BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) SWANSON PRINTING COMPANY ) Docket Nos. GPO BCA 27-94 Program D404-M ) GPO BCA 27A-94 Purchase Order 93869 ) Print Order Nos. 86087 and 86144 CONSOLIDATED DECISION AND ORDER I. Statement of the Cases By letter dated July 27, 1994, Swanson Printing Company (Appellant or Contractor), 5205 York Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21212, filed a timely appeal of the final decisions of Contracting Officer Richard Weiss, dated April 5, 1994, and July 21, 1994, respectively, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (Respondent or GPO or Government), Printing Procurement Department, Washington, DC 20401. See GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984, Rule 1(a) and 2 (Board Rules). The Contracting Officer's final decision of April 5, 1995 (GPO BCA 27-94), rejected the Appellant's equitable adjustment claim of $3,710.00 for the costs incurred in the second printing of a Department of Justice (DOJ or customer agency) brief under Print Order 86087. See R4 File I, Tab O.1 See also Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated July 10, 1995, at 1-2 (RPTC-1).2 Similarly, in his final decision of July 21, 1994 (GPO BCA 27A-94), the Contracting Officer denied two claims from the Contractor for additional work performed for the DOJ under Print Order 86144-(1) a "back to press" claim of $776.00 for printing 100 extra copies of the DOJ's Petition in Rison v. Demjianjuk; and (2) a $7,220.00 claim for 100 additional copies of the Appendix in the same case-and instead offered to settle the matter for $2,540.00. See R4 File II, Tab U.3 See also Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated September 1, 1995, at 8 (RPTC-2).4 Although the appeals were docketed separately, at the request of the parties they were consolidated by the Board for the purpose of hearing and the issuance of a decision. See Notice of Hearing, dated October 31, 1995, at 4. See also Board Rules, Rules 17 and 18. For the reasons which follow, the final decision of the Contracting Officer in GPO BCA 27-94 is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED. With respect to GPO BCA 27A-94, the Contracting Officer's final decision is also AFFIRMED, and the appeal DENIED, except that the matter is REMANDED to the Respondent with instructions to pay the Appellant $2,540.00-the amount offered by the Contracting Officer by way of settlement in his final decision letter of July 21, 1994-for the extra work performed. II. Background The relevant facts in these consolidated appeals are essentially uncontroverted, and are set forth here as presented in R4 File I, R4 File II, RPTC-1, RPTC-2, the transcript of the hearing held by the Board on December 12, 1995,5 and the stipulations of the parties,6 as amended at the hearing (Tr.: 10-26).7 In that regard, it should be noted that while the stipulations describe the events in this case in their chronological sequence, the Board has reworded, combined or reformatted some stipulations for stylistic reasons, or changed their placement for smoother reading. However, in doing so the Board has been careful not to alter the content of the stipulations in any way. A. The Contract 1. On July 12, 1993, the Respondent issued an Invitation for Bids (IFB) for Program D404-M, which involves the production of two categories of saddle-stitched and perfect bound legal publications (i.e., briefs) for the DOJ (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 1, 5).8 As indicated in the IFB, Program D404-M covers operations such as composition and proofs (Category 1 only), film-making, printing, binding, packing, and delivery (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 5). The contract resulting from the IFB was to be a multiple award term contact for the period beginning with the date of award and ending July 31, 1994 (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 1). The contract anticipated that orders for work could be issued to the contractor directly by the customer agency, the DOJ (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 11).9 See Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 1. See also RPTC-2, at 2-3; Tr.: 112-13. 2. Category 1 work (briefs from manuscript copy) required the Government to furnish: The majority of the text will be unprepared typewritten manuscript and printed pages, furnished as manuscript for composition. In addition, a few scattered pages will be furnished as reproduction proofs, and previously printed pages as camera copy to be reproduced same size or with reduction. See R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 5; Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 2. See also RPTC-2, at 3. Similarly, Category 2 work included: Camera ready copy, or reprint copy to reproduce same size or with reduction. See R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 5; Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 2. See also RPTC-2, at 3. With respect to finishing attributes, Category 1 orders could be bound in a variety of ways, including saddle-wire stitch or perfect bound with a wraparound cover, whereas Category 2 provided only for saddle-wire stitch binding (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 8-9). See Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 2. Furthermore, Category 1 orders could be between 4 and 1,200 pages, although the majority were between 4 and 96 pages, while Category 2 orders would be between 4 and 76 pages per order (R4 File, Tab A, at 5). See Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 2. 3. The contract also required proofs for Category 1 work, and specifically provided that "[t]he contractor must not print prior to receipt of an 'OK to print'[.]" (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 7-8). See Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 2. 4. Finally, the contract incorporated by reference all relevant provisions of GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2, Effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (hereinafter GPO Contract Terms), as well as GPO Contract Terms, Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program, GPO Publication 310.1, Effective May 1979 (Revised November 1989) (hereinafter QATAP) (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 2). See RPTC-2, at 3. 5. On July 30, 1993, the Appellant, who has done Program D404-M work before, see R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co.,GPO BCA 15-90 (March 6, 1992), 1992 WL 487874, supplemental decision (July 1, 1993), 1993 WL 56638, reconsid. granted (December 20, 1993), aff'd sub nom. Richard C. Swanson and Larry A. Ford, d.b.a. Swanson Printing & Typesetting Co. v. United States, Civil Action No. 94-185C (U.S. Court of Federal Claims, August 15, 1996) (unpublished),10 submitted its bid to the Respondent (R4 Files I and II, Tab B).11 Thereafter, on August 10, 1993, GPO issued Purchase Order No. 93869 to the Appellant making it one of the contractors for Program D404-M for the term beginning August 14, 1993, and ending July 31, 1994 (R4 File, Tab D).12 See Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 3. See RPTC-2, at 2. 6. Prior to awarding Purchase Order No. 93860, the Contracting Officer, by letter dated August 9, 1994, specifically informed the Contractor: For this program, direct contact between your company and the ordering agency is authorized for transmitting print orders, copy and other required materials. Representatives of the ordering agency do not have authority to alter or change the specifications, contract terms, or the print orders, once issued. Changes and any resulting costs can only be authorized by a Government Printing Office contracting officer. See R4 File II, Tab D. [Emphasis added.]. See also Stip. 1, ¶ 3; RPTC-2, at 5-6; Tr.: 79-80. B. GPO BCA 27-94 1. On January 3, 1994, the DOJ issued Print Order 86087 to the Appellant for the production of 208 copies of the Appendix only for a brief in the matter of United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (R4 File I, Tabs E and H). Among other things, the Print Order established a delivery date of January 19, 1994, and required the Appellant to submit eight (8) sets of page proofs to the customer agency by January 7, 1994, which would be returned to Appellant by January 18, 1994. See Stip. 2, ¶ 4; Tr.: 120-23. 2. The Appellant prepared the proofs of the Appendix and submitted them to the DOJ. On January 14, 1994, the customer agency returned the corrected Appendix proofs to the Appellant for printing (R4 File I, Tab F). However, with the corrected Appendix the DOJ also sent 23 additional manuscript pages-the brief's Petition-to the Appellant for typesetting and preparation of proofs (R4 File I, Tab F). The customer agency asked the Appellant to send it eight (8) proofs of the Petition by Tuesday, January 18, 1994, so that the final printed brief would be ready by the contract due date of January 19, 1994.13 Since the Appendix and the Petition, when bound together, constituted the complete brief, the Appellant was instructed to "wait until Monday for the o.k. to print the Appendix" (R4 File I, Tab F). Also that same day, the DOJ asked GPO to make the appropriate change to its printing and binding requisition (R4 File I, Tab G). See Stip. 2, ¶ 5; Tr.: 121-22. 3. The Appellant did not contact Richard Weiss, the Contracting Officer for Program D404-M during this period, regarding any additional work that it says it was required to do to meet the requirements of the print order.14 Instead, on January 27, 1994, the Appellant submitted a payment voucher for the completed work (R4 File I, Tab H). Included in its bill were charges totaling $3,710.00 for a "2nd printing" of the brief. These charges were disallowed by GPO's Financial Management Service, and the Appellant was told to contact the Contracting Officer (R4 File I, Tab H). The Appellant was also asked "to submit proof of reprinting with an explanation of what happened[.]" (R4 File I, Tab I.).15 See Stip. 2, ¶ 6; Tr.: 123, 127, 147. 4. On February 18, 1994, Appellant wrote to Weiss contending that the charges for the second printing were appropriate (R4 File I, Tab I). The Appellant's argument was that it had printed the Appendix, as corrected on January 18, 1994, after receiving assurances from the DOJ's agents that there would be no other changes, only to discover when the proofs of the Petition were subsequently returned that the customer agency had also made additional alterations in the Appendix (R4 File I, Tab I). The Appellant claims that it had to print the Appendix a second time in order to make the extra changes (R4 File I, Tab I). On March 29, 1994, the Appellant sent a follow-up letter to the Contracting Officer asking him to expedite payment of its claim which "is properly due" (R4 5. In the interim, the Contracting Officer had contacted those DOJ employees involved with this contract, and was told that the customer agency had not authorized two printings of the Appendix (R4 File I, Tabs K and L).16 Accordingly, by letter dated April 5, 1995, entitled "Notice of Final Decision," the Contracting Officer denied the Appellant's claim for recovery of the costs for a second printing the Appendix (R4 File I, Tab O).17 See Stip. 2, ¶ 8; Tr.: 135, 142. 6. On June 13, 1994, the Appellant wrote the Contracting Officer concerning his determination to reject the Contractor's claim for payment of the additional work allegedly performed on Print Order 86087, as well as on another job-Print Order 86144 (R4 File I, Tab P). The Contracting Officer reaffirmed his decision to deny additional payments for this Print Order in letters dated June 17, 1994, and July 13, 1994, respectively (R4 File I, Tabs Q, T). Appellant formally appealed this decision by letter to the Contracting Officer, dated July 27, 1994 (R4 File I, Tab U). See Stip. 2, ¶ 9; Tr.: 150-51. C. GPO BCA 27A-94 1. On May 10, 1994, the DOJ issued Print Order 86144 to the Appellant for the production of 208 copies of the brief and Appendix in the matter of Rison v. Demjanjuk. The Print Order required proofs and designated the job as being in Category 1 (R4 File II, Tab E).18 On May 16, 1994, the Appellant submitted proofs of the Appendix to the DOJ. On May 19, 1994, the DOJ returned the corrected proofs to the Appellant for final printing and delivery by May 23, 1994, the original ship/delivery date (R4 File II, Tab E). Also on May 19, 1994, the DOJ requested that the Petition portion of the brief (32 pages, including 31 pages of manuscript) be produced under separate cover (R4 File II, Tabs P and U.) See Stip. 1, ¶ 4; Tr.: 30. See also RPTC-2, at 6. 2. The record indicates that when it returned the proofs, the DOJ also asked the Contractor to produce an additional 100 copies for delivery by May 24, 1994 (R4 File II, Tabs H and I). See RPTC-2, at 6; Tr.: 31. Since that the initial order of 208 copies was scheduled to be delivered on time (May 23, 1994), the Appellant told the DOJ's representative, Roye Stroman, that a written "change order" would be necessary to perform the additional work (R4 File II, Tabs K19 and L, Letter from the Appellant to GPO, dated June 2, 1994.). See Tr.: 30-32, 42-43, 81. 3. Without first contacting the Contracting Officer, and relying only on the assurance from the representatives of the DOJ that a "change order" would be issued, the Appellant proceeded to print and deliver the additional copies requested by the customer agency. The Appellant contends that it received a "change order" providing for the additional printing, however, the R4File reflects that the Appellant is referring to a DOJ "Request for Change on Printing and Binding Requisition" (Request for Change) addressed to GPO, dated May 24, 1994, and not to a change order issued by the GPO Contracting Officer (R4 File II, Tabs H, I and L).20 See Stip. 1, ¶ 5; Tr.: 43-44, 52-54, 78-79, 81, 83-84, 113-14. See also RPTC-2, at 6. 4. On May 25, 1994, the Appellant submitted a voucher for payment of the completed work. Included in its bill were charges totaling $7,996.00 for "back to press" charges for the additional copies (R4 File II, Tab J).21 Subsequently, on June 8, 1994, the Appellant wrote to GPO requesting that a change order be issued (R4 File II, Tab M). See Stip. 1, ¶ 6; Tr.: 32-33, 50-51. See also RPTC-2, at 7-8. 5. On June 13, 1994, the Appellant wrote to Weiss contending that its charges of $7,996.00 to go "back to press" were appropriate (R4 File II, Tab Mc).22 After receiving additional information from the DOJ, Weiss indicated that the Appellant's claim was under review (R4 File II, Tab O). On June 30, 1994, Weiss wrote to the Appellant advising that the evidence received from the DOJ did not support its claims for additional compensation. Instead, Weiss contended that the evidence indicated that the DOJ indicated their need for an additional 100 copies of the Appendix before Appellant went to press; i.e., at the proofing stage (R4 File II, Tab R).23 See Stip. 1, ¶ 7; Tr.: 75, 115-16. 6. In his final decision addressing this situation, dated July 21, 1994, the Contracting Officer found that the additional work for which the Appellant sought recovery was outside the contract terms, that the Appellant never contacted the Contracting Officer for a modification of the original print order, and that the charges the Appellant sought to recover from the Government were neither fair nor reasonable for the work performed.24 The Contracting Officer offered to pay the Appellant $2,540.00 (R4 File II, Tab U). By letter dated July 27, 1994, Appellant appealed this decision (R4 File II, Tab W). See Stip. 1, ¶ 8; Tr.: 75-77, 110. III. ISSUES PRESENTED The ultimate issue in GPO BCA 27-94 is: 1. Has the Appellant proved its equitable adjustment claim under Print Order 86087 for costs in the amount of $3,710.00 for printing the Appendix of the DOJ's brief in the matter of United States v. National Treasury Employees Union a second time in order to incorporate additional author's alterations made by the customer agency after the first printing had been run and was ready for delivery by the contract due date of January 19, 1994? However, subsumed in that question is another one, namely: 2. Did the Contractor print the Appendix without authorization in the face of unambiguous contract language which states that "[t]he contractor must not print prior to receipt of an 'OK to print'[.]"