

Advance Questions for General John P. Jumper
Nominee for the Position of Chief of Staff of the United States Air
Force

Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Yes.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

My experience has shown that these reforms have been institutionalized and made part of the daily operations, oversight, and management of the Department of Defense in general and the U.S. Air Force in particular. I am aware that the sweeping changes produced by Goldwater-Nichols require continued diligence to ensure full compliance with the intent of the legislation.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

Goldwater-Nichols has been remarkably successful in getting the Services to work together as a Joint Team. For a decade and a half now, we've been a much more effective instrument of National Security policy due, in part to the clearly defined position and authority of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and combatant commanders.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Yes.

Recently, there have been articles which indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

Almost 15 years of experience under Goldwater-Nichols has meant significant changes in the way the Defense Department operates. I am certain that legislative changes could provide further improvements. However, I would prefer reserving judgment on this until after I have studied any specific proposals and acquired some experience as a member of the JCS. At that time, I would be pleased to share my thoughts with the Committee as appropriate.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Air Force Chief of Staff?

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips America's Air Force to best provide the Secretary of Defense and the combatant Commanders in Chief the forces they need to accomplish our national security objectives.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

It has been my distinct honor to serve on active duty in the United States Air Force for more than 35 years. During this time, I have been privileged to serve at every level of command, culminating with my current duties at Air Combat Command, overseeing all combat airpower based in the Continental United States. My experience in the Pentagon as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and my earlier tours as Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and as a Deputy Director for Pol-Mil Affairs on the Joint Staff provided me with a firm foundation in military operations at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels. My tour of duty as Commander, US Air Forces in Europe, during the Kosovo conflict was particularly crucial in crystallizing my views on the effective employment of airpower in a Joint and Allied effort. My background provides extremely good preparation for the critical duties of Air Force Chief of Staff.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Air Force Chief of Staff?

A complete understanding of current Air Force and Defense Department issues is essential to my ability to discharge these important duties. Since my nomination, I have

taken action to enhance my knowledge of such issues, and I pledge to diligently continue to study the broad national security issues that will require my attention if I am confirmed.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you?

I believe Secretary Roche will expect me to continue the efforts and initiatives of Gen Ryan in enhancing the readiness and resources of the Air Force, and to focus on the re-capitalization needed for our aging aircraft fleet. I also believe Secretary Roche will expect me to engage in the Quadrennial Defense Review discussions that will shape our strategy and force structure for the next decade. I pledge to work these issues alongside my colleagues in the other services.

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

The Secretary of Defense.

I will work closely with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the best possible military advice for the Secretary of Defense. As Chief of Staff, I will diligently work to ensure the readiness of air forces to accomplish the aerospace side of the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance.

The Secretary of the Air Force.

Americans are rightfully proud to have the world's preeminent aerospace force. I will work very closely with the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure we meet our Air Force Vision: Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I will assist the Chairman in formulating military advice as a member of the JCS. I will diligently advise the CJCS on the capabilities of the Air Force and its preparation to support military operations by combatant commands. I will advise the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense on matters within my expertise as required.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I will assist the Vice Chairman to execute duties prescribed in statute and otherwise as directed by the Chairman or Secretary of Defense. I will advise the Vice Chairman of the capabilities and future requirements of the Air Force. I will also assist the Vice Chairman when he or she performs the duties of the Chairman because of a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the CJCS.

The Chiefs of the other services.

I will cooperate and work closely with the Chiefs of our other services to help them carry out their responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will seek to encourage synchronization of service capabilities to better produce the effects desired by our CINCs.

The Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

Like most commanders, I view my Vice as the person who has the insight and confidence to tell me when I'm wrong. I'll rely on my Vice for candid, resourceful counsel on the multitude of complex issues we face. I'll also expect my Vice to complement my efforts in communicating key Air Force issues.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command.

I intend to support the efforts of CINCUSSPACECOM, to ensure America's interests are both protected and advanced in space. Space offers tremendous potential for our country and I will work very closely with my colleagues in US Space Command as we implement the recommendations of the Space Commission.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command.

I view TRANSCOM as absolutely indispensable to our Air Force, from the way it moves a young airman's family between duty stations, to its ability to project our forces into harm's way with the sustainment necessary to protect our people and win the fight. I'll work with the CINC to improve our ability to do these things.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command.

I will keep the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Strategic Command advised of the readiness of the air forces to support Strategic Command operations.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command.

Clearly an area of critical importance, I'll ensure that the Air Force is providing the CINC with the right equipment and fully trained people to execute these demanding missions. As with the other officials named above, a forthright dialogue is the way to get that done.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Air Force Chief of Staff?

As we continue to refine our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy our Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAFs) must continue to evolve to include

the robusting of our low density high demand assets. Our greatest challenge remains the requirement to advance new capabilities while maintaining the robust readiness required to meet day-to-day warfighter requirements. It is imperative we develop our Global Strike Task Force (GSTF), a kick-down-the-door force that will assure access and aerospace dominance for all our joint forces, yet our current aging airframes must be sustained at a level enabling rapid response to any present threat. We will continue to address the challenge of retaining our skilled personnel, as well as meeting the needs of our deteriorating base infrastructure.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Day-to-day readiness of our aging aircraft fleet depends on continued robust funding of spare parts, aggressive efforts to enhance retention of skilled personnel, and engaged unit leadership on our flight lines. . . I plan on focusing much of my efforts on these three essentials. Moreover, I plan to actively pursue implementation of the Global Strike Task Force concept alongside my fellow service chiefs so as to provide the Department a compelling joint capability that incorporates the key lessons of the '90s and addresses the emerging threat.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Air Force Chief of Staff?

Because the Chief of Staff is primarily responsible for providing properly trained and equipped forces to the Combatant Commanders, the most serious problem facing us today is adequate resources to accomplish that task. No matter how you slice it, the Air Force needs more funding to provide the essential tools to our warfighting commanders. Without recapitalization of our aircraft fleet, we face a downward spiral in capability that will affect the options available to the National Command Authority. Furthermore, without recapitalization we can never achieve the savings, both in dollars and American lives that could be realized through the completion of the AEF concept and the implementation of capabilities like the Global Strike Task Force.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

I recognize that fiscal realities will constrain the funds available to us and I'm prepared to aggressively manage the funding entrusted to the Air Force to ensure we get the absolute maximum in combat power for every dollar of the taxpayer's money we spend. The Air Staff cannot do this alone, however. I will tell subordinate commanders, at all levels, that I consider sound fiscal management an integrity issue. We can accept nothing less from those who spend the funds. The immediate timeline for solutions has already been dictated by the budgeting process – we already know what we can buy and when. Obviously, I would hope to affect that process in the long term by continuing to keep this Administration and Congress informed of our needs.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues, which must be addressed by the Air Force Chief of Staff?

*I intend to follow the objectives put forth by Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Roche that include **transformation, readiness, retention, and recapitalization**.*

***Transformation**, because the Air Force is inherently transformational-- constantly adapting ourselves to new threats and leveraging new technology in order to posture ourselves to face the challenges of an uncertain future.*

***Readiness**, because it is the heart and soul of our ability to perform our mission on a day-to-day basis, and is the hallmark of our combat capability.*

***Retention**, because we can only be successful through the energy and dedication of skilled and motivated personnel.*

***Recapitalization**, because we must recover from a decade-long spending hiatus to provide the tools our Airmen need to fly, fight and win.*

Strategic Airlift Requirements

What is the biggest challenge for the Air Force in meeting strategic airlift requirements and what would you do, if confirmed as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to meet that challenge?

The largest challenge remains the reliability of the C-5 Fleet and the modernization of this fleet. If confirmed, I will place a strong emphasis on the AF's 2-phase program to modernize the C-5. Phase I is an Avionics Modernization Program that replaces unreliable and unsupportable avionics components. Phase II is a reliability and re-engining program providing for commercial replacement of the aircraft's powerplants and the replacement of "bad actor" hydraulic, landing gear, and fuel system components among others. The resulting goal of this program is a 75% mission-capable rate for the C-5 fleet.

The Air Force has completed, but has not made available to the Committee, the Outsize/Oversize Analysis of Alternatives for strategic lift aircraft. That analysis is required for the Congress to evaluate possible alternatives for providing strategic airlift.

If confirmed, when do you intend to forward that analysis to the Congress?

The Outsize/Oversize Analysis of Alternatives is currently in final coordination with AMC/CC. We intend to forward the study to Congress following the OSD Strategic Review and QDR.

Mobility Requirements Study

What priority would you place on carrying out the strategic airlift recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study?

MRS-05 provided the most in-depth analysis of airlift requirements to date; CJCS, Service Chiefs, and CINCs agreed to the airlift requirement of 54.5 MTM/D. However, MRS-05 did not resolve the fleet mix. The Outsize/Oversize Analysis of Alternatives (O/O AoA), the OSD Strategic Review, and the QDR will address the most effective and fiscally responsible fleet mix. The AF is awaiting firm follow-on requirements as well as requirements derived from MRS-05, O/O AoA, and the QDR before negotiating follow-on contracts.

