

**RECORD VERSION**

**STATEMENT BY**

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CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

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**GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER**  
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss modernizing the United States Army for the national security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

I would like to begin by describing for you the rationale behind the Army's Modernization Plan, briefly outlining its key components and the risks we face as we prepare for the future.

**A Strategy-Based Force**

We are a "strategy-based force." Strategy defines requirements, which in turn determines our force structure and modernization needs. The triumphs and failures of American military history can be traced through how well we have kept the demands of strategy and the requirements for military force in balance. When the link between strategy and our rationale for retaining and modernizing forces remained clear and compelling, the military proved an effective instrument of national policy. When strategy and military capability drifted apart we put both our national interests and the men and women of the armed forces at risk.

Any discussion of modernization must always begin with strategy. In fact, our current National Military Strategy, based on the three pillars of shape, respond and prepare now, explicitly defines our modernization needs in the context of the missions we are required to perform in the post-Cold War world. The military must help "shape" the international environment setting the conditions for an effective foreign policy; "respond" appropriately to a crisis that threatens our national interests; and, at the same time, continue to transform the force so it is prepared for the security challenges that may emerge in the decades ahead. Effective modernization of the U.S. Army requires simultaneously supporting all three components of our National Military Strategy.

Our experience in implementing the National Military Strategy has taught several significant lessons that we could not ignore as we crafted the Army Modernization Plan.

- *We are busier than ever.* Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 we have participated in 32 major operations. In addition, the day to day requirements for land forces are tremendous. On Christmas eve 1998, for example, the Army had 144,313 Active and Reserve component soldiers stationed or deployed temporarily in 65 different countries doing everything from deterring Iraq and North Korea to peacekeeping in Bosnia and assisting civilian authorities in Central America in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. The pace of operations and training is taking its toll on people – and equipment.
- *We depend on a quality force.* Having reduced the Army by about 700,000 people, we have to rely more than ever on the qualitative advantage of our forces to ensure we can accomplish a mission with the minimum risk to soldiers.
- *We have to use the total force.* Today, 54 percent of the Army is in the Reserve Components. We cannot accomplish any major operation without significant participation from the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. More than ever, we have to be concerned about modernization from a total force perspective.
- *We are part of a joint force.* Virtually every operation we execute today is joint. All this experience argues that Joint Vision 2010 has laid out exactly the right course for our future modernization needs.
- *We have to be able to get there fast.* The ability to intervene at the right time with the right force on the ground can make all the difference, giving our national leaders the greatest flexibility and the broadest options for dealing with the complex regional challenges of the post-Cold War era.
- *We need to be able to respond to many threats.* We have to “over-match” enemies that may come at us with more than just conventional military forces. The Army has to add capabilities to our force that we didn’t need very much

during the Cold War.

- *We have to change.* We have to meet the challenges and requirements for land forces in a world that is being transformed by the power of information-age technology. Change means more than “dressing-up” the force with high-tech equipment or simply radically restructuring organizations, it means fundamentally transforming how we use force to conform with the realities of a world being reshaped by the power of information. Our measure of success is not how fast or how radically we change, but that the Army gets it right. Changing at the right pace, while maintaining trained and ready forces, is our best hedge against the uncertainties of the future.
- *We cannot change overnight.* It does us no good, for example, to have new weapons without quality soldiers trained to use them, the doctrine to employ them or the organizations to support them. To get change right we must develop all the forces’ core competencies – and that takes time.
- *We have to make the best use of available resources.* Today, the United States’ strategic advantages are unprecedented. At the same time, the world is changing rapidly. Now is the time for prudent investments, ensuring we buy the right equipment, at the right time as we move towards an uncertain future. With limited resources we have to modernize with discipline and precision. Since 1987, we have terminated or restructured over 100 programs. Since 1989, Research, Development, and Acquisition has been reduced by 44 percent, procurement by 52 percent. We do not have the luxury of wasted effort.
- *Finally, we’ve found there are no “time outs” for modernization.* Accommodating all the other factors I’ve just mentioned compels us to change the Army and continue to modernize, but at the same time they reemphasize the continuous and recurring demands for land forces. We know we have to balance the nation’s requirements for trained and ready forces with the resources that we can dedicate to procuring the equipment we will need in the future.

