BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) WBC, INC., d/b/a LITHEXCEL ) Docket No. GPOBCA 17-98 Program 2848-S ) Print Order 61008 ) For the Appellant: Michael Allison, P.C., BARNETT & ALLISON, Albuquerque, New Mexico. For the Respondent: Kerry L. Miller, Esq., Associate General Counsel, U.S. Government Printing Office. DECISION AND ORDER WBC, Inc., dba Lithexcel, 2408 Alamo S.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico (Appellant), appeals the decision of Contracting Officer Raymond MacDonald of the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO or Respondent) to reduce the amount to which the Appellant was entitled to be paid for lamination work performed pursuant to its Program 2848-S contract and ordered by Print Order 61008. The Respondent has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, the motion is DENIED, and the appeal is SUSTAINED. I. BACKGROUND 1. On September 22, 1997, the Appellant was awarded a requirements contract (Purchase Order M3448) for Program 2848-S, which called for the production and delivery, as ordered, of promotional materials, such as books, pamphlets, posters, and post cards, for the Blue Angels, the Navy's aerial demonstration team. Rule 4 File, Tabs 1, 2.1 The contract contained line items for various materials to be used and operations to be conducted in the performance of the contract, along with estimated quantities for each line item and the prices bid by the Appellant. Rule 4 File, Tabs 2, 4. For one line item, sheet laminating, the contract contained an estimate of 26 (per page sized unit/per side/per 100 leaves); Appellant bid a unit price of $120, for an evaluated extended price of $3,120. Rule 4 File, Tabs 4, 5. The total estimated contract price was $71,977.40, less a 2 percent prompt payment discount. Rule 4 File, Tab 5. 2. The contract was a direct-deal contract, under which the customer agency, the Defense Automated Printing Service (DAPS), could place orders directly with the contractor. On December 22 DAPS issued Print Order 61008, which called for the production of 50,050 11" x 14" posters. The Print Order required both sides of the posters to be laminated. Rule 4 File, Tab 6. 3. The Appellant produced and delivered the posters and, consistent with the unit pricing of the contract, billed GPO for $249,609.10. More than $240,000 of that amount was for laminating work. GPO paid the invoiced amount, less a prompt payment discount, on February 20, 1998. Rule 4 File, Tab 9. 4. In early February, the Contracting Officer, after learning of the matter, advised DAPS that the amount of lamination required by the Print Order "far exceeded" what the contract anticipated and that the work was outside the scope of the contract. Rule 4 File, Tab 11. He also wrote to Appellant and stated that the order "did not fit the contract because we did not anticipate requiring lamination of this magnitude" and that the work "should be treated as a change to the contract and be paid for by establishing new prices for the non-contract goods and services." Rule 4 File, Tab 12. 5. After attempts to reach agreement with the Appellant on revised pricing failed, the Contracting Officer issued a "Change Order ? pursuant to ? [the] Changes [clause]," reducing the price for the Print Order by $144,144 to $105,465.10, an amount the Contracting Officer considered to be "fair and reasonable" for the work performed. Rule 4 File, Tab 19. GPO subsequently recovered the $144,144 through offset against amounts owed to the Appellant for unrelated work. Complaint ¶ 16. The Contracting Officer denied the Appellant's claim regarding this matter by final decision dated June 11, 1998, Rule 4 File, Tab 24, and the Appellant filed this appeal. II. DISCUSSION In deciding motions for summary judgment, the Board2 is guided by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to which courts will grant such motions where the pleadings and supporting documents show that there are no genuine issues as to material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Composite Laminates, Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 310 (1992); Wickersham Printing Co., Inc., GPOBCA 23-96 (December 18, 1998), supra, at 8. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that it is so entitled. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The material facts are not in dispute, and the Respondent asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the work called for by Print Order 61008 was outside the scope of the contract and therefore the Appellant, while entitled to payment of a reasonable amount for the work performed, was not entitled to be paid pursuant to the pricing contained in the contract. The Appellant, on the other hand, argues that the contract contained no quantity limitations and that therefore the work ordered by Print Order 61008, including the lamination, was within the scope of the contract such that the Government is obligated to pay for the work in accordance with the contract. The courts and boards of contract appeals often have been called upon to determine if work ordered by the Government was within the scope of the contract against which the order was placed. These cases, usually involving the "Changes" clause,3 tell us that work is within the general scope of the contract if it was "fairly and reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into," Freund v. United States, 260 U.S. 60 (1922), or "essentially the same work as the parties bargained for when the contract was awarded." Aragona Constr. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 382 (1964).4 If the work effectively requires the contractor to perform duties materially different from those originally bargained for, it is outside the scope of the contract. Asbestos Transportation Servs., Inc., ASBCA 46263, 98-1 BCA ¶ 29,502. There is no exact formula, however, for determining if ordered work is outside the scope of the contract-each case must be analyzed "on its own facts and in light of its own circumstances." Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956 (Ct. Cl. 1965); ThermoCor, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 480 (1996). Resolution of these types of disputes often turns on the nature of the ordered work and its relationship to the work called for by the contract. For example, certain repair work ordered under a computer maintenance contract, although not identified by the contract as a work requirement, was held to be work of a kindred type and therefore within the scope of the contract, see ITT Commercial Services, Inc., GSBCA 4210, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,218, while changing a requirement from red oak furniture to furniture made of ash was held to have materially changed the nature of the contract and therefore was outside the scope of the contract. See Marvin J. Perry & Assocs., Comp. Gen. B-277684, B-277685, Nov. 4, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 128. In the case before us, Appellant's contract clearly provided for the Government to order, and the Appellant to furnish, laminated printed promotional material. There is no question that the printed material-50,050 posters- ordered pursuant to Print Order 61008 was encompassed by the scope of the contract. There is also no question that lamination of ordered printed products was encompassed by the contract. Thus, what must be resolved here is whether the lamination ordered by Print Order 61008 is beyond the scope of the contract because the amount of lamination required is materially different from what the parties contemplated when entering into the contract. An increase in the quantity of the major specific items to be furnished under a contract normally is not a permissible change within the scope of the contract because a quantity change is not encompassed by the "Changes" clause.5 See, e.g., Valley Forge Flag Co., Inc., VABCA 4667, 5103, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,246; Swanson Printing Co., supra, at 38-39; John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 394 (Third ed. 1995). When, however, a requirements contract is involved, there is no specified quantity that can be increased or decreased-there are only estimates of what the Government will order. Under such contracts, used when the Government has recurring needs but cannot predetermine the precise quantities or future demand for the commodity or service, Technical Assistance Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 150 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 967 F.2d 579 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the fact that the Government orders substantially more or less than the estimated quantity may raise a question about the validity of the estimates and how they were derived, but usually will not raise a scope of contract question. See, e.g., Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 506 (1993); American Marine Decking Servs., Inc., ASBCA 44440 et al., 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,821; KPT, Inc., GPOBCA 14-97 (November 30, 1998), slip op., 1998 WL 993634; RIM Advertising, GPOBCA 38-94 (September 24, 1997), slip op., 1997 WL 742429; GraphicData, Inc., GPOBCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996), slip op., 1996 WL 812875. This is so because it is well understood that the Government is not bound to its estimates. While the Government must use due care in preparing the estimates it furnishes, Womack v. United States, 389 F.2d 793 (Ct. Cl. 1968); KPT, Inc., supra; Qualitype, Inc., GPOBCA 21-95 (April 21, 1998), slip op. at 7, 1998 WL 350484, recon. denied, GPOBCA 21-95 (June 24, 1998), slip op., 1998 WL 350480, the Government does not guarantee that it will not order significantly less or significantly more than what it has estimated, GOECO, ASBCA 46573, 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,412, and bidders are on notice that, despite the Government's use of due care, the estimates may not reflect what will actually occur during the term of the contract.6 Technical Assistance Int'l Inc. v. United States, supra; Medart, Inc. v. Austin, supra. In other words, the fact that the Government orders substantially in excess of the estimated amount does not mean that the ordered quantity is beyond the contract's scope. While a contractor may be entitled to an equitable adjustment if the