VI. Tibet

Introduction | The Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama | Autonomy | Culture, Development, and Demography | Tibetan Culture and Human Rights

FINDINGS

• The Dalai Lama has said that he does not seek independence and aims for a solution based on Tibetan autonomy within China. But Chinese leaders do not seem to recognize the benefits of moving forward in the dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his envoys. Chinese laws on regional ethnic autonomy contain provisions that could benefit Tibetans and their culture, but poor government implementation of these laws largely negates their potential value.
• Chinese government statistics suggest that Tibetans are not yet prepared to compete in the economic and ethnic environment created by central government policies. The Tibetan rate of illiteracy is five times higher than China's national average. Most Tibetans do not have access to a bilingual education system that can impart skills to help them compete for employment and other economic benefits.
• Chinese laws and official statements lend credibility to Tibetan concerns that programs such as Great Western Development and projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet railroad will lead to large increases in Han migration.
• The rights of Tibetans to their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly are subject to strict constraint. Government officials persecute prominent Tibetans, especially religious leaders, believed to have links to the Dalai Lama.

Introduction

The impact of Chinese laws and policies in the Tibetan areas of China shows that the government and Party place economic development ahead of protecting basic human rights, such as the freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly. Chinese officials support their claims of Tibetan progress with statistics that show some economic achievement, but the data also show that the main beneficiaries live in urban areas, where most ethnic Han reside, and not in the rural areas where 87 percent of Tibetans live. Tibetans struggle with poverty, inadequate education, and competition from a growing Han population. The Chinese government can strengthen ethnic and national unity by improving the implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), and by ensuring that Tibetans can manage their affairs, protect their culture, and become equal competitors with their neighbors.

The Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama

U.S. government policy on Tibet recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties¹ in other provinces to be a part of China.² The State Department's third annual Report on Tibet Negotiations³ detailed the U.S. government's steps to encourage Chinese officials to "enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives leading to a negotiated agreement on Tibet."⁴ The report expressed encouragement that Chinese officials invited the Dalai Lama's envoys to visit China for the third time in September 2004 and described the Dalai Lama as someone who "can be a constructive partner as China deals with the difficult challenges of regional and national stability." The report noted the gravity of the issue, saying, "The lack of resolution of these problems leads to greater tensions inside China and will be a stumbling block to fuller political and economic engagement with the United States and other nations."

The Dalai Lama has said that he does not seek independence and aims for a solution based on Tibetan autonomy within China. In March 2005, he told an interviewer, "This is the message I wish to deliver to China. I am not in favor of separation."⁵ The State Department's Report on Tibet Negotiations acknowledges the Dalai Lama's position, saying that he "has expressly disclaimed any intention to seek sovereignty or independence for Tibet."⁶

The Dalai Lama's envoys held meetings with Chinese officials twice during the past year. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari,⁷ and Envoy, Kelsang Gyaltsen, traveled to China for the third time in September 2004, meeting with senior Chinese officials and visiting autonomous Tibetan areas of Sichuan province.⁸ Gyari characterized the discussions as "the most extensive and serious exchange of views" so far. He cautioned that "major differences" exist on "fundamental" issues, and that "flexibility, far-sightedness and vision" will be necessary to bridge the gap.⁹ The envoys met with Chinese officials for the fourth round of talks in late June and early July 2005 at the Chinese Embassy in Bern, Switzerland.¹⁰ The talks were the first to take place outside China. Gyari said afterward that "major differences on a number of issues, including on some fundamental ones, continue to remain," but that "both sides had a positive assessment of the ongoing process."¹¹ An official of the Tibetan government-in-exile explained that the main issue for the two sides to resolve is the definition of Tibet:¹² "While China sees Tibet as the area included under the Tibet Autonomous Region, Tibetans claim a much larger area where the culture and language are Tibetan."¹³

The Tibetan government-in-exile's remarks following the envoys' meetings are aligned more closely with the Dalai Lama's position than previous statements.¹⁴ The exiled government explained its assessment in an annual statement saying that the "basic principle" to seek "genuine national regional autonomy" within the framework of China's Constitution cannot be changed.¹⁵

Samdhong Rinpoche, who heads the exiled Tibetan government, pointed to pragmatism as the guiding factor: "We have to accept ground realities of the new world order. We feel that the Dalai Lama's middle way approach to seek genuine autonomy for Tibetans is an achievable objective and are therefore moving ahead for it."¹⁶ He played down the idea popular among some Tibetans, but rejected by the Chinese government,¹⁷ that all of the current areas of Tibetan autonomy should be combined into a single unit.¹⁸

Chinese officials have rejected the Dalai Lama's approach and maintain that he seeks Tibetan independence and to "split China."¹⁹ A Chinese government spokesman responded to the State Department Report on Tibet Negotiations by reiterating preconditions: "So long as Dalai truly gives up his advocacy of 'Tibet independence,' stops the activities of separating the motherland and publicly declares and recognizes that Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China, we can contact him for consultation."²⁰ In 1998, then-President Jiang Zemin demanded that the Dalai Lama make a statement about Taiwan.²¹ An exiled Tibetan government spokesman responded that it is "entirely for the people of Taiwan to speak their voice."²²

Contacts so far between the Dalai Lama's envoys and Chinese officials have not produced concrete results. The dialogue has the potential to lead to strengthened protection of Tibetan culture and to improved regional stability and prosperity. The Dalai Lama is in an unrivaled position to promote a mutually beneficial outcome but, at age 70, his ability to pursue this opportunity could wane with advancing age.

