

Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Charles R. Holland

Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your joint assignments.

1. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Yes, the establishment of the unified and specified combatant commands, the delineation of responsibilities, and most importantly the focus on “jointness” outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have significantly enhanced the readiness and warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

2. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

I believe these reforms have been successfully implemented. CINCSOC works on a par with the other combatant commanders, is well established with the Joint Staff, and enjoys a high degree of cooperation with the Services. Largely as a result of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, today’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) are without equal.

3. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

I would say the most important reform is the clear direction regarding the chain of command from the National Command Authorities direct to the combatant commanders as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the well-defined responsibilities of the combatant commanders (particularly for CINCSOC) for the execution of missions and the preparedness of assigned forces. Additional reforms in the areas of strategic planning, joint doctrine, and joint professional military education have enhanced our focus on joint warfighting.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

4. Do you agree with these goals?

Most definitely. We now have truly joint, integrated U.S. fighting forces, who are under the undisputed command of a single theater commander and working from jointly developed and executable war plans. The increased authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has immeasurably improved the substance of the senior military advice to the Secretary of Defense. Since the enactment of the defense reforms, we've seen successful coordination and conduct of joint operations worldwide from the Gulf War, to Haiti, to the Balkans. Efforts must continue, however, toward improving the formulation of strategy; providing for even more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Recently, there have been articles that indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

5. Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a watershed that resulted in a profound improvement in the way the U.S. military organizes itself and executes its missions; however, it may be premature to amend Goldwater-Nichols. Recent experience has shown the Goldwater-Nichols Act to be the most important and timely act of law shaping the Defense establishment for the challenges we will face in the 21st century. As our recognition and understanding of the rapidly changing security environment of this new millennium and its attendant threats increase, so too has the recognition that our national strategy may need to change to meet those threats. The security environment is rife with threats that span the spectrum from low-technology threats, not sponsored by a nation or state, to extremely high technology, information-based threats. In all of these possible scenarios, the one element that will remain key is our ability to act quickly and decisively in support of national objectives. Often this will be prior to the unambiguous recognition of a crisis and most assuredly in an ambiguous political or politico-military environment. Key among the considerations in ensuring the ability of U.S. military forces to act swiftly and decisively is the increasing importance of military and U.S. Government (USG) inter-agency coordination. Additional reforms could expand on stressing and institutionalizing the roles, relationships and interactions between the USG interagency, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, in support of war plans and perhaps more importantly, emergent crises.

6. From the perspective you have gained in your previous assignments, particularly as Deputy Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, and as Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command, in particular, are appropriate?

I do. In the general sense, the combatant commanders now have the authority and the mechanisms to fully execute their warfighting responsibilities and to provide direct input to the Secretary of Defense as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe that the existing provisions of Title 10 ensure programming of resources and priorities for all of the combatant commanders. Specifically, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has worldwide mission responsibilities, so the entire range of authorities afforded USCINCSOC under the Nunn-Cohen amendment and other follow-on legislation, codified in Title 10 USC Section 167, are vital. For example, USSOCOM materiel needs vary greatly in terms of technological maturity and timeliness. The authority of USCINCSOC to acquire, operate, and sustain those materiel systems and equipment peculiar to Special Operations Forces (SOF) ensures SOF will continue to offer effective options relevant to the challenges faced by joint force commanders.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command, to the following offices:

7. The Under Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretaries of Defense were established to assist the Secretary of Defense in specific functional areas: Policy, Comptroller, Acquisition and Technology, and Personnel and Readiness. These Under Secretaries provide coordination and exchange of information with Department of Defense (DOD) components having collateral or related functions, which include the combatant commanders. Combatant Commanders are expected to respond and reciprocate, and I would anticipate frequent interaction with the Under Secretaries, particularly in the development of military policy and the acquisition process. The law requires that these coordinations are to be communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Title 10 USC, Section 138, establishes the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). He is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations (SO) and low intensity conflict (LIC) matters as well as the senior management official within DOD for SO/LIC. These responsibilities include the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of SO and LIC activities of DOD. While USSOCOM has the principal responsibility for the readiness and preparation of SOF in support of the regional CINCs, USSOCOM's ability to execute those missions would be greatly hindered without the

sound policies and oversight, interagency coordination, and advocacy provided by the ASD (SO/LIC). I believe that this civilian oversight enhances USSOCOM's ability to carry out its missions. The relationship provides a key source of advice and information to both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

9. The other Assistant Secretaries of Defense

Other than the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD) for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I), Public Affairs, and Legislative Affairs, all the other Assistant Secretaries fall under one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. As the ASD (C3I) and ASD/Legislative Affairs are the Secretary's principal deputies with overall supervision of C3I and legislative matters respectively, relations between them and USSOCOM would be conducted along the same lines as those discussed above regarding relations with the various Under Secretaries of Defense.

10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) responsibilities are clearly delineated in Title 10, Section 153. He serves as the principal military advisor to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The CJCS serves as an advisor but is not in the direct chain of command that runs from the NCA directly to the combatant commanders. However, there are provisions for the President to direct that communications between him and the Secretary of Defense be transmitted through the CJCS. This ensures the Chairman stays informed in order to execute his other responsibilities. I see it as a CINC's duty to work with and through -- but never around -- the Chairman in providing for the security of his command and execution of NCA-directed taskings.

11. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The functions of the Vice-Chairman are prescribed under Title 10, Section 154. The Vice-Chairman is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when the Chairman is absent, or disabled, the Vice-Chairman acts in his stead. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) responsibilities are delegated to the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). The VCJCS also regularly represents the Chairman on the Interagency Deputy's Committee, the Defense Acquisition Board, and other boards and councils as necessary. Thus, the VCJCS plays an essential role for the CJCS in fulfilling his principal military advisor obligations. Communication between a CINC and the VCJCS is as critical as it is with the CJCS.