? As for GPO BCA 27A-94, three questions surfaced from the discussions at the prehearing telephone conference on July 6, 1995, namely: 1. Did the Contracting Officer correctly decide that the Appellant's production and delivery of 100 additional copies each of the Petition and the Appendix, pursuant to Print Order No. 86144 issued by the DOJ, was outside the scope of the contract, and if so, was he justified in denying the Contractor's request for payment at the rates established under the contract for Category 1 work? 2. Was the Contractor entitled to bill for the production of additional quantities of the Petition and Appendix as "back to press" charges under the contract, and to what extent, if any, do the past payment practices of GPO affect the Contractor's claim? 3. What is the appropriate amount of compensation which should be awarded to the Appellant as an equitable adjustment in this case? See RPTC-2, at 9-10. IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES25 A. The Appellant The Appellant presents two equitable adjustment claims in this appeal, each premised on a different Print Order-Print Order 86087 and Print Order 86144. However, the Contractor's position is basically the same for both. In that regard, reduced to its essentials, the Appellant's argument, as extrapolated from its brief is: Swanson had a contract to perform the work at issue, with prices for various operations. The work was requested by the customer agency [DOJ] and Swanson performed the work. Swanson submitted invoices for on the work performed in accordance with the schedule of prices contained in the contract. * * * * * * * * * * A simple reading of the contract and its accompanying schedule of prices and comparing those to Swanson's invoice for the two jobs at issue show that all prices and operations were allowed under the contract and that the Government's continued refusal to pay is completely with out merit. See App. Brf., at 1-2. The Contractor says the circumstances in this case are no different from other Print Orders processed under Program D404-M in the past, and there is an established prior course of dealing whereby it is allowed to make last minute changes in a brief pursuant to instructions from the DOJ, and the Respondent, in effect, ratifies this action by paying for the work at the contract prices. See App. Brf., at 1; App. Exh. No. 1. See RPTC-2, at 9. Furthermore, the Appellant dismisses as irrelevant the Respondent's contention that the work was unauthorized because the Contracting Officer had not given his prior approval, by observing that the job involved was performed outside of normal GPO hours which made securing the Contracting Officer's permission impossible. See App. Brf., at 1. Finally, the Contractor believes that after the Contracting Officer certified the Appellant's contract prices to be fair and reasonable when the bid was accepted, it is now "disingenuous" for him to attempt to "negotiate" lower prices for the work after it is completed. See App. Brf., at 2. Accordingly, for these reasons, the Contractor urges the Board to overturn the Contracting Officer's final decisions on these claims and direct the Respondent to pay the invoices, as submitted. B. The Respondent The Respondent's position equally uncomplicated. The Government says that non-payment of the two claims in this case is justified because, contrary to the express provisions of the contract, the Appellant failed to obtain the Contracting Officer's prior approval to perform the work.26 See R. Brf., at 10-11 (citing R4 Files I and II, Tab A at 2 [incorporating by reference GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 1 (Contractual Responsibility)]; R4 File II, Tab D). In that regard, GPO observes that Board precedent firmly establishes this principle for direct deal contracts such as the one here.27 See R. Brf., at 11 (citing RD Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 02-02 (December 16, 1992), slip op. at 10, fn. 6, 1992 WL 516088; R.C. Swanson Printing & Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 31-90 (February 6, 1992), slip op. at 6, fn. 5, 1992 WL 487874; Castillo Printing Co., GPO BCA 10-90 (May 8, 1991), slip op. at 3-4). As for the Appellant's contention that the parties have a prior course of dealings which, in effect, renders meaningless the contract's clear prohibition against implementing changes without first obtaining the Contracting Officer's approval, the Respondent simply states that the Contractor has not proved its case.28 See R. Brf., at 11. In so many words, GPO asserts that apart from the fact that Print Order 86020, which the Contractor relies on, is readily distinguishable from Print Orders 86087 and 86144 in terms of the substantial difference in the amounts involved ($416.00 versus $3,710.00 and $7,996.00, respectively), it is well-settled that a single deviation does not, in and of itself, create an exception to the general rule that the Contracting Officer must approve the work beforehand in order for a contractor to be paid. See R. Brf., at 11-12 (citing Wheatly Associates, ASBCA No. 24760, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16760; Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra; App. Exh. No. 1). Accordingly, for these reasons, the Respondent asks the Board to sustain the Contracting Officer's final decisions in these two appeals. See R. Brf., at 12. V. DECISION29 Once again, the parties appear before the Board with their request to solve a problem relating to Program D404-M. Their last dispute, which at various times involved questions concerning the Board's jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, the proper cost basis for figuring a convenience termination settlement, and the nature of GPO's multiple-award "requirements" term contracts, took more than four (4) years to finalize, counting from the date the Board issued its initial opinion (March 6, 1992) to the day the U.S. Court of Federal Claims denied the Contractor's appeal from the Board's final decision (August 15, 1996). See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra. The issues in this appeal are more commonplace. The controversy with respect to Print Order 86987 involves a simple question-is the Appellant is entitled to an equitable adjustment under the circumstances; i.e., has it supported its right to claim extra compensation?-the claim amount itself has not been challenged by the Respondent. On the other hand, the issue presented by Print Order 86144 is just the reverse-is the amount of additional compensation claimed by the Contractor fair and reasonable?-the Contracting Officer seems to accept the fact that the Appellant is entitled to some equitable adjustment under the circumstances. However, notwithstanding ordinary nature of these issues three things stand out about this dispute which deserve comment. First, Program D404-M is a very special kind of contract. The product it covers-DOJ legal briefs-can be instrumental in shaping the course of American jurisprudence.30 Second, the customer agency is the Government's lawyer, playing a role which has the significant impact and influence on the relationship between the Government and the people, as well as the private lives of all Americans. Third, the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing only confirmed what the Board itself has observed in 28 years of practice-the production of legal briefs is often an exercise in crisis management. Typically, in the time just before a brief is due, an attorney will find him or herself reviewing the text with one eye, while keeping the other on the clock, and making compromises between the best legal arguments which can be mustered and the filing deadline. Consequently, it is an unfortunate, but nonetheless real, characteristic of the practice of law that briefs are notoriously "last minute" documents-every drop of allotted time will be consumed before a brief is filed.31 Because of these factors, the Board has no trouble believing that the DOJ frequently ignores the express terms of its "direct-deal" authority when it comes to getting its briefs ready for court. No other conclusion can be drawn from the Contracting Officer's admission at the hearing that the DOJ has been admonished by the Respondent "numerous times" for doing so. Tr.: 108-09. Indeed, it seems clear that by not rejecting the Appellant's vouchers outright, the Contracting Officer tacitly took into account the DOJ's method of operation and gave the Appellant the benefit of the doubt that the customer agency had ordered further changes after normal working hours. In the final analysis, perhaps a "direct-deal term contract" creates an environment in which innocent contractors will occasionally have to confront a true dilemma as businessmen and businesswomen-how do I satisfy the demands and needs of my customer and at the same time comply with the requirements of the contract? The Board has lots of sympathy but no easy answers for a contractor facing this quandary. On the other hand, the Board in another context has cautioned GPO contracting officers that their "wish to mollify a customer- agency is no basis for defaulting a contractor." See Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (September 1, 1992), slip op. at 28, 1992 WL 487875; Colorgraphics Corp., GPO BCA 16-87 (March 31, 1987), slip op. at 24. Likewise, the Board believes that in a "direct-deal" situation, a contractor's understandable desire to satisfy the customer agency's needs is no basis for ignoring the express requirements of its contract with GPO.32 With these thoughts in mind, the Board reaches the following findings and conclusions concerning the issues in this appeal: A. GPO BCA 27-94: The Appellant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the DOJ authorized it either to print or reprint the Appendix of the customer agency's brief in the matter of United States v. National Treasury Employees Union. Accordingly, there is insufficient proof to support the Contractor's equitable adjustment claim for costs in the amount of $3,710.00 under Print Order 86087. As indicated above, the issue with respect to Print Order 86087 boils down to a simple matter of entitlement; i.e., do the facts show that the Appellant, indeed, had to print the Appendix in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union a second time to accommodate additional DOJ changes, and thus obligating the Government to pay it additional compensation as an equitable adjustment? However, before addressing this question, certain elemental principles concerning equitable adjustments should be restated so that the parties may have a clear understanding of the guideposts followed by the Board in resolving this dispute. First, an equitable adjustment is basically a corrective measure designed to keep a contractor whole when the Government modifies a contract. See Universal Printing Co., GPO BCA 09-90 (June 22, 1994), slip op. at 39, 1994 WL 377586; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 25. Accord J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 620, 627 (1986) (citing, Bruce Construction Corp. v. United States, 163 Cl. Ct. 97, 100, 324 F.2d 516, 518 (1963)); Dick & Kirkman, Inc., VABCA Nos. 1545, 1581, 84-3 BCA ¶ 17,662, at 88,082; CRF, A Joint Venture of CEMCO, Inc. and R.R. Communications, Inc., ASBCA No. 17340, 76-1 BCA ¶ 11,857, at 56,805 (hereinafter CRF, A Joint Venture). Second, the purpose of an equitable adjustment is to place a contractor in the position it would have been in had the change not occurred; i.e., the adjustment also should not alter the contractor's profit or loss position from what it was before the change occurred.33 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 39; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 26. Accord J.F. Shea Co. Inc. v. United States, supra, 10 Cl. Ct. at 627; Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 499, 508, 491 F.2d 734, 739 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Nager Electric Co., Inc. and Keystone Engineering Corp. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 835, 851-53, 442 F.2d 936, 945-46 (1971) (hereinafter Nager Electric); Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 983, 999-1002, 364 F.2d 838, 849-850 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 958 (1967); CRF, A Joint Venture, supra, 76-1 BCA at 56,804; Hensel Phelphs Construction Co., ASBCA No. 15142, 71-1 BCA ¶ 8,796. See generally John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 3rd ed., (The George Washington University, 1995), at 672-73 (hereinafter Cibinic & Nash). Third, the burden of proof in establishing the total amount of an equitable adjustment falls on the party who is claiming the benefit of the adjustment. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40. See also Cibinic & Nash, at 698. Thus, a contractor has the affirmative burden of proving the amount of money to which it is entitled. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40. See also New South Press & Associates, GPO BCA 14-92 (January 31, 1996), slip op. at 49, 1996 WL 112555; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra (Supplemental Decision), slip op. at 19 (termination for convenience cases). Accord Michael-Mark, Ltd., IBCA Nos. 2697, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,453; Lemar Construction Co., ASBCA Nos. 31161, 31719, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,429; Lawrence D. Krause, AGBCA No. 76-118-4, 82-2 BCA ¶ 16,129; Onetta Boat Works, Inc., ENGBCA No. 3733, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,279; Globe Construction Co., ASBCA No. 21069, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,337. Meanwhile, the Government must establish the amount of the credit it took, if any. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 28. Accord Michael-Mark Ltd., supra; Zurfluh Enterprises, Inc., VABCA No. 1941, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17, 789; CRF A Joint Venture, supra; Hudson Garment Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 4645, 60-1 BCA ¶ 2,628. In fulfilling this burden of proof, the party must establish both the reasonableness of the costs claimed and their causal connection to the alleged even on which the claim is based. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra (Supplemental Decision), slip op. at 19. See also New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 49; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 43. Accord S.W. Electronics and Manufacturing Corp., ASBCA No. 20698, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,631, aff'd, 228 Ct. C. 333, 655 F.2d 1078 (1981); Triple "A" Machine Shop, Inc., ASBCA No. 21561, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,065; Cal Constructors, ASBCA No. 21179, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,992. Whether that burden has been met is determined by the "preponderance of the evidence" test.34 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40. Accord Teledyne McCormick-Selph v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 672, 558 F.2d 1000 (1977); Wilbur Smith & Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 35301, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,025. See Cibinic & Nash, at 698. Fourth, the preferred method for establishing the amount of an equitable adjustment is through the introduction of actual cost data.35 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40-41; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 37. Accord Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, supra, 930 F.2d at 882; American Line Builders, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 115 (1992); Cen-Vi-Ro of Texas v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 684 (1976); Cherry Hill Construction, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA No. 12087-REIN, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,810; Buck Brown Contracting Co., IBCA No. 1119-7-76, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,360; Engineered Systems, Inc., DOTCAB No. 75-5, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,211; Bregman Construction Corp., ASBCA No. 15020, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9,411. See generally Cibinic & Nash, at 703. As a rule, actual costs are proved through the introduction of the contractor's accounting records, which will be accepted if they have been audited by the Government and are unrebutted. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 37-38. Accord Celesco Industries, ASBCA No. 22251, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,604. However, if the accounting records are not available due to no fault of the contractor, the costs may be established on the basis of estimates, if they are supported by detailed, substantiating data.36 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 38. Accord R. G. Robbins & Co., ASBCA No. 27516, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,420; Leopold Construction Co., ASBCA No. 23705, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,277; Bailey Specialized Buildings, Inc., ASBCA No. 10576, 71-1 BCA ¶ 8,699. Finally, the touchstone for determining the amount of an equitable adjustment is the difference between what it reasonably would have cost to perform the work as originally required and what it reasonably cost to perform the work as changed.37 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41-42. Accord General Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 477 (1969); Michael-Mark Ltd., supra; Zurfluh Enterprises, Inc., supra; Dick & Kirkman, Inc., supra; Lawrence D. Krause, supra; Celesco Industries, supra; Jack Picoult, VABCA No. 1221, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,024. Whether a contractor's costs are reasonable is a question of fact depending on the circumstances.38 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 42 (citing Nager Electric, supra). Applying these principles to the Appellant's equitable adjustment claim with respect to Print Order 86087, it is clear that the Contractor has failed to prove its case. First, as a threshold matter, for the Appellant to receive extra compensation it was required to show that it was authorized to perform the second printing of the Appendix. The disputed contract, like many other GPO agreements, states in unambiguous terms that "[t]he contractor must not print prior to receipt of an 'OK to print'[.]" (R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 7-8). See Stips. 1 and 2, ¶ 2. Although the Appellant insists that the DOJ had given it the required approval to reprint the Appendix (Tr.: 122, 126-27, 135), the documentary record shows that when the Contracting Officer contacted the customer agency to find out if this was so, he was told that it had never authorized two printings; i.e., the DOJ only authorized one printing of the Appendix-the final version (R4 File I, Tabs K and L; Tr.: 135, 142-43). The Contractor, on the other hand, believes that the DOJ's January 14, 1994, memorandum to it is sufficient proof that it had the customer agency's permission to proceed (R4 File I, Tabs F, I and N). That memorandum states, in pertinent part: Attached herewith is additional manuscript in [United States v. National Treasury Employees Union]. Please type set copy and return 8 proofs by [Tuesday, January 18, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.] for sure. This additional manuscript will precede the Appendix portion which is being returned for correcting and printing. Please wait until Monday [January 17, 1994] for the o.k. to print the Appendix. The Appendix and the petition should be bound under one cover as one complete brief. (R4 File I, Tab F). [Emphasis added.] Clearly, the Appellant understood so much of the memorandum which says: " . . . the Appendix . . . which is being returned for correcting and printing. . . .", as a promise from the DOJ that there would be no further changes to the Appendix even though the "O.K. to print" would not be forthcoming until January 17, 1994. However, the Board, like the Respondent, sees nothing in this memorandum as making such a sweeping commitment. Indeed, the Board agrees with the Contracting Officer, that the principal purpose of the memorandum was to give the Contractor instructions regarding typesetting, proofing, and the placement of the additional manuscript copy [the Petition] within the brief-the memorandum is silent with respect to printing, initially or otherwise (R4 File I, Tab O). Consequently, if the Appellant printed the Appendix before the DOJ approved the final version of the brief, then it did so on its own without the required authorization, and it cannot expect the Government to pay for it. In that regard, the Board has consistently held that a contractor who "jumps the gun" and begins printing without proper authorization assumes the risk that a reprint may be required because of customer agency changes. See e.g., The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 49-51; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 25-92 (April 11, 1994), slip op. at 18-19, 1994 WL 275093. See also Seriagraphic Arts, Inc., GPOCAB 22-79 (May 8, 1980), slip op. at 7-8, 1980 WL 81264.39 The Appellant has offered no reason to hold otherwise in this case. An even more daunting obstacle to the Contractor's recovery in this case is the fact that it has failed to comply with the payment provisions of the contract. In that regard, incorporated by reference in the contract is GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, which provides, in pertinent part: 24. Payments on Purchase Order. (a) Payment will be made to the contractor upon submission of a proper voucher (Standard Form 1034, Public Voucher for Purchases and Services Other than Personal), in accordance with GPO Form 199, "Billing Instructions." Vouchers should be mailed to the U.S. Government Printing Office, Examination and Certification-Stop: FMCE, Washington, DC 20401. The following are required in support of the charges: * * * * * * * * * * (4) One completed copy of the specified product (exception classified documents). (5) A copy of the print order or purchase order as applicable. * * * * * * * * * * [Emphasis added.] Thus, even if the DOJ had given a verbal "go ahead" to the Appellant, as the Contracting Officer was willing to assume,40 the simple matter is that in seeking payment for reprinting the Appendix, the Contractor was not able to provide the Respondent with a copy of the first printing. The Appellant's excuse is that all copies were disposed of pursuant to instructions from the customer agency. See Tr. 131, 135-36. Thus, the problem confronting both the Contracting Officer and the Board is illustrated by the following colloquy from the hearing: Mr. Spaulding: And you denied the additional payment that Swanson sought with its voucher, and can you explain why? Mr. Weiss: It was denied in accordance with regulations. The department said they did not ask for a reprint. Normally, if there is a reprint, and it has happened before on the 404 contract where covers or something else had to be reprinted, we had an employee in the case of the other one, was Mr. John Sagner, who lived in Baltimore, go out an just verify they had been run. It was a normal practice anytime there is a reprint. It is just for GPO to verify that the work was actually performed. Then, it is our decision what we want to do with the copy. Mr. Swanson said he did not have any copy for us to look at, it was all thrown away. I had no copy to look at from any billing. So what I had, what I was faced with was the contractor saying that they had no copy at all to show me, the department saying they did not request it. I had no choice in making the decision I made. Mr. Spaulding: Now, speaking specifically -- may I misunderstood or I didn't hear correctly -- with regard to Mr. Sagner and the fact that he lived in Baltimore, that was in connection with contracts or rather work that might be prepared by Swanson? Mr. Weiss: No, it was with regard to in the past, I know at least one incident where there was a reprint, where Mr. Swanson called me, and we verified it, and a modification was issued. Mr. Spaulding: In your view, what should have happened in this particular instance? Mr. Weiss: Normally, on all jobs where there is a mistake or a reprint, the contractors call the contracting officer, explain what happened, show the work that was done, hold onto it, in other words, not destroy the work, and then a decision would be reached by the contracting officer. Now, sometimes if the work has been done, the decision may be to split the cost because we cannot specifically say it was one person's fault or the other, but in every case, the work is held onto until it is verified that it actually was produced. Judge Foss: Let me interject here for a minute. When you say "hold onto the copies," what copies, the copies of the first printing or the second? Mr. Weiss: The copies of the first printing. Judge Foss: Okay. Mr. Weiss: The second printing has been delivered. Judge Foss: That is what I thought. See Tr.: 142-44. [Emphasis added.] See also Tr.: 148 (Mr. Weiss: ". . . I am simply saying I have been asked to okay a reprinting, and I have nothing to show that reprinting was ever done."). The Board has held that GPO is entitled to insist on a contractor's strict adherence to the record keeping provisions of the contract and its responsibility to provide adequate supporting documentation before the Government is obligated to pay for the ordered supplies. See B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 14-91 (August 10, 1992), slip op. at 24, 1992 WL 382917.41 In the Board's view, while maintaining the appropriate documentation may seem mundane and ministerial, it is nonetheless an important duty relating to the contract. Id., at 28. Consequently, it is unavailing for a contractor to argue that the Government's acceptance of less than adequate records in the past amounts to a waiver of its right to require proper documentation forevermore. Id., at 26. Furthermore, insofar as the Appellant claims that there is an established "prior course of dealing" with respect to Program D404-M in which the Respondent simply endorses the last minute changes ordered by the DOJ, see App. Brf., at 1; App. Exh. No. 1; RPTC-2, at 9, the Contractor has misconstrued the nature of that doctrine. In the first place, the "prior course of dealing" principle is an interpretative device which applies to situations where the parties are divided over the meaning of contract language.42 See Olympic Graphic Systems, GPO BCA 01-92 (September 13, 1996), slip op. at 32, 1996 WL _____; MPE Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 10-95 (August 16, 1996), slip op. at 59, 1996 WL_____; Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., GPO BCA 4-84 (August 18, 1986), slip op. at 10-11, 1986 WL 181457.43 See generally, Cibinic & Nash, at 206-09. This appeal is not a contract interpretation dispute-the contract specifications are clear and unambiguous and the parties know exactly what they mean. Second, and perhaps most importantly, as the Respondent suggests (R. Brf., at 11-12), one prior deviation from the contract (App. Exh. No. 1) is not enough evidence to establish a "prior course of dealing." See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 33; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 62; Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., supra, slip op. at 11 (citing Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra). Accord Kvaas Construction Co., ASBCA No. 45965, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,513 (no waiver found even though Government had approved a deviation on four prior contracts); General Secretarial Services Corp., GSBCA No. 11381, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,897 (no waiver found although the Government had approved a specification deviation on six prior contracts); Western States Construction Co., ASBCA No. 37611, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,418 (no waiver by course of dealing on two prior contracts-one with another contractor). See also, Cibinic & Nash, at 206-07. In the final analysis, this case is not about any "prior course of dealings" regarding what criteria the Government applies in paying for print orders, see Olympic Graphic Systems, supra; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, but rather how does the Contractor prove that the work for which it claims payment was actually performed. Quite frankly, the Board is simply astonished that the Appellant, an experienced Government contractor, did not retain the required documentation-copies of the Appendix-from the first printing of Print Order 86087, notwithstanding the DOJ's instructions to destroy them. In light of the customer agency's denial that it ordered a reprint of the Appendix, it was incumbent on the Contractor to prove otherwise, and it has failed to do so. Its excuse is that the evidence has been destroyed and is no longer available.44 However, without such proof the Contractor's case is essentially an unverified assertion that it reprinted the Appendix. Such a contention is little more than argument, which standing alone cannot substitute for proof. See Univex International, GPO BCA 23-90 (July 31, 1995), slip op. at 31, 1995 WL 488438, reconsid. denied, 1996 WL 112554 (February 7, 1996). Cf. Reese Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA No. 35144, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,358. Indeed, the Board has never allowed such unsubstantiated contentions to form the basis of recovery. See Univex International, supra, slip op. at 31-32; B & B Reproductions, supra, slip op. at 39; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57. Accord Singleton Contracting Corp., GSBCA No. 8548, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,748; Tri-State Services of Texas, Inc., ASBCA No. 38019, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,064)); Gemini Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 30247, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,736. Accordingly, the Board concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the Contracting Officer properly refused to pay for a second printing of the Appendix, and his decision is AFFIRMED. B. GPO BCA 27A-94 1. When the DOJ asked the Appellant to produce and deliver an additional 100 copies of the brief in Rison v. Demjanjuk it was requesting work not "within the general scope of [the] contract," as that language is understood in the "Changes" clause. Furthermore, the Contractor proceeded with performance without proper authorization from the Contracting Officer. Consequently, the extra work was produced in violation of the contract. Nonetheless, the Appellant is entitled to some payment for producing the 100 additional copies of the Appendix to the brief. Unlike the situation involving Print Order 86087, there is no question that the Appellant performed the all of the work requested by the DOJ under Print Order 86144. Instead, the issues basically concern whether the work was properly authorized, and how to pay for it, if at all. These questions bring into play a provision of the contract, namely the "Contractual Responsibility" clause of GPO Contract Terms, and the Respondent's regulations relating to "Contract Modifications" in the PPR.45 The "Contractual Responsibility" Clause states: Awards by GPO for printing, binding, and related services are the sole responsibility of GPO and not of its customer agencies. Modifications shall have no force or effect unless addressed before the fact to and subsequently confirmed in writing by the Contracting Officer. Failure to comply with this article may be cause for nonpayment of additional costs incurred or rejection of the order. GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 1 (Contractual Responsibility). [Emphasis added.] The clear purpose of this contract clause is to implement so much of GPO's printing procurement regulation which says the only person authorized to enter into, administer and terminate contracts, and to make related determinations and findings is the Contracting Officer. See PPR, Chap. I, Sec. 2 (Definition of "Contracting Officer"), Sec. 3, ¶ 2(d) (Procurement Authority-Contracting Officers). See also B & B Reproductions, supra, slip op. at 37-39; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 10, fn. 11; Castillo Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 48. Indeed, the clause was reenforced by Weiss in his letter of August 9, 1994, accompanying the Purchase Order awarding the contract, when he warned the Contractor that: " . . . Representatives of the ordering agency do not have authority to alter or change the specifications, contract terms, or the print orders, once issued. Changes and any resulting costs can only be authorized by a Government Printing Office contracting officer." See R4 File II, Tab D. [Emphasis added.]