BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) ASA L. SHIPMAN'S SONS, LTD. ) Docket No. GPO BCA 06-95 Jacket No. 384-764 ) Purchase Order 99362 ) DECISION AND ORDER This appeal, timely filed by Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd. (Appellant or Contractor), 800 East 91st Street, Brooklyn, New York 11236, is from the final decision of Contracting Officer James L. Leonard, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (Respondent or GPO or Government) Printing Procurement Department, Washington, DC 20401, dated January 26, 1995, terminating the Appellant's contract identified as Jacket No. 384-764, Purchase Order 99362, for default because of the Appellant's inability to meet the delivery schedule (R4 File, Tab K).1 For the following reasons, the Contracting Officer's decision is hereby AFFIRMED. I. FINDINGS OF FACT2 1. On December 8, 1994, the U.S. Air Force (USAF or customer-agency) sent a requisition to GPO for the procurement of 130,000 copies of file folders entitled "Unit Personnel Record Group, Form Number: AF 10 (Mar 81)" (hereinafter AF Folders) (R4 File, Tab D). The Invitation for Bids (IFB) for these AF Folders was issued by the Respondent on December 16, 1994 (R4 File, Tab A, p. 1). The product being procured was a three-leaf, cloth-reinforced, expansion-type file folder, equipped with two single (one on the inside front cover leaf and one on the inside back cover leaf) and one dual permanently-affixed metal fastener (R4 File, Tab A, p. 1). Apart from the usual design, performance and quality assurance specifications,3 the IFB also provided, in pertinent part: Any contract which results from this Invitation for Bid will be subject to the applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms (GPO Pub. 310.2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev.9-88)) [hereinafter GPO Contract Terms]; and Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program (GPO Pub. 310.1, effective May 1979 (revised 12-92)). * * * * * * * * * * CONSTRUCTION: File folder with one inner leaf, bound on outside with a cloth strip approximately 64 mm (2-1/2") wide on the 298 mm (11-3/4") dimension to allow a total expansion of approximately 38 mm (1-1/2") (two equal expansions of approximately 19 mm (3/4") each). This cloth strip must wrap around the ends, not cut flush. Inner leaf to have a 44 mm (1-3/4") cloth strip on each side of the 198 mm (11-3/4") dimension; these strips to be the same kind and color material as the outside strip and to be cut flush. See furnished sample. * * * * * * * * * * SCHEDULE: Furnished material will be available for pick up at The U.S. Government Printing Office, 27 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20401, on December 27, 1994. Ship complete to arrive at destination on or before January 20, 1995. * * * * * * * * * * See R4 File, Tab A, pp. 1, 2, 4. [Emphasis added.] As indicated above, GPO Contract Terms was incorporated by reference in the contract. The "Default" clause of GPO Contract Terms provides, in pertinent part: 20. Default (a) (1) The Government may, subject to paragraphs (c) and (d) below, by written notice of default to the contractor, terminate in whole or in part if the contractor fails to- (i) Deliver the supplies or to perform the services within the time specified or any extension thereof; (ii) Make progress, so as to endanger performance (but see subparagraph (a) (2) below); or (iii) Perform any of the other provisions. (2) The Government's right to terminate under subdivision (1) (ii) and (iii) above, may be exercised if the Contractor does not cure such failure within 10 days (or such other period as the Contracting Officer may determine to be reasonable and authorize in writing) after receipt of the notice from the Contracting Officer specifying the failure. (b) If the Government terminates in whole or in part, it may acquire, under the terms and in the manner the Contracting Officer considers appropriate, supplies or services similar to those terminated, and the contractor will be liable to the Government for any excess costs for those supplies or services. However, the contractor shall continue the work not terminated. (c) Except for defaults of the subcontractors, at any tier, the contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform arises from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. Examples of such causes include acts of God or of the Public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather. In each instance, the failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. (d) If the failure to perform is caused by the default of a subcontractor at any tier, and if the cause of the default is beyond the control of both the contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either, the contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform unless the subcontracted supplies or services were obtainable from other sources in sufficient time for the contractor to meet the required delivery schedule. * * * * * * * * * * (g) If, after termination, it is determined that the Contractor was not in default, or that the default was excusable, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as if the termination had been issued for the convenience of the Government. * * * * * * * * * * See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20 (Default). [Emphasis added.] 2. The Respondent sent copies of the IFB to 15 potential contractors, but only received two responsive offers, one from Bluff Springs ($104,000.00) and the other from the Appellant ($74,100.00) (R4 File, Tabs B, C and G). On December 27, 1994, after confirming the Appellant's low bid, GPO issued Purchase Order 99362 awarding it the contract (R4 File, Tabs E, F and H).4 3. It is undisputed that the Appellant did not produce and deliver the AF Folders by the contract completion date of January 20, 1995. 4. On or about January 24, 1995, an employee from GPO's Contract Compliance Section (CCS) telephoned the Appellant's facility to inquire about the status of the order (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1).5 The Contractor's President, Richard de Marigny, informed the Respondent's representative that as of the previous day, January 23, 1995, the AF Folders had not been shipped (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1). However, de Marigny also said that he expected to receive the necessary paper stock by February 10, 1995, and that the order should be shipped by end of February (R4 File, Tabs I, p. 1, and J).6 Furthermore, according to de Marigny, it was during this conversation that he first told GPO that the principle reason for nonperformance was a flu epidemic in New York City during the performance period. See Appellant's Letter, dated March 15, 1995, annotated attachment (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1); App. Exh. Nos. 1, 2 and 3.7 Indeed, the Appellant's evidence indicates that the firm's three key officers, Richard de Marigny, Gerard de Marigny, and Angela de Marigny, were disabled by the flu from on or about December 23, 1994, to January 20, 1995. See App. Exh. Nos. 4, 5 and 6.8 5. After the above conversation, the Respondent telephoned the USAF to see if it would accept delivery of the AF Forms on February 28, 1995 (R4 File, Tab I, p. 2). When the customer- agency refused, GPO made the decision to default the contract (R4 File, Tab I, p. 2).9 6. On January 25, 1995, the Contracting Officer sought the concurrence of the Respondent's Contract Review Board (CRB) to terminate the contract for default (R4 File, Tab J).10 Termination was requested "due to the contractor's inability to perform the requirements of the contract"(R4 File, Tab J). The Contracting Officer also noted that he had considered the relevant factors in the PPR before seeking approval to default the contract (R4 File, Tab J).11 The Contracting Officer received the CRB's approval on January 26, 1995 (R4 File, Tab R). 7. Accordingly, by letter dated January 26, 1995, expressly titled "Notice of Termination-Complete" (Notice), the Contracting Officer terminated the Appellant's contract for default because of its inability to comply with the "Schedule" specification; i.e., ship the order to the USAF on or before January 20, 1995 (R4 File, Tab K). The Notice also informed the Appellant that it was potentially liable for any excess reprocurement costs (R4 File, Tab K). That same day, the Contracting Officer sent a memorandum to the FMS asking it to recover the amount of excess costs upon reprocurement of the order.12 See Res. Brf., Attachment 1-E. 8. The Respondent took immediate steps to reprocure the work. The record shows that rather than issuing a repurchase solicitation, the Contracting Officer contacted Bluff Springs, the only other responsive offeror on the initial IFB, and on February 1, 1995, less than a week after the default, awarded it the reprocurement contract (Jacket No. 390-419, Purchase Order 99517) at its original bid price of $104,000.00. See Res. Brf., Attachments 1-F and 1-H. The terms and conditions of the repurchase were essentially identical to that the terminated contract. The only change noted from the original IFB was in the "Schedule" clause, where, as would be expected, new "material pick up" and "ship complete" dates-February 1, 1995, and February 27, 1995, respectively-were necessary. See Res. Brf., Attachment 1-I. Also on February 1, 1995, the Contracting Officer sent another memorandum to the FMS informing it that the defaulted contract had been reprocured, the Appellant had been so notified, and directing it to recover excess costs from the Contractor. See Res. Brf., Attachment 1-G. Bluff Springs completed the work and received final payment by electronic funds transfer on March 20, 1995. See Res. Brf., Attachments 1-A and 1-C. As for the excess reprocurement costs of $29,900.00,13 the record discloses that the FMS recovered those funds from payments due the Appellant on five other contracts between February 8, 1995, and April 3, 1995.14 See Res. Brf., Attachment 1-B. See also RPTC, p. 7, fn. 3 (citing PPR, Chap. VIII, Sec. 3, ¶ 4). 9. By letter dated February 2, 1995, the Appellant timely appealed the Contracting Officer's default decision (R4 File, Tab L). II. ISSUES PRESENTED At the close of the presubmission conference, the Board identified two questions as being presented by the facts in this case, namely: 1. Has the Appellant shown that its failure to perform was due to the effects of a flu epidemic in New York City at the time set for contract performance? Stated otherwise, was the flu epidemic, an event arising from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor, the principal cause of its nonperformance? 