12. The Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The combatant commanders are the single points of contact for providing U.S. military representation within their assigned theaters per the Unified Command Plan. As they assess matters, the CINCs are fully engaged in the interagency process. The Assistant to the Chairman has an extensive charter to represent the CJCS in the interagency process in the national capitol region. Although the Assistant to the Chairman has no responsibility to

report to combatant commanders, the Assistant shares valuable knowledge of the interagency process with the CINCs and is often called upon to do so. Personal matters of interest to the CJCS are also worked by the Assistant, which may require consultation with a combatant commander.

13. The Director of the Joint Staff

The Director of the Joint Staff has many significant responsibilities, which would result in frequent interaction with USSOCOM. The Director is typically the CJCS point of contact when soliciting input from all the CINCs in the development of a position on any key issue.

14. The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they provide to the combatant commands. The responsibilities are outlined in Title 10 USC, Section 165, which notes that the Secretaries are subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commander's authority over Service components including those forces assigned to him is clear, but requires close coordination with the Secretaries to ensure no infringement on those lawful responsibilities that the Service Secretary alone may discharge.

15. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

While the Service Chiefs are no longer in the chain of command, they do have two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no CINC can hope to ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces for NCA-directed missions. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs provide military advice to the NCA. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that every CINC can call upon; it would be a privilege to work with them. If confirmed as USCINCSOC, I intend to continue a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all the Services.

16. The other combatant commanders

I would look forward to close, mutual support and continued dialogue on key issues with the other combatant commanders, as well as frequent face-to-face contact. The combatant commanders define requirements for their respective areas of operational responsibility, an effort that assists USSOCOM in defining its support requirements. In my relationship with combatant commanders, I will foster an atmosphere of teamwork and complete trust, which I believe is critical to executing U.S. national policy and meeting the commanders' theater requirements.

Major Challenges

17. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command?

I believe USSOCOM supports our Nation's security and military strategies by providing trained and ready Special Operations Forces in support of the NCA, the regional unified and combatant commanders, and our U.S. Ambassadors and their country teams. Concurrently, we must develop a resourcing program designed to ensure the most effective Special Operations Forces are available to meet present day taskings, while funding critical acquisition and modernization programs designed to ensure force relevancy across the future operational continuum. In a time of constrained resources, the major challenges I see facing USSOCOM include the development of forward thinking, customer-oriented strategies that ensure the availability of mature and capable SOF resources.

18. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

USSOCOM must provide the NCA with a force capable of meeting the wide variety of threats, which demand the unique skills resident in SOF. For example, our number one core mission area is Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. As threats emerge, USSOCOM will carefully assess those threats and, as appropriate, provide an effective SOF solution through strategic planning, resourcing, acquisition and/or operational support initiatives. Equally important, the command will identify, through a strategic planning process, those missions no longer relevant for SOF and recommend shifting these missions to general purpose forces in order to better focus scarce MFP-11 resources on critical SOF mission areas.

Most Serious Problems

19. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command?

One of the greatest challenges faced by USCINCSOC, given the legislative responsibilities in Title 10, is the management of constrained MFP-11 resources to ensure SOF adequately address a balance among operational challenges, sustainment and modernization, as well as, research, development, and procurement.

20. What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

I am aware that USSOCOM has a mechanism in place referred to as the Strategic Planning Process, or the SPP. This management process interfaces with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System. Within the SPP are a series of key events that are ratified during scheduled Board of Director meetings, where critical decisions are made that move the process forward toward completion of a Program Objective Memorandum (POM). That process is designed to meet the challenges faced in a fiscally constrained environment; it also allows the commander to be a good steward of

the taxpayers' dollar. However, funding shortfalls are a serious challenge for USSOCOM-identified and validated requirements. One way to address these shortfalls is through a POM addendum. In USSOCOM's POM 2002-2007 submission, it became evident that the command's modernization accounts were declining from Fiscal Year 1995 through Fiscal Year 2007. A significant overguidance request has been submitted to OSD to meet those future modernization challenges. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts to address USSOCOM requirements.

Qualifications

Section 164 of title 10, United States Code, requires a Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command to have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a general officer.

21. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I believe my 32 years of experience and training qualify me for this position. I have served in a variety of special operations units since the early 1970s and numerous Joint Task Forces, which have relied upon the components of special operations as well as the Services. Two of these joint assignments have provided particularly useful experience for the position of CINCSOC.

During operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti, I was the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander in support of the overall task force under General Shelton. This position required enormous coordination and integration with all assets involved in the operation – ground, air, and maritime.

As the Commander of Special Operations Command – Pacific, I was in charge of the CINC's rapid reaction joint task force (among other duties). As such, I planned, coordinated, and prepared to execute numerous Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and counter-terrorism missions with special operations and general purpose forces (including Marine Corps MEU-SOCs).

The opportunity I had to interact with our U.S. Ambassadors was incredibly valuable, not only in advancing the mission at hand, but also in fostering a positive rapport for future interactions with subsequent U.S. representatives.

And, most significantly, from my assignment as the Deputy Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command, I became intimately familiar with the special operations capabilities of the other Services and the command's importance to this nation.

Lessons Learned

22. What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions within the special operations community?

The most important lesson I learned from my SOF assignments was the enduring nature of the SOF truths. These are:

- Humans are more important than hardware
 - Quality is better than quantity
 - SOF cannot be mass produced
 - Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur
- Another equally important lesson is the value of jointness. Being joint enables one to use the strengths that each Service has to provide and bring them all together.
- A final lesson learned is that one should never confuse enthusiasm for capability.

Transformation of Special Operations Forces

Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our armed forces, but most of that focus is on conventional forces.