These strategic realities have shaped our approach to modernization. They demand a prudent, flexible modernization plan that provides for current operational readiness and prepares the Army now for the challenges ahead.

### **Strategy-Based Modernization**

We have used the real-world requirements of our National Military Strategy to determine both the end-state of the Army's Modernization Plan and our approach to achieving it.

Basically, the end-state we seek is to transform the Army from an industrial-age force (a force crafted for the Cold War), into an information-age Army designed to meet the national security challenges ahead. I describe this end-state as a land force that can act with unprecedented *knowledge*, *speed* and *power*.

In particular, we must prepare and organize our people, harnessing the power of the information age to create *knowledge*. We have already figured out how to outfit the force with the latest information-age technologies. We have, however, only begun to tap the potential of warriors to exploit these tools. We must develop forces that will thrive in an information-charged environment and have the capacity to fully exploit the potential of the systems and organizations we put in their hands. They must be able to share a common relevant picture of the battlefield, distill and interpret a complex mass of information, and make independent, rapid, intuitive decisions.

We must also have an Army that can act with unmatched *speed*, the ability to get there fast and move as fast as the operation requires. Today, thanks to pre-positioned equipment we can deploy some of our heavy forces to selected regions of the world in less than 96 hours. Thanks, to enhanced strategic lift, we can deploy our light forces on a moment's notice. These advancements have demonstrated the utility of getting ground forces in a theater fast and rapidly moving them to where they are needed most. We must push this advantage further. Our post-Cold war operational experience and future wargaming exercises have shown time and time again that one soldier at the right place early on is worth five soldiers later on. We must be able to deploy more quickly and be more mobile in the area of operations. Increasing our strategic, operational and tactical mobility is essential.

We also need greater *power*. With our smaller post-Cold War force, we need an enhanced capacity to respond decisively to diverse threats. Today, we rank a distant eighth in the size of the world's armies. Quality, however, has a quantity all its own. We ensure success by "overmatching" an enemy with superior forces. As we saw during Operation Desert Storm, even in a major regional conflict where allied forces conducted an intensive air campaign, ground units were still required to fight in heavy combat. Among the U.S. land engagements, the Battle of 73 Easting offered an excellent example of the kind of intense ground warfare the Army must be prepared to conduct during a major conflict. In this brief 23-minute battle, a handful of American tanks faced-off against a numerically superior Iraqi force, destroying 30 enemy armored vehicles. In the future we will need to be able to achieve these kinds of results not just in conventional warfare, but in countering all the diverse threats we may face.

*Knowledge, speed and power* accurately define the end-state of our Modernization Plan. Together these kinds of capabilities describe what we are embedding in the Army through our modernization efforts.

The Army's Modernization Plan recognizes that to achieve our end-state we must continue to balance current and future readiness. Providing for current readiness means funding the force so that our soldiers are trained and ready to take on any mission they might be assigned today. Future readiness requires preparing now so that we will have the capabilities needed to meet the missions we foresee in the years ahead. Based on the need for balance, the Army Modernization Plan has established five appropriate, achievable goals.

### **Army Modernization Goals**

Each of the Army Modernization Plan's five goals contributes measurably towards achieving our end-state within the constrained resources available.

First, we are "digitizing" the Army. Digitization means integrating information systems into the Army force. The cornerstone of this effort is to equip a digitized division by the end of fiscal year 2000 (FY00) and a digitized corps by the end of FY04. As part of this centerpiece effort, we are currently realigning the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below program to accommodate more extensive testing requirements and an early low rate initial production procurement to ensure this critical

system is available for the first digitized division in the year 2000. We are also extending digitization beyond the tactical force into our sustaining base infrastructure, digitizing the Institutional Army to achieve the economies and efficiencies envisioned by the Defense Reform Initiatives. Our efforts in this area range from recruiting and mobilization, to Distance Learning and Telemedicine, to Electronic Commerce and Knowledge Management

Second, we must maintain combat “overmatch.” In critical areas we are making prudent incremental improvements in current systems and, where appropriate, inserting new technologies to ensure our combat forces retain a significant qualitative edge over potential foes. This commitment is reflected in our Comanche, Crusader, Apache Longbow and Armor Systems modernization programs. Our intent is to field overmatching systems by “brigade sets.” This approach will not only maximize efficiency in deploying new systems, but will dramatically enhance operational effectiveness. Together these programs comprise a “system of systems,” in combination they will have a synergistic effect expanding the qualitative edge of our ground forces.