Autonomy

Although the preamble of the REAL states that China's government has an obligation to ". . . [respect] and [protect] the right of every minority nationality to manage their own internal affairs,"²³ article 7 of that law voids this commitment to autonomy by allowing local government in autonomous regions to manage their affairs only in a manner that puts the interests of the People's Republic of China as a whole first.²⁴

A 2004 Harvard University study of autonomy in Tibetan areas of China notes that poor implementation negates the value of autonomy legislation and erodes the rule of law.²⁵ The report found that at least 161 Chinese laws and regulations that directly address issues of Tibetan autonomy apply at the national, provincial, prefectural, or county level.²⁶ "Now more than ever, the Tibetan issue appears ripe for a settlement that would preserve Tibetan culture and China's territorial integrity," the report concludes,²⁷ and advises Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives to conduct jointly "an examination of existing laws and regulations in the context of international norms and standards." It goes on to say:

Such an examination should address not only actual legislation, but also its implementation at the national, prefectural, and county levels. In some instances, China has adopted appropriate laws but neglected to fully implement them. Many of these laws contain conditions and caveats that impede or undermine progress toward their implementation. When the necessary laws and regulations are found to be absent, steps should be taken to draft and enact appropriate measures. When laws have already been promulgated but not effectively implemented, prompt measures should be taken to enhance their earliest implementation.²⁸

A 2004 East-West Center report is less optimistic and does not predict a breakthrough in the near term. It cautions, "Unless the Tibet issue should erupt as a violent conflict, the factors pushing Beijing to negotiate are likely to be regarded as insufficiently compelling to justify the risks entailed. On the other hand, if the current talks break off, Beijing will be going it alone as it manages the chronic threat of ethnonationalist discontent."²⁹ But despite citing negative factors, the report says that prospects for engagement have improved, even as the "window of opportunity to negotiate a lasting solution draws to a close."³⁰

Culture, Development, and Demography

Existing government policy initiatives, especially the Great Western Development (GWD) program implemented in 2000, exert pressure on Tibetan culture and heritage. Tibetans say privately that they believe the programs are attracting a steady flow of ethnic Han migrants into Tibetan areas. The Qinghai-Tibet railway, which will begin trial operations soon, and the construction of passenger terminals in Lhasa contribute to Tibetan concerns. The rights of autonomous Tibetan governments to manage their local affairs are weak in practice, leaving Tibetans with few administrative, legislative, and judicial resources to cope with the changes that confront them.

Long-term prospects for Tibetan culture and self-identity depend on preserving and developing the role of Tibetan language in Tibetan life, and on building a solid educational foundation for a modern and prosperous Tibetan society. This objective requires an education system that will train Tibetans in both Tibetan and Mandarin Chinese languages and teach skills that will enable Tibetans to compete for good jobs and other economic opportunities. The central, provincial, and autonomous Tibetan governments operate schools and universities with bilingual programs designed for Tibetans. Commission staff delegations visited Tibetan educational institutions in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces, the TAR, and Beijing and observed that students, faculty, and administrators seemed committed to their tasks.³¹

Government statistics on educational achievement show that most Tibetans are not prepared to compete for employment and business opportunities in the Han-dominated economic environment developing around them. Chinese government policies did not require Tibetans to live with large numbers of Han until Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening up began to take effect in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Tibetans currently have the highest rate of illiteracy of any ethnic group in China having a population greater than 500,000.³² The rate of illiteracy of Tibetans (47.55 percent) is more than five times higher than China's national average (9.08 percent), according to 2000 census data.³³ The TAR rate of illiteracy (47.25 percent) is the highest in China and is nearly twice as high as second-ranked Qinghai province (25.44 percent).³⁴ Primary school is the only level of educational attainment for which data show Tibetans nearly on par with the national average.³⁵ In the job market, Tibetans compete with Han migrants who graduate from universities at more than triple the rate of Tibetans, and from senior middle school at five times the Tibetan rate.³⁶

The disparity between the level of educational attainment by urban and rural Tibetans adds to the social and economic challenges facing Tibetans. Census data for 2000 show that Tibetans living in TAR cities were 19 times more likely to reach senior middle school than Tibetans living in rural areas. Tibetans living in TAR townships were 7.6 times more likely to do so.³⁷ Nearly 85 percent of Tibetans living in the TAR,³⁸ and 87 percent of all the Tibetans in China,³⁹ live in rural areas. Rural Tibetans are the largest and least prepared category of Tibetans facing competition for the new opportunities created by government economic development programs.

Officials in Tibetan areas stress the upward trend of economic indicators, and downplay other issues that concern Tibetans. Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo), chairman of the TAR government, said in May 2005, "If you have to say there are some 'Tibet issues,' [they] shall be ones related to the development of Tibet. . . . [W]hat Tibet does need now is only development, no other issues can prevail."⁴⁰ Claiming success for development policies, he cited 2004 statistics for the TAR that show steady gains in GDP and personal income.⁴¹ But the data also show a wide gap between the 1,861 yuan per capita income of the rural majority of Tibetans and the 8,200 yuan "disposable income" of those living in the TAR's urban areas. Development programs that reach farmers and herders will benefit the most needy group of Tibetans.