23. Do our Special Operations Forces need to be transformed?

USSOCOM faces an operational environment characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid technological advancement, evolving threats, constrained resources, and potential new roles. These factors require innovative thinking if we are to provide the widest array of options in protecting America's interests. "Business as usual" will not provide the capabilities we need to deal with the transnational and asymmetric opponents of tomorrow.

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change. Guided by a comprehensive, enduring vision and supporting goals, USSOCOM must constantly reshape itself to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. This reality means that USSOCOM must embrace change and develop processes that allow SOF to move closer to a highly flexible and technologically savvy vision. During this journey, only SOF's core values are permanent and non-negotiable. Everything else--the organization, force structure, platforms, equipment, and missions--must continuously evolve to meet the needs of the nation, enable the capabilities of general-purpose forces, and seize the opportunities brought about by change.

24. If so, what is your vision for a transformation of these forces?

If confirmed, my vision will be to ensure USSOCOM provides the most capable and relevant Special Operations Forces in existence while upholding standards of personal and professional excellence. To be relevant in the future, Special Operation Forces must continue a transformation, while maintaining the readiness required to shape and respond to the world today. Special Operation Forces need to anticipate trends and future scenarios, conditioning themselves not to be "surprised by surprise." As new threats arise, SOF must decide which current capabilities to retain or modify, which new ones to develop, and which old ones to discard.

SOF must focus on emerging threats that either exceed the capabilities of general purpose forces or can be dealt with better by small, highly-specialized units. They must carefully assess those threats and, as appropriate, provide an effective solution through strategic planning, resourcing, acquisition, and operational support initiatives. Equally as important, SOF must identify those missions no longer relevant for SOF and recommend

shifting these missions to the general-purpose forces to better focus resources on critical special operations activities.

SOF must be unique full-spectrum, multi-mission forces, who provide a comprehensive set of capabilities to the nation. This means they must swiftly adapt to diverse and evolving threats from less technologically advanced adversaries to peer competitors. They must continue to operate effectively in joint, combined, and interagency environments. They must transcend these traditional parameters to fuse all of America's political, military, economic, intellectual, technical, and cultural strengths into a comprehensive approach to future challenges. SOF's future will tap into such diverse areas as commercial information technologies, utilization of space, biomedicine, environmental science, robotics, organizational design, and commercial research and development.

The 21st century SOF warrior--selectively recruited, mature, and superbly trained and led--will remain the key to success in special operations. These warriors must be proficient in core competencies and train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. SOF must be capable of conducting strategic operations in tactical environments by combining a warrior ethos with language proficiency, cultural awareness, political sensitivity, and the ability to use Information Age technology. They must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative, useful solutions to ambiguous problems and provide a coherent set of choices to the supported CINC or Joint Force Commander--more often like Sun Tzu, less like Clausewitz. In other words, we must train and educate people *how* to think not just what to think.

I am aware that USSOCOM has established a Future Concepts Working Group (FCWG) to assist in this transformation. The FCWG provides the primary mechanism to link the Strategic Planning Process (SPP) to SOF's Vision 2020. While the SPP focuses on the next POM cycle, it does not look beyond the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) window. The FCWG provides a process to focus on the years between the FYDP and SOF Vision 2020 to develop the new concepts needed to transform SOF for the future.

25. What are the resource implications of this vision?

I believe there are two developments that place SOF at a critical crossroads for the future. I understand that USSOCOM was forced to constrain its current readiness accounts in POM 2002-2007 for the very first time. This disturbing trend prompted correspondence to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD Staff for funding assistance.

The initial acquisition concept for SOF was to take existing Service developed equipment and modify it for special operations use. Over time, SOF acquisition has had to evolve to meet the ever-increasing demands of the warfighting CINCs and Ambassadors around the world. SOF now must develop and procure or enhance major platforms to meet the operational and strategic requirements placed on the Command. The good news is that SOF are better equipped than ever before and the Services are adopting systems that USSOCOM has developed. The downside is this approach greatly increases the cost of SOF acquisition, which is above and beyond the original scope for which USSOCOM's funding (Major Force Program-11) was designed.

I am concerned about the potential future impacts to USSOCOM capabilities if the downward trend in modernization is not arrested. Like the Services, USSOCOM is facing

the strain of replacing aging platforms. However, unlike the Services, USSOCOM's small budget lacks the flexibility to absorb the large cost increases involved in such modernization efforts. In the past, Congress has recognized this reality and has been extremely supportive in ensuring USSOCOM had the necessary resources to keep SOF relevant.

26. Are the Special Operations Command and the Department of Defense investing in the technologies to realize this vision?

I am aware that USSOCOM has a small technology program that depends on leveraging the Services and government laboratory efforts. USSOCOM is developing technology objectives to help focus the efforts of others on SOF's needs. USSOCOM will continue to aggressively harvest technologies that will provide high-payoff capabilities to address the changing and uncertain challenges that lie ahead. A tool kit of capabilities, one that uses state-of-the-art technologies, will keep SOF flexible and relevant in the future.

Recruiting and Retention

During the last few years, all of the military services have been experiencing increasing difficulty recruiting and retaining enlisted personnel and junior officers. Because SOCOM draws on each of the departments for personnel management, your success or difficulty in retaining special operations personnel is not apparent from the overall service statistics. In fact, for the past several years, the Navy SEAL community has faced a particularly difficult junior officer retention problem.

27. How successful has SOCOM been in retaining the personnel it needs to assure readiness?

Retention among the USSOCOM components has historically met or exceeded the Service averages. For Fiscal Year 2000, retention rates among enlisted SEALs have been significantly higher than in previous years; rates for enlisted aircrew and special tactics members in Air Force special operations remain relatively healthy; and, retention rates within the two most critical Army special operations MOSs (Psychological Operations and Special Forces) are very healthy. Increases in base pay and Selective Re-enlistment Bonuses (SRB) and the elimination of restrictions on the number of Hazardous Duty Pays a member can receive have had very positive impacts on retention.