2. Is the Appellant liable for the excess reprocurement costs incurred by the Government under the circumstances of this case, and if so, to what extent? See RPTC, pp. 7-8. III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES The Appellant concedes its nonperformance in this case. See App. Brf., p. 1; RPTC, pp. 5, 7. However, it believes that its failure to produce and deliver the 130,000 copies of the AF Folders was a direct result of a flu epidemic in New York during the time set for performance, which incapacitated the five employees comprising its entire administrative, managerial, and supervisory staff, and shut down production from December 30, 1994, to January 20, 1995.15 See App. Brf., p. 1; RPTC, p. 5, 6. The Appellant observes that the contract's "Default" clause specifically identifies this type of medical emergency as a cause "beyond the control and without the fault or negligence" of the Contractor, which would provide a defense to the default action. See App. Brf., p. 1; RPTC, pp. 5, 6 (citing, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(c)). Accordingly, the Contractor submits that the Contracting Officer's default decision is in error, and it is entitled to reimbursement of the excess reprocurement costs already deducted from its account.16 See App. Brf., p. 2; RPTC, p. 7. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the contract was properly terminated for default because of the Appellant's failure to meet the prescribed delivery schedule. See Res. Brf., pp. 2-3; RPTC, p. 5. Since the Contractor admits that it did not deliver the AF Forms on January 20, 1995, as specified in the contract, GPO says that it had an immediate right to default the Contractor once the delivery date passed. See Res. Brf., p. 2 (citing, Riggs Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 26509, 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,955; M.H. Colvin & Co., GSBCA No. 5209, 79-2 BCA ¶ 13,981; National Farm Equipment Co., GSBCA No. 4921, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,195). With regard to the Appellant's contention that its nonperformance was excused by the flu epidemic, the Government, relying on our opinion in R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 31-90 (February 6, 1992), Slip op. at 25, 1992 WL 487874, aff'd, Civil Action No. 92-128C (U.S. Claims Court, October 2, 1992),17 where the Board enunciated the standard of proof required of contractors seeking to excuse a default based on untimely performance,18 argues that such a defense does not lie in this case. See Res. Brf., 3-7; RPTC, p. 5. First, the Respondent says that the Appellant's proffered excuse is not believable because the only medical evidence submitted by the Contractor relates to the three members of the de Marigny family, not all five key employees claimed to have been incapacitated by the flu, and besides GPO's records show that Richard de Marigny was actively conducting business for his firm during the time of claimed incapacitation. See Res. Brf., p. 4; Attachments 2, 3; R4 File, Tabs E and I; Complaint, p. 2. Second, GPO states that the Contractor cannot prove that nonperformance was attributable to the flu epidemic because the record shows that it still did not have the paper stock necessary to produce the AF Forms by the contract delivery date. See Res. Brf., p. 5 (citing, Lee K. Geiger Construction Co., GSBCA Nos. 2152, 2164, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6189; American Construction Co., Inc., GSBCA No. 1055, 65-1 BCA ¶ 4581, reconsid. denied, 65-2 BCA ¶ 4964). Third, the Government asserts that there is no evidence from the Appellant showing that it took reasonable precautions to avoid the foreseeable impact of the flu and minimize its effect; i.e., the record is silent regarding the number of production workers, if any, who were incapacitated, or whether the Contractor sought temporary replacements to avoid a shutdown, or if it attempted to notify GPO that production was jeopardized by the flu epidemic. See Res. Brf., pp. 5-6 (citing, Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 11496, 11781, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6456). To the contrary, the record shows that on December 27, 1994, when he was supposedly debilitated by the flu, Richard de Marigny reviewed and confirmed the Appellant's bid (R4 File, Tab E). Finally, the Respondent states that the Contractor has not established a precise period of time that the flu allegedly impeded performance. See Res. Brf., pp. 6-7. Indeed, GPO questions the veracity of the Appellant's claim that an outbreak of the flu caused a cessation of production at its plant from December 30, 1994, to January 20, 1995, see App. Brf., p. 1; Complaint, p. 3, because it directly conflicts with a "Show Cause" response, dated May 2, 1995, from the Contractor to the Respondent's Atlanta Regional Printing Procurement Office (ARPPO), explaining that its delay in shipping the product on time was because the flu epidemic which "inmobilized [sic] our plant from mid-January 1995 for a period of five weeks." See Res. Brf., p. 7; Attachment 4 .19 [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, the Government asserts that the default decision was not in error, and the Contracting Officer's action should be affirmed. See Res. Brf., p. 7; RPTC, p. 6. IV. DISCUSSION This appeal asks the Board to decide whether or not the Appellant has shown sufficient grounds to excuse its admitted failure to perform the contract, and if not, what is the extent of its liability for excess reprocurement costs, if any? At the outset, therefore, it is worthwhile to repeat some of the legal principles which apply to these issues. First, GPO's "Default" clause provides that a contracting officer may, upon written notice of default to the contractor, terminate a contract, in whole or in part, if the contractor fails, inter alia, to "deliver the supplies or perform the required services within the time specified or any extension which may have been granted." See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(a)(1)(i). Further, where defaulted work must be reprocured, the contractor will be held responsible for excess procurement costs and possible liquidated damages. GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 20(b), 22(d). However, the contractor is excused from paying such reprocurement costs or damages if the failure to perform or to deliver on time results from causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence.20 GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 20(c), 22(e), 23. Such causes include, but are not limited to, acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather-but in each case, the failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(c). See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 17; K.C. Printing Co., GPO BCA 02-91 (February 22, 1995), Slip op. at 9; Printing Unlimited, GPO BCA No. 21-90 (November 30, 1993), Slip op. at 16, 1993 WL 516844; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), Slip. op. at 11, 1991 WL 439270. Where the failure to perform is caused by the default of a supplier or subcontractor, the cause of the default must be beyond the control of both the contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either, in order for the contractor not to be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the subcontracted supplies or services could have been secured from other sources in sufficient time to meet the required delivery schedule. GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(d). See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 17; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11. Second, a default termination is a drastic action which may only be taken for good cause and on the basis of solid evidence.21 See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 17; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 10-11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Slip op. at 25; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 20 (citing, Mary Rogers Manley d/b/a Mary Rogers Real Estate, HUDBCA No. 76-27, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,519; Decatur Realty Sales, HUDBCA No. 75-26, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,567). Consequently, the Government has the burden of proving the basis for the default, while the contractor has the burden of showing that its failure to perform was excusable. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 18; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Slip op. at 28; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11. Accord, Lisbon Contractors v. United States, 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Switlik Parachute Co. v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 362 (1978); J.F. Whalen and Co., AGBCA Nos. 83-160-1, 83-281-1, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,066; B. M. Harrison Electrosonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 7684, 1963 BCA ¶ 3,736. If the Government fails to meet its burden of proof, then the termination is converted into one of convenience and the contractor is allowed to recover for the work performed. GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(g). Cf. Univex International, supra, Slip op. 18; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 11; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 17-18; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 9. Third, where the default termination is based on untimely performance, as in this case, the contractor's burden of proof is four-fold: (1) to prove affirmatively that the delay was caused by or arose out of a situation which was beyond the contractor's control and that it was not at fault or negligent; (2) to show that performance would have been timely but for the occurrence of the event which is claimed to excuse the delay; (3) to show that it took every reasonable precaution to avoid foreseeable causes for delay and to minimize their effect; and (4) to establish a precise period of time that performance was delayed by the causes alleged. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 18-19; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Slip op. at 28-29; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12. This burden must be carried by substantial evidence22-unsupported reasons by way of explanation are not enough-and the contractor must also show that the delay in contract performance was due to unforeseeable causes beyond its control and without any contributory negligence on its part. See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 11; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12-13 (and cases cited therein). Finally, a default termination is a discretionary act which can be challenged on an abuse of discretion standard. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 19; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 12; Graphics Image, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 24-28; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12. Accord, Darwin Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Quality Environment Systems v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 428 (1985); Jamco Constructors, Inc., VABCA Nos. 3271, 3516T, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,405, reconsid. denied, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,792; Walsky Construction Co., ASBCA No. 41541, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26.264, reconsid. denied, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,698. The contractor has the burden of proving abuse of discretion. See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 12; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12. Accord, Kit Pack Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 33135, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,151; Lafayette Coal Co., ASBCA No. 32174, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,963. Applying these principles to the facts in the record, the Board reaches the following conclusions: A. The Appellant has not shown that the principal cause of its failure to perform was the effects of a flu epidemic in New York City at the time set for contract performance. 1. The Appellant admits that it did not produce and deliver the Government's order of 130,000 copies of the AF Folders by January 20, 1995. The Contractor's failure to deliver the AF Folders when due gave the Respondent the right to terminate the contract for default under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of the "Default" clause. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, unless the Appellant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its failure to deliver was excusable, GPO properly terminated the contract for default. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 18; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11. In that regard, the Contractor contends that the delivery delay was excused because of a flu epidemic which incapacitated its key staff, and resulted in no production from December 30, 1994, to January 20, 1995. The Board disagrees. 2. Although listed in the "Default" clause as one of several causes of excusable delay, such enumeration does not make the occurrence of an epidemic an excusable cause per se. See Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 17565, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,600, at 50,624; Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., supra, 67-2 BCA at 29,955. In Ace Electronics, which appears to be the lead case for the rule regarding epidemics as an excuse for nonperformance, the Armed Services Board Contract Appeals (ASBCA) stated, in pertinent part: Illness occasioned by the onset of a flu epidemic is in general an excusable cause for delay provided that it can be shown that performance was in fact delayed by reason of such epidemic. It is incumbent upon appellant to establish not only the existence of an excusable cause for delay but also that such cause actually contributed materially to such delay as well as the actual extent of the delay so caused. [Citations omitted.] See, 67-2 BCA at 29,955. [Emphasis added.] See also The Tommy Nobis Center, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 8988-TD, 9420-TD, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,112, at 111,225 (no showing that the flu epidemic was of long duration, or that it had an adverse effect on the volume of production); Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co., supra, 74-2 BCA at 50,624 (no showing that a flu epidemic involved a sufficient number of the contractor's employees to cause delay).23 The essence of the "Ace Electronics" test is the requirement that a defaulted contractor prove that an epidemic was the sole cause, not merely a contributing cause, of the performance delay. See John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 3d ed., (The George Washington University, 1995), p. 567 (hereinafter Cibinic & Nash). 3. In this case, the Appellant has demonstrated that there was a flu epidemic in the New York City area during the time established for performance of the contract. However, the Contractor has not satisfied the second part of the "Ace Electronics" test, namely, showing that the flu epidemic was a materially contributing cause of the nonperformance, as well as the actual extent of the delay in performance caused by the epidemic. Although the Appellant claims that the flu epidemic forced a shut down of the company's production from December 30, 1994, to January 20, 1995, it has presented no evidence, as required in the lead case, which would show, inter alia: (a) the precise duration of the epidemic; (b) what personnel, apart from the three members of the de Marigny family, were affected by the flu and the periods during which they were absent because of the disease; (c) whether such absences in fact caused the delay in performance and if so the extent of such delay; and (d) what efforts were made during such absences by the use of overtime or other measures to keep the work going. See Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., supra, 67-2 BCA at 29,955. Because the Contractor has not supplied any factual details to support its contention that the production of the AF Folders was delayed by the flu epidemic, relief on that basis must be denied for failure of proof. 4. The only position advanced by the Appellant based on the flu epidemic was that no work could be performed on the contract because its entire administrative, managerial, and supervisory staff, consisting of the three de Marigny's and two other key employees, were disabled from about December 23, 1994, to January 20, 1995. This so-called "key personnel" argument fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, the Contractor is a corporation,24 and it is a "black letter" principle that where, as here, a contract has been awarded to a corporate entity, the illness of a key person within the organization does not excuse the corporation's failure to perform its obligations, even though the corporation may be a small business. See e.g., Brill Brothers, Inc., ASBCA No. 42573, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,352; M.W. Microwave Corp., supra; Press Automation Systems, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 29902, 30357, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,273; Marmac Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 23590,24029, 24502, 24503, 84-1 BCA ¶ 17,098; Electro-Magnetics, Inc., ASBCA No. 19830, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,503; Universal Steel Strapping Co., GSBCA No. 3049, 70-1 BCA ¶ 8190. The rule's rationale was explained by the ASBCA in M.W. Microwave Corp.: . . . [W]e have held that where the contract is awarded to a corporate entity, the illness of a key person within the organization does not excuse the corporation's failure to perform its obligations, even though the corporation may be a small business. E.g., Press Automation Systems, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 29902, 30357, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,273; Yankee Telecommunication Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 25240, 25534, 26308, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17, 786; Electro-Magnetics, Inc., ASBCA No. 19830, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,503. In this context, the Government's expectation is that the corporation, as opposed to any particular individual, is responsible for performing the work. The corporation assumes the responsibility for insuring that there is adequate manpower available. As part of this responsibility, the corporation also assumes the risk of non-performance due to the illness of a key employee. In other words, because of its responsibility for insuring adequate manpower, the illness of the key employee is generally not said to be "beyond the control and without the fault or negligence" of the contractor. See 93-3 BCA at 129,377-78.25 The principle reflects one of the distinguishing features between a corporation and some other form of business organization, such as a sole proprietorship or a partnership. A corporation is viewed as having a continuing life; thus the loss of key personnel does not necessarily cause the corporation to cease, but rather, in most cases, it continues to carry on its business. See Electro-Magnetics, Inc., supra, 75-2 BCA at 54,891. Second, insofar as the Appellant's "key personnel" argument is concerned, nothing in the contract specifically designated any of the five employees named by the Appellant for the performance of any production tasks, much less assigned them personal responsibility for overall performance of the contract. See e.g., Jonatech, Inc., ASBCA No. 46088, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,248; M.W. Microwave Corp., supra; Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., supra. Accordingly, there is no merit whatsoever to the Contractor's "key personnel" excuse. 5. Moreover, the Appellant cannot escape the consequences of its admission that even without the flu epidemic during the performance period, the AF Folders could not have been delivered by January 20, 1995, because it did not have the necessary paper on hand to manufacture the product. See Complaint, pp. 5, 6; Notice of Appeal, pp. 3, 4. In that regard, the Contractor's own evidence tells us that the required paper stock was not expected to arrive at its plant until approximately February 10, 1995-some three weeks after the contract due date and two weeks after the contract was terminated. See Appellant's Letter, dated March 15, 1995, p. 2, annotated attachment (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1) Notice of Appeal, p. 5. Although the Contractor says that it ordered the paper stock in a timely manner, it also flatly states that "[t]he resulting difficulties in our receiving the paper shipment can be attributed solely to the paper mill, regardless of the flu epidemic." See Complaint, p. 6, Notice of Appeal, p. 4. 6. As previously indicated, where, as here, a contractor seeks refuge in the performance failure of its supplier or subcontractor to excuse its own lack of performance, it must show that the cause of the default was beyond the control of both the contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either of them. GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(d). See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 17; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11. Stated otherwise, the failure of a supplier to deliver the supplies to the contractor on time is not an excuse for the contractor's default unless the supplier's failure was beyond the supplier's control and without its fault or negligence. See Yankee Telecommunication Laboratories, Inc., supra; Marmac Industries, Inc., supra; Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co., supra. See also Hogan Mechanical, Inc., ASBCA No. 21612, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,164. In this case, the Appellant has made no attempt to show that the cause of its paper mill's delay was also a flu epidemic or some other legitimate excuse within the meaning of the "Default" cause. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence that the reason for the supplier's failure to deliver the paper stock to the Contractor in time for performance was beyond the mill's control and without its fault or negligence. All that appears in the record is the Appellant's bald assertion that the paper supply problem "can be attributed solely to the paper mill." However, as the Board has said on numerous occasions, such unverified assertions-which amount to little more than argument-standing alone, cannot substitute for proof, see Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 31 (citing, Reese Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA No. 35144, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,358), or form the basis for recovery, see B & B Reproductions, supra, Slip op. at 39; Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at 29; Printing Unlimited, supra, Slip op. at 12; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 57. Accord Singleton Contracting Corp., GSBCA No. 8548, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,748; Tri-State Services of Texas, Inc., ASBCA No. 38019, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,064)); Gemini Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 30247, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,736. 7. In many respects, this appeal is similar to the situation in Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co. In that case, the ASBCA affirmed the default of a contract for the production of fuse parts because the contractor failed to deliver a first article on time and to make scheduled deliveries, and in the process dismissed the contractor's allegations, inter alia, that its performance delay was caused by subcontractor's poor machining and a flu epidemic. In so ruling, the ASBCA held that the subcontractor's failure did not constitute an excuse for the delay because the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the subcontractor was not shown, and moreover, the defaulted contractor also failed to prove that the flu epidemic caused the delays, especially in light of the fact that the flu coincided with the subcontractor problems. See Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co., supra, 74-2 BCA at 50,622-24. The ASBCA's reasoning is particularly persuasive when measured against the facts of this case: The appellant's first contention that it was excused by reason of its supplier's failure to deliver satisfactory broaches misconstrues the applicable rule.26 Proper application of the rule requires the appellant to establish that the performance failure of its supplier resulted from causes beyond the control, and without the fault or negligence of both the appellant and its first- tier subcontractor, a fact patently absent from the record. See Thurmont Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 13473, 69-1 BCA ¶ 7604. Appellant's second ground for relief is based upon the occurrence of a flu epidemic which allegedly affected its key employees. Although listed in the Default clause as one of several causes of excusable delay, such enumeration does not make the occurrence of an epidemic an excusable cause per se. It was incumbent upon the appellant to establish not only the existence of this excusable cause of delay but also that it actually contributed materially to the performance delay. Significant with respect to this alleged delay is the fact that the flu-caused absence of key employees occurred during the same period of time that the appellant was unable to produce assemblies because it has not received satisfactory broaches from its supplier. It also is worthy of note that with the exception of one week and two employees the illness of the several key employees did not overlap. The average absence per employee was approximately 2-3 days. The four week delay attributed to this cause hardly explains the appellant's failure to perform during the period 6 February though 10 May 1972. We are not convinced that the flu epidemic contributed materially to the appellant's performance delay. See Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 11496, 11781, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6456. See Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co., supra, 74-2 BCA at 50,624. [Emphasis added.] See also Yankee Telecommunication Laboratories, Inc., supra, 85-1 BCA at 88,873 ("Furthermore, appellant was at fault in not having obtained binding commitments from its suppliers of essential components . . . and therefore cannot eschew responsibility for the lack of those components when needed." Citing B & H Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 24558, 24578, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,568,).27 8. Considering the record as a whole, the Board concludes that the Appellant has not met its burden of proof with respect to excusing its failure to deliver the AF Folders in accordance with the terms of the contract. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. 31; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 18; Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at 19; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11. Therefore, the Board also concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the Contracting Officer's termination of the contract for default was not in error, and his decision is affirmed. B. The Respondent has sustained is burden of proof with regard to the Appellant's liability for excess reprocurement costs. 1. The last issue concerns the scope of the Appellant's liability, if any, for excess reprocurement costs.28 In that regard, the legal principles governing questions concerning excess reprocurement costs can be summarized as follows: The assessment of excess reprocurement costs is considered a Government claim. See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, [Slip op.] at 50-51 (and cases cited therein). Consequently, the Government has the burden of demonstrating the propriety of the repurchase and proving its entitlement to the amount of excess costs it claims. Id., [Slip op.] at 51 (and cases cited therein). In doing so, the Government must satisfy five criteria to establish an entitlement to recovery against a defaulting contractor, namely, it must show that: (a) the reprocurement contract was performed under substantially the same terms and conditions as the original contract; (b) it acted within a reasonable time following default to repurchase the supplies; (c) it employed a reprocurement method which would maximize competition under the circumstances; (d) it obtained the lowest reasonable price; and (e) the work has been completed and final payment made so that the excess costs assessment is based upon liability for a sum certain. [Footnote omitted.] Id., [Slip op.] at 52-53 (and cases cited therein). Furthermore, the Government claim must be supported by evidence in the record as to each element of the claim. Id., [Slip op.] at 53 (and cases cited therein). Failure to satisfy even one criterion may result in a reduction of the excess costs claimed. Id., [Slip op.] at 53-54 (and cases cited therein). See Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 32-33; K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 18-19. [Original emphasis.] Whether the Government's repurchase was improper, and if so, what is the amount of reasonable excess costs under the circumstances, are questions of fact. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 33; K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 19, fn. 20; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 50 (citing, Cable Systems and Assembly Co., ASBCA No. 17844, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,172, at 47,892). Measuring the repurchase action in this case against the above standards, the Board concludes that the Respondent has satisfied all of the elements necessary to sustain an entitlement to excess reprocurement costs. 2. First, the Board's own comparison of the original and reprocurement contracts leaves no question but that the reprocurement contractor, Bluff Springs, was asked to produce and deliver the identical AF Folders, in the same quantity and under essentially the same terms and conditions, as those in the Appellant's original contract-the only change, as would be expected, was in the "Schedule" clause where new "material pick up" and "ship complete" dates were established. Compare R4 File, Tab A with Res. Brf., Attachments 1-I. The Appellant does not allege otherwise. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the Respondent has met the first condition entitling it to excess reprocurement costs, namely, that the reprocurement contract purchased the same or similar items, and was performed under substantially the same terms and conditions as the original contract. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 19; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 62-63. Accord Futura Systems, Inc., ENG BCA Nos. 6037, 6057, 6099, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,654; B & M Construction, Inc., AGBCA No. 90-165-1, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,431; Zan Machine Co., ASBCA No. 39462, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,085; Boston Pneumatics, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 26188, 26190, 26825, 26984, 27605, 27606, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,395. 3. Second, the Board has no trouble in concluding that the reprocurement was accomplished in a timely fashion. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 20; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 63. The Appellant's contract was terminated for default on January 26, 1995 (R4 File, Tab K). The reprocurement contract was awarded to Bluff Springs on February 1, 1995, less than a week after the default. See Res. Brf., Attachments 1-F and 1-H. Accordingly, the record clearly shows that the Respondent acted with reasonable dispatch and without undue delay to reprocure the AF Folders, and thus it has satisfied its evidentiary burden. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 20; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 64-65. Accord Astro-Space Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 200 Ct.Cl. 282, 470 F.2d 1003 (1972); Puroflow Corp., ASBCA No. 36058, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,191; John L. Hartsoe, AGBCA No. 88-116-1, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,614; Sequal, Inc., ASBCA No. 30838, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,382; Disan Corp., ASBCA Nos. 21297, 22221, 79-1 BCA ¶ 16,677. 4. Third, the Board believes that the Contracting Officer chose a reasonable method to repurchase the AF Folders. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 20-23. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 73. As a rule, a contracting officer has very broad discretionary powers in reprocuring items on a defaulted contract, and the choice of which procurement method to use is one of them. See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 17, fn. 25 (citing, Astro- Space Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, supra; Old Dominion Security, Inc., GSBCA No. 9126, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,745; Columbia Loose Leaf Corp., GSBCA Nos. 5805(5067)-REIN, 5806(5230)-REIN, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,464). See also e.g., Venice Maid Co., Inc. v. United States, 639 F.2d 690 (Ct.Cl. 1980); Zan Machine Co., supra. Although, in reprocuring a defaulted contract, the Government has an obligation to mitigate the defaulted contractor's excess cost liability by selecting a method that will maximize competition and obtain the best or lowest reasonable price under the circumstances, see e.g., Scalf Engineering Co. and Pike County Construction Co., A Joint Venture, IBCA No. 2328, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,950, at 110,425 (citing, Techcraft Systems, VABCA Nos. 1894, 2027, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,320) (hereinafter Scalf Engineering Co.); Sequal, Inc., supra, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,382, at 103,067; Century Tool Co., GSBCA No. 4007, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,050, reconsid. denied, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,345, the law also allows a contracting officer to limit competition for the repurchase if the situation demands it-e.g., the Government's need to assure a quick award to a firm which could begin work almost immediately-since a reprocurement is technically a purchase for the defaulted contractor's account, see Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 67. Accord e.g., William A. Hulett, AGBCA Nos. 91-230-3, 92-133-3, 92-196-3, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,389; Old Dominion Security, Inc., GSBCA No. 9126, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,745; Century Tool Co., GSBCA No. 3999, 76-1 BCA ¶ 11,850; Sequal, Inc., supra, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,382.29 The test used in determining the adequacy of a repurchase solicitation is one of reasonableness, and the burden is on the Government to prove that it acted reasonably in selecting the reprocurement method and in mitigating excess costs.30 See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 21 (citing Sam's Electric Co., GSBCA Nos. 9359, 10044, 90-3 BCA ¶ 12,128; Fancy Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 26578, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,659). See also Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 67. However, the Government's obligation to mitigate costs "is not one of perfection, but one of reasonableness and prudence under the circumstances." See Barrett Refining Corp., ASBCA Nos. 36590, 37093, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,566, at 118,145. See also Mid-America Painters, Inc., ENG BCA No. 5703, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,367, at 117,232 ("On the other hand, the Corps is not required to make extraordinary efforts to ferret out the single best situation which will absolutely minimize the [defaulting] party' damages. All that is required is that the [Corps] act reasonably and promptly given the circumstances.'" Citing Ketchikan Pulp Co. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 164 (1990)).31 Soliciting the firms which bid on the original procurement is one commonly used reprocurement method.32 See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 22 (citing American Marine Upholstery Co. v. United States, 170 Ct.Cl. 564, 345 F,2d 577 (1965); Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra). See also Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 69. Furthermore, while the contracting officer is not required to contact second low bidder on the original procurement when attempting to repurchase the defaulted supplies,33 nonetheless such a mitigation step is considered presumptively reasonable, even if the reprocurement price itself seems unreasonable. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 22 (citing Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra); Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 69-70 (citing Zoda v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 49, 180 F.Supp. 419 (1960); United Microwave Co., ASBCA No. 7947, 1963 BCA ¶ 3,701). Cf. American Photographic Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 29272, 29832, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,491, reconsid. denied, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,728 (the Government failed to mitigate damages because it did not contact the second low bidder on the original contract). That is precisely the reprocurement method chosen by the Contracting Officer in this case. Here, where the Respondent's solicitation of 15 potential contractors only resulted in two responsive offers, the Appellant's and Bluff Springs', see R4 File, Tabs B, C and G, the Contracting Officer elected to award the reprocurement contract to Bluff Springs at its original bid price of $104,000.00, see Res. Brf., Attachments 1-F and 1-H. By repurchasing the AF Folders from the second lowest bidder at its original offer, the Contracting Officer was acting consistent with established GPO policy which has been found reasonable in other cases. See Business Forms Service, Inc., GPOCAB 9-81 (October 20, 1981), Slip op. at 9, 1991 WL 95444; ATC Decal Company, GPOCAB 3-81 (July 14, 1981), Slip op. at 8-9; Technical Publishing Services, Inc., GPOCAB 1-81 (January 20, 1982), Slip op. at 6, 1982 WL 122519.34 See also K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 4 (although the defaulted contractor's excess reprocurement liability was based on the price of the fourth lowest bidder on the original contract, it was the next lowest responsible offeror); Valley Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 1-84 (January 15, 1986), Slip op. at 13, 1986 WL 181464 (even though the Government's excess cost claim was denied on other grounds, the Board stated that ordinarily the proper measure of such costs would be the difference between the price the Government would have paid the first bidder if it had been able to perform and the price the Government actually paid to the bidder next receiving the procurement award). Since only two companies had provided responsive bids on the original contract, the Board has no reason to believe that further solicitation of other firms would have resulted in lower prices in this case. See ATC Decal Company, supra, Slip op. at 8-9 (citing San Antonio Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 8110, 1964 BCA ¶ 4479). Therefore, given the nature of this contract and the necessity of obtaining the AF Folders without further delay, in the Board's opinion readvertising was not required. See Business Forms Service, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 9; Technical Publishing Services, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 6. Consequently, even though the repurchase was made at a price approximately 39 percent higher than the original contract, the Board is satisfied that the reprocurement method chosen by the Respondent in this case was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.35 See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 22-23; Business Forms Service, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 9; ATC Decal Company, supra, Slip op. at 9; Technical Publishing Services, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 6. See also Futura Systems, Inc., supra (the Government's reprocurement award to the second low original bidder at its original bid price, which was 39 percent higher than the original contract price, was reasonable because the defaulted contractor had intentionally underbid the contract); Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra (the Government acted reasonably in taking the second low bid in the original solicitation despite the fact that the reprocurement price was 174 percent above the original contract). Accordingly, the Board believes that the Respondent has met its burden with respect to the third criterion necessary to establish an entitlement to recovery of excess reprocurement costs against a defaulting contractor. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 23. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 73. 5. Fourth, mitigation of damages also requires the Government to show that it obtained the lowest reasonable reprocurement price.36 See, e.g., Sequal, Inc., supra; Fancy Industries, Inc., supra. However, the mere fact that there is a significant price increase in the reprocurement does not render it unreasonable in the face of Government due care and diligence.37 See, Foster Refrigerator Corp., ASBCA No. 34021, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,591; Boston Pneumatics, Inc., supra; Fancy Industries, Inc., supra. Thus, while it is true that Bluff Springs reprocurement bid price of $104,000.00 was approximately 39 percent more than the Appellant's original offer of $74,100.00, in light of the fact the Respondent, by promptly awarding the repurchase to the next low bidder on the original contract at the bidder's original price, used a reasonable and appropriate reprocurement method, this "mathematical discrepancy, standing alone, does not compromise the adequacy of the Respondent's reprocurement efforts." See Futura Systems, Inc., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,873. Besides, the Contracting Officer's obligation was to obtain the best or lowest reasonable price for the Government under circumstances, see, e.g., Scalf Engineering Co., supra; Sequal, Inc., supra, not the defaulted Contractor, see, Barrett Refining Corp., supra. The Board is fully satisfied that the Contracting Officer secured the lowest reasonable reprocurement price in this case, and that the Government has met its responsibility to mitigate its damages. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 25; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 84-85. Accord, Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra; Birken Manufacturing Company, supra; Sequal, Inc., supra; Fancy Industries, Inc., supra; Zero-Temp, Inc., ASBCA No. 215, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,212. Accordingly, the Board finds that the Respondent has carried its burden of proof of showing that the excess reprocurement costs assessed reasonably minimized the liability of the Appellant. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 25. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 77. 