Strategic Forces

Do you believe that the United States should retain a strategic Triad of offensive nuclear forces for deterrent purposes?

Yes.

Do you believe the current Air Force bomber roadmap is sufficient to sustain a bomber force to perform its strategic nuclear missions?

Yes, the Next Generation Bomber Study demonstrates how modernization of the bomber fleet will provide new bomber equivalent capability at significantly less cost. However, as a part of the DoD's National Military Strategy Review all force structure and modernization priorities are being re-evaluated. The Air Force needs a minimum of 157 bombers (B-52, B-1, B-2) at their full capability to employ a variety of weapons across the full spectrum of conflict.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

On a recurring basis, regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), express significant concern about the responsiveness and availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to support their respective theaters, both in peacetime and during conflict. A review of recent budgets indicates relatively modest investment in the airborne ISR assets CINCs are most concerned about, compared to the large investment in national level ISR assets.

In your view, is the investment strategy in theater level and national level ISR assets appropriately balanced?

Yes. There are important modernization and acquisition priorities for both theater- and national-level ISR assets. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the needs

of the regional CINCs are appropriately reflected in the Air Force budget.

In view of the risks associated with manned reconnaissance, as pointed out by the recent EP-3 incident, what is your vision for ISR in the future, both manned and unmanned?

We will continue to move forward with manned, unmanned and space reconnaissance assets, but will look to better integrate the information collected by horizontal integration of all of these assets. This combination of manned, unmanned and space platforms will talk together at the digital level to resolve ambiguities of target location and target identification. Together, they will provide the right information to predict the enemy's intentions and successfully execute air operations to defend national interests.

Information Dominance

As you are well aware, Joint Vision 2020 identifies information dominance as a key enabler of mission success. This is especially true for precision strike operations, wherein full situational awareness and assured communications are critical. Information operations and information assurance assume key roles in current and future warfare.

What is your view of the role of information operations in current and future military operations?

Information Operations personnel are part of our new warrior class, an integral arm of the Air Force, and information operations in synchronization with traditional kinetic means, will remain a critical element of our strategy to fight and win future conflicts.

Are you satisfied with the unity of effort within the Air Force and within the Department of Defense towards integrating information operations into overall military operations?

The Department of Defense has done an excellent job of focusing on the discipline of Information Operations. As technology develops and there are more available, reliable means of communications, there will be new opportunities and challenges faced by DoD. The Air Force will continue to work with all DoD agencies to seek out better ways for exploiting those opportunities and protecting our systems from adversary countries' efforts to do the same. In particular, we must bring IO to the operational and tactical levels of war.

Joint Response Forces

A recurring theme in the on-going strategic review and Quadrennial Defense Review has been the need for standing joint task forces or joint response forces that habitually train together and can quickly respond to support contingencies around the world.

Do you believe that there is a need for such joint response forces?

The concept of joint response forces is still in proposal stage and I have only limited exposure to the details of the proposal. I'm certainly willing to study any concrete proposal along these lines or to offer my views on how best to proceed. I believe that the current Title 10 system, refined under Goldwater-Nichols, has proven its worth and yielded real success. The Services operate effectively to provide trained, equipped, and ready forces for the specific needs of the combatant commanders. There may be a place for a standing Joint Task Force (or Joint Response Force) Headquarters, consisting of command and planning elements organized under a warfighting CINC and exercised jointly by USCINCFJCOM. However, that requires further study and coordination with the services.

What implications does this concept have for the way the Air Force is currently organized, including strike assets, global response assets, and ISR assets?

The AEF provides the current Air Force construct for organizing and presenting forces to combatant commanders. Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) packages represent capabilities designed to produce the effects every CINC calls for while helping us better manage the tempo of our personnel and equipment. If a new joint response force concept were created, the Air Force would perform our role within the existing EAF construct.

What improvements are needed in current Air Force and joint command and control systems to support such a concept?

We are very focused on development of a horizontally-integrated Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) system that will link together space, manned, and unmanned platforms using machine-level conversations to produce decision quality information for commanders and target quality information for cockpits. This system, by its very nature, will include and integrate all service C2ISR capabilities. Such a system would also enhance the effectiveness of a Joint Response Force if it were to come to pass.

Officer Management Issues

We consider promotions to general and flag officer ranks as identifying military officers for very senior positions that should be filled only by officers with the very highest moral and ethical values.

Do you believe the officer corps has confidence in the integrity of the officer

promotion system in the Air Force?

Yes.

What role do you expect the Air Force Chief of Staff to play in the officer promotion system?

Title 10 calls for the SECAF to oversee the officer promotion process and govern all promotion board actions. I will advise the secretary as he seeks to ensure only the highest caliber individuals are nominated and promoted.

What role do you expect the Air Force Chief of Staff to play in the general officer management and nomination process?

I will engage in continuous collaboration with the secretary on the management and nomination of general officers with the goal to ensure only those officers who possess the highest standards will be nominated. USC Title 10 guides the SecAF and CSAF in the management of general officers, which I intend to use as a starting point for guaranteeing that USAF senior leaders remain the best possible officers in the USAF.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that only the most highly qualified officers are nominated for promotion to general and flag officer rank?

The Air Force has already taken several important steps to ensure our system is fair and effective. Throughout the last decade, revisions in our promotion system have withstood scrutiny from both outside and inside the Air Force. I will make certain my predecessors' efforts to improve the promotion system remain viable and I will provide the best possible advice to the SecAF as part of my USC Title 10 responsibilities. I will work this particular issue energetically, and will help guarantee my staff and that of the secretary maintains an open dialogue with this Committee on these critical general officer matters.

Protected Communications

Section 1034, Title 10, United States Code, prohibits taking retaliatory personnel action against a member of the armed forces as reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command. We continue to see a lack of understanding in the senior military leadership of the policy that it is appropriate and necessary to protect service members who report misconduct to appropriate authorities outside of the chain of command.

Do you support prohibiting retaliatory personnel actions for making protected communications?

I strongly support the statutory prohibition on taking retaliatory personnel actions against those who make protected communications. I believe any such retaliation strikes at the heart of honest discourse that must occur between airmen and their leaders, inside and outside the chain of command. In Air Combat Command, my Inspector General has made investigation of all IG complaints, including reprisal, a priority.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior Air Force leaders understand the need to protect service members who report misconduct to appropriate authorities within or outside the chain of command?

If I am confirmed, I will do three things to ensure Air Force members remain confident they will be protected when they make these types of communications: (1) I'll ensure every airman and civilian member of the Air Force understands their right to make these statements and to be afforded the protections of the statute, where necessary; (2) I'll devote the needed resources to permit the Inspector General to properly investigate allegations of reprisal whenever they occur; and (3) I'll stress to commanders the importance of acting appropriately to punish those found to have engaged in reprisal.

Operating Tempo

The services have been very concerned in recent years about the impact of the pace of operations, or "ops-tempo," on the quality of life of our people in uniform and specifically on their willingness to reenlist.

What steps do you plan to take to address the Air Force opstempo concerns?

We are stretched too thin and are wearing people and equipment out. Sustained operations tempo is a major factor in recruiting and retention efforts. It has taken its toll on the force--which is still deploying over 3 times more often despite the drawdown--a total force now 67% (AD now 60%) of its former size. High ops-tempo also compounds challenges of an aging fleet, by putting additional stresses on airframes that already require extensive maintenance to maintain mission capable status. High ops-tempo, downsizing, and other factors have placed us in a position of doing more with less. The Air Reserve Component is integral to reducing active duty ops-tempo, however, high operations rates also challenges ARC recruiting and retention. The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) brings much needed predictability & stability, incorporates total force, and provides for a reconstitution period, providing tools to better manage the force. The EAF construct determines how the Air Force is organized, trained and equipped, and provides the tools to better manage the force. Additionally, we are working with ANG and AFR to better manage the tempo of our operations.

Recruiting and Retention

The Air Force achieved its recruiting goal for active duty personnel for FY2000 and projects that it will meet its FY2001 active duty recruiting objectives.

The Air Force Reserve missed its FY 2000 recruiting goal, and it does not appear that the Air National Guard will achieve its FY2001 goal.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to assist the Air Force in meeting its recruiting and retention goals?

Your continuing support of our recruiting initiatives has helped us meet our recruiting goals without lowering our standards. That support included bonuses, adjusted pay initiatives, retirement reforms, and improvements in medical benefits, which helped us achieve our FY00 recruiting goals, and has kept us on track again this year. We still need your help to attract the highest quality individuals into the military service. If confirmed, I will aggressively work with the appropriate agencies to ensure the AF continues to meet the recruitment goal, both in terms of quality and quantity.

In an effort to meet our recruiting goals, The Air Force held a comprehensive review of recruiting and accessions processes. One of the most important initiatives from this review was to increase our recruiter force. We increased the number of recruiter authorizations from 1,209 to 1,450 in FY00, and we project 1,650 recruiter authorizations by the end of 2001. The active duty drawdown has also created an additional recruiting challenge for our Guard and Reserve components. As a result, the Air Force Reserve is increasing its recruiting force in FY01 by 50 recruiters (to 564), and the Air National Guard is adding 65 recruiters (to 413) over the next three years.