I understand that the SEAL Officer Continuation Pay has been a tremendous success. Their goal was to get 104 of 140 eligible officers under contract. To date, 112 officers have accepted the offer with more becoming eligible by the close of this fiscal year. While the Air Force's pilot pipeline is producing at maximum capacity, separation rates show that AFSOC and Air Force lost more pilots than they produced from Fiscal Year 1998-2000. The monetary increases in Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) for Fiscal Year 2000 have had positive effects on pilot retention. Although there are shortfalls in pilot manning, front line operational units are prioritized for 100 percent manning with shortfalls in staff manning.

28. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the SOCOM community?

I would view OPTEMPO, in conjunction with a robust economy, as the biggest challenge for all USSOCOM communities. Numerous deployments and time away from home increase stress on families. SOF members are finding civilian job opportunities more abundant and attractive due to comparable compensation without the added stresses of family separation.

For SEAL officers, continued shortages in the grades of O-4 to O-6 continue as the full effect of two years of high Lieutenant (O-3) separations are felt throughout the system. For AFSOC, retaining experienced pilots and navigators is the biggest challenge. Despite ACP, the inventory of experienced company grade pilots is still decreasing. The combined effects of low pilot retention and low navigator production for the last four years mean a greater dependence upon undergraduate pilot and navigator training, which fill authorizations but result in a younger and less experienced rated force.

For enlisted members the biggest challenge appears to be the ability to get sufficient high-quality candidates into basic SOF initial training courses to graduate the numbers required to sustain the force. High attrition rates and lean recruiting have hampered these areas for a number of years. I understand all of the components are in the process of reviewing their respective training curricula with the intent of decreasing attrition rates without compromising standards.

29. Specifically, what is the status of the efforts to increase retention among the Navy SEAL officers?

I understand the SEAL Officer Continuation Pay (OCP) has been a positive factor in retaining our SEAL officers. After two successive years of near-double historic separation rates for O-3s, SEAL officer retention rates for the last two years have returned to near historic levels. Continuation pay, as well as other community initiatives including SEAL representatives on all statutory promotion boards, selection of their own unit commanding officers and executive officers, expanded post-graduate education opportunities, and fewer non-operational tours have led to increased retention among junior officers.

Special Operations Aviation units have the most highly trained and proficient pilots in our military.

30. What impact is the demand for pilots by the airlines and the high operational tempo having on pilot retention within Special Operations Command?

Pilot retention is an Air Force-wide concern. It is a serious problem, and I know the Air Force is aggressively pursuing solutions, which include recently approved bonus programs.

As AFSOC draws its pilots from the Air Force, they are particularly impacted by this challenge. If confirmed, I will continue to closely monitor the impact of pilot retention and PERSTEMPO to ensure USSOCOM will accomplish its missions. Army Special Operations rotary-wing pilots have been largely unaffected by the demand of the

airlines and OPTEMPO does not seem to have affected retention. However, there is concern about the diminished recruiting base, which has resulted from Army downsizing.

31. What, if any, suggestions do you have to increase the retention of these precious resources?

Competitive pay and allowances, fair retirement, accessible quality medical care, and suitable housing are core elements to sustaining a quality force. Recent congressional efforts in passing comprehensive legislation for base pay increases, pay table reform, and retirement reform this past year sent a positive signal to service members and their families. Continued attention in these areas ensures sustainment of a quality force to support operational capability.

I firmly believe that the military recruits the member, but retains the family. Across DOD, when it comes to retaining the service member, the family plays a more important role in the decision than in years past. Providing predictability in people's lives and enhancing their quality of life will be the primary factors in retaining our personnel.

CV-22

The CV-22 will bring great new capabilities to the special operations community. The V-22 has had some serious incidents in the past year and its cost continues to rise.

32. Do you have concerns about the fielding of CV-22 to AFSOC and the special operations community?

As you know, no program is ever without concerns. Despite the recent mishap and cost issues, I know that USSOCOM remains totally committed to the fielding of all 50 CV-22s, which is the absolute minimum necessary to meet SOF requirements. The mishap analysis found nothing wrong with the platform. Therefore, I would not expect the mishap to significantly impact CV-22 fielding. It is critical for SOF to obtain the performance found in this platform. The current inventory of special operations aircraft lacks the self-deployment capability and performance required to maximize our success for assigned missions, such as infiltration or exfiltration within a single period of darkness. The CV-22's high speed, range, survivability, low-altitude adverse weather capability, and ability to land almost anywhere make this tilt-rotor aircraft a critical mobility platform for us.

33. Will the rising cost of the CV-22 have a significant impact on SOCOM either in terms of number of aircraft, fielding schedule, or impact on other programs?

I am sure it will have an impact, but SOF are doing what is necessary to minimize its significance. Unfortunately, this is essentially a budget-driven issue as there were not sufficient funds out to Fiscal Year 2007 to maintain the planned production profile. USSOCOM is doing what is required within the current force structure and budget to minimize the risks associated with stretching out the completion of CV-22 deliveries from 2009 to 2012. They have kept initial deliveries in the same fiscal year as previously scheduled. They have also focused on maintaining the inherent capabilities of the CV-22.

Other aircraft platforms will temporarily cover parts of the mission as planned during the CV-22 transition. They will deploy CV-22 squadrons on the original timeline and fill these squadrons to full strength as additional platforms become available. Deliveries should allow an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of mid-Fiscal Year 2005, which equates to a six-month slip.

Joint Experience

SOCOM has always been an Army-dominated command because of the size of the Army component --- Army Special Forces, Army Rangers, and Army aviation support. If confirmed, you will be the first non-Army Commander-in-Chief of the United States Special Operations Command.

34. In your opinion, do you have sufficient joint experience to deal with the integration of services within Special Operations Command?