. See also Stip. 1, ¶ 3; RPTC-2, at 5-6; Tr.: 79-80.1. As for GPO's regulations concerning the use and processing of contract modifications, they state, in pertinent part: 1. General a. Definition. Contract modifications are defined as any changes to any existing contract. They include alterations in the specifications [footnote omitted], delivery point, rate of delivery, contract period, price, quantity, or other provision of the contract. Modifications can be accomplished by a written bilateral agreement or by a written unilateral action in accordance with a contract clause. Examples of contract clauses that give the Government a unilateral right to change a contract are the "Changes", "Paper Price Adjustment", and "Extended Term". b. Contracting Officer decision. It is not mandatory for the Contracting Officer to make the requested change and modify the contract. When the Contracting Officer deems that it would be in the best interest of the Government, such as where the modification would significantly change the product, he/she has the option to terminate the original contract for the convenience of the Government and readvertise with revised specifications. In such cases, the termination shall be made in accordance with XIV-2. c. Bilateral Agreements, Unilateral Actions, and Administrative Changes. (1) Bilateral agreements are required when the proposed modifications affect substantial/material aspects of the contract not covered in the original contract. Substantial/material aspects of the contract include, but are not limited to, quantity, contract provisions, contract period, etc. To consummate the bilateral agreement a supplemental agreement shall be issued requiring the signature of both the Contracting Officer and the contractor. A supplemental agreement shall include a description of the modified or additional requirement and the agreed upon consider for its performance. (2) If the modification is authorized by a contract provision, the Contracting Officer has the unilateral right to issue a change order. Before issuing a change order under the "Changes" clause, the Contracting Officer shall try to reach an equitable adjustment and issue a supplemental agreement in accordance with the above paragraph. . . . Change orders require the signature of the Contracting Officer only. The contractor is required to comply with the requested change regardless of whether a bilateral agreement has been reached. . . . 2. Processing a. CRB concurrence. All proposed modifications involving an increase or decrease in excess of 25 percent of the contract or print order price (if the increase/decrease exceeds $5000), or any modification increasing or decreasing the contract or print order price by $10,000 or more must be submitted to the central office CRB [Contract Review Board]. b. GPO Form 913. All contract modifications shall be issued by the Contracting Officer in writing on GPO Form 913, "Contract Modification,". . . * * * * * * * * * * e. Checkboxes on GPO Form 913. The appropriate box shall be checked to distinguish between a change order and supplemental agreement on GPO Form 913. The authority for issuing the change order/supplemental agreement shall be stated on the appropriate line. Change orders may be issued pursuant to the "Changes" clause or other contract provision. Supplemental agreements are entered into pursuant to mutual agreement. * * * * * * * * * * 5. Examples of Contract Modifications (not all inclusive). * * * * * * * * * * b. Supplemental Agreement (1) Quantity has been increased. * * * * * * * * * * See PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 2, ¶¶ 1(a)-(c), 2(a)-(b), (e), 5 (Contract Modifications). [Emphasis added.] Recently, in GraphicData, Inc., the Board examined and discussed the meaning of the term "change order" in the above regulation, and the circumstances in which it applied.46 See GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 101-02. This case involves a situation in which a "supplemental agreement" would be appropriate. The facts pertinent to this issue are simple, straight-forward, and undisputed. They can be summarized as follows: (1) Print Order 86144, which was issued by DOJ on May 10, 1994, ordered 208 copies of the brief and Appendix in Rison v. Demjanjuk, a Category 1 job, for delivery by May 23, 1994; (2) the Appellant submitted the required proofs to the customer agency on May 16, 1994; (3) the DOJ returned the corrected proofs on May 19, 1994, for final printing and delivery in accordance with the specifications; (4) at the same time, the customer agency asked the Contractor to produce an additional 100 copies for delivery on May 24, 1994, the day after the contract due date for the initial 208 copies; (5) the Appellant told the DOJ representative, Stroman, that a written "change order" would be necessary to perform the additional work; (6) the customer agency sent a Request for Change form to GPO on May 24, 1994, asking for a "Change in Quantity" and authorizing "back to press for an additional 100 copies;" (7) based on DOJ's promise to seek a modification (which it did), the Appellant proceeded to print and deliver the extra copies for the customer agency; and (8) only to have its voucher for the additional work in the amount of $7,996.00 rejected by GPO on the grounds that (a) the work was outside the contract terms, (b) the Contractor had not asked the Contracting Officer for a modification first, and (c) besides the claimed "back to press" charges were not fair or reasonable for the work performed since, inter alia, the DOJ had indicated its need for an additional 100 copies of the brief at the proofing stage before it was printed. See Stip. 1, ¶¶ 4-8; R4 File II, Tabs E, H, I, J, K, L, R, and U; Tr.: 30-33, 42-44, 50-54, 75-79, 81, 83-84, 113-16; RPTC-2, at 6-8. From these facts at least four critical things stand out. First, it is clear that the Appellant recognized that when the DOJ increased the quantity of the original order by 100 copies it was asking for work which is generally considered outside the scope of the contract,47 see Cibinic & Nash, at 390 (". . . [A] change adding quantities above the contractual maximums was found to be outside the scope [of competition]." Citing Liebert Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 448 (B-232234.5), 91-1 CPD ¶ 413), and that a contract modification would be required for the purposes of performance and payment, id., at 394 (Although the authors say that "[i] ncreases in quantity of the major items to be furnished are generally thought not be authorized by the Changes clause," citing P.L. Saddler v. United States, supra; 30 Comp. Gen 34, supra; 15 Comp. Gen. 573, supra, they add that "increases in the quantity of subsidiary items are generally authorized by the [Changes] clause unless a variation is so large that it alters the entire bargain[,]" citing Symbolic Displays, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-182847, 75-1 CPD ¶ 278) (the addition of a quantity of new lights was within the general scope of a contract for the manufacture of aircraft)). Second, the DOJ representative who ordered the increased quantities knew that his direct-deal powers were limited and did not include a delegation of authority from the Contracting Officer to issue contract modifications. See B & B Reproductions, supra, slip op. at 38; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 34, fn. 50. Accord American Electronic Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 608, 625, 427 F.2d 1233, 1243 (1970). Therefore, he promised the Appellant that he would seek a contract modification from the Contracting Officer, and in fact did so by sending a Request for Change form to GPO. See R4 File II, Tabs H and L. Although the customer agency sent a second Request for Change form directly to the Appellant (R4 File II, Tab I), there is nothing in the record to indicate that the DOJ was purporting to issue a contract modification itself, or if it was, that the Contracting Officer has ratified its unauthorized act. See B & B Reproductions, supra, slip op. at 38; Castillo Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 44, fn. 27. Accord California Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 19, 27 (1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Durocher Dock & Dredge, Inc., ENG BCA No. 5768, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,145; Tymeshare, PSBCA No. 206, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,218. See also Metcalf & Associates, GSBCA No. 3190, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9516 (the board held that a contracting officer's award of compensation to a contractor for certain changes directed by unauthorized representatives did not constitute a ratification but was an attempt at settlement not binding upon the Government). But cf. Allen Wayne, Ltd., GPO 6-87 (November 20, 1987) slip op. at 11, 12, fn. 1, 1987 WL 228973 (acquiescence found). Also cf., T.W. Cole, PSBCA No. 3076, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,091 (acceptance of work with knowledge of order to modify it); Henry Burge & Alvin White, PSBCA No. 2431, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,910 (acceptance of work with knowledge of modification); Norwood Precision Products, ASBCA No. 24083, 80-1 BCA ¶ 14,405 (payment for products accepted after a default termination indicated the official's adoption of the inspector's unauthorized acceptant); Mil-Pak Co., GSBCA No. 5849, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,482 (contracting officer ratified a "change order by unilaterally fixing the amount of the equitable adjustment"). See generally Cibinic & Nash, at 53. Rather, this second Request for Change form serves more or less as a confirmation letter.48 Third, there is no doubt that the Appellant produced the extra copies without the required contract modification. Instead, the Contractor performed the work solely the basis of the DOJ's promise that it would take the necessary steps to secure one from GPO, and it made no attempt on its own to contact the Respondent. The conundrum for the Appellant is that it printed the additional copies before the Contracting Officer authorized the work or issued a contract modification; indeed, to date no such modification has been issued in this matter. In that regard, as the Board stated with respect to Print Order 86087, above, the risk is on the contractor who begins printing without proper authorization. See e.g., The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 49-51; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 18-19; Seriagraphic Arts, Inc., supra, slip op. at 7-8. And fourth, the Appellant's mistake was in assuming that the Respondent would automatically issue a contract modification when it receive the customer's agency's Request for Change form. However, since the right to change a contract is vested solely in the Government, contractors, as a rule, have no right to receive contract modifications. See Hunkin Conkey Construction Co. v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 638, 461 F.2d 1270 (1972) (contracting officer permitted to buy changed work from another contractor after finding that the contractor's price for the changed work was unacceptably high); Bridgewater Construction Corp., VABCA 2936, 91-2 BCA ¶ 24,273 (contracting officer allowed to buy items inadvertently omitted from the specifications from a vendor after obtaining an engineering change proposal from the contractor). Perhaps more importantly, as indicated above, GPO's regulations clearly state that "[i]t is not mandatory for the Contracting Officer to make the requested change and modify the contract[,]" but rather if the Contracting Officer determines that it would be in the best interest of the Government, ". . . he/she has the option to terminate the original contract for the convenience of the Government and readvertise with revised specifications. . . . ".49 See PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 2, ¶ 1(b) (Contract Modifications). When the Board considers all of the above, it is compelled to conclude that in ordering, printing and delivering the extra copies of the brief in Rison v. Demjanjuk, both the Appellant and the DOJ completely disregarded the contract's requirements for managing this procurement. Furthermore, it is also clear that their conduct deprived the Respondent of its right to seek a price for the additional work that was "in the best interest of the Government" from another source.50 See Hunkin Conkey Construction Co. v. United States, supra; Bridgewater Construction Corp., supra. Indeed, it can be argued that the Contracting Officer, if he so chose, could have properly refused to pay anything at all for the additional copies. See e.g., The George Marr Co., supra; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra; Seriagraphic Arts, Inc., supra (premature printing). See also Editors Press, Inc., GPO BCA 03-90 (September 4, 1991), 1991 WL 439271 (GPO not obligated to pay for a contractor's additional costs arising from the delay which occurred when it unilaterally stopped production while it sought a retest of the paper stock from GPO). However, where, as here, a contractor agrees to perform work which is beyond the scope of the contract, and thereby waives its right to object to a cardinal change,51 the Government is obligated to pay for it. See Mac-Well Co., ASBCA No. 23097, 79-2 BCA ¶ 13,895; Edward E. Harwell, ASBCA No. 9624, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5329; Aston-Mardian Co., ASBCA No. 7912, 1963 BCA ¶ 3836, reh'g denied, 1963 BCA ¶ 3928; Texas Trunk Co., ASBCA No. 3681, 57-2 BCA ¶ 1528. See generally Cibinic & Nash, at 399. In other words, there is no basis on this record for concluding that just because a contract modification was not issued, the Contractor was, as far as performance of the additional work is concerned, a "volunteer."52 Cf. Editors Press, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19 (citing Calculus, Inc., ASBCA No. 37155, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,520; Norflor Construction Corp., ASBCA No. 31579, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,649; Shedd B. Smith, DOT CAB No. 1381, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,780; Control Temp, Inc., ASBCA No. 23380, 80-1 BCA ¶ 14,443); Celia Translations, Inc., GPO CAB 10-79 (February 6, 1981), slip op. at 7, 1981 WL 95443). Such a conclusion would fly in the face of common sense and experience since contractors do not, as a rule, voluntarily perform work not called for by the contract. See Chris Berg, Inc. v. Untied Sates, 197 Ct. Cl. 503, 455 F.2d 1037 (1972); M.S.I. Corp., GSBCA No. 2428, 68-2 BCA ¶ 7262; Brown Construction Co., ASBCA No. 22648, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,745; Sigma Construction Co., ASBCA No. 37040, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,926. See generally Cibinic & Nash, at 436. The record shows that the Contracting Officer did, in fact, attempt to negotiate a fair and reasonable price for the extra work, but his offer of $2,540.00 was rejected by the Appellant. Accordingly, the Board must also decide the second issue involving Print Order 86144, namely, what is a fair and reasonable price for the 100 additional copies of the brief in Rison v. Demjanjuk? 