6. Finally, in order to establish a right to excess reprocurement costs, the Government must demonstrate that the repurchased work has been completed, and final payment made to the reprocurement contractor so that the excess costs assessment is based upon liability for a sum certain. See Whitlock Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 758, 159 F.Supp. 602 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 815 (1958). See also e.g., John L. Hartsoe, supra; Lafayette Coal Company, ASBCA Nos. 32174, 33311, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,116. Where the Government fails to offer evidence that a reprocurement contract was awarded, performed, or paid for, the assessment of excess costs against a defaulted contractor will be denied. See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 85. Accord, Patty Armfield, AGBCA Nos. 91-185-1, 92-141-1, 92-143-1, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,235; Pyramid Packing, Inc., AGBCA No. 86-128-1, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,831; Scalf Engineering Co., supra. Here, the relevant documentation presented by the Respondent consists of the reprocurement specifications (Res. Brf., Attachment 1-I), the reprocurement purchase order (Res Brf., Attachment 1-H), a memorandum to the FMS directing it to recover excess reprocurement costs from the Contractor (Res. Brf., Attachment 1-G), an affidavit from the Assistant Comptroller, FMS, stating that excess reprocurement costs were assessed against the Appellant (Res. Brf., Attachment I-A), and a computer printout showing that Bluff Springs received final payment for the completed work by electronic funds transfer on March 20, 1995 (Res. Brf., Attachment 1-C). Accordingly, the Board finds that the Respondent has carried its burden of proof with respect to the last element necessary to establish its entitlement to excess reprocurement costs. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 26. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 83. Also cf. Patty Armfield, supra; Pyramid Packing, Inc., supra; Scalf Engineering Co., supra. ORDER Considering the record as a whole, the Board finds and concludes that: (1) the Appellant has not shown that the flu epidemic in New York City during the time set for contract performance was the principal cause of its failure to perform; and (2) the Respondent has sustained is burden of proof with regard to the Appellant's liability for excess reprocurement costs. THEREFORE, the Contracting Officer's decisions terminating the Appellant's contract for default and assessing excess reprocurement costs are hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED. It is so Ordered. August 29, 1995 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Judge ______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on March 9, 1995. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984 (Board Rules), Rule 4(a). It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. The R4 File has 12 documents identified as Tabs A through L. 2 The record on which this decision is based consists of: (a) the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, dated February 2, 1995; (b) the R4 File; (c) the Appellant's Complaint, dated February 24, 1995; (d) the attachments to the Complaint submitted in accordance with Rule 4(b) of the Board Rules,, namely, a transcript of a television news broadcast from Channel 12 on February 2, 1995, a transcript of a television news broadcast from Channel NY1 on February 2, 1995, a transcript of a radio news broadcast from WCBS-AM on January 25, 1995, and three medical excuse notes, all dated January 27, 1995, from Victor Weinstein, M.D. for Richard de Marigny, Gerard de Marigny, and Angela de Marigny (hereinafter App. Exh. Nos. 1 through 6, respectively); (e) a letter from the Appellant, dated March 15, 1995, enclosing copies of R4 File, Tabs I and J with the Contractor's annotations; (f) the Respondent's "General Denial" to the Complaint, dated March 31, 1995; (g) the Report of Presubmission Telephone Conference, dated July 7, 1995 (RPTC); (h) the Appellant's Brief, dated May 11, 1995 (hereinafter App. Brf.); and (i) the Respondent's Brief, dated June 16, 1995 ((hereinafter Res. Brf.), with four attachments, namely (1) a multi-page attachment pertaining to the reprocurement process used in this case (Attachment 1, which consists of a declaration from Robert D, Colvin, Assistant Comptroller, Procurement Accounting Division, Financial Management Service (FMS) (hereinafter Attachment 1- A); a handwritten sheet containing the excess reprocurement cost computations and indicating the contracts and the dates from which the costs were recovered from the Appellant (hereinafter Attachment 1-B); a computerized payment history of the reprocurement contract (hereinafter Attachment 1-C); a computerized billing history of the original contract (hereinafter Attachment 1-D); a memorandum, dated January 26, 1995, from the Contracting Officer to the FMS asking it to recover the amount of excess costs upon reprocurement of the order (hereinafter Attachment 1-E); a copy of Purchase Order 99517 (the reprocurement purchase order), dated February 1, 1995, awarding the repurchase to Bluff Springs Paper Co., Ltd./Thompson (Bluff Springs) (hereinafter Attachment 1-F); a memorandum, dated February 1, 1995, from the Contracting Officer to the FMS informing it that the defaulted contract had been reprocured and directing it to recover excess costs from the Appellant (hereinafter Attachment 1-G); the bid abstract for the reprocurement (Jacket No. 390-419) (hereinafter Attachment 1-H); and a copy of the repurchase specifications (hereinafter Attachment 1-I); (2) a bid sheet from the Appellant on a contract for the U.S. Marine Corps (Jacket No. 634-764, dated January 9, 1995 (Attachment 2); (3) an offer from the Contractor on a contract for 15,000 folders (Jacket No. 610-750), dated January 9, 1995 (Attachment 3); and (4) a letter, dated May 2, 1995, from the Appellant to GPO's Atlanta Regional Printing Procurement Office (ARPPO), answering a "Show Cause Notice" on Jacket No. 634-764, and explaining that the delay in shipment was due to an influenza (flu) epidemic in New York City (Attachment 4). See Board Rules, Rule 13(a). The facts, which are essentially undisputed, are recited here only to the extent necessary for this decision. 3 The record indicates that this was a Quality Level III job (R4 File, Tab A, p. 3). 4 The record discloses that the Appellant was the previous contractor for the AF Forms (R4 File, Tab G). 5 The Respondent's telephone record identifies the employee in question as Jerry Nash, but the Appellant claims it was someone named "Angela." See R4 File, Tabs I and J; Appellant's Letter, dated March 15, 1995, annotated attachment (Tab I). The GPO Telephone Directory shows that Jerry Nash is a Printing Specialist in the CCS, and an Angela Haythe also works there as a Procurement Clerk. See GPO Telephone Directory, GPO Publication 865.2 (Effective August 1994), p. 55. 6 The Contractor denies the Respondent's version of this conversation insofar as GPO assumed that there was an implied commitment concerning dates for receipt of the paper and shipment of the final product. See Appellant's Letter, dated March 15, 1995, annotated attachment (Tab I, p. 1). The Appellant says that at most it merely promised to call its paper supplier and confirm the delivery date for the paper, which was done on January 25, 1995, Id. Furthermore, the Contractor states that it did not give GPO a date certain for the shipment of the complete order because no such date could be given until the paper delivery date was ascertained. Id. 7 App. Exh. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are broadcast transcripts of news reports from television channels 12 and NY1 on February 2, 1995, and radio station WCBS-AM on January 25, 1995. The substance of these reports concerns the adverse impact the flu epidemic was having on New York City's blood supply during the Christmas holiday season. However, the radio report notes that because of the flu "[a]bsenteeism in the corporate sector is very high, . . .". See App. Exh. No. 3. See also RPTC, p. 6. 8 App. Exh. Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are medical excuse notes, dated January 27, 1995, from Victor Weinstein, M.D. App. Exh. No. 4 says that Richard de Marigny was under the doctor's care for the flu and complications from December 23, 1994, to January 20, 1995. App. Exh. Nos. 5 and 6 state that Gerard de Marigny, and Angela de Marigny, respectively, were also under his care for the flu from December 26, 1994, to January 20, 1995. See also RPTC, p. 6. 9 The Contractor's notes regarding the R4 File, Tab I, page 2 are essentially the same as its editorial comments with respect to the R4 File, Tab I, page 1. See note 6 supra. Furthermore, the Appellant also summarized its version of the relevant events on a copy of the R4 File, Tab J. See Appellant's Letter, dated March 15, 1995, annotated attachment (Tab J). The Contractor wrote: "Mr. Richard de Marigny never spoke to Mr. Jerry Nash (Compliance) with reference to the subject contract. On [January 24, 1995] a girl named `Angela' talked with Mr. de Marigny. Mr. de Marigny explained on this phone call that due to an outbreak of the flu (epidemic) Shipman's had not yet performed on [the] subject contract. In addition, Mr. de Marigny explained that Shipman's paper supplier tried to contact him while Shipman's was closed due to the flu affecting all key personnel. Mr. de Marigny specifically said that he would not be able to give a definative [sic] shipping date until he contacted the supplier to find out the extent of the problem. Mr. de Marigny tried to contact Mr. Charles Washington 4 times with the definative [sic] shipping dates, but Mr. Washington was unavailable. Also, Mr. de Marigny NEVER gave February 28, 1995 as a shipping date to anybody, therefore this request and subsequent concurrence to terminate was based on FALSE information. [Original emphasis.]" 10 Under the Respondent's printing procurement regulation, the Contracting Officer must submit a proposal to terminate a contract for default to the CRB for its review and concurrence. See, Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (September 1, 1988), Chap. I, Sec. 10, ¶ 4.b.(i) (PPR). See also, Univex International, GPO BCA 23-90 (July 31, 1995), Slip op. at 9, fn. 12; Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., GPO BCA 27-91 (January 24, 1994), Slip op. at 7, fn. 10, 1994 WL 275098; Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31, 1992), Slip. op. at 9, fn. 10, 1992 WL 487875. 