Furthermore, we launched a multi-faceted marketing campaign, including NASCAR, television and movie theater advertising. We are synchronizing our efforts through a newly established marketing and advertising office. Our ads depict the teamwork, dedication, and technological sophistication that characterize the Air Force. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard also launched a national campaign that includes television, radio, and outdoor advertisements. We also continue to emphasize to all our Air Force people that "We Are All Recruiters." With an emphasis on publicity and our own people telling the Air Force story, we broaden the Nation's awareness of the Air Force.

The Air Force is also expanding accession incentives. Enhanced enlistment bonuses are focused on 85 critical skills, which have resulted in and increase in 6-year enlistment from 11% in FY98 to 55% in FY00. In January of this year the AF Recruiting Service and the AF Directorate of Personnel began evaluating "signing bonuses" of up to \$5,000 for Mechanical, Electrical and other designated skills to help meet recruiting goals during the hard-to-recruit months of February through May. We are considering several initiatives to attract more Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) candidates, including offering cadets contracts after their freshman year rather than waiting until the end of their sophomore year, as well as recommending legislation to permit an officer accession bonus. We actively pursue the talent in our enlisted force through enlisted commissioning opportunities--we have nearly quadrupled the number of prior service commissioning accessions from 169 in FY1998 to 647 so far in FY2001. This program offers a great incentive for people who want to continue their Air Force career.

Current projections indicate that the Air Force will not meet its 2nd and 3rd term retention goals and will miss its required end strength by 4,100.

Why do you believe the Air Force is having trouble retaining 2nd and 3rd term airmen?

The Air Force is recovering from several years of low retention rates from 1st-term airmen through career airmen. With your support we have extended reenlistment bonuses, increased housing allowances, and expanded the Montgomery GI Bill benefits, helping us to successfully turn the corner on 1st-term enlisted airmen retention. Part of the trouble with retaining 2nd-term and career airmen is they have been overtasked year after year; collectively changing their mind to stay in the AF is more difficult than convincing a 1st-term airmen to give us a second chance. These airmen are the backbone of our enlisted force and they endure the increased load to train our new accessions plus carry out the day-to-day work required of experienced technicians. The AF increased total accessions to offset poor retention in an effort to meet end-strength goals. AF apprentice (3-level) manning is currently at 115% and journeyman (5-level) manning is at 80%. In the short-term, this significantly impacts our experience levels. Our journeyman, who make up the majority of 2nd-term reenlistments and a portion of the career reenlistment categories, are working hard to carry the load as we work to balance the experience within the force. If, however, we sustain our 1st-term reenlistment goal, these people will become tomorrow's experienced technicians and mentors, easing some of the experience inequities.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to address this problem?

If confirmed, I will continue to fight against the key factors that cause low retention. These factors include wages, high operations tempo, quality of life issues, and leadership. The primary tool to mitigate low retention is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, which offers a bonus to 76% of our enlisted skills. We continue to look for initiatives to improve retention. The AF held a Retention Summit composed of MAJCOM senior officer/enlisted representatives, AFPC and ANG reps--19 initiatives were approved, including Career Assistance Advisors, Patient Advocates, Retention Toolkit, enhanced Spousal Employment program and subsidized in-home childcare in support of extended hours. Four Red Team/Integrated Process Teams are now studying NCO Retraining, Enlisted Bonuses, Pay Structure and Montgomery GI Bill/Tuition Assistance.

The Air Force has requested an end strength of 358,800 personnel, an increase of 1800 over the FY 2001 authorized end strength of 357,000.

Do you think the Air Force can achieve this increased end strength if it misses its FY 2001 authorized end strength by more than 4000 airmen?

The requested end-strength is justified and we will increase accessions and improve our retention to meet our goals. People are our most vital resource, our most crucial readiness component. Our long-term goal is to stop the decline in end-strength and start growth to size the force to support increased operations tempo. The Air Force has undergone a 38% decrease in end strength since FY98. We base military end-strength needs on combat capability after rightsizing infrastructure, taking advantage of technology, reengineering functions, and competing non-military essential support functions. However, the number of peacekeeping missions, relief efforts and other military operations have steadily increased -- driving the need to increase aircrews, maintainers and combat support. Also, updated manpower requirements models, driven by lessons learned from real-world operations, and stresses on the fleet due to aging aircraft and longer sortie durations, have resulted in increased manpower requirements.

The Air Force is having difficulty retaining officers with skills that are in high demand in the private sector. This includes pilots, scientists, engineers, and communications computer systems officers.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve officer retention, particularly in these high demand areas?

For pilots, increased production and longer active duty service commitments improve overall accessions and the average time a pilot remains on active duty. With your help, the Air Force significantly improved the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program. For both our pilots and non-rated officers, our AEFs are helping to manage operations tempo, and recent Quality of Life improvements have removed some of the "irritants" that drive quality people to other jobs in the civilian economy. The cumulative effect of bonuses, the improved rhythm of our AEFs and improvements in quality of life help our total retention efforts.

Quality of Life Issues

The Air Force has made significant strides toward improving the quality of life of its personnel. Despite these improvements there are still significant problems. By some estimates the Air Force must still revitalize over 58,000 housing units and an equally large number of barracks spaces.

In this period of constrained resources, if confirmed, how would you weigh the allocation of resources to modernization of the Air Force and improving quality of life?

People are our most vital resource. We must continue to maintain a balance between caring for our Airmen and paying for the tools needed for mission accomplishment. Your help over the years on pay, retirement and health care has been much appreciated. Quality of life issues are terribly important to attract and retain great people, but so is quality of service. Quality of service addresses the need to ensure we give our airmen the proper tools to do the tough jobs we ask them to do in places like

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in the no-fly zone enforcement where combat occurs on a daily basis. The same is true in the Balkans and Korea. Quality of service is not just about equipment with which they operate, but the ranges and hangers and buildings and shops in which we ask them to do their work. Therefore, I will work to ensure an effective balance between quality of life and modernization spending is maintained.

Should the Air Force allocate more resources toward improving quality of life for our forces deployed overseas? If so, why?

Focus on quality of life is required for all of our forces, wherever they are stationed. As a result of my recent experience as COMUSAFE, I am aware of some the unique quality of life initiatives (COLA, DoD schools, etc.) that require particular attention. If confirmed I will ensure these special emphasis areas continue to be properly addressed.

In your view, can and should our allies provide more support toward improving the quality of life of our military personnel and their families deployed in Europe and the Far East?

Our allies in the Far East and Europe already provide significant support to our forces overseas, and our regional commanders are actively engaged with our allied counterparts to ensure that level of support is sustained. Consideration of increased support should be addressed at policy level. If confirmed, I will work to keep appropriate policymakers informed of Air Force requirements for continued overseas support.

Homosexual Conduct Policy

Do you support the current Department of Defense Homosexual Conduct Policy?

Yes, I support the current policy.

If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the basic policy or its implementation? If so, what changes will you propose?

No, I don't plan to make any changes if I am confirmed. The Air Force/JA monitors all cases other than those at Basic Military Training School (BMTS). BMTS separations are mostly voluntary. The AF system for monitoring these cases has been praised by DoD and there have been only a handful of violations of the policy within the Air Force over the past 5 years, and those have been characterized by a lack of familiarity with the policy rather than through malice or prejudice.

Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program

DOD considers the biological agent anthrax to be the greatest biological weapon threat to our military force because it is highly lethal, easy to produce in large quantities, and remains viable over long periods of time. The anthrax vaccination program has been curtailed because of limited quantities of FDA approved vaccine.

If confirmed, will you support and enforce the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program if DoD reinstates it?

Yes.

How do you believe the Air Force should respond to service members who refuse to take the vaccine when ordered to do so?

We should carefully educate our people on the very real danger posed by anthrax, and we should inform them of the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine. This is a force protection issue. We will continue to make experts available to answer any questions our service members have. In the past, almost everyone who has been fully informed of the threat and the protection afforded by the vaccine has chosen to be inoculated. For those few members who ultimately refuse an order to be vaccinated, appropriate disciplinary action should be considered. Any disciplinary response will be accomplished at the lowest appropriate level.

Montgomery GI Bill

Almost all new service members enroll in and contribute to the Montgomery GI Bill. Only about half use their benefits, and many do not use all of their entitlement. Many airmen say they would like to stay in the Service, but feel they have to leave so that they can provide for the education of their spouses and children. Some of these service members might stay in the service if they could transfer all or a part of their unused entitlement to GI Bill benefits to family members in return for a service commitment. Service Secretaries could use this retention tool selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses.

Do you support this approach?

Yes, I have always been a firm believer in the theory that we recruit the individual but retain the family. I see the transfer of educational benefits to family members as another way of helping us achieve our retention goals.