Central government subsidies for infrastructure projects and government staff salaries, rather than local agricultural production, manufacturing, and services, provide most of the TAR economy.⁴² TAR government sector employees earn salaries that are the third highest in China, behind Beijing and Shanghai, according to the Tibet Information Network (TIN).⁴³ Although urban wages fueled by government subsidies are on the rise, the Tibetan share is declining, according to TIN.⁴⁴ Central government subsidy of the public sector, driven in part by the GWD program, has been a principal source of economic growth in the TAR. Government spending on local administration and public services has benefited some Tibetans, but now Tibetan employment in the public sector, the fastest-growing and highest-paying part of the economy, is falling.⁴⁵

The Golmud-Lhasa section of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad is scheduled to begin trial operations in July 2006.⁴⁶ The project is not only the most expensive infrastructure project in any Tibetan area of China, but also has the greatest potential to affect Tibetans. When Premier Wen Jiabao visited Golmud in May 2005, he hailed the railroad as "a hallmark project of the large-scale development of the western region" and praised "the builders fighting on the frontline of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway."⁴⁷ As work moved into its final stages, Lhasa area authorities reportedly refused to compensate at the promised rate some Tibetans whose land was expropriated for the railroad project.⁴⁸

Chinese laws and official statements lend credibility to Tibetan concerns that programs such as GWD and projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet railroad will lead to large increases in Han migration. State Ethnic Affairs Commission Minister Li Dezhu wrote in 2000 that a westward flow of ethnic Han would be "in keeping with the execution of large-scale western development" and referred to the potential population shift as "the peacock flying west."⁴⁹ Implementation regulations for the REAL issued in May 2005 call for "professionals of all levels and types" to move to autonomous areas, and for local governments to provide special treatment for newly arriving Han.⁵⁰ So far, Tibetan officials maintain that there has not been any significant change in the population mix.⁵¹

Official Chinese census data for 1990 and 2000 depicts the Han population in most Tibetan areas as decreasing during the 1990s, a finding at odds with observations by Tibetans and foreign experts.⁵² Han population decreased in 10 of the 13 Tibetan autonomous areas, according to census data.⁵³ The five largest declines in Han population, ranging from 16 to 25 percent, are recorded for Qinghai province. Even in Haixi prefecture, which includes the booming city of Golmud and its rail link to Xining and Beijing, the Han population supposedly dropped 9 percent. The data show increases in Han population in only three Tibetan areas.⁵⁴ According to this census data, Han population in Tibetan autonomous areas fell by 3.3 percent during a decade when development policy and economic conditions encouraged Han to work and conduct business in Tibetan areas.⁵⁵ The method for conducting the 2000 census called for local enumeration to include temporary residents, recent arrivals, and persons without a household registration.⁵⁶ The decline in Han population portrayed by census data contradicts the visible changes evident in many Tibetan towns and cities, and raises questions about its completeness and reliability.⁵⁷

Tibetan Culture and Human Rights

The Chinese government did not begin major new political campaigns across Tibetan areas during the past year. CECC Annual Reports for 2002 through 2004 discussed how government policies that promote a national identity defined in Beijing, and that favor atheism, discourage Tibetan aspirations to foster their distinctive culture and religion. As a result of these policies, Tibetan rights to their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly are subject to strict constraint. Expressions and nonviolent actions that officials suspect could undermine Party supremacy are sometimes punished as threats to state security. The downward trend in the number of known Tibetan political prisoners suggests that Tibetans are avoiding the risks of direct criticism or protest against Chinese policies and are turning to education, arts, and religion for ways to express and protect their culture and heritage.⁵⁸

As reported incidents of Tibetan political protest decline, Chinese censors and police watch for other signs of Tibetan resentment or nationalism. Writing, publishing, or sharing literature that laments cultural loss, or that advocates ethnic ambitions not sanctioned by the Party, is sometimes repressed or punished. Penalties range from loss of employment or housing to imprisonment. For example, authorities stripped Tibetan writer Oezer (Weise) of her job, residence, insurance and retirement benefits, and barred her from applying for a passport after a collection of her essays was published in Guangzhou, and then banned, in 2003.⁵⁹ The volume presented thoughts "relating to Tibet's history, personalities, and way of life." Authorities ruled that positive references to the Dalai Lama were "political errors."⁶⁰ The Tibetan Cultural Association in Lhasa, Oezer's employer, assembled a group to conduct "thought correction" with her. She left Lhasa to avoid pressure to recant her views and abandon Buddhism.⁶¹

In Qinghai province, five monks were imprisoned in January 2005 for publishing a poem in a monastery newsletter. Security officials considered the poem to be politically sensitive and ordered the monks to serve terms of two to three years of re-education through labor.⁶² The poem allegedly expressed admiration for two monks from the same monastery who were sentenced in 2002 to three years imprisonment for advocating Tibetan independence.

Prominent Tibetans, especially religious leaders, whom officials believe have links to the Dalai Lama, risk persecution or punishment. In some cases, such as those of Tenzin Deleg and Bangri Tsamtrul, prosecutors accuse a Tibetan leader of supporting a violent act allegedly committed by another Tibetan. In these cases, authorities refuse to disclose the details of evidence directly linking the prominent Tibetan and the alleged criminal act.

Three Tibetan political prisoners are serving life sentences for crimes that include "endangering state security." Two cases involve contact with the Dalai Lama; the third is based on printing pro-independence leaflets.