Third, we are sustaining research and development (R&D) efforts to produce “leap-ahead technology.” Since, we are deferring the acquisition of most next generation systems, we are relying on our R&D efforts to ensure we retain our qualitative advantage in the long-term and are postured to take the best advantage of new capabilities when they become available.

Fourth, we are recapitalizing the force. By selectively replacing or refitting aging systems we can ensure continued operational effectiveness and minimize excessive maintenance and support costs. This is a real challenge. We have a significant backlog in unfunded recapitalization.

Fifth, we are ensuring the interoperability of our Active and Reserve Component forces. We are going to modernize in a manner that reflects how we are using the total force. From FY92-99 we fielded the Reserve Components with \$21.5 billion in new or serviceable equipment. In FY00-05 we have programmed \$7.6 billion for Reserve Component modernization.

The goals of the Army Modernization Plan reflect exactly the right mix of effort to maintain a trained and ready force, and continue the fundamental transformation of the Army within the constrained resources available.

### **Modernization, the Future and Risk**

As I testified before on you January 5, 1999, despite our best efforts to mitigate risks through balanced investments, efficiencies and innovative practices, concerns remain. I quantified our readiness risk at \$5 billion each year over the course of the FYDP, not including requirements for increasing compensation, fixing the retirement system, and funding contingency operations. While the FY00 budget makes a significant down payment on the future, it contains a \$1.8 billion risk in our modernization program. That risk is not programmed to begin to diminish until FY05.

While it is difficult to precisely quantify these risks, we can anticipate their influence on national security policy. If trend lines continue, we may see greater risk in:

- A higher potential for casualties in major operations.
- Decreased options for our national-security decision-makers.
- An unacceptable dependence on stand-off lethal attack.
- Long-term readiness and recruitment and retention of a quality force.

While these potential risks are real, and troubling, I believe that working closely with the leadership of the Administration and the Congress their impact on the future force can be mitigated. The challenges of preparing the Army for the future cannot be fully addressed in one year or one budget. It will require our collective commitment and leadership over the long-term.

## Reflecting Back, Looking Ahead

I want to conclude my statement by reaffirming the tremendous importance of the Army Modernization Plan. In preparing for this testimony, I was rereading some passages from *Citizen Soldiers*, Stephen Ambrose's magnificent account of the U.S. Army in Western Europe during World War Two. Dr. Ambrose describes the tremendous performance and achievement of American soldiers throughout that historic campaign. He also, however, points out the Army's many shortfalls and inadequacies that had to be overcome -- failures in training, doctrine and equipment.

At the outbreak of the war, the United States was suddenly caught in a strategy and forces mismatch, where our national interests far-exceeded the capabilities of our forces. The great leaders of the Second World War, men like Generals Marshall and McNair, demonstrated remarkable leadership in creating an Army to fight a global war on very short order. They implemented new organizations, new equipment, doctrine and training methods overnight. They devised field trials to experiment with ideas and test men and machines. In winning, they also suffered 586,628 casualties. I could not but help wonder how different the campaign in Europe might have been if we had given these leaders more time and resources to prepare for the future, to develop the right equipment and right organizations so that we were prepared to mobilize for the crisis.

Today we have the time to prepare for the future, what we require is the wisdom to make the right investments. The Army Modernization Plan strikes the right balance between our current and future needs – and it represents an investment that we can afford. By embarking on a prudent course of modernization now, we can prepare for the alternatives that our nation may confront in the years ahead and direct resources more confidently as the future unfolds.

I believe the generation of warriors we have today is every bit as courageous and dedicated as the generation that won the Second World War. Today, however, we have the advantage of building on the lessons and achievements of past generations.

I look forward to discussing further the specifics of the Army's modernization programs during the course of the hearing.