If confirmed, will you give serious consideration to how the Air Force can use the transfer of unused GI Bill benefits to family members as a retention tool?

Yes, if confirmed I will work to package the transfer of these benefits in the manner that best meets the needs our airmen and our service's retention goals.

Gender Integrated Training

Basic training, which may be the single most important phase of an individual's life in the military, is structured and defined differently by each Service.

Do you believe the current DOD policy of allowing each of the services to establish its own policy for gender integration in Basic Training is effective?

Yes. Each of the Services has its own needs when it comes to basic training. I know that a great deal of time and effort has been devoted to find the right answers for the Air Force and I expect that work to continue. The essential element for me is that we must train our newest members to handle the physical and psychological tests that await our Air Force -- our training program must address that squarely and I'm dedicated to achieving that objective.

If confirmed, will you propose changes to Air Force policies? If so, what changes will you propose?

I am sure that I will gain additional perspective on this issue if I am confirmed as Chief of Staff but, at present, there are no immediate changes I would make in our basic training policies.

Priorities in Tactical Aviation

Over the past several years, the Senate Armed Services Committee has devoted substantial attention to the condition of tactical aviation. The Committee concluded that there are persistent and serious problems, including aging of the aircraft fleet, shortages of certain types of tactical aircraft, and inefficient production rates. There have been continuing concerns about the affordability of the overall tactical aviation modernization effort, focusing on the three major programs, F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter.

Do you believe that all three tactical aviation modernization plans are affordable?

If not, what criteria should Congress use in deciding which programs should go forward?

Current fighters in the Air Force inventory are rapidly approaching obsolescence due to new fighter and air defense threats. At the F-22 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date (Dec 05), the average age of the F-15C will be 26 years. Supportability is becoming very expensive in terms of maintenance and manpower costs. Many of our parts suppliers are moving on to commercial work. The F-22, a truly transformational design with its unique maneuverable stealth and supercruise, will provide rapid air dominance.

A-10 and F-16 survivability against advanced threats are also becoming an issue, and the F-16 is rapidly approaching the end of its service life. Additionally, we have planned to cross flow new technologies from the F-22 to the JSF, so it is critical to keep F-22 development on schedule to ensure JSF can affordably replace F-16 and A-10 prior to the end of their service lives. This mix is the most cost effective fiscal and operational solution to Air Force fighter modernization.

The Air Force has historically (FY75-FY05) averaged 16% of service Total Obligation Authority (TOA) on RDT&E and Procurement of aircraft. Procuring both the F-22 and the JSF, both of which are critical to our modernization, will expend less than this historical average. In its peak expenditure year, the F-22 encompasses just 5.6% of Air Force TOA or 1.7% of the DoD TOA, both of which are comparable to past modernization investment levels. If we committed the same percentage of national resources for the F-22 that we did for the F-15, we would be buying an inventory of 1000 F-22s.

F-22 Program

Over the past several years, the F-22 program has been operating under a legislated production cost cap. This cap was based on the Air Force's assessment of what would be required to complete the buy of 339 aircraft. At the time, it was understood that there were other offices, including the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) that had higher estimates of F-22 production costs. Over the past couple of years, the Committee has believed that F-22 production would fit within the cost cap, largely due to Air Force assurances that the various cost estimates were beginning to converge.

This year, the Air Force estimate of production costs for the F-22 is up by roughly \$2 billion. In such a circumstance, we should have expected that this increase would have indicated some further convergence of the cost estimates. Press reports, however, indicate that the independent cost estimates have begun to diverge from the Air Force estimate.

Why, in your opinion, are these cost estimates diverging?

F-22 funding projections are well within historic norms of spending for aircraft development and procurement as a percentage of AF TOA, and the AF is proactively managing costs to remain within Congressional caps.

What steps should the Air Force take to ensure that it will be able to produce enough aircraft to meet the requirements for the program within the cost cap?

Currently, the F-22 program is structured around a buy of 339 aircraft. We are studying in this strategic review capabilities needed for the future, and what number of

F-22s will meet those needs. The F-22 is a huge leap in capability -- an airplane that can super-cruise at well above 1.5 Mach; has very good legs; has stealth capabilities that are revolutionary. So the need for this airplane is very clear. The numbers will be the question as we go through this review. It is in testing right now, as you know, and doing very well. In fact, its signature, its capability to super-cruise, its avionics capability and its aerodynamic capabilities are as we predicted them and, in some cases, better. We are behind on testing, but we're not going to rush that at the expense of safety or missing something as we develop this airplane. Testing is something you don't want to rush. It's not something that you restrict to a timeline--you do this in a very structured way. Overall, the program is in very, very good shape.

Modernization

At a recent Committee hearing, Air Force officials testified that the F-22 will not be able to meet its congressionally-mandated cost caps for either development or production.

What are your views on cost caps in general, and, specifically, on the F-22 cost caps?

F-22 funding projections are well within historic norms of spending for aircraft development and procurement as percentage of AF TOA and the AF is proactively managing costs to remain within Congressional caps, but caps are currently constraining our testing. The F-22 flight-testing has been extremely successful -- over 1260 hours, and the aircraft is demonstrating some revolutionary capabilities. Some delays have been encountered, due in part to late airframe deliveries, requiring additional time before initiating operational testing. To meet the additional costs associated with these delays, the Air Force recommends removal of the EMD cost cap. The actual development is 95% complete -- EMD caps are currently constraining continued flight-testing.

The Source Selection decision for the Joint Strike Fighter is scheduled in the near future.

Do you think the programmed quantities of the Air Force variant of this aircraft will be affordable?

The JSF program is focused on affordability. JSF will provide a lower cost, multi-role fighter--the bulk of the force and a compliment to the F-22. The quantity of aircraft purchased will help keep costs lower. In addition, our contracting strategy provides incentives to the contractor to meet affordability goals. And three of eight key performance parameters for this program directly target reductions to Total Ownership Costs. Cost as an independent variable (CAIV) has been used during development to balance cost and operational capability in established weapon system requirements; the CAIV process will continue to be an integral part of the JSF program, ensuring a next-generation fighter--in the numbers we require--at a price we can afford.

What are your views on the future roles that will be played by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles in the Air Force?

The UCAV will join the B-2, F-22 and JSF in our vision of an all stealth force. The UCAV holds great promise for the future. Many challenges remain in terms of how we operationalize its capability as we move into the future. UCAVs will allow us greater degrees of stealthiness to be able to operate against projected anti-access threat. If confirmed, I intend to see to the development of a low life-cycle cost, mission effective system design and demonstrate the critical technologies, processes, and system attributes for a UCAV weapon system as well as potential SEAD/Strike capabilities.

In recent operations, it appeared a larger percentage of weapons used were precision-guided.

PGMs were highly effective in the Air War Over Serbia, resulting in decreased risk and limited collateral damage . The USAF employed over 5,289 precision munitions against nearly 64% of all desired impact points. The collateral damage rate was less than 0.1%.

Are inventories of precision-guided weapons sufficient?

No. They are still well below desired inventory level and failure to increase stockpiles risks wartime shortfalls. Northern / Southern Watch and Allied Force significantly reduced inventory levels such that we must use War Reserve Munitions for training. Major acquisition programs will begin to increase precision inventories with the addition of JDAM, JSOW-B, and JASSM, however, serious shortfalls in standoff and legacy munitions persist through FYDP.

What are the major developmental thrusts that are necessary to improve the accuracy and lethality of our weapons inventories?

I believe the JDAM, WCMD, JASSM, SDB, and ABL programs are the major developmental thrusts and these programs are on track.

F-22 Event-based Decision Making

The Air Force is required to manage the F-22 program on the basis of achieving certain milestones, rather than "graduating" when certain time on the calendar has elapsed. There have been delays in the testing program that will delay the start of operational testing by up to one year from the previously planned date. Nevertheless, there is still some risk that developmental testing may not be able to support operational testing even on this delayed schedule.

Can you assure the Committee that the Air Force will not proceed to

operational testing before the program has completed sufficient developmental testing?

Yes! If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring the F-22 does not proceed to operational testing until sufficient developmental testing has been completed. It is critical that developmental testing be fully conducted in order to have the best possible capabilities ready for the operational testing. I will ensure the Air Force completes all necessary testing prior to certifying the F-22 is ready to enter DIOT&E.

Unmanned Air Vehicles

In the Fiscal Year 2001 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act, Congress set a goal that within ten years one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned. In addition, Congress invested an additional \$50 million above the President's budget request in the Air Force Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle.

Do you support the ten-year goal of one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft being unmanned?

Yes. I fully support the AF/DARPA project that is underway and that was chartered to achieve that very goal. The focus today is on developing UCAVs for the SEAD/Strike mission; other potential UCAV roles we're exploring include directed energy, electronic attack, and ISR.

Do you feel the current level of investment, the Fiscal Year 2002 President's budget request of \$60 million, is sufficient to realize this goal?

No. Although combined DARPA and AF funding of UCAV through FY 03 exceeds \$200M, no funding exists in the President's Budget beyond FY 03. Fielding 30 deep-strike UCAVs will require an additional \$1.3B between FY02-FY07.