2. The Appellant has failed to carry its burden of showing both the total amount of its actual costs, and that its costs were reasonable, the sine qua non of an equitable adjustment recovery. The Respondent, on the other hand, has demonstrated that the Contracting Officer's settlement offer of $2,540.00, contained in his final decision letter of July 21, 1994, constituted fair and reasonable compensation for the extra copies of the Appendix to the brief under the circumstances. Therefore, the Board will remand the case with instructions to the Respondent to pay the Appellant that amount as an equitable adjustment. At the outset, the Board should make clear that in deciding the fair pricing issue in this case, it is not dealing with a "constructive change." The "constructive change" doctrine is the mechanism used to direct the Government to retroactively compensate a contractor for work which could have been properly compensated under the "Changes" clause during the term of the contract by means of a "change order." See GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 103 (citing Merchant Service Co. [No GPO CAB No.] (February 11, 1980), slip op. at 16, 1980 WL 81262). See also Cibinic & Nash, at 429 ("A constructive change occurs when the contract work is actually changed but the procedures of the Changes clause have not been followed."). However, the Board has already noted that the Government's order for increased quantities of a product is not a matter generally covered by the "Changes" clause. See P.L. Saddler v. United States, supra; Liebert Corp., supra. See also Cibinic & Nash, at 390. Instead, the appropriate mechanism for paying the Appellant for the extra work in this case was by means of a "supplemental agreement" arrived at under the "Contract Modification" procedures in the PPR. In that regard, the PPR not only defines contract modifications as "any changes to any existing contract," and expressly includes "alterations in . . . quantity[,]" see PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 2, ¶ 1(a) (Contract Modifications), it also tells GPO contracting officers that when proposed modifications affect the "substantial/material aspects of the contract" which are not covered in the original agreement, then "[b]ilateral agreements (or supplemental agreements) are required," id., ¶ 1(c)(1).53 The term "substantial/material aspects of the contract" is defined to include, inter alia, "quantity." Id. The substance of this dispute is the Appellant's view that the 100 additional copies of the brief and Appendix in Rison v. Demjanjuk were properly billed as "back to press" charges, and the Contracting Officer's conclusion that such charges were neither fair nor reasonable. As the Board understands the Appellant's reimbursement theory, it seems to be predicated on the idea that once the original 208 copies of the brief and Appendix were delivered on time, any additional copies produced for delivery at a later date (in this case the next day) are reprints for which "back to press" charges equal to the amount of the original printing are appropriate. See RPTC-2, at 9. Furthermore, the Contractor tells us that GPO has accepted this method of paying for additional copies of a publication in the past, and is now bound by that "past practice." Id. In the Board's opinion, however, the Appellant's analysis is simply not supported by the facts or the law. That the Appellant incurred some additional costs and is entitled to some compensation for the extra work is not in dispute. However, as the Board sees it, the real problem for the Contractor in this case is that it has failed to carry its dual burden of showing the total amount of its actual costs, see New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 49; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40; R.C. Swanson Printing Co., supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 43, fn. 53, and perhaps more importantly, demonstrating that its costs were reasonable. New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 49; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 43. Accord S.W. Electronics and Manufacturing Corp., supra; Triple "A" Machine Shop, Inc., supra; Cal Constructors, supra. As previously indicated, the amount of an equitable adjustment is determined by the difference between what it reasonably would have cost to perform the original work and what it reasonably cost to perform the work as changed. See New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 49-50; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41-42. Accord General Builders Supply Co. v. United States, supra; Michael-Mark Ltd., supra; Zurfluh Enterprises, Inc., supra; Dick & Kirkman, Inc., supra; Lawrence D. Krause, supra; Celesco Industries, supra; Jack Picoult, supra. Indeed, it is upon the shoals of "reasonableness," the touchstone of an equitable adjustment, that the Appellant's "back to press" analysis founders. In that regard, the undisputed facts show that the DOJ's request for an additional 100 copies was made during the proofing stage of the production process, and that only the customer agency's establishing May 24, 1994, as the due date for the extra copies, while leaving undisturbed May 23, 1994, as the shipment date for the original 208 copies, prevented this from being one continuous order (R4 File II, Tabs H, I and P). See RPTC-2, at 6; Tr.: 31. Thus, for that reason, there is absolutely no basis for a "back to press" claim with respect to the Petition in Rison v. Demjianjuk; instead, any compensation at all would be for the extra copies of the Appendix. Second, there is unrefuted evidence in the record which indicates that at the time the DOJ made its request and was told by the Appellant that a "change order" would be needed to perform the work, the Contractor ". . . had not completed printing the original order-208 copies nor had [it] bound the copies[.]" (R4 File II, Tab K).54 Indeed, the Appellant's witness, Larry Ford, testified at the hearing, in response to a question from Counsel for GPO, that if the job had been a single order of 308 copies the Government's cost would have been $9,197.00. Tr.: 51. Third, for reasons already stated, the Contractor's claim of a "prior course of dealings" between the parties as support for its "back to press" charges fails for want of proof. See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 33; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 62; Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., supra, slip op. at 11 (citing Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra). Accord Kvaas Construction Co., supra; General Secretarial Services Corp., supra; Western States Construction Co., supra. Moreover, the Appellant's reliance on Print Order 86020 (App. Exh. No. 1), the one instance brought to the Board's attention where it appears that GPO allowed "back to press" charges for additional copies of a brief ordered by DOJ, is clearly misplaced. In that case, the records show that more than a month had elapsed between the shipment/delivery date for the original order (September 17, 1993) and the issuance of a contract modification authorizing an additional 75 copies (October 19, 1993) for delivery about a week later (October 25, 1993), and besides the amount involved was relatively small ($416.00). Here, the gap between the original and "back to press" shipment/delivery dates is just one day (May 23, 1994, and May 24, 1994, respectively), and the amount in dispute is comparatively large ($7,996.00). When these facts are measured against the foregoing equitable adjustment principles, the Board can find no justification for "back to press" charges equal to the amount of the initial printing costs, particularly where, as here, the number of additional copies is less than half of the original order (48 percent). To be blunt, the Contractor's "back to press" claim does not inspire much trust or confidence as a proper claim under the regulations,55 because it exactly doubles the price of the work for the Government. Thus, the Appellant's claim here is analogous to the contractor's claim rejected by the Board in Universal Printing Co., because: On the surface, . . . rather than being an accurate and complete statement of the Appellant's costs as reflected in its accounting ledgers, or at least a rational and honest estimate of them, the revised makeready/setup charge looks suspiciously like the result of some arbitrary formula. Claims prepared on such a basis are uniformly rejected by agency boards of contract appeals. [Footnote omitted.] See e.g., Ordnance Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 32371, 88-3 BCA ¶ 20,910 (a contractor's appeal for an equitable adjustment was denied because his claim was based on the arbitrary formula he used in preparing his bid rather than on the actual increase in his costs stemming from the Government's change order). See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36. See also New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 51-52 ("On the one hand, the Appellant's simple expedient of merely applying its standard charges for stripping and bluelines to the operations in question, is analogous to figuring the costs for those tasks on the basis of some arbitrary formula. The Board has previously noted that claims prepared on such a basis are uniformly rejected by boards of contract appeals. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36 (citing Ordnance Materials, Inc., supra).") 56 For that reason alone, the Contractor's "back to press" claim is rejectable. On the other hand, at the hearing the Contracting Officer explained in detail how he reached a figure-$2,540.00-which he thought was fair and reasonable compensation for the extra 100 copies under the circumstances: There was a question as to whether [the Appellant was] notified ahead of time about this. I did not want to get into a big argument about that, and I was really trying to work out an agreement between us where we could pay for it. I just felt that the money that we were being requested to pay was way too high, and I also felt that it included a composition charge which, in prior negotiations, Mr. Swanson and I had agreed was a $15[.00] a page charge that was added in there. We have had occasion[s] where work was done and stopped for binding, and we agreed that $15[.00] was a fair and reasonable composition charge. So for that reason, I deducted that amount, that $15[.00] that I felt was composition, added the charge, and there was only a limited number of charges that Mr. Swanson had bid. He had no charge to composition, and obviously, there was composition, so that price is included someplace. And that's the reason I came up-took that from the $22.50 per page [makeready] price, which left me with $7.50 per page, and added in the $200[.00] [makeready] cost, [and it] came out [$2,540.00]. See Tr.: 76-77.57 In the Board 's view, the Contracting Officer's analysis is logical and rational. The Board also believes that his approach comes closer to an "honest estimate" of the true costs for reprinting the additional copies of the Appendix than the Appellant's. In the Board's mind, a critical weakness in the Contractor's position has always been its internal inconsistency. There is a stark contrast between the Appellant's contention that it cost $7,996.00 to reprint the extra copies of the brief and Appendix for shipment on May 24, 1994, and its statement that if they had been produced as part of the original order for delivery a day earlier, the additional cost would only have been $1,201.00 ($9,197.00 - $7,996.00 = $1,201.00). The Contractor has failed to explain to the Board's satisfaction why a mere 24 hour delay would increase the production costs for these extra copies by a factor of nearly 6-1/2 times, or 650 percent, when it seems that the time frame is so brief that the Contractor would have had to expended little effort in fulfilling the DOJ's order (the major tasks and the bulk of the work having been accomplished in producing the original 208 copies). The Contracting Officer's analysis suffers from no such logical infirmity. Indeed, his settlement offer of $2,540.00, which is more than double the $1,201.00 the Appellant says it would have cost to print the 100 extra copies as part of the original order, seems reasonable and generous by the Board's standards. Although the Contracting Officer's "final decision" letter states that his offer "is withdrawn upon apppeal [sic] of the contracting officer[']s final decision," see R4 File, Tab U, at 3, his hearing testimony implied that the offer was still "on the table." Tr.: 74-77. In the Board's judgment the Contracting Officer's calculations establish a fair and reasonable basis for compensating the Appellant for the extra copies under the circumstances. See McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 06-91 (May 6, 1994), slip op. at 39, 1994 WL 377581; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90 (December 20, 1993), Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order, slip op. at 14, 1993 WL 668317; Banta Company, supra, slip op. at 61. Therefore, the Board adopts his calculations and rationale as its own, and will remand the appeal to the Respondent with instructions to pay the Contractor the amount of $2,540.00 as an equitable adjustment for the additional copies of the Appendix under Print Order. 86144.58 VI. ORDER For the above reasons, the Board finds and concludes with regard to GPO BCA 27-94 that: (1) the Appellant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the DOJ authorized it either to print or reprint the Appendix of the brief in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union; and (2) thus, there is insufficient proof to support the Contractor's equitable adjustment claim for costs in the amount of $3,710.00 under Print Order 86087. ACCORDINGLY, the final decision of the Contracting Officer rejecting the claim is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED. With respect to GPO BCA 27A-94, the Board finds and concludes that: (1) the DOJ's request that the Appellant produce and deliver an additional 100 copies of the brief in Rison v. Demjanjuk was not "within the general scope of the contract," as that language is understood in the "Changes" clause; (2) the Contractor proceeded with performance without proper authorization from the Contracting Officer; (3) therefore, the extra work was produced in violation of the contract; (4) because the DOJ ordered the extra 100 copies during the proofing stage of the production process, there is no foundation for a "back to press" claim with respect to the Petition; (5) nevertheless, the Appellant is entitled to some payment for producing the 100 additional copies of the Appendix to the brief; (6) however, the Appellant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence the total amount of its actual reprinting costs, or demonstrated that those costs were reasonable, which are basic to support an equitable adjustment recovery; and (7) the Respondent, on the other hand, has shown that the Contracting Officer's settlement offer of $2,540.00 constitutes a fair and reasonable compensation for the 100 additional copies of the Appendix under the circumstances. THEREFORE, the Contracting Officer's final decision is also AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED, except that matter is REMANDED to the Respondent with instructions to pay the Appellant $2,540.00 for the extra work performed. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 56; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 40; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 15; Banta Co., supra, slip. op. at 62; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 37; General Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 2-84 (December 3, 1985), slip op. at 23, 1985 WL 154846. It is so Ordered. November 18, 1996 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Judge _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file in GPO BCA 27-94 was assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, and delivered to the Board on September 12, 1994. Board Rules, Rule 4(a). It will be referred to hereafter as R4 File I, with an appropriate tab letter also indicated. As originally submitted to the Board, R4 File I contained twenty two (22) documents, identified as Tabs A-V. 2 The prehearing telephone conference in GPO BCA 27-94 was conducted by the Board on July 6, 1995. However, the discussions at the conference were not directed at the merits of the controversy, but rather focused on whether or not the appeal was timely filed since the date on the Notice of Appeal, July 27, 1994, was more than 90 days after the Contracting Officer's final decision of April 5, 1994. See RPTC-1, at 2. In that regard, the Government argued that the appeal was untimely, while the Appellant contended the Contracting Officer's reconsideration of his initial final decision effectively extended the time the Contractor had to file an appeal. See RPTC-1, at 2-3. The parties agreed that the jurisdictional issue needed to be answered before other issues in the case were considered, and it was decided that the appropriate method to decide the question was by means of a motion to dismiss from GPO and a response from the Appellant. See RPTC-1, at 3. Therefore, the Board established a schedule for the Respondent to file a motion to dismiss, for the Appellant to respond to the motion, and for GPO to reply to the Contractor's response. Pursuant to that schedule, the Board received the following documents from the parties: (1) "Respondent's Motion to Dismiss with Points and Authorities in Support Thereof," dated July 28, 1995; (2) "Respondent's Supplement to Motion to Dismiss," dated August 1, 1995; and (3) "Appellant's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Respondent's Supplement to Motion to Dismiss," dated August 8, 1995. On September 29, 1995, after carefully considering the submissions of the parties, the Board concluded that: (1) a letter from the Appellant to the Contracting Officer, dated July 6, 1994, constituted a validly filed, timely Notice of Appeal (R4 File I, Tab S); and (2) regardless of the effect of the Contractor's letter, the Contracting Officer's actions between April 5, 1994, and July 13, 1994, gave a reasonable appearance that he was reconsidering his final decision. See Decision and Order Accepting Appeal and Denying Motion to Dismiss, dated September 29, 1995, slip op. at 15. Accordingly, the Board DENIED the Government's motion to dismiss. Id., at 23. 3 The Contracting Officer's R4 File in GPO BCA 27A-94, was also delivered to the Board on September 12, 1994. Board Rules, Rule 4(a). It will be referred to hereafter as R4 File II, with an appropriate tab letter also indicated. As originally submitted to the Board, R4 File II contained twenty four (24) documents, identified as Tabs A-W, including Tab "Mc." 4 The prehearing telephone conference in GPO BCA 27A-94 was also conducted by the Board on July 6, 1995. For this appeal, however, the discussions at the conference concentrated on the merits of the dispute. 5 The reporter's transcript of the hearing shall be referred to hereinafter as "Tr.," followed by a colon (:) and an appropriate page number. 6 Separate stipulations were submitted for Docket Nos. GPO BCA 27-94 and GPO BCA 27A-94. The stipulations were identified by the parties at the hearing as "Stip. 2" and "Stip. 1," respectively, and shall be so cited here, followed by an appropriate paragraph number. 7 As a rule, a party is bound by its stipulations, and such evidentiary agreements freely entered into are controlling and conclusive on all issues of fact. See GraphicData, Inc., GPO BCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996), slip op. at 7-8, fn. 11, 1996 WL ______; The George Marr Co., GPO BCA 31-94 (April 23, 1996), slip op. at 3, fn. 3, 1996 WL ______; Banta Co., GPO BCA 03-91 (November 15, 1993), slip op. at 52-53, 1993 WL 526843 (citing Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 906, 99 S.Ct. 1995 (1979); Bromley Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 69, 74 (1987), aff'd 861 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Gresham & Co. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 97, 112, 470 F.2d 542, 551 (1972); FED. R. CIV. P. 16). While a court or board may reject a factual stipulation if it is "demonstrably false" or contrary to the record evidence, the record here fails to disclose any facts which would contradict the stipulations in this case. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), slip op. at 43, fn. 57, 1995 WL 488488 (citing Dillon, Read & Co., Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 293 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Bromley Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States, supra, 14 Cl. Ct. at 74; Kaminer Construction Corp. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 182, 197, 488 F.2d 980, 988 (1973)). See also GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 7-8, fn. 11; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 3, fn. 3; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 53. 8 The two categories were: (a) Category 1, which covered briefs from manuscript copy; and (b) Category 2, which involved briefs from camera copy only. See R4 Files I and II, at 13 (Determination of Award and Placement of Work). See also RPTC-2, at 4. The specific product in both categories was "Supreme Court Briefs." Id., at 2. 9 Under GPO's regulations, this sort of arrangement is called a "direct-deal term contract." See Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 2 (hereinafter PPR). As defined in the regulations, a "direct-deal term contract" is one which: ". . . allow[s] the customer agency to place print orders (GPO Form 2511) directly with contractors rather than routing them through the GPO for placement." See GPO Agency Procedural Handbook, GPO Publication 305.1, dated March 1987, Sec. IV, ¶ 1, at 8 (hereinafter GPO Handbook). The purpose of this method of contract administration is: ". . . to ensure that agency printing needs are met in the most effective and efficient manner possible." Id. It should be noted, however, that an agency's direct-deal authority: ". . . extends only to the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs. . . . All other authority rests with GPO's Contracting Officers." See GPO Handbook, Sec. IV, ¶ 2, at 9. {Emphasis added.] See also Graphicdata, Inc., supra, slip op. at 60-61, fn. 54; B & B Reproductions, GPO BCA 09-89 (June 30, 1995), slip op. at 3, fn. 5, 1995 WL488447; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 40-92 (January 31, 1994), slip op. at 3, fn. 4, 1994 WL 275096; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), slip op. at 2, fn. 4, 1994 WL 275077. 10 According to the record, at the time of the IFB the first contractor for Category I work under Program D404-M was Wilson- Epes. Balmar Printing was the first contractor for Category II. See R4 Files I and II, Tab C. See also Stips. I and II, at 2, fn. 2. The record also indicates that at the time of the hearing, the Appellant had been a contractor for Program D404-M for approximately eight (8) years. Tr.: 41. 11 Based upon the anticipated needs over the contract term, the Contractor's bid, after discounting for prompt payment, was calculated at $363,242.70 for Category I work, and $20,189.40 for Category II, the lowest offer in both categories. See R4 Files I and II, Tab C. See also Stips. I and II, at 2, fn. 3. 12 The contract was awarded to the Appellant at the following estimated contract prices: (a) $290,594.16 (for Category I work); and (b) $16,151.52 (for Category II work). See R4 Files I and II, Tab D. See also Stips. I and II, at 2, fn. 4. The Appellant's total estimated contract price was $306,655.68. See RPTC-2, at 2. 13 The days of the week in question were Friday (January 14, 1994), Tuesday (January 18, 1994), and Wednesday (January 19, 1994). Furthermore, Monday, January 17, 1994, was the "Martin Luther King's Day" holiday. See Stip. 2, at 2-3, fn. 5. 14 At the hearing, the Appellant testified that the reason the Contracting Officer was not notified was that DOJ made its changes late at night (around 11:40 p.m.), and there was no one at GPO to contact. See R4 File I, Tab J; Tr.: 122, 126, 134, 136-37. 15 The Appellant identified Karen Biehl, a Printing Specialist in GPO's Term Contracts Division, as the employee who asked him to provide proof of reprinting. See Tr.: 129-30. 16 From the testimony at the hearing, it is clear that this is the critical factual dispute with regard to Print Order 86087. In that regard, the Appellant was adamant that DOJ did authorize a second printing of the Appendix (at 11:40 p.m. on January 18, 1994), and that the customer agency was in a rush because the brief had to be filed with U.S. Supreme Court at 10:00 a.m. the next day. Tr.: 122, 126-27, 135. The Contracting Officer, on the other hand, was told by DOJ representatives that the customer agency did not ask for or authorize a reprint (R4 File I, Tabs K and L). Tr.: 135, 142-43. However, in response to a question from the Board, the Contracting Officer said that he was not challenging the fact the Contractor may have received a verbal "O.K. to print" from the customer agency, but rather his position was that under GPO's regulations the Appellant was obligated to submit certain things to support a claim, and it did not comply. Tr.: 148, 150-1, 153. 17 The crux of the Contracting Officer's position was that because the Appellant failed to retain the briefs from the first printing, he was left with no choice but to deny the claim. Tr.: 142-44. As he explained it, in pertinent part: "Mr. Swanson said he did not have any copy for us to look at, it was all thrown away. I had no copy to look at from any billing. So what I had, what I was faced with was the contractor saying that they had no copy at all to show me, [and] the department saying they did not request it. . . . Normally, on all jobs where there is a mistake or a reprint, the contractors call the contracting officer, explain what happened, show the work that was done, hold onto it, in order words, not destroy the work, and then a decision would be reached by the contracting officer. Now, sometimes if the work has been done, the decision may be to split the cost because we cannot specifically say it was one person's fault or the other, but in every case, the work is held onto until it is verified that it actually was produced." Tr.: 142-43. [Emphasis added.] See also Tr.: 148-51. As indicated in the Contracting Officer's testimony, the Appellant says that the DOJ told it to dispose of the copies of the first printing, and it did so. Tr. 131, 135-36. 18 Although the Print Order estimated the Appendix at 288 text pages per copy, the actual number of pages was 312 per copy (R4 File II, Tabs E and U). See RPTC-2, at 6, fn. 2. See also Tr.: 44-45. Furthermore, the job was designated as Category 1 work because the brief was more than 76 pages. See Tr.: 34-35. 19 The Contracting Officer's notes regarding the job contains the following undated entry: "Mr. Swanson inform[ed] the agency [DOJ] he could not go back to press unless he had it in writing. He said at [the] time of the request he had not completed printing the original order-208 copies nor had he bound the copies[.]" (R4 File II, Tab K). 20 There are two DOJ Request for Change forms, dated May 24, 1994, in the record, and it is unclear to the Board which one the parties are referring to in their stipulation (R4 File II, Tabs H and I). Both are addressed to GPO, signed by Stroman, and have a check mark in the "Change of Quantity" box. However, one (R4 File II, Tab H), states, in pertinent part: "P.O. #86144 . . . The Department has authorized back to press for an additional 100 copies. The Department must have final printed copies on 5-24-94 by 3:00 PM as per our originally established schedule[.]", and appears to have been sent by facsimile transmission directly to GPO, where it was received in the Customer Service Department on June 1, 1994. See R4 File II, Tab K; Tr.: 84-87. A copy of this Request for Change form was sent to the Contractor (R4 File II, Tab L). The other Request for Change form (R4 File II, Tab I), which simply says, in pertinent part: "This is to authorize back to press for an additional 100 copies[.]", seems to have been sent to the Appellant, and is in the nature of a confirming letter. Obviously, both Request for Change forms were prepared and mailed after the original ship/delivery date. See Tr.: 32, 87. 21 Basically, the Appellant billed for the extra copies as if they were new publications, claiming the full contract rate of $22.50 per page, which included the costs of composition, printing and binding, even though no composition work was involved. See RPTC-2, at 8. However, the record also indicates that the Contractor and the Contracting Officer had previously agreed to $15.00 as the appropriate per page charge. See Tr.: 76-77. See also note 26 infra. 22 The Contractor reasoned that "back to press" charges were appropriate because the 100 additional copies were requested after the original order had been shipped. See Tr.: 51. 23 The Contracting Officer testified that: " . . . in reviewing the notes I had from the [DOJ] and from Mr. Roye Stroman and Shirley Anderson, it seemed to show me that they were notified prior to running the 32-page portion (the Petition) and that initially they ran the 32-page[s] when the [DOJ] had requested proofs, and when they went back, asked them to review the portion that they had printed, use it as a proof. The records that I received from the Department showed that they were notified at that time, so therefore, I did not authorize payment for the additional 100 copies on that, but I did authorize payment for the 32-page [Petition]." See Tr.: 75. In that regard, his notes contain the following entries: (a) "6/3/94. Call[ed] Roye Stroman of [DOJ], inform[ed] him what the cost was for the 100 [additional copies] when the [Contractor], Swanson [Printing] had to go back to press ($7,996.00) . . .;" and (b) "6/7/94. Called A. Hyde to call agency. Need memo OKing cost of going back to press for above print order[.]" (R4 File II, Tab K). The appeal file shows that the DOJ furnished two memoranda in response to the Contracting Officer's request (R4 File II, Tabs N and P). The first memorandum, dated June 15, 1994, is from Stroman to Alvin Hyde of GPO's Customer Service Department, and describes the DOJ's dealings with the Appellant on Print Order 86144, and says "[DOJ's Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which placed the order with the Appellant "after hours" without the knowledge of the customer agency's Printing Procurement Unit (PPU)] is requesting that this cost of $7,996[.00] should not be billed to them[.]" (R4 File II, Tab N). The second memorandum, dated June 21, 1994, is from G. Shirley Anderson, OSG's Supervisory Paralegal, to Charles Hurd, Acting Chief of the PPU (a copy of which was provided to Hyde on June 24, 1994, and confirms Stroman's factual description regarding how the Print Order was handled, and states, in pertinent part: "The reprinting affected only the [Petition] portion and not the [Appendix]. Since the brief had been printed under separate covers, the printer did not incur any expense for reprinting the [Appendix] portion. The [DOJ] does not authorize payment of any reprinting costs incurred by the printer in reprinting the [Petition] portion . . ." (R4 File II, Tab P). [Original emphasis.] 24 In addressing the Appellant's contention at the hearing that if it did not carry out the DOJ's instructions it could be defaulted, the Contracting Officer testified that the Contractor's fear was groundless, and it should have told the DOJ that its request was "out of the scope of the contract, and [the Contractor] cannot proceed until the [C]ontracting [O]fficer gives them authority." See Tr.: 88-90. Indeed, the Contracting Officer stated: "As long as [contractors] obey [GPO Contract Terms] and don't do anything without a contract modification, they can never be hurt." See Tr.: 110. Finally, the Contracting Officer also noted that if he had been informed ahead of time about the DOJ's request for 100 additional copies of the brief, he would have had to get the approval of GPO's Contract Review Board (CRB) to issue a contract modification because the Appellant's proposed increase in the cost of Print Order 86144 was in excess of $5,000.00. See Tr.: 82. See also PPR, Chap. I, Sec. 10, ¶ 4.b(iv). 