estimate was not prepared with due care, Womack v. United States, supra; Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. United States,29 Fed. Cl. 506 (1993); Viktoria Fit Internationale Spedition, ASBCA 39703, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,968; Ambulance Service & Transport of Marlin, VABCA 3485, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,729, or, as this Board has held, when the Government makes a program change that unreasonably increases the quantities ordered at additional performance cost to the contractor, GraphicData, Inc., supra, the bases for that entitlement and the adjustments themselves are considered to be within the scope of the contract. That does not mean, however, that under a requirements contract or other kind of indefinite delivery contract there cannot be circumstances where the quantity ordered by the Government is beyond that envisioned by the parties and therefore outside the scope of the contract. For example, in some cases the Government expresses an intention to order only up to a certain quantity. In Valley Forge Flag Co., Inc., supra, a significant increase in quantity orders over what the Government originally intended to order was viewed as beyond the scope of the contract because the Government had intended to order 60 percent of its requirements from the contractor and 40 percent through other contracts but ordered far more than 60 percent of its total needs from that contractor. In Comdisco, Comp. Gen. B-277340, Oct. 1, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 105, task orders, more than 25 percent of the value of which was for hardware and software, were held to be outside the scope of the contract because the contract limited the acquisition of hardware and software to not more than 25 percent of the value of a task order. Similarly, where a contract imposed a maximum on the quantity of certain equipment that could be ordered, an order that caused the maximum to be exceeded was also outside the scope of the contract. Liebert Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 448 (1991), 91-1 CPD ¶ 413. Even where the Government does not express any intended quantity limitation, there is language in several cases suggesting that an order or modification could be beyond the scope of the contract simply because it results in a very large increase in the quantities ordered over those estimated. For example, it has been stated that "[t]here is a point when the increase in amount may become so great that it would be unreasonable to insist on peformance," LFS, Inc., LBCA 82-BCA-10, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17,306, and that an agency is not entitled to place unlimited orders having no reasonable relation to the estimates. Allied Paint Mfg. Co., Inc., GSBCA 1488, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,387, aff'd, Allied Paint Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Moreover, this Board, while holding that a significant increase in the quantity of paper patent sets ordered, well above the contract's estimated quantity due to the Government's change in the planned method of producing patents from a mix of paper and CD-ROMs to paper only, was within the scope of the contract, recognized the possibility that under other circumstances a very large quantity increase could be a "drastic modification beyond the scope of the contract work." GraphicData, Inc., supra, at 113 n.68. Similarly, the Comptroller General, while finding that delivery orders and contract modifications that increased by varying amounts the quantities ordered or that could be ordered were within the scope of the contract, recognized the possibility that larger increases could have been outside the scope of the contract. See Exide Corp., Comp. Gen. B-276988, B-276988.2, Aug. 18, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 51, and cases cited therein. These cases, to the extent they remain viable on this point, see infra at 12, would not compel any particular result here. The Appellant's contract contains no express limitation on the amount of lamination that could be ordered, and the cited cases, while recognizing the possibility that a quantity deviation could be so great so as to be beyond the contract's scope, all viewed the specific variation involved as within the contract's scope and provide little guidance as to when or under what circumstances a substantial quantity increase must be considered to be beyond the scope of the contract. In this regard, the Comptroller General has viewed quantities ranging from 13 percent to 30 percent above the contract estimates as within the scope of the contract, see Exide Corp., supra, and cases cited therein, while in GraphicData, Inc., supra, this Board, consistent with the approach taken by other boards of contract appeals, concluded that an increase of 138 percent over the estimated requirements was not sufficiently "drastic" to be outside the scope of the contract. See also Allied Paint Mfg. Co. Inc., supra (125 percent deviation from estimate); Sponge Fishing Co., Inc., GSBCA 1386, 65-1 BCA ¶ 4,627 (143 percent deviation); and Crawford Painting & Decorating Co., ASBCA 