Reserve Components

Although the Department of Defense claims a commitment to the "Total Force," some question this commitment. Those who question the Department's support of the reserve components claim that the reserve components do not receive an appropriate share of the defense budget and that they are not assigned appropriate missions. The most recent example of concern is raised by the Air Force proposal to retire the B-1 wings in the Air National Guard.

What is your response to these concerns?

I am a firm believer in the total force concept. We cannot complete our mission successfully without our reserve component. The Air Force is a recognized leader in the integration of its Guard and Reserve forces. The ARC is a full partner in the AF's

corporate programming and budget process. Additionally, Guard and Reserve units participate in combat and combat support operations on a daily basis.

The decision to consolidate B-1s is a monetary one. The money saved from consolidating the B-1 units onto two bases will be used to bring the remaining B-1 fleet up to current modernization levels. With over \$2B in unfunded requirements, we can pour that money back into modernizing the remaining B-1 fleet.

What is the appropriate criteria for deciding on the appropriate missions and level of contribution from the reserve components?

On a larger scale, to be relevant in the present and future AF, which is key to funding and survival, the ARC must at all times mirror their AD counterparts. If the missions ever separate into an ARC vs AD mission, then funding, organization, training, equipping, etc. becomes threatened.

From an AEF perspective: The appropriate criteria should be the same for the ARC as for any other active duty (AD) MAJCOM in the AF. If the ARC has a designed operational capability (DOC) statement tasking it to deploy F-16s to various theaters, the F-16 mission should be the same for the ARC as it is for the AD. If there is an air-to-ground, air-to-air, SEAD/DEAD mission, that criteria for that mission should be the same across the board.

The level has to be based on a measure of volunteerism and what the reserve components do is look at their historical participation and project how long per person and how long can the ARC sustain that mission over time. Subjectively, with volunteerism, the ARC on ECS can handle about 10% of the total steady state mission for AEFs.

It is erroneous to dictate that it takes six ARC personnel for one AD person equivalent. By weapon system and position, on average for AEFs the ARC really is on a 1 for 3 or 1 for 4 level. It takes 3 to 4 people/volunteers to fill one active duty position for one 3-month AEF rotation. If there is a PRC, we're back to one for one. To clarify, there are not 3 to 4 reservists on station for one AD person. There is only one person there. So to do the job on a daily basis, it takes only one person, but over the entire span of the deployment, 3 or 4 people.

Are the reserve components used to the maximum extent practicable? If so, do they still have excess structure that can be eliminated?

The ARC annually participates in all major contingencies, exercises, and competitions. Additionally, it is the linchpin of our humanitarian and North American Air Defense efforts.

Do you foresee any significant shift in the roles and missions currently

performed by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve?

The ANG and AFR currently play an integral part in reducing active duty tempo and we will continue to look for additional ways to use them in support of AF requirements.

Base Closure

The President’s February budget blueprint document states that “with 23 percent in estimated excess infrastructure, it is clear that new rounds of base closures will be necessary to shape the military more efficiently.”

Do you believe that we need more base closures?

Yes, BRAC is an integral part of readiness and modernization as infrastructure is reshaped to match changing mission needs and other requirements.

Do you believe the Air Force has excess infrastructure that uses resources that could be applied to higher priorities within the Department of the Air Force?

Yes, the Air Force is over-based for the force structure we have today. We think that we can avoid significant costs in the out-years with a base closure process.

Do you believe the process established by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 is a fair and effective way to reduce excess military infrastructure and return the property to local authorities? What changes, if any, would you propose to this process?

The facts clearly support our burden of excess infrastructure. The BRAC is the only method by which we have fairly reduced our burden in the past; thus, I believe BRAC is effective. Changes to the BRAC process may be in order. Such changes would be products of legislation on which I am not yet in a position to comment.

In your view, would changing the base closure process to exempt some bases from the independent commission’s review make the process more or less open, fair, and stressful to communities with military installations?

Again, any changes to the BRAC process would be products of legislation on which I am not yet in a position to comment.

Over the past several years, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified that there is excess defense infrastructure and requested the Congress to authorize another round of base closure.

Do you believe that we have excess defense facilities and, if so, where does this excess capacity exist?

I will only speak for the United States Air Force, because I don't have insight into the other services' needs. I would say we as an Air Force are over 10 percent overbased.

BRAC Environmental Cleanup

In its report on *Issues and Alternatives for Cleanup and Property Transfer of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Sites*, dated August 1, 2000, the Institute for Defense Analyses noted that despite Department of Defense efforts to accelerate the program by working with effected communities and with Congress, property transfer is taking too long and goals are not being met. Many BRAC acres have not yet been transferred. These problems are compounded by recent indications that there are funding shortfalls for BRAC cleanup in the fiscal year 2002 budget of about \$92 million in the Navy account and \$55 million in the Air Force account. Such funding shortfalls adversely effect cleanup milestones, undercut the timeliness and value of property transfers, further harm communities already hurt by base closure, and threaten the overall credibility of the BRAC process.

Do you believe that adequate funding for BRAC cleanup should be an Air Force priority?

I believe it is important to keep BRAC cleanup on schedule for the benefit of the communities. The Air Force is committed to responsible environmental stewardship.

What is your response to the shortfalls in the fiscal year 2002 budget?

If confirmed, I will work to alleviate shortfalls in the FY02 budget in order to keep clean up on time and meet the program goals.

Investment in Installations

The military departments have consistently struggled to maintain their base infrastructure. The backlog of real property maintenance has remained high, whether budgets were increasing or decreasing. The military is far behind industry standards for maintaining and modernizing its facilities. Even the substantial increase in the Operation and Maintenance accounts in the fiscal year 2002 budget request does not provide sufficient funding to maintain the Air Force's facilities in their current status.

Are there any new approaches to this issue that you believe could help the Air Force move toward a solution of this perennial problem?

If confirmed, I will support BRAC to eliminate excess infrastructure. BRAC is an integral part of readiness and modernization as infrastructure is reshaped to match changing mission and other requirements. Other DoD initiatives should augment (not

replace) BRAC.

Traditionally, funding the upkeep of installations has been a low priority in the services' budgets. It is anticipated that after the completion of the current Quadrennial Defense Review, future budgets will devote a greater share of resources to modernization and transformation efforts.

Do you expect that funding for real property maintenance will decline even further once the QDR is completed?

It is too early to tell. But, if real property maintenance (RPM) continues to decline, we will feel the impact on readiness and retention. Our people deserve more than a 191-year plant replacement value rate for their facilities.

Outsourcing of Commercial Activities

Over the past several years the Department of Defense has increased its reliance on the private sector to perform certain activities including equipment maintenance and facility operations.

Do you believe that the military services should retain a core capability to perform certain key support activities such as equipment maintenance?

Yes. In the Air Force, we have improved efficiency and saved money by privatizing areas such as utilities, housing, and demolition, and A-76 conversions have added to savings, but the Air Force must retain core capabilities for any support activities which have the potential to adversely affect our combat capability (such as for maintenance on equipment which is essential for deployment).

Encroachment Issues

The Senior Readiness Oversight Committee is currently reviewing a group of readiness challenges it has characterized as “encroachment” issues. These include population growth near military installations, environmental constraints on military training ranges, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and the conflicts with civilian users over the use of radio frequency spectrum.

In your opinion, how serious are these problems for the Department of the Air Force?

Encroachment is a very serious problem for the Air Force. Maintaining continued access to our ranges, airspace and frequency spectrum is absolutely critical; in fact, if our ability to train our aircrews continues to diminish, America will soon lose its only edge in air combat proficiency. We can no longer rely on current Air Force

technology to provide an advantage against our next adversary—that next adversary already has access to more advanced equipment than ours. It is only our superior training that enables our pilots to have the upper hand in air combat. That training depends on the right amount and the right type of ranges and airspace. These areas are national assets that allow the Air Force to test new equipment, develop new tactics, and train our forces to be combat-ready. AF ranges also accommodate important civilian industry aeronautical testing, and provide for public use and natural and cultural resource protection.

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these challenges and what actions would you propose to take to address them?

If confirmed, my role will be to direct the Air Force to meet military needs while addressing public concerns along with federal, tribal, state, and other agency issues. We have adopted a spirit and practice of flexibility and willingness to adapt without compromising our operations. In fact, in 1994 the AF organized and stood-up an airspace and range staff in the Pentagon to work the issues facing our combat forces, and in 1995, Air Combat Command created an interdisciplinary staff that works range and airspace issues on a daily basis. Additionally, we realize the importance of establishing and maintaining permanent relationships with stakeholders. These stakeholders are supportive of the AF and our mission. Sustainable access to ranges benefits many people. Our ranges contain significant cultural and natural areas, are used for grazing and crop production, and allow hunting or other forms of outdoor recreation.

