The Lugar Warner Amendment

SA 2208. Mr. WARNER (for himself and Mr. Lugar) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1585, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XV, add the following:

Subtitle D--Iraq

   SEC. 1541. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) The United States has vital national security interests in Iraq and the Middle East region.

    (2) These vital interests include the prevention of Iraq or any piece of its territory from being used as a safe haven or training ground for terrorists or as a repository or assembly point for weapons of mass destruction; the prevention of acts of violence and disorder that upset wider regional stability, undermining friendly governments, expanding refugee flows, impairing the international shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, or destroying key oil production or transportation facilities; the prevention of Iranian domination of or aggression toward nations or areas of the Middle East, which would have potentially serious consequences for weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of Israel, and the stability of friendly governments; and the protection of U.S. credibility in the region and throughout the world.

    (3) On January 10, 2007, the President announced the ``New Way forward'' (hereinafter known as ``the President's strategy''), which consists of four basic elements: political, regional, economic, and military.

    (4) The central component of the military element of the President's strategy is an increased emphasis on population security with augmented Iraqi and Coalition force levels in Baghdad and elsewhere. This element required the deployment of five additional U.S. brigade combat teams, with the fifth brigade combat team having been deployed and having become operational in June 2007.

    (5) It is widely recognized that there is no purely military solution to the situation in Iraq. The Iraqi leaders must, as a unified government, reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, for their failure to do so greatly contributes to the violence and disorder in Iraq.

    (6) The viability of the President's strategy within Iraq depends upon: 1) military success at reducing violence and instability in Iraq to a degree that creates greater political normalcy to conclude political compromises; 2) the willingness of Iraqi leaders to subordinate their personal, tribal, and sectarian loyalties and agendas to allow for meaningful and lasting compromises on key questions of economic and political power, such as the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources, the enactment of a de-baathification policy, the enactment of provincial election law, the completion of the Constitutional review process, and the settlement of the Kirkuk question; and 3) the ability of these potential compromises to achieve a sufficient level of national reconciliation to sustain a stable, unified government, security forces loyal to that government, and a cohesive society despite the continuing risk of terrorism or sectarian violence.

    (7) According to the Initial Benchmark Assessment Report, issued on July 12, 2007, under the requirements of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 110-28), enacted May 25, 2007, the Administration has scored satisfactory progress toward 8 of 18 benchmarks, but unsatisfactory or mixed progress is being marked in 10 others. Specifically, in the Security sector, while the report grades ``satisfactory progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations, ``the Iraqi Government has made unsatisfactory progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces units capable of operating independently'', and has not made satisfactory progress ``in ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. . .''

    (8) The Administration's Initial Benchmark Assessment Report of July 12, 2007, indicates clearly that none of the benchmarks set forth in P.L 110-28, nor those milestones recommended by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group in December 2006 in the areas of national reconciliation, security and governance have been reached in their entirety.

    (9) Sectarian agendas, heightened by current power struggles and the memory of the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein, have generated fear, distrust, and hatred in many parts of Iraq leading to ethnic cleansing, violence, sabotage, economic discrimination, and uncompromising political agendas that have hindered attempts to achieve political reconciliation.

    (10) Many leaders of the Iraqi government and sectarian factions have not demonstrated a commitment to the concept of a pluralist government; nor have they demonstrated the ability to control many sub-factions within their sects.

    (11) The difficulty of achieving short-term political accommodation in Iraq has been complicated by absenteeism in Parliament, personal feuds among leaders, factional boycotts, and the demands of making policy by consensus in a fragmented society.

    (12) Though some Iraqi military and security units have achieved a commendable, professional degree of capability and have performed courageously in combat, a measure of sectarian loyalties, agenda, and corruption still afflict the Iraqi security services.

    (13) Given continuing high levels of violence in Iraq and few manifestations of political compromise among Iraq's factions, the optimal outcome in Iraq of a unified, pluralist, democratic government that is able to police itself, protect its borders, and achieve economic development is not likely to be achieved in the near future.

    (14) American military and diplomatic strategy in Iraq must adjust to the reality that sectarian factionalism is not likely to abate anytime soon and probably cannot be controlled from the top.

    (15) The U.S. military's capacity to interpose itself indefinitely between sectarian factions in Iraq is limited by the high tempo of deployments to Iraq during four and a half years of conflict have impacted the overall readiness of our armed forces, complicated the all-volunteer policy of recruitment, and strained the quality of life for military families.