• Tenzin Deleg (A'an Zhaxi), recognized by the Dalai Lama as a reincarnate lama, was convicted in a closed court in Sichuan province in November 2002 of conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism.⁶³ Chinese authorities claim that his case involves state secrets and refuse to disclose the details of evidence that shows a direct link between him and the alleged criminal acts. Tenzin Deleg professed his innocence in a smuggled tape recording. The provincial high court commuted his reprieved death sentence to life imprisonment in January 2005.
• Bangri Tsamtrul (Jigme Tenzin Nyima), a lama who lived as a householder, was convicted of inciting splittism and sentenced to life imprisonment in a closed court in Lhasa in September 2000.⁶⁴ He and his wife Nyima Choedron managed a children's home in Lhasa. His sentencing document lists evidence against him that includes meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting a donation for the home from a foundation in India, and a business relationship with a Tibetan contractor who lowered a Chinese flag in Lhasa in 1999 and tried to blow himself up. Jigme Tenzin Nyima acknowledged meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting the contribution, and knowing the contractor, but he denied the charges against him and rejected the court's portrayal of events.⁶⁵ Authorities sentenced Nyima Choedron to 10 years imprisonment and subsequently reduced her sentence to seven years and six months.⁶⁶
• Choeying Khedrub, a monk of Tsanden Monastery in the TAR, was sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for his role in a group of men who allegedly printed pro-independence leaflets. According to information that the Chinese government provided to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), he was found guilty of endangering state security and "supporting splittist activities of the Dalai clique."⁶⁷ The UNWGAD reports that the Chinese response "mentions no evidence in support of the charges, or if they used violence in their activities," and finds that the government "appears" to have misused the charge of endangering state security.⁶⁸

Ngawang Phuljung and Jigme Gyatso are examples of Tibetans serving long sentences for the obsolete crime of counterrevolution handed down under the 1979 Criminal Law. Both of them visited India and returned to the TAR without official papers. The UNWGAD issued opinions rejecting the legitimacy of both convictions.

• Ngawang Phuljung, a monk of Drepung Monastery, was sentenced in 1989 to 19 years imprisonment for crimes that included "forming a counterrevolutionary organization" and "spreading counterrevolutionary propaganda."⁶⁹ A 1993 UNWGAD decision declared his imprisonment arbitrary, and called on China's government to "remedy the situation." Ngawang Phuljung is currently the longest-serving Tibetan convicted of counterrevolution.
• Jigme Gyatso, a former monk who operated a restaurant, was sentenced in 1996 to 15 years imprisonment for counterrevolution. Chinese officials told a UNWGAD delegation in September 2004 that he was guilty of "planning to found an illegal organization and seek to divide the country and damage its unity."⁷⁰ Another UNWGAD opinion on the case found that "there is nothing to indicate that the 'illegal organization' . . . ever advocated violence, war, national, racial, or religious hatred." Jigme Gyatso was "merely exercising the right to freedom of peaceful assembly with others in order to express opinions."⁷¹

The CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD) listed approximately 120 current cases of Tibetan political imprisonment in June 2005, less than one fifth of the number in late 1995.⁷² The number of Tibetan political prisoners continues to decline as Tibetans imprisoned for political protests during the late 1980s to mid-1990s complete their sentences and are released. Sentence information is available for two-thirds of the current prisoners. Their average sentence is 10 years and six months.⁷³ Monks and nuns make up 62 percent of current Tibetan political prisoners, compared to 75 percent in 2002.⁷⁴ Lhasa's TAR Prison (Drapchi) holds 50 known Tibetan political prisoners, though the actual number is likely to be somewhat higher. They are serving an average sentence of 12 years and six months. Chinese authorities did not grant early release from prison to any high-profile Tibetan political prisoner during the past year.

Nearly 70 Tibetan political prisoners are believed to be imprisoned in the TAR, nearly 40 in Sichuan province, and fewer than 15 in Qinghai province, based on PPD data in June 2005. None are documented in Gansu or Yunnan provinces. In Sichuan province, the ratio of Tibetan political prisoners to the provincial Tibetan population is 29.9 prisoners per million Tibetans. The ratio is 27.6 per million in the TAR, and 12 per million in Qinghai province. The lower rates of political detention in Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan coincide with a religious and educational environment that experts privately say is not as repressive as in Sichuan province or the TAR. Conversely, government authorities in the areas of the TAR and Sichuan with the highest rates of political detention are known to deal with Tibetans and their culture more harshly.⁷⁵

Notes to Section VI―Tibet

1 Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development with Chinese Characteristics (Washington D.C.: self-published CD�C ROM, 1997), Table 7. The 13 autonomous areas include the provincial-level Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectures and two Tibetan autonomous counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces. The 13 areas are contiguous and total 2.24 million square kilometers (865,000 square miles).

2 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Report on Tibet Negotiations, April 2005. The Report is mandated by Section 611 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, and was sent to the Congress in April 2005.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. "Encouraging substantive dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama is an important objective of this Administration. The United States encourages China and the Dalai Lama to hold direct and substantive discussions aimed at resolution of differences at an early date, without preconditions. The Administration believes that dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives will alleviate tensions in Tibetan areas and contribute to the overall stability of China."

5 Laurence Brahm, "Conciliatory Dalai Lama Expounds on Winds of Change," South China Morning Post (Online), 14 March 05.

6 U.S. State Department, Report on Tibet Negotiations.

7 In addition to serving as the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari is the Executive Chairman of the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). According to the ICT mission statement, ICT "promotes self-determination for the Tibetan people through negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama." The ICT Web site describes Tibet as an "occupied country" of 2.5 million square kilometers (965,000 square miles) with Lhasa as its capital.