25 Both parties filed a closing brief in these consolidated cases. The Appellant's closing brief, dated February 15, 1996, shall be referred to herein as "App. Brf.," with an appropriate page number thereafter. The Respondent's closing brief, dated March 4, 1996, shall be cited herein as "R. Brf.," followed by an appropriate page. In addition, the Contractor submitted an exhibit at the hearing consisting of documentation relating to another Program D404-M order, Print Order 86020, for the purpose of establishing a prior course of dealing between the parties. Tr.: 57-68. The Appellant's Exhibit shall be referred to as "App. Exh. No. 1." 26 Indeed, regarding the appeal in GPO BCA 27-94, the Respondent alleges that the Appellant has not even established that it performed the extra work for which it now seeks additional compensation. See R. Brf., at 12. No such doubts exist with respect to GPO BCA 27A-94. In that appeal, the Government concedes the extra work was performed, but challenges the Contractor's method of charging for it. See R. Brf., at 10, fn. 8. Basically, GPO argues that the Appellant's accounting for the additional 100 copies of the brief as "back to press" charges, and in effect billing for them as if they were new publications, was unreasonable, although the Government could also understand the Contractor's economic incentive for doing so; i.e., if the extra copies had been part of the original order it would not have received any additional compensation because its bid prices did not include a separate running charge. Id. (Citing Tr.: 50-52; R4 Files I and II, Tab A, at 5, 16). See also RPTC-2, at 8. Instead, the Respondent believes that its offer of $2,540.00 is a fair and reasonable price for the added work performed, and offers that amount as an equitable adjustment for Print Order 86144. See RPTC-2, at 8-9; R4 File II, at Tab U. 27 The Respondent contends with respect to the appeal in GPO BCA 27A-94, specifically, that the Appellant had ample opportunity to obtain the Contracting Officer's prior approval for the extra copies sought by the DOJ, and its failure to do so deprived the Government from exercising its discretion to pay the Contractor's "steep additional charges" or procure the work from other sources. See R. Brf., at 10. See also RPTC-2, at 8 (The Appellant's "back to press" charges were "grossly inflated."). 28 In this respect, the Government has a better grasp of the law on this issue than the Contractor. Contrary to the Appellant's belief that the Respondent was responsible for producing evidence or testimony distinguishing the Print Orders in dispute from "the myriad of orders previously ordered and paid for involving reprints and/or camera ready copy[.]," see App. Brf., at 2, it had the burden of proof because it was the party raising the issue and seeking the benefit of the "prior course of dealings" doctrine. See R. Brf., at 12 (citing Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 150, 158, 462 F.2d 1150 (1972). See also J.W. Bateson Co., ASBCA No. 26617, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,682; Watson Electrical Construction Co., GSBCA No. 4260, 76-1 BCA ¶ 11,912; Lake State Manufacturing Corp., ASBCA No. 17286, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,190, reconsid. denied, 74-1 BCA ¶ 10,462. 29 The Board's decision is based on the following record: (a) the Appellant's Notices of Appeal, dated July 27, 1994; (b) the Appellant's Complaints, dated May 11, 1995; (c) the Respondent's Answers, dated June 8, 1995; (d) R4 Files I and II; (e) RPTC-1 and RPTC-2; (f) the record transcript and documentary evidence presented at the hearing on December 12, 1995; and (g) the closing briefs filed by the parties. 30 Thus, Print Order 86087 covered the production of DOJ's brief in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned on First Amendment grounds so much of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, prohibiting receipt of honoraria by Federal Government employees. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, ___U.S.___, 115A S.Ct. 1003 (1995). Print Order 86144 was for the brief in Rison v. Demjanjuk, a matter on certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court involving allegations made by an accused Nazi war criminal, who had been extradited to Israel and acquitted of capital charges there, that Federal Government attorneys had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose to the courts and to him exculpatory information in their possession during the extradition process. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom., Rison v. Demjanjuk, ___U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 295 (1994). 31 Reasons of strategy also dictate this practice-a party who files an early brief runs the risk of allowing his or her opponent to submit what amounts to a reply brief. 32 The Board has stated on numerous occasions when a "direct-deal term contract" is at issue, the contractor and GPO are the only parties to it, and "while [the customer agency is] certainly an active 'participant' in the contract by virtue of its 'direct- deal' authority, it [is] not a party . . .". See Graphicdata, Inc., supra, slip op. at 60. See also B Reproductions, supra, slip op. at 37-38; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 10, fn. 11. 33 The reason for this approach was stated in Bruce Construction Corporation: "Since the purpose underlying such adjustments is to safeguard the contractor against increased costs engendered by the modification, it appears patent that the measure of damages cannot be the value received by the Government, but must be more closely related to and contingent upon the altered position in which the contractor finds himself by reason of the modification." Bruce Construction Corp. v. United States, supra, 163 Ct. Cl. at 100, 324 F.2d at 518. 34 "Preponderance of the evidence" simply means such evidence as, when weighed against that opposed to it, is more convincing that something is more likely so than not. See Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, GPO BCA 9-95 (August 5, 1991), slip op. at 31, 1991 WL 439272 (Decision on Remand) (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F.Supp. 1202, 1204, fn. 3 (D.D.C. 1990). To meet this standard of proof a party is required to present evidence sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. See Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, supra, slip op. at 31-32 (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F.Supp. at 1206; E. Devit, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 7-2.02 (4th ed. 1987). 35 The reason for this bias was clearly stated by the Federal Circuit in Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, when it said: ". . . the 'actual cost method' is preferred because it provides the court, or contracting officer, with documented underlying expenses, ensuring that the final amount of the equitable adjustment will be just that-equitable-and not a windfall for either the [G]overnment or the contractor." See Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1991), rev'g, 18 Cl. Ct. 682 (1990). 36 While the contractor's original or bid estimate can be used to determine the cost of the work, later evidence, such as purchase order prices or vendor quotations, are normally better evidence of the costs that the contractor would have incurred. See, e.g., Atlantic Electric Co., GSBCA No. 6016, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,484. If there is no such evidence, the bid estimate may be considered the best available proof of this amount. See Select Contractors, Inc., ENGBCA No. 3919, 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,869; Dawson Construction Co., Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA No. 5672(5308)-REIN, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,387, aff'd on reconsid., 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,914; Onetta Boat Works, Inc., supra; Pruitt, Inc., ASBCA No. 18344, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,213. Cf. Ordnance Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 32371, 88-3 BCA ¶ 29,910. However, the use of estimates does not change the burden of proof. Cf. Lagarelli Brothers Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 34793, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,363; Clary Corp., ASBCA No. 19274, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,927. 37 In Condor Reliability Services, Inc., the ASBCA stated: "The rule applicable to the price is . . . 'the difference between the reasonable cost of performing without the change or deletion and the reasonable cost of performing with the change or deletion.' [Citation omitted.] The result should not change the contractor's loss or profit position before the change occurred. In other words, there should be no repricing of the contract as a whole." Condor Reliability Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 40538, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,254, at 116,675-76. [Emphasis added.] 38 As explained by the Claims Court: "The search for 'reasonability' . . . , is not limited to inquiry of such factors as 'fair market value' or 'historical cost.' . . . The reasonable cost concept includes both 'objective' and 'subjective' elements . . . The objective focus is on the costs that would have been incurred by a prudent businessman placed in a similar overall competitive situation . . . However, unless it also takes into account the subjective situation of the contractor, a test of 'reasonable cost' is incomplete. . . .". See Nager Electric, supra, 194 Ct. Cl. at 851-53, 442 F.2d at 945-46. 39 Seriagraphic Arts, Inc., was decided by one of the ad hoc appeals panels which considered disputes between contractors and GPO prior to the establishment of the Board in 1984. See GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984. While the Board is not bound by their decisions, its policy is to follow the rulings of the ad hoc panels where applicable and appropriate. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 50, fn. 40; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-91 (April 29, 1993), slip op. at 14, fn. 19, 1993 WL 526848; Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 02-88 (December 21, 1991), slip op. at 18, fn. 20, 1991 WL 439274; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), slip op. at 9, fn. 9, 1991 WL 439270. 40 The Appellant says that on January 18, 1994, it received verbal assurances from either Davis or Stroman at the DOJ that there would be no other changes to the Appendix, and that proofs were only required for the Petition. However, the Appendix was returned with additional changes along with the Petition proofs (R4 File I, Tabs I). Neither Davis nor Stroman were called by the Contractor as witnesses at the hearing. On the other hand, while the Contracting Officer was willing to assume that the Appellant may have received the DOJ's verbal approval to proceed, he testified that normally an "O.K. to print" will be in writing. See Tr.: 152-53. See also R. Brf., at 10, fn. 7. 41 B. P. Printing and Office Supplies involved a contractor's appeal protesting a contracting officer's final decision reducing the contract price by $74.20 because of a shortage in the number of books delivered. The contract in question contained a so- called "Receipt for Delivery" clause which set forth, in detail, the type of information which the contractor had to provide to receive payment for the work performed, including: (1) the GPO jacket, program, and print order numbers; (2) the total quantity delivered; (3) the number of cartons, and quantity per carton; (4) the date when delivery made; and (5) the signature of the Government agent accepting delivery. The contractor claimed that he had shipped all of the books required by the contract, and provided the contracting officer with its "shipping list," which it said was in a form which the Government had accepted as evidence of shipment in the past. However, the contracting officer concluded that the "shipping list" did not meet the requirements of the contract, and made the appropriate adjustment to the contract price. Specifically, there was nothing to indicate, on the face of the document, the number of cartons, and quantity per carton for that order, and who accepted them on behalf of the customer agency, and the contractor subsequently providing that information orally could not cure this defect. The Board affirmed the contracting officer's decision and dismissed the appeal. Id., at 26-27. 42 "Prior course of dealing" is defined as a sequence of previous conduct between the parties relating to their former agreements or transactions which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 ("agreement"); U.C.C. § 1-205 (1977) ("transaction"). The rule is that the Government will not be allowed to suddenly change its long-standing interpretation of contract language to the detriment or prejudice of a contractor who has acted in reliance on that historic meaning or contractual practice. See Gresham and Co., Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 542 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Western Avionics, Inc., ASBCA No. 33158, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,662). 43 Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co. is the Board's lead case on the issue. In that opinion, it said the following about the use of "prior course of dealing" as an interpretive device in contract interpretation cases: "[¶] On the question of the weight to be given a course of prior dealings, Professors Nash and Cibinic in examining the principal case of L.W. Foster Sportswear, Co. v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 499, 405 F.2d 1,285 (1969), tell us that in Government contract law "[w]here the parties to an interpretation dispute have interpreted, either expressly or by their actions, the provisions of a similar, previously performed contract in a certain manner, they will be presumed to have intended the same meaning for those provisions in the disputed contract. This presumption is rebuttable by clear evidence that the parties have changed their intent or are in disagreement at the time they enter into the disputed contract. See, e.g., Lock[h]eed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 36, 426 F.2d (1970)." Ralph C. Nash, Jr. and John Cibinic, Jr., Federal Procurement Law, Third Edition, The George Washington University, 1980, at 969 n.1 (emphasis added). [¶] They further tell us in footnote 2 that "[w]hen the contract language is clear and precise, the court or board will normally give lesser weight to a prior course of dealing. [T]he governing factor in such cases is the degree of clarity or exactness with which the disputed term or clause is written, Robert McMullan & Sons, Inc., ASBCA [No.] 21455, 77-1 BCA [¶] 12,456 (1977) . . . however, superficially exact language may not correctly express the parties agreement. Generally more convincing evidence of a course of prior dealing will be required to controvert contract language which is stated precisely. Cf. Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 150, 462 F.2d 1150 (1972)." Id. at 970, n.3. [¶] In addition, they tell us that "[t]he parties may be bound by their interpretation of prior contracts even though the language of the disputed contract has been altered." Id. at 971, n.3. [¶] Lastly, they tell us that "[t]he reasoning underlying the prior course of dealing rule requires that both parties have actual knowledge of the prior course of dealing and of its significance to the contract. Clearly, it would be unreasonable to find that a party had agreed to a term which he was not aware." Id. at 972, n.5 (emphasis added)." See Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co.,supra, slip op. at 10-11. [Original emphasis.] 