<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:21634.wais]
A REVIEW OF ONGOING MANAGEMENT CONCERNS AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL
LABORATORY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 5, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-45
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida Ranking Member
Vice Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BART GORDON, Tennessee
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
Mississippi, Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JIM DAVIS, Florida
MARY BONO, California JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HILDA L. SOLIS, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JAY INSLEE, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Bud Albright, Staff Director
David Cavicke, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky, Chairman
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BART STUPAK, Michigan
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, Ranking Member
Mississippi DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JAY INSLEE, Washington
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
JOE BARTON, Texas, (Ex Officio)
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Eggenberger, A.J., Acting Chairman, Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board.................................... 18
Friedman, Gregory H., Inspector General, Department of Energy 13
Kilpatrick, Michael, Director of Independent Oversight,
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance,
Department of Energy....................................... 23
Paul, Jerry, Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, accompanied by Edwin Wilmot,
Manager, Los Alamos Site Office, National Nuclear Security
Administration............................................. 7
(iii)
A REVIEW OF ONGOING MANAGEMENT CONCERNS AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL
LABORATORY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Whitfield
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Whitfield, Walden,
Burgess, Stupak, DeGette and Inslee.
Staff present: Mark Paoletta, chief counsel; Thomas Feddo,
majority counsel; Chad Grant, staff assistant; Dwight Cates,
majority professional staff member; Chris Knauer, minority
investigator; Edith Holleman, minority counsel; and Turney
Hall, minority staff assistant.
Mr. Whitfield. At this time, I will formally call the
meeting to order.
Today's subject of this hearing is A Review of Ongoing
Management Concerns At Los Alamos National Laboratory. I will
begin with an opening statement, and then we will do the
opening statements, and then we will be introducing the panel.
We only have one panel today. Originally we had two, but we
combined them into one.
I am going to submit my entire opening statement for the
record, but I just want to briefly touch on a few points.
First of all, we had the shutdown of Los Alamos back in
July 2004 because of the classified removable electronic
material issue. In addition to that, we had the injury to the
intern because of a laser mishap. We have had several plutonium
exposures, the most recent one back in March. We have had
contract mismanagement. We have had the security--the TA-18
issue about moving the material out of Los Alamos out to
Nevada. Bill Richardson was the Secretary of Energy at the time
that commitment was first made, and we still have not made much
progress on that. We have had research program delay as a
result of the shutdown. We have had a culture of noncompliance
at Los Alamos for some time.
And I would just like to make the comment that, even though
it is the first time this has occurred, I am delighted that the
Department of Energy is issuing a new RFP for the management of
this facility, because it is quite apparent that there are
significant issues with the management at Los Alamos.
I am really looking forward to the testimony today. We will
be having another hearing after this one in which the
University of California will be testifying as well as some
whistle-blowers. But I do want to thank you for being here, and
I would once again say I am sorry for the brief delay that we
had because of the votes on the floor.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Ed Whitfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ed Whitfield, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
This hearing will come to order. Today the Subcommittee will review
ongoing management concerns at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Over
the years, this Subcommittee has held numerous hearings to review
safety, security, and procurement management problems at Los Alamos. In
2003, we held three hearings to review major procurement fraud and
incidents of outright theft of government property at the Laboratory.
These serious problems, like so many other problems at Los Alamos, were
discovered by hard-working and honest employees at the lab who later
suffered acts of retaliation from managers that did not want the truth
to see the light of day.
At another Subcommittee hearing in May of 2000, Mr. Joe Gutierrez,
an employee in the audits division at Los Alamos, testified regarding
acts of retaliation he suffered for revealing that the Lab was not in
compliance with the Clean Air Act. The Department of Labor determined
his whistleblower claims were real, and this decision was upheld
numerous times, in spite of several appeals from the team of defense
lawyers hired by the University of California.
Over the years, the Subcommittee has struggled to understand the
apparent culture of disregard for rules and procedures at Los Alamos.
Just last month, Los Alamos Director Pete Nanos testified at our
nuclear facility security hearing regarding his decision to shut down
the Laboratory after several safety and security incidents in the
Summer of 2004. In his testimony, Director Nanos referred to ``clear
signs of a behavioral problem'' among some employees at the laboratory
who demonstrated a ``disregard for basic safety and security rules.''
If you review our extensive hearing record on Los Alamos, you will
find numerous examples that support this conclusion. At today's
hearing, we will review several additional findings that demonstrate a
similar disregard for the rules, for instance:
A February 2005 report from DOE Inspector General Gregory Friedman--
who will testify on our first panel--found that DOE will not
meet its commitments for removing transuranic wastes from Los
Alamos because the laboratory ``had not consistently followed
approved waste processing procedures.''
Another February 2005 audit report of the DOE Inspector General found
that ``LANL out-processing procedures were not followed by 40
percent of the 305 employees included in our sample.'' Thus,
there were no assurances that security badges for these
employees were turned in, or that classified documents in the
possession of these employees were accounted for after they
left.
And just a few weeks ago last March, several employees were exposed
to plutonium while working in a confined tank vault. According
to an investigation report, these workers were unnecessarily
exposed to plutonium because safety technicians failed to
analyze the radiation hazard, and failed to implement controls
for the hazards they did identify.
In spite of these recent problems, I do believe that Director Nanos
has finally gotten the attention of every employee at Los Alamos.
During the six-month stand-down, the lab conducted a valuable self-
assessment that identified almost 4,000 issues that need to be
corrected. The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the
University of California can finally tackle the problems identified in
the self-assessment, and turn the tide on the culture of mismanagement
at Los Alamos.
However, I am concerned that the laboratory may not maintain the
momentum necessary to implement the corrective actions that were just
developed. An even greater risk is that whistleblowers that continue to
identify problems at the lab will continue to be retaliated against for
their efforts to correct the culture of mismanagement.
I look forward to the testimony from today's witnesses. I plan to
hold a second hearing on these matters in the near future to get the
views of the University of California as well as several whistleblowers
from the laboratory.
Mr. Whitfield. At this time, I would recognize the ranking
member, Mr. Stupak of Michigan, for his opening statement.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last summer, after decades of internal and external
reports, congressional investigations and hearings, volumes of
recommendations for changing the culture and corrective action
plans that were often not implemented, the director of Los
Alamos National Laboratory shut the lab down due to a massive
review and upgrade of safety, security and other processes at
the lab. The final straw leading to the shutdown was a
laboratory accident in July involving improper use of a laser
beam which permanently injured the eye of a graduate student
working at the laboratory.
Some of us on this committee which has been overseeing the
lab for more than 2 decades said it was about time. But this
action was extremely controversial within the laboratory
community.
A group of scientists started a blog in which they rallied
against Pete Nanos, the current director, for destroying the
laboratory and complained about retaliation. The blog
culminated in a petition in February, which I have placed in
the record, demanding the removal of Mr. Nanos by the
University of California. Some of the more thoughtful comments,
however, pointed out that the long-term problems at the
laboratory are both poor management and bad science and the
lab's long history of retaliating against anyone who pointed
out problems. The blog--this one e-mail said: Try to remember,
one person wrote, Nanos is not the problem. He is our
punishment. End of quote.
On January 31, the laboratory reopened. Many problems were
identified, and more corrective action plans were written.
On March 4, 2005, an Operational Efficiency Project
execution plan identified eight major problems which needed to
be addressed: safety, quality assurance, software quality
assurance, conduct of engineering, safety basis, operations,
environmental risk management, and training.
The question now is, has anything changed? Based on a
radiation exposure incident that happened in March of this
year, I am skeptical. Let me describe it.
In 2003, Don Brown, a contract employee at Los Alamos hired
to find gaps in the quality control program at Los Alamos,
found that there was no tank inspection or preventive
maintenance program at Los Alamos. In fact, it had been
dismantled years before under a, ``we will fix it when it
breaks,'' management approach. Brown described this approach as
fraught with danger.
On March 3, 2005, his prediction came true. Contractors
were repairing a leak in one of these tanks that had finally
broken. The tank, which is 23 years old, held corrosive and
radioactive liquid waste from TA-55. A weld had given way, and
at least 300 gallons had leaked out in 2003 before the tank was
emptied. While scraping out and bagging paint chips and debris,
three workers were exposed to plutonium 239.
Why did this happen? The report is in the record, Mr.
Chairman, but let me highlight the findings. It is a litany of
unacceptable practices.
First, radiological hazards inside the tank were estimated
prior to beginning the work, not reviewed by appropriate health
physics personnel or confirmed by actual measurements. The
removal of contaminated paint was not even specified in the
work package.
No. 2, the required continuous air monitor was not placed
inside the tank while the work was ongoing but was outside.
No. 3, managers did not require a conservative approach
performing work in a largely uncharacterized environment.
No. 4, workers were not skilled radiological workers and
had insufficient training for working in a high contamination
airborne environment. The radiation technician was not properly
trained.
Five, the radiation technician allowed the workers to take
off their respirators, which were highly contaminated, and
breathe in the contaminated air. He should have taken steps to
remove the contamination first by wiping down the respirators.
No. 6, ventilation was degraded during the work.
No. 7, the leak itself was preventable if there had been a
preventive maintenance plan.
Eight, workers were in a vault, which is a confined space,
which requires rescue equipment. Although the workers were
equipped with a rescue harness, the harnesses were not attached
to the line to remove them from a vault if necessary.
It is really difficult to know what else could have gone
wrong.
Just after the incident, Los Alamos responded to Mr. Brown
by saying that there was a tank inspection program in place but
said the sufficiency of its implementation needed to be
confirmed. However, the investigative report of the March
incident recommended that a formal inspection and testing
program be developed.
Additionally, when our staff asked if the radiation
technician has been retrained during the shutdown and safety
procedures, they were told the radiation protection program
was, ``an essential program,'' so it wasn't part of the
shutdown and there was no training. Is this the prescribed
resumption process for essential activities that Mr. Paul
describes in his testimony?
Mr. Chairman, I remain skeptical as to whether the culture
at Los Alamos will really change. Director Nanos may have made
some mistakes, but if he leaves, as is widely rumored, who will
pick up the mantle to institute these necessary changes?
Because the culture at Los Alamos appears to be so poisoned at
this point--and this blog is just another example of this--it
is unclear what can be done to truly fix this broken facility.
Replacing the director and his top mates while allowing the
status quo culture with the rest of the employees would only
prolong the wasting of taxpayers' money or, worse, jeopardize
national security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
At this time, I will recognize the gentleman from Texas for
his opening statement.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the interest of time, I will submit mine for the record
so we can get to the witnesses.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Texas
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important
hearing.
This hearing resumes a continuation of the committee's oversight
regarding Los Alamos and other nuclear facilities. As I expressed in
the last hearing, I am concerned about the troubling reports regarding
Los Alamos's safety and security procedures. This important national
security matter deserves Congress' full attention, and I support the
Chairman's investigation of this pressing issue.
At this time in American history, our national security has become
the most important issue facing our nation. It is critical that we do
everything within our power to ensure that our nuclear weapons
laboratories are highly secured and protected. We cannot allow our
national security to be compromised because of inadequate safeguards.
The recent security incidents at Los Alamos illustrate that changes
must be made to guarantee not only the safety of weapons and top
clearance material, but also the employees.
Today, I look forward to the opportunity to further review the
security status of Los Alamos. In the last hearing, I entered into a
discussion with Director Nanos. While I appreciated his candor, I was
greatly troubled by his account of a laser injury that occurred in the
Los Alamos Laboratory. The egregious harm caused by the poor laboratory
safety procedures at Los Alamos was extremely disturbing. I hope that
today's discussion will further focus on particular laboratory safety
procedures that have been implemented to ensure that this type of
incident will never occur again.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this crucial hearing in which
we can address some of these essential concerns regarding nuclear
facilities and the security of our nation.
Mr. Whitfield. At this time, I recognize the gentlelady
from Colorado.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I will submit my full statement for the
record as well. I just want to make a couple of observations.
The first one is that I completely associate myself with
Mr. Stupak's opening statement. We have seen problems at Los
Alamos for years now.
Last summer, Chairman Barton and I went out to the facility
in Los Alamos and looked at the situation, talked to Mr. Nanos,
talked to his senior staff. At that time he was relatively new
in the job, and we were impressed that he was trying to finally
change the culture at Los Alamos. Since last summer, we have
seen problem after problem again, culminating in this blog that
Mr. Stupak is talking about where people are complaining once
again about the management.
I agree with Mr. Stupak and I probably think this is a
feeling held in a bipartisan way on this committee. The issues
at Los Alamos, some of them are management, but there is a
pervasive atmosphere there of not understanding what needs to
happen to bring this facility up to the level it should be, not
understanding why certain precautions or procedures are
important, and generally an arrogance among many employees
there. I don't know how we break that. But I don't think that
changing management in and of itself, as we have done so many
times before at Los Alamos, is going to do anything to solve
the situation.
So I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. I
think I can speak for all of us when I say we are tired of
having these hearings. We would like to see some things change
at the facility.
With that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you very much, and I appreciate those
opening statements.
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, Committee on Energy
and Commerce
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. Over
the past decade, this Subcommittee has held dozens of hearings to
review DOE management problems, and Los Alamos has been the top subject
at many of these hearings. This Subcommittee has spent a significant
amount of time identifying procurement, safety, and security problems
at Los Alamos.
However, in addition to our efforts to uncover specific acts of
waste, fraud, and abuse, I would point out that we have spent much of
our time trying to figure out why the same management problems keep
recurring at Los Alamos.
It seems unlikely that these repeated mistakes are the result of
any honest misunderstanding of the rules. Too many managers at Los
Alamos plainly believe they can write their own rules. They regularly
side-step procurement processes, ignore safety requirements, and simply
decline to comply with the sorts of security procedures that are
required of all DOE contractors.
It also seems obvious that the lab prizes convenience more than
accountability. A common attitude we've noticed is that problems don't
exist unless they become too large to ignore. If noticed, problems are
swept under the rug like embarrassing household dirt. This is nothing
new, and the rugs at Los Alamos are getting noticeably lumpy. These
management problems have led to costly project overruns, damage to our
national security, and serious health consequences for workers. Last
July a graduate student lost her vision in one eye due to faulty
practices of a safety manager at a laser lab. And just days after the
lab's stand-down ended, several workers were exposed to plutonium in an
underground vault.
I understand that some of the witnesses today believe that the
recent stand-down at Los Alamos has helped identify areas for follow-up
action by the University of California. This might be true, but I don't
plan to get excited until I can see real improvement at the site. Based
on our previous oversight work at Los Alamos, I am concerned that the
lab may return to business as usual and fail to implement the
corrective actions identified during the self-assessment. In fact, the
Committee staff has discovered that more than 90 action items from the
re-start corrective action plan are already past due.
As I have stated before, I believe the stand-down at Los Alamos was
necessary, but it was a direct result of the culture of mismanagement
at Los Alamos. I sent several letters to NNSA Administrator Brooks
urging him to have the University of California pay for a portion of
the costs of the stand-down out of its own pocket. I am pleased to
learn that on April 8th NNSA notified UC that it intends to disallow
$14 million of these costs. I hope NNSA will follow through on this
announcement, and collect the entire $14 million.
I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses today, and I
also look forward to the next hearing to get the views of several
whistleblowers at Los Alamos as well as officials from the University
of California. I thank the Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Whitfield. As you all are aware on the panel, this is
an investigative hearing, and as is the policy with oversight
and investigation we take this testimony under oath. I would,
first of all, ask any of you, do you have any objection to
testifying under oath today? I would also advise you that,
under the rules of the House and under the rules of the Energy
and Commerce Committee, you are advised by counsel. Do any of
you desire to be advised by counsel today before you testify or
during your testimony?
In that case, I would ask you to rise and raise your right
hand; and I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Whitfield. You now are under oath.
I would ask that we start the opening statements with Mr.
Friedman.
My able counsel tells me we are starting with Mr. Paul. So,
Mr. Paul, you are recognized for your 5-minute opening
statement.
TESTIMONY OF JERRY PAUL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWIN
WILMOT, MANAGER, LOS ALAMOS SITE OFFICE, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; A.J. EGGENBERGER, ACTING
CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD; AND MICHAEL
KILPATRICK, DIRECTOR OF INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT, OFFICE OF
SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members.
I have submitted a written statement. I would ask that it
be made part of the record, and I will attempt to briefly
summarize and also respond to some of the comments that were
made in your opening statements.
I want to thank the committee for holding these hearings.
We take these matters at the National Nuclear Security
Administration and the Department of Energy very seriously. You
are right.
Mr. Whitfield. If I may interrupt you just 1 minute. I do
want to introduce all the panel members for the people who may
be listening.
Of course, Jerry Paul is the Principal Deputy Administrator
at the National Nuclear Security Administration. He is
accompanied by Mr. Edwin Wilmot, who is the manager of the Los
Alamos site office for the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
We have Mr. Gregory Friedman, who is the Inspector General
at the Department of Energy.
We also have with us Dr. A.J. Eggenberger, who is the
Acting Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
And then we have Mr. Michael Kilpatrick, who is the
Director of Independent Oversight, Office of Security and
Safety Performance Assurance at the Department of Energy.
So excuse me, Mr. Paul. And you may proceed.
Mr. Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that courtesy; and I
hope to have an opportunity to refer to the role that each of
the members on the panel have played in this. They are heroes
in my mind. I can assure you, together, all of us in different
capacities share the concerns that were voiced earlier. These
are difficult challenges, but every person at this table has
played a very unique role in trying to remedy some of the long-
standing problems that you referred to and I think that we are
going to get into during the course of the hearing.
As I said, we do indeed take these matters very seriously.
You are right to raise these concerns. Your oversight, this
committee's oversight is an important part of the reforms that
are necessary at Los Alamos National Lab. Although I am
relatively new to the National Nuclear Security Administration
and this is the first time that I have testified before this
august body, I am very familiar with the role that this
committee has played, including yourself and the ranking
member. In fact, I remember hearing the ranking member say at
one time a while back that you were frustrated, that you had
been watching this recurring pattern for 10 years, and over and
over and over had heard groups of people testifying in front of
you and say that they finally get it and that now we will make
the fixes, but it didn't seem like they ever did.
So it is under that color that I now stand before you and
say that we have a group here who does finally get it. I am
very well aware that that rings hollow because of the history
that the members on this committee have with these matters, but
I can assure you, to Congresswoman DeGette, that there is no
sense of--you referred to a sense of arrogance. I can assure
you that that does not prevail upon those who are sitting
before you now nor anybody on my team. These people have worked
very hard, and they are doing a very difficult task under
difficult circumstances.
I won't belabor the chronology of events. Every member on
the dais is very familiar with the CREM issue, with the laser
issue and what happened on July 16, the shutdown and then the
resumption process.
I would point out that the resumption process I think is
really an historic effort. Is it perfect? No. But never before,
certainly no other administration, probably no other group of
people have ever taken on that task to set out and try to
reform an organization as broadly as they did here with the
more than 3,000 findings, 400 of which were necessary for
resumption. My staff alone at the site office and Mr. Wilmot's
staff was augmented with almost 100 people to task individual
activities throughout the resumption process. As you know,
there were consequences as well.
Now there are limits to the tools that we have available to
us. We have attempted to manage and oversee--or we have
attempted to oversee the way that the tools afford us.
For example, in the fee determination for 2004, the total
amount of fee that was available is $8.7 million. Ultimately,
the only fee that was received was about a third of that. We
made two reductions there. One was a little over $2 million on
the performance base because we judged their performance on the
operations to be unsatisfactory.
Second, Ambassador Brooks invoked for the first time ever a
conditional clause in the contract that allowed him to exert a
punitive reduction based on the stand-down itself of
approximately $3 million.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, this contract is being
bid--competitively bid for the first time in over 60 years. We
also have a challenge to those portions of the costs of stand-
down that we believe are challengeable. There is a notice of
intent to deny allowability on those, and we are currently in
the 60-day determination period on that as to two categories.
But you are also, each of you, right in referring to the
bigger problem, and that is the culture of noncompliance. We
are trying to change that culture. The ranking member and Madam
Congresswoman are correct that it is not as simple as blaming a
single person, and we spend a lot of time every single day
trying to figure what are the mechanisms we can use to show the
leadership to try to change that culture. It is difficult. It
does take time. I am perhaps not as patient at times as I
should be, and I sense that the members of this committee have
lost their patience, and you have been dealing with it for many
more years than I have.
I do want to point out, though, that there truly are some
unsung heroes in this, some of the people on the panel, people
at the sites. People like Chris Steele, a nuclear engineer who
heads up the Authorization Basis Team, has done yeoman's work
and others, people like Fred Bell, who is also an engineer, who
has worked night and day. Some of those people out there, they
are exhausted at our site offices trying to wrestle this to the
ground, get the lab back up and running because of the
importance of this mission but do it in a safe way and do it in
a secure way.
One of the members actually mentioned some of the good news
here, some of the points of pride here. Being able to move the
TA-18 material in while all of this is going on is something
that we are proud about, and I hope we have an opportunity to
talk about that in more detail. We are still on schedule. In
fact, we have accelerated the schedule.
Before we had thought that, due to stand-down, that the
schedule for removal of all category 1 and category 2 material
out of TA-18 would slip from September to November. I think we
are going to get that back to September of this year and have
all category 1, category 2 material out of TA-18, out of that
canyon.
We are on schedule. We are ahead of schedule on that, and
that has been done in large part through the leadership of the
gentleman sitting next to me and his team and the focus on this
committee. I know it is something that you all have focused a
lot of attention on, and we have tried to be responsive to
that.
The hydrotest that took place last month, very proud of
that. It is a difficult task that required a lot of attention,
a lot of work, a lot of energy, a lot of resources, and to do
it safely, securely, in the face of all the other activities
that had to take place. And also the Mox shipments, being able
to process the shipment of the Moxley test assembly material in
the midst of all of this.
But surely no person would have credibility sitting in
front of you right now and telling you that this is a perfect
process or that we can clearly see that we are on the path to
complete reform. I am not going to make that pledge to you
because I don't know that that is true. I know that we are
better than we were, I know that our oversight is better than
we were, but we had problems. Some of those problems probably
still exist.
One of the things that troubles Ambassador Brooks and
myself probably as much as anything is that we ourselves have
not been very good, the U.S. Government, at seeing some of the
problems before other people see them before us. The ranking
member refers to the incident at TA-50, and I think we are
going to get into some of the more details. There is an example
where we thought the resumption--had all of the commitments
that were in the findings been complied with, we believe that
event would have been prevented. There were about three of the
400, however, that touched and concerned that very facility,
where persons actually signed off that they had made those
commitments when they really hadn't. So we did not catch the
fact that they had not met those commitments.
So I am trying to communicate to you that, although we feel
as though we have made a lot of progress, we certainly believe
that we have a lot of work, a long way to go; and we look
forward to the input that we will get from each of you. I can
assure you that the National Nuclear Security Administration is
committed to doing this right. It is absolutely critical to the
security of this Nation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Jerry Paul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerry Paul, Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to address the current state of security and safety operations at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Over the past ten months we
have seen an extraordinary effort by NNSA officials, LANL managers and
the employees themselves to address serious concerns about safety and
security practices at the laboratory. Today I intend to describe the
role that the National Nuclear Security Administration played during
the stand down and resumption process at the laboratory and offer a
status report on corrective action plans at the laboratory.
HISTORY
On July 16, 2004, the laboratory director, Dr. G. Peter Nanos,
suspended all operations in response to two serious events: the
discovery that two computer disks thought to contain classified
information could not be located and were assumed to be lost, and an
industrial accident in which a summer intern was injured by a laser.
(Ultimately, after exhaustive investigations by the laboratory, NNSA,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we concluded that the computer
disks never really existed, the error caused by the improper handling
of identification bar codes.)
After the stand down was declared, laboratory managers planned to
resume activities on a risk basis. All activities at the laboratory
were placed into one of four risk categories: essential, low risk,
medium risk and high-risk activities. Some activities categorized as
essential, such as systems critical to safety at operational
facilities, were allowed to continue. For all other activities the
laboratory developed a prescribed process to permit resumption, based
on the level of risk. For the highest risk level, managers were
required to conduct a self-assessment, followed by an independent
readiness assessment by a team of highly qualified individuals. All
laboratory staff was interviewed by their management, who discussed the
need for security, safety, and environmental compliance. Many staff
members had to be trained in the restart process, including self-
assessments, and readiness assessments. During the assessments nearly
2500 findings and substantive observations were identified throughout
the laboratory; about 400 of them had to be resolved before resumption
was allowed. The rest of the findings will be addressed by implementing
fully resourced plans that may take two to three years to complete. No
activity or staff member was left untouched by the resumption
activities. An enormous amount of work was completed before Director
Nanos announced, on January 31, that the laboratory had fully resumed
activities, with only a few minor exceptions. It should be noted that
activities designated as essential were still subject to the resumption
process. A special emphasis of the resumption involved accountable
classified information contained on computer disks and other removable
electronic media, known as CREM. The laboratory had amassed over 80,000
pieces of CREM over the years, which had created a significant
accounting problem. During the resumption period, the laboratory
reduced its inventory of CREM to around 23,000 pieces and developed a
library concept to manage what remains. Twenty libraries supported by
13 additional satellite offices were created to control CREM. These new
libraries are staffed and controlled by well-trained custodians whose
sole responsibility is to account for the CREM inventories. All CREM
users and custodians were trained in the new approach to protecting
classified materials.
Today, only one program-essential activity associated with
radiography and hydrodynamic testing has not completed the prescribed
resumption process. This activity will soon complete its required
readiness assessment.
The laboratory has created an Operations Efficiency Project that
combines the institutional corrective actions being completed to ``get
well.'' Project management tools are being employed to ensure that it
receives management attention and can be successfully completed. The
Operations Efficiency Project is also integrated with Local Corrective
Action Plans that are being implemented for unique corrective actions
for each of the major sub-organizations within the laboratory.
Though the effort of resumption has been truly epochal, much
remains to be done in order to bring the laboratory up to appropriate
levels of performance for safety, security, and environmental
compliance. Our work is not finished.
ROLE OF NNSA DURING RESUMPTION
Even before the stand down, the NNSA had held discussions with the
laboratory director and his deputy about our concerns about safety
practices at the laboratory. The NNSA was consulted prior to Director
Nanos' decision to stand down activities. Throughout the entire period,
the NNSA was actively involved in all aspects of the resumption.
Initially, the NNSA enlisted additional resources from throughout the
Department of Energy, notably the Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board also
increased its presence, sending selected experts to assist their site
representatives. In addition, the full DNFSB Board visited Los Alamos
during the resumption to assess progress. The Los Alamos NNSA site
office manager met regularly with the DNFSB site representatives to
review their concerns. At one point, the NNSA Administrator, Linton
Brooks, authorized the site office to bring in more than 40 additional
staff to oversee and assist the resumption process. Federal employees
were directly involved in self-assessments, readiness assessments,
training, finding reviews, and decisions regarding resuming activities.
This was very much a joint activity in which the NNSA site office was
making decisions and concurring in all safety and security steps along
the way. Resumption of activities for medium risk and high-risk
activities required my concurrence. For activities designated as
essential, either safety or program-based, the federal staff
participated as a veto member of teams performing these activities.
Consequently, site office staff were readily available to make real
time decisions regarding security and safety while in the field. Site
office staff helped create the resumption plan, assisted in developing
procedures, participated in training, and lent their operational and
security expertise to the effort.
The NNSA Administrator went to Los Alamos on July 19, shortly after
the stand down was announced, to meet with senior managers at the site
office and the laboratory and made subsequent visits to monitor
progress. During the first few weeks after the stand down the Deputy
Secretary of Energy and Administrator Brooks conducted daily conference
calls with senior DOE officials and the site office manager to examine
issues associated with resumption activities.
As an aside, I should note that the Secretary of Energy expanded
the stand down of CREM activities to all sites within the Department of
Energy complex to ensure that proper accounting and control practices
were in place. These stand downs generally lasted for a few weeks.
A BROADER PROBLEM
While much of the public attention to events leading to the
laboratory stand down focused on the supposedly missing classified
media, we in NNSA felt that inattention to safety procedures at the
laboratory presented a greater problem. Together they led us to believe
that a culture of non-compliance existed within the laboratory. A
careful review of leading indicators for operations of hazardous
facilities, that is, events that are precursors to low probability-high
consequence accidents, suggested that laboratory performance had been
declining. Some employees simply were not complying with regulations or
working with regulatory agencies or bodies, including NNSA and the rest
of the Department of Energy. It is this culture that we, and the
laboratory's senior managers, are trying to reverse.
IMPACT ON PROGRAMS
The laboratory is currently assessing the impact of the stand down
on programs outside of NNSA that are commonly referred to as Work for
Others, which includes work for the Department of Defense. Though the
results have not been finalized, preliminary indications are that
programs such as analytical activities that did not involve operations
at hazardous facilities were not impacted greatly. During the stand
down, certain NNSA programs were declared essential from a programmatic
mission standpoint and allowed to continue. These programs included
shipments of plutonium to France as part of the mixed oxide program;
movement of special nuclear materials from Technical Area-18 to the
Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site; and the hydrodynamic
test and radiographic examination of modified weapon components in
support of the W-76 life extension program. In each of these, crucial
programmatic milestones were met despite the overall laboratory stand
down.
NNSA and the laboratory employed a special process involving
intensive federal oversight to conduct these programmatic essential
activities. Project teams were formed with laboratory and federal site
office staff so that approvals could be obtained on a real time basis.
Significant compensatory measures were employed where safety and
security weaknesses had been identified. Senior management, both
laboratory and federal, were actively engaged.
Other programs, such as efforts to remove aboveground transuranic
waste from the Los Alamos Site and ship it to the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant were delayed. The shipments to WIPP were renewed early in April
2005.
For NNSA programs in general, some interim milestones were missed;
but the laboratory in many cases believes that major impacts to the
programs have been avoided. Impacts to other NNSA sites were minimized
by cooperative efforts between LANL and the other sites. In some cases
work was shifted to other sites.
COST ALLOWABILITY
This Committee has asked about the cost of the stand down and
whether these costs are an allowable expense that would be reimbursed
by the government. Because of accounting procedures used by the
laboratory, NNSA has been unable to determine precisely what portion of
the laboratory's expenses are directly attributable to the stand down.
Laboratory officials, using an accepted estimating technique,
identified $119 million in labor costs attributable to the stand down.
The NNSA Service Center reviewed the laboratory records to make its own
determination and identified a fully burdened upper limit of $367
million for the stand down costs during the period from July 19, 2004
to January 28, 2005. The methodology used to develop this upper limit
uses very conservative factors that could overstate the actual cost of
the stand down.
Based on NNSA's review of the terms of the contract with the
University of California, it is apparent that the vast majority of the
costs are allowable costs, and thus are reimbursable expenses by the
government. After consulting with the NNSA Field Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) and legal counsel, the NNSA site office manager
determined that the duration of the stand down was reasonable in light
of the issues faced by the laboratory and the degree of federal
oversight given to the restart of activities. In fact, I believe that
the duration was not only reasonable, but likely noteworthy for its
efficiency.
Nevertheless, NNSA has questioned the allowability of about
$14million of costs incurred during the stand down. The questioned
expenses involve two blocks of money: $6.3 million in small
subcontractor claims and other incremental costs and $8 million of
costs for the first two days of the stand down. The site office manager
has issued a formal Notice of Intent to Disallow these costs and is
awaiting response from the laboratory. The laboratory has until June 6
to respond. As this Committee is aware, the Government Accountability
Office is currently conducting a review of the costs attributable to
the stand down. They made an initial visit to Los Alamos during the
week of April 18. NNSA will continue its review of the costs of the
stand down, and is not foreclosed from questioning additional amounts
as new information is gathered.
STATUS OF ``GETTING WELL''
Now that the laboratory has fully resumed operations, one of our
challenges is to ensure that the laboratory follows through on the
hundreds of corrective actions that remain to be addressed. Many of the
issues uncovered during the resumption process had been identified in
previous reviews conducted during the past 10 years. Corrective Action
Plans from these reviews were prepared but never fully implemented.
NNSA has provided additional temporary (varies between 30 and 40) and
permanent staff (approximately 20) to the site office to maintain an
intensive campaign to verify that the laboratory is performing as it
has told the NNSA it will. We have just completed an intensive review
of corrective actions and compensatory measures taken to allow the
laboratory to resume activities. The review found that only 8 of about
400 actions were not properly completed. Where issues arose, the
laboratory took immediate action to remedy them. The federal workforce
will continue to work closely with the laboratory as it begins
implementing the Operations Efficiency Project and Local Corrective
Action Plans. In addition, the Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance will perform an assessment later this summer to
add to the assurance that activities are being properly performed. The
NNSA site office is planning a survey this June of all security
functions.
Progress is being made in the implementation of the Operations
Efficiency Project and the Local Corrective Action Plans. The
Operations Efficiency Project implementation is three weeks behind
schedule, but important actions have been taken to delve into the way
in which the laboratory manages and maintains its facilities. The delay
is of concern, but the groundwork necessary for the Operations
Efficiency Project to be successful must be established. Poor facility
management has been a serious problem for many years. Establishing the
proper roles and responsibilities for facility owners, users, and
support organizations lies at the heart of many of the operational
issues of the laboratory. Because fixing these prerequisites before
fully implementing the Project is so important to its success, the
delay becomes acceptable. The Local Corrective Action Plans of each of
the sub organizations with the laboratory are going to be reviewed by
Assist Teams. The review will look to standardize actions across the
laboratory and to integrate these recent findings about facility
management into the planning.
Current demands upon the Laboratory for completion of programs
outside of NNSA being monitored by the Administrator to avoid over-
stressing a somewhat fragile recovery process that will continue
through the next year or two.
PROGNOSIS
Progress to date does provide one the opportunity to be cautiously
optimistic. We must all keep in mind that the nature of change
necessary at the laboratory will take several years and much hard work.
The NNSA remains committed to ensure that the laboratory is successful
through the vigilance of its federal oversight. Though we have been
through a very challenging period that we all would have preferred to
avoid, I am heartened by the creativity, dedication and hard work that
so many men and women, in both the federal and contractor workforce,
have shown in addressing these issues and getting Los Alamos National
Laboratory back on track to fulfill its important national security
mission.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
Mr. Friedman, you are recognized for your 5-minute opening
statement.
TESTIMONY OF GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN
Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to testify on the
results of our work at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
In February 2003, I testified before this subcommittee on
procurement and property issues at the laboratory. At a
subcommittee hearing in May 2003, I addressed our findings
regarding the general state of the business systems at Los
Alamos. And, in short, we concluded that Los Alamos and the
University of California had not paid adequate attention to
laboratory business operations.
Since that time, the Office of Inspector General has
continued to examine management practices at Los Alamos. We
found the laboratory has acted to correct several problem areas
but that certain internal control weaknesses persist.
In the 2004 report, we concluded that the laboratory had
improved the management of its purchase card program. The
purchase card program was the source of a lot of the
controversy that existed at the laboratory in 2003.
Specifically, we found that Los Alamos had reduced the number
of cards in circulation, subjected purchase card transactions
to multiple reviews, and made approving officials responsible
for fewer cardholders.
Despite the laboratory's efforts, my office has issued a
series of reports and completed several investigations that
pointed to needed improvements in the areas of project
management, security and contract administration for which Los
Alamos, the University of California and the Department have a
shared responsibility.
Our report on the Dual Access Radiographic Hydrodynamic
Test Facility, commonly referred to as DARHT, found that Los
Alamos had not made full use of available project management
tools to complete the facility. The laboratory had changed work
scope, eliminated key elements, and shifted critical activities
to other programs.
Furthermore, Los Alamos significantly underestimated the
cost of various work elements as well as the funds needed for
project contingencies. The laboratory's ability to complete the
project on schedule and within budget was adversely affected,
potentially impeding the Department's Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
In the security arena, a February 2005 inspection on
security and the outprocessing of employees concluded the
procedures at Los Alamos did not provide assurance that, prior
to departure, employees turned in security badges, completed
the required Security Termination Statement, or had their
clearances and access authorizations terminated in a timely
manner. Subsequent to completion of our field work, the
laboratory revised its outprocessing procedure.
Our 2004 report on subcontract administration found that
Los Alamos had not effectively managed certain aspects of its
very sizable subcontracting process. At the time of our review,
the laboratory had not provided adequate audit coverage to
determine whether costs were allowable for 93 active
subcontracts valued at $1.3 billion, nor had it determined the
allowability of over $9 million in costs questioned by audits
completed during 2001 through 2003. The laboratory had not
provided sufficient resources to its contract audit function,
and it had not established formal procedures regarding cost
resolution.
In a joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, we determined that two Los Alamos employees used
government funds to purchase items for their personal use,
including television sets, automobile parts and barbecue
grills. In 2004, a Federal grand jury returned a 28-count
indictment for fraud, conspiracy, theft of property and making
false statements to investigators. Both employees were
sentenced to confinement and ordered to pay restitution.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, our 2005 audit on home office
expenses revealed that the Department will incur unnecessary
costs to pay for corporate activities at the University of
California in support of the laboratories. Specifically, the
Department will pay about $21 million in unnecessary fixed
costs because of a calculation error made at the time of
contract award. It will pay about $8 million for work that did
not benefit government-funded activities, and it reimbursed the
University of California $880,000 for erroneously claimed
expenses.
As you and everyone else is aware, the Department has
initiated procurement actions to recompete the contract to
operate Los Alamos. Regardless of the outcome, the Department
needs to strengthen its contract administration strategy at the
laboratory. There are six principles which we believe are
essential to this effort:
The Department and the National Nuclear Security
Administration must ensure that its contractors establish
robust, effective, and reliable business systems; promote
contractor governance models that adequately protect the
Department's interests; foster a culture where contractors
fully understand and honor the very special responsibility
associated with managing taxpayer-funded Federal facilities;
promote an environment where both Federal and contractor
employee concerns can be raised and addressed without fear of
retaliation; develop quantifiable, outcome-oriented metrics and
maintain a system to track critical aspects of contractor
performance; and reward contractors commensurate with their
accomplishments.
My office will continue to review the situation at Los
Alamos as it evolves.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Gregory Friedman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Energy
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am
pleased to be here to respond to your request to testify on the results
of our work at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, one of the
Department of Energy's most prominent facilities.
In February 2003, I testified before this Subcommittee on
procurement and property management at Los Alamos. My testimony
addressed weaknesses in controls over: property accountability;
procurement authority, including purchase cards; and, security of
computers.
At the Subcommittee's hearing in May 2003, I testified that the
Laboratory had not given adequate attention to its business operations.
Specifically, my testimony focused on financial management weaknesses
at Los Alamos. I pointed out that the Office of Inspector General had
questioned the allowability of certain costs that the Laboratory
claimed between Fiscal Years 2000 and 2002, and that weak controls in
Los Alamos' audit function; payroll and travel approval process; and,
financial systems contributed to an environment where questionable
costs could be incurred and claimed.
Since the 2003 hearings, the Office of Inspector General has
continued to examine management practices at Los Alamos. In a series of
reviews, some of which I will highlight today, we followed-up on a
number of previously identified weaknesses. In some cases, the
Laboratory had taken appropriate corrective actions. However, in other
cases, our reports have shown that more work is needed to correct
problem areas.
ENHANCEMENTS OF INTERNAL CONTROLS
In 2004, the Office of Inspector General performed a follow-up
review to determine whether the Laboratory had conducted a thorough
analysis of its purchase card program and had initiated corrective
action to resolve previously reported weaknesses. In our report, Los
Alamos National Laboratory's Purchase Card Program Corrective Actions
(DOE/IG-0644, April 2004), we concluded that Los Alamos had made
improvements in the management of its purchase card program. Some
positive steps that the Laboratory implemented included:
Reducing the number of purchase cards in circulation from 800 to 550;
Subjecting purchase card transactions to multiple reviews and
electronically reconciling to supporting documents;
Prohibiting cardholders from approving their own transactions; and,
Making approving officials responsible for fewer cardholders,
permitting them to provide additional scrutiny of transactions.
Although the Laboratory had clearly made progress, we identified
certain opportunities to further reduce risk of card misuse. For
example, we pointed out that Los Alamos could clarify guidance
concerning unauthorized items, automate data analysis techniques, and
enhance periodic reviews of cardholder activities.
AREAS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT
Our recent work disclosed continuing problems in several key areas
of Laboratory management. Specifically, we issued a series of reports
that pointed to needed improvements in the areas of project management
and security. Further, we identified continuing problems in the general
area of contract administration, problems for which Los Alamos, the
University of California and the Department have a shared
responsibility.
Project Management
Construction and operating projects are essential to accomplishing
the Department's missions. Numerous multimillion dollar projects
support the scientific and technologically-complex work of the
Department, and many of the projects are unique in the world. Prior
reviews by my office and others revealed that many of these projects,
including some at Los Alamos, have been adversely affected by cost
overruns, schedule slippages, and other management problems. Based on
our recent reviews at Los Alamos, we concluded that improved project
management discipline and structure are needed to effectively manage
the costs, schedules, and scope of key initiatives.
Our audit report on Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility (DOE/IG-0599, May 2003) found that Los Alamos and the National
Nuclear Security Administration had not made full use of available
project management tools to complete the facility. As a result, the
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) would not be
completed before June 2004, 15 months behind schedule. The DARHT
facility at Los Alamos will be the nation's first test facility capable
of providing three-dimensional x-ray photographic diagnostic
information on the behavior of weapon parts and the effects aging has
on a nuclear weapon. Absent underground testing, the facility will play
a critical role in certifying that the weapons in the stockpile are
safe and reliable. During the review, we found that the Laboratory had
changed work scope, eliminated key elements, and shifted critical
activities to other programs. Los Alamos had significantly
underestimated the cost of various work elements of the project, as
well as funds needed for contingency. The Laboratory's ability to
complete the project on schedule and within budget was adversely
affected, potentially impeding the Department's Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
The audit report on Stabilization of Nuclear Materials at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (DOE/IG-0659, August 2004) showed that,
although the Laboratory had made some progress in stabilizing the most
hazardous fissionable materials, it had not accelerated stabilization
to the level anticipated. We found that the Laboratory would not
stabilize materials until 2010, well beyond the original projected
completion date of 2002. In fact, Los Alamos missed interim milestones
and project tasks, which could delay stabilization beyond 2010. We
found that, among other things, the Laboratory had not made full use of
available tools to effectively manage the project. For example, many of
Los Alamos' work packages, which were intended to provide the detailed
guidance for project completion, often lacked milestones and clearly
defined statements of work. Managers, therefore, lacked an objective
basis to assess and report on the project's status. By extending the
schedule until 2010, the Department will incur an estimated $78 million
in added costs. Additionally, radioactive materials may continue to
deteriorate and negatively impact the safety and health of workers.
Our audit report on Transuranic Waste Management at Los Alamos
National Laboratory, (DOE/IG-0673, February 2005) noted that the
Department will not meet its commitment for removing transuranic waste
from Los Alamos and shipping it to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. For
example, based on projections at the time of our review, the Department
was unlikely to complete removal of the legacy transuranic waste before
2014--four years beyond the commitment date. We concluded that Los
Alamos' rapid scale-up of waste operations resulted in operational
breakdowns. Specifically, operating procedures failed when the
Laboratory attempted to increase its volume of shipments to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant. As a result, the Laboratory had to revise its
procedures and retrain personnel on waste processing. The lack of
progress in disposing of the waste prevented Los Alamos from
expeditiously reducing the health and safety risk posed by the
continued above-ground storage of transuranic waste. In addition, the
total cost of completing the waste disposition project could increase
by over $70 million.
Security
One of the Department's national security objectives is ensuring
that nuclear weapons, materials, facilities, and information are secure
through effective safeguards and security policy, implementation, and
oversight. Since the events of September 11, 2001, this objective has
taken on added importance and required the Department and its nuclear
weapons laboratories to reassess and strengthen their security posture.
However, our recent reviews at Los Alamos, one of the Department's most
sensitive sites, disclosed that weaknesses exist in the protection of
the Department's critical resources and infrastructure. For example:
An inspection on Security and Other Issues Related to Out-
Processing of Employees at Los Alamos National Laboratory (DOE/IG-0677,
February 2005) concluded that the Laboratory's process did not provide
assurance that terminating employees: (1) turned in security badges;
(2) completed the required Security Termination Statement; or (3) had
their security clearances and access authorizations to classified
matter and/or special nuclear material terminated in a timely manner.
We found that Laboratory out-processing procedures were not followed
for more than 40 percent of the 305 cleared and uncleared terminating
employees included in our judgmental sample. We identified 21 employees
who retained their security clearances in the Department's data base
after terminating employment at the Laboratory, 3 of which remained
active in the data base for over a year. By not following the
Laboratory's out-processing procedures, there was no assurance that
terminating employees fulfilled their responsibilities to, among other
things, account for classified holdings. Subsequent to completion of
our fieldwork, the Laboratory revised its out-processing procedures to
address concerns we raised during our inspection.
In 2004, we completed an inspection on Internal Controls over
Personal Computers at Los Alamos National Laboratory, (DOE/IG-0656,
August 2004), which identified continuing weaknesses over classified
and unclassified computers at the Laboratory. Specifically, we found
that the Laboratory's listing of Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facility classified desktop and laptop computers was not accurate. We
also found that a number of classified desktop computers were not
entered into the property inventory, and some computers were not
assigned property numbers. Finally, we determined that the Laboratory's
Office of Security Inquiries had not been notified about a missing
component of a computer system accredited for classified use. While
there was no evidence that the missing component contained classified
information, a security inquiry had not been conducted because
personnel did not follow Laboratory policy requiring such notification.
These weaknesses undermined confidence in the Laboratory's ability to
assure that computers were controlled in accordance with existing
property management and security requirements and were adequately
safeguarded from loss or theft.
Contract Administration
We have also identified contract administration problems on the
part of both Los Alamos and the Department. Appropriate contract
administration is needed to ensure that contractor operations are
effective and efficient, and that contractors' expenses are allowable.
Recent reviews by my office have identified areas where Los Alamos and
the Department have not provided effective administration over
subcontractor costs, business controls, and home office expenses paid
to the University of California to support the Laboratory.
Our audit on Management Controls over Subcontract Administration at
the National Security Laboratories, (OAS-M-04-06, August 2004) noted
that during Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002, Los Alamos, as well as Lawrence
Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories, did not always effectively
manage certain aspects of the subcontracting process. Los Alamos and
its counterparts are expected to ensure that Federal funds entrusted to
their care are expended appropriately, that questioned costs are
resolved in a timely manner, and that subcontracts are closed when all
actions are complete. During the subject audit, we found that Los
Alamos had not provided adequate audit coverage to determine whether
costs were allowable for 93 active subcontracts with an aggregate value
of $1.3 billion. Furthermore, 11 completed subcontracts, valued at $68
million, had not been subjected to close-out audits at the time of our
review. We also noted that action to determine the allowability of over
$9 million in questioned subcontract costs remained incomplete.
Adequate audit coverage was lacking because the Laboratory had not
provided sufficient resources to the audit function and had not
established formal procedures and training regarding cost resolution.
My office is currently reviewing the Laboratory's actions to improve
audit coverage of subcontractor costs.
Regarding Los Alamos' administration of business controls, in a
case that had much public and Congressional interest, we completed a
joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
determined that two former Los Alamos National Laboratory employees
used Government funds to purchase items for their personal use,
including television sets, automobile parts, and barbeque grills. A
Federal grand jury returned a 28-count indictment for fraud,
conspiracy, theft of property, and making false statements to
investigators. One subject of the investigation was sentenced to over a
year of confinement and 2 years probation. The second subject was
sentenced to 6 months confinement, 6 months of electronically monitored
home detention, 2 years and six months probation, and a $30,000 fine.
The former employees were also ordered to pay nearly $40,000 in
restitution.
In addition, we determined that improvements were needed in the
Department's administration of its contract with the University of
California, which operates Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratories. Under its contractual arrangements with
the University, the Department committed to pay the University for
certain corporate activities performed in support of the laboratories.
Our audit, Department of Energy Contractor Home Office Expenses (DOE/
IG-0676, February 2005), revealed that the Department: (1) will incur
about $21 million in unnecessary expenses over the 5-year life of the
contracts with the University because it used an incorrect allocation
base to calculate the fixed payments for home office expenses; (2)
inappropriately agreed to provide about $8 million for a percentage of
the University's operational costs that did not benefit Government-
funded activities; and, (3) reimbursed about $880,000 for erroneously
claimed expenses and for unallowable expenses such as costs for student
recruitment.
CONCLUSION
Although the Los Alamos National Laboratory has acted to improve
controls in a number of areas, our recent work indicates that continued
emphasis is needed on improving key management processes.
As you are aware, the Department initiated procurement actions to
re-compete the contract to operate Los Alamos. Regardless of the
eventual outcome, the Department needs to strengthen its overall
contract administration strategies and methodologies at Los Alamos.
While this must be a multi-faceted effort, there are six integral
principles which we believe are most important. The Department and the
National Nuclear Security Administration should:
Ensure that its contractors establish robust, effective, and reliable
business systems;
Promote contractor governance models that adequately protect the
Department's interests;
Foster a culture where contractors fully understand and honor the
special responsibility associated with managing taxpayer-funded
Federal facilities;
Promote an environment where both Federal and contractor employee
concerns can be raised and addressed without fear of
retaliation;
Develop quantifiable, outcome-oriented metrics and maintain a system
to track critical aspects of contractor performance; and,
Rate and reward contractors commensurate with their accomplishments.
To assist the Department in addressing the weaknesses discussed
today and measure progress towards correcting them, my office will
continue to aggressively review the situation at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and other contractor-operated facilities.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Friedman.
Dr. Eggenberger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF A.J. EGGENBERGER
Mr. Eggenberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee.
Congress created the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board as an independent technical agency within the executive
branch, external to DOE, to identify the nature and
consequences of potential threats to public health and safety
at the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities, to
elevate these issues to the highest levels of authority and to
inform the public. The Board is not a regulator but a small
advisory agency with a staff of approximately 60 technical
individuals.
The way that the Board operates is we conduct our oversight
mission by identifying conditions or deficiencies to DOE. The
Board provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy primarily by way of letters, reporting requirements, and
formal recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. Although
DOE's contractors take most of the actions in response to the
Board, the Board works primarily through DOE--both the
headquarters staff and the site office staff.
With respect to the shutdown at Los Alamos, I would like to
divide that into three quick parts, if I could. First is, what
were we doing prior to the shutdown by the director?
Based on the hazards, it is important to note that the
Board's primary interests at LANL include plutonium operations,
processing and stabilization of nuclear materials, the
potential for nuclear criticality, nuclear waste processing and
storage, and tritium operations. Nuclear programs overall that
are also of interest to the Board include integrated safety
management, which has been mentioned, the authorization bases,
work control, and quality assurance.
Prior to the shutdown, again, in January 2004 the Board
identified deficiencies in the implementation of DOE's orders
on facility safety that included structured application of
engineering standards and practices and the use of formal
design reviews.
In February 2004, the Board identified the need for a
revised plan to accelerate risk reduction at LANL through the
stabilization, repackaging, and disposition of excess nuclear
materials.
In May 2004, the Board identified deficiencies in the
application of integrated safety management for work planning
and control at several NNSA sites, of which LANL was included.
In May 2004, again, the Board pointed out a number of
safety issues at the TA-18 facility, where an over-reliance on
administrative controls was being used in lieu of engineered
controls, and the lack of effective operational oversight by
both NNSA and the Laboratory. This is where the high
criticality operations were that we talked about earlier.
Then, in May, we identified deficiencies in the development
and maintenance of safety bases at LANL.
Now, the shutdown occurred. What did the Board do? In
response to the shutdown, the entire Board with its staff went
to LANL to assess the condition of the nuclear facilities to,
among other things, ensure that the affected defense nuclear
facilities were shut down in a safe configuration. We provided
several observations to NNSA as to the need to adjust any of
the plant conditions to maintain the safe and stable condition
during shutdown. We also at that time mentioned that there are
longer term issues that need to be identified if you want to
startup.
Now we have invested considerable staff resources in
monitoring both NNSA and the laboratory during the resumption
process.
As far as our issues are concerned and the resumption
process, it was mentioned previously that the Operational
Efficiency Project included a set of subprojects. Our issues--
most of our issues have been rolled up into the Operational
Efficiency Project. However, there are a few that have not
been.
One of them is fire protection upgrades at the site and the
resumption of certain criticality operations at Technical Area
18. There is also an effort on our part to reduce the risk at
LANL with respect to stored materials. That is what is called
the ``quick to WIPP'' idea, and we are making sure that that is
continuing with utmost speed.
Now, with that, we will continue our vigil at the
laboratory. We do have two site representatives onsite that
interact on a daily basis with the site office at LANL and also
report back to our headquarters.
This is a summary of my testimony, and the entire testimony
I would request that that be entered into the record. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of A.J. Eggenberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of A.J. Eggenberger, Acting Chairman, Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to present testimony on the health and safety oversight
activities of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory.
I would like to first summarize the statutory safety oversight
mission of the Board, then briefly review the Board's recent oversight
activities relevant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the
Board's current health and safety focus at that site.
THE BOARD'S STATUTORY OVERSIGHT MISSION
Congress created the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) as an independent technical agency within the Executive Branch,
external to DOE, to identify the nature and consequences of potential
threats to public health and safety at the Department of Energy's
defense nuclear facilities, to elevate such issues to the highest
levels of authority, and to inform the public. The Board is not a
regulator, but a small advisory agency with approximately 60 technical
staff.
The Board's approach to conducting its nuclear safety oversight
mission is to identify conditions or deficiencies to DOE. The Board
provides advice and recommendations to DOE primarily by way of letters,
reporting requirements, and formal Recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy. DOE can accept or reject the Board's advice and
recommendations. Although DOE's contractors take most of the actions in
response to the Board, the Board works primarily through DOE--both
headquarters and site office staff.
Operations at DOE's defense nuclear facilities include: assembly,
disassembly, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; and maintenance and
surveillance of the aging nuclear weapons stockpile. Operations at
defense nuclear facilities also include the stabilization and storage
of nuclear materials, the deactivation and decommissioning of
facilities, and the processing and storage of radioactive waste.
Broadly speaking, the Board provides nuclear safety oversight of DOE's
defense nuclear facilities from design through construction, operation,
and decommissioning.
The Board conducts its safety oversight of DOE-National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) activities at the Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories; the Pantex Plant, the Y-12
National Security Complex, the Savannah River Site, and the Nevada Test
Site. The Board also conducts nuclear safety oversight of DOE's
Environmental Management activities at these sites as well as the
Hanford Site, Idaho National Laboratory and Idaho Cleanup Project, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and the Fernald
and Mound Sites in Ohio. In establishing its safety oversight program,
the Board allocates its resources based on a number of factors,
including (1) urgency in terms of any imminent threat to public health
and safety; (2) potential risk to public health and safety; (3)
effectiveness of DOE management in managing the risks; and (4)
timeliness in relation to DOE programmatic or operational goals. In
assessing priorities, the Board considers issues brought to its
attention by all sources, including workers and members of the public.
The Board's jurisdiction covers nuclear safety oversight of DOE's
defense nuclear facilities and activities. As such, some of the issues
being discussed in this series of hearings, like those directly related
to safeguards and security, business management practices, and
operations in non-nuclear non-defense facilities at LANL are not under
the Board's jurisdiction. There may be, however, causal elements
associated with these issues that are of interest to the Board.
Moreover, there are often important relationships between nuclear
safety and security, and between nuclear and industrial safety. For
instance, the consolidation of nuclear materials can have both safety
and security components; however, the Board's jurisdiction is limited
to safety issues related to consolidation.
PAST BOARD ACTIVITIES RELEVANT TO LANL
The Board has routinely conducted nuclear safety oversight at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory, or LANL, since the Board's inception in
1989. The Board's focus at LANL is directed by the hazards at that
site.
Based on the hazards, the Board's primary interests at LANL include
plutonium operations, processing and stabilization of nuclear
materials, the potential for nuclear criticality, nuclear waste
processing and storage, and tritium operations. Nuclear safety programs
at LANL are also of interest to the Board, including integrated safety
management, authorization bases, work control, and quality assurance.
The greatest hazard at LANL, hence the area of greatest interest to
the Board, is plutonium in all forms, including metals, powders,
solutions, and wastes. Consequently, the Board has placed emphasis on
its oversight of the Technical Area-55 plutonium facility and the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility. A few examples of the
results of the Board's efforts at the plutonium facility include
improvements in the plutonium-238 scrap recovery line, the
stabilization and safe packaging of excess material, and successful
design and installation of the fire water system.
Other examples of areas in which the Board has been involved at
LANL include facility upgrade and risk reduction initiatives to safely
extend the life of the CMR facility, improvements in operations and
oversight at Technical Area-18, and improvements in lightning
protection at nuclear facilities.
During 2004, prior to the laboratory shutdown, the Board provided
advice to NNSA identifying the need to address a number of safety
issues at LANL:In January 2004, the Board identified deficiencies in
the implementation of DOE's order on facility safety at LANL, including
the structured application of engineering standards and practices and
use of formal design reviews. This concern is generally referred to as
``conduct of engineering.'' Appropriate corrective actions to address
this issue have now been developed by LANL, at DOE direction, and are
included as part of the Operational Efficiency Project discussed later.
In February 2004, the Board identified the need for a revised
plan to accelerate risk reduction efforts at LANL through the
stabilization, repackaging, and disposition of excess nuclear
materials. This activity is being conducted in response to two
previous Board Recommendations concerning stabilization of
excess nuclear materials, Recommendation 94-1 and
Recommendation 2000-1. A revised schedule was developed by LANL
to address this concern. These stabilization efforts have been
impacted by the LANL shutdown. This is a long term activity and
LANL's ability to meet the revised schedule is not certain.
In May 2004, the Board identified deficiencies in the
application of Integrated Safety Management for work planning
and control at several NNSA sites, including LANL. For LANL,
this was a follow-up to a previous observation, and encouraged
further improvements beyond those actions already taken. LANL
has developed actions to improve its work planning and control
processes, and these actions have been included as part of the
LANL Operation Efficiency Project.
In May 2004, the Board pointed out a number of safety issues
related to nuclear operations at Technical Area-18 at LANL,
including an over-reliance on administrative controls in lieu
of engineered controls, and the lack of effective operational
oversight by both NNSA and the laboratory. High hazard
criticality operations have not been restarted at Technical
Area-18. Both LANL and NNSA have made substantial changes in
the management and oversight of Technical Area-18. LANL is now
preparing to demonstrate readiness to conduct a limited number
of criticality experiments.
Also in May 2004, the Board identified a number of
deficiencies with the development and maintenance of safety
bases at LANL. There have been some improvements in this area.
LANL has established a safety basis academy and taken other
steps to improve the quality of its safety basis submittals.
Likewise, the Los Alamos Site Office has taken action to reduce
its safety basis approval backlog.
Again in May 2004, the Board identified deficiencies
associated with DOE Facility Representative training and
staffing at NNSA sites, specifically including LANL. In order
to provide the monitoring and oversight of contractor
activities necessary to ensure the adequate protection of
public health and safety, the Board has long communicated to
DOE the necessity to maintain ``eyes and ears'' in its
facilities. DOE's Facility Representative Program addresses
this need. As a result of the Board's communication, NNSA is
increasing the number of Facility Representatives at its Los
Alamos Site Office.
In June 2004, in order to enhance its oversight at LANL, the
Board announced its decision to assign a second Board site
representative to LANL. This second site representative began
on-site duties in August 2004.
SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AT LANL
In response to the shutdown of LANL last July, the Board went to
LANL to assess the condition of the nuclear facilities to, among other
things, ensure that the affected defense nuclear facilities were shut
down in a safe configuration. We also wanted firsthand knowledge of the
planned resumption activities. The Board provided several observations
to NNSA including the need to adjust plant conditions to maintain safe
and stable conditions during the shutdown, the need to aggressively
pursue the implementation of improvements in the laboratory's work
control process, and the need to continue to address several long-term
safety initiatives that would be delayed by the shutdown.
The Board invested considerable staff resources in monitoring both
NNSA and laboratory efforts during the resumption process at LANL. In
general, the Board has concluded that near-term actions and
compensatory measures appear to be appropriate to support the
operations that have been restarted.
THE BOARD'S CURRENT FOCUS AT LANL
The hazards associated with nuclear operations at LANL are both
significant and complex. The recent shutdown resulted in the
identification of numerous corrective actions. The successful
implementation of these corrective actions and the execution of the
Operational Efficiency Project are vital to achieving long-term
improvements in safety at LANL. The Operational Efficiency Project
consists of several sub-projects focused on improving the safety of
laboratory activities, all of which are of interest to the Board. These
sub-projects include:
Safety (through adequate work planning and control),
Quality Assurance (including welding deficiencies),
Software Quality Assurance,
Conduct of Engineering,
Safety Bases,
Operations,
Environmental Risk Management, and
Training.
If appropriately implemented, the corrective actions identified for
these Operational Efficiency Project initiatives should address several
of the Board's concerns. The laboratory has established mechanisms to
analyze, prioritize, and manage these actions. The Board plans to
closely monitor this effort.
In addition to the Operational Efficiency Project, there are other
identified corrective actions that must be completed. Fire protection
upgrades must be completed, and nuclear material stabilization and
packaging activities must be continued. The resumption of certain
criticality operations at Technical Area-18 must be conducted safely
with deliberate operations. To reduce the risk from accidental
dispersion, potentially vulnerable transuranic waste material must be
removed from the site through execution of the ``quick to WIPP''
effort.
There are also other opportunities to improve the safety of nuclear
operations at LANL. Concerns with NNSA oversight at LANL were part of a
larger, complex-wide problem recognized by the Board and communicated
to the Secretary of Energy in May 2004 by Recommendation 2004-1. In
this Recommendation, the Board identified potential safety
vulnerabilities at DOE associated with an increased emphasis on
productivity at the possible expense of safety, the loss of technical
competency and nuclear safety research capabilities, a lack of
operational awareness at high organizational levels, and a de-emphasis
of central safety oversight. The Secretary of Energy has accepted this
Recommendation and an implementation plan is being developed that
should result in improvements in DOE's oversight of its high hazard
nuclear activities.
Concerns with the manner in which nuclear material confinement was
being implemented at several defense nuclear facilities across the
complex led the Board to issue Recommendation 2004-2. This
recommendation calls for active confinement ventilation for nuclear
facilities with the potential for a radiological release. At LANL, an
effective confinement strategy must be established for the Technical
Area-55 plutonium facility in response to this Recommendation, and to
ensure that accidents do not result in radioactive material being
released from the facility. An effective confinement strategy must also
be established for the proposed Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement facility in response to this Recommendation.
The Board recently issued Recommendation 2005-1 to the Secretary of
Energy, which concerns nuclear material packaging. This Recommendation
resulted in part from plutonium-238 uptakes by employees at LANL that
were caused by a packaging failure. The Recommendation calls for the
development of DOE-wide criteria for packaging systems for nuclear
materials. Implementation of this Recommendation will reduce the
likelihood of a nuclear material release and subsequent worker exposure
at all DOE sites, including LANL.
Late last year DOE issued a draft Request for Proposal for the LANL
contract. The Board reviewed this draft Request for Proposal with
respect to provisions that affect safety. We concluded that it
contained unnecessary and ill-advised limitations on DOE's oversight of
the contractor and undermined DOE's system for identifying and
implementing safety requirements. The Board has worked with DOE to
correct this condition. The latest version of the Request for Proposal
addresses the Board's concern by preserving DOE's system for
identifying and implementing safety requirements, and by not limiting
the ability of DOE to direct or oversee contractor activities in the
safety area.
In conclusion, the Board believes that the physical and
programmatic safety improvements being pursued at LANL are needed, and
that close oversight by both NNSA and the Board is required to ensure
that needed improvements are realized.
Thank you for the opportunity to report on the Board's efforts and
perspective relative to ensuring the adequate protection of public and
worker health and safety at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This
concludes my prepared remarks.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Mr. Kilpatrick, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KILPATRICK
Mr. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify today regarding safety and security at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. As mentioned, I am the
Director of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance, which is responsible for evaluating environment
safety and health, emergency management, safeguards and
security and cybersecurity functions for the Department of
Energy complexwide.
My testimony today will focus on our independent
perspectives on the safety and security aspects of the LANL
stand-down. Our perspectives are based on our recent
assessments and, in particular, reviews that were conducted in
calendar year 2004 following the stand-down as well as early in
calendar year 2005.
First, our safety perspectives on LANL. Our most recent
comprehensive inspection of LANL's integrated safety management
program was completed in April 2002. At that time, we had
concluded that LANL had made improvements in a number of areas,
such as development of their integrated safety management
program framework and documentation. However, more importantly,
we had identified weaknesses in LANL's implementation of their
processes in a number of important areas, including procedure
compliance and feedback and improvement systems for both DOE's
Los Alamos site office and the contractor organization.
In accordance with our regular schedule, we had planned to
perform an inspection of LANL in the August and September
timeframe of 2004 to evaluate selected aspects of integrated
safety management, including progress and correcting the
deficiencies identified in the 2002 inspection. However,
because of both security and safety concerns, as you are aware,
site management had declared the stand-down of most activities
on July 16, 2004. Because virtually no work would be ongoing
during the timeframe of the planned inspection, we would not
have been able to observe implementation of safety requirements
and thus our ability to do a performance-based evaluation of
safety would be limited.
At about the same time, the former Deputy Secretary of
Energy Kyle McSlarrow asked us to temporarily step out of our
normal role at Los Alamos. In doing so, he recognized the
importance of resuming operations at Los Alamos as well as the
importance of helping the site to more comprehensively identify
and correct their problems. Based on the former Deputy
Secretary's direction, it was decided to defer the planned
inspection and instead perform an ``Assistance Review,'' which
was intended to help the site office--and by extension the
laboratory contractor--to assess safety at Los Alamos.
Our approach to the Assistance Review was to use our
expertise to mentor and coach the Los Alamos site office and
the laboratory and their staff and to provide additional
perspective and advice based on our broad expertise and
technical depth in conducting critical assessments across the
DOE complex.
We found that the resumption process was having a positive
impact on improving safety performance by identifying a number
of areas requiring LANL management attention and action and by
more generally raising safety awareness across the laboratory.
However, we also concluded that significant efforts remained to
be completed and that sustained and continued management
attention would be needed to improve site office and laboratory
oversight and assessment processes, to improve compliance with
requirements and procedures, to ensure that expectations are
understood and implemented, to improve implementation of the
integrated work management process, and to prevent recurrences
of past problems.
At the conclusion of the Assistance Review, most LANL
activities were still undergoing validation and few had
actually been approved for resumption. Since that time,
Independent Oversight personnel have continued to monitor the
progress of Los Alamos, and we understand that most activities
have now in fact been resumed. The upcoming safety inspection
now scheduled for September to November 2005 will evaluate the
adequacy of actions taken by LANL to address safety
deficiencies identified through the resumption process and the
efforts by the National Nuclear Security Administration and the
LANL site office in ensuring the effectiveness of the
laboratory's efforts.
Turning now to our perspective on security at Los Alamos,
our most recent comprehensive inspection was conducted in
December 2002. At that time, we had noted improvements in a
number of aspects of LANL's security, but we also identified
weaknesses in implementation of requirements in such areas as
unclassified cybersecurity as well as weaknesses in line
management oversight by the Los Alamos site office.
The problems with Classified Removable Electronic Media,
which includes disks and other removable storage media--and I
will refer to them as CREM for short--surfaced--or, actually,
resurfaced in December 2003 when a LANL annual inventory
revealed missing items. Personnel from the Office of Security
and Safety Performance Assurance and NNSA personnel performed a
review within a few weeks of that time and concluded that the
most direct cause for the missing CREM was the failure of LANL
staff to adhere to established procedures and the failure of
CREM users, which mostly means scientists, to work with
designated classified matter custodians. Subsequently, a number
of other incidents involving CREM occurred at LANL, including
the inability to account for a classified ZIP drive. DOE and
FBI investigations of some of these incidents determined that
classified information was not actually compromised, but,
nonetheless, the incidents highlighted performance problems in
accountability systems and compliance with requirements.
Because of the number of these CREM incidents at LANL and
other DOE sites, Former Secretary Abraham took aggressive
action in July 2004, including a memorandum directing stand-
down of all departmental classified operations involving
accountable CREM and establishing a set of much more stringent
requirements. Senior management also imposed criteria for
resuming CREM-related activities, which included training,
performance testing, validation by a local validation team, and
approval by the former Deputy Secretary prior to resumption.
Further, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary,
Independent Oversight was asked to and completed independent
validations of the implementation at critical facilities
subsequent to their restart, primarily in the late 2004
timeframe.
Independent Oversight's initial post-start review of Los
Alamos was performed in November 2004. At that time, LANL had
resumed some but not all of their CREM operations. We
identified significant improvements in the protection of CREM,
but we also identified a number of weaknesses in implementation
of the requirements by LANL.
Because of these concerns, we conducted a follow-up
validation review in March of this year, at which time the
remaining CREM libraries were operating. We found that further
improvements had been made, and most of the concerns from the
November 2004, review had been adequately addressed. However,
we continued to find weaknesses in some LANL facilities with
regard to the adequacy of documented procedures, and we are
currently in discussions with NNSA regarding the rigor and
formality of the NNSA approval of some specific exceptions to
departmental CREM policy.
An Independent Oversight comprehensive inspection of LANL's
security is scheduled for the November-December 2005,
timeframe. During this inspection we plan to take a hard look
at CREM implementation as well as other important aspects of
their protection strategy.
In closing, Independent Oversight believes that the
attention focused on LANL has resulted in significant
improvements both in the safety and security arenas. However,
the concerns are long-standing and the efforts to change a site
culture are difficult, as evidenced by the initial deficiencies
and implementation of these new DOE CREM requirements. While we
believe that the recent DOE and NNSA actions have been
aggressive and appropriate, continued management attention is
warranted. Further improvements in LANL's self-assessments and
line management oversight by the NNSA and its Los Alamos site
office are essential to sustaining the momentum and preventing
future events.
This concludes my prepared testimony, and I request that my
written statement be accepted for the record. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Michael Kilpatrick follows:]
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Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
We appreciate the testimony of all of you.
Administrator Paul, I find it ironic that, because of
mismanagement at Los Alamos, there was incurred additional cost
or costs of $120 to $363 million, roughly. A significant part
of that money would have been spent on research, but because of
the stand-down that was not done. So the government taxpayers
are picking up this cost because of mismanagement.
Now I was pleased to hear or to learn that the National
Nuclear Security Administration on April 8 did send a notice to
the University of California that they were going to disallow
$14 million. Now that is a relatively small number when you
consider the magnitude of the cost, and I would like to ask
you, how did you determine it was only $14 million?
Mr. Paul. Let me first address your initial comment that it
is shocking to you that all of the costs could not be
recovered. The ultimate decision, the way these contracts are
written, is made by a contracting officer, and there is the
standard as to what is an allowable and is not an allowable
cost. Unfortunately, at least the legal opinions that we have
received so far have tended to indicate that these costs
actually cannot be charged against the University but for a
couple of exceptions relating to some small contractor claims,
for example, and also for the first 2 days of the shutdown
where apparently there was no work done whatsoever.
Mr. Wilmot was involved at that exact time and actually
issued the notice of intent time based upon some of the small
contractor claims; and if the Chair would indulge me, I would
like to have him provide a little bit more detail on the
analysis that resulted in the exact figure of the $14 million,
if that would be appropriate.
Mr. Whitfield. That is fine.
Mr. Wilmot. Mr. Chairman, I am the contracting officer for
the Los Alamos contract. I also have two other contracting
officers that support me in that.
In making the determination, I consulted the Chief
Financial Officer of the NNSA as well as my legal staff and the
service center legal staff. The decision I had to make was,
there was some question as to the reasonableness of the
duration of the stand-down and had I made a determination that
it was an unreasonable duration, then I could possibly have
found additional unallowable costs. But my rationale that I
used in making the determination was, since I participated on a
daily basis and in effect made decisions every day about the
duration of the activities, I participated throughout the
period, and so my determination was--is that the length of the
stand-down was reasonable. So that was the key decision I had
to make. It this is based on interpretation of the contract
language.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay.
Do you have a further comment, Mr. Paul?
Mr. Paul. Well, just that the actual standard itself,
because you are asking the very questions that obviously I have
asked myself when I first started looking at this, the standard
apparently in the contracts, in all research and development
contracts that we have in the government pursuant to an FAR
clause, apparently there is a fair amount of specificity,
guidance, requirements, given to you about what you can put in
these contracts. The concept of a stand-down like this is not
directly referred to in the FAR, as I understand it, as the
lawyers tell me, and it basically falls within the category of
allowable costs.
I understand your frustration with it.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you. I am also going to ask unanimous
consent that we enter into the record this notice of intent to
disallow these costs. If you will enter that in the record.
Mr. Paul. If I could supplement, Mr. Wilmot, could you
point out where we are with that NOI. It is a 60-day
determination.
Mr. Wilmot. Yes. There is about 30 days remaining until the
laboratory responds back.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Paul, another question for you.
In your testimony, you state that you believe that a
culture of noncompliance existed within the laboratory, and you
also stated this is a culture that we and laboratory senior
managers are trying to reverse.
Could you describe quickly, succinctly, what you think are
the root causes for this culture of noncompliance that has come
into existence at Los Alamos?
Mr. Paul. Well, I mentioned earlier I tended to concur with
the comment that one of the members said earlier, that the
blame cannot be laid to a single person, so I want to be
careful to not fall into that trap, as the Congresswoman
pointed out accurately. But it does come down to leadership,
leadership of an organization that is the contracting
organization, but also leadership of the government that is the
overseer, over a long, long period of time.
A culture is something, in my view, that is built up
through past practices and patterns, conduct that is allowed,
that is condoned, that is acquiesced to, over a long period of
time. Leaders send signals that their subordinates receive very
clearly, and they adjust their actions accordingly, and if
leaders send messages that certain conduct is acceptable, then
they are facilitating it. They are fostering it. They are
breeding it.
Mr. Whitfield. I guess it is easy to be complacent when you
have been managing something since 1943, and you have never had
to compete for it.
Mr. Paul. Exactly, so that is not to blame a particular
person or a particular group of people, but a trend that has
occurred over a long period of time. It is trend now to try to
taking a particular person or particular group, but, quite
frankly, the events that occurred I think are the byproduct of
many years of atrophy, if you will, atrophy in seeking
excellence, in expectations on the business side, the six
factors that Mr. Friedman laid out.
Here is the thing. We have got the best science in the
world there. There is a standard of excellence when it comes to
science. The toughest problems resolved by man on the face of
the Earth happen on that plot of land by these great Americans,
and they have done so for over 6 decades. But in terms of the
management and the culture of compliance, we haven't quite
gotten to that standard of excellence.
I think we, me, the guy you are looking at right now,
shares some of that responsibility. I haven't been here long,
but every day that I am here, I am more responsible if it is
not fixed.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Friedman, in a recent report that you
had, you had identified approximately $30 million of improper
payments to the University of California and some contractors
have reimbursed DOE for these inappropriate payments.
Has the University of California reimbursed NNSA for any
improper payments identified in this report?
Mr. Friedman. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the $30
million I think you alluded to includes the three laboratories
under the University of California. However, 50 percent of the
money is applicable to Los Alamos, 40 percent to Livermore and
10 percent to Lawrence Berkeley national lab are tear. We mated
a recommendation that those expenses be reviewed for cost allow
built. We think they are highly questionable and should be
recovered. But at this point, the decision, we have not gotten
the decision from the Department, so therefore, to the best of
my knowledge they have not been recovered from the university.
Mr. Whitfield. So there has been no payment whatsoever?
Mr. Friedman. To the best of my knowledge, that is correct.
Mr. Whitfield. That is something still under review at this
time?
Mr. Friedman. Well, our responsibility is to make
recommendations to the NNSA, which we have done. The ball is in
the NNSA's court on this issue at this point.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Paul, do you want to respond to that, or
Mr. Wilmot?
Mr. Paul. I am going to have to get back with you on that.
I have seen some of the written explanations of those costs. I
have to be candid with you and tell you I am not exactly sure
what procedures we are taking to address that. I know that it
is happening through the service center, and I just, if I could
take it for the record and get back to you.
Mr. Whitfield. I would appreciate you getting back to us on
the exact status of that.
Mr. Kilpatrick, you point out in your testimony that CREM
management at Los Alamos resulted in a decision to order a shut
down of all CREM operations at all DOE sites in order to
conduct a full evaluation.
Most weapons facilities like Sandia and Lawrence Livermore
were able to restart their operations within a couple of
Mondays. Why did the restart of the CREM operations take so
much longer at Los Alamos?
Mr. Kilpatrick. There are several reasons that contributed
to it, not the least of which that it was an especially large
undertaking at Los Alamos in that they both had a very large
inventory of CREM items, numbering upwards of 80,000 items at
one point. But also because of the decentralized and
geographically disbursed nature of how it is that they manage
their CREM. That latter factor is a lot of what contributed to
the many problems that they experienced over the last few
years, but notably in the early part of 2004.
As a result of that, unlike some other sites, they
basically were in a position where they had to step back and
completely redesign a system and process for managing CREM, and
hence the development of this concept of 20 centralized
libraries, each of which required the development of not only
institutional procedures, but library-specific local
procedures, training custodians and training users on those and
putting in place all of the physical controls that were
associated with that.
The other thing that is worth noting is that, for good
reasons, the deputy secretary actually imposed more stringent
requirements on Los Alamos than what was imposed for the rest
of the departmental sites and, in particular, the requirement
to do daily inventories of CREM, which substantially
complicated their resumption effort.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. Thank you. At this time, I will
recognize Mr. Stupak for his question period.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to Ms.
DeGette. She is catching a plan. I will defer to her.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much for your comity, Mr. Stupak.
I just have a couple of questions. Mr. Paul, the Chairman
talked about your written testimony where you talked about the
culture of noncompliance within the laboratory. Frankly, that
is what I was talking about in my opening statement.
You said in your oral testimony there is a group that
finally gets it, and I guess you are referring to the
management, because there is obviously to me a big group that
doesn't get it. I have the blog right here, and it is page
after page after page after page of anonymous postings of
people griping. Frankly, I have a daughter who is in high
school. I am appalled, the level of these complaints are like
high school student complaints. They are not like, the
management is doing this particular thing that respects one of
our high-level nuclear facilities wrong. It is about, ``Gee, I
don't like Nanos and I wish he would go to hell.'' That is the
level of complaining in this blog. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Paul. It is hard to disagree.
Ms. DeGette. So here is my question: For the rest of you,
have you all come across this same kind of culture of
noncompliance? Mr. Wilmot, I know you are probably the closest
to this on the ground.
Mr. Wilmot. I have been through culture transitions both at
Idaho and Savannah River, and I have seen instances where the
culture has deteriorated and then had to regain momentum and
improve.
Ms. DeGette. Do you see that happening at Los Alamos right
now?
Mr. Wilmot. I see a small light at the end of the tunnel.
The people I deal with in operations and facility management I
think truly are what I think the group of people that Jerry is
talking to when he sees they get it. So there is a group that
operates the facilities and particularly the high hazard
nuclear operations that really do get it. But there was brought
up a mention of this recent accident in March, or incident in
March, that is something I would be willing to talk more about.
It seems to be something that is telling us that we still
have got that serious problem. We still have it. But I would
like to talk about that incident if indeed it were possible.
Ms. DeGette. That is what we need to go into a closed
session for?
Mr. Wilmot. You don't need to.
Ms. DeGette. Maybe there might be some time in a few
minutes. But my question to you really is, do you think that
this culture that you have seen at other places and now you are
seeing can be fixed at Los Alamos?
Mr. Wilmot. Yes, ma'am, but it will take a considerable
amount of time. I can say that my experience in Idaho was many
years, and Savannah River was 5 to 7 years.
Ms. DeGette. You will be pleased to know that we have been
dealing with this for a great amount of time here, too, so how
much more time is it going to take? Mr. Paul, do you have some
sense?
Mr. Paul. Well, Congresswoman, let me be clear. My comments
earlier were with respect to the ranking member's comments that
I had read or listened to some time back where he said he heard
over and over and over that they finally get it, and I was
simply pointing out that the people at this table testifying
before you who have tried to tackle this situation, they get
it.
Ms. DeGette. You know what, I think you are right. When I
visited with Admiral Nanos, I was very impressed. But you are
not going to fix the situation until you change the culture,
and I think all of you would agree, is there anybody here that
doesn't agree with that statement? All of you would agree with
that.
So here is my question, and that is what I was trying to
get at with Mr. Wilmot, how do you change that culture with all
of these anonymous people who are the ones supposedly doing
this work?
Mr. Paul. I think some of the--it is going to be a spectrum
of tools, some of which we have tried to exert already, the
message that we sent through the adjustment of the fee, the
pushing back on the allowability of the costs, the competition
itself I think sends a message. But those things in themselves
won't do it. It is also going to require leadership, leadership
on behalf of the government overseers, ourselves, IG, Defense
Board plays an extraordinarily important role, SSA--that is
independent oversight--and NNSA, but also the lab leadership.
Ms. DeGette. Let me stop you there. Have we seen this kind
of culture of contempt for safety and security at the other
labs, like Sandia, Lawrence Livermore and Pacific Northwest?
Have we seen those problems there?
Mr. Paul. I cannot tell you that there is evidence that it
is exactly the same. Look, every facility has a different
personality, a different culture. The culture of noncompliance
that has resulted in the data that you have been monitoring for
years now is somewhat unique at Los Alamos. I think everybody
understands that.
Ms. DeGette. So your answer would be no?
Mr. Paul. That is correct.
Ms. DeGette. Okay. Part of the problem is, I think, we have
to face that at Los Alamos, and we have to say, why is that? If
we are not seeing that kind of culture at these other labs and
we continue to see it at Los Alamos, no matter who the leader
is of Los Alamos----
Mr. Paul. That is right.
Ms. DeGette. Every time, folks like you come to testify
before us, you recognize the problem. So it is not just that,
and you know this, it is not just at your level.
Mr. Paul. Just to put a finer point on it, you know, I run
what we call the Leadership Coalition, a collection of our
Federal site managers from every one of our facilities within
NNSA, and we meet once every 2 months. For the last several
meetings, we spent a pretty fair amount of the time in that
leadership coalition where I sit in the middle of all of them
and get each one of them to dedicate some of their FTEs, some
of their resources to go to this one facility, to help it get
better.
So that, in a sense, answers your question. Yes, this one
is different. I am pulling from all of them----
Ms. DeGette. Well, you know what, I don't think you should
take this personally, which you seem to be doing, because it is
not--frankly, you understand that there is a problem.
What I am getting at with you and Mr. Wilmot and others is,
what do we do--when I was in Los Alamos talking to the
relatively new management right after the shutdown last summer.
They got it. They were working on it. Well, that has now been
almost a year and not only have things gotten worse, not gotten
better, they have gotten worst in some ways, because, as of
June, July--I guess it was July when I was there last year--
people didn't yet hate Mr. Nanos like they apparently do now.
So I don't see the solution on the horizon.
Maybe Mr. Wilmot has something. He did say he saw a little
light. I am just hoping it is not a train coming toward you.
Mr. Wilmot. I hope so, too. Let me just comment that I
think that the solution is to carry the message and win the
hearts of all of the members of the laboratory staff and
convince them that this is truly an effort that if you improve
your safety statistics and your operational capabilities, you
don't run plants to failure, you have efficient business
systems, that this is going to benefit and it is going to free
up more funding to allow them to do more science.
Ms. DeGette. How do we convince them of that?
Mr. Wilmot. Well, my sense is, during the restart, they
felt like this was imposed on them rather than participating in
it. So somehow we have got to reverse that feeling and create
the ownership.
Ms. DeGette. How do we do that?
Mr. Wilmot. Clearly, it has to be a very strong message
from management that they are listening. The scientists have a
unique issue here, because they have very small laboratories.
And it is very onerous for them to try to look at the
regulations themselves individually for each small task they
have. We have got to try to tailor our approach to this, which
is something we haven't done yet.
Ms. DeGette. Can I stop you? Is that different than these
other facilities?
Mr. Wilmot. Actually, it is a little bit. At Savannah
River, for example, we were a production plant. We had a small
R&D facility there called Savannah River Technology Center. We
had a unique issue to deal with that technology center, and it
took a little longer there, because we weren't sure how to get
science more engaged in the conduct of operations and doing
things in a manner that is more acceptable by our standards.
Ms. DeGette. But what about the other comparable labs,
Sandia, the ones I have mentioned? Is it so different at Los
Alamos than at those labs?
Mr. Wilmot. My truth is that the institution has failed its
staff. They have failed to convey the message of the importance
of these particular disciplines, like project management,
conduct of operations and all of those necessary things that
you have to have in today's environment to run nuclear
facilities. I believe the institution has failed its staff in
getting the message to them and holding them accountable for
those things.
Ms. DeGette. The institution? Who?
Mr. Wilmot. Me, too. I have been here a year now, and I am
devastated by the accident--the incident that occurred in
March. That is me. I own it. And what we have got to do----
Ms. DeGette. You know, the devastation continues year after
year. I am empathetic with you. I think it is very frustrating.
But I think it goes deep into the institutional ethos at Los
Alamos. I don't know what we do about it. I am not sure any of
you do either.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Whitfield. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for
his question period.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Maybe, if we could just continue on that line for just a
moment and forgive me, because I am new, so these questions may
sound naive. Mr. Wilmot, the institution has failed its staff.
From what I am hearing here today, it sounds like you need new
staff to me. That am I just being woefully naive in that
assumption?
Mr. Wilmot. Not at all naive, but I can assure you that
every individual I have worked with, I have been very impressed
with the people at the laboratory, and I have met a lot of good
people. But my sense is, it is not an institution. They have
not worked as an institution. There have been small groups. It
was almost more like a university where you have small
organizations.
Mr. Burgess. I agree with that statement. But it is a very
serious business of our Nation's nuclear program that they are
running, not getting their own education.
Mr. Wilmot. Let me just comment that the light I was
referring to, what I have seen since about February, is what I
consider to be an institution struggling to come together. I
have seen it at the very top, at the director and deputy
director level and the senior management team. I think my sense
is that they are getting the message, but this does not happen
overnight, because there are management systems that are not in
place to help them to be an institution.
Mr. Burgess. Well, I know we are not supposed to go into
sports metaphors, but they always say, you fire the coach
because you can't fire the team. I remember once down in Dallas
when Don Nelson fired the team, and it actually worked out. I
can't help but think that might be part of your solution.
I want to come back to you in a minute because you asked
for some time to talk about the incident that happened on your
watch.
But, Mr. Friedman, if we could just talk for a second
about--you talked about, I guess it sounded like some credit
cards that were used inappropriately and some people actually
are incarcerated because of that?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burgess. And then the next paragraph you talked about
some budgetary errors that looked a lot more significant, like
the difference between the credit cards was $40,000 and the
budgetary effort was $23 million.
Mr. Friedman. $30 million actually.
Mr. Burgess. Did someone go to jail for the larger error,
or have they, or will they?
Mr. Friedman. Let me clarify one thing, Mr. Burgess, if I
can. The purchase card, the total amount of purchases made by
purchase card at Los Alamos is a very, very significant number.
I don't have it at instant recall, but it was in excess of $100
million a year. So it is not an insignificant amount of money.
So violations, misuse of the purchase card, is a serious,
serious matter, and I want to keep it in perspective.
With regard to the other issue, there were miscalculations
made at the time the contract was signed, and the taxpayers are
going to foot the bill of about $30 million at this point,
unless there is some further action taken. So I think it is a
significant issue.
Mr. Burgess. Who is responsible for that further action? Is
that our action here at this committee level?
Mr. Friedman. The way we work under our charter, Mr.
Burgess, is that I report to NNSA, and the contracting officer
decides, to quote a phrase. And we have issued our report. We
have taken a position on $30 million. It is over a 5-year
period. It applies to all three laboratories, as I defined
earlier, and the ball right now is in the court of NNSA to make
a decision.
Mr. Burgess. Will you be so kind as to follow up with this
committee in writing as to the disposition of that? Are you
allowed to do that?
Mr. Friedman. We, as a matter of course, without a request
from you or the committee, we keep a constant watch on those
recommendations and determinations as to how they have been
resolved.
Let me be very candid with you. We suspect, and this is not
my decision, we suspect that $29 million of the $30 million, it
probably is unlikely that the Department will decide to try to
recoup that from the university. That is my guess, because
there was agreement at the time of contract initiation. I don't
agree with that interpretation necessarily, but I think that is
where the Department probably will come out.
There is an additional $880,000, which is the third
component, the third leg of this thing, we think clearly should
be recouped from the university.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you.
Mr. Friedman. It is unequivocal.
Mr. Burgess. Mr. Wilmot, use my remaining time----
Mr. Whitfield. I think Mr. Paul wanted to comment.
Mr. Paul. I beg your pardon. Just briefly, if I may, to
respond to your earlier question about, whose responsibility is
it? It is the NNSA, and we manage that contract through our
service center. The colloquy I was having with the Chairman a
little bit ago about the $30 million and our discrepancy, our
chief financial officer at the service center is currently
reviewing the Inspector General's report and trying to
determine what portion of that could be claimed, you know, as a
charge. I don't know the result of that. What will happen is,
he will issue his recommendation. We will make a management
decision. A management decision will be made through the
contracting officer, who is the manager of the Los Alamos site
for the Federal Government. That is Mr. Wilmot. So we will
follow up and tell you where we are at with that process.
I think the Inspector General is correct, that some of
those decisions are, to some extent, burdened by the decisions
that were made let's say in early 2000. So we are working
through that.
Mr. Burgess. Very well.
Mr. Wilmot, if you would, let's use what time I have left
to allow you to discuss what you were trying to get to earlier.
It sounds like the safety incident--my goodness, painters sent
into the vault that had no special training--it almost sounds
like premeditated assault to me. But, by all means, let's hear
what you have to say about that.
Mr. Wilmot. Thank you. I do appreciate the opportunity.
As I said, I was quite devastated by that. What I wanted to
convey was that, as Mr. Paul had stated earlier, when we
resumed activities at the end of January-early part of February
and declared resumption started, we essentially had roughly 400
findings that we had to make sure and have corrective actions
for or some sort of compensatory measure in place.
Now, I didn't have the staff to go out and validate all of
that in the field, so we relied on the signature of an
associate director in each of the organizations to sign off
that, yes, barely, we had said what we were going to do. That
is in February. This event occurred in March, early March.
We asked the laboratory to do an investigation, to
understand all of the things that went wrong in that particular
event. In the meantime, I had an investigation team that went
out and validated all of the corrective actions, these 400 or
so findings--excuse me, the 400 findings that we validated. We
found that only eight of those had not been validated or done
as people signed off and said they had.
Guess what? This organization that had this accident occur
under its auspices was the one that I think actually even five
of the findings were not--actually they did not correct them.
Not that I feel good about it, but I just don't want you to
get the wrong impression about the overall resumption because
of this. Because they said they had fixed them. When I came
back and validated after the fact of the accident, of course,
they had not done what they said they did, with the signature
of an associate director.
So that is why I am devastated. That is the concern to me.
So everything that has gone wrong in the laboratory could be
found in that report. It is that serious. Those management
errors that are there are egregious, no question, sir.
So, but the point to you is, and to the panel, is that I
don't want you to take away the message that we failed in
resumption. I am not happy about what happened, believe me, but
I do believe if that organization had implemented what it said
it was going to do for resumption, we might not have had that
incident. That was my point, and I thought it was very
important for the subcommittee to hear that.
Mr. Burgess. Okay. What sort of accountability have you
extracted from the individuals responsible?
Mr. Wilmot. We have a conditional approval clause, just as
I did for the laser accident or for the CREM incident. I am not
saying, right now, I am going to do it, but I certainly have
that available to me, and this is of that importance. What that
allows me to do is, of the earned fee, I can take up to 100
percent of that earned fee away from them.
Mr. Burgess. I encourage you to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Stupak is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. Stupak. When you say you can take up to 100 percent of
their earned fee, that just means the lab loses some money,
right?
Mr. Wilmot. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. What about the individual who failed to sign
off?
Mr. Wilmot. Honestly, one of the actions that the
laboratory has committed to is to look into the personal
practices of the individuals.
Mr. Stupak. So if you want accountability and you put the
lab back on line and the associate director is supposed to sign
off and you are led to believe they did, you go back and check,
they didn't, where is the accountability of this associate
director who is supposed to sign off rather than punishing the
lab? But not punishing the associate director?
Mr. Wilmot. I will not second guess what the laboratory
should be doing here, but I am certainly going to be watching
their actions on this. I was on the airplane----
Mr. Stupak. Wait a minute, let's not be watching. We have
been through this so many times. We get this all the time: I
will be watching. Then you come and tell us another story, and
this terrible accident happened in March, and it is a serious
accident when you have radioactivity being leaked out and
people being exposed to it. And we are just going to watch it?
Where is the accountability?
Mr. Paul. May I?
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Mr. Paul. If I may, Congressman, I think what Mr. Wilmot is
saying is he doesn't have the direct authority to take a
direct----
Mr. Stupak. Who does?
Mr. Paul. The laboratory is their employer.
Mr. Stupak. Who is the employer? UC?
Mr. Paul. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. But isn't your job to oversee it? Aren't you
supposed to be the management and director? Wouldn't you be
managing UC?
Mr. Paul. Exactly. And I think that is what Mr. Wilmot is
trying to convey.
Mr. Stupak. So if UC is not doing it, then it falls on your
hands then, correct?
Mr. Paul. Correct.
Mr. Stupak. So what are you going to do about this
associate director?
Mr. Paul. I believe what Mr. Wilmot is saying is that the
mechanism through which we can manage is through that employer
down--when he says he is going to be watching it, I don't think
he means passively. He means that that is a criteria he is
going to use when he makes his decisions about whether to meet
out some other--about whether to invoke other options.
I believe that is--I don't want to lead the witness, but I
believe, Congressman, that is what he is pointing out, not that
we are going to passively watch this, but we have to stay
within the bounds of law.
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this then: What is so special at
Los Alamos that we go through this year after year, that what
is being done in Los Alamos, why can't it be transferred to
other labs? In other words, why do we need Los Alamos? What is
in the science that can't be transferred somewhere else?
We are moving some stuff up to Colorado. We moved some
stuff to Lawrence Livermore. We have this--what--46-acre
facility, and we get back here all the time with complaint
after complaint after complaint. We are trying to change a
culture? I guess we are not social scientists.
How are we going to do this? Why do we have to have this
lab, seriously?
Mr. Paul. A perfectly legitimate question. We ask that
question. As good managers we have to ask that question about
every single facility on a regular basis and justify everything
we are doing with taxpayer dollars.
We currently have a complex-wide study being conducted with
an outside group to look at that very issue, what facilities
are necessary for the defense nuclear complex of the future? We
should receive by the end of June, I believe. I think we will
have a written report by the end of June on that, and I am sure
one of the issues--I haven't read the report, obviously, but I
believe one of the issues is an analysis of every single
facility and what activities could be moved.
You specifically asked Los Alamos. There is some unique
infrastructure there that would be very expensive to move and
very difficult to move. Just the environmental impact statement
alone on moving the Legacy Research Facility that has existed
for the United States of America for over 60 years, the IS
alone on that would be the biggest one ever in this country. It
would be significant, facilities like DARHT and TA-55 and CMR.
Mr. Stupak. Hopefully, we will get to the point in this
country where we don't need all of these nuclear labs. So if we
have so many problems with this one lab and if the work can be
transferred to the other labs, why not do it?
Mr. Paul. I think when we get the complex study, there will
be an opportunity--we all look forward to that complex study,
and I know from your interest in these issues, you will, too.
Mr. Stupak. But I don't want to know about consolidating
government services. I am saying we have a lab here that is a
constant problem, that is costing us $30 million here. Let's
see, shutdown was $119 to $300-some million it was estimated.
We are not quite sure yet. You have objected to the $14
million. $119 was the low end. $367 I think was the high end.
So take away $14 million, so it is $357-some million it cost
us. We talk about $30 million here on charge cards that people
can't sort of account for.
Why do we need this one then? Why can't we transfer those
things out of here? The science? Is there any really unique
science that can only be done at Los Alamos and nowhere else?
Mr. Paul. I think you have to have a national laboratory.
If you are asking me----
Mr. Stupak. We have a couple more, we have Lawrence
Livermore, right? Sandia.
Mr. Paul. There has historically been a thought that peer
review, that having more than one adds a lot of value to big
science. You have to have that intellectual tension, if you
will, that peer review. One lab doesn't do it for you.
Mr. Stupak. We have four of them besides Los Alamos, don't
we? Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Brookhaven, GNNC.
Mr. Paul. Certainly, the concept of moving a laboratory to
another facility is not beyond the ability of man to analyze,
and we will look into this.
Mr. Stupak. How do you change this? This is all these
blogs. I just looked at one of them. Look at that: ``Roger that
to the petition.'' in other words, this person wants Mr. Nanos
gone. ``you can understand that phrase, can't you, Mr. Nanos? I
can't call you director or doctor because I can only do this if
I respect the person and the position for which they hold and
perform.'' this person obviously doesn't.
So you can't change that. You are not going to change this
person. His mind is made up. And you can go through 46 pages
here of them, and they are all sort of like this.
Mr. Burgess is right. You can't fire the team, and we
can't. But maybe we can transfer the science, and they can
transfer if they are interested in working for the government
and doing the job. And if they are honorable people, as they
claim they are in these blogs, they will continue their
research somewhere else.
What is wrong with that? Maybe we won't be back here next
year, and again and again and again. I haven't been here that
long. I have been here 13 years. I have been 12 years on this
committee, and every year, I am here getting the same thing. I
always get all these nice answers that it is leadership. It is
management. It is this. It is that.
I am just saying, why do we have to have this place any
longer? Can anyone really tell me what is so unique that we
can't do anywhere else what we are doing at Los Alamos?
By your silence, I take it there is nothing that we
couldn't transfer somewhere else and still keep our national
security and our research and that all done, right?
Mr. Paul. Look, anything that man does, he can undo. I
don't want to reduce this to philosophy, but anything man does,
he can undo. I mean, the rhetorical question, could you move
something from one place to another, I guess theoretically you
can.
This particular facility, this particular lab and the
facilities that are there, could you move everything there into
the desert somewhere----
Mr. Stupak. I am not talking about desserts. Why can't we
move it to other labs?
Mr. Paul. You could certainly do a cost-benefit analysis of
doing that, and I think that is exactly what we are studying.
That is the message I am trying to convey to you. I am trying
to violently agree with you, that we need to be looking at all
of these issues, and that is indeed exactly what is being done
as to every single facility, trying to look into the future at
what are the critical missions for this complex, how do they
need to be done and what are the locations where we would need
to do them.
Mr. Stupak. And have you identified any critical mission
that is being performed at Los Alamos that can't be done
somewhere else in the United States by one of our labs or the
military?
Mr. Paul. Well, when we see the complex study, we will have
a better handle on that.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. If we can, the decision was made last
year to shut down all the operations at the lab, and this
decision was ordered by Mr. Nanos and, ultimately, may have
cost taxpayers millions of dollars. In retrospect, was this a
good decision, why or why not, and would Los Alamos have been
shut down, for example, by NNSA had this not been ordered by
the director? Can you give me your opinions on that?
Mr. Paul. I can tell you that even prior to the shutdown,
NNSA was having discussions with the director about doing it
itself based probably more on safety grounds than on security.
But, certainly, they both played into it.
The decision to stand down itself we stand by. I think this
committee and the committee chairman has stated that he stands
by that decision as well. The question of duration, it indeed
took longer to resume, to stand back up, about twice as long
than what was expected.
This organization believed that it was better to do it
right than to hold to a particular time line. A very serious
undertaking here to go through that level of reform, what we
are trying to do here, 3,000 findings, it was very difficult,
and it did take a heck of a lot longer.
The management system is a business. They atrophied so bad,
Congressman, you just didn't have an infrastructure in place,
and you had to create it out of whole cloth in a lot of ways.
And it just took longer.
Mr. Stupak. You agree with this decision to shut her down?
Mr. Paul. Yes, at that stage, I think it had to be done.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Wilmot, you agree it had to be shut down?
Mr. Wilmot. I had discussions with the director and the
deputy director about a rolling shut down at one time, and I
actually gave him a draft paper of my concerns. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Friedman, do you want to add anything? Dr.
Eggenberger?
Mr. Eggenberger. Yes, I will add a little bit. The Board
does nuclear safety at defense nuclear facilities only, so some
of these issues that we are talking about we don't----
Mr. Stupak. Would not be in your area, right. How about
from your area?
Mr. Eggenberger. From our area, if the Board would have
thought that there was an eminent threat to health and safety,
we would have recommended to the Secretary of Energy to shut it
down. We did not do that.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Do you think Mr. Nanos was correct in
shutting her down or doing a rolling shutdown as it was thought
of, or do you think--what do you think on that?
Mr. Eggenberger. You talked about the program of resumption
and listed the items. That program had started before the
shutdown. It was in its infancy. And as far as our individual
concerns that I had mentioned in my summary, most of those,
with a few exceptions, were rolled up into that program. So we
believed that our interests were being taken care of if that
program were implemented in a proper sense.
To back up a little bit, the laboratory generally is very
good at responding to our concerns and understanding our
concerns and putting together a plan to address them. They are
generally very good at that. The issue that generally comes up
is the implementation, and implementation, in our view, is the
responsibility of management at the laboratory and it is also
the responsibility of the oversight by the Department of
Energy. If that was done properly, we saw no reason why the
laboratory could not continue on.
Now, one other thing that I would like to mention is, in
2004, we wrote to the Secretary a recommendation, and it is
called Recommendation 2004-1. 2004-1. The Secretary has
accepted that. And what that recommendation says or the
requirements in it are that the Department of Energy take a
more proactive role at headquarters in their interactions with
their site offices such that they can understand and implement
the safety programs that they have.
Now, I am talking from a safety point of view.
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this then on the safety program,
DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health issued proposed
industrial and construction worker safety regulations in
January 2005 in response to the Defense Authorization Act of
2003. They were intended to parallel the Price-Anderson nuclear
safety regulations.
But tucked into this, put out by DOE safety regulations
here, were 10 separate exemptions to these rules, none of which
were authorized by Congress and not part of the OSHA regime.
Some of us feel that many of these exemptions are going to
usurp the rules put in place. Are you saying that the Board
agrees with this approach? Could these exemptions actually lead
to a reduction in current levels of worker safety there?
Mr. Eggenberger. My understanding is this is outside the
nuclear safety regime and is in the safety regime that more
addresses the OSHA-type items.
Mr. Stupak. But it also deals with the nuclear, like that
vat they were cleaning out there with the release of the
radiation and the paint chips and all that that I spoke about
in my opening. That may be OSHA, but you have to have a
technician trained in handling radioactive material in order to
do it. And when you put 10 separate exemptions on nuclear
safety regulations, it may be OSHA, but it came from the Board.
So is the Board more concerned about complying with OSHA than
safety regulations?
Mr. Eggenberger. That didn't come from us.
Mr. Stupak. DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health.
I know it is not you, but you were just talking about it. You
were just talking about DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and
Health. So I thought maybe you knew something about this.
Mr. Eggenberger. No, I am talking about nuclear safety and
implementation of nuclear safety, which is a line operation
that runs from the Secretary to the NNSA chief down through the
line down into the sites and results in the overseeing of the
laboratories.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, you have been more than kind.
Thank you very much.
It seems like we just keep going around and around here.
But this is a lab involved with nuclear research. We are not
making Rice Krispies here. I really wish we would either fix
this lab or end it. I just don't see much future, other than
more hearings for us.
Mr. Whitfield. Just to follow up for one moment here, you
referred to a complex study in which are looking at
alternatives and options available. When do you expect this
study will be completed?
Mr. Paul. Chairman Hobson had actually put language in the
last Defense Authorization Act requiring this complex study.
NNSA was on its way to creating it at the time. The original
deadline I believe was the end of April.
It was difficult to assemble the exact collection of people
with the right qualifications to perform that study, so it
didn't get started until a little bit later than what was
anticipated.
To answer your question, I believe that Chairman Hobson has
said he was going to relax the due date on that for an oral
presentation. I am not totally sure, but I think an oral
presentation at the end of May and a written at the end of
June. I don't think a final decision has been made on that.
Within the next couple of months, I believe we are going to
see the complex study which truly takes a holistic analytical
approach to looking at every single facility within the NNSA
complex and trying to match that up with a NNSA of the future
and come up with some different options for condensing,
consolidating and really analyzing what the footprint should be
and where.
Mr. Whitfield. So one possible option would be what Mr.
Stupak suggested, that some research could be transferred
elsewhere?
Mr. Paul. I want to be very careful here, because I have
not had that specific discussion with any member on the complex
study, but my understanding is they are looking at all options.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. We will certainly be interested in
looking at the results of that study.
One other thing I would like to do, this is the corrective
action performance report dated April 27, 2005, which basically
shows that the University of California is already behind on 92
post-start corrective actions contained in the corrective
action plan. This document breaks down Los Alamos by division,
and you will find on page three here that the manufacturing
systems and methods division accounts for a total of 43 of the
92 corrective actions thus far.
I would just ask you directly, Mr. Wilmot, can you explain
what the manufacturