article (via The Guardian). In Yang Chunlin's case, the main piece of evidence against him appears to be a petition he helped organize titled "We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics," which the procuratorate claimed tarnished China's international image, according to Yang's lawyer as reported in a February 19 Reuters article (via The Guardian). Yang was arrested in August 2007. His trial took place on February 19 but the court has not yet issued its verdict.

Short of formally arresting citizens, Chinese officials have also detained citizens or held them for questioning in an apparent effort to prevent them from publicly criticizing the Chinese government and the Olympics. Earlier this month, law professor Teng Biao went missing for two days after plainclothes police officers seized Teng outside his home in Beijing, placed a sack over his head, and drove him away to be questioned, according to a March 14 Wall Street Journal article. Authorities warned him to stop writing articles criticizing China's human rights record and the Olympics or risk losing his university post and going to jail. In September, Teng and Hu co-wrote a letter titled "The Real China Before the Olympics" (Chinese, English), which criticized Beijing for failing to live up to its promise to improve human rights for the Olympics. Internet essayist Wang Dejia was recently detained after he used the Internet to air his criticisms of the government and gave an interview to a foreign newspaper in which he said China was focusing too much on hosting the Olympics and not enough on caring for its own citizens. Before releasing him on bail on January 12, officials reportedly required Wang to agree to stop posting online essays critical of the government and told him not to speak to foreign journalists.

For more information on freedom of expression in China, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-17 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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"Bilingual" Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools

A new program in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) strengthens government measures to promote Mandarin Chinese at the preschool level via educational instruction that the government describes as "bilingual" but that places primacy on Mandarin at the expense of ethnic minority languages. According to a February 28 article from the Urumqi Evening News (via Tianshan Net), authorities in the XUAR implemented a program in February to send student-teachers from the Xinjiang Preschool Teacher's College to preschools in Kashgar prefecture to supplement the area's shortage of bilingual teaching staff. Students who volunteer for the one-semester program receive various benefits, including a monthly subsidy for living expenses and preferential treatment once they enter the job market. Based on the results from this group of student-teachers, authorities will expand the scope of the program, the article reported.

The program follows earlier news on enlarging the scope of bilingual preschool education. In late 2005, the XUAR government stressed the importance of strengthening bilingual preschool education and announced plans to comprehensively implement bilingual education at the preschool level the following year. In 2006, it announced it would allocate 430 million yuan (US$59.76 million) over five years to support bilingual preschool programs in seven prefectures, to reach a target rate of 85 percent of rural ethnic minority children enrolled in two years of bilingual preschool education by 2010, according to an October 2006 article from the Xinjiang Economic News (via Tianshan Net). The following year, the XUAR Department of Finance allotted 70.39 million yuan (US$9.78 million) to cover subsidies for both students and teachers in bilingual preschool programs, according to a November 2007 report from Xinjiang Daily. According to the Urumqi Evening News article, as of 2007, the XUAR had 2,982 bilingual preschool classes encompassing around 93,000 children and 1,835 staff members. The previous year, the Xinjiang Economic News article reported that the XUAR would support over 1,300 bilingual preschool classes involving 51,900 students and 1,296 teachers for that academic year.

Available information on the bilingual programs in XUAR schools indicates that many programs deemed "bilingual" have focused on instruction primarily in Mandarin Chinese, in some cases relegating instruction in ethnic minority languages solely to language arts classes. In addition, at least one predominantly ethnic minority city has cast its language policy as instruction exclusively in Mandarin Chinese, rather than use the "bilingual" label. The education for students enrolled at the Xinjiang Preschool Teacher's College, the XUAR's training base for bilingual preschool certification and source of student-teachers for the February program, also indicates the shift to Mandarin at higher levels of education. Although one description of the college, available on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site (undated), describes the institution as a combined ethnic minority-Han school that teaches in Mandarin, Uighur, and Kazakh, 2007 recruitment materials for the school, posted on the Xinjiang Education Department Web site (undated), stated that the language of instruction for all subject areas, including bilingual education classes, would be in Mandarin Chinese.

Despite evidence of this focus on Mandarin in XUAR schools, as reported in sources including a 2006 Xinjiang Daily article (via Tianshan Net), XUAR Chair Nur Bekri stated in a March 5, 2008, Xinjiang Metropolitan News article (via Xinhua) that bilingual education in the region equally values ethnic minority languages and Mandarin. Nur Bekri described criticisms of bilingual education as an attack from the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism operating outside China.

XUAR language policies violate Chinese laws that protect and promote the use of ethnic minority languages, which form part of broader legal guarantees to protect ethnic minority rights and allow autonomy in ethnic minority regions. For example, Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) guarantee that ethnic minorities have the freedom to use and develop their own languages. Article 121 of the Constitution and Article 21 of the REAL state that government agencies in ethnic autonomous regions adopt the languages in common use in the region. The REAL adds that "where several commonly used languages are used for the performance of such functions, the language of the nationality exercising regional autonomy may be used as the main language." In the specific area of education, Article 37 of the REAL stipulates that "[s]chools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction." Despite these various legal provisions to protect ethnic minority languages and promote their use as lingua franca of the region, authorities have developed a linguistic environment in the XUAR that privileges Mandarin and makes knowledge of it a functional requisite in various public spheres, including but not limited to the XUAR education system. As a result of current policy, opportunities for educational, professional, and economic advancement in the XUAR increasingly have become contingent on knowledge of Mandarin. While bilingual education programs that diminish the use of ethnic minority languages respond to this need for Mandarin skills, XUAR officials do not acknowledge that the need stems from official failures to protect ethnic minority rights and implement autonomy in ethnic minority regions as provided for in Chinese law.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-13 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Qinghai-Tibet Railway Statistics Add to Confusion, Mask Impact on Local Population

China's state-run media has released additional information about passengers who used the Qinghai-Tibet railway to travel to and from the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) from July 2006 to December 2007, the first 18 months of the railway's operation. Based on Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) analysis of the fragmentary and sometimes contradictory information, more than a half million passengers, most of whom are likely ethnic Han, may have traveled during that period to the TAR to seek work, trade, and business opportunities. The railway's impact could overwhelm the Tibetan population in urban centers such as Lhasa, and sharply increase pressure on the Tibetan culture.

A February 8, 2008, Xinhua article entitled, "Qinghai Tibet Railway Transports 5.95 [million] Tourists," contradicted information provided by a December 20, 2007, Xinhua article (reprinted in China Daily the same day) by reporting a significantly higher number of passengers traveling to and from Lhasa, the capital of the TAR, and characterizing all of the passengers as tourists. (See details below.) The February 2008 report, which did not provide any explanation for the unexpectedly high figures, adds to the confusion about the number and purpose of passengers who travel to the TAR on the railway. As a result, the report may mask the probable impact on Tibetan population in the TAR. Tibetans made up 92.8 percent of the TAR's population in 2000, according to official Chinese census data.

Chinese media reports seek to focus attention on the increased tourist traffic to the TAR that the railway makes possible, and on the boost that tourism has provided to the regional economy. The February 2008 report states, for example, that 2007 tourism revenue in the TAR surpassed 2006 by 75.1 percent, and that tourism in 2007 accounted for 14.2 percent of the TAR gross domestic product (GDP) -- a rise of 48 percent over tourism's share of GDP in 2006 (9.6 percent, according to Xinhua, 30 November 07). The reports provide little information about the number of non-tourists who travel to the TAR to seek employment, trade, and business opportunities, and no information about the railway's impact on the size and ethnic composition of population in TAR urban centers such as Lhasa and the nearby prefectural capitals Naqu (Nagchu), Rikaze (Shigatse), and Zedang (Tsethang). Naqu is the last major stop on the Qinghai-Tibet railway before Lhasa; an extension of the railway to Rikaze is scheduled for completion in 2010; officials have not announced a railway extension to Zedang, but the town is linked to Lhasa by paved road and ample public transport.

As the economically driven, mostly Han influx continues, the Chinese government's weak implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law will continue to hinder Tibetans from preserving their culture, language, and heritage. Weak implementation of the law prevents Tibetans from realizing the law's guarantee that ethnic minorities have the "right to administer their internal affairs." (See "Tibetan Culture Under Chinese Development Policy and Practice," in Section IV, "Tibet: Special Focus for 2007," in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report for more information about how Chinese laws, regulations, and policies increase pressure on the Tibetan culture and erode the Tibetan people's ability to preserve their heritage and self-identity.)

Contradictions: Did 5.95 Million Railway Passengers Travel in 18 Months?

The February 2008 Xinhua report of 5.95 million persons traveling on the Qinghai-Tibet railway during the 18-month period raises questions about the scale of the claim, about what measures, if any, authorities have implemented to increase the railway's passenger capacity to the claimed level, and about passengers' purpose for traveling.

The figure 5.95 million contradicts the December 2007 Xinhua report on passenger traffic during the same 18-month period, surpassing that report by approximately one-quarter.
- An average of approximately 10,870 passengers would have to commence travel each day for 18 months to reach a total of 5.95 million. If equal proportions of passengers traveled to and from the TAR -- a premise that ignores the likelihood that somewhat more than one-half of the passengers travel inbound and that some passengers remain for a time to work, trade, or engage in business -- the average daily passenger total in each direction would be approximately 5,435.
- The figure 5,435, however, surpasses by about 1,000 persons the average daily total of approximately 4,400 Lhasa-bound passengers during the same 18-month period reported by the December 2007 Xinhua article. (See additional statistical information below.) The February 2008 report does not refer to any of the data provided by the December 2007 report, nor does it provide any new information that could account for the large increase in the reported number of passengers for the same period.
The assertion that 5.95 million passengers traveled on the railway in an 18-month period exceeds the railway's stated capacity, as reported in official Chinese media.
- In May 2006, a TAR official stated that the railway would transport 4,000 tourists per day into the TAR when it commenced service on July 1. A June 28, 2006, China Tibet Information Center (CTIC) report published shortly before the railway began operation discussed the number and composition of Qinghai-Tibet railway trains. A total of four trains would arrive in Lhasa each day and the capacity of each train would be 936 persons, based on the number and capacity of each type of car the trains reportedly would include. Car capacities range from 32 to 98 passengers depending on the standard of accommodation. Based on the CTIC information, the capacity of four trains would be 3,744 passengers.
- CTIC's preliminary schedule information appears to remain generally consistent with timetables available on the Travel China Guide Web site on February 25, 2008. Although passenger services for Lhasa depart from seven Chinese cities, only four trains arrive in Lhasa each day: service from Beijing runs daily; the services departing from Chengdu city and Chongqing city merge into a single train in Baoji city; the service departing from Lanzhou city merges in Xining with the Xining city service; and, according to CTIC, the services departing from Shanghai city and Guangzhou city depart on alternate days. The timetable for Naqu (Nagchu), the capital of Naqu prefecture in the TAR, illustrates how services with different points of origin retain their original service numbers after they merge to form a single train.
- The December 2007 report does not provide any information that explains how the railway accommodates the average daily number of TAR-bound passengers claimed by the article (approximately 4,400), which exceeds by approximately 650 passengers per day the 3,744 passenger per day capacity of the four arriving trains based on the CTIC information. The excess number of passengers could be accommodated by adding one or two cars to some of the services.
- If the February 2008 report of 5.95 million passengers arriving in and departing from the TAR each day during the first 18 months of operation (10,870 passengers per day) is accurate, then it would surpass by nearly 3,400 passengers per day the railway's daily bidirectional capacity of 7,488 passengers based on the CTIC information. The CECC has not seen any public reports by Chinese news media announcing large increases of service on the Qinghai-Tibet railway.
- Even if Chinese authorities had announced a significant expansion of Qinghai-Tibet railway service, such an announcement would not resolve the contradiction between the passenger statistics provided by the December 2007 and February 2008 Xinhua reports.
The February 2008 report characterizes all of the Qinghai-Tibet railway's 5.95 million passengers as "tourists," contradicting the December 2007 report's acknowledgement that nearly one-half of the passengers during a 12-month period were not tourists.
- The December 2007 report stated that "more than a half" of Qinghai-Tibet railway passengers from July 2006 to June 2007 were tourists, implying that somewhat less than half of the passengers during that period were not tourists.
- A September 14, 2006, Xinhua report on the railway's initial period of operation revealed that less than half of the Lhasa-bound passengers were tourists. Midway into September 2006, after two and one-half months' of railway operation, Jin Shixun, the Director of the TAR Committee of Development and Reform, said that 40 percent of the passengers were tourists and that the rest were business persons, students, transient workers, traders, and individuals visiting relatives. (See additional details below.)

Clues: How Many Passengers Aren't Tourists, but Seek Jobs, Economic Opportunity?

Even though increased Han migration into Tibetan and other ethnic areas is among the objectives of China's Great Western Development (GWD) program, and even though the Qinghai-Tibet railway is formally designated a key GWD project, the Chinese government avoids providing information about the number of railway passengers who remain in the TAR for longer periods to seek employment, trade, or business opportunity. Official reports have provided clues, however, that more than a half million such passengers, most of whom are likely to be ethnic Han, may have arrived in the TAR during the railway's first 18 months of operation. The analysis below sets aside the February 8, 2008, Xinhua report of 5.95 million passengers traveling on the railway because of the unresolved questions and contradictions that it poses (explained above), and is instead based on the December 20, 2007, and September 14, 2006, Xinhua reports.

Approximately 2.35 million passengers arrived in Lhasa during the 18-month period from July 2006 to December 2007, based on the December 2007 report.
- Referring to the period January-December 2007, the last 12 months of the 18-month period, the December 2007 report stated, "About 1.6 million passengers are forecast to travel on the Qinghai-Tibet railway this year." The article reported that during the first 12 months of operation, July 2006 through June 2007, "[A] total of 1.5 million people had come to [the TAR] by train."
- Based on the average monthly passenger traffic provided by these statistics, an average of approximately 125,000 passengers per month (4,170 per day) arrived in the TAR in July to December 2006, and an average of approximately 133,300 passengers per month (4,440 per day) did so in January to December 2007. Based on those figures, the 18-month total of passenger arrivals in the TAR would have been approximately 2.35 million. The December 2007 report did not provide any information about the number of passengers departing from the TAR.
Among the approximately 2.35 million persons arriving in Lhasa from July 2006 to December 2007, more than a half million may have been non-Tibetan, mostly ethnic Han, workers, traders, and business persons who intended to remain for a period in the TAR to work, engage in business, or seek other economic opportunity, based on information provided in the September 2006 and December 2007 Xinhua reports.
- If information provided in the September 2006 report about the different purposes of passengers for traveling to the TAR remained representative throughout the 18-month period of July 2006 to December 2007, then as many as 1.41 million of the 2.35 million arriving passengers may have been non-tourists, and over half of the 1.41 million non-tourists may have been mainly Han who intended to remain for a period in the TAR for economic reasons. The remaining 940,000 passengers (40 percent of 2.35 million), would have been tourists.
  - According to the September 14, 2006, Xinhua report, the railway carried 272,700 passengers in the period from July 1, 2006, until Xinhua published the report (76 days). The figure suggests an average of approximately 3,590 arrivals per day in the TAR, a plausible figure because the Shanghai and Guangzhou services did not start operation until October 1 and 2, respectively, according to Xinhua reports on the same dates. According to the September 2006 report, of the 60 percent of the passengers who were not tourists, 30 percent were businesspersons, and the remaining 30 percent were "students, transient workers, traders, and people visiting relatives in Tibet."
- The December 2007 Xinhua information reports a lower proportion of non-tourist arrivals than the September 2006 report, but even the more recent information supports the observation that the railway passengers may have included more than a half million mostly Han workers, traders, and businesspersons.
  - The December 2007 Xinhua report stated that "more than a half" of the 1.5 million passengers arriving in the TAR between July 2006 and June 2007 were tourists -- a greater proportion of tourist arrivals than the 40 percent Xinhua reported in September 2006. It is unlikely, however, that the proportion of tourists surpassed one-half by a substantial amount. If, for example, the proportion of tourists had reached 60 percent, or even more, officials and news reports would have been likely to call attention to the figure and identify it.
  - If, for the purpose of illustration, the tourists who made up "more than a half" of the 1.5 million arriving passengers reached 55 percent of the total, then the 45 percent of arriving passengers who were not tourists during the 12-month period would have been numbered approximately 675,000 (about 56,250 per month). If that rate of arrivals for non-tourists represented an average for the entire 18-month period, then approximately 1 million non-tourists would have arrived in the TAR. If the proportions of purposes for non-tourist travel that the September 2006 report described continued to be indicative for the 18-month period, then over half of the 1 million non-tourists arriving in the TAR may have been principally Han persons seeking work and business opportunity.

Scale of Impact: The Influx in a Tibetan Context

If a fraction of the estimated half million or more principally Han persons who arrived on the Qinghai-Tibet railway to work or conduct business in the TAR during the 18-month period from July 2006 to December 2007 remained in Lhasa's urban district (Chengguan), they may have outnumbered the Tibetans who live there (105,997 according to the 2000 census). The influx of new workers and businesspersons may have surpassed the number of Han already present in the entire TAR: 158,570 in 2000, according to official census data, or 105,379 in 2005, according to the 2006 Tibet Statistical Yearbook.

National census and yearbook data on the same period conflict because each collects data differently. The census methodology is designed to include temporary residents, recent arrivals, and persons without a household registration. But because census day in 2000 was November 1, a substantial number of Han who work or trade in the TAR had departed by census day to spend the winter elsewhere in China. Provincial annual statistical yearbooks rely on data compiled by the Public Security Bureau (PSB).

The importance of railway passengers to Tibetans cannot be gauged adequately by measuring increases in tourism and regional GDP. The scale of the cultural, social, and economic impact on Tibetans will depend in part on whether the number of mainly Han workers, traders, and businesspersons proves large enough to overwhelm the Tibetan population first in Lhasa, then in nearby prefectural capitals such as Rikaze, Naqu, and Zedang, and eventually in the more distant prefectural capitals Linzhi (Nyingtri) and Changdu (Chamdo). The potential impact on Tibetans does not depend on whether or not Chinese officials classify the newly arriving participants in the TAR economy as transients or residents, or on whether their presence is officially recorded in statistical compilations such as the national census or provincial yearbooks. The scale of the impact on Tibetan culture will depend on the numbers, needs, and activities of the persons who travel to the TAR. The Chinese government provides little public information on such subjects.

Chinese government data appears to underrepresent the number of Han who are present in Tibetan autonomous areas, and to report statistics that are inconsistent with each other and with observations by Tibetan and foreign experts.

A TAR government official explained to a CECC staff delegation visiting Lhasa in 2003, before the Qinghai-Tibet railway was completed, why the Han population appeared to be larger than official statistics indicate. He said that "every day" there is a mobile Han population numbering more than 200,000 in the TAR, and that it peaks from June through October. (CECC 2004 Annual Report.) A Tibetan academic in Lhasa told a CECC staff delegation in 2002 that the temporary population of Han workers and traders in Lhasa's urban district alone reaches approximately 100,000 during summer and declines to about 10,000 in winter.
A Chinese academic study of the migrant worker population in Lhasa in 2005, before the railway was completed, concluded that the actual number of temporary migrants is much larger than official records reveal. Studying the migrant workers in the TAR is difficult, the paper observed, because the workers move seasonally and generally try to avoid registering with local authorities in order to escape payment of fees and charges. The paper noted that the Great Western Development program promotes the flow of "a large number of temporary migrants" into the TAR, and leads to increased competition between a "low quality" local Tibetan workforce and incoming (mostly Han) migrant workers.

For more information on the Qinghai-Tibet railway and related issues, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report; Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2004 Annual Report; and Section VII, Tibet, in the CECC 2003 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-04 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Time Line: Central Government Legislation on Religion

In 2004 the State Council issued the Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA), marking the first national-level comprehensive regulation on religion. Since then, the government has not issued one consolidated set of implementing provisions, as some observers anticipated, but rather expanded upon specific articles within the RRA by issuing legal measures (banfa) regarding these articles. In addition, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) continues to publicize a book of interpretations of the RRA that elaborates on each article of the regulation. See the SARA Web site for more information.

The list below provides a brief chronology of the central government's legislative activity in the area of religion since the RRA's promulgation.

Measures on the Examination, Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity, issued April 21, 2005.
Measures for Putting Religious Personnel on File, issued December 29, 2006.
Measures for Putting on File the Main Religious Personnel of Venues for Religious Activities, issued December 29, 2006.
Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, issued July 18, 2007. See a CECC analysis on these measures for more information.
Measures on Establishing Religious Schools, issued August 1, 2007.
Measures Regarding Chinese Muslims Registering to Go Abroad on Pilgrimages (Trial Measures), undated (estimated date 2006).

For more information on religion in China see the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), Section II--Religious Freedom.

Source: -See Summary (2008-02-28 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political and Religious Publications

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) will make "illegal" political and religious publications the focal point of their campaign to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications," according to a January 18 report from Xinhua. Li Yi, head of the XUAR Propaganda Bureau, made the announcement at a January 17 conference at which he stressed the importance of censoring illegal publications and taking actions such as eliminating pornography and removing "harmful information" from the Internet to ensure reforms develop in a stable manner and to promote a "sound cultural environment." He described the situation regarding "illegal" religious and political publications as "severe," and called for enforcement agencies to maintain vigilance against such publications. While "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications" campaigns targeting a range of materials exist throughout China, authorities in the XUAR target religious and political materials also as part of broader controls in the region over Islamic practice and expressions of political dissent.

The report noted that in 2007, authorities in the XUAR confiscated a total of 1.82 million copies of illegal publications, which included pirated and pornographic items in addition to "illegal" political and religious publications. The report did not disaggregate the figure, but data for 2006 indicates that XUAR authorities confiscated 6,999 copies of "illegal political publications" and 11,580 copies of "illegal religious propaganda materials" out of a total of 1.73 million copies of illegal publications collected between January and November of that year. (See a January 2007 Xinhua report reprinted in Tianshan Net for more information.) Reports from local governments provide more details on the scope of the operation and the types of religious and political materials targeted in the past year:

Officials from the XUAR "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications" bureau made a trip to the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture in June 2007 to examine the prefecture's work to "attack" "illegal" political and religious publications, according to a report posted that month on the Changji Autonomous Prefecture Government Web site. XUAR authorities told local officials to make "illegal" political and religious publications the focus of their work on illegal publications. In a 13-day campaign held earlier that month and in late May, local officials inspected marketplaces as well as areas in the vicinity of schools and mosques and confiscated 135 copies of "illegal" religious publications.
Changji City authorities targeted four types of "illegal" religious publications in their work to supervise the city's cultural market: items that incite religious fanaticism, propagate violent terrorism, advocate holy war, or incite sentiment against Han Chinese and sentiment promoting their expulsion from the region, according to a July 2007 report on the Changji City Government Web site. In an inspection of those categories of materials, authorities confiscated 74 copies of "illegal" religious materials. The article did not detail the standards used to determine whether a publication falls into one of the categories above, but past examples suggest the threshold is low. In 2005, authorities found that a short story about a caged bird who chooses suicide over a life without freedom, titled "Wild Pigeon," incited separatism and sentenced the story's author, Nurmemet Yasin, to 10 years in prison. Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the literature journal that published the story, served a three-year sentence for dereliction of duty and is presumed to have been released from prison upon the expiration of his sentence on February 2, 2008.
Authorities in Qumul City confiscated 32 copies of "illegal" religious publications and 5 copies of "illegal" political publications in an inspection of sites including religious gathering places, according to a June 2007 report from the Qumul City Government Web site. The report said the inspection was carried out in accordance with a regional action plan to "attack" "illegal" political and religious publications.

For more information on restrictions over freedom of the press in the XUAR, see prior CECC analyses on campaigns to confiscate illegal publications in February and May 2006. For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-02-19 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Tibetan Abbot Suspected of Link to Posters Sentenced to Three Years' Imprisonment

A court in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), located in Sichuan province, sentenced the abbot (khenpo) of a Tibetan Buddhist monastery on July 16, 2007, to three years' imprisonment for endangering state security with "anti-government propaganda" and by "incitement of [the] masses," according to a February 2, 2008, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) report. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2007 Annual Report named Abbot Jinpa of Taglung Monastery, located in Chogtsang village, Seda (Serthar) county, as one of nine Tibetans whom Ganzi authorities detained between March and August 2006, according to news media and non-government organization reports issued between June and September 2006. Authorities did not accuse any of the Tibetans of violent activity, based on those reports and on information available in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD).

Officials detained Jinpa on August 23, 2006, although security officials did not find any "incriminating materials" when they searched his living quarters, according to a September 7, 2006, Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. A source told RFA that Jinpa's detention could be linked to the appearance of pro-independence posters in the monastery a year earlier (in August 2005, according to the TCHRD press release). Ten vehicles carrying public security officials arrived at the monastery three days after Jinpa's detention and ransacked his room in a search for evidence, according to TCHRD. Authorities subsequently detained and questioned an unspecified number of unnamed persons in connection with the case, and released all of them after 10 to 15 days, TCHRD reported.

Information about the official charges against Jinpa and the evidence submitted before the court to support such charges is not available. If the court sentenced him in connection with the alleged appearance of pro-independence posters at the monastery, it is likely that the court convicted him under Article 103 of China's Criminal Law, which punishes inciting "splittism" ("splitting the State or undermining unity of the country"). After the court sentenced Jinpa, authorities transferred him to the Ganzi prefectural prison located in Xinduqiao (Minyag) township, Kangding (Dardo) county, which the TCHRD report referred to as Rangakha prison.

During the period 2002-2007, authorities in Ganzi TAP detained or imprisoned more Tibetans for peaceful political expression than any other prefectural-level area of Tibetan autonomy in China. Sixty of the 145 Tibetans known to have been detained or imprisoned during the period lived in Ganzi at the time of their detention, based on PPD information. Of the 60 Ganzi residents, 22 of them are known or believed to remain detained or imprisoned as of February 5, 2008.

For additional information about the political detention and imprisonment of Tibetans, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, and Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-02-12 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Uighur Editor Korash Huseyin's Prison Sentence Expires

Editor Korash Huseyin completed his three-year prison sentence for "dereliction of duty" on February 2 and is presumed to have since been released from prison, according to information from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. Radio Free Asia's Uighur service, which reported on the sentence's expiration in a February 1 article, reported that Chinese authorities have not provided confirmation of the release. Huseyin had served as chief editor of the Kashgar Literature Journal, based in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which published a short story in 2004 deemed to promote separatism. As noted in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, police initially detained Huseyin on February 3, 2005, one day after the Maralbéshi (Bachu) County People's Court sentenced the story's author, Nurmemet Yasin, to 10 years in prison for "inciting splittism." The same court sentenced Huseyin on July 14, 2005. Huseyin served his sentence in the Maralbéshi Prison. Yasin's story, Wild Pigeon, describes a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom. Authorities read the story as an attack against government policy in the XUAR. Yasin is serving his sentence in the Urumqi Number One Prison.

The sentences of Yasin and Huseyin, both members of the Uighur ethnic group, reflect widespread repression in the region. As noted in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), the Chinese government has increased repression in the XUAR since 2001, and targets the Uighur population in particular with harsh policies to squelch political dissent and control expressions of religious and ethnic identity.

Source: -See Summary (2008-02-05 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Official Defends Response to Forced Labor Scandal

Yu Youjun, the former provincial governor of Shanxi province, described as "unparalleled" the punishment of 95 local Communist Party officials for their role in a scandal involving the enslavement of more than 1,300 people, including kidnapped children and mentally challenged adults, discovered working in Shanxi brick kilns in May and June 2007. According to an October 22, 2007, China Daily article, "About 8 of the 95 officials were expelled from the Party and lost their jobs, 30 were dismissed from their posts and more than 20 officials were demoted." The head of the provincial department of labor and social security and the mayors of Linfen and Yuncheng cities were "required to make a self-criticism at an official conference."

According to the China Daily, Yu said that the harshness of the punishments was unprecedented in Shanxi's history. "Officials at county and township levels are mainly responsible for the management of brick kilns and small mines, therefore we focused on them," Yu was quoted as saying. Authorities initially announced the punishments of the 95 officials in July 2007, according to a July 16 China Daily article. In July, a death sentence, life imprisonment, and other prison sentences were given to owners, managers, and employees at the kilns, according to a July 17 China Daily article. The October report noted that "life and even death sentences were given to five kiln owners, managers and guards."

In June, Yu apologized for the forced labor scandal and said he would take responsibility for it, according to a June 23 New York Times report. In September, the State Council appointed Yu as a vice-minister in the national Ministry of Culture, as well as Party chief within the Ministry, according to a September 7, 2007, Xinhua article. Yu was also named a Central Committee member at the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress held in October, as noted on the People's Daily Web site (undated).

As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), in May and June 2007, Chinese media and Internet activists uncovered a massive network of forced labor in brick kilns in Shanxi and Henan provinces. Reports indicated that people forced to work in the kilns included children and mentally challenged adults kidnapped by human traffickers and sold to the kilns, where they were beaten, denied food, and forced to work up to 20 hours per day.

Source: -See Summary (2008-02-04 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Beijing Public Security Officials Formally Arrest Activist Hu Jia

Beijing public security officials formally arrested activist Hu Jia on charges of "inciting subversion of state power," according to a February 1 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article and a January 31 report in the Dui Hua Foundation's Human Rights Journal. Beijing public security officials detained Hu on December 27, 2007. On January 30, officials served Hu's family with an arrest notice and officials allowed Hu's father to visit him on January 31, according to the Dui Hua report and a February 3 RFA article. The Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau previously denied lawyer Li Jinsong's reconsideration request (posted on Boxun on January 8) to allow Hu to meet with his lawyers, citing the involvement of state secrets in the case, according to a January 25 RFA article. The same article reports that officials also denied Li's application (posted on Boxun on January 15) for Hu to obtain a guarantor pending trial, a process similar to bail, on the grounds that it could "endanger society." Officials have continued to harass individuals connected to Hu and those who attempt to visit the residence of Hu and his wife, Zeng Jinyan, according to the RFA articles dated February 1 and February 3.

For additional information on Hu's detention, see a previous CECC analysis and Hu's record of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2008-02-04 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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CECC Political Prisoner Data Shows Rise in Tibetan Detentions in 2007

According to information available in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) Political Prisoner Database (PPD) since January 30, 2008, the number of known political detentions of Tibetans in 2007 (24) is greater than the number of such known detentions in 2006 (13) and 2004 (15), is currently the same as the number in 2005, and may surpass the number of known political detentions in 2003 (33) and 2002 (36) as additional information about detentions in 2007 emerges from China. (See, for example, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reports on June 21, August 22, and October 29, on incidents in Sichuan province, Qinghai province, and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) for some reports of detention that are not currently included in the 24 Tibetan PPD records for 2007). Chinese authorities detain and imprison Tibetans for peaceful expression and non-violent action, charging them under China's Criminal Law with crimes such as "splittism" (Article 103) that allegedly "endanger state security."

The increase in known political detentions in 2007 is a negative development in a trend that has generally shown decreasing political imprisonment of Tibetans over recent years. Fourteen of the 24 detentions in 2007 are linked directly to making statements about the Dalai Lama or possessing printed or recorded material about him, based on NGO and news media reports referenced in the PPD. Most of the remainder of the 2007 detentions are associated in some manner with Tibetan devotion to the Dalai Lama and to the Tibetan cultural identity that he embodies, based on CECC analysis of the NGO and news media reports. Eleven of the detentions took place in Sichuan province, eight in Gansu province, four in the TAR, and one in Qinghai province.

A factor contributing to the increase of Tibetan political detention may be rising Tibetan resentment against Communist Party campaigns and policy initiatives, and against recent government-issued legal measures that increase control over and interfere with Tibetan Buddhist activity. For more information on the following examples, see the CECC 2007 Annual Report.

The intensification of the anti-Dalai Lama campaign.
The "TAR Implementing Measures for the 'Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA)' (Trial Measures)", which took effect on January 1, 2007, and impose wide-ranging controls on Tibetan Buddhist activity in the TAR.
The "Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism" (translated by the International Campaign for Tibet), effective on September 1, 2007, that establish unprecedented state control of one the religion's most unique and important features -- lineages of teachers that Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations and that can span centuries.
Accelerating economic, social, and demographic change in Tibetan autonomous areas with infrastructure projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway, a key project of the Great Western Development program, and government programs that compel nomadic herders to cease their traditional means of livelihood and settle in communities of fixed dwellings (Human Rights Watch, 11 June 07).

Concurrent with the pressures that such policies and campaigns apply to Tibetan culture, a number of public disturbances involving Tibetans have occurred since mid-2007. The CECC PPD does not record as political prisoners persons who were detained or imprisoned for violent activity such as assault and destroying property.

June, Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province. "[H]undreds of Tibetans blocked a road and staged a hunger strike" in the Bamei (Garthar) area during a two-week long protest that began on June 5 in response to Chinese mining activity on a mountain that local Tibetans consider to be sacred, according to a June 21 RFA report. After Tibetans destroyed a number of vehicles, authorities dispatched approximately 300 security personnel to the scene. Authorities detained approximately 40 Tibetans who intended to petition government officials against the mining, and had released 13 of them by the filing date of the RFA report. A June 25 Xinhua report acknowledged the incident, saying that 300 villagers had damaged mining equipment and vehicles and seriously injured two government workers. Police had "captured" a number of villagers to protect government workers, and had released all but five of them.
June, Suo (Sog) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR. A June 27 dispute between Tibetans and migrant Hui Muslim traders over the purchase price of cordyceps sinensis (a valuable ingredient in Chinese traditional medicine) that Tibetans had gathered resulted in a brawl and the detention of approximately 30 Tibetans, according to a July 3 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) report. The commotion abated when a senior lama from Tsanden Monastery intervened. TCHRD reported in its September Human Rights Update that "dozens of people were seriously injured from both sides," and that the Naqu Intermediate People's Court sentenced approximately 13 Tibetans to terms of imprisonment of one to three years. The reports did not provide information about whether or not any non-Tibetans were detained or punished for involvement in the fighting.
July, Yajiang (Nyagchukha) county, Ganzi TAP. Hundreds of Tibetan nomads that a July 31 RFA report described as "women and youngsters" blocked a local highway on July 23 in protest of the 2002 imprisonment of a popular local religious teacher, Tenzin Deleg, after authorities forbade Tibetans from displaying his portrait during the dedication of a new building in a monastery that he had established prior to his incarceration. Authorities detained 10 Tibetans and released all of them on July 29 except two women who allegedly organized the protest. TCHRD reported on August 31 that authorities released both of the women on August 27.
August, Litang (Lithang) county, Ganzi TAP. An August 1 incident at a horse-racing festival resulted in the detention of Tibetan nomad Ronggyal Adrag, who mounted the speaker's platform and called for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, the release of Gedun Choekyi Nyima (the Panchen Lama identified by the Dalai Lama), and Tibetan independence. When Tibetans gathered at the detention center to call for his release, authorities deployed People's Armed Police (PAP) forces to disperse the crowd and patrol the area. In November, the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced Ronggyal Adrag and three other Tibetans to terms of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 10 years on charges of splittism, espionage (Criminal Law, Article 110), or both. (See reports by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) on August 2, August 10, and August 24; and by RFA on August 2, August 8, and August 10.)
August, Maqin (Machen) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province. A violent clash developed on August 4 between Tibetans and Hui Muslims after a Tibetan claimed that he found a human tooth in a dish served at a restaurant operated by a Hui Muslim, according to an August 9 RFA report. A local Tibetan religious leader attempted to intervene and calm the situation, but hundreds of Tibetans destroyed a local mosque three days later, according to the same report. RFA reported on August 22 that authorities had detained "up to 20 people, including two senior monks" after the violent clashes, but a government official told RFA that police were conducting investigations and none of the Tibetans had been formally arrested.
September, Pulan (Purang) county, Ali (Ngari) prefecture, TAR. A group of approximately 20 Tibetans attempted on September 28 to form a "human shield" around an open-air Tibetan Buddhist religious statue in Darchen village to prevent authorities from demolishing it, according to a November 1 ICT report based on eyewitness accounts by foreign tourists. An estimated 80-100 armed security officials dispersed the Tibetans and destroyed the statue, located near Tibetan Buddhism's most sacred peak, Mount Kailash (Gang Rinpoche). Article 44 of China's Regulation on Religious Affairs (English translation available on the China Elections and Governance Web site), effective on March 1, 2005, requires the demolition of outdoor religious statues built in violation of the regulation, including those built without government permission (Article 24). The TAR Implementing Measures for the RRA expanded the types of Tibetan Buddhist religious structures that face demolition if they are not built in compliance with the measures (see Articles 13, 48).
November, Biru (Driru) county, Naqu prefecture, TAR. A quarrel on November 20 between three teenage monks and Chinese shopkeepers in Baiga (Bankar) township escalated into a confrontation that public security officials tried to break up by firing warning shots, according to a November 27 RFA report. Police detained two of the monks and beat the third one, who was wearing a Dalai Lama pendant, according to the report. Several hundred Tibetan nomads gathered to appeal for release of the two juvenile monks and became violent when officials refused, ransacking government buildings and vehicles. Security officials detained an unknown number of persons the next day, when the crowd exceeded 1,000, according to RFA. Authorities ordered hundreds of PAP to the area and instituted a "patriotic education" campaign, according to an RFA report on December 19.

For additional information about the political detention and imprisonment of Tibetans, and how the Chinese government applies the Constitution and law in a manner that restricts and represses the exercise of human rights by Tibetans, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; and Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-31 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Thousands of Chinese Citizens Call for Ratification of ICCPR Before Olympics

More than 14,000 Chinese citizens signed an open letter released to the public on January 1, 2008, urging the Chinese government to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) before the 2008 Olympics "without reservations," according to a January 1 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article (in Chinese). The letter (posted on the China Human Rights Forum Web site) also called on China to undertake a number of domestic reforms to bring the country in line with the ICCPR, including the revocation of regulations restricting religious freedom and abolishment of the requirement that social organizations must first register with the government to be considered legal. RFA reported that signers of the letter included professors, lawyers, workers, farmers, and government officials. On January 10, Southern Weekend, a progressive weekly based in Guangdong province, published an article that appeared to report on the same campaign, saying that "on the first day of 2008, a number of legal scholars" recommended that China ratify the ICCPR prior to the Olympics. The Southern Weekend article cited the same organizer quoted in the RFA report, but did not mention that more than 14,000 citizens had signed the letter. As detailed in the Southern Weekend article, China signed the ICCPR in 1998, but has yet to ratify it despite statements from top officials in recent years indicating that they are preparing for ratification. China is a member of the UN Human Rights Council. Reuters issued a report (via The Guardian) about the letter on January 31.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-31 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental Information

The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) issued measures that standardize the disclosure of environmental information by government agencies and enterprises, and provide the public with the right to request government environmental information, according to an April 25, 2007, SEPA press release. SEPA issued the Measures on Open Environmental Information (the Measures) on April 11, and was the first government agency to release its own implementing measures after the State Council issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information on April 5. Both come into effect on May 1, 2008. The Measures highlight the central government and Communist Party leadership's increased attention to environmental issues in recent years. In 2002, former President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin's report at the Party's 16th National Congress used the words "environment" or "environmental" in reference to environmental issues eight times. Five years later, those words appeared in Hu Jintao's report at the 17th National Congress on 19 occasions. Hu's report also mentioned the requirement to "promote a conservation culture" for the first time, according to a January 11, 2008, China Environment News article.

The Measures could increase the amount of information available on environmental conditions before and during the Beijing 2008 Olympics in August, enabling the public to better assess China's progress toward fulfilling its environmental commitments for the event. The Measures require environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) to disclose information on "environmental quality conditions" and to take no longer than 30 business days to reply to requests for information. EPBs must also disclose environmental statistics, information on sudden environmental incidents, and the outcomes of petition letters and complaints, among other items. Some areas have already formulated documents to implement the Measures. The Chongqing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, for example, has posted its information guide and catalogue (in Microsoft Word format) on its open government information page. For an overview of the Measures, click on "more" below.

A senior Chinese environmental official has noted the importance of information disclosure in efforts to protect the environment. Pan Yue, SEPA's Vice Minister, said in a May 22, 2007, Central People's Government Web site interview (reprinted in Xinhua) that "environmental information disclosure is a prerequisite and the foundation for the public to effectively participate in environmental protection." Pan added that heavily polluting enterprises currently often refuse to provide emissions information to the public on the grounds that such information is a "trade secret." "Disclosing these enterprises' environmental information leverages the weight of public opinion to standardize enterprises' environmental conduct and strengthen the public's societal supervision of enterprises," Pan said. According to a September 2002 World Bank (WB) report, pilot projects in China that involve the public disclosure of enterprise pollution information have significantly reduced pollution, even in locations where environmental groups are not very active.

While the Measures may increase disclosure, their effectiveness in protecting the environment also depends on the extent that they encourage public participation and overcome resistance from local interests. Current measures to encourage participation in environmental issues have fallen short, according to Ma Jun, Director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs. "Looking at the implementation of the Provisional Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment, the public's level of interest has been wholly inadequate," said Ma, according to an April 29, 2007, Xinhua article. Article 8 requires EPBs to ensure the funding and personnel for disclosure work. Disincentives to protect the environment at the local level, however, could hinder EPBs from receiving the funding they need to adequately implement the Measures. The WB report suggests that the costs of disclosing environmental information about enterprises may be low since EPBs already collect much of this information. Yet the report also notes that such programs have "substantial start-up costs." As the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) noted in its 2006 Annual Report and 2007 Annual Report (page 135), EPBs depend on local governments for funding, but local governments derive income from polluting enterprises and evaluations of officials are largely based on local economic performance, leading some officials to underfund and pressure EPBs to overlook polluters. It is not clear whether the Measures will be able to overcome such systemic barriers.

The Measures may still give local officials too much discretion to limit disclosure of government environmental information, which Article 2 defines as "information created or obtained in a definite form by environmental protection departments in the course of carrying out their environmental protection responsibilities and recorded and stored in a definite form." Article 17 provides for an EPB to reject a request if the information "does not fall within the scope of disclosure," "the law provides that disclosure is not within a department's responsibility," the information "does not exist," or "the content for which the application is being made is unclear." The Measures also prohibit EPBs from disclosing environmental information that involves state secrets. According to a Human Rights in China 2007 report, China's laws and regulations define state secrets to encompass essentially all matters of public concern, giving officials broad latitude to withhold information.

Two environmental activists, Wu Lihong and Tan Kai, have been tried and sentenced, in part for their efforts to provide environment-related information to higher levels of government or the public. Tan was released in April 2007 after serving an 18-month sentence on the charge of "illegally obtaining state secrets." Wu is currently serving a three-year sentence on the charge of "extortion." For more information, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database, and the section on the Environment, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Overview of the Measures on Open Environmental Information

Supervision Structure:
SEPA's General Office is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of government environmental information disclosure work, with each office within SEPA performing disclosure work in their area of responsibility. Environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) at the county level and above are responsible for disclosure work in their administrative regions, with each EPB designating an office for organizing that bureau's disclosure work. Higher-level EPBs can order lower-level EPBs to make corrections if they violate provisions in the Measures. If circumstances are serious and fall into six categories, managers or other personnel with direct responsibility may be subject to administrative punishment. (Articles 3, 6, 26, and 27)

The Role of Environmental Protection Bureaus:
The Measures require EPBs to disclose information falling into any one of 17 categories within 20 business days from the date "such information arose or was modified." EPBs must publish disclosure guides, catalogues, and an annual report on their disclosure work. EPBs must not endanger social stability or state, public, or economic security in disclosing information, and should establish a disclosure system, which includes a system for safeguarding against disclosing state secrets. EPBs must guarantee the personnel and funding for that bureau's disclosure work. They are authorized to audit environmental information released by an enterprise, award law-abiding enterprises that voluntarily disclose information, and fine enterprises a maximum of 100,000 yuan (US$13,826) for failure to abide by the Measures. When citizens or others request information, EPBs have 15 business days to reply. If they are unable to meet this timeline, the deadline may be extended up to 15 business days. (Articles 2-4, 6, 8-15, 17-18, 23-25, and 27-28)

The Role of Enterprises:
The Measures encourage enterprises to voluntarily disclose information that falls into nine categories. The Measures further require EPBs to compile lists of enterprises whose pollution discharge exceeds standards. Such enterprises must disclose information regarding their major pollutants, environmental protection facilities, and environmental emergency plans, within 30 days of appearing on the list. These enterprises may not use the protection of trade secrets as a reason to refuse the disclosure of information. (Articles 19-23)

The Role of Citizens:
Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations can apply to EPBs to request government environmental information. The Measures require EPBs to maintain disclosure guides explaining what information is available and how to request information. Requests should include the requestor's name and contact, a detailed description of the requested information, and the format of disclosure. Citizens and others shall not harm national interest, public interest, or the interest of other people when using the disclosed information. If they believe a bureau has not fulfilled its obligation to disclose information in accordance with law, they may report their concerns to a higher-level EPB. They may also apply for administrative reconsideration or file an administrative lawsuit if they believe that the specific acts of an EPB in carrying out disclosure work violated their lawful rights and interests. (Articles 5, 7, 16, and 26)

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-31 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05		more ...
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Mixed Progress for Olympic Foreign Reporting Regulations One Year Later

A year after China's Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period went into effect, a Beijing-based association of foreign journalists noted "improved overall reporting conditions for foreign journalists" but also "hot spots where journalists have experienced repeated violations" of the regulations, according to a January 1 Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC) press release. The temporary regulations, effective from January 1, 2007 to October 17, 2008, give foreign journalists greater freedom to report in China, something the International Olympic Committee required China do in order to host the 2008 Olympics. Specifically, foreign journalists no longer need separate government permission to interview individuals and organizations that consent to be interviewed. Furthermore, the regulations apply to a foreign journalist's coverage of all kinds of topics, not just those related to the Olympics.

The FCCC press release notes that while foreign journalists reported "easier travel and better access to officials," they also reported to the FCCC 180 incidents of "reporting interference" in 2007. Of particular concern were reports of:

"Plainclothes thugs" intimidating or physically assaulting foreign journalists. Cited as an example was an incident in September in which more than a dozen "thugs" beat a Reuters reporter trying to investigate allegations that an "illicit detention center" in Beijing was holding petitioners.

Local authorities following journalists and holding them in custody, including in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and "preventing many Chinese citizens who agree to be interviewed from talking to foreign journalists." One example occurred in August, when a French journalist reported being frequently followed in Kashgar and surrounding counties while investigating allegations that teenage Uighur girls sent to work in factories in eastern China had been abused. The journalist reported that a source and a family he had met were subsequently questioned. In a more recent incident, reported by Reporters Without Borders on January 11, Beijing police prevented foreign journalists from interviewing Zeng Jinyan, a prominent blogger and the wife of detained activist Hu Jia.

Central government attempts to compel media organizations to drop certain interviews or news stories. The FCCC said that several media outlets had reported being warned to cancel interviews with Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama, or face "the consequences."

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the government agency in charge of foreign journalists in China, has cited the difficulty of implementing a new regulation and argued that it is unrealistic to expect implementation to proceed without any problems. "The regulations' full implementation needs close coordination among different government bodies and it takes time for local governments and organizations to fully understand the terms of the regulations," said Liu Jianchao, Director-General of the Information Department of MOFA in an August 3 China Daily article. Liu noted progress had been made, however, saying that foreign media were now making fewer complaints. He touted the regulations as creating a "better environment for foreign journalists to cover their stories in China in a more comprehensive, objective and balanced way...."

Foreign reporters have reported some progress as a result of the regulations, as noted above, and in separate reports released in August by the FCCC, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), and Human Rights Watch (HRW). For example, the HRW report found that for some reporters the new regulations had "significantly widened access to sources and topics previously taboo, such as access to certain prominent political dissidents and to villages with public health emergencies." The FCCC's January press release said it believed "the new regulations have been a positive step that has brought China closer to meeting international standards."

Anecdotal evidence over the last year, however, suggests several ongoing obstacles to full implementation of the regulations and the spirit behind them. As MOFA has acknowledged, ensuring local officials' compliance with the national regulation has proven difficult. Foreign reporters have encountered local officials who deny knowledge of the regulations or erroneously insist that the regulations apply only to coverage of the Olympics, according to the August FCCC report and HRW report. MOFA has reportedly been helpful in resolving some of these disputes, according to the CPJ report. And while foreign reporters themselves have gained greater freedom to report, authorities have sought to intimidate their Chinese interviewees and co-workers, neither of whom is explicitly protected by the regulations. Authorities have questioned Chinese co-workers, kept them under surveillance, and intimidated members of their family, according to the August FCCC report and HRW report. HRW reported that officials warned a source he would have to "bear the consequences" if he spoke to foreign journalists, and the FCCC reported that interviewees had been chided for "disgracing their own country." In addition, MOFA, which controls a foreign journalist's entry into and ability to remain in China, has called journalists into the foreign ministry to reprimand them for their stories. HRW noted that these reprimands "appear to have become a fallback position for the Chinese government to intimidate foreign correspondents whose coverage displeases them" since the regulations had somewhat weakened "the government's capacity to proactively and overtly prevent such reporting." Finally, Chinese propaganda officials have stepped up censorship of the domestic media's reporting on certain topics out of concern that foreign journalists were picking up story ideas from their domestic counterparts.

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) 2007 Annual Report called on China to live up to its commitment to grant foreign journalists complete freedom to report in China before and during the 2008 Olympics Games, to remove the October 2008 expiration of this commitment, and to grant similar protections to domestic journalists, for which this commitment does not apply. Domestic journalists remain subject to a wide range of government and Party regulations, policies, and pressures that encourage self-censorship and hinder their ability to report freely. For more information on China's restrictions on its own journalists, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-25 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Party Congress Promotes Officials Linked to Harsh Policies Toward Tibetans

Introduction

The 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which concluded on October 21, 2007, resulted in the promotions of two high-ranking Party officials, Zhou Yongkang and Liu Yandong, whose recent posts associate them with harsh policies that contribute to the repression of human rights such as the freedoms of religion and expression, and that undermine ethnic minority rights guaranteed by China's Constitution and system of regional ethnic autonomy. The Party’s elevation of Zhou and Liu to the highest levels of Party power is likely to signify strong endorsement of their work, and ensure the continuation and perhaps strengthening of the policies associated with them, especially during the period of the Party's 16th Central Committee (2002-2007).

Although Zhou's and Liu's work impacts citizens and groups throughout China, this article will consider their promotions within the context of the human rights and rule of law environment for ethnic Tibetans living in China. Their promotions may presage heightened repression of ethnic minority groups and of cultural, religious, and political rights that the Party suspects could threaten the Party's supremacy or ethnic and national unity. Ethnic and religious issues could be treated as an even higher priority during the period of the 17th Central Committee (2007-2012) than during past five years. The level of Party intolerance toward Tibetan religious activity and expression that it deems threatening may increase, instead of moderating as China becomes a more mature, prosperous, and resilient nation.

Zhou Yongkang is one of the most influential Party figures guiding policy and implementation with respect to public security and the process of investigating, charging, prosecuting, trying, and sentencing cases of alleged criminal activity. Liu Yandong has played a prominent role in ensuring implementation of Party polices toward ethnic minorities and religion. She has played a direct and important role since late 2002 in the on-going dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama's representatives, a process that has resulted in little evidence of progress. Zhou and Liu are both members of the Party's highest ranking group focused on Tibetan issues, giving added weight to their promotions and their views on policy and its implementation.

(See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information on human rights in Tibetan areas of China, and on Chinese government implementation of regional ethnic autonomy.)

Zhou Yongkang Promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo
(People’s Daily bio, 22 October 07)

Swift Rise to Party's Most Powerful Body

Zhou Yongkang has moved up swiftly to join the Party's highest-ranked and most powerful body, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee, and to head one of the Central Committee's most influential supervisory groups, the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (Xinhua, 26 December 07). Advancing within the Central Committee at each of the 14th-17th Party Congresses, he attained the rank of an alternate Central Committee member at the 14th Congress, full Central Committee member at the 15th Congress, member of the Politburo at the 16th Congress, and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 17th Congress. Zhou held the posts of Party Secretary and Minister of the Ministry of Public Security from 2002-2007. As Secretary of the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, Zhou presides over a group whose members include the leadership of the state's security, legal, and judicial establishment (Web site of China's Central Government, State Structure, visited 22 January 08): Xiao Yang (President of the Supreme People's Court), Jia Chunwang (Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate), Wu Aiying (Minister of Justice), Meng Jianzhu (Minister of Public Security), and Geng Huichang (Minister of State Security). Zhou served as the committee's Deputy Secretary from 2002-2007.

Party Secretary in Sichuan Province

Zhou served as the Secretary of the Sichuan Province Communist Party Committee from 1999-2002, a period that included the partial destruction of the Larung Gar and Yachen Gar monastic teaching institutions, located in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and the expulsion of thousands of Tibetan Buddhist nuns and monks from the institutions. (International Campaign for Tibet, 20 June 01 and 9 July 04). During Zhou's tenure as the Sichuan Party Secretary, authorities throughout the Tibetan autonomous areas of China detained or imprisoned 187 Tibetans for peaceful expression or non-violent activity, based on information available in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD). Of those 187 Tibetans, 60, of whom 33 were monks and nuns, were detained or imprisoned in Sichuan. In two of the Sichuan cases, the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced to imprisonment popular Tibetan Buddhist teachers who had traveled to India without official permission and met with the Dalai Lama: Sonam Phuntsog (detained October 2004, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for "splittism"); and Tenzin Deleg (detained April 2002, sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, later commuted to life imprisonment, for conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism).

While Zhou served as the Sichuan Party secretary, he characterized China's ethnic minority educational system, which provides for teaching of ethnic minority languages as well as for classes to be taught in those languages, as a "heavy burden" on the government, and questioned whether the government should "bother so much" with the program (South China Morning Post, in OSC, 14 March 00). He accused Tibetans of having "blind faith" in the Dalai Lama and of wasting their money by offering donations to Buddhist monasteries, according to the article.

Leadership of Party and Government Agencies Pressuring Tibetan Rights

During the 2002-2007 period when Zhou held the top public security posts in both the Party and government and the position of Deputy Secretary of the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, Chinese security officials, procuratorates, and courts in Tibetan autonomous areas of China pursued a policy of detaining, charging, convicting, and sentencing Tibetans to imprisonment for peaceful expressions and activities that officials characterized as "splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country"). After Zhou's promotion to the Secretary of the committee, he called on senior officials attending a December 26, 2007, national conference on "politics and law work" to "master the work objectives of improving the national security strategy and system, earnestly safeguard national security, as well as remain highly vigilant and strictly guard against all kinds of splittist, infiltration and subversive activities," (Xinhua, translated in OSC 28 December 07).

Even as Tibetans have become far less confrontational since the early- and mid-1990s, insofar as more recently they rarely resort to open displays of behavior that Chinese officials punish as threats to state security (see below), authorities have not responded to the change by moderating the level of repression of expressions of ethnic and religious identity―especially in cases where Tibetan devotion to the Dalai Lama is involved. Instead, officials have tightened enforcement of laws and seek to punish activity that is innocuous in comparison with previous years. Tibetans in the early- and mid-1990s faced imprisonment for bold expressions of public dissent, such as staging demonstration marches in busy public locations. In the post-2000 period, however, authorities imprison Tibetans for activities such as possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama and copies of his teachings, writing or possessing "splittist" literature, or for arguing with a patriotic education instructor.

Imprisonment Data: After Public Protests Decline, Inconsequential Actions Punished

Comparing information about Tibetan political imprisonment for the period 2002-2007 with 1992-1997 shows that while Zhou exercised authority over the public security establishment, officials punished Tibetans for inconsequential activity, claiming that the activities endangered state security, even after Tibetans had dramatically moderated the scale and style of expressions of dissent. During the 1992-1997 period there were 1,232 political detentions of Tibetans, according to CECC analysis of PPD information, of which at least 529 (43 percent) resulted from peaceful public demonstrations by Tibetans. An additional 73 (6 percent) of the detentions were the result of protests (including prison protests). Another 259 (21 percent) of the Tibetans put up small posters or distributed leaflets to make political or religious statements. Of the remaining detentions, 95 (8 percent)--a figure certain to be low--are known to have resulted from making statements or possessing materials about the Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama. Of those 95 Tibetans, 32 (33 percent) used posters or leaflets to make their statements.

In comparison, during 2002-2007, none of the protests is known to have been a public demonstration march in a public area. At least 107 (75 percent) of the 142 known political detentions of Tibetans during the period resulted from making statements about the Dalai Lama or possessing materials associated with him, based on PPD information current in January 2008. About 30 (29 percent) of the 107 Tibetans put up small posters or distributed leaflets to make their statements. Of the remaining 35 detentions, only 13 (9 percent) are known to have been the result of protest activity such as shouting slogans.

Deputy Leader of the Party's Tibet Work Coordination Group

Zhou plays a leading role in the Party's top Tibetan policy work group, which seeks to end the Dalai Lama's influence among Tibetans and to prioritize economic development over protecting Tibetan culture. After the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the Central Committee leadership appointed Zhou as one of three deputy leaders of the group, headed by Jia Qinglin, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), according to a July 10, 2006, People's Daily report (translated in OSC, 23 April 07). The other two deputy leaders are Liu Yandong, Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD) and Vice Chairman of the CPPCC, and Hua Jianmin, State Councilor and Secretary General of the State Council. An April 17, 2007, Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 18 April 07) implied that the group's leadership had not previously been made public and stated that the group is formally known as either the "Central Tibet Work Coordination Group" or the "Central Coordination Group on the Struggle Against the Dalai Clique." The group has "overall charge of Tibetan affairs," the Singtao Daily report said.

The Tibet work group's "main tasks" are "opposing the Dalai clique and maintaining Tibet's stability," and a principal means of achieving those goals is accelerated economic development, according to the People's Daily report. Completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in July 2006, added "a beautiful chapter to the history of Tibet," and demonstrated the "correct leadership" of central authorities in their work to "consolidate and develop" the TAR and other Tibetan ethnic areas, according to the report. The group held five leadership meetings in the 2003-2006 period, according to People's Daily, as well as three regional level work meetings in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Liu Yandong Promoted to the Politburo
(People's Daily bio, 22 October 07)

Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD)

Liu Yandong, who served as Head of the UFWD from December 2002 (Xinhua, 5 December 2002) until December 2007 (Xinhua, 2 December 07), has been promoted to the 25-member Politburo of the Central Committee. Liu's attainment of Politburo rank was concurrent with State Council Vice Premier Wu Yi's retirement from the Politburo and Central Committee (Xinhua, 21 October 2007), positioning Liu as China's highest-ranking female Party official. Liu has served since 2003 as a Vice Chairwoman of the CPPCC national committee and a member of its Leading Party Members’ Group. The UFWD oversees the implementation of Party policy toward China's eight "democratic" political parties, ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs, among other functions. In 2005, the UFWD established a new bureau to handle Tibetan affairs, according to a Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 15 September 06). The Seventh Bureau's mission is "to cooperate with relevant parties in struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans."

As noted above, Liu is a Deputy Leader of the Party's Tibet Work Coordination Group tasked with "opposing the Dalai clique" and pursuing a Tibetan solution based on accelerated economic development.

Dialogue with the Dalai Lama's Representatives

Despite the Party's hostility toward the Dalai Lama, the UFWD served as the host organization for the dialogue process between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives, Special Envoy Lodi Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen, during all of their five visits to China. Liu's status as Head of the UFWD during four of the five visits to China by the envoys associates her with the disappointing status of the dialogue. The CECC noted in its 2007 Annual Report:

The Commission has observed no evidence of substantive progress in that dialogue toward fair and equitable decisions about policies that could help to protect Tibetans and their religion, language, and culture, even though a session of dialogue took place each year beginning in 2002, and even though a basis for such protections exists under China's Constitution and law.

On their first trip, the envoys met with Wang Zhaoguo, then-Head of the UFWD and currently a Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress. Liu served as UFWD Head during the subsequent four visits, and met with the envoys herself on their second and third trips in 2003 and 2004. After meeting with the UFWD's top official during the first three visits, the envoys met UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun on their fourth and fifth visits in 2006 and 2007. In an address to the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. in November 2006, Gyari identified the Chinese government's distrust of the Dalai Lama as "one of the most critical obstacles" facing Tibetans in the dialogue process. In Gyari's statement following the 2007 trip, the briefest and least optimistic issued after any of the rounds of dialogue, he noted that the envoys had conveyed their "serious concerns in the strongest possible manner," and that the dialogue process had reached a "critical stage." (See Special Envoy's statements on visits to China in September 2002, May-June 2003, September 2004, February 2006, and June-July, 2007. In June-July 2005, the envoys met with Zhu Weiqun in Bern, Switzerland. See CECC articles on rounds of dialogue in 2005 and 2006. See CECC Annual Reports 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 for more information on the dialogue.)

Heading a Tibetan Cultural Preservation Organization

Liu is the head of an organization that describes its purpose as preserving Tibetan culture, and that has registered with the United Nations (UN) as an independent NGO although it is supervised by senior Party and government officials. In her role as Honorary President of the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (CAPDTC), Liu opened the organization's first China Tibetan Culture Forum in Beijing in October 2006, according to an October 10, 2006, report by the China Tibet Information Center (CTIC),a Chinese government-run Web site. Liu retained the position as of December 2007 when CAPDTC held its second forum in Nepal, according to a December 13, 2007, CTIC report.

CAPDTC was founded in 2004 and promotes increased economic development and tourism as measures that can help to ensure the preservation and development of Tibetan culture. UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun is also the Vice President of CAPDTC, and Sithar (Sita), director of the UFWD's Seventh Bureau that handles Tibetan affairs, is the Vice Chairman of CAPDTC. (CAPDTC, 9 October 06; CTIC, 10 October 06; China Daily, 10 October 06; CAPDTC, 10 October 06; CTIC, 9 October 06; CAPDTC, 11 October 06).

For more information, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; and Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-23 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Wang Dejia, Shi Weihan Released on Bail

State security officials in China released Internet essayist Wang Dejia (whose pen name is Jing Chu) on bail on January 12, the Chinese rights advocacy Web site Minsheng Guancha reported on the same day. The report said that Wang had been released from the Quanzhou County Detention Center in Guilin city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Wang was originally detained in Quanzhou on December 13, 2007, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power." Wang has written and posted numerous articles on the Internet criticizing the Chinese government and Communist Party and has also criticized China's hosting of the Olympics, which takes place in August of this year. According to Wang's wife, as reported in a January 17 Agence France-Presse article (via The China Post), authorities released Wang on the condition that he cease posting essays critical of the Chinese government. She said they required Wang to sign a pledge not to write any more and told him not to speak to foreign journalists.

While released on bail, Wang's case could remain open and subject to further investigation and prosecution for up to a year. Under Chinese law, being released on bail is referred to as having "obtained a guarantor pending trial" (qubao houshen). Article 58 of China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) provides that "[t]he period granted by a People's Court, People's Procuratorate, or public security organ to a criminal suspect or defendant for awaiting trial after obtaining a guarantor shall not exceed twelve months..." Article 58 also requires officials to continue "investigation, prosecution and handling" of a case while an individual is released on bail and to terminate such status if officials determine that the individual should not be investigated for criminal responsibility. During the period that Wang is released on bail, he must observe certain restrictions, including obtaining the government's permission before leaving his city or county of residence, according to Article 56 of the CPL.

Also in January, Beijing authorities released bookstore owner Shi Weihan on bail after detaining him for "illegal printing and distribution" of religious literature, according to a January 7 press release (English, Chinese) from the China Aid Association (CAA). According to CAA, authorities decided not to formally arrest Shi because of "insufficient evidence" and released him and two dozen others allegedly involved in the case on bail on January 4. Shi was originally detained on November 28.

For more information on China's imprisonment of online critics and punishment of citizens who publish religious materials without permission, see "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression and "Religious Speech" in Section II - Freedom of Religion, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-18 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Politburo Study Session Calls for Uniting Religious Communities Around Party

At a Politburo study session held December 18, Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed the Party's policies for controlling religion and called on religious communities to play a "positive role" in promoting state goals and to "closely unite" around the Party. Hu's statements, which outlined direction for carrying forward Party policy on religion, also continued a trend in mentioning a "positive role" for religious communities at high levels of the Communist Party. According to a description of the study session posted December 20 on the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), Hu called for "closely uniting religious personages and the religious masses around the Party and government" and outlined three "requirements" for carrying out the Party's work on religion under what he described as "new historic conditions":

Continuing the Party's Basic Policy on Religion. Hu described this requirement to involve "bringing into play the positive role of religious personages and the religious masses in the promotion of economic and social development." He also called for upholding the state's policies on "freedom of religious belief"; the administration of religious affairs in accordance with law; independence and self-governance; and the guiding of religion's adaptation to socialist society. In addition, he emphasized encouraging religious communities in their cultivation of a "love of country and love of religion," the promotion of unity, and their "fine traditions of serving society," as well as supporting them in making contributions to "ethnic unity, economic development, social harmony, and unification of the motherland."
Strengthening Work Regarding the "Religious Masses." Hu stressed uniting religious adherents and using their "wisdom and strengths" in building a healthy society and accelerating "socialist modernization." Hu also called for gaining religious communities' consensus on issues including support for Communist Party leadership and the socialist system, an "ardent love of country," defending China's unification, and promoting social harmony. In addition, Hu stressed "sincerely caring" about religious adherents and aiding those living in hardship, to let them experience the "loving care" and "warmth" of the Party and government.
Strengthening Construction of the Ranks of Religious Personnel. Hu emphasized the importance of building a contingent of religious personnel with political reliability, academic attainments, and appropriate morals. In addition, he called for supporting the role of the state-controlled "patriotic religious associations" in charge of China's registered religious communities and for guiding the associations in their work.

The study session, which according to a Chinese academic cited in a December 20 South China Morning Post article (subscription required) was the first of its kind as a topic for such a Politburo session, followed an address by Hu on October 15 at the 17th Party Congress, in which he similarly called for promoting religious communities' "positive role" in economic and social development. In that speech, Hu also mentioned the importance of promoting harmony in religious relations and of carrying out the Party's basic policy on religion. At the October Congress, the Communist Party also amended the Communist Party Constitution to include mention of religion for the first time, adding language that calls on the Party to "fully implement" its basic policy toward work on religious affairs and to unite religious adherents "in making contributions to economic and social development." For more information, see the texts of Hu's speech (English, Chinese) and the amended Constitution (English, Chinese) on the China Internet Information Center Web site, as well as an October 21 article from Xinhua. Prior to the October Congress, other high-level officials also had stated that aspects of religion could take on a "positive role" in promoting state goals. For example, in August 2006 SARA director Ye Xiaowen dedicated an article in the official Party journal Seeking Truth (via Open Source Center, subscription required, and the Chinese Communist Party News Web site) to the topic of "bringing into play the positive role of religion in promoting social harmony."

Whether Hu's October and December statements will translate into improvements in religious freedom for Chinese citizens remains unclear. Although the statements articulated a "positive role" for religious communities within China, the December Politburo session reiterated the Party's fundamental positions on religion, including its policy of granting citizens only "freedom of religious belief" rather than "freedom of religion." As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), "freedom of religion" as defined in international human rights standards includes not only the freedom to believe in a religion but also the freedom to manifest that belief. Chinese laws and policies permit only "normal religious activities" and do not define this term in a manner to provide meaningful protection to all aspects of religious practice. In addition, the Chinese government applies its framework for freedom of religious belief only to members of recognized religious communities organized under the patriotic religious associations.

In addition, it is unclear whether statements from the study session that recognize a "positive role" for religious communities reflect a degree of accommodation, an effort to better co-opt religious communities and subject them to tighter state control, or some measure of both. Past statements from state officials have couched measures to control religious groups and their internal religious doctrine in terms of accommodating religious communities. For example, in a July 2006 interview, SARA Director Ye Xiaowen called for helping religious communities integrate into society but stressed achieving this goal by having the state direct religious leaders in their interpretations of religious tenets to "convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers" in line with state goals.

For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-15 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Public Security Officials Detain Activist Hu Jia, Intensify Surveillance of Others

Beijing public security officials detained activist Hu Jia on December 27, 2007, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power," according to a December 31 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article. Hu has advocated on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients, environmental issues, and rights defenders such as Chen Guangcheng. Officials entered the residence of Hu and his wife, Zeng Jinyan, disconnected the couple's outside lines of communication, and took Hu away before he could get fully dressed, according to a January 2 RFA article. They also confiscated a number of items, including the couple's computer, fax machine, camcorder, tape recorder, books, and list of phone contacts. The same article reports that public security officials later intensified their surveillance of Zeng, stationing approximately 30 to 40 officials in and around her building. Hu is being held at the Beijing Municipal Detention Center, located in Dougezhuang township, Chaoyang district, according to his detention warrant as reported in the January 2 RFA article.

It is not clear why Hu has been detained, but John Kamm, Executive Director of the Dui Hua Foundation, said that it may be linked to Hu’s comments at a European Parliament Human Rights Subcommittee hearing on November 26, according to a January 2 Jurist article. Participating via conference call, Hu made comments critical of China's hosting of the Olympics, and noted that China's harassment of rights defenders had reached a peak in recent months. According to Article 69 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), the maximum period of detention prior to approval of a formal arrest is 37 days after taking into account extensions permitted by law. If Hu is formally arrested and tried, it is likely he will be convicted. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2006 Annual Report reported that courts convict 99 percent of defendants tried for crimes that allegedly "endanger state security," including "inciting subversion of state power," a crime under Article 105 of the Criminal Law as amended in 1997. According to official information about charges in the CECC Political Prisoner Database as of January 9, 2008, courts had convicted 88 Chinese citizens of subversion. Based on sentencing information available for 84 of the prisoners, courts sentenced them to an average of approximately 6 years and 11 months’ imprisonment.

Lawyers Li Jinsong and Li Fangping delivered paperwork to request a meeting with Hu, but public security officials denied the request, citing the involvement of state secrets in the case, according to a second January 2 RFA article and a January 4 RFA article. According to Article 96 of the CPL, if a case involves state secrets, the criminal suspect must obtain the approval of the investigative organ to appoint a lawyer. In turn, the appointed lawyer must obtain the approval of the investigative organ before meeting with the suspect. Li Jinsong said that he would submit a request for reconsideration of the decision within three days on the grounds that he should be allowed to meet with Hu if materials for the case involved state secrets but the case itself did not, according to the January 4 RFA article and a second January 4 RFA article. Li Jinsong added that he will try to visit Zeng to discuss applying for Hu to be placed under residential surveillance or an order to obtain a guarantor pending trial, which is a process similar to bail, in light of Hu’s health condition, according to the second January 4 RFA article. The article reports that Hu has severe liver cirrhosis.