11 In that regard, the PPR lists eight factors which "[t]he Contracting Officer shall consider" in determining whether to terminate a contract for default: (i) the provisions of the contract and applicable laws and regulations; (ii) the specific failure of the contractor and the excuses, if any, made by the contractor for such failure; (iii) the availability of the supplies or services from other sources; (iv) the urgency of the need for the supplies or services and the period of time which would be required to obtain sources as compared with the time in which delivery could be obtained from the delinquent contractor; (v) the effect of a termination for default upon the contractor's capability as a supplier under other contracts; (vi) the effect of a termination for default on the ability of the contractor to liquidate progress payments; (vii) the availability of funds to finance repurchase costs which may prove uncollectible from the defaulted contractor, and the availability of funds to finance termination costs if the default is determined to be excusable; and (viii) any other pertinent facts and circumstances. See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.c.(3). See also Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 10, fn. 14; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-92 (April 29, 1993), Slip op. at 26, fn. 31, 1993 WL 526848; Graphics Image, Inc., supra, Slip. op. at 26, fn. 31. The PPR essential repeats the requirements contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See FAR § 49.402-3(f)(1)-(7). 12 The Respondent's procedure for recovering of excess reprocurement costs is set forth in the PPR, which states: "If repurchase is effected at a price in excess of the supplies terminated, the Contracting Officer shall: (i) advise the Financial Management Service, Voucher Examination Branch (Stop FMCE) that such a repurchase has been made; (ii) provide the jacket number, the purchase order number and the contractor's name for both the terminated and new contracts; and, (iii) request that excess costs be computed and the Contracting Officer advised. When advised by the Voucher Examination Branch, the Contracting Officer shall make a written demand (with a copy to the Voucher Examination Branch) on the defaulted contractor for the total amount of such excess including increases or decreases in other costs such as transportation and discounts. If the contractor fails to make payment, the Voucher Examination Branch shall take appropriate action to collect the amount due." See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.f.(3). See also, Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 34, fn. 32. 13 The Appellant and the Respondent disagree as to the actual amount of excess reprocurement costs assessed. The Contractor maintains that it has been charged with $29,900.00 in excess costs, see App. Brf., p. 2; Complaint, p. 7, while the Government states that such costs amounted to $29,100.00, see Res. Brf., p. 2, RPTC, p. 6. Since the difference between the parties' figures is only $800.00, or less than 3 percent of the amount of excess costs cited by each of them, their disagreement is basically de minimis. Although the Board notes that the Assistant Comptroller, FMS, asserts that the amount of excess reprocurement costs were $29,900.00, which raises an internal conflict in the Respondent's position, see Res. Brf., Attachment I-A, ¶ 3, it finds it unnecessary to resolve this dispute in the context of this decision, see B & B Reproductions, GPO BCA 09-89 (June 30, 1995), Slip op. at 16, fn. 18. 14 Specifically, the record reveals the following recovery schedule: (a) $6,236.00 from Purchase Order F-8974, Jacket No. 539-206 on February 8, 1995; (b) $13,953.00 from Purchase Order C-1196, Jacket No. 610-750 on February 9, 1995; (c) $6,167.60 from Purchase Order 99176, Jacket No. 382-298 on March 23, 1995; (d) $2,715.00 from Purchase Order F-0528, Jacket No. 634-764; and (e) $819.40 from Purchase Order 99176. Jacket No. 382-298 on April 3, 1995 (second voucher). See Res. Brf., Attachment 1-B. 15 Apart from Richard de Marigny, Gerard de Marigny, and Angela de Marigny, the Appellant claims that the flu epidemic also resulted in the temporary loss of Venerio Rigolini, Vice President of Engineering, and Artis Myers, Supervisor, to the firm. See Complaint, p. 3. No doctor's notes were submitted for Rigolini and Myers, although the Contractor states they are available upon request. Id. 16 At various times in this proceeding, the Appellant also asserted that: (a) the default action was somehow procedurally defective because the Contracting Officer failed to issue a "Show Cause Notice," affording the Contractor an opportunity to explain the reason for its failure to perform, before terminating the contract; and (b) the real reason for the default was the Contracting Officer's desire to "teach the Appellant a lesson," which amounts to an allegation of bad faith and an abuse of discretion. See Complaint, p. 4; Appellant's Letter, dated March 15, 1995, p. 4; RPTC, pp. 5, 6-7. The Contractor's contention that a "Show Cause Notice" was required prior to default was rejected by the Board at the presubmission conference. See RPTC, p. 7. As the Board noted, since the default was based on the failure to deliver the AF Folders within the time specified in the contract, neither a "Show Cause Notice" or "Cure Notice" was required to be sent to the Contractor prior to termination. Id. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 21; K.C. Printing Co., GPO BCA 02-91 (February 22, 1995), Slip op. at 13; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-92 (April 29, 1993), Slip op. at 13, 1993 WL 526848; B.P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 22-91 (February 5, 1993), Slip op. at 12, 1993 WL 311371; Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 2-88 (December 20, 1991, Slip op, at 19-20, 1991 WL 439274. With respect to a "Show Cause Notice," in particular, while GPO's printing procurement regulation, like the procurement rules of other Federal agencies, recommends the issuance of a show cause letter, "where practicable," prior to the default termination of a contract for failure to make timely deliveries or perform services within the time required by the contract, see PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶ 3(c)(1); cf. Lewis B. Udis v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 379, 385-86 (1985), the omission of a "show cause notice" by the Government is not generally a procedural defect to a termination based on the contractor's failure to make timely deliveries or perform timely services, see Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 24, fn. 25; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 14, fn. 20; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 20, fn. 22. The Appellant's assertion that the termination stemmed from the Contracting Officer's desire to "teach the Appellant a lesson" appears to rest on a statement allegedly made by Charles Washington, a Printing Specialist in the Contracts Branch of GPO's Purchase Division, who apparently was assigned to work with the Contractor in winding up matters on the contract after it was defaulted. See GPO Telephone Directory, p. 57. Such a statement, even if made, is hearsay, which is defined as "a statement made by the out-of-court declarant which is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." See Taylor Air Systems, Inc., ASBCA No. 25526, 84-1 BCA ¶ 17,141, at 85,396. See also FED. R. EVID. 801. As a rule, credible hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, including those of this Board. See, Vanier Graphics, GPO BCA 12-92 (May 17, 1994), Slip op. at 36, fn. 29, 1994 WL 275102 (hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative proceedings provided it is relevant and material, and otherwise reliable, adequate, probative, and fundamentally fair. [Citations omitted.]). Accord, Southwest Marine, Inc., DOTBCA No. 1661, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,168; Rocky Mountain Trading Co., GSBCA No. 8671-P, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,406; Johnson & Son Erector Co., ASBCA No. 23689, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,931; Hof Construction, Inc., GSBCA No. 7012, 84-1 BCA ¶ 17,009. However, the statement proffered by the Appellant in this case is the "rankest sort of hearsay," more in the nature of speculation, and is entitled to no credence whatsoever. See Amdahl Corp. v. Department of Health and Human Services, GSBCA No. 11998-P, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,612, at 127,488. More importantly, the Board has never made a finding of bad faith on such skimpy evidence. In that regard, the Board has held on many occasions that because of the strong presumption that Government officials properly and honestly carry out their functions, an allegation of bad faith must be established by "well-nigh irrefragable" proof. See, e.g., Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), Slip op. at 43, fn. 58; Universal Printing Co., GPO BCA 09-90 (June 22, 1994), Slip op. at 24, fn. 24, 1994 WL 377586; Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89 (March 28, 1994), Slip op. at 34-35, fn. 46, 1994 WL 275104; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 14-91 (August 10, 1992), Slip op. at 16, 1992 WL 382917; The Standard Register Co., GPO BCA 4-86 (October 28, 1987), Slip op. at 12-13, 1987 WL 228972. Accord, Brill Brothers, Inc., ASBCA No. 42573, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,352; Karpak Data and Design, IBCA No. 2944 et al., 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,360; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491. The key to such evidence is that there must be a showing of a specific intent on the part of the Government to injure the contractor. Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977). See, Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 54. In the Board's view, no such "irrefragable" proof of bad faith exists in this record. 17 The United States Claims Court was renamed the United States Court of Federal Claims on October 29, 1992, pursuant to Title IX of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992). 18 In R.C. Swanson, the Board adopted a four-part test against which to measure the evidence presented by a contractor attempting to excuse a default for untimely performance. In that regard, the contractor had to prove: (a) that the nonperformance was due to a situation which was beyond its control and it was not at fault or negligent; (b) that performance would have been timely but for the occurrence of the event which is claimed to excuse the nonperformance; (c) that it took every reasonable precaution to avoid foreseeable causes for nonperformance and to minimize their effect; and (d) that a precise period of time of nonperformance because of the causes alleged. See R.C. Swanson Printing & Typesetting Co., supra, Slip op. 28-29. 