I do. As I noted in the question relating to my experience and background, I have worked in special operations assignments since the early 1970s. In fact, during my first assignment, I was upgraded to a Special Air Warfare mission qualified pilot on tactical airlift C-130s, followed by a Southeast Asia tour in AC-130 gunships where I flew 79 combat missions. Both of these assignments required close coordination with Special Operations Forces – before joint operations were the norm. I worked with the special operations community again while in Europe as the Airdrop Planning Officer for Army Special Forces units.

In all six of my command positions, I have planned, directed, and operated with Army, Navy, and, of course, Air Force Special Operations Forces.

My experiences in the Pacific and European Theaters, Haiti, and other large-scale exercises have provided a solid background in joint and combined operations.

35. What challenges will this present to you as the new leader of SOCOM?

I can recall conversations with former CINCSOCs about a long-range plan to develop senior leaders from each of the Services. The pervading rationale was to provide an opportunity for each Service to compete for the position of CINCSOC.

The very nature of special operations is joint and my credentials as a SOF warfighter are well accepted; in other words, I believe my background is broad enough to command multi-service forces and is in line with the command's on-going leadership development opportunities—opportunities which would bring that long-range plan of the Goldwater-Nichols Act into reality for all of USSOCOM's Service components.

Threats to National Security

36. As you ponder the threats to our national security from your perspective as the next CINC, SOCOM, what worries you most?

I worry most about the ability to effectively respond to unconventional use of force. The future operating environment for SOF will consist of more conflicts and fewer wars. These conflicts are likely to involve forces using unconventional methods to overcome superior U.S. military capabilities. I am concerned about threats involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and the use of information operations against U.S. interests.

The proliferation of WMD is my number one concern. The unchecked spread of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons threatens not only U.S. facilities worldwide but also impacts regional stability. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria have active WMD programs aided primarily by Russia and China. The threat from biological attack is growing due to a relatively large number of experts throughout the world capable of developing and manufacturing biological agents and the low cost of producing many agents. Similarly, chemical weapons, while formally checked by the Chemical Weapons Convention, remain in the inventories of many countries. Expansion of dual-use fertilizer and pesticide facilities in rogue countries increases the specter of CW production and weaponization outside of international controls. Additionally, we know that terrorist groups are attempting to procure or develop both chemical and biological weapons.

Nuclear weapons proliferation is also monitored by international convention, but clandestine and criminal movement of such weapons from the former Soviet Union can potentially deliver a nuclear warhead to a group having the will and the resources to obtain one.

In addition, we're seeing that many states in the WMD development business are moving their WMD infrastructure underground into hardened, deeply buried tunnels. Placing these facilities underground makes intelligence collection or attack against them extremely difficult.

In terrorism, we have seen increasing sophistication of weapons, communications, and denial and deception. I am aware that today there are 28 identified terrorist organizations that are diverse, well trained, well equipped, and capable. Modern terrorist groups operate more like a matrix-managed business than separate organizations. In a review of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa, we saw planning in Afghanistan, a sophisticated, well-hidden logistic network throughout Africa, and an operations team that included radical Islamic terrorists from several countries. Their communications were by cellular telephones and couriers, and their operations were highly compartmented. Future terrorist acts will likely follow similar patterns.

While terrorists continue to use improvised weapons, explosives, and other traditional attack mechanisms, their interest in WMD cannot be denied. Usama bin Ladin's Al Qaida organization perhaps leads worldwide efforts to obtain and use WMD. Today, we know that terrorists seek to use WMD. Therefore we must ensure that we have effective methods to prevent or respond to such attacks.

While terrorists have focused their previous attacks primarily on U.S. facilities overseas, the threat of an attack on U.S. soil cannot be discounted. Additionally, terrorists' increasing awareness of our intelligence collection capabilities will challenge us to expend more resources to monitor worldwide terrorist organizations' capabilities and identify their intents.

The global information infrastructure is central to our national security and a goal

of Joint Vision 2020 is information superiority. While our information infrastructure provides us great strength, it also presents a great vulnerability. The exploitation and penetration of U.S. government network systems – both classified and unclassified – has become a priority task for many foreign governments. Unclassified networks and databases can be contaminated or their use denied. While there has been considerable publicity surrounding criminal hacking into commercial networks and Internet sites, we know that foreign governments, terrorist groups, and individuals are probing for weaknesses they can exploit immediately or at a later date. Our increasing reliance on commercial systems and backbones opens us up to potential exploitation. We now know that there is a considerable foreign intelligence service and terrorist presence on-line, one that is targeting our information technology-based systems.

In summary, the worldwide threats to U.S. interests now are less easily defined, more unpredictable, and can cause more damage than traditional threats. Weapons of mass destruction threaten society itself. Terrorism threatens the stability of individual governments as well. Information warfare targeted against our digital infrastructure threatens our military readiness, economy, and our ability to seek and maintain information superiority. U.S. Special Operations Command with its global mission remains key in defending against these threats.

Joint Vision 2020

Joint Vision 2020 calls for networked based information sharing systems to assure information dominance and decision dominance.

37. Are you satisfied that SOCOM is doing everything necessary to ensure seamless integration and interoperability with conventional forces and supported commands?

I am confident that USSOCOM is aggressively implementing the tenants of Joint Vision 2020. Under the guidance of the last few CINCs, USSOCOM implemented quality improvements to its networks, communications platforms, and SOF peculiar applications and architectures.

USSOCOM runs a command-wide network known as SCAMPI (Secure Conferencing Access with Multicast Protocols for the Internet), which provides connectivity down to the field officer command level within its Service components, JSOC, and theater Special Operations Commands. SCAMPI has both a garrison and deployed capability. It is also a model of interoperability -- it uses commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and exclusively employs the Defense Information Systems Network for connectivity between sites. This capability gives SOF the ability to extend all of the Defense Information Infrastructure capabilities today including Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRnet), Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet), the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS), Defense Switch Network (DSN), Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN), etc., to any deployed location.