8 "Statement by Special Envoy Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation to China," Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 13 October 04. The envoys met Liu Yandong, Vice Chairperson of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee and head of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party (UFWD); Zhu Weiqun, the deputy head of the UFWD; Chang Rongjung, UFWD Secretary General; and other officials in Beijing. The delegation visited Lhasa, Tashi Lhunpo Monastery, and Samye Monastery in the TAR, and several counties in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), including Xinlong, Lodi Gyari's birthplace.

9 Ibid.

10 "Dalai Lama's Envoys Meet Chinese Officials in Switzerland for Fourth Round of Talks," Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 1 July 05. The envoys met with Zhu Weiqun and Sithar of the UFWD. (Zhu is also a "senior official" of the State Council Information Office according to "Economy Grows in Minority Regions," China Daily (Online), 31 May 05.)

11 "Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Tibetan Delegation for the Fourth Round of Meetings with the Chinese Leadership," Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 7 July 05.

12 The Tibetan government-in-exile's representation of Tibet exceeds the total area of Chinese-designated Tibetan autonomy by about 100,000 square miles. Aside from pockets of long-term Tibetan settlement in Qinghai province, most of that area is made up of autonomous prefectures or counties allocated to other ethnic groups in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The area includes substantial Han Chinese populations, some established for centuries.

13 "Spokesman: Differences on Tibet's Definition Persist Between China, Dalai Lama," Associated Press (Online), 8 July 05.

14 Surojit Mahalanobis, "Options in Exile," Times of India (Online), 6 June 03. For example, during this interview in June 2003, Samdhong Rinpoche said, "In Hong Kong, the Chinese have agreed to a one-country-two-systems policy. The Dalai Lama is negotiating such a status for Tibet." He said that "genuine autonomy" means, "A little more than what Hong Kong enjoys."

15 "The Statement of the Kashag on the 46th Anniversary of the Tibetan People's Uprising Day," Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 10 March 05. "After the return of the third visit of His Holiness's envoys last year, and carefully studying the minutes of their discussions, we have decided to put more efforts towards negotiations. . . . [T]he entirety of the Tibetan population having legitimate rights within the constitutional framework of the People's Republic of China to enjoy genuine national regional autonomy is the legitimate requirement of the Tibetan people. Therefore, the need of such an autonomy, equally and uniformly practiced amidst all the Tibetan people, has already been emphasized; not just once but many times. We would like to once again state that this basic principle can not be changed at all."

16 "We Have To Accept Ground Realities," Outlook India (Online), 19 March 05.

17 "Dalai Lama More and More Unpopular Among Tibetans, Says Chairman," Xinhua, 31 May 05 (FBIS, 31 May 05). Chairman of the TAR government Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo) said, "Dalai Lama had before put forward a series of ideas puffing [as received] high degree autonomy in Tibet or establishing a 'big Tibetan area' that involves four more Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Gansu. However, according to the Chinese history, there was only one 'big Tibetan area' about one thousand years ago in southwest China but no more reappeared thereafter. As far as today's Tibet is concerned, such an area is absolutely nothing but impossible."

18 Aloke Tikku, "Dalai Envoys Plan China Talks," The Telegraph, Calcutta (Online), 9 March 05. Samdhong Rinpoche referred to the "non-negotiable" demand for autonomy for all Tibetans and said, "The Chinese thought we were seeking consolidation of Tibetan areas and eventually independence. Whether the Tibetans then wanted to be governed as one administrative entity or separately is something that can be looked at later."

19 "Dalai Lama More and More Unpopular Among Tibetans, Says Chairman," Xinhua. Chairman of the TAR government Jampa Phuntsog said, "What Dalai and some Western forces really want is nothing but splitting Tibet from China. Whatever the names he invents for Tibetan independence, his nature will remain the same."

20 "PRC FM Spokesman: US Must Not Use Tibet To Interfere in China's Internal Affairs," Xinhua, 24 April 05 (FBIS, 24 April 05).

21 "Transcript: Presidents Clinton, Jiang Debate Rights, Tiananmen," U.S. Department of State (Online), 27 June 98. During the televised debate President Clinton said, "I reaffirmed our longstanding one-China policy to President Jiang and urged the pursuit of cross-strait discussions recently resumed as the best path to a peaceful resolution. In a similar vein, I urged President Jiang to assume a dialogue with the Dalai Lama in return for the recognition that Tibet is a part of China and in recognition of the unique cultural and religious heritage of that region." President Jiang responded, saying, "Just now President Clinton also mentioned the Tibetan issue and the dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Actually, as long as the Dalai Lama can publicly make the statement and a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China and he must also recognize Taiwan as a province of China, then the door to dialogue and negotiation is open."

22 "TSGs and the Struggle of the Tibetan People," Department of Information and International Relations, Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), May 2000; Speech by Secretary Kesang Y. Takla to the Third International Conference of Tibet Support Groups, Berlin, 11�C14 May 00. "First of all I believe that it is the responsibility of His Holiness to speak for the Tibetan people, for the status of Tibet, which he has always consistently done, and it is entirely for the people of Taiwan to speak their voice."

23 PRC Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, adopted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, preamble: "The implementation of regional autonomy of minority nationalities embodies the spirit of the state fully respecting and protecting the right of every minority nationality to manage their own internal affairs as well as the principle of the state adhering to the principle of equality, unity, and common prosperity for all nationalities."

