

Baghdad Cable NotesTele.txt

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ACTION OBO-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	EEB-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-00
	CIAE-00	INL-00	DNI-00	DS-00	EUR-00	OIGO-00	E-00
	UTED-00	FOE-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00
	MOFM-00	MOF-00	M-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIG-00
	OMB-00	PA-00	PER-00	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00	D-00
	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	NCTC-00	FMP-00	CBP-00
	R-00	SCRS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00
	ALM-00	SAS-00	FA-00	SWCI-00	/000W		

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1439

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001786

DEPT FOR OBO; NEA/EX; DS; DS/DSS; DS/IP/NEA; DS/IP/OPO; A/LM/AQM

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, AMGT

SUBJECT: STATUS - NEW BAGHDAD EMBASSY SECURITY FORCE (BESF) GUARD
CAMP

- REF: A) LOTD 07-130-077 dtd 5/14/07
B) KBR Electrical Assessment for BESF DFAC dtd 5/15/07
C) KBR Technical Inspection of BESF DFAC dtd 5/25/07
D) OBO/EPCO memo dtd 5/18/07
E) White/Golden memo dtd 5/18/07
F) State 69549
G) Baghdad 001743 dtd 5/25/07

1. Summary: The new Baghdad Embassy Security Force (BESF) guard camp remains vacant and non functional. Poor quality construction, specifically involving the electrical wiring and generator installation have precluded post from being able to utilize the camp as intended. Life safety issues, lack of turnover and training, inherent construction deficiencies and refusal by OBO to provide operations and maintenance support left post with no recourse but to shut the camp down, in spite of the blistering heat in Baghdad, until the concerns listed below can be resolved.

2. The following is a brief summary of the chronology of events and the status of the new BESF guard camp. Post requests that DS, NEA/EX, AQM and OBO coordinate a resolution to this situation.

3. On 14 May 2007, RSO was contacted by KBR concerning an electrical problem at the new BESF guard camp Dining Facility (DFAC). RSO and Embassy Facilities Management (FM) representatives met with individuals from KBR, OBO and First Kuwaiti at the new BESF guard camp. The meeting was requested due to the melting of the electrical wiring in the DFAC during the process of KBR initiating the preparation of the first meal to be served in the DFAC.

4. According to KBR, all the DFAC equipment had been turned on five days previously and all the appliances appeared to be operational. Based on this initial determination, the first meal was to have been served in the DFAC on 15 May and the guards would begin moving into

the new camp. In conjunction with the meal preparation, KBR moved food from Camp Jackson to the new BESF guard camp DFAC. During the course of preparing the first meal on 14 May, KBR kitchen personnel began to notice that some of the appliances were not working properly, some of the kitchen staff received electrical shocks and there was a burning smell in the DFAC. Further inspection revealed that the electrical wiring under the DFAC had melted. KBR subsequently shut down all the DFAC equipment. KBR is the only resource available to post that has the subject matter expertise to inspect these systems.

5. At the 14 May meeting, the group decided that the DFAC at the new guard camp was currently non-operational. As it was unknown as to when the repairs would be made, and how long it would take to verify that the problem had been corrected, a decision was made to provide the Triple Canopy guards at Camp Jackson with MRE's and continental type meals for the next 24-48 hours. During this period, KBR would move the Camp Jackson food back to Camp Jackson and begin serving meals at Camp Jackson on 17 May. KBR received direction from DCMA (Ref A) that will allow KBR to continue to provide meals at Camp Jackson for 1-2 weeks, or until such time as the new guard camp DFAC is fully operational. The movement of the guards from Camp Jackson will be delayed until the new BESF guard camp DFAC is functioning properly.

6. The DFAC wiring issue was discussed with, S. Drisko, the LOGCAP DOS Contract Officer Representative (COR) and the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO). Both agreed with the course of action outlined above and will provide the necessary administrative support.

7. The initial assessment by the KBR electricians was that the gauge of the DFAC electrical wiring is too small for the electrical load required and that most if not all of the wiring will need to be replaced. A follow-on inspection by KBR electricians Ref (B) identified additional electrical issues that require corrective action. A copy of Ref (B) was provided to the OBO representative. OBO has not provided documentation regarding the electrical problems or corrective action by First Kuwaiti. However, during a 16 May meeting, it was discussed that the First Kuwaiti electricians concur with all the corrective actions indicated in Ref (B) with the exception of item (1) which involves:

Panel 1 Dining Area

- 100 ampere main: this panel appears to be overloaded
- 12 window unit AC's @ 10 amp each
- 33 ampere lighting load on two 15 ampere circuits
- Additional load: two coolers and receptacles

KBR electricians expressed belief that the load on the 100 ampere main was in excess of the capacity provided. First Kuwaiti electricians advised that the load did not exceed the capacity of the 100 ampere main. First Kuwaiti advised this was a design issue vice being construction related. Once the wiring repairs have been made, the actual load requirements for this panel will be tested and the results evaluated.