By nature of its mission and employment of forces, Special Operation Forces need to ensure interoperability with all Services in all theaters of operations. Under its Title 10 responsibilities, the command has developed and employed various communications

platforms built with interoperability as their key performance criterion. Because of this, USSOCOM systems are built to ensure they can interoperate with all Service systems and are often more capable than Service developed platforms.

In order to exchange information seamlessly with general purpose forces and the supported CINCs, USSOCOM has ensured that it uses all the standard applications needed; however, it is still possible to find unique systems used by theaters or Services which hinder interoperability. Some of these applications have been packaged into SOF "suites" --- such as the Special Operations Command Research Analysis and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES) --- but when peeled back, you will find that SOCRATES is really the standard intelligence applications found on JWICS. In addition, USSOCOM uses Global Command and Control System (GCCS), Global Combat Support System (GCSS) and the Defense Message System (DMS) suites of applications. USSOCOM's components also use the DOD standard package, or perhaps when required the Service specific derivation such as GCCS-A in the case of USASOC. Development of future systems, such as mission planning or simulation systems, has been planned with rapid, seamless information exchange in mind.

Finally, USSOCOM developed systems are based on DOD architectures and standards to ensure they have the ability to interoperate with general purpose forces. The current SOF Information Enterprise (SIE) has a direct link to the DOD Global Information Grid (GIG). The USSOCOM Acquisition Executive and the Command's Chief Information Officer have ensured that all USSOCOM information technology programs are Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) compliant or have established plans to bring non-compliant programs into compliance. Even in those cases where we need to run closed systems, we do so by leveraging the DISN (Defense Information Systems Network) paths provided by DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency) but with an increased level of encryption and protection necessary to support mission accomplishment. Thus, these units still maintain access to all common user systems and maintain good interoperability within the theater of operation.

Combating Terrorism

If confirmed, you will play an integral role in the Department's combating terrorism mission.

38. Which Department of Defense official provides the primary civilian oversight with regard to SOCOM's combating terrorism mission?

In accordance with DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, through the DOD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee Subcommittees "... provides policy oversight and guidance to DOD Components in support of respective antiterrorism and counterterrorism program efforts." (That directive also changes the name of the DOD Combating Terrorism Program to the DOD AT/FP Program.)

39. Who are other Department of Defense officials with whom you would most

interact in fulfilling SOCOM's combating terrorism mission?

As a functional CINC, I would interact directly with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate any emergent, unforeseen AT/FP requirements that MFP-11 or the Services could not fund. Through my representative to the DOD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee, I would interact with representatives from the Service Secretaries; the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Comptroller, and Acquisition and Technology; the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Force Management Policy, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs; the DOD General Counsel and Inspector General; the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; and the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and Defense Security Cooperation Agency. As a combatant commander, I would again coordinate directly through the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense for any deployments of Special Operations Forces under Title 10.

Civil Affairs Units

The increased role of the United States in humanitarian and peace keeping missions throughout the world has stressed the Special Operations Command, in particular the civil affairs units, most of which are in the Army Reserve.

40. If the current high operational tempo continues, would it be advisable to increase the number of civil affairs units?

I understand USSOCOM's Program Objective Memorandum for Fiscal Year 2002-2007 was submitted to OSD in May 2000, which included adding four additional Reserve Component Civil Affairs (CA) battalions with associated manpower to USSOCOM's force structure. These additions were in response to a concern by the Joint Staff, USSOCOM and the U.S. Army that there were insufficient Civil Affairs units to meet both wartime and peacetime requirements. USSOCOM, at the request of Joint Staff, conducted a study to determine the adequacy of the current CA force to meet requirements. The results were the addition of the four Reserve CA units and additional Active Component personnel to the single Active Component CA battalion. At present, based on current and projected requirements for CA support, these additions to the CA force should meet requirements and alleviate excessive personnel or operational TEMPO. Thus, no additional Reserve CA force structure is required at this time.

41. If so, should the increase be in the active Army or the Army Reserve and why?

Both. I understand the Chairman approved increasing the active component by a battalion, which will double the number of deployable teams. That increase improves USSOCOM's ability to respond to short-term CA needs. Most Army reserve units also will receive a personnel increase and additional units are forming. The USAR CA increase amounts to about 1,100 troops.

42. What impact has the high operational tempo had on recruiting and retention in

reserve civil affairs units?

I understand USASOC has achieved its USAR recruiting goals for the last five years, and retention has remained within the goals during that time as well. I would expect these trends to continue.

43. What impact has it had on Employee/ Employers relations?

Employers appear to understand the provisions of Presidential Reserve Call-up and they support reservists. My concern would be to ensure that the Special Operations community manages the use of reservists carefully so that USSOCOM would not create an unsustainable burden on employers.

Military Construction

Special Operations units routinely are tenant units on military installations and rely on the host service to provide troop housing and other quality of life support. There have been concerns raised that the special operations units do not receive adequate support and lag behind in barracks upgrades and other quality of life facilities.

44. Is this perception based on fact?

I know USSOCOM continually monitors the level of facility support received from the Services. I believe the level is consistent with that provided to the Services' other troops. Specifically, barracks construction and renovation for SOF at Air Force installations is equal to that provided to all airmen. The Army has an aggressive campaign, the Whole Barracks Renewal Program (WBRP), to bring all its unaccompanied housing up to current standards. This program is scheduled for completion by Fiscal Year 2008. Following a "fix the worst first" priority system, SOF barracks requirements are firmly embedded in the Army's program. The status of SOF WBRP projects varies from recently completed, to under construction, to programmed for near term or out year construction. The priority of SOF barracks is in line with the overall Army program. Barracks provided to the SEALs and other Naval Special Warfare Command sailors compares favorably with barracks for other sailors.