24 Ibid., art. 7: "Organs of national autonomous areas should place the overall interests of the state in the first place and actively fulfill all tasks handed down by higher-level state organs."

25 Theodore C. Sorenson and David L. Phillips, Legal Standards and Autonomy Options for Minorities in China: The Tibetan Case (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), 45.

26 China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does it Protect Minority Rights?, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Written Statement submitted by David L. Phillips, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.

27 Theodore C. Sorenson and David L. Phillips, Legal Standards and Autonomy Options for Minorities in China: The Tibetan Case, 78.

28 Ibid., 78.

29 Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), ix.

30 Ibid.

31 In May 2002, a Commission staff delegation visited the Central Nationalities University and the Chinese Center for Tibetan Studies in Beijing, the Southwest Minority Nationalities University and the Sichuan University Center for Tibetan Studies (Chengdu, Sichuan province), and the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences (Lhasa, TAR). In September 2003, a Commission staff delegation met with staff of the Qinghai Province Ethnic Minority Institute (Xining, Qinghai province), and visited the Huangnan TAP Teacher Training College and the Tongren Tibetan Language Middle School (Tongren, Qinghai province). In April 2004, a Commission staff delegation visited the Chinese Center for Tibetan Studies in Beijing, the Northwest Nationalities University (Lanzhou, Gansu province), and the Gannan TAP Teacher Training School (Hezuo, Gansu province). Commission staff impressions were based on meetings with administrators, faculty, and students, visits to campus facilities, statistics on graduation, and private meetings with experts that corroborated Commission impressions.

32 Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003). Table 2�C3, based on persons aged 15 and over, shows that the Dongxiang, Salar, Baoan, Monba, and Lhoba nationalities have higher rates of illiteracy than Tibetans. Table 2�C3 provides rates of illiteracy for Mongols and Uighurs of 8.40 and 9.22 percent, respectively.

33 Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. Data provided in Table 2�C3 show that 9.08 percent of China's population aged 15 and over is illiterate; 47.55 percent of Tibetans aged 15 and over are illiterate. Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, August 2002). Data provided in Table 1�C8 show that 89,629,436 of 1,156,700,293 persons aged six and over in China have had no schooling.

34 Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China. Table 1�C9 provides provincial rates of illiteracy based on the illiterate population aged 15 and over.

35 Ibid. Data provided in Table 2�C2 show that the highest level of education attained by 35.2 percent of Tibetans aged 6 and over is primary school. Ibid. Data provided in Table 1�C8 show that the highest level of education attained by 38.2 percent of China's population aged 6 and over is primary school.

36 Ibid. Table 2�C2 shows that of 1,061,196,336 Han aged six and over, 93,677,240 (8.83 percent) reached senior middle school and 13,323,659 (1.26 percent) reached university. Of 4,791,241 Tibetans aged six and over, 81,366 (1.70 percent) reached senior middle school and 18,315 (0.38 percent) reached university.

37 Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. Table 2�C1a shows that 8,845 of 137,545 TAR Tibetans aged six and over, and classified as "city" residents, reached senior middle school as their highest level of educational attainment; Table 2�C1b shows that 5,400 of 211,990 TAR Tibetans aged six and over, and classified as "town" residents, reached senior middle school; Table 2�C1c shows that 5,999 of 1,808,859 TAR Tibetans aged six and over, and classified as "rural" residents, reached senior middle school.

38 Ibid. Table 1�C2 shows 2,427,168 Tibetans in the TAR. Table 1�C2c shows that 2,058,011 of them are classified as "rural."

39 Ibid. Table 1�C2 shows the total Tibetan population as 5,416,021. Table 1�C2a shows the "city" population of Tibetans as 221,355. Table 1�C2b shows the "town" population of Tibetans as 473,467. Table 1�C2c shows the "rural" population of Tibetans as 4,721,199.

40 "Dalai Lama More and More Unpopular Among Tibetans, Says Chairman," Xinhua.

41 Wei Wu, "Tibet at Best Period of Development, Stability," Xinhua (Online), 2 June 05. Chairman of the TAR Jampa Phuntsog said that TAR GDP grew by more than 10 percent for 10 consecutive years and reached 12.2 percent in 2004 (21.154 billion yuan). Per capita GDP was 7,772 yuan, ranking 23rd among 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. The annual per-capita net income of Tibetan farmers and herdsmen was 1,861 yuan. The disposable income of the urban Tibetans was 8,200 yuan.

42 Wei Wu, "Tibet at Best Period of Development, Stability." Chairman of the TAR Jampa Phuntsog said in an interview, "The central government has poured an annual average of more than 10 billion yuan [U.S.$1.2 billion] into Tibet in the past years to start big projects and update local infrastructure. Together with investment from other channels including civil investment, there is more than 16 billion yuan [U.S. $1.93 billion] of investment poured into Tibet annually." These figures compare to a 21.154 billion yuan GDP in the TAR in 2004.

43 Tibet Information Network (Online), "High TAR Wages Benefit the Privileged," 10 February 05. "Given the predominance of the state sector in 'staff and worker' employment in the TAR, it is worthwhile to look at the specific state-sector wages more closely. Again, average money wages of state-sector staff and workers in the TAR were the highest in the PRC in 2002, but fell to third place in 2003, just behind Beijing and Shanghai. Average state-sector wages in 2003 were 27,611 yuan in the TAR, compared to 28,406 for Shanghai, and 28,464 yuan for Beijing."