10914, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5,658 (150 percent deviation). Even quantities varying from the estimates by as much as 3,000 percent have been treated as within the scope of the contract. See Viktoria Fit Internationale Spedition, supra.7 The Board notes that in addition to considering the extent to which quantities exceed estimates, the boards and courts also consider the impact of an order or modification on contract cost when resolving questions of contract scope. It is not clear, however, that a modification or order may be considered outside the scope of the contract on the basis of cost impact alone. While cost is taken into account, it appears to be used to buttress a conclusion based on other factors that the order or modification is beyond the contract's scope. For example, in finding a $99 million contract modification to be outside the scope of the contract, the GSBCA noted the "enormous increase in contract value" represented by the modification, but reached its conclusion on the basis of several other factors as well. Wiltel v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11857-P, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,314. That decision was reversed in AT&T Communications, Inc. v .WilTel, Inc, supra, with the court disagreeing with the GSBCA on the effect of those other factors and ignoring the cost of the modification. In Sprint Communications Co., Comp. Gen. B-278407, B-278407.2, Feb. 13, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 60, the Comptroller General referred to the potential cost of a modification as supporting what was otherwise clear from the contract itself--that the modification was outside the scope of the contract, while in an earlier case he referred to the magnitude of the technical changes made by a modification and their overall impact on price (a 29 percent increase in unit price) and delivery. See American Air Filter Corp., 57 Comp. Gen. 285 (1978), 78-1 CPD ¶ 136, recon., 57 Comp. Gen. 567 (1978), 78-1 CPD ¶ 443. In the Comptroller General's view, a substantial price increase engendered by a contract modification is not sufficient to establish that the modification is outside the scope of the contract where the modification has not changed the nature and purpose of the contract. Techno-Sciences, Inc., supra; Defense Sys. Group et al., Comp. Gen. B-240295.2 et al., Nov. 6, 1990, 1990 WL 293536. The Board's own precedent also does not dictate a particular result here. The only case with somewhat similar facts--where the very high cost of a subsidiary operation led the Respondent to declare work ordered by customer agency print orders to be outside the scope of the contract--is United Computer Supplies, Joint Venture, GPOBCA 26-94 (January 23, 1998), slip op., 1998 WL 148845. In that case, Respondent's customer agency issued print orders for marginally-punched continuous forms against a requirements contract for multiple-part carbonless paper sets. The contract, envisioning only an occasional order for perforating, contained a very low estimate for perforations. The print orders, however, required more than 5.5 million perforations. The contractor complied with the print orders and subsequently billed the Government $93,230.80 and $41,890.90; included in those amounts were charges for perforations, based on the contract unit price, of $70,092 and $35,046, respectively. After the customer agency and the Respondent became concerned about the unexpectedly high cost of the print orders, the GPO contracting officer determined that the ordered work was outside the scope of the contract, that the contract pricing therefore did not apply, and that the contractor was entitled to be paid only the reasonable amounts of $8,436.51 and $5,380.96, the amounts the contractor would have been paid had the work been ordered under another contract specifically intended for the acquisition of marginally-punched continuous forms. The Board held that the contracting officer was correct, and the Board's decision was subsequently affirmed on appeal. United Computer Supplies, Inc./Cole Computer Forms/McCall's Printing Express, Joint Venture v. United States, No. 98-142C, 1999 WL 216833 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 2, 1999). Neither the Board nor the court based its decision on the excessive quantity of ordered perforations; the focus instead was on the differences between multiple part carbonless sets and marginally-punched continuous forms, particularly with respect to binding. The Board did find support for its conclusion in the contract estimate, however, noting that because the ordered forms typically are ordered with vertical and horizontal perforations, the low contract estimate for perforations provided "a strong indication" that the forms were not meant to be encompassed by the contract. United Computer Supplies, Joint Venture, supra, at 10-11. In United Computer Supplies, there were clear differences between the forms ordered and the carbonless sets that were the subject of the contract, and the perforation estimate was a strong indication that the ordered forms were not meant to be encompassed by that contract because the estimated number of perforations was