On the Issues
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IRAQ INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY The United States went to war in Iraq based on intelligence that the Administration said left no doubt that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was likely to help terrorist groups like al Qaeda to obtain such weapons. However, administration statements concerning the intelligence on Iraq were not consistent with that intelligence, and the underlying intelligence itself appeared flawed. So it was important to determine if the intelligence was objective, accurate and credible; how the intelligence was used to plan for the war; and to determine whether the intelligence was exaggerated by the Administration to help make its case for war. On June 27, 2003, Senator Levin announced that he had directed his staff on the Armed Services Committee to conduct an inquiry into these matters concerning the pre-war intelligence. He had previously suggested to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John Warner, R-Va., that the Committee staff should conduct a bipartisan inquiry. However, Senator Warner decided he would wait until after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded its review of pre-war Iraq intelligence before deciding how his staff would proceed on this matter. The minority staff requested and received tens of thousands of pages of documents, which the staff reviewed in detail. Some of the documents requested from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency took more than 18 months to be delivered, and some were not provided. The inquiry led to concerns that the Department of Defense policy office had conducted its own intelligence analysis concerning Iraq’s relationship to al Qaeda, and developed an alternative view to that of the Intelligence Community which it promoted to the White House without the knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency. On July 9, 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its report [PDF] on the first phase of its inquiry. That report provided more than 500 pages of details of the many serious flaws with the pre-war intelligence, particularly concerning issues of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. On September 30, 2004, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, issued his comprehensive report on the search for Iraq’s WMD. The report concluded that the pre-war intelligence was wrong, and that Iraq did not possess WMD, nor was it actively pursuing any WMD. On October 21, 2004, Sentator Levin issued his "Report of an Inquiry into the Alternative Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq-al Qaeda Relationship." [PDF] The report documented and examined the role of the Defense Department policy office in creating and promoting its alternative intelligence analysis, and the statements made by senior Administration officials that reflected the alternative analysis. Since issuing his report, Senator Levin has had additional pre-war intelligence information declassified. This new information shows that Administration statements before the war were not supported by the intelligence. On September 22, 2005, Senator Levin wrote to the Department of Defense Inspector General to request that they expand an inquiry into the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy related to intelligence on Iraq , to determine if any such activities were inappropriate or improper. Senator Levin asked the Inspector General to consider ten specific questions, including questions about an alternative intelligence assessment presented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the White House in September 2002. [ Read Senator Levin's letter. PDF] On February 9, 2007, the Department of Defense Inspector General issued a classified report on the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)], responding to Senator Levin's request. In its unclassified findings, the Inspector General concluded that: "The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers." The actions of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy "were inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the intelligence community." "This condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative intelligence." On February 9, 2007, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a briefing on the Inspector General's report. Senator Levin has requested an unclassified version of the report to be made public, and he will continue to pursue Iraq intelligence matters in 2007. Links:
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Iraq Intelligence Inquiry
Senator Levin announced in June that he was directing his Armed Services Committee staff to conduct an inquiry into the objectivity and credibility of intelligence on Iraq prior to the war, and to examine the impact of that intelligence on planning for the war and on the conduct of combat and stability operations. more >
US Policy Toward Iraq
Perhaps the most important decision that the Congress must make is whether to authorize the President to use military force against another nation. The decision to authorize the use of force against Iraq and resulting policies continue to be a matter of controversy. more >
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