8. The DFAC wiring is under warranty and thus First Kuwaiti is obligated to correct the problem. OBO and First Kuwaiti

representatives agreed that KBR electricians could observe the repairs to ensure familiarity with the wiring. The OBO

representative advised that repairs would take approximately two days after the problem had been assessed.

9. A subsequent meeting on 16 May at the new BESF guard camp DFAC was held with representatives from RSO, Embassy Facilities, KBR and OBO. During this meeting additional electrical concerns were presented which included grounding and the electrical feeds into the DFAC. It was discussed that there have been at least four known fires in DFAC's in Iraq, in which the primary causes appeared to be improper grounding and electrical wiring. During this meeting several photos of the initial DFAC wiring were shown that displayed numerous instances of split wiring and wiring not contained in electrical conduit or junction boxes. As this wiring presented a potential fire hazard and it was unknown as to whether similar wiring was present in the residential trailers, those guards that had moved from the Villas to the new camp have returned to the Villas. No guard personnel will move to the camp until the extent of the electrical concerns can be fully assessed and necessary corrective action completed. During the 16 May meeting, "as built" drawings were requested from OBO.

10. The 16 May meeting also included concerns expressed by KBR as to their responsibility and liability in assuming Operations and Maintenance for the camp electrical system and other camp infrastructure. KBR involvement and concern stems solely from their pending responsibility to provide Operations and Maintenance to the camp. It was agreed that this issue would be reviewed with the DOS LOGCAP COR and DCMA ACO. A meeting will be held with Embassy personnel, KBR, OBO, DOS LOGCAP COR and DCMA ACO to discuss this issue and actions required to allow the guards to occupy the new BESF guard camp.

11. OBO advised on 24 May 2007 that the DFAC wiring had been corrected. KBR conducted a Technical Inspection of the DFAC wiring on 25 May 2007 and submitted a report Ref (C) indicating continuing concerns with the DFAC electrical wiring.

12. RSO and FM had previously identified several potential problems pertaining to the construction of the BESF guard camp. Extensive records of the problems identified are readily available and were identified prior to the acceptance of the camp by post. RSO and Post were directed to accept the camp from DS and OBO. This directive was based upon OBO on site ensuring post representatives that First Kuwaiti would correct any deficiencies identified after move in at no cost to the USG and that they, First Kuwaiti, would continue to provide O&M for water purification, sewage treatment, and power generation for 60 to 90 days or until the new NEC O&M contractor (PA&E) was operational. The plan entailed that PA&E would provide the water purification system, sewage treatment and electrical power O&M at the BESF camp. AQM has advised post that PA&E will not be operational until July 2007.

13. Several additional issues have risen since the electrical concerns regarding the BESF camp DFAC electrical wiring were identified, including the discovery of counterfeit wire that was labeled as being 10mm when in fact it was only 6mm.

14. Formaldehyde fumes were first discovered emanating from the residential trailers in early May. Some personnel have experienced a reaction from the fumes. Post FM contacted OBO/SHEM and OBO at post contacted the trailer manufacturer (Red Sea) regarding the fumes. OBO advised that the trailer manufacturer confirmed that formaldehyde was used in the trailers and that airing the trailers

with the door/windows open was the best remedy to dissipate the fumes. OBO/SHEM confirmed the method of airing the trailer. The manufacturer also advised that placing charcoal in an open container in each room may also absorb the fumes. Post is airing the trailers as prescribed and this appears to be working although the fumes are still prevalent.

15. On 18 May 2007, OBO/EPCO provided RSO with a memo, ref (D) indicating that effective 1200 noon on 20 May 2007, OBO/EPCO would cease to provide maintenance of power stations, water treatment and waste water treatment at the BESF camp. Post responded (ref E) to this memo and on 19 May 2007, OBO/EPCO extended the deadline to 27 May 2007. On 26 May 2007, OBO agreed to provide 30 minutes of maintenance daily to the water treatment system to prevent damage or failure. On 28 May, OBO advised the FM that OBO will no longer provide any O&M for the BESF camp water system.

The post FM attempted to assume maintenance responsibilities for power generation and sewage treatment until an alternative O&M provider can be identified. However, the FM does not have any O&M resources or staff at this time, thus only one generator will be operated by the FM in order to provide air conditioning to the unit housing water purification chemicals. Post was advised by First Kuwaiti that the water purification system has 16 filter membranes that must remain wet or they will need to be replaced. Each membrane costs approximately \$6,000 to replace. Without OBO cooperation and the provision of at least minimal water system O&M, post is unsure as to the extent of damage that will be caused to the water system

or if/when it could be made operational.