19 As indicated in note 2 supra, three attachments to the Respondent's brief relate to different contracts than the one which is the subject of this appeal; i.e., Attachments 2 and 4 concern a contract identified as Jacket No. 634-764, while Attachment 3 deals with a contract awarded as Jacket No. 610-750. GPO's clear intent in seeking to make these documents part of the record is to impeach the Appellant's assertion that it ceased production from December 30, 1994, to January 20, 1995. Indeed, the Contractor's statement to the ARPPO on May 2, 1995 (Attachment 4), that its plant was not operating from the middle of January to nearly the end of February, would, if introduced at hearing, make the Appellant's position in this case vulnerable to attack as a prior inconsistent statement. See Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 32637, 35074, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,380. However, the Board's narrow jurisdictional mandate prevents it from considering matters outside the scope of the disputed contract. See, Universal Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 26, fn. 27, Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 7, fn. 11; B.P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Slip op. at 14-15. Accordingly, the Board has not considered Attachments 2, 3, and 4 to the Respondent's brief in the context of this case. 20 While the excusable events listed in the "Default" clause, all of which must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor, are set forth in the context of relieving the contractor from responsibility for excess reprocurement costs, it is well-settled that the same occurrences extend the time available for performance and make termination prior to that time improper. See e.g., FKC Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 14856, 70-1 BCA ¶ 8,312. 21 Default terminations-as a species of forfeiture-are strictly construed. See D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 979, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969). See also Foremost Mechanical Systems, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 12335, 12384, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,382; J. D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 45, 408 F.2d 424 (1969); Murphy, et al. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 332 (1964). 22 The standard of proof in these cases is a "preponderance of the evidence." See M.W. Microwave Corp., ASBCA No. 45084, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,627, at 129,377. 23 The cases tell us that essentially the same rule applies to contractor delays caused by illness, see e.g., Jerome Bailey, PSBCA No. 3638, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,447; C. Howdy Smith, AGBCA No. 90-154-1, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,884, injury, see e.g., Lewis Evans, AGBCA No. 85-498-1, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,328, or death, see e.g., Stanley Jewell, GSBCA No. 10348, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,283. 24 On August 18, 1995, the Board telephoned the State of New York's Department of State, Corporation Division, and was informed by Ms. Donna Rapisarda, Senior Clerk, Corporation Research, that the Appellant was incorporated under the laws of New York on December 11, 1974, and that according to her records, it is currently a business in good standing. Since the Contractor's corporate status is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned," the Board takes judicial notice of that fact for the purposes of this decision. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 25 The ASBCA also observed that: "It is not, however, whether the contracting party is incorporated or not that is decisive insofar as excusability is concerned, as the Government seems to suggest. Rather, it is whether the parties intended to have the particular individual do the work, although this expectation may be remote whenever a corporation is involved. See, e.g., John F. Lehnertz, AGBCA No. 77-132, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,895 (owner's disabling illness did not justify failure to perform a tree trimming contract because the contract was `for nonpersonal services and there was no basis for concluding that the parties intended to have the [owner] do the work'). On the other hand, when the Government contracts with a sole proprietor, the expectation may be that the owner will personally perform the services requested. Delay due to the illness of that individual may be excusable. Herman White, ENG BCA No. 5109, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,897. See also Plus Technology, ASBCA No. 45353, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,854, 10 March 1993 (owner's terminal illness was beyond his control and without his fault or negligence, but no showing illness delayed performance). The answer must depend on the individual circumstances involved." See M.W. Microwave Corp., supra, 93-3 BCA at 129,378. 26 In this context, a "broach" is a tapered bit on a metal- cutting machine tool that is pulled or pushed through a hole to enlarge or shape the hole. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 176 (3rd coll. ed. 1988). See Crawford Development and Manufacturing Co., supra, 74-2 BCA at 50,622. 27 This rule is nothing more than the "black letter" principle which requires a contractor to either have on hand or made arrangements for all the necessary ingredients-labor, plant, equipment, material and finances-adequate for contract performance prior to making a contract commitment with the Government. See, K.C. Printing, supra, Slip op. at 15; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Slip. op. at 33; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 14-15. See also Yankee Telecommunication Laboratories, Inc., supra, 85-1 BCA at 88,873. The reason for the rule is simple-implicit in a contractor's promise to perform is its assurance that it has the ability to perform. See, K.C. Printing, supra, Slip op. at 15; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Slip. op. at 34; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 14. 28 When a defaulted contractor appeals a contracting officer's termination decision, the usual practice is for the Board to look at the excess reprocurement cost issue as well, provided that question is ripe for consideration; i.e., such costs have been assessed. See Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 33-34; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 48. 29 As the Board has observed in past cases, GPO reprocurement procedures are consistent with the general practice in Government reprocurements. See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.f.(2). See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 21, fn. 22; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 17, fn. 25, at 68, fn. 65. 30 In most cases, the Government satisfies this burden by showing that it used sealed bid advertising to repurchase defaulted supplies and services. See e.g., H & H Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 168 Ct.Cl. 873 (1964); Lester Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 536 (1960); Star Food Processing, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 34161, 34163, 34164, 34165, 35544, 35545, 35546, 35547, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,390; Erickson Enterprises, AGBCA 77-168, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,628. See generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 1020-23. 31 This duty is to be carried out within the confines of Federal procurement statutes, regulations, policies and directives, and in pursuit of the Government's own best interests, whether or not that results in a lower price for a defaulted contractor. See Barrett Refining Corp., supra, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,566, at 118,145. 32 If the Government fails to make a reasonable effort at contacting the original bidders, the result may be a denial or reduction excess costs. See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 22, fn. 23 (citing Associated Cleaning, Inc., GSBCA No. 8320, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,360; Old Dominion Security, Inc., supra; Barrett Chemical Co., Inc., GSBCA No. 4544, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,625). Basically, the law creates a rebuttable presumption that the repurchase could have been completed at the price previously quoted by a lower bidder if an effort had been made to do so. See Dillon Total Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 732 (1978); AAA Janitorial Services, ASBCA No. 9603, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,091. 33 Where the Government fails, without adequate explanation, to solicit the second lowest bidder on the defaulted contract, that bid will set the limit of recovery for excess reprocurement costs. See, Birken Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 32590, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,845; Prestex, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 21284, 21372, 21453, 21467, 23184, 81-1 BCA ¶ 14,882, aff'd, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,397; Environmental Tectonics Corp., ASBCA No. 21204, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,986; Solar Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No. 19957, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,115. 34 Business Forms Service, Inc., ATC Decal Company, and Technical Publishing Services, Inc. were decided by ad hoc contract appeals panels which considered appeals from final decisions of GPO Contracting Officers prior to the establishment of the Board in 1984. GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984. Decisions of these ad hoc panels are cited by the Board in its decisions as "GPOCAB." While the Board is not bound by the decisions of the ad hoc panels, its policy is to follow their rulings where applicable and appropriate. See, Univex International, supra, Slip op. at 23, fn. 24; Universal Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 11, fn. 9; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 14, fn. 19; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 18, fn. 20; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 9, fn. 9. 35 The Board might have reached a different conclusion if there had been more than two bidders on the original contract. See, Marine Engine Specialties Corp., ASBCA No. 20521, 76-1 BCA ¶ 11,891 (the Government failed to mitigate its excess costs by awarding the reprocurement contract to the second low bidder on the original solicitation without making an effort to contract three other contractors who had submitted offers on the defaulted contract, where the repurchase unit price was 25 percent greater than that of the original contract). 36 In fulfilling the obligation to secure the best price for the Government, a contracting officer must follow the same standard of reasonableness and prudence under the circumstances which he/she exercised in the timing and selecting of the method of reprocurement. See, William A. Hulett, supra; Barrett Refining Corp., supra; Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra. 37 On the other hand, in the absence of negotiations or some other explanation for the increase in the price of repurchased supplies, most appeals boards will reduce the amount of recoverable excess costs. See Puroflow Corp., supra; Sequal, Inc., supra. See also Solar Laboratories, Inc., supra, 76-2 BCA at 58,195.