45. Would you advocate the SOCOM's military construction budget include funding for barracks construction?

No, I would advise against USSOCOM including barracks in their military construction program. MFP-11 should continue to focus Military Construction on SOF unique missions and direct support requirements.

46. If not, why not?

As a unified combatant command, USSOCOM's principal function is to train and prepare Special Operations Forces to carry out their assigned missions. The authority that

established USSOCOM allowed the command to program for acquisition of specific material, supplies or services for Special Operations Forces. SOF budgets for its own operations, training, equipment maintenance, and storage facilities--each specific to the training or operational requirements of that mission. There is nothing specific about unaccompanied troop housing or common support facilities that would justify the inclusion of such projects in the USSOCOM MFP-11 budget. The military departments, as part of their overall support responsibilities, should meet SOF's requirement for common support facilities.

The level of common support facility backing from the Services meets the needs of USSOCOM. I would suggest we maintain this arrangement so the SOF budget can continue to concentrate on mission support facilities.

Joint Combined Exchange Training

A couple of years ago there were a number of articles about the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program of the Special Operations Command. Those articles portrayed a program that was out of control, lacked appropriate civilian oversight, and engaged in the military training of individuals who were known to have committed human rights abuses. However, the Department of Defense, while acknowledging some problems, challenged the accuracy of these reports. The Congress enacted legislation to ensure that this program would not be used to engage in inappropriate activities and that it received the appropriate level of civilian oversight.

47. Please outline the current status of the JCET program including:

- The extent to which this program enhances SOCOM readiness by providing varied training opportunities,**
- The extent to which this program enhances the Regional CINCs' engagement strategy,**
- The extent to which this program enhances mil-to-mil contacts between U.S. and foreign military forces thereby fostering greater understanding and cooperation between the U.S. and officials from other nations,**
- A comparison of the extent to which the activities of this program in Africa, and the extent to which the activities of this program in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, enhance U.S. national security.**
- Those actions that the Department has taken to ensure that this program does not engage in the training of individuals who have committed gross violations of human rights according to any credible information that has been received by the Secretary of Defense.**

The USSOCOM Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program is one of the cornerstones of SOF training. The training gained during one of these events ensures SOF remain viable for response to short notice deployments and contingency operations worldwide. The ability to train with a host nation in-country simply cannot be replicated. SOF have the strategic flexibility to deploy anywhere in the world. This flexibility is only possible by having intelligent, mature and resourceful personnel, with cross-cultural

communications skills. These skills are gained only from conducting training with host nation forces. Also, SOF must be able to successfully interact with U.S. Embassy country teams, non-governmental agencies, U.S. and foreign governments and military officials. The JCET program requires SOF to work in foreign cultures--speaking the native language and working closely with host nations' security forces and our own embassies. The JCET program, with its unique environment, ensures SOF remain relevant to the needs of U.S. Ambassadors and the National Command Authorities.

The JCET program is a wonderful tool for the regional CINCs. SOF can engage a foreign nation with a low-visibility, low-density force that supports the Regional Commander in Chief's engagement strategy. DOD policy states that JCET are to be paid for with MFP-11 funds, so, the Regional Commander in Chief gets the engagement without any associated costs. USSOCOM coordinates with the Regional CINCs and train with the host nation force when it supports the Regional Commander in Chief's engagement strategy. I want to ensure that one thing is clearly understood. The JCET program's primary purpose is to train SOF. But at no time will we conduct a JCET exercise that runs counter to his strategy or to the American Embassy objectives in country.

During the conduct of a JCET exercise, SOF forces work hand in hand with foreign security forces. As such, USSOCOM has the opportunity to influence how the foreign force views the United States military and the U.S. Government. The SOF operators show, through words and actions, the benefits of a democratic system of government in which the military is subordinate to its civilian leaders. With the United States' increasing involvement in multinational operations, the contacts we gain during JCET exercises help build mutual trust, open lines of communications, and enhance interoperability with host nations. I know many people within government and outside government are concerned about the possibility of the forces we train with violating the human rights of others. SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen can ease these concerns. The CINCSOC policy is to build human rights themes into each JCET exercise. If confirmed, I will continue this policy.

The JCET program enhances the national security of the U.S. in several ways. First, the operators become familiar with host nations' cultures, languages and, in many cases, the military leadership of these countries. This can only help if SOF are called on to deploy to a nation in which we have conducted JCET exercises. You will often hear the term "global scouts" associated with SOF warriors. As stated earlier, the SOF operator on the ground also has the chance to influence the host nation's military force in positive ways. Through his actions, the operator gives the host nation a positive example of what soldiers, sailors, and airmen can accomplish in a democratic society. The JCET program is one of the important ways by which SOF remain out front and capable of conducting missions large and small when called on to do so at short notice.

Leahy legislation ensures SOF do not train with known violators of human rights. Section 8098 in the Fiscal Year 2000 DOD Appropriations Act restricts SOF from conducting a training event with the host nation if the Department of State finds there is credible information of gross violations of human rights by the unit U.S. military forces intend to train with. This law is applicable not only to JCETs, but to any DOD-funded training. The Department of Defense published guidance in the December 1999 Joint Staff message that is very explicit in identifying and assigning responsibilities for the vetting of

host nation forces for human rights violations. To reiterate, USSOCOM took steps beyond what is required in the law. U.S. SOF forces are required to conduct human rights awareness training prior to their deployment, and they also include human rights themes into the training syllabus. I agree with the prohibitions in the Leahy Laws as they ensure we serve America's larger interests in the world and ensure we are advancing the President's national security objectives.