44 Technically, this is not the sort of case which would entitle the Board to draw a negative inference from the Appellant's failure to produce the documentation necessary for payment. See Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, supra, slip op. at 39 (". . . [B]ecause the Appellant has not introduced evidence to explain why the documents are missing, the accepted legal principles allow the Board to draw a negative inference in favor of the Respondent that the contents would be harmful to the Appellant's case. Citing Morowitz v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 621 (1988); Jen-Beck Associates, VABCA Nos. 2107-10, 2133-2117, 2119-20, 2122, 2124-25, 2127, 2129-35, 2186, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,831). Accord Cape Tool & Die, Inc., ASBCA No. 46433, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,465 at 136,845 ("A recurring problem in appellant's claim is the lack of documentation. No pre-award records are offered to support appellant's proposed profit of the anticipated hours for machining first article casings. No invoices are offered to show the cost of the Anderson thread gages, while other purchases are supported by invoices. With regard to settlement expenses claimed for the labor of appellant's president and unnamed shop personnel, the hours are estimated and there is no explanation of what was done. Neither is there a persuasive explanation tendered for the lack of records. Where such records are not produced, an inference may be [drawn] against appellant." Citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 291 (Chadbourn rev. 1979)); KRW, Incorporated, DOT BCA No. 2572, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,435, at 131,539 ("When the persons having the greatest familiarity with events are not called, but a litigant seeks to rely on the testimony of one having lesser familiarity, or when a litigant fails to produce other relevant evidence known to exist, a tribunal may draw an inference that the testimony of the person not called or the evidence not introduced might not support or might actually be adverse to that litigant." Citing Inter-West, Ltd., DOTBCA No. 2238, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,073 (1992); TDC Management Corporation, DOTBCA No. 1802, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,815 (1991) at 119,258, affirmed upon reconsideration, 93-1 BCA ¶ 24,061, affirmed without opinion sub nom. Skinner v. TDC Management Corporation, 975 F.2d 869 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Here, the Contractor has told us why the copies of the brief's first printing are missing, and the Board accepts its explanation no matter how illogical it sounds. 45 But for the fact that the issue in this case involves a substantial increase in quantities, it could be argued that GPO's "Changes" clause also applies. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 4 (Changes). See GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 98-99; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 34. Accord United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988); Van Cleef v. Aeroflex Corporation, 657 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981); L.B. Foster v. Railroad Service, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1990). However, the general rule is that increases in quantities are thought not to be authorized by the "Changes" clause. See P.L. Saddler v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 557, 287 F.2d 411 (1961) (a change order almost doubling the amount of material required for an embankment was beyond the scope of a contract to build a levee); 30 Comp. Gen 34 (B-95069) (1950); 15 Comp. Gen. 573 (A-66501) (1935) (separate buildings may not be added on a construction project). See also Cibinic & Nash, at 390 (". . . [A] change adding quantities above the contractual maximums was found to be outside the scope [of competition]." Citing Liebert Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 448 (B-232234.5), 91-1 CPD ¶ 413)). 46 GraphicData, Inc. involved a contractor's claim for an equitable adjustment under a single-award "requirements" contract for the printing of patents. As awarded, the contract was divided into two production periods, the first period in which patents were to be produced on paper or microfilm, and the second where CD-ROMs would be substituted for printed patents. Under this plan, the customer agency's need for printed patents would be substantially reduced in the second production period, and the contract estimates reflected that fact. Furthermore, the invitation for bids had expressly warned potential contractors that as customers switched to CD-ROM patents the contract's estimated quantities might be "significantly reduced even further." The contractor relied on the Government's estimates of reduced work in the second production period in bidding the job. However, after award the customer agency canceled its CD-ROM plan, and required all patents to be printed on paper or microfilm for the entire contract term. This unexpected additional work resulted in a financial loss to the contractor when priced at the contract rates, and it asked for an equitable adjustment and a repricing of the agreement. GPO denied the claim on the ground that the contract's "Determination of Award" figures were estimates only, and GPO's standard "requirements" clause expressly states that "if the Government's requirements for the items set forth herein do not result in orders in the amounts or quantities described as 'estimated', it shall not constitute the basis for an equitable price adjustment." Appealing to the Board solely on the issue of entitlement, the contractor advanced three theories in support of its claim: (a) the Government's estimates were negligently prepared; (b) the parties had made a mutual mistake; and (c) the customer agency's cancellation of its CD-ROM program amounted to a "constructive change" in the contract. Although the Board rejected the "negligent estimates" and "mutual mistake" arguments, it agreed with the contractor that there had been a "constructive change," i.e., a complete restructuring of the contract, and ruled that the contractor, therefore, was entitled to an equitable adjustment. See GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 95-110. While not dispositive in the context of the case, the Board also rejected the Government's position based on the fact that no formal "change order" pursuant to the "Changes" clause had been issued by the contracting officer; i.e., GPO Form 913 ("Contract Modification"). See PPR, Chap. XVI, Procurement Forms, at 176. The thrust of the Government's position was that unless the contracting officer received CRB concurrence for the modification, and informed the contractor of the change by signing and issuing a copy of GPO Form 913, no "change order" within the contemplation of GPO's regulations was issued. The Board disagreed. It held that a letter could be a "change order" (and there was such a letter in the record) provided it conformed to the requirements of the "Changes" clause by: (a) being directed to the contractor by the person with contracting authority; (b) being in writing; (c) being within the general scope of the contract and concerning the drawings, designs, specifications, method of shipment or place of delivery; (d) providing for an equitable adjustment in case costs are increased by the change; and (e) informing the contractor that must submit any "proposal for adjustment" within 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order. Id., at 99-100 (citing Queens Lithographing Corp., GPOCAB No. 9-77 (March 30, 1979), slip op. at 11, 1979 WL 28897). In short, the Board saw nothing in the "Changes"clause limiting contracting officers to GPO Form 913 for the purposes of making a change in the contract, particularly since the drafters of GPO Contract Terms had taken the trouble to identify various GPO forms in other clauses, including referring to GPO Form 913 in the "Payment for Accelerated Delivery" clause, but had not done so in the "Changes" clause. Id., at 102 (citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 26 (Payment for Accelerated Delivery)). See W.H. Armstrong & Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 519 (1943); A.L. Harding, Inc., DCAB PR-44, 65-2 BCA ¶ 5261, reconsid. denied, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5463; Lincoln Construction Co., IBCA 438-5-64, 65-2 BCA ¶ 5234, reconsid. denied, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5343; C.A. Logeman Co., ASBCA No. 5692, 61-2 BCA ¶ 3232 (where the only Government defense is the lack of a written change order, an oral change order will be upheld if the contracting officer also promised an equitable adjustment once a fair amount could be determined). But cf. Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545 (1913); General Bronze Corp. v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 176, 338 F.2d 117 (1964); Comspace Corp., GSBCA No. 3550, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9674 Instruments for Industries, Inc., DCAB NBS-16, 69-2 BCA ¶ 8025, reconsid. denied, 70-1 BCA ¶ 8169 (lack of a written change order is a reason for denying a claim for price adjustment). See generally, Cibinic & Nash, at 408-10. 47 Whether changes are beyond the general scope of the contract is usually determined by comparing the total work performed by the contractor to the work called for by the original contract. The usual test is whether the work performed was "essentially the same work as the parties bargained for when the contract was awarded." See Aragona Construction Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 382 (1964). See also Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States, supra; Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 180, 351 F.2d 956 (1965); Akcon, Inc., ENGBCA No. 5593, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,250. 48 See note 20 supra. 49 A contracting officer's decision about whether to continue with an existing contract despite extraordinary actions by a customer agency or to terminate the agreement for the Government's convenience has never been questioned by the Board, see Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 32-33 (citing R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co. supra); Graphic Litho Company, Inc., GPO BCA 17-85 (February 23, 1988), 1988 WL 363327, reconsid. denied, September 30, 1988, particularly where the contractor has not challenged the exercise of that discretion, see Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 33 (citing Condor Reliability Services, Inc., supra; Goetz Demolition Co., ASBCA No. 39129, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,241; Kinetic Engineering & Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 30726, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,397; Celesco Industries, Inc., supra). Therefore, in accordance with its general policy, and in the absence of some "compelling reason," and none has been shown, the Board will not disturb the Contracting Officer's choice of procedure in this case. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip at 34 (citing Shepard Printing, supra, slip. op. at 14-15, fn. 20; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19-20, fn. 22; Stabbe Senter Press, GPO BCA 13-85 and 19-85 (May 12, 1989), slip op. at 53, 1989 WL 384977). 50 At the hearing, when asked on direct examination, "Indeed, were there other ways that you could have gotten this work produced?", the Contracting Officer responded, "Yes. Since the job was already printed, we could have simply gotten a copy from the [DOJ] and there is numerous ways we could have gotten it overnight on general usage contracts or a small purchase." Tr.: 82-83. The follow up question was "Do you have a sense for what that might have cost the Government if you had done [that]?", and he answered "The approximate cost I worked up on the 814 [A814-M] program, taking approximately the fifth contractor, was approximately $1,500[.00]." Tr.: 83. 51 A "cardinal change" occurs if the ordered deviations alter the nature of the thing to be constructed, or amount to a "drastic modification beyond the scope of the contract work." See GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 113-14, fn. 68 (citing Airprep Technology, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 488, 505 (1994); Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 269, 275, 408 F.2d 1030 (1969)). See generally Cibinic & Nash, at 384-86. 52 The voluntary nature of additional work must be proved by "clear and convincing" evidence. See Driftwood of Alabama, GSBCA No. 5429, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,169. See also Quiller Construction Co., ASBCA No. 14964, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9322 ("preponderance" of the evidence test applied to find voluntary performance). 53 As indicated in the regulation, the simple difference between a "supplemental agreement" and a "change order" is that the former is bilateral and requires the signature of both the Contracting Officer and the contractor, while the latter is the unilateral issuance of the Contracting Officer. See PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 2, ¶¶ 1(c)(1)-(2) (Contract Modifications). 54 See note 19 supra. 55 The PPR describes a properly filed claim as possessing certain essential characteristics, namely: (1) it must be made in good faith; (2) it must honestly and accurately reflect of the contractor's belief of the contract liability of the Government; (3) it must be prepared from the contractor's books of account in accordance with Government recognized cost principles and accounting practices; (4) it must be accurate, complete, and current as of the date of submission; and (5) it must be prepared for the purpose of furnishing a basis for settlement. PPR, Chap. X, Sec. 1, ¶ 3. These requirements are somewhat mirrored in the Board Rules regarding Complaints. Board Rules, Rule 6(a). See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 35. 56 As the Board observed, a contractor is required to show its actual costs in order to avoid a windfall for either party. See New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 52. See also Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41 (citing Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, supra; Cen-Vi-Ro of Texas v. United States, supra; Buck Brown Contracting Co, supra; Engineered Systems, Inc., supra; Bregman Construction Corp., supra). 57 See also R4 File II, Tab U, at 3 ("As your pricing for composition, printing and binding, on this contract is lumped together, and as the requirement to go back to press only calls for printing and binding, it is necessary to separate the composition costs from the printing and binding costs. This was done by using the $15.00 per page composition charge mutually negotiated in previous settlements, and used again by you in your pending settlement proposal of [P]rint [O]rder 86148. After deduction of the $15.00 per page composition charge from your overall makeready price of $22.50 per page, we are left with $7.500 per page for printing and binding. Multiplying the $7.50 figure against the 312 pages called for in the publication, and then adding your makeready cost of $200.00 for the cover, bring the total cost for the 100 additional copies to $2,540.00."). 58 The Board might have reached a different conclusion if the Contracting Officer had used Program A814-M as the basis for his equitable adjustment offer. See New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 52-54. However, although the Contracting Officer used Program A814-M for his initial "work up," which resulted in an equitable adjustment of approximately $1,500.00, see note 50 supra, he clearly rejected that figure as being too low under the circumstances. In any event, the Board itself would have disallowed the use of Program A814-M in the context of this case because the Appellant could not have been bound by the range of prices in Program A814-M, see New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 53; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26, fn. 27 (citing Atlantic Electric Co., GSBCA No. 6016, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,484); RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 13, fn. 15. In so many words, the employment of Program A814-M as the equitable adjustment baseline for the additional 100 copies of the Appendix in this case would have been neither fair or reasonable. See e.g., New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 54.