Public security officials have questioned or heightened surveillance of individuals connected to Hu, including activist Qi Zhiyong, lawyer Li Heping, and activist Wan Yanhai, according to a January 3 RFA article and a December 29 Reuters article. The January 3 RFA article reports that officials also placed Shanghai writer Li Jianhong, whose pen name is Xiao Qiao, under surveillance on the day that Hu was taken away. Officials have frequently used "inciting subversion of state power" to punish citizens who peacefully criticize the government and Communist Party, and in recent months have targeted critics of China's hosting of the Olympics. Two weeks before Hu's detention, officials in Guangzhou province detained Internet essayist Wang Dejia on suspicion of inciting subversion. No exact reason has been given, but Wang had criticized China for focusing on the Olympics at the expense of its citizens. In August 2007, officials arrested Yang Chunlin, the organizer of an open letter titled "We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics," on the charge of inciting subversion. A January 9 RFA article reports that international organizations, over 700 petitioners in Shanghai, and 62 Chinese citizens, who signed a public letter (in Chinese and English, posted by Boxun on January 8), have called for Hu's release.

Hu has been previously harassed, including being beaten and detained during visits by foreign officials, detained while attending an AIDS conference in 2005, and detained after organizing a hunger strike in 2006. For additional information about Hu, see the section on Public Health, in the CECC’s 2007 Annual Report, and his record of detention, searchable through the CECC’s Political Prisoner Database. The CECC’s 2007 Annual Report called for an end to the harassment of Hu Jia and other activists.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-11 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Internet Essayist Wang Dejia Detained for Inciting Subversion

Police in Guilin city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, detained Internet essayist Wang Dejia (whose pen name is Jing Chu) on December 13, 2007, alleging that Wang "incited subversion of state power," according to a December 14 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. The Associated Press reported on December 19 (reprinted in CNN) that Wang was detained at his home in Quanzhou County in Guilin, and that officers had confiscated Wang's "computer, memory cards, books and banking documents." According to Wang's wife, as reported by RFA, police told her that they had been monitoring Wang's online activities for three or four years.

Wang has written and posted numerous articles on the Internet criticizing the Chinese government and Communist Party. In his essays and reports, many of which have appeared on overseas Web sites such as Fire of Liberty and the U.S.-based Minzhu Luntan (Democracy Forum) that are intended to promote democracy and freedom of expression and feature pieces often critical of China's policies, Wang has delved into topics Chinese authorities consider politically sensitive, including Taiwan, China's state secrets laws, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy protests. Wang has also been critical of China's hosting of the 2008 Olympics. In a July 2007 interview with The Epoch Times, Wang criticized the Communist Party's Olympics preparations for focusing on China's image abroad, while leaving China's citizens worse off. A December 18 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) report noted that in October, Wang met with U.S. Embassy officials to discuss China's "human rights situation." According to the RSF report, Wang's family believes his detention is related to this meeting and his online articles.

The underlying basis for the charge in Wang's case is unclear, but public officials in China have frequently used the charge of "inciting subversion of state power," a crime under Article 105 of China's Criminal Law, to punish Chinese citizens (recent cases include Zhang Jianhong, Chen Shuqing, and Yan Zhengxue) who peacefully criticize the government and Party in essays posted on foreign Web sites. International human rights standards for freedom of expression, set forth in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, guarantee the right of Chinese citizens to peacefully criticize their government and the Party through any media and regardless of frontiers. Article 35 of China's Constitution guarantees Chinese citizens freedom of speech and Article 41 gives citizens the right to criticize their government.

In addition, while it is unclear whether Wang's detention is related to his criticism of China's Olympics preparations, Chinese public officials have used Article 105 to detain other citizens who criticized China in the context of the Olympics. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) 2007 Annual Report, in August 2007, public security officials in Heilongjiang province arrested Yang Chunlin and charged him with inciting subversion after he organized the mass signing of an open letter titled "We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics" to protest the loss of land by farmers. Two weeks after Wang's detention, Beijing police detained on suspicion of inciting subversion noted activist Hu Jia, who had made comments critical of China's hosting of the Olympics before a European Parliament subcommittee hearing. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has denied the charge that China is cracking down on critics in the run up to the Olympics. At a January 8, 2008, press conference (Chinese, English), spokesperson Jiang Yu accused "some organizations and individuals" of using the Olympics as an opportunity to "vilify China." "China is a country under the rule of law and its government protects the freedom of speech and other fundamental rights of the Chinese citizens. Everyone stands equal under the law and no one has any privilege beyond it. Punishment will only be imposed when one breaks the law," Jiang said. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) has noted, however, that China's national security laws are vaguely worded and do not contain adequate checks to prevent them from being used to punish peaceful activity. In a report on its 2004 mission to China (available on the UNWGAD's Country Visits Web page), the UNWGAD expressed concern that China's Criminal Law had not adopted a definition of the term "endangering national security" (the category of crimes which includes Article 105) and that "no legislative measures have been taken to make a clear-cut exemption from criminal responsibility of those who peacefully exercise their rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." For additional information about Wang, Zhang, Chen, Yan, and Yang, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database, as well as "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-11 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Bishop Ordinations in 2007 Return to Holy See Involvement

The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), which oversees China's registered Catholic church, ordained three bishops in late 2007 who had received approval from the Holy See, continuing a trend that was interrupted in 2006 by several bishop ordinations without Holy See approval. Although the CPA appoints and ordains bishops according to its own internal procedures and does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to make such appointments, in recent years it has tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops. After breaking with this practice for some bishop appointments in 2006, the CPA ordained a total of five bishops in 2007 all of whom had Holy See approval. Recent ordinations include:

Lü Shouwang, ordained as bishop of the Yichang diocese in Hubei province on November 30. For Chinese government reporting on the event, see an article posted December 3 on the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). See a December 3 article from the Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) for overseas reporting on the ordination.
Gan Junqiu, ordained as bishop of the Guangzhou diocese in Guangdong province on December 4, a year after being elected to the post. According to November 16 and December 3 articles from AsiaNews, internal disputes over which bishops would be involved in the ordination had delayed the date of the ceremony. For Chinese reporting on the event, see a December 7 SARA article.
Li Jing, ordained as coadjutor bishop of the Ningxia diocese in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on December 21. According to a December 10 article from AsiaNews, the issue of whether bishops with Holy See approval would preside over the ordination may have been a factor in postponing the ceremony from its originally scheduled date of December 8. For additional information, see December 21 articles from AsiaNews and UCAN, as well as a January 7 correction to the UCAN story. See also a December 22 article from the China Daily (via the China Internet Information Center) and a December 24 report from SARA.

In September, the CPA ordained the coadjutor bishop of the Guizhou diocese and the bishop of Beijing. The ordinations followed an open letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Catholic church members in China, written in May and issued the following month, urging reconciliation between registered and unregistered Catholic communities in China and expressing concern about bishop selections by Chinese state authorities. The extent to which the subsequent five bishop ordinations with Holy See approval were a response to the letter, however, remains unclear, given factors including delays in some of the ordinations and in the Chinese government's initial reaction to the letter. Chinese authorities blocked Internet access to the letter, and local officials reportedly detained some Catholic clergy in an effort to assert authority in the aftermath of the letter's publication. For more information, see Section II---Freedom of Religion, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-01-10 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Ganzi County Soundly Launches "Public Security Head" Pilot Project (Chinese and English Text)

The following is a translation prepared by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The Chinese text was retrieved from the Ganzi Prefecture Development Planning Committee Web site on March 4, 2008.

Ganzi County Soundly Launches "Public Security Head" Pilot Project

In order to further solidify the foundation for grassroots-level work to safeguard stability, Ganzi County will soon implement a "Public Security Head" pilot project at five grassroots-level police substations in rural villages. Local villagers are invited to assume the duties of public security head, performing "transmission," "notification," "reconciliation," and other functions so as to assist the local substations in safeguarding public order in their jurisdiction and promoting social harmony and stability in rural villages. The principal methods are:

First, rigorous selection of personnel. Public security heads should all be politically reliable and enjoy prestige among the people, and furthermore should be those who hold a concurrent post as village Party branch secretary and who possess a relatively strong sense of responsibility for their work and a relatively strong ability to coordinate groups.

Second, rigorous training. At each village-level activities office, a workspace will be established for public security heads and more than 2000 yuan will be invested for putting in place a related management system. Security cadres and police from the local police substation will come by to conduct one-on-one trainings for select public security heads. There will be instruction on related legal knowledge, and explanations of work responsibilities, the limits of their powers, and related work procedures, to enhance the ability of public security heads to carry out their functions.

Third, rigorous supervision. The limits of the job powers of public security heads will be made clear. Each local police substation will periodically evaluate the public security heads. Public security heads will be supervised and urged to develop their work according to the law and in a standardized way. In cases where a public security head has abused his or her authority, or gone so far as to use his or her power as a public security head to violate the law and commit a crime, adjustments will be made in a timely manner and corresponding responsibility will be pursued and investigated according to the law.

Fourth, strengthening the incentive mechanism. Public security heads may attend the local police substation's comprehensive governance work meeting as nonvoting delegates. At the end of the year, commendations will be given to outstanding public security heads. Public security heads who provide important information or clues to assist in solving a crime or in prevention work will receive an award for each instance. This is to effectively increase the enthusiasm of the public security head for his or her work.

Following the success of the pilot project, the "Public Security Head" system will be extended to the entire county, to become a major force in safeguarding village harmony and stability.

甘孜县扎实开展“治安户长”工作试点

为进一步夯实基层维稳工作基础，近日，甘孜县在5个基层派出所所在村推行“治安户长”试点，聘请当地村民义务担任治安户长，履行“传声”、“报信”、“劝和”等职能，协助当地派出所维护辖区社会治安，促进农村社会和谐稳定。主要做法是：
一是严格选人。治安户长均由政治上靠得住、群众中有威望，并且具有较强工作责任心和较强组织协调能力的村支书兼任。
二是严格培训。在各村级活动室为治安户长落实了工作场所，投入2000多元将相关管理制度上墙，派出所干警上门对选定的治安户长进行了一对一培训，讲授相关法律知识，讲解工作职责、权限以及相关的工作程序，提高了治安户长履职能力。
三是严格监管。明确了治安户长的工作权限，各派出所定期对治安户长进行考评，督促其依法规范开展工作，对滥用职权、甚至利用治安户长职权进行违法犯罪的，将及时进行调整，并依法追究相关责任。
四是健全激励机制。治安户长可以列席当地派出所综治工作会议；年终对优秀治安户长进行表彰；对破案、防控工作提供重要信息和线索的治安户长实行一事一奖，有效提高了治安户长工作积极性。
试点成功后，将在全县进行推广“治安户长”制度，使之成为维护农村和谐稳定的一支重要力量。
摘自：各县信息

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-24 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05		more ...
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Tibetans Appeal Splittism, Espionage Sentences for Horse-Racing Festival Incident

Relatives of four Tibetan men -- two nomads, a monk, and a school teacher -- traveled from a Tibetan area of Sichuan province to the provincial capital, Chengdu City, to submit appeals to the Sichuan High People's Court following the men's sentencing on November 20, 2007, on splittism and espionage charges, according to a December 4 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. The Ganzi (Kardze) Intermediate People's Court, located in Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, sentenced the four men to prison terms of up to 10 years on charges of splittism, espionage, or both, for actions linked to an August 1 incident at a horse-racing festival in Litang (Lithang) county in Ganzi TAP, according to a Xinhua report published the same day as the sentencing.

The Ganzi court convicted one of the men, 52 year-old nomad Ronggyal Adrag (or Runggye Adak) on October 29 on the charges of attempting to "subvert state power" and "split the country" by standing before a crowd gathered at the festival and shouting slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and greater Tibetan freedoms, according to an October 30 RFA report. Security officials detained him immediately. (For more information, see International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) reports, 2 August 07, 10 August 07.) If the report of conviction on both charges is accurate, Ronggyal Adrag was the first Tibetan convicted under the 1997 Criminal Law on the charges of "splittism" (Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country") as well as "subversion" (Article 105: "subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system"). The judge presiding over the trial said that Ronggyal Adrag's sentencing would take place within six or seven days (e.g. by November 5), according to the RFA report.

The same court sentenced Ronggyal Adrag to eight years' imprisonment on the charge of splittism on November 20 (about two weeks later than the court predicted), according to another Xinhua report that day. The report did not provide any information showing that Ronggyal Adrag was sentenced on the subversion charge. Articles 103 and 105 each provide sentences ranging from three years up to life imprisonment depending on the court's perception of the seriousness of the alleged activity. In October, the judge presiding over the trial characterized Ronggyal Adrag's crimes as "very severe," according to the October 30 RFA report, leading to initial concerns that he could face a prison sentence of extraordinary length as punishment for an incident of disorderly conduct.

The Ganzi court sentenced the other three Tibetans, monk Adrug Lupoe of Lithang Monastery (detained August 21), middle school teacher Jamyang Kunkhyen (detained August 22), and nomad Jarib Lothog (detained August 19), for alleged activities following Ronggyal Adrag's detention, when Tibetans reportedly protested in and near Litang town, and authorities called in the People's Armed Police (PAP) to enforce a crackdown, according to an August 24 ICT report, an August 28 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report, and a September 4 RFA report. Adrug Lupoe (one of Ronggyal Adrag's nephews) and Jamyang Kunkhyen followed "directions from overseas sources" and "took pictures and made discs and provided them to overseas organizations" with Jarib Lothog's assistance, according to information about the sentence provided in the first Xinhua report cited above. The report did not name the photographer or the overseas recipient of the images. According to the September 4 RFA report, Kunkhyen's detention was "thought to be connected to his possession of a video camera at the time of the protests," and followed a search of his residence by security officials. The August 24 ICT report provided images of security officials and PAP in and near Litang on August 8 to disperse Tibetans gathered to protest Ronggyal Adrag's detention.

The court found the three men guilty of espionage (Criminal Law, Article 110) because some of the images recorded on the discs "concern[ed] national security and interests" and "provid[ed] intelligence to overseas organizations," according Xinhua's account of the verdict. In addition to espionage, the court convicted Adrug Lupoe and Jamyang Kunkhyen of inciting splittism by "writing and posting secessionist flyers," and sentenced them to prison sentences of 10 years and 9 years, respectively. Jarib Lothog was sentenced to three year's imprisonment as an accomplice to espionage.

The men's relatives initially attempted to submit appeals to the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court in Kangding, but "they were not allowed to do so in the same court," according to a Kangding source cited in the December 4 RFA report. The Ganzi court's refusal to accept the appeal is consistent with Article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which provides "the defendant, private prosecutor, or their legal representatives" the right to refuse to accept a judgment and "to appeal in writing or orally to the People's Court at the next higher level." A provincial high court is one level higher than an intermediate court. When the relatives traveled to Chengdu, the Sichuan High People's Court did not at first respond to their requests to submit the appeals, the RFA source said. The provincial court accepted the appeals and provided the relatives with an official receipt only after the relatives produced a "joint appeal" addressed to officials in Beijing and signed by an unspecified number of Tibetan residents of the Litang area.

The CPL imposes strict limits on the period of time during which an appeal may be submitted. Article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law states, "A defendant shall not be deprived on any pretext of his right to appeal," but Article 183 restricts the period of time during which an appeal may be lodged to 10 days after receipt of the written judgment.

Information is not available about whether or not the men have access to legal counsel during their appeals process. A court-appointed lawyer representing Ronggyal Adrag at his trial in Kangding argued that his call for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet was strictly religious in nature, and not aimed at toppling the government, according to a November 20 ICT report.

See Section IV, on "Tibet: Special Focus for 2007," in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, available on the Web site of the Government Printing Office (GPO), for more information. The Tibet section of the 2007 Annual Report is available as a reprint on the GPO Web site.

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Slogans Take on Softer Tone, But Restrictive Population Policies Remain

China's National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) has altered its population planning slogans to reflect a less strident tone, according to an October 11 Xinhua article and a July 19 circular posted on the NPFPC Web site. The NPFPC eliminated older slogans like "Raise fewer babies but more piggies" and "One more baby means one more tomb" that drew controversy and created a "misunderstanding about the [population planning] policy and even tarnish[ed] the image of the government," according to the NPFPC, as cited in the Xinhua article. In their place are slogans including "The mother earth is too tired to sustain more children" and "Having a boy or girl brings much joy, gender imbalances bring much worry." The slogans, organized by theme, include catch phrases directed at migrant populations and slogans to encourage officials to properly implement population planning policies. (See the Xinhua article for translations of some phrases. Click here and scroll to the bottom of the page to open an attachment listing the 190 new slogans in Chinese.) Despite this change in tone, the government's population planning policies remain unchanged, and have been reinforced by two new policy documents issued in recent months.

On May 24, 2007, the National Population and Family Planning Commission issued a plan to "rectify" out-of-plan births in urban parts of China. (English translation available from Open Source Center and quoted here.) The new directive addresses weak compliance with population planning requirements, including by public officials who have more than the permitted number of children. The plan also encourages urban areas to "play a leading and influential role" in population planning work. It sets out four main tasks:

taking "measures against ... social public figures, party members and cadres who run counter to the family planning policy;"
investigating violations of population planning policies, including births of second children and births to unmarried parents;
publicizing "unlawful" births; and
launching a propaganda campaign to "carry forward justice, foster a good atmosphere, and guide the broad masses of the people to consciously carry out the family planning policy."

News that followed this plan echoed similar concerns about officials' failure to comply with population planning policies by having more children than permitted. As discussed in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), official Chinese media reported in July 2007 that Hunan population planning authorities found that from 2000 to 2005, nearly 2,000 officials in the province had violated the national Population and Family Planning Law. In September 2007, the central government and Communist Party announced new measures to monitor public officials' adherence to population planning requirements and deny promotions to officials who had more than the permitted number of children.