Of particular concern to the Air Force, commercial air traffic is expected to increase six percent annually, and military airspace use will also increase with the next generation of high performance weapon systems. As a result of the pressures associated with commercial air traffic congestion, noise, and other concerns, the acquisition and use of special use airspace has evolved into a challenging endeavor for all of the military departments.

If confirmed, what actions would you propose to address this challenge?

With the advent of the F-22 and JSF, we will go to the limits of our current range and airspace capability to accommodate both Operational, Test & Evaluation (OT&E) and training requirements. Not only will more sophisticated instrumentation be needed but more complex surface-to-air threat emitters will be required. These two sophisticated systems will allow us to maximize our daily training by providing proper feedback of our missions and give us realistic threats to simulate actual combat. As our weapons, weapons systems and tactics evolve, we cannot endure further encroachments that will decrease the size or quality of the airspace and ranges we use or our training will suffer, thereby affecting our combat readiness.

Efforts are also underway now to link space and information operations (IO) test and training capabilities to the range and airspace structure. Such physical and virtual connectivity will allow air, space, and IO capabilities to test and train in an integrated

fashion. This will not create an increased requirement for physical range space, but we will have limited funding and manpower to perform the integration of these capabilities as well as exercising them on the range.

We not only need land and airspace, but we rely heavily on critical parts of the electronic spectrum to carry out our missions. We must also ensure we can continue developing new electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures systems and capabilities as well as exercise existing systems as closely as possible to how we would employ them in conflict. In the future, we expect to encounter increasing challenges not only with our current level of operations, but also with beddowns of new weapon systems or realignments.

Maintaining our edge in air combat is directly linked to robust training capabilities, capabilities inherent in continued access to AF ranges and airspace. The AF recognizes the need to balance its test, training, and readiness requirements with responsible stewardship. We continue to look to our installations, ranges and airspace to provide the AF the operational flexibility, efficiency, and realism necessary to continuously enhance readiness while allowing commanders to minimize, to the extent possible, the impacts of their mission on the community, the environment, and the National Airspace System. The challenges we face require effective communication with all affected parties. The partnerships we have with our sister services, civilian government agencies, and other stakeholders are essential. Moreover, legislative and fiscal initiatives are also needed. Together, we can meet these challenges head-on and sustain America's readiness into the 21st century.

Readiness Levels

What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to execute its assigned missions?

Our dominance of the full spectrum of operations tends to overshadow what has happened to our readiness. Responding across this full spectrum of operations necessitates we have a certain number of units ready to deploy in the first thirty days of conflict. This is the basis of our readiness requirement of 92%. Since 1996, our worldwide combat force readiness rates have decreased 23 percentage points to a rate of 68% in April 2001. Furthermore, our overall Air Force readiness is lower than any time since June 1987. We are capable of winning today; however, we are concerned about these trends in readiness indicators.

The Air Force's major areas of concern are aging aircraft, retaining an experienced workforce, and working with constrained resources and parts (aging infrastructure, cannibalization of "hangar queens").

AGING AIRCRAFT: A major factor in the decline is the increasing age of our aircraft. On average, our aircraft are about 22 years old, and getting older. An aging fleet costs more, both in effort and dollars, to operate and maintain. For example, our flying hours have remained relatively constant over the past five years, but their cost has increased by over 45% after inflation. Older aircraft are simply more difficult to maintain as

mechanical failures become less predictable, repairs become more complicated, and parts become harder to come by and more expensive. But, even with these contributing factors, we had the best year in our history for aviation safety, a clear measure of our people's professionalism.

EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE: People are our most vital resource; the most crucial readiness component. Loss of experienced personnel contributed to 24% decline in readiness since 1996.

CONSTRAINED RESOURCES: We are also experiencing infrastructure shortfalls in our facilities (i.e., bases), vehicles and support equipment, and communications infrastructure. Sufficient inventories of weapon system spare parts are crucial to mission readiness. Lack of spares puts a severe strain on the entire combat support system, creating increased workload for our logistics personnel and reducing the number of mission-capable aircraft available to our operational forces. When our logistics system suffers parts shortages, maintenance personnel must either cannibalize parts from other equipment or aircraft to serve immediate needs, or accept degraded readiness while they wait out long-delivery times for back-ordered parts.

SPARE PARTS: With recent financial assistance from the Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress, we are turning our spare parts problems around. However, as our fighter, ISR, combat search and rescue, mobility, and tanker aircraft continue to age, they need more frequent and substantial repairs, driving up readiness costs. This, in turn, reduces the number of aircraft available for missions and creates higher demands on the remaining fleet. Reversing this trend will take additional funding and a concerted recapitalization effort. In addition, the maintenance tasks and materiel growth inherent in supporting our aging aircraft fleet have increased our depot workload. Limited depot infrastructure investment over the past decade, coupled with constrained funding, adds to our already significant challenges in meeting readiness requirements.

What are your recommendations for addressing your major areas of concern?

AGING AIRCRAFT: The increasing cost of readiness (including operations and maintenance) is consuming the funds required to modernize our systems and our infrastructure. We have developed a responsible, time-phased plan to modernize our force without sacrificing readiness or capability goals.

EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE: We have reshaped ourselves into an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) to balance impacts of a less experienced workforce and improve retainability by providing predictability and stability through our AEFs. We have also increased the use of Air Reserve Component (ARC). If confirmed as CSAF, I will continue to work on improving retention. People are our most important asset. Other improvement programs include compensation packages and quality of life programs that will make the AF competitive and desirable. I will also continue to work on improving

access to quality health care, workplace environments, and providing safe, affordable housing.

EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE: Continue to reduce the military pay gap relative to private sector; Reduction of out-of-pocket expenses; Enhanced legislative flexibility on Special Pays and Bonuses to target critical skills; Pursue force shaping initiatives to optimize civilian workforce; Improve TRICARE for active duty members, retirees, and family members.

SPARE PARTS: Recent improvements in spare parts funding are turning this situation around. Through internal funding realignment, the Administration, OSD and congressional plus-ups, we were able to spend an additional \$2 billion for spare parts over the past two years. This helped replenish inventories drained during Operation ALLIED FORCE. During the summer 2000 program review, the DoD fully supported our efforts to fill shortfalls in the spare-parts pipeline which were impacting operational requirements. Additional Administration and OSD support for FY02 includes full funding of the flying hour program and our airlift readiness spares packages, and increased funding to reduce the spares repair backlog.

OVERALL: We need to fix readiness shortfalls in key logistics resources including people, skills, spares, munitions, bare base assets, and vehicles. We need to improve our capability to rapidly develop deployment and sustainment plans for fast-breaking contingencies. Finally, we are making enhancements to our ACS command and control capability to make it more responsive, better integrated, and sufficiently robust to support EAF needs. These agile combat support initiatives are crucial to sustaining current and future combat operations.

Readiness Assessments

General Shinseki recently described our current readiness standards as “a Cold War legacy” that “reflect neither the complexity of today’s strategic and operational environments nor other important factors.”

What do you believe are the critical elements of a readiness assessment system?

The critical elements of a readiness assessment system look at personnel factors as well as weapon systems issues. A valid assessment system would then look at the possible operational environments and determine how and to what degree the Air Force can achieve the desired effects.

Does our current system contain these elements?

Yes.

Do you believe the Department can create a new readiness measurement system that will be able to better assess readiness for joint operations and predict

future readiness?

I think we can be more consistent across the Services regarding how we assess readiness. Per CSAF direction, as CAF Lead, I am responsible for certifying to USCINCFROM that each of our 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) we present to him meets the requirements for its three-month deployment vulnerability window. To ensure accurate reporting, we have developed an AEF Certification process, designed to increase chain of command involvement by moving readiness processes from the functional level to the command level. This process, in conjunction with our current Status of Operational Readiness and Training (SORTS) report, will provide us a clearer picture of current and future readiness.

Readiness Reports vs. Statements from the Field

One of the principal readiness concerns of the Committee is the apparent disconnect between the official readiness reports the Committee receives from the Pentagon and the concerns we hear from the operating forces. In the past, official reports and statements often indicated that the readiness of our military forces was high. Statements made by individuals in the operating forces, however, cast a far different picture. Recently, we have seen the official reports indicate that the readiness of the forces has been in decline. This more accurately reflects what we see in the field.

In your view, does the foregoing reflect a problem with the way we measure and report readiness?

No. However, we are instituting a process that will help address this issue. Per CSAF direction, as CAF Lead, I am responsible for certifying to USCINCFROM that each of our 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) meets the requirements for its three-month deployment vulnerability window. To ensure accurate reporting, we have developed an AEF Certification process, designed to increase chain of command involvement by moving readiness processes from the functional level to the command level. This process, in conjunction with our current Status of Operational Readiness and Training (SORTS) report, will provide us a clearer picture of readiness. The objective of certification is to hold commanders at each level accountable for organizing, training and equipping Unit Tasking Codes (UTCs), in order to provide required mission capability and to inform the CINCs on the status of deploying forces. Bottom line, commanders must send every individual and UTC into theater full-up and ready to fight.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that you are kept

abreast of the readiness concerns of the Air Force operating forces that may not always be represented in the official reports?