Readiness and OPTEMPO

Over the past several years, we have heard a number of reports that the pace of operations, largely the result of numerous contingencies, has had a dramatic impact on the readiness of the military services as equipment is worn out, training is postponed, personnel depart the service because of family concerns with OPTEMPO, and funding is diverted from normal readiness accounts to pay for the cost of these operations. Special Operations Forces are often heavily involved in these operations and have reportedly experienced some of the same results as other military units.

48. To what extent has the pace of operations in recent years had an impact upon USSOCOM's readiness, retention, and resources?

While OPTEMPO concerns on the whole are being addressed within both Services' and USSOCOM's strategic planning, USSOCOM has continued to experience high, long-term OPTEMPO for certain personnel specialties and key pieces of equipment. In particular, Civil Affairs units, most of which reside in the Reserve Component, Special Forces units, aerial refueling assets, and forces involved in Combat Search and Rescue have continued to operate at a very high OPTEMPO with little relief in sight.

The command has made progress in mitigating OPTEMPO by rotating high demand forces that support these operations, however the specialized nature and theater orientation of SOF make this a difficult challenge as well. As noted earlier, USSOCOM will add additional personnel to the active component Civil Affairs force to address CA shortages. Through these and other efforts, the Command has helped offset the negative effects of the high OPTEMPO. Nevertheless, high OPTEMPO has a long-term detrimental effect on readiness by degrading training, quality of life, and eventually recruiting and retention.

Meanwhile, USSOCOM has been busy squeezing the greatest degree of readiness possible out of MFP-11 funding. USSOCOM monitors its organizational structure to ensure the forces are properly aligned to execute the tasks assigned. The command is building on the innovations made in acquisition, resourcing, and the relations within the Department of Defense and other government agencies. By carefully managing risks USSOCOM can afford the leading edge technology that will give tomorrow's special operators the capability they will need to remain relevant.

Current mission capable rates for the Command, in the aggregate, exceed the goals established by the component commanders to meet both operational and training requirements, which was not always the case.

Several factors contributed to the improvements in mission capable rates. First, all levels of the Command and supporting logistical activities carefully monitored mission capable

rates. Second, the fielding of several new systems to the component commands over the past few years replaced Vietnam-vintage systems and equipment. Third, continued reengineering and acquisition reform efforts allowed USSOCOM to implement best business practices. Fourth, reporting mechanisms such as Joint Monthly Readiness Reporting, although imperfect, have improved readiness awareness. Finally, USSOCOM was better able to influence mission capable rates through Major Force Program 11 investments.

This final factor underscores the benefits of the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command with budget and acquisition authority independent of those of the Services. These benefits become clearer each year. If confirmed, I plan to leverage these benefits through continuation of the reengineering efforts across all areas, particularly those impacting readiness rates and standards.

49. What actions can be taken to reduce any negative impacts?

I understand USSOCOM is aggressively managing four specific areas that will reduce negative impacts in the long run. These areas include force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability, and infrastructure.

I am sure these actions will facilitate the development of an even more responsive and ready force in the future and should serve to diminish any negative impacts due to changes in readiness and resource availability. If confirmed, I will put full effort into making visible progress in force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability, and infrastructure.

Anthrax Vaccination

50. Have you received any of the series of anthrax vaccinations?

Yes, I have had all six shots in the vaccination series and will continue the annual booster shot.

51. If not, why not? And would you be willing to begin the vaccination protocol before you are confirmed?

Not applicable.

52. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure the confidence of the force in the safety and necessity of the anthrax vaccine?

The anthrax vaccine has an extremely well proven track record of safety. It has been used for 30 years on hundreds of thousands of Americans at risk of anthrax infection, including our own Service members. Our medical community has demonstrated that it is very effective, even after receiving only three of the six doses in the series. While it is as good or better than many other vaccines, it does not guarantee 100 percent protection. But in concert with the gas mask, the anthrax vaccination is absolutely the best protection we presently have against this known biological warfare agent. We would be remiss if we did not take all possible measures to protect the health of our troops.

There are many information sources (literature and online websites) available

within the DOD for military personnel to access and address concerns about the vaccine itself -- including a site for personal questions. Unfortunately, there are also plentiful non-objective websites, which are promulgating unproven rumors about harmful side effects of the vaccine (everything from causing sterility to genetic alterations, which can be passed to our children). Extensive research and scrutiny have shown that this vaccine is safe. To be effective, the anthrax vaccination program must be a Commander's program, with Commander's emphasis on educating personnel on the facts and dispelling rumors and myths. If confirmed, I plan to lead the way in an active anthrax vaccination program for SOF.

Micro-management

A survey of almost 2500 young officers last fall found that only about one-third intend to make a career of the military and that those planning to leave are disgruntled about “micro-management “, heavy workloads while in port, and a “zero defects mentality” among their superiors.

53. What is your assessment of these findings?

I am aware of personnel departing due to greater financial rewards and opportunities for family stability in the civilian sector, but I do not have the sense that there is a larger exodus of disgruntled, micro-managed personnel. The Department and the Services have been working to reduce the OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO so that personnel are home more frequently and are deployed on a more predictable schedule.

As for a “zero defects” mentality, one must never forget the seriousness of our mission or the peril U.S. Armed Forces face on a daily basis. There is little margin for error when charged with the responsibility of lives or national security. We must balance the reality that good people err from time to time with the need to police ourselves and maintain the trust and confidence of the American people.

Overall, special operations personnel enjoy a solid rate of retention and recruitment, and I believe this is because they do worthy work and can take great pride in their contributions to our nation.

54. If you agree with the findings, what actions do you plan to correct these concerns?

If confirmed, I will continue to champion those initiatives by working with the Services and carefully monitor personnel retention to make sure we hold on to our most valuable resource --- our people.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

55. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this

Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

56. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

57. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command?

Yes.

58. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.