Ref (F) indicated OBO continued support for providing water, sewage and power O&M to the BESF camp. In ref (G), Post expressed appreciation for the OBO support and acknowledged the continued need for this support until an alternative O&M provider could be established. Without the provision of O&M support reflected in ref (F) or an alternative as described in ref (G), post is left without an O&M service provider for the BESF camp.

16. On 25 May 2007, as part of the technical inspection to assume O&M for power generation, a KBR HazMat expert identified leaks in fuel pipes of all ten generators at the BESF camp. It was also noted that the fuel tanks are direct buried single walled steel tanks without any corrosion protection. Further, no leak detection or any level gauges were installed. Multiple leaks on the pipe fittings between the underground tank and the generators were noted by oil saturated soil around the joints. As a result of these issues KBR has refused to assume O&M of the power generators. The FM confirmed the findings of the KBR HazMat expert. It appears that Teflon tape used for water piping was used on all the fuel pipes. The KBR HazMat expert advised that this Teflon tape will only hold a seal for a few weeks and will then fail as this type of Teflon tape is not designed for fuel systems and will dissolve upon contact with diesel fuel. Post is exploring options with DCMA and the LOGCAP COR to waive liability that would allow KBR to perform power generation O&M.

17. On 26 May 2007, First Kuwaiti delivered minimal spare parts for the power generator and less than minimal spare parts for the water treatment plant. The material is currently being stored at the BESF camp.

18. On 26 May 2007, KBR completed a technical inspection of the DFAC and submitted a report (ref C) that indicates "reworked" wiring is still sub-standard. The KBR report indicates that KBR cannot provide DFAC services in the BESF camp until the deficiencies in the current DFAC wiring is corrected.

19. On 27 May 2007, First Kuwaiti stopped providing services to the power generator and waste water treatment plant. During the course of the attempt by the FM to maintain generator operation, the FM identified the following items related to power generation that need to be corrected as part of the original work completed by First Kuwaiti (FKTC) at the new BESF guard camp.

- Generator switches and breakers must be labeled. The lack of clear markings presents a maintenance and safety concern as only the previous FKTC operators are aware of which switch to turn and what breaker to operate. Nothing is labeled on the distribution panels or fuel pump panels. Post did not receive any walkthrough or transition training on the generators which presents additional safety concerns.

- Installation of the generators has not been completed. Additional work is required to permit the automatic fuel fill system to operate. The fuel fill system must now be operated manually and the auto system has apparently never worked.

- Install overflow piping from the day tank back to the main supply tank. Overflow piping has been removed from all 10 generators creating a hazardous situation if the tank overflows. The overflow pipe currently exits the day tank, runs down vertically from the day tank to the floor of the generator housing and deposits overflow on the floor of the generator housing unit.

- Clean oil spills from all generator containers. Obvious overflows have occurred and all generators have excessive residue of fuel on the floor. This presents a dangerous fire safety situation.

- Repair leaks on all fuel piping joints between the underground tank and the generators. Each joint is currently leaking fuel both into the generator housing unit and on the ground between the underground tank and the generator. Post has requested information as to whether the fuel system was pressure tested prior to being placed in service.

20. As of 27 May 2007, vehicle wedge barriers have not been delivered to the BESF camp as was required in the original camp construction statement of work.

21. On 26 May 2007, First Kuwaiti began installing the fire suppression system and initiated construction to complete the kennels at the BESF camp. The \$500,000 project to install the fire suppression system which DS funded, is under way without any EPCO supervision. The main project manager is a third country national who the day before was responsible for the plumbers running the water system on the camp. During the construction of the BESF guard camp, there were multiple changes to the project managers. To date there have been a total of five individuals intermittently identified as the project manager for the BESF guard camp. Post has experienced difficulties in attempting to obtain information from EPCO project managers as it seems each time post requested information from one

individual, post was directed to someone else. Two of the project

managers have had extremely limited previous project management experience.

22. The timeframe for moving the BESF guards from tents and deplorable living conditions into the new camp is dependent on the ability to correct DFAC electrical deficiencies, the result of a pending KBR technical inspection of the residential trailers and the ability to provide O&M services to the water treatment facility, sewage treatment and power generation systems. Post is seeking alternative options for housing the incoming NEC guard force personnel and will advise.

23. The Embassy facilities point of contact on this issue is Embassy Facilities Manager Brian McCarthy. The RSO point of contact on this issue is Countermeasures RSO Brian Murphy.

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End Cable Text

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