Key readiness concerns that impact operations and training are accounted for in our Status of Readiness and Training (SORTS) Reports. Additionally, we have developed an AEF Certification process designed to increase chain of command involvement by moving readiness processes from the functional level to the command level. The objective of certification is to hold commanders at each level accountable for organizing, training and equipping UTCs, in order to provide required mission capability and to inform the CINCs on the status of deploying forces. That includes the responsibility of raising concerns to the appropriate level to obtain remedy or relief, when applicable. Bottom line, commanders must send every individual and UTC into theater full-up and ready to fight.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that these concerns are captured in the reports that the Air Force provides to the DOD as a whole as well as the Congress?

I firmly believe that effective leadership demands the ability to provide an honest assessment of capability, which includes the highlighting of shortages. I expect my commanders to be aware of and raise readiness concerns to the appropriate level to obtain remedy or relief as applicable. If nominated, I will continue to drive this point home with AF leaders at all echelons.

Readiness

Over the last few years we have heard increasing reports that the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces has begun to deteriorate as a result of the over-commitment of an under-resourced Department of Defense.

What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 4 years, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?

The Air Force has and will continue to focus on aggressive transformation to the extent our budget allows. This Fiscal Year 2002 budget shores up some of our most critical people and readiness concerns and allows us to remain the world's most respected aerospace force.

Total Air Force readiness has declined 23 percentage points since 1996. We attribute this decay to the problems associated with supporting the oldest aircraft fleet in Air Force history; the inability to retain an experienced workforce; and constrained resources and spare parts. With recent financial assistance from the Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress, we are turning our spare parts

problems around. However, as our fighter, ISR, combat search and rescue, mobility, and tanker aircraft continue to age, they need more frequent and substantial repairs, driving up readiness costs. This, in turn, reduces the number of aircraft available for missions and creates higher demands on the remaining fleet. Reversing this trend will take additional funding and a concerted recapitalization effort. In addition, the maintenance tasks and materiel growth inherent in supporting our aging aircraft fleet have increased our depot workload. Limited depot infrastructure investment over the past decade, coupled with constrained funding, adds to our already significant challenges in meeting readiness requirements. We are also experiencing infrastructure shortfalls in our base facilities, vehicles and support equipment, and communications infrastructure. Overall, we are committed to improving readiness, and it must be synchronized with our people, infrastructure, and modernization programs.

CINC Identified Readiness Deficiencies

The latest Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress identified 87 CINC-identified readiness related deficiencies. Thirty one of these are listed as Category I deficiencies, which entail significant warfighting risk to execution of the National Military Strategy. Most of the specific deficiencies have been reported for the past several years and have not as yet been effectively addressed.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Air Force dedicates sufficient resources to address these CINC-identified readiness deficiencies?

Thanks to the tremendous talent of our people, we have enjoyed great victories in combat. These victories tend to overshadow what has happened to our readiness. Responding across this full spectrum of operations necessitates we have a certain number of units ready to deploy in the first thirty days of conflict. This is the basis of our readiness requirement of 92%. Since 1996, our worldwide combat force readiness rates have decreased 23 percentage points to a rate of 68% in April 2001. Furthermore, our overall Air Force readiness is lower than any time since June 1987. We are capable of winning today; however, we are concerned about these trends in readiness indicators. A major factor in the decline is the increasing age of our aircraft. For example, our flying hours have remained relatively constant over the past five years, but the cost of those flying hours has increased by over 45% after inflation. Older aircraft are simply more difficult to maintain as mechanical failures become less predictable, repairs become more complicated, and parts become harder to come by and more expensive.

The increasing cost of readiness (including operations and maintenance) is consuming the funds required to modernize our systems and our infrastructure. We have

developed a responsible, time-phased plan to modernize our force without sacrificing readiness or capability goals.

Near-Term Readiness vs. Modernization

One of the long-standing concerns of the Committee is that the services, in an attempt to maintain near-term readiness and pay for numerous contingency operations, have under-funded long-term readiness, i.e., modernization accounts. This has resulted in equipment becoming old and increasingly expensive to maintain. This increased expense has created an additional hurdle in the way of our ability to maintain current readiness and modernize for the future.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the Secretary of the Air Force in order to resolve this downward readiness cycle?

Contingency operations are a reality for today's Air Force. We must recognize that reality in our force structure, modernization, budgeting, and planning processes. The ongoing QDR does contain criteria which accurately reflect our operating environment: we must be able to win a major theater war, while maintaining the capability to halt aggression in other parts of the world and continue numerous small-scale operations elsewhere. In future reviews, we must also take into account backlogs such as we have in real property maintenance. These are areas which we must work to resolve, and every year of delay simply puts us that much deeper into the hole.

Quadrennial Defense Review

The Congress required the Department of Defense to conduct the Quadrennial Defense Review to include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward preparing the armed forces of the United States for the security environment of the 21st Century.

Please outline your views on how to best organize and equip the Air Force to support the National Military Strategy. What do you believe should result from the QDR process?

The QDR process will give us a clear idea of the force structure required across the Services to fulfill the National Military Strategy. In past QDRs, we used the two-major-regional-contingencies and two-major-theater-wars scenarios to calculate the

depth of force structure required, and we assumed that any other activities would be lesser-included cases of those two scenarios. However, this QDR uses a different scenario, recognizing that we need to continue to be able to win one major theater war, while maintaining the capability to repel attack in other areas of the world, and continuing to do a series of smaller, lesser-scale contingencies at the same time. We are in the process right now of putting forces against those requirements to measure our required force structure. The result of this process will give us a clear idea of how best to organize and equip the Air Force.

Flying Hour Costs

For the past several years, the Air Force has requested increases above their budget requests to deal with unanticipated growth in the cost of their flying hour program. The Air Force budget for fiscal year 2002 contains significant increases in funding for flying hours.

Do you believe this year's budget request fully funds your program so that you will not need to seek additional funding to execute your flying hour program?

Your support of the FY01 supplemental request will further help us maintain our readiness levels. However, we still need your continued support to improve our readiness. Your United States Air Force is currently operating and maintaining the oldest aircraft fleet in our history. On average, our aircraft are about 22 years old, and getting older. An aging fleet costs more, both in effort and dollars, to operate and maintain. Last year, while we flew only 97% of our programmed hours, they cost us 103% of our budget. Over the past five years, our costs per flying hour have risen almost 50%.

What steps is the Air Force taking to control this cost growth?

The only way we can control these costs is to recapitalize the aging fleet.

Need for Overseas Installations

The Air Force currently maintains a network of bases to support our forward deployed forces.

Do you believe that an increased emphasis on long-range power projection would decrease the need for permanent basing for forward deployed Air Force personnel?

No. We have already drawn down our overseas basing to a critical level. As we saw with Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF), our forces are capable of traveling thousands of miles to conduct precision strikes. However, to conduct an effective air campaign such as OAF, you must have persistent air power and the capability to perform time-critical strike which dictate that either permanent or temporary forward basing will continue to be a requirement for effective operations.

Reducing Commitments

In recent years there has been concern over the level of deployments and the time service members spend away from home. The Air Force has created the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept to make deployments more predictable. Congress has enacted a per diem payment for members deployed above a specified number of days. Another approach to controlling or reducing time away from home is to reduce the number of overseas commitments.

What are your views on the contributions that each of these three approaches has made or could make to managing the OPTEMPO of Air Force personnel?

The Expeditionary Air Force concept has done an excellent job of providing predictability and stability to our Airmen. While there are still some areas to be worked out, we continue to improve our capability to deploy customizable Aerospace power packages to theater CINCs. The congressional initiative to compensate personnel for extended deployments may also help our young Airmen deal with the challenges of our worldwide commitments. We need to continue to do everything possible to take care of our personnel meeting the deployment needs associated with our national strategy. That strategy will dictate the amount of overseas commitments, and the Air Force stands ready to support those commitments, whatever they may be. In addition, we are prepared to assist in assessing our current overseas commitments.

Overseas Contingency Deployments

Congress has long been concerned about the impact on readiness of the numerous deployments of our military personnel over the last eight years.

What are your views regarding the impact of contingency operations on military readiness?

We must continue to address years of constant high tempo, aging equipment, and reduced defense spending to meet the high demands we place on our people and systems.

Several years of sustained high operations tempo, aging equipment, and reduced funding have led to a slow, steady decline in readiness. It will take several years of significant investment to recover. We must restore readiness through substantial and sustained recapitalization of people, equipment, infrastructure and “info”-structure. However, contingency operations are a reality in today’s Air Force, and we must recognize that reality in force structure, modernization, budgeting, and planning processes.

Associate Wings

The Air Mobility Command has had great success with its Associate Wings. These Wings allow the Air Force to maximize the use of airlift aircraft without incurring the high cost of increased active duty end strength.

Based on the success that the Air Mobility Command has had with the Associate Wing concept, why has this concept not been expanded to the Air Combat Command? What are your views on expanding the Associate Wing concept to include the Air Combat Command?