    (16) The extended Iraq deployments have potential consequences for U.S. abilities to respond to other national security threats, including challenges in Afghanistan.

    (17) The safety and security of our military forces, as well as our credibility in the region require that any military withdrawal or redeployment from Iraq be carefully planned and executed.

    (18) Some level of American military presence in or near Iraq would improve prospects that the United States could respond to terrorist threats, protect petroleum flows, help deter a regional war, and reassure friendly governments of America's commitment to Middle East security.

    (19) Our military planners and diplomats must have as much time as possible to develop and implement the elements of any follow-on policy to the President's strategy, including securing the cooperation of the Iraqi government and key states in the region and establishing the logistics to support a residual or temporary American military presence.

    (20) A poorly-planned or precipitous withdrawal from Iraq could compound the risks of a wider regional conflict stimulated by Sunni-Shia tensions, damage U.S. credibility among regional allies, expose Iraqis who have worked with the Coalition to retribution, increase the magnitude of destabilizing refugee flows, undercut economic and development projects currently underway in Iraq, and signal that the United States was abandoning efforts to prevent Iraqi territory from being used as a terrorist base.

    (21) The December 2006 report issued by the Iraq Study Group advocated a comprehensive strategy that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly;''.

    (22) A new strategy should reference the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, which consulted nearly 200 leading officials and experts, including senior members of the Government of Iraq, the United States Government, and key coalition partners and received advice from more than 50 distinguished scholars and experts from a variety of fields who conducted working groups in the areas of economy and reconstruction, military and security, political development, and the strategic environment in Iraq and the Middle East.

    (23) The long term importance of Iraq and the Middle East to American economic and national security requires that our policy in Iraq be militarily sustainable and that it command the greatest degree of public and Congressional support possible.

    (24) The report of the Iraq Study Group opened with a letter from the co-chairs, James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, which states ``Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people in order to win their support''.

   SEC. 1542. REPORTING AND PLANNING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) The President shall require the Director of National Intelligence to review and update, as required, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled ``Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead'', dated January 2007, not later than September 4, 2007. The updated NIE shall include an assessment specifically of the consequences of the various courses of action reducing U.S. forces in Iraq on the future of Iraq, the Middle East region, U.S. national interests, and U.S. partners and allies.

    (b) The President, in close coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military leaders, shall, as a matter of prudence, consider all options and initiate planning to:

    (1) transition U.S. combat forces from policing the civil strife or sectarian violence in Iraq;

    (2) redeploy or reallocate those forces in a responsible manner as conditions permit;

    (3) refocus U.S. military operations on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and its associates, protecting U.S. forces and facilities, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security; and

    (4) address the findings of the Independent Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces as provided by PL 110-28 to include decision points for the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq that are based upon the readiness of Iraqi Security Forces.

    (c) The aforementioned plans shall be presented to Congress, in a format determined by the Administration, not later than October 16, 2007, and shall be accompanied by the results from modeling and simulation efforts by appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. government that address the consequences of the courses of action proposed and analyzed. The results of that modeling and simulation shall be made available to Congress.

    (d) We recommend that the President and the Administration design plans to be executable beginning not later than December 31, 2007.

   SEC. 1543. AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE.

    Findings:

    (1) In the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 110-28), enacted May 25, 2007, the Congress enacted broad legislation, part of which originated in the Senate, and the President signed the legislation which specifically mandated that the President take the following actions:

    (A) ``The President shall submit an initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved''.

    (B) ``The President, having consulted with the Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, and the Commander of U.S. Central Command, will prepare the report and submit the report to Congress''.

    (C) ``If the President's assessment of any of the specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory, the President shall include in that report a description of such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and military components of the strategy, as announced by the President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall include in the report, the advisability of implementing such aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, as he deems appropriate''.

    (D) ``The President shall submit a second report to the Congress, not later than September 15, 2007, following the same procedures and criteria, outlined above''.

    (E) ``Prior to the submission of the President's second report on September 15, 2007, and at a time to be agreed upon by the leadership of the Congress and the Administration, the United States Ambassador to Iraq and the Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq will be made available to testify in open and closed sessions before the relevant committees of the Congress''.

    (F) The Department of Defense ``will commission an independent, private-sector entity, which operates as a 501(c)(3), with recognized credentials and expertise in military affairs, to prepare an independent report assessing the following:

    (i) The readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, and bringing greater security to Iraq's 18 provinces in the next 12-18 months, and bringing an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation;

    (ii) The training, equipping, command, control and intelligence capabilities, and logistics capacity of the ISF;

    (iii) The likelihood that, given the ISF's record of preparedness to date, following years of training and equipping by U.S. forces, the continued support of U.S. troops will contribute to the readiness of the ISF to fulfill the missions outlined in subparagraph (A)''.

    (iv) It is anticipated that the ``Independent Report on the Iraqi Security Forces,'' will, in whole or in part, be available before September 5, 2007.

    (2) Two successive reports by the President, a report from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, a report from the Commander of Multinational Forces--Iraq, and the Independent Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces, thereby provide a comprehensive body of information available to the American public and to the Congress, upon which they can establish opinions and evaluate decisions on the future course of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the surrounding region.

    (3) The findings that supported H.J. Res. 114, Public Law 107-243, which was enacted in 2002 and which authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States against Iraq, require review and revision. Therefore, as part of his September 15, 2007, report, Congress expects that the President will submit to Congress a proposal to revise Public Law 107-243.

   SEC. 1544. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT.

    The President shall direct the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, to initiate negotiations with the Government of Iraq on a Status of Forces Agreement with a goal to complete work not later than 120 days after enactment of this Act.

   SEC. 1545. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

    (a) Findings

    (1) The Iraq Study Group recommended a diplomatic offensive, stating ``all key issues in the Middle East - the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism, are inextricably linked''. The report stressed that diplomacy aimed at solving key regional issues would ``help marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and interests, and improve America's global image''.

    (2) Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council-Plus-Two issued a joint statement on January 16, 2007, reflecting ``their collective desire to prevent Iraq from becoming a battleground for regional international powers and urged all to help end sectarian violence in Iraq''.

    (3) The Bush Administration supported and participated in the March 10, 2007, regional conference in Baghdad and the follow-up regional conference held in Egypt on May 3 and 4, 2007, and that conference produced three working groups: one chaired by Syria on Border Security, a second chaired by Jordan on Refugees, and a third by Turkey on Fuels and Energy.

    (4) The redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq to other locations in the Middle East, would require the cooperation of regional governments.

    (5) A revision of U.S. military policy in Iraq could increase the chances of stimulating greater economic and diplomatic assistance for Iraq from multi-lateral organizations and European allies, who have sought to limit their association with an unpopular war.

    (6) Regional players, including- Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others have substantial concerns about Iran's disruptive agenda in the region that converge with U.S. interests.

    (7) All states in the region, including Iran and Syria have some interest in preventing political turmoil and refugee flows from emanating from Iraq or the break-up of Iraq into sectarian regions.

    (8) All nations that depend on oil imports, particularly those who are dependent on Persian Gulf oil, have a strong economic and security interest in maintaining stability in the Gulf region.

    (b) It is the Sense of Congress that the United States Government should work vigorously with like-minded governments, including the Iraqi government, to establish a predictable and regular multi-lateral diplomatic forum related to Iraq that meets frequently and is open to all parties in the Middle East.

    (c) Such a forum could be based on the existing structure of the May 2007 foreign ministers conference at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt that plans to reassemble in Istanbul at a date to be determined, or it could be initiated with a new structure.

    (d) U.S. goals in advancing the forum should include promoting international support for reconciliation in Iraq, dealing with refugee flows emanating from Iraq, protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq, advancing Iraqi economic development, and containing any conflict that might spread from Iraq.

    (e) The United States should work with other nations at the forum to promote transparency of national interests and actions so that the risks for neighboring states of pursuing armed aggression or destructive sectarian agendas are heightened and all parties avoid miscalculations that could lead to conflict.

    (f) In the context of a drawdown of American forces in Iraq, the United States should attempt to secure contributions of resources or military personnel for international efforts to stabilize Iraq's borders.

    (g) Although focused on a multi-lateral approach to issues related to Iraq, the United States should encourage opportunities to discuss other regional concerns and to facilitate bilateral contacts between those in attendance, when appropriate.

    (h) As the United States attempts to establish a more sustainable policy in Iraq, our government should launch a broader diplomatic offensive in the region aimed at repairing alliances, assuring regional governments of our staying power in the Middle East, enlisting greater help international help in combating terrorism, stabilizing oil prices, and making progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.