The second document, an opinion issued by the General Office of the State Council on May 31, 2007, focuses on strengthening officials' administration of population planning requirements. The document, issued on the heels of a series of protests in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR) over the enforcement of population planning policies, cited concerns about "mass incidents" and threats to "social stability" stemming from local officials' abuses in implementing the policies. (See Section II, Population Planning, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information on the events in the GZAR.) The opinion calls for:

"unwavering" support for population planning policies;
strengthening officials' implementation of relevant laws and directives, and safeguarding citizens' "lawful rights and interests;"
continuing policies to spread propaganda and education, promote contraception, and ensure consistency in population planning work;
maintaining a system to inspect the enforcement of population planning policies;
strengthening early warning and response mechanisms to handle urgent situations related to population planning; and
strengthening legal education for public officials.

Although the opinion articulates a limited number of steps to address abuses in the enforcement of population planning requirements, both the opinion and the earlier plan reinforce basic population planning policies that violate international human rights standards. For more information, see Section II, Population Planning, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Guo Feixiong Sentenced to Five Years for Illegal Business Operation

A Guangzhou court sentenced rights defender Yang Maodong (who uses the pen name Guo Feixiong) to five years in prison for "illegal operation of a business," a crime under Article 225 of China's Criminal Law, according to a November 16 Guangzhou Daily article (in Chinese, via the Web site of the Guangzhou Municipal People's Government). A November 14 Human Rights in China (HRIC) press release said that the Tianhe District People's Court, in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, handed down the sentence on November 14 and also fined him 40,000 yuan (US$5,400). The Guangzhou Daily article said that Guo's punishment stemmed from activities he allegedly undertook beginning in 2001. The article said that in July 2001, Guo fabricated the existence of a magazine publisher named "Comprehensive Law" and misappropriated the publication number of the publication "Chemical Reagent." Guo then used the number to print 26,086 copies of a publication named "Comprehensive Law 2001 Special Issue" and distributed them to the cities of Shenyang and Dalian, both in Liaoning province, to be sold. While the Guangzhou Daily described the item being sold as a "publication" and gave no details as to its content, the HRIC press release and a November 15 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article (subscription required) reported that Guo was punished for publishing a book concerning a political scandal in Shenyang. SCMP reported that the book had "angered local officials."

Guo's punishment comes amid a sustained government crackdown against prominent rights defenders such as Guo, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng, and Zheng Enchong. For more information on this crackdown, see "Access to Counsel and Right To Present a Defense" in Section II - Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report. Guo himself was previously detained for more than three months in late 2005, after he advised villagers in Taishi village, Guangdong, on their recall campaign against an allegedly corrupt village committee head. In February 2006, Guo published an online essay identifying government suppression of the recall campaign as the start of the crackdown against rights defenders. Two days after the essay was published, unidentified assailants reportedly beat Guo outside the police station where officials had earlier interrogated him. In early 2006, Guo took part in a hunger strike relay that Gao initiated to protest government abuses. In October 2006, about a month after Guo was detained, Chinese authorities arrested writer Zhang Jianhong and Internet essayist Chen Shuqing, both of whom had expressed support for Gao and are now serving sentences of six years and four years, respectively.

Guo's more recent detention and trial included a number of procedural postponements. According to the HRIC press release:

September 14, 2006 - Guo detained.
September 30 - Guo formally arrested, after which the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau (PSB) refers his case to the Tianhe District People's Procuratorate.
January 19, 2007 - procuratorate sends case back to the Guangzhou PSB for supplemental investigation.
January 20 - case transferred to authorities in Liaoning.
February 17 - case sent back to the Tianhe District People's Procuratorate.
March 1 - procuratorate sends case to Guangzhou PSB for supplemental investigation.
May 15 - Guo formally indicted.
July 9 - Guo's trial begins at the Tianhe District People's Court.
July 26 - Guo's wife, Zhang Qing, learns that the procuratorate has requested a supplemental investigation.
End of August - supplemental investigation completed.
October 12 - Zhang learns that the court has requested a one-month delay from the Guangdong Provincial High People's Court.

In a June 4, 2007, appeal to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (translated and reprinted by HRIC), Zhang reported that police interrogators in both Guangzhou and Shenyang used coercive methods in an attempt to force a confession from Guo, including tying him to his bed in arm and leg manacles for 40 days and using electric batons and rods to strike his genitals. Article 247 of the Criminal Law and provisions issued by the Supreme People's Procuratorate in 2005 prohibit and punish the use of torture to coerce a confession. The Chinese government is further bound by provisions in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which it ratified in 1988. Wang Zhenchuan, Deputy Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, acknowledged at a November 18, 2006, seminar in Sanya city, Hainan province, that almost all wrongful convictions in China involve police abuse during the investigation stage. Official Chinese statistics show that only about 30 people are wrongfully convicted in China each year due to police abuses, but Wang said that the real number could be higher.

The Chinese government has relied on the crime of "illegal operation of a business" to selectively punish other individuals for publishing political or religious materials. For example, house church pastors Wang Zaiqing and Cai Zhuohua were sentenced to two years and three years, respectively, for printing Bibles and other Christian literature without government permission. China's licensing scheme for publishing prevents citizens from publishing through anyone but a government-licensed publisher. To obtain a license, publishers must have a government sponsor and meet minimum financial requirements. The government limits the number of publications by requiring a publication to have a unique serial number, the allotment of which the government controls. These restrictions force citizens who wish to publish information or opinions that the Chinese government or Communist Party disagrees with to refrain from doing so or to risk punishment by publishing without government permission.

For more information on the Chinese government's policy toward publishing, see "Government Policy Toward Publishing" in Section II - Freedom of Expression of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report. For additional information about Guo, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng, Zhang Jianhong, Chen Shuqing, Wang Zaiqing, and Cai Zhuohua, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Central Propaganda Department Restricts Reporting on Air Quality, Food Safety

The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) of the Chinese Communist Party recently issued a notice to Chinese news editors restricting domestic coverage of topics relating to China's hosting of the 2008 Olympics, including air quality and food safety, according to a November 13 South China Morning Post (SCMP) report (subscription required). The report said that the CPD, responsible for ensuring that China's media follow the Communist Party's lead, delivered the notice during the week of November 5 and that the notice "ordered journalists to steer clear of Olympics-related story ideas that could show the country in a bad light." A source who read the notice told the SCMP that it identified air quality, food safety, the Olympic torch relay, and the Paralympics as topics that had recently generated "unfavorable publicity" in the foreign media. The source said the notice "requires state media to put a spin on those topics to 'offset the bad publicity' created by those previous reports." The SCMP added that Chinese media regulators were becoming more aware of the influence domestic stories have on foreign media coverage of China, noting that "most foreign media pick up story ideas from the domestic press." CPD directives, which are frequently issued in response to politically sensitive events, may apply to any Chinese journalist.

Such notices violate international standards for freedom of expression. Article 19 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed and has committed to ratify, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), guarantees the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. The ICCPR and UDHR permit states to restrict this freedom under a limited number of circumstances, but furthering a political agenda is not one of the permitted exceptions. In addition to the ICCPR and UDHR protections, Article 35 of China's Constitution provides that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of the press.

The notice follows other instances this year where the CPD and local propaganda officials have exercised their power to restrict or manipulate domestic reporting for political reasons:

In August, the CPD issued an almost complete ban on reporting about a bridge collapse that killed 64 people amid suspicions of corruption and shoddy construction, according to an August 17 Associated Press report (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune).

In July, local propaganda officials in Beijing ordered a Beijing newspaper to discontinue its political reporting and warned other local papers not to issue "negative" news about food safety, according to a July 31 SCMP report (subscription required). The actions came amid rising international concern over the safety of China's food exports and followed the discovery that a Beijing television reporter had falsified a news report claiming that food vendors were filling steamed buns with pieces of cardboard.

In January, the CPD ordered media executives not to focus on problems in China's legal system or the excesses of corrupt officials and to emphasize stories "that preserve social stability and avoid triggering social conflict" in the run-up to the annual National People's Congress session held in March and the 17th Party Congress held in October, according to a February 27 Washington Post report.

The notice also calls into question China's commitment, set forth in the Beijing Olympic Action Plan issued by the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games in 2002, to "be open in every aspect to the rest of the country and the whole world" in its preparations for the Olympics. The plan also says that China will bring "into full play the role of public supervision" and that "the preparation for Olympic Games will be transparent." By restricting local media coverage of air quality and food safety, China threatens to hinder public monitoring of the air quality and food safety commitments it made for the Olympics, even as concern about China's ability to fulfill such commitments remains. In its bid, China promised that "air quality during the period of the Games in 2008 will be of a high quality, and meet Chinese and WHO [World Health Organization] standards." A 2007 report by the United Nations Environment Programme noted, however, that levels of small particulate matter "remain well above" current WHO air quality guidelines and that "despite the relatively positive trends of recent years, air quality remains a legitimate concern for Olympic organizers, competitors and observers, as well as for the citizens of Beijing." Controversies this year involving such food products as fish and eggs have called into question China's system for monitoring food production, putting greater spotlight on China's pledge to ensure the safety of food for Olympic participants, as reported in a July 11 Xinhua article (reprinted on the Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympics Games).

The recent restrictions on domestic reporters come in a year when hosting the 2008 Olympics has prompted China to issue regulations that, on paper, relax restrictions on foreign journalists reporting in China. For more information about the CPD and restrictions on the reporting activities of Chinese journalists, see Section II--Freedom of Expression in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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"Green Olympics" Commitments Raise Concerns Over Transparency and Implementation

Beijing's bid in 2000 to host the 2008 Olympics promised a "Green Olympics" and the "greatest Olympic Games environmental legacy ever," yet concerns remain over Beijing's transparency and progress toward fulfilling the specific commitments underlying these promises, especially with regard to air quality. In its bid, Beijing promised to achieve objectives in the city's environmental master plan three years ahead of schedule with the completion of 20 major projects by 2007. The projects include infrastructure improvements addressing air and water quality, waste management, and energy, according to Table 1.1 in the 2007 United Nations Environmental Programme's Environmental Review of the Olympics (UNEP report). Beijing also promised that air quality would meet World Health Organization (WHO) standards and that the city's drinking water, which it said met WHO standards, would continue to be protected. The UNEP report noted that "Beijing has already achieved many of its bid commitments, for example on waste water treatment, water source protection, and waste management, and appears to be well on the way to fulfilling all of them." The UNEP report called the progress "an achievement in itself."

Despite this noteworthy progress, there are concerns over Beijing's promise that air quality "will meet Chinese and WHO standards." The WHO air quality guidelines include guidelines for particulate matter (PM) 2.5 and PM 10, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide. According to an October 5, 2006, WHO press release, revisions made to the guidelines in 2005 significantly reduced the guidelines for PM 10, ozone, and sulfur dioxide. The Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau monitors PM 10, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon, but does not monitor ozone or PM 2.5, according to the UNEP report and an October 16 Washington Post (WP) article. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, exposure to small particulate matter such as PM 2.5 and ground-level ozone, which is at particularly high levels during the summer, have documented adverse health effects. The UNEP report recommended "further investigation" into ozone levels because of the timing of the Olympics in August 2008.

With less than a year to go until the Olympics, air pollutants such as PM 10 and nitrogen dioxide currently exceed WHO guidelines (both before and after the change in 2005) by a significant amount, according to information presented in the UNEP report and the WHO guidelines. There is some ambiguity over whether Beijing is obligated to meet current WHO guidelines or the guidelines in place at the time of Beijing's bid in 2000. The UNEP report uses the current WHO guidelines, but a December 3 Reuters article (reprinted in the Guardian) quotes one of the drafters of the environmental commitments as saying, "We will fulfil our original bid commitment, namely to meet Chinese and pre-2005 World Health Organisation standards on air quality." The Host City Contract, entered into between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the city of Beijing and China's National Olympic Committee, may help to clarify Beijing's contractual obligations in this regard. The contract, however, has not been made publicly available.

The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad pledged in its 2002 Beijing Olympic Action Plan to make preparations for the Olympics transparent, yet there are concerns over the difficulty in accessing information on pollutants and charting Beijing's progress toward achieving its bid commitments. Chinese Communist Party censorship of domestic media reports concerning air quality may lead to less information or misleading information being made available to the public and the scientific community. In addition, Beijing officials refuse to publicly release information on pollutant levels in different areas of the city and during different parts of the day, although there are 27 monitoring stations throughout the city, according to the WP article and a November 29 Associated Press article (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune). In May 2008, the Measures on Open Environmental Information (in Chinese) will go into effect, but it remains to be seen whether these measures will lead to greater transparency regarding Beijing's pollution.

Other areas of concern include what kind of environmental legacy the Olympics will leave behind in Beijing and elsewhere, and if the pursuit of the environmental targets for the Olympics actually signifies greater protection of the environment. For instance, the availability of fuel cell buses highlights Beijing's goals for clean energy and an improved public transportation system, yet an October 23 China Watch article notes that the buses are running far short of their capacity and that usage may be hindered by the lack of signs and schedule information. For more information on environmental protection and access to information in China, see Section II, on "Environment" and "Freedom of Expression," in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, available on the Web site of the Government Printing Office.

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Hunan Authorities Issue New Legal Measures To Regulate Folk Belief Venues

Authorities in Hunan province have passed new legislation that strengthens legal protections for folk belief practices, but that also subjects them to increased government scrutiny. The Hunan Province Provisional Measures for the Management of Venues for Folk Belief Activities (Provisional Measures), issued by the Hunan province Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) in August 2007, mark China's first comprehensive provincial-level legal measures dedicated solely to activities related to folk beliefs [minjian xinyang huodong]. The Provisional Measures follow earlier steps from Hunan province to regulate such practices. Article 48 of the Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs (Hunan RRA), issued on September 30, 2006, provides for the registration of venues for folk belief activities, building off of 2005 provisions that outline the establishment of a management system for folk beliefs and a 2002 directive to channel folk beliefs into the scope of management by religious affairs departments in the province. (See three undated news items from the Hunan province RAB, likely from 2006 (report 1, report 2, report 3), that discuss the background to these legislative developments.) Outside of Hunan province, neither the national Regulation on Religious Affairs (national RRA) nor other publicly available provincial-level regulations on religion recognize folk beliefs or provide for the registration of venues for folk belief activities, though some local governments have reported on regulating folk beliefs. (See, for example, a February 6, 2007, article from China Ethnicities News (CEN) and a February 13 CEN article for information on developments in cities in Fujian province, and an October 16 article from the Hebei province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Department for news on developments in a county within Hebei.) The national RRA does not explicitly designate Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism as China's only state-sanctioned religious groups, but in practice, the government has created a legal and policy framework that recognizes only these groups for limited state protection. At the same time, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) maintains an office that carries out research and formulates policy positions on folk beliefs and religious communities outside the five recognized groups. See the SARA Web site for more information.

The Provisional Measures articulate some protection for venues for folk belief activities, but also subject such sites to requirements that are stricter than those imposed on general venues for religious activities. Key features of the Provisional Measures include:

Defining Venues for Folk Belief Activities. Article 2 defines venues for folk belief activities to mean temples with "the characteristics of primitiveness, localism, diversity, historical tradition, and primordial religions." It also extends the definition to temples for ethnic minority beliefs. It excludes the "religious activity venues" designated in the Hunan RRA, as well as Confucian temples and ancestral halls. Article 3 forbids venues for folk belief activities from carrying out such "feudal superstitious" activities as rites to expel illness and exorcise demons [qubing gangui], "spreading rumors to deceive people," performing trance dances [tiaoshen fangyin], and other "illegal" activities.
Registering Venues. The Provisional Measures provide for the registration of existing folk belief activity venues, but do not establish a mechanism to allow for the construction and subsequent registration of new sites. (See Articles 4-7.) Article 4 states that "in principle," no new venues for folk belief activities may be built, and "in general," no venues that have been destroyed may be rebuilt. The article allows for the rebuilding of venues of "historical stature" and "great influence" upon consent of the provincial RAB. The requirements are stricter than those provided for in the national RRA and related measures on registering religious venues, as well as those in provincial regulations, including Article 13 of the Hunan RRA, which encompass the registration of new venues for religious activities as well as existing ones. In those cases, registered religious organizations apply to register venues. The Provisional Measures, however, do not establish a framework for organizing and registering communities of people who practice folk beliefs. Article 5 specifies that a venue's management committee, which serves as the internal managing body at each site, apply to the county-level RAB to register the venue for folk belief activities. Article 3 stipulates that "participants" in folk belief activities carry out such practices at registered venues.
Government and Party Control. Although all national and local regulations on religion establish active state control over religious organizations and venues, the Provisional Measures are more explicit in providing for direct state control. Article 8 states that members of a venue's management committee must endorse the leadership of the Communist Party, as well as submit to the administrative management of the government. Neither the national RRA nor other provincial regulations issued after the national RRA include this precise stipulation, and none mentions the Communist Party.

The limited scope of the Provisional Measures and their lack of stock language stating protection for freedom of religious belief suggest that Hunan authorities have not expanded the definition of protected forms of religious expression to fully encompass folk belief practices, even as RABs in the province regulate venues for folk belief activities. The Provisional Measures thus reinforce the central government's adherence to a narrow definition of religion rather than to broader understandings articulated in international human rights standards that include folk, spiritual, and other beliefs. In addition, the registration process stipulated in the Provisional Measures gives authorities the discretion to deny state sanction to those venues deemed to support cults or superstitions. Nonetheless, the Provisional Measures provide a degree of legal status to some venues for folk belief activities, which may signify a broader trend in accommodating some folk belief practices. SARA authorities visited Hunan province and indicated an interest in drawing on experiences there to draft national documents on the regulation of folk beliefs, according to an article from the Hunan RAB (undated, likely from 2006).

For additional information, see a previous analysis of the Hunan RRA and Section II--Religious Freedom, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Religious Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan

Local governments and educational institutions in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued in 2007 to impose religious restrictions on Muslims' observance of the holiday of Ramadan. Local governments and schools called for increased controls over religious activities during Ramadan, banning students from fasting, forbidding teachers and other state employees from engaging in religious activities, and requiring local restaurants to remain open during the holiday.