There are obvious synergies and benefits to reserve associate programs throughout the Air Force. As you probably know, we have completed a very successful test of a fighter Reserve Associate Program at Shaw AFB. AMC has indeed been very successful in such programs, and ACC and AFRC are in the midst of developing the requirements for expansion to other weapon systems. Reserve associate programs have tremendous potential to leverage the experience resident in the Air Reserve Component.

Space Commission

What are your views on the need for legislation to implement the recommendations of the Space Commission?

We support the decisions and recommendations of the Space Commission. The Air Force is the right service for department-wide responsibility for planning, programming and acquisition of space systems. We are currently realigning to effectively organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space ops. This move reduces fragmentation within both DoD and intelligence committee and improves space advocacy by implementing a single chain of authority. We must employ space to speed transformation of the military and effectively prepare for future conflicts.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that interests and requirements of all services are preserved under an Air Force Executive Agency for Space?

A new and comprehensive national security space management and organizational approach is needed to promote and protect our interests in space. It was

the commissions assessment that DoD and the intelligence community are not currently focused to meet 21st century national security space needs. The relationship between the Secretary of Defense and Director, Central Intelligence will continue to be critical for future development. It was the commissions conclusion that current methods of budgeting for national security space programs lack visibility and accountability. The Air Force will work to correct that to meet the needs of all DoD space users.

Do you see a need to maintain a strong cadre of space professionals in all the services?

The demands for integration of space capabilities and information for modern warfighting will continue to grow in the future. It will be essential that all the services understand how to integrate space into combat operations. If confirmed, I will ensure that the US Air Force works closely with other services to coordinate efforts to effectively use space assets.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Air Force helps to develop and sustain such a DOD-wide cadre?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Air Force makes available the coordinated training to ensure that an appropriate level of expertise is in all services to ensure effective application of space assets.

Space Future

What is your vision for the future of the space component of the Air Force?

We are working toward increased funding for space surveillance to hone a developing space-based capability. The Air Force is working to fund and lead technology efforts, developing capabilities for offensive and defensive systems. The Air Force continues to ensure we are creating an effective organizational structure for space control. This led to the creation of new Space Control and Space Aggressor squadrons. We have also created a Counterspace Oversight Council to deal with future threats to our space-based assets.

In your view, how should the Air Force approach its mission of ensuring continued access to space?

The AF recognizes its unique capabilities and responsibilities with respect to space operations and is committed to meet the space leadership challenge. To ensure continued access to space, the Air Force is working in close, active partnership with our sister services, agencies, and industry to implement the recommendations from the Broad Area Review on spacelift. We will also work to improve the organization, management, and employment of space to meet the growing Joint Warfighter needs. Finally, the Air Force will continue to work closely with the Intelligence, civil, and commercial space

communities to enhance and exploit the full range of our Nation's space capabilities.

Do you agree with the recommendation of the Space Commission that the “US must participate actively in shaping the space legal and regulatory environment?”

Yes, there must be an effective means to monitor and control space assets, and we in the US Air Force will be an active participant in shaping the environment based on our capabilities and expertise.

Do you agree with the recommendation of the Space Commission that “To protect the country's interests, the U.S. must promote the peaceful use of space...?” In your view, how should the Air Force participate in implementing this portion of the recommendation?

Yes, the peaceful use of space is essential to our Nation's, and the international community's, interests. We need safe and reliable space-based communications and research capabilities to further US interests. Additionally, space assets are increasingly critical to our national security. The Air Force will ensure continued access to these technologies through a new and comprehensive national security space management and organizational approach designed to promote and protect our interests in space.

Do you agree with the Commission observation that U.S. dependence on and vulnerability of its space assets makes the U.S. “an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’”?

I agree that much like other US military resources, space assets make a lucrative target for those that wish to discredit or damage the United States. However, we are aware of the threats posed to space-based assets and are vigilant to finding ways to counter possible threats. It is unlikely we would be taken completely unaware by an attack on our space capabilities.

Do you agree with the Commission recommendation that the U.S. “develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests”? How would you recommend that the Air Force support this recommendation?

I agree with the space commission findings, the US Air Force will work to ensure that space remains a safe environment to support US interests. The Air Force is realigning to effectively organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space ops, protecting the space realm as we do the environment over the world's battlefields.

Do you agree with the Commission assessment that deterrence would be

strengthened through development of the capability to project power in, from, and through space?

Yes, the inherent nature of space-based assets gives the Air Force better access to all regions across the face of the earth. By continued development of space systems we gain not only access to collect information from denied or difficult to reach regions, we will also be better able to communicate and command operations in those areas. Through the continued, controlled development of space, we increase our ability to observe regions of instability, or monitor peacekeeping/enforcement operations, increasing US overseas influence without increasing deployed presence.

ICBMs

Do you support retirement of the Peacekeeper ICBM?

-Yes. The Program Budget Directive supports the transition of Peacekeeper warheads to the Minuteman III force. The Air Force has been planning for the retirement of Peacekeeper and the SecDef has announced his intention to retire PK beginning in FY02, and I support that move.

The deactivation will take a minimum of three years to remove the 50 boosters and reentry systems and an unknown number of additional years to successfully complete clean-up activity.

Do you support retirement of the W62 warhead from the Minuteman III ICBM?

Yes. The Air Force has programmed the retirement of the MK12/W62 warhead from the active ICBM warhead fleet. The Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program will provide the design and equipment to place the MK21/W87 warhead, (being removed from the Peacekeeper) on the MMIII as a replacement for the W62.

Will you support full funding in the future to retire the Peacekeeper beginning in fiscal year 2003?

-I support the Presidents Budget and the placement of the PK retirement within that process.

If the W62 warhead is retired, is there an existing or refurbished nuclear weapon in the stockpile which will fill the DoD's requirement met by the W62 or is it no longer required?

The MK21/W87 and MK12A/W78 Warheads are planned to replace the present MK12/W62 on the MMIII system.

If the W62 warhead is retired, would it be dismantled or would it be placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile reserve?

- The current plan is to place the MK12/W62 warhead into storage until final disposition is determined.

Do you support de-alerting any ICBMs?

As you know, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is currently being conducted by the Department of Defense and I understand alert status is being examined in this review. I anticipate being fully engaged with the NPR as it unfolds more completely in the coming months. There are some enduring fundamentals that are at the foundation of deterrence that the NPR will have to take into account. ICBMs are an essential element of the United States' nuclear forces and I believe will remain so in whatever future framework evolves. As such, I believe that those systems should be operated as designed-on alert. To do otherwise by increasing the time it takes to employ these forces increases safety, security, stability, and possibly even proliferation risks. As a matter of military practice, lowering military readiness lessens credibility.

Science and Technology Investment

Secretary Rumsfeld, in his June 28, 2001 testimony, publicly stated that he has set a goal of 3% of the total defense budget for the Defense Science and Technology program.

If confirmed, would you support a similar goal for the Air Force Science and Technology portfolio as a percentage of the entire Air Force budget?

I am in lock step with Secretary Rumsfeld. Our Science and Technology portfolio is our investment in the future and cannot be forsaken. Already, potential adversaries possess capabilities beyond those of our own. We cannot afford to fall farther behind. To do so would violate the sacred trust of our Airmen because we owe it to them to arm them with the most advanced technology possible.

Science and Technology Planning Process

In Section 252 of the Fiscal Year 2001 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a review of the long-term challenges and short-term objectives of the Air Force science and technology programs. This review is scheduled for completion in October, 2001.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the uniformed officers are engaged

in the science and technology process for determining long-term challenges and short-term objectives critical for future defense superiority?

I firmly believe we must focus our science and technology, and acquisition efforts, on valid warfighter requirements. If confirmed, I will ardently work to foster constant science/technology and warfighter interface. The goal of this is a streamlined acquisition and development process geared exclusively at addressing warfighter requirements.

In your view, does the current Air Force science and technology portfolio adequately support the warfighter of today and the future?

AF science and technology supports the AF vision of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force in the 21st Century and is funded at a level to achieve Critical Future Capabilities. Our FY 02 budget reflects a real growth increase of 5.2% for science and technology compared to FY 01.

If confirmed, how do you intend to facilitate communication between the science and technology community and the warfighter?

If confirmed, I will establish a recurring system of conferences whereby the warfighter and the science and technology community regularly meet to discuss requirements and possible solutions.

Education Savings Plan

Another legislative proposal under consideration by the Committee to address the cost of education for dependent spouses and children envisions the award of United States Savings Bonds to military members in connection with reenlistment. If implemented, it potentially could provide a flexible, tax-leveraged means for service members to fund the cost of college tuition for their dependent family members.

If confirmed, will you give serious consideration to how the Air Force could use the award of U.S. Savings Bonds as a means to enable Airmen to save money for the education of themselves and their dependents?

Yes. I firmly believe we recruit the individual but retain the family. Helping to reduce the cost of education for both service members and family members is another way of helping us achieve our retention goals.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Air Force Chief of Staff?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.