completely inconsistent with the type of form ordered. Obviously that is not the situation here. The material ordered was exactly what the contract was for--promotional material for the Blue Angels, in a format (poster) and in a size8 permitted by the contract. Moreover, the contract provided that "[a]n occasional order may require that the product be laminated face only or face and back after printing ?." Rule 4 File, Tab 2 at 13. Thus, United Computer Supplies is of little help in resolving the instant appeal. Ultimately, and notwithstanding the language in the cases suggesting that an ordered quantity could be so large as to be beyond the scope of the requirements contract against which the order was placed, what must be controlling here is the standard enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Technical Assistance Int'l, Inc. v. United States, supra. In that case the contractor alleged damages resulting from the Government's failure to place orders approaching the estimated quantity. Stating that under a requirements contract the buyer "is generally accorded significant freedom in determining its requirements ? because it has specifically bargained for such flexibility," the court held that the only limit on the buyer ("lest it be permitted to vary its requirements to such an extent that the seller is exposed to an undue risk of severe economic hardship") is the duty to act in good faith. 150 F.3d at 1372. According to the court, a buyer acts in good faith if it has a valid business reason for varying its requirements other than dissatisfaction with the contract. Since there was no evidence that the Government had acted in bad faith, the court held that the contractor was not entitled to relief.9 While the court was called upon to deal with a situation where the ordered quantity fell below the contract estimate, the court's decision clearly is intended to apply also to the situation where the ordered quantity significantly exceeds the estimate ("?where the quantity ordered is considerably more or considerably less than that anticipated from a reading of the contract's terms ? the courts will ? [apply] a test of good faith ?." 150 F.3d 1372, quoting from Shader Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 276 F.2d 1, 7 (Ct. Cl. 1960)). Moreover, the General Services Board of Contract Appeals recently ruled that the court's ruling does indeed apply to situations where orders under a requirements contract significantly exceed the contract estimate. Workrite Uniform Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14839, 1999 WL 417074. In other words, under the standard set forth by the Federal Circuit, a requirements contract is virtually an open-ended agreement pursuant to which the federal agency buyer may place orders in any quantity, so matter how far removed from the contract estimate, so long as the agency's action reflects good faith business reasons. Such orders, by definition, must be regarded as within the scope of the contract as originally awarded. That being so, the Respondent is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is no evidence before the Board that the Government acted in bad faith in placing Print Order 61008. In fact, it appears that the Order was issued for very legitimate business reasons__the requiring activity believed its needs required 50,050 posters that were to laminated on both sides. Therefore, the Appellant contractor, should it have made a claim for relief on the grounds that the ordered work was beyond the scope of the contract, would not be entitled to such relief. That being so, the Board must conclude that the Respondent also is not entitled to avoid the consequences of placing the Order by asserting that the Order was outside the scope of the contract. It would be anomalous indeed if an order could be viewed as outside the scope of a properly bargained-for contract if the Government makes that argument but not so if the assertion is made by the contractor. III. ORDER The Respondent's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Appellant has not formally filed its own motion for summary judgment. In its Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, however, the Appellant requested the Board to order the return to Appellant of "sums wrongfully withheld by the GPO, equal to $144,400." The Appellant also referenced its Prehearing Brief, a document in which it reserved its right to a hearing "[i]f the Board determines that there are disputed material facts which preclude summary resolution ? for the benefit of WBC." Since, in the Board's view, there are no material facts in dispute, in effect the Appellant is requesting the Board to render judgment in its favor without resort to a hearing or the introduction of additional evidence. Moreover, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the absence of a formal motion for summary judgment does not preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of the non-moving party if the other party has had an adequate opportunity to show that such summary judgment would be inappropriate. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d §§ 2720. The Respondent, through the submission of its Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents, has had that opportunity. Accordingly, since there are no material facts in dispute and, pursuant to the discussion above the Appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Board grants summary judgment for the Appellant in the amount of $144,144. The appeal is SUSTAINED. It is so Ordered. September 22, 1999 Ronald Berger Ad Hoc Chairman Board of Contract Appeals _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on July 30, 1998. It is referred to as the Rule 4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. The Rule 4 File consists of 24 documents identified as Tab 1 through Tab 24. 2 Although the Board's rules do not explicitly provide for a summary judgment procedure, the Board routinely entertains summary judgment motions. See Wickersham Printing Co., Inc., GPOBCA 23-96 (December 18, 1998), slip op., 1998 WL 993636, aff'd on recon., GPOBCA 23-96 (March 1, 1999), slip op., 1999 WL ______; French Bray, Inc., GPOBCA 16-96 (August 21, 1998), slip op., 1998 WL 640415; Nimbus Mfg., Inc., GPOBCA 21-96 (July 9, 1998), slip op., 1998 WL 640422; Graphicdata, Inc., GPOBCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996), slip op. at 47, 1996 WL 812875, and cases cited therein. 3 Respondent's clause, which is identical to that used by the Executive Branch, is found at GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Pub. 310.2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88), Contract Clauses, ¶ 4. The "Changes" clause allows the Contracting Officer to make changes, within the general scope of the contract, to the specifications, the method of shipment or packing, and the place of delivery. 4In other cases, where the dispute is not between the contractor and the Government but arises from a third-party complaint that the Government, instead of ordering under an existing contract, should have conducted a new competitive procurement, the focus is on whether the work ordered was within the scope of the competition originally conducted, that is, whether the original competitors should have reasonably anticipated that the work could be ordered under the contract to be awarded, or whether the work added to or ordered under the contract is materially different from the contract as originally entered into. AT&T Communications, Inc. v. WilTel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1993); CCL, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 780 (1997); Techno-Sciences, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277260.3, May 13, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 138; MCI Telecommunications Corp., Comp. Gen. B-276659.2, Sept, 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 90; Neil R. Gross & Co., 69 Comp. Gen. 247 (1990), 90-1 CPD ¶ 212. Changes in the type of work, performance period, and costs are examined to determine if there is a material difference between the original contract and the contract as modified. Makro Janitorial Services, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-282690, Aug. 18, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ ___; Access Research Corp., Comp. Gen. B-281807, Apr. 5, 1999, 99-1 CPD ¶ 64. 5 Respondent's regulations permit a quantity increase through a supplemental agreement signed by both parties. Printing Procurement Regulation (PPR), GPO Pub. 305.3 (Rev. 5-99), Ch. XIII (formerly Ch. XII), Sec. 2. See Swanson Printing Co., GPOBCA 27-94, 27-94A (November 18, 1996), slip op. at 34-36, 1996 WL 812958. 6 Indeed, the rules of the Executive Branch regarding unbalanced bidding, see Federal Acquisition Regulation §§ 14.404-2(g), 15.404-1(g), have stemmed from a concern that bidders, knowing that the estimates may prove to be an unreliable indicator of what will be ordered, may structure their bids not on the basis of the estimates but on the basis of their own understanding of what the Government's requirements actually will be, which, if that understanding proves correct, could result in the evaluated low bid actually costing the Government more than another bid. See Severn Cos., Inc., GSBCA 9353-P et al., 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,689; Daniel I. Gordon, Unbalanced Bids, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (1994). There is no provision in the Respondent's PPR dealing with unbalanced bids. 7 In Viktoria Fit the ASBCA held that an appellant's burden to show lack of due care in the preparation of estimates was satisfied solely by evidence of a large disparity between the estimates and the quantities ordered. That holding was effectively overruled by Medart, Inc. v. Austin, supra. See KPT, Inc., supra, at 6. 8 The Print Order called for 11 x 14" posters. The contract's Schedule of Prices established a 10 x 12" page size for billing purposes but made clear that pricing for larger sizes would be adjusted accordingly. Rule 4 File, Tab 2 at 19-22. 9 The court noted that under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) a buyer cannot order a quantity "unreasonably disproportionate" to the estimate but held that the UCC is not binding with respect to Government contracts and declined to adopt the UCC standard. 150 F.3d at 1372.