In the township of Yitimliqum in Qarghiliq county, local Party and government officials convened a meeting to instruct attendees, including local cadres, teachers' representatives, and religious personnel, to intensify inspection and supervision of religious activities during Ramadan, according to a September 13 report on the Qarghiliq county government Web site. Authorities called for strengthening measures by villages and schools to administer and control religious activities; intensifying implementation of the "two systems" of maintaining regular government contact with mosques and religious figures; ensuring religious activities and worship sites remain under the administration of "patriotic religious personages" and preventing unlicensed religious clergy from leading religious activities; and prohibiting party members, state cadres, and minors from observing Ramadan or participating in other religious activities. The report also called for preventing unauthorized religious pilgrimages and eliminating "infiltration and sabotage" activities carried out in the name of religion.
Party and government officials in Yopurgha county inspected local restaurants and food service companies during Ramadan to "strengthen work regarding social stability during Ramadan and protect market order," according to a September 18 report on the Kashgar government Web site. Authorities forbade restaurant and food service businesses from closing during the holiday and instructed the food service industry to serve the needs of customers not observing Ramadan. The report said that authorities would "deal sternly" with individuals and businesses that forced restaurants to close during the holiday.
In a September 15 speech posted on the Bügür county government Web site, local Party Secretary Zhang Zhengrong stated that Party members, cadres, and students may not profess a religion. Zhang called on schools to strengthen propaganda education during Ramadan and to put a stop to activities including fasting and professing a religion.
The Kashgar Teachers College implemented a series of measures to prevent students from observing Ramadan, according to a September 25 report from Radio Free Asia. The school imposed communal meals and required students to obtain permission to leave campus. School authorities also made students gather for a school assembly at a time of day coinciding with Friday prayers. The report noted that under direction from the government, other schools in the region appeared to be implementing similar measures in order to prevent students from observing the holiday.

These restrictions over the observance of Ramadan are a continuation of repressive measures implemented by local governments and educational institutions in previous years. According to reports issued in 2006, Qarghiliq county education offices required schools to enforce communal lunches for students and teachers and instructed school officials to take other preventative measures to ensure that students did not fast or participate in other religious activities. Aqsu prefecture education officials forbade teachers from fasting during Ramadan and forcing or leading students to participate in religious activities, among other measures. In the XUAR capital, Urumqi, and within Kashgar prefecture, local governments also enforced measures to prevent students from fasting.

Religious repression in the XUAR during Ramadan reflects broader religious controls that local governments and Party leaders impose in the region. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), in recent years the government has limited access to mosques, detained citizens for possession of unauthorized religious texts, imprisoned citizens for religious activities determined to be "extremist," and most recently confiscated Muslims' passports in an effort to strengthen control over Muslim pilgrimages. In addition, the XUAR government maintains the most severe legal restrictions in China on children's right to practice religion. For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on religion in China, see the CECC 2007 Annual Report, Section II--Freedom of Religion, and Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Source: -See Summary (2007-12-12 / English) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Chinese Government Relaxes Restrictions on Foreign Journalists for Olympics

Under China's Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period (Olympic Regulations), issued by the State Council on November 1, 2006, foreign journalists in China need only obtain the consent of the organization or individual they wish to interview. The regulations set aside an earlier provision requiring foreign journalists to obtain the permission of provincial, autonomous region, or municipal government officials before reporting in that area.

More specifically, the Manual for Candidate Cities for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad 2008 (Manual), issued by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), states that candidate cities must:

[p]rovide a covenant from the government of your country stating the following: . . . guarantees free access to and free movement around the host country for all accredited persons on the basis of a passport (or equivalent document) and the Olympic identity and accreditation card referred to in the Olympic Charter.

The Manual further stipulates that candidate cities:

[i]n addition to the covenant requested in question 2.1.1, supply a guarantee, from the relevant authorities that, notwithstanding any regulations in your country to the contrary, all holders of the Olympic identity and accreditation card (including doctors, media representatives, etc.) will be able to carry out their Olympic function for the duration of the Olympic Games and for a period not exceeding one month before and one month after the Games.

The Manual notes that:

[t]he likely number of media representatives accredited at the 2008 Olympic Summer Games is estimated at 17,000 (excluding the Olympic Broadcasting Organisation). The total number of media accreditees for 2008 will be determined following the previous Olympiad.

In its bid, China promised that "[t]here will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games," and the IOC's 2001 evaluation report on candidate cities noted that China had confirmed that "there will be no restrictions on media reporting and movement of journalists up to and including the Olympic Games." Just before China won its bid in July 2001, then-Secretary-General of the bid committee Wang Wei reiterated this promise, telling a press conference that foreign media would have "complete freedom" to report when they come to China for the Olympics, according to a July 12, 2001, China Daily article. The Olympic Regulations went into effect on January 1, 2007, and will expire on October 17, 2008. China will host the 2008 Summer Olympics from August 8 to 24, according to an August 9, 2006, China Daily article. As of August 2007, there were 705 resident foreign correspondents in China and 2,060 foreign journalists had come to China on reporting tours in 2007, according to an August 3, 2007, China Daily article. The regulations do not apply to domestic journalists.

The Olympic Regulations set aside restrictions found in the Regulations Concerning Foreign Journalists and Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies, issued by the State Council in 1990 (1990 Regulations). At a December 1, 2006, press conference (in Chinese) to discuss implementation of the Olympic Regulations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Information Department Director Liu Jianchao said that provisions in the Olympic Regulations that conflict with provisions in the 1990 Regulations will prevail, but that the 1990 Regulations will otherwise remain in force. Article 83 of the Legislation Law provides that in the case of administrative regulations enacted by the same body, a special provision that differs from a general provision shall prevail, and a newer provision that differs from an older provision shall prevail.

Noteworthy Changes from 1990 Regulations

Government Permission and Host Organization Sponsorship No Longer Required: Article 15 of the 1990 Regulations required foreign reporters to obtain permission from the foreign affairs office of the people's government of a province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the central government in order to report in that area. In practice, many foreign reporters had relied on what a December 2, 2006, Washington Post article characterized as "subterfuge and stealth" to bypass this requirement, but those who were caught were often detained, scolded, or forced to confess to violating the law. Liu said at the December 1 press conference that the requirement that foreign reporters obtain permission from local foreign affairs officials would no longer apply, and that the only permission foreign journalists wishing to interview an organization or individual would need is that of the organization or individual (Article 6 of the Olympic Regulations).

The 1990 Regulations divide journalists allowed to work in China into two types: resident foreign correspondents and foreign reporters for short-term news coverage (six months or less). Article 13 of the 1990 Regulations required short-term reporters to arrange their reporting activities through a Chinese host organization. Liu said that foreign journalists no longer need to be accompanied by a host organization.

Visa Exemption: The Olympic Regulations provide that foreign journalists holding an Olympics accreditation card will be allowed to enter China to cover the Olympics without a visa (Article 3). Accreditation cards are issued not by China, but by national Olympic committees around the world, under the authority of the IOC, according to the Olympic Charter and a June 9, 2006, IOC press release. Journalists who hold accreditation cards for the Summer Olympics will only be able to stay in China from July 8, 2008, to September 24, 2008, according to the Service Guide for Foreign Media Coverage of the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period (Service Guide, Chinese, English). According to the Games' official Web site (English, Chinese) the quota for accredited press will be 21,600, including a quota of 5,600 for written and photographic press, the same as for Athens in 2004 and Sydney in 2000, 4,000 for the Beijing Olympic Broadcasting Co., Ltd., a joint venture between the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee and the IOC, and 12,000 for rights-holding television and radio broadcasters. Another 10,000 non-accredited media are expected to cover the Games, according to an August 7, 2007, Reuters report.

For additional analysis and information, click on "more" below.

Applicability

Broad Range of Topics: The Olympic Regulations apply not only to the Olympics, but also to a broad range of topics arguably not related to the Olympics, subject to important national security and public interest exceptions discussed below. Article 2 provides that the regulations apply to "the Beijing Olympic Games and related matters," but "related matters" is not defined. The Service Guide, which was formulated pursuant to the Olympic Regulations, says that the regulations "shall apply to the coverage of the Beijing Olympic Games and the preparation as well as political, economic, social and cultural matters of China" (emphasis added). Chinese Olympics and government officials have made similar statements about the regulation's scope, according to a December 2, 2006, article and a December 29 article, both in the China Daily.

Definition of "Foreign Journalist": The Olympic Regulations do not define "foreign journalist" for purposes of the regulation but other documents indicate that the new rules apply only to foreigners whom Chinese officials have allowed to work as journalists in China. The new rules clearly apply to journalists holding an Olympics accreditation card. Those not holding an accreditation card must be either a "resident foreign journalist" or a "foreign reporter in China for short-term news coverage," according to the Service Guide. According to the Procedures for Foreign Reporters To Apply for Short-term News Coverage issued in 2007, such journalists, or their news organization, must formally apply to the MFA or a Chinese Embassy, consulate, or visa-issuing institution authorized by the MFA, to cover news in China. The 1990 Regulations, which recognizes only these two types of journalists, prohibit other foreigners from engaging in journalistic activities in China.

Exceptions To Protect National Security, Maintain Order: The Olympic Regulations leave intact Article 14 of the 1990 Regulations, which prohibits foreign journalists from engaging in activities "which are incompatible with their status or tasks, or which endanger China's national security, unity or community and public interests." Liu also said that during "sudden emergencies" or "major accidents," officials would take necessary measures to maintain order and that journalists should not interpret such measures as directed at them. "This is current practice in every country," he said. International standards, such as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, do allow for restrictions on freedom of expression to the extent provided for by law and necessary to protect national security or public order, public health or morals, or the rights or reputations of others. An August 2006 report by the Foreign Correspondents Club of China, however, suggests that Chinese officials have relied on an overbroad interpretation of these exceptions to prevent reporting on politically sensitive topics. The report found that officials on numerous occasions detained foreign journalists attempting to cover "social issues such as anti-pollution protests, land disputes, and the plight of AIDS victims," sometimes using Article 14 as their basis.

Tibet Autonomous Region: When asked about the Olympic Regulations' applicability to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Liu said the regulations applied to all parts of China. Other regulations that impose travel restrictions to the TAR, however, remain in place. MFA spokeswoman Jiang Yu said at a February 13, 2007, press conference (Chinese, English) that "due to restraints in natural conditions and reception capabilities," foreign reporters would still be subject to travel restrictions to Tibet. "Please contact the local foreign affairs office for conducting reporting activities in Tibet," Jiang said. According to the Web site of the China Tibet Tourism Bureau, which is directly under the TAR People's Government, foreigners must obtain a permit to enter the TAR and another permit to travel to closed areas, which include much of the TAR.

The Olympic Regulations do not apply to domestic journalists, who remain subject to a wide range of government and Party regulations, policies, and pressures that encourage self-censorship and hinder their ability to report freely. For more information on China's restrictions on its own journalists, see the Freedom of Expression section of the 2007 Annual Report.

Enforcement

The Olympic Regulations do not include any enforcement provisions and it is unclear how the rights of foreign reporters to report without permission and to interview consenting individuals and organizations will be ensured. The MFA is the "competent authority in charge of foreign journalists" and at the December press conference Liu urged foreign reporters to contact the MFA's Information Department "if difficulties arose," according to a December 1, 2006, Xinhua article. According to the August 3 China Daily article, the Information Department has set up a "round-the-clock" hotline for foreign journalists. Both the Administrative Reconsideration Law and the Administrative Procedure Law, which apply to foreign nationals, may provide foreign reporters with a possible legal forum to challenge administrative interference in the exercise of rights provided under the Olympic Regulations. Neither, however, would cover acts of the Communist Party. Furthermore, foreign reporters may lack standing under the Administrative Procedure Law, which prohibits courts from accepting cases involving state action in the area of foreign affairs (Article 12). The Administrative Reconsideration Law does not expressly mention such an exception.

Source: -See Summary (2007-11-30 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05		more ...
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Xinjiang Authorities Target Christian-Owned Businesses for Closure

Authorities in western China have closed four businesses owned or headed by local and overseas Christians, reflecting their concerns over perceived instability and "foreign infiltration" from overseas religious groups. According to a series of reports published by the U.S.-based nongovernmental organization China Aid Association (CAA), in September, authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) shut down two businesses owned or headed by local Protestants, accusing both businesses of conducting illegal religious activities. Officials accused one business of "seriously endanger[ing] the security of the state and social and political security" by "illegally preaching Christianity" among ethnic Uighurs in the region. Authorities cited a series of Chinese legal and policy directives, including the Regulation on Religious Affairs, to accuse the head of a second business of "illegal religious infiltration activities," including proselytizing and preaching outside of approved religious venues. XUAR authorities levied similar charges the same month against two American businesspeople and ordered them to leave China. (For more information, see two CAA reports from October 10 (Report 1, Report 2) and one report from October 9.)

The September business closures come amid a series of reports and incidents indicating heightened concern over religious activities in the region and throughout China:

In an October interview, Cao Shengjie, head of the state-controlled China Christian Council, expressed concern about "social problems" stemming from a lack of properly trained preachers and resulting misinterpretations of doctrine, according to an October 14 Xinhua article. She also stated that the official Chinese Protestant church "faces the problem of foreign infiltration." She stressed that the church would "persist in the principles of autonomy, self-cultivation, and self-propagation" to uphold government policy to prevent foreign influence over domestic religious communities.
In July, XUAR government Chair Ismail Tiliwaldi called on local government officials to strengthen oversight of local Catholic and Protestant communities and guard against foreign infiltration in the name of Christianity, according to a July 11 report from Tianshan Net.
On July 10, the CAA reported that authorities had initiated a campaign earlier that year to expel missionaries from China, including over 60 (later reported as over 50) from the XUAR.
Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang (promoted in October to the Politburo Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) stated in March that the government would "strike hard" against hostile forces inside and outside the country, including religious and spiritual groups, to ensure a "good social environment" for the Olympics and 17th Communist Party Congress, according to Agence France-Presse (via Open Source Center, March 20, 2007, subscription required).

XUAR government authorities exercise harsh control over various aspects of religious practice in the region. At the same time recent actions indicate increased attention to Christian groups, XUAR authorities also continue to maintain a longstanding policy of religious repression over Muslims in the region. For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on religion in China, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Web site of the Government Printing Office), Section II--Religious Freedom, and Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Source: -See Summary (2007-11-16 ) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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Tibetan Nomad Calling for Dalai Lama's Return Convicted of Subversion and Splittism

A court in Sichuan province convicted Tibetan nomad Ronggyal Adrag on October 29, 2007, on charges of attempting to "subvert state power" and "split the country" by standing before a crowd gathered at a horse-racing festival and yelling slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and greater Tibetan freedoms, according to an October 30 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. The judge presiding over the Ganzi (Kardze) Intermediate People's Court, located in Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, said that sentencing would take place within six or seven days.

Convicting Ronggyal Adrag on the dual charges of "splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country") and "subversion" (Article 105: "subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system") could result in an unusually long sentence that authorities may intend to serve as a warning to Tibetans that they must adhere to Communist Party policies on ethnic and religious issues. (See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information about Party policy and government implementation.) If Tibetans view his punishment as provocative, it may further increase regional tension. Ronggyal Adrag addressed the court, according to the RFA report, and explained the actions that led to his conviction:

The main reason was that there is nobody in Tibet who does not have faith in, loyalty to, and the desire to see the Dalai Lama. On the contrary, the Chinese government sends out propaganda saying that the Tibetans inside Tibet have no desire to meet him and have lost faith in him.Ronggyal Adrag (or Runggye Adak) is the only ethnic Tibetan known to have been convicted on the charge of "subversion" since the Criminal Law was amended in 1997 to replace the crime of "counterrevolution" with "endangering state security," based on information in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD). He is the first Tibetan convicted under the 1997 Criminal Law on charges of "subversion" as well as "splittism." If the court sentences Ronggyal Adrag under the "incitement" provisions for each charge, each charge can carry a sentence of not more than five years. But if the court sentences him for "organizing" or "plotting" a "major crime" under either charge, he could face a minimum sentence of 10 years or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for that charge. Both articles provide for sentences of not less than 3 years and not more than 10 years for persons who "take an active part" in splittist or subversive activity. Web site operator Huang Qi, a resident of Sichuan's capital, Chengdu city, is the only other Chinese citizen known to have been convicted of both charges, according to the PPD. Huang served a five-year sentence and was released in 2005.

Procuratorates and courts nearly always apply the charge of splittism to ethnic Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols, whom officials suspect of seeking to break up China through non-violent action. Courts have convicted 131 Chinese citizens of splittism under the 1997 Criminal Law, based on information about official charges in the PPD as of October 31, 2007. Huang Qi is the only known person convicted of splittism or undermining national unity who is not a Tibetan, Uighur, or Mongol. At the same time, courts rarely convict persons of such ethnic groups on the charge of subversion. Of 93 convictions on subversion charges, 1 was of a Tibetan (Ronggyal Adrag) and 2 were of Mongols (Badun and Xu Jian, both now released), based on PPD data for cases with adequate information. The total number of cases of imprisonment resulting from charges of splittism or subversion is higher, but information about official charges is not available for every case.

Ronggyal Adrag climbed onto the stage where officials attending the August 1 horse-races in Litang (Lithang) county were scheduled to speak and, according to an August 2 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) report, shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, the release of Gedun Choekyi Nyima (the Panchen Lama identified by the Dalai Lama), and Tibetan independence. According to other reports (International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 2 August 07; RFA, 2 August 07), he called for the Dalai Lama's return, freedom of religion, and the releases of the Panchen Lama and Tenzin Deleg. Ronggyal Adrag's statements may have been provoked by a petition drive conducted by Chinese officials who visited local monasteries in the weeks before the festival and told monks to sign a petition stating that they do not want the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, according to ICT reports on August 10 and October 8.

In an unusually swift and public response, a Xinhua report (reprinted in China Daily, 3 August 07) acknowledged that officials detained Ronggyal Adrag for "inciting separation of the nationalities," and that more than 200 Tibetans had gathered outside the detention center to call for his release. According to an August 24 ICT report, People's Armed Police (PAP) used tear gas and stun grenades on August 8 to disperse Tibetans who gathered peacefully near the horse-racing grounds to call for Ronggyal Adrag's release.

Information about 10 Tibetans detained in Lithang county during the period from mid-July through mid-October, based on RFA, ICT, and TCHRD reports, is available in the PPD. In addition to Ronggyal Adrag, at least five of the Tibetans are believed to remain detained: Adrug Lupoe, a Lithang Monastery monk and nephew of Ronggyal Adrag; Kunkhyen, a middle school teacher who may have had a video camera at the horse-racing festival; Adrug Kalgyam, a nomad who spoke out at a village patriotic education session, saying that Tibetans are not happy under Communist Party control; Lobsang Phuntsog, a Lithang Monastery monk who allegedly had photographs of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in his room and who was associated with Kunkhyen; and Jamyang Tenzin, a monk of Yuru Monastery who argued with patriotic education instructors, saying that Tibetans do not have religious freedom or they would be able to display images of the Dalai Lama in their homes and monasteries. Other detentions have been reported but details about them remain incomplete.

In the weeks following Ronggyal Adrag's protest, officials moved "thousands" of PAP into Lithang county to reinforce security, according to a September 4 RFA report, and replaced Tibetan officials deemed to be insufficiently loyal with officials presumed to be Han Chinese, including the county Party secretary and the heads of the county government and public security bureau. According to an October 8 ICT report, Chinese Party officials presided over patriotic education sessions conducted in local government offices, with leaders of extended nomad families (clans), and at monasteries and schools. A Tibetan source told ICT, "The main points of the meetings are always the same: denounce His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oppose the 'separatist clique,' of which [Ronggyal Adrag] is said to be a part, and finally, to be grateful to the Communist government." PAP were frequently present at such meetings, adding to the level of intimidation, according to the ICT source. Patriotic education instructors required schoolchildren to write essays denouncing the Dalai Lama and his supporters, according to the same report.

See Section IV, on "Tibet: Special Focus for 2007," in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, available on the Web site of the Government Printing Office (GPO), for more information. The Tibet section of the 2007 Annual Report is available as a reprint on the GPO Web site.

Source: -See Summary (2007-11-01 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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GENERAL OVERVIEW - 2007

The Commission observed ongoing human rights abuses and stalled development of the rule of law in China during 2006-2007. The Commission also observed increased repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Tibetan Autonomous areas of China, stepped-up harassment of legal advocates, and increased restrictions on Chinese reporters. In addition, across the areas the Commission monitors, the following general themes emerged: (1) Chinese leaders’ increasing intolerance of citizen activism and greater suppression of information on urgent matters of public concern (including food safety, public health, and environmental emergencies); (2) the instrumental use of law for political purposes; (3) the localization of dispute resolution in order to insulate the center from the backlash of national policy failures; and (4) the influence that China’s linkages with the rest of the world have had on some aspects of its domestic rule of law and human rights development.

Intolerance of citizen activism

Chinese officials have paid particularly close attention in the last year to civil society organizations. Central and local officials not only tightened existing controls over many citizen organizations, but also engaged in selective use of rarely enforced laws to provide a legal justification for shutting these organizations down. The influential China Development Brief was closed down in 2007 after one of its editors was accused of violating China's Statistics Law. As a vice minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration publicly criticized a dangerous algae bloom that had fouled China's Lake Tai, Wu Lihong, an environmental activist who was among the first to bring the lake's pollution problems to the public's attention, languished in prison. Official harassment of the family members of human rights activists (including Rebiya Kadeer, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng, and Hua Huiqi) has continued. Chinese citizens who have attempted to organize workers outside of the Party- controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions risk imprisonment, and particularly high-profile labor activists such as He Chaohui, Yao Fuxin, Wang Sen, and Hu Shigen remained in prison in 2007, serving out sentences that ranged from 7 to nearly 20 years. China's leaders rely on the disunity of workers to drive the economic growth on which the Party has staked its claim to supremacy. Notwithstanding the new Labor Contract Law's collective contracting provisions (which do not, in fact, provide for true collective bargaining, nor do they grant workers the right to organize or to select their own representatives), the Party views organized labor as it does citizen activism on most matters of public concern: as a threat to the Party's hold on power.

Instrumental use of law for political purposes

An increasing number of provisions concerning national unity, internal security, social order, and the promotion of a “harmonious society” crept into laws and regulations during 2006-2007, carving out for public officials an ever-widening realm for official discretion. China's laws place a burden of undefined risk on citizens. Unbounded legal discretion is manifest in many ways, including the deliberate omission of fundamental procedural protections (such as access to a lawyer or a public trial) for those accused of state security crimes, and the use of overbroad terms (such as “endangering state security,” “subversion,” “splittism,” and “disturbance of public order,'' or the arbitrary criteria used to distinguish between “normal religious activities” and illegal religious practices). The Commission also noted several cases in the past year in which the state criminalized political activists not by charging them with state security and disturbance of public order crimes, but by indicting them on offenses such as fraud, extortion, tax evasion, or illegal border crossing. Most Chinese citizens--those who refrain from unapproved political and religious activities--enjoyed increased room to maneuver in many aspects of daily life. The system provides for an increasing number of legal protections across many areas, but enforces them selectively. Against persons the Party deems to pose a threat to its supremacy, officials wield the legal system as a harsh, and deliberately unpredictable, weapon.

It is now less obvious than before that the rapid pace with which China produces new legislation should be seen as a sign of progress. China has permitted the efficiency of legislative processes to become increasingly divorced from consistent and effective implementation. As a result, the distinction between the promulgation of law and the making of propaganda has become blurred in some instances, placing the credibility of China's legal and regulatory reforms at risk.

Insulation of the central leadership from the backlash of policy failure

Throughout 2007, China's top leaders increasingly have encouraged the resolution of disputes through nonjudicial channels at the grassroots level wherever possible, insulating the central government from the backlash of national policy failures. In a March 29 speech, Supreme People's Court President Xiao Yang expressed concern over cases involving “hot button problems that can give rise to mass group administrative disputes.” Xiao's call to resolve lawsuits involving rural land confiscations and urban home evictions through mediation rather than through administrative litigation came less than a month after China's passage of its new Property Law, one stated goal of which was to provide stronger legal protections for property rights holders. Xiao also spotlighted cases concerning “enterprise restructuring, labor and social security, and resource and environmental protection.'' Party directives and State Council regulations concerning the petitioning system (“letters and visits,'' or xinfang) and administrative reconsideration system echoed the emphasis on dispute resolution through nonjudicial channels, at local levels wherever possible. A draft labor dispute resolution law, if adopted, would shift the focus of Chinese labor law to the nonjudicial, in-house resolution of labor disputes. This across-the-board trend appears intended, at least in part, to ensure that sensitive disputes do not enter legal channels which lead to Beijing.

Billed as a policy of local empowerment and part of a measured long-term strategy to induce grassroots legal development, the localization of disputes actually insulates the center from the backlash of national policy failures. China's leaders remain suspicious of efforts to undo this insulation. In February 2007, Luo Gan, a member of the Party Politburo Standing Committee, warned legal officials not to be swayed by “enemy forces” trying to use the legal system to Westernize and divide China, and by internal forces that denied the Party's leadership on legal matters. He reminded them that the “correct political position” is to be consistent with the Party.

Rising stakes of legal reform in China

Among the most important developments of the last year is the growing impact outside of China of its domestic problems of implementation. China's increased engagement with the world economy means that events within China have an increasing influence on China's neighbors and trading partners. Weak or ineffective implementation of law and policy directly impacted China's international relations during 2007. A series of unsafe exports underscored the ways a lack of government transparency and weak legal institutions can have sudden and serious consequences on distant shores. It became more evident than ever during 2007 that the rest of the world has a stake in improved governance in China.

Chinese and Western experts have taken note of China's use of diplomatic leverage and, in particular, of the way Chinese diplomacy in recent years has promoted a notion of national sovereignty that supplies China's leaders with a theoretical basis and rhetoric with which to resist international calls for improvement in its domestic human rights. Even if they may not all fall within the mandated scope of this Commission's work as understood in keeping with past precedent, these linkages form the backdrop against which some readers are likely to engage this report. Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have found China's international actions troubling--especially when they have included China's opposition to, or withholding of support for, global efforts to combat human rights atrocities or humanitarian abuses in other parts of the world. China's new-found global reach affords it an expanded array of levers through which to reward those overseas who support or remain silent on its domestic human rights abuses, while punishing those critical of these practices. China's role in the UN's new Human Rights Council, Uzbekistan's extradition of Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil to China rather than allowing him to return home, some of China's actions related to Sudan and Darfur, and China's campaign of pre-Olympics surveillance and intimidation of nongovernmental organization activists overseas may be understood, at least in part, in this context.

Even as the Commission highlights these areas of concern, China over the past year has issued a number of laws and regulations which have the potential to produce positive results if central and local government departments and Party officials prove their ability and willingness to implement them faithfully. Faced with popular anger over rampant corruption and abuse of power, China's procuracy has issued broad-ranging provisions, including, among others, July 2006 Provisions on the Criteria for Filing Criminal Cases of Dereliction of Duty Infringing Upon Rights, which directs procurators to prosecute a lengthy list of crimes of official abuse, including cases of torture and retaliation against petitioners. China in 2007 passed a long-awaited Labor Contract Law which, if fully implemented, could provide greater regularity and procedural protections in hiring, firing, workplace benefits, and safety. The Labor Contract Law was passed amid widespread worker anger over cases of unpaid wages. In April 2007, the State Council issued the Regulation on the Public Disclosure of Government Information, dubbed by some observers as China's first national “freedom of information” regulation. In order for this regulation to play an effective role, however, the government will have to clarify and limit the sphere of information considered “state secrets.'' Finally, in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games, Chinese authorities adopted looser restrictions on foreign journalists, and issued regulations on the protection of the mentally ill, which could represent an important first step away from the almost entirely arbitrary police detention of the past.

Full Text of the 2007 Annual Report (text/pdf).

Source: -See Summary (2007-10-11 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation

The Chinese government State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued legal measures on July 18, 2007, that if fully implemented could transform Tibetan Buddhism as it exists in China into a less substantial, more completely state-managed institution, and further isolate Tibetan Buddhist communities from their counterparts outside China. The "Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism" (MMR) (Web site of the SARA (in Chinese), 18 July 07) take effect on September 1. The MMR (ICT translation) would empower the Chinese Communist Party and government to gradually reshape Tibetan Buddhism by controlling one of the religion’s most unique and important features―lineages of teachers that Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations and that can span centuries. As elderly reincarnations pass away, the measures authorize government officials to decide whether or not a reincarnation is eligible to reincarnate, and if one is permitted, the government will supervise the search for the subsequent reincarnation, as well as religious education and training.

An August 3 SARA statement (Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily) describes the government objective as "an important move to institutionalize management on reincarnation of living Buddhas." A SARA official summarized political requirements of a reincarnation under Article 2 of the MMR: "The selection of reincarnates must preserve national unity and solidarity of all ethnic groups and the selection process cannot be influenced by any group or individual from outside the country." The remark refers to the Dalai Lama and other high-ranking Tibetan Buddhist teachers living in exile in India and elsewhere. This provision underscores how the MMR will further subordinate traditional Tibetan Buddhism to Party policy, and heighten the barrier between Tibetan Buddhists in China and their teachers and co-religionists living abroad.

The MMR establishes or expands government procedural control of the principal stages of identifying and educating reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teachers, including:

Determining whether or not a reincarnated teacher who passes away may be reincarnated again, and whether a monastery is entitled to have a reincarnated teacher in residence (Arts. 3-4).
Conducting a search for a reincarnation (Arts. 5-7).
Recognizing a reincarnation and obtaining government approval of the recognition (Arts. 4, 7-9).
Seating (installing) a reincarnation in a monastery (Art. 10).
Providing education and religious training for a reincarnation (Art. 12).

The measures provide for administrative or criminal punishment to individuals or offices that are responsible for a failure to comply with the measures, or that conduct activities pertaining to reincarnation without government authorization (Art. 11).

The MMR substantially expands the geographical reach of government oversight of reincarnation because the measures will be effective throughout China, not just in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where less than half of China's Tibetan Buddhists live (according to official census data, 2.43 million of the 5.42 million Tibetans in China were located in the TAR). Once the measures take effect, they will apply to every reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teacher who is recognized and seated in a monastery. Until now, the Chinese government has intervened only in the selection and installation of exceptionally important Tibetan Buddhist teachers. Most famously, China's State Council in 1995 installed a boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, as the 11th Panchen Lama after declaring the Dalai Lama’s recognition of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama to be "illegal and invalid." The government has approved only 30 Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations in the TAR in the period following 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled to India and the Party instituted "democratic reforms," according to a May 2004 State Council White Paper on "Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet," (Xinhua, 23 May 04). Since it is unlikely that any of the approvals occurred until the early 1980s, when the government began to allow Tibetans (and other Chinese citizens) to resume religious activity, the number of government-approved reincarnations in the TAR appears to have averaged less than two per year.

The number of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers who would be subject to the MMR is far higher. Incomplete information from official Chinese sources provides a reasonable basis to estimate that the total number of such teachers in the Tibetan areas of China probably exceeds 1,000, and could reach or surpass 2,000. The total number of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries probably exceeds 3,300, and each monastery hopes to have a reincarnated teacher in residence, although some monasteries have none and other monasteries have more than one. As current reincarnations pass away, government enforcement of the MMR may prevent Tibetans from searching for and recognizing some reincarnated teachers, and will subject permitted reincarnations to government regulation.

There are approximately 1,700 monasteries and nunneries and 46,000 monks and nuns in the TAR, according to the White Paper.
There are 655 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries and 21,000 monks and nuns in Qinghai province, according to statements by an official to a CECC staff delegation in 2003. Another official said that in Huangnan (Malho) TAP in Qinghai, there are 83 monasteries and nunneries and 116 reincarnations. (The Huangnan information suggests a ratio of about 1.4 monasteries and nunneries, or 32 monks and nuns, to each reincarnated teacher.)
There are 276 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries, about 10,000 monks and nuns, and 144 reincarnations in Gansu province, according to statements by an official to a CECC staff delegation in 2004. (The data suggests a ratio of about 1.9 monasteries and nunneries, or 69 monks and nuns, to each reincarnated teacher.)
There are 515 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries and about 38,000 monks and nuns in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in Sichuan province, according to an August 2005 report (in Chinese) available on the Web site of the Sichuan Province Party Committee Policy Research Office.
The figures above total 3,146 monasteries and nunneries and about 115,000 monks and nuns and do not include those in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture and Muli (Mili) Tibetan Autonomous County in Sichuan province, and Diqing (Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.

The MMR includes a provision that could empower authorities to eliminate, over time, all reincarnated teachers located in certain city areas, perhaps even Lhasa, which has the highest urban concentration of Tibetan Buddhist monks and reincarnated teachers anywhere in China. Article 4 disallows the recognition and seating of reincarnations within urban districts established by governments at the municipal level or higher if that government issues a local decree banning further reincarnations. (See the Web site of China Internet Information Center for a discussion of Chinese administrative divisions.) The Chengguan district under Lhasa municipality is the only urban district within the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. Two of the largest and most influential Tibetan monasteries, Drepung and Sera, are within Chengguan, as well as the two oldest Tibetan Buddhist temples, Jokhang and Ramoche, both of which maintain a resident monastic community. The CECC is not aware of a local government decree banning reincarnations in Chengguan, but the appearance of such language in the MMR may encourage such a ban in Lhasa, or in urban districts that are established in the future.

A partial precedent for the MMR exists in Articles 36-40 of the TAR Implementing Measures for the "Regulation on Religious Affairs" (TAR 2006 Measures), issued on September 19, 2006, by the TAR People’s Congress Standing Committee (CECC translation). But these measures, which took effect on January 1, 2007, provide fewer opportunities for the government to interfere in the reincarnation process than the new national measures do. For example, the MMR―unlike the TAR 2006 Measures―requires that "[a] majority of local religious believers and the monastery management organization [Democratic Management Committee (DMC)] must request the reincarnation." DMCs, charged by the Party and government to implement policies on religion, are unlikely to request a reincarnation that local officials oppose. Local authorities are also well-positioned to discourage "religious believers" from expressing their desire to maintain a reincarnation in a local monastery if that wish does not comport with Party and government preferences.

The government and Party claim historical legitimacy for seeking to assert control over the identification of very high-ranking Tibetan Buddhist incarnations (such as the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama) on the basis of an 18th century Qing Dynasty edict demanding that Tibetans draw a name from an urn in the presence of a Chinese imperial official (State Council White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China, Web site of the Embassy of China in the United States, 16 October 97). An article on the Web site of the government-run China Tibet Information Center explains that the Qing sought control over the "Grand Living Buddhas," but does not suggest that at any time the imperial court attempted to control the entire institution of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation.

The Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA), issued by the State Council in November 2004, draws on the Qing edict and mentions reincarnation in Article 27: "The succession of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism shall be conducted under the guidance of Buddhism bodies and in accordance with the religious rites and rituals and historical conventions" (translation available on the Web site of China Elections and Governance). The December 1991 TAR Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs (CECC translation) contain only one article referring to reincarnations (banning the involvement of "foreign forces"), a contrast with the MMR and TAR 2006 Measures that illustrate how recent measures make more elaborate use of the law to repress the freedom of religion.

See Section V(d), on Freedom of Religion, "Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists" of the CECC 2006 Annual Report for more information.

Source: -See Summary (2007-08-22 / Chinese / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-05-05
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