44 "Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment in the TAR," Tibet Information Network (Online), 20 January 05. "These reductions in employment have come at a time when the state-sector has been one of the most important and most dynamic sources of growth in the TAR. GDP growth rates have been the highest in Western China in 2002 and 2003, largely fuelled by expansions in state-subsidized investment and administrative spending on the state-sector itself. A stronger involvement in state-sector employment therefore bears a high potential for increasing Tibetan employment. Instead, Tibetan employment in the state-sector has been falling, along with state-sector employment in general. Paradoxically, employment, especially Tibetan employment, has been shrinking in precisely the parts of the economy that have been growing fastest."

45 Ibid.

46 "Qinghai-Tibet Railway to Start Trial Operation in 15 Months," People's Daily (Online), 12 April 05. The 2001 estimated budget for construction of the 1,142 kilometer section (710 miles) was 26.2 billion yuan. Expenditure for 2004 was 6.8 billion yuan, according to Vice Minister of Railways Sun Yongfu, and the 2005 allocation is 5.5 billion yuan. With two-thirds of the work on "key projects" completed, the cost has been 19.8 billion yuan. (In an interview with Commission staff, a Chinese official stated that the cost of the railroad is estimated at 30 billion yuan.)

47 "While Inspecting Qinghai, Wen Jiabao Points Out That It Is Necessary To Give Play to the Pioneering Spirit of Hard Struggle in Pushing Forward the Grand Strategy of Large-Scale Development of China's Western Region," Xinhua, 2 May 05 (FBIS, 3 May 05).

48 "Tibetans Appeal Compensation Over Loss of Homes, Land," Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 May 05. Tibetans petitioned authorities at township, county, and regional level about the reduced compensation, but received no help. A local Party official who "tried to speak out on behalf of his community" was removed from his post. (In interviews with Commission staff, private sources reported incidents similar to the RFA account. In some cases, authorities warned dissatisfied Tibetans to keep silent or face further losses.)

49 Li Dezhu, Minister of State Ethnic Affairs Commission, "Large-Scale Development of Western China and China's Nationality Problem," Seeking Truth, 1 June 00 (FBIS, 15 June 00). "It is conceivable that a phenomenon of 'the peacock flying west' will appear in keeping with the execution of large-scale western development. Two way population flow is an inevitable trend of economic development, will promote cultural exchange, and will help to raise the cultural level of the western regions."

50 Provisions of the State Council for Implementing the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People's Republic of China, issued 26 May 05, art. 29. "The state shall encourage and support professionals of all levels and types to work or start their businesses in national autonomous areas. Local people's governments shall provide them with preferential and convenient working and living conditions. Appropriate consideration in terms of employment and schooling shall be given to the families and children of the professionals of Han nationality and other nationalities who go to work in national autonomous areas in remote areas and frigid zones where conditions are relatively harsh."

51 "No Immigration of Other Ethnic Groups: Tibetan Official," Xinhua (Online), 26 September 03. Jampa Phuntsog, TAR Deputy Party Secretary, said "there has been no immigration of other ethnic groups into Tibet." "Ethnic Tibetans Remain Majority in Tibet: Tibetan Chairman," People's Daily (Online), 5 September 02. Legchog, then TAR Deputy Party Secretary, said that it was an "absurdity" to suggest that Chinese population could overtake Tibetans. Yixi Jiacuo, "Raidi Meets Hong Kong Journalists, Gives Interview," Tibet Daily, 7 August 01 (FBIS, 7 August 01). Ragdi (Raidi), then TAR Executive Deputy Party Secretary, said "[S]ome people say that with immigration, the Tibetan population is greatly reduced and Tibetan culture will be extinguished. There is absolutely no basis for such talk."

52 One of the most common concerns expressed by Tibetans speaking privately is that the Han population has increased steadily and significantly since the 1980s, especially in towns and cities. Commission staff have heard similar comments from foreign experts who have visited Tibetan areas over a period of years.

53 Tabulation on China's Nationality: Data of 1990 Population Census (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1993); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. According to census data, Han population decreased in 10 areas of Tibetan autonomy (listed in order of size of decrease): Guoluo prefecture (Qinghai), -25.0 percent; Hainan prefecture (Qinghai), -22.7 percent; Haibei prefecture (Qinghai), -20.2 percent; Huangnan prefecture (Qinghai), -19.2 percent; Yushu prefecture (Qinghai), -16.9 percent; Muli county (Sichuan), -16.1 percent; Aba prefecture (Sichuan), -14.3 percent; Haixi prefecture (Qinghai), -9.0 percent; Ganzi prefecture (Sichuan), -7.9 percent; Tianzhu county (Gansu), -0.9 percent.

54 Compare Tabulation on China's Nationality: Data of 1990 Population Census with Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. Han population increased in three areas of Tibetan autonomy (listed in order of size of increase): TAR, +96.2 percent; Diqing prefecture (Yunnan), +13.9 percent; Gannan prefecture (Gansu), +2.0 percent.

55 Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. The total Han population in the 13 Tibetan autonomous areas fell from 1.52 million in 1990 to 1.47 million in 2000.

56 "Measures for Fifth National Population Census," National Bureau of Statistics of China (Online), 23 April 02. Chapter 2, Article 7, provides the following instructions:

The following persons should be enumerated in their own townships, towns and street communities:

(1) those who reside in the townships, towns and street communities and have had their permanent household registered there.

(2) those who have resided in the townships, towns and street communities for more than half a year but the places of their permanent household registration are elsewhere.

(3) those who have resided in the townships, towns and street communities for less than half a year but have been away from the place of their permanent household registration for more than half a year.

(4) those who live in the townships, towns and street communities during the population census but the places of their household registration have not yet settled.

57 Census day was July 1 in 1990, and November 1 in 2000. The population of transient Han workers and vendors in Tibetan areas peaks during summer and is declining by November, undermining the reliability of direct comparison of 1990 and 2000 data. The shift of census day from July to November, however, may not be an adequate explanation for significant declines in Han population.

58 Tibet Information Network, TIN Testimonies―Writing in Today's Tibet, 19 April 05. (TIN interview with a young Tibetan writer from Qinghai province.) "[I]n my own case, restrictions on what one can write about actually enthuses me to write even more. I was able to write political things. I was able to conceal political matter in my writing. They were not written openly. Generally I write the things that I know and that I feel. The things one is not allowed to write about, one has to write in a hidden way. For example, 'cuckoo' and 'elder brother' is written to represent the Dalai Lama and this could be explained or interpreted as having a different meaning if one is asked." TIN summarized: "While open criticism of the system, expressions of faith in the Dalai Lama and aspirations to greater freedom are off limits, demanding extensive self-censorship, descriptions of the Tibetan landscape, the celebration of Tibetan cultural icons, and even the use of the Tibetan language itself, are perceived as expressions of allegiance to one's 'nationality'."

59 Human Rights in China (Online), "Tibetan Writer Persecuted for Praising Dalai Lama," 27 October 04.

60 Ibid. HRIC sources reported that Tibet Journal was banned by the UFWD and the Guangdong Provincial Publishing Bureau.

61 Ibid.

62 "Five Tibetan Monks Jailed in Western China," Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 February 05. The monks are Abbot Tashi Gyaltsen, Tsultrim Phelgyal, Tsesum Samten, Jamphel Gyatso, and Lobsang Dargyal, of Dragkar Traldzong Monastery in Xinghai county. They are reportedly serving their sentences at a brick factory near Xining.

63 "The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality," Topic Paper of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, February 2003.

64 Official sentencing document: Lhasa Municipal Intermediate People's Court, Criminal Court Judgment, No. 52 (2000). "Defendant Jinmei Danzeng Nima is guilty of the crime of attempting to split the country. He is sentenced to life in prison and shall be deprived of political rights for his lifetime (prison term starting on the day this judgment goes into effect)." (Jigme Tenzin Nyima's Buddhist name is Bangri Tsamtrul Rinpoche.)

65 Ibid. Jigme Tenzin Nyima said in his own defense, "Without any evidence, I will absolutely deny having committed any crime adjudicated." His defense counsel told the court, "Therefore, the facts do not clearly show that defendant Jigme Tenzin Nyima committed the crime of trying to split up the country as changed and the evidence is not sufficient."

66 "New Details on Cases of Tibetan Political Imprisonment," Tibet Information Network (Online), 9 July 04. According to information based on official Chinese sources, Nyima Choedron received a sentence reduction of one year six months in 2002, and one year in 2003.

67 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 13/2003, 26 November 03, 71.

68 Ibid., 74. The Working Group emphasized, in the report on its visit to China (E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.2, para. 43) that 'unless the application of these crimes is restricted to clearly defined areas and in clearly defined circumstances, there is a serious risk of misuse'. That appears to be the case in the present instance, inasmuch as the Government, in its reply, does not specify the nature of the activities of which the men were accused other than founding a peaceful association and distributing leaflets and mentions no evidence in support of the charges, or if they used violence in their activities."

69 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Decisions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Decision No. 65/1993, 5 October 94.

70 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Addendum, Mission to China, 29 December 04, 22.

71 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 8/2000, 9 November 00, 70.

72 Steven D. Marshall, In the Interests of the State: Hostile Elements III―Political Imprisonment in Tibet 1987�C2001 (London: Tibet Information Network, 2002), 3. There were nearly 700 known or likely Tibetan political prisoners by the end of 1995.

73 Based on data available in the CECC Political Prisoner Database for 121 records in June 2005, 85 Tibetan political prisoners were known or believed to be serving prison terms, nine were serving sentences of re-education through labor, and 27 were awaiting sentencing or release, or were of uncertain status.

74 The CECC issued its first Annual Report in 2002.

75 Based on CECC Political Prisoner Database residence data current in June 2005 for Tibetan political prisoners, and official Chinese data on Tibetan population from the 2000 census:

(1) Lhasa prefecture had a rate of 80 Tibetan political prisoners per million Tibetans (31 political prisoners resided in Lhasa prefecture before detention; Lhasa prefecture had a Tibetan population of 387,124 in 2000);

(2) Ganzi prefecture, in Sichuan province, had a rate of 37 Tibetan political prisoners per million Tibetans (26 political prisoners resided in Ganzi prefecture before detention; Ganzi prefecture had a Tibetan population of 703,168 Tibetans in 2000);

(3) Changdu prefecture, in the eastern TAR, had a rate of 28.4 Tibetan political prisoners per million Tibetans (16 political prisoners resided in Changdu prefecture before detention; Changdu prefecture had a Tibetan population of 563,831 Tibetans in 2000);

(4) Aba prefecture, in Sichuan Province, had a rate of 26.4 Tibetan political prisoners per million Tibetans (12 political prisoners resided in Aba prefecture before detention; Aba prefecture had a Tibetan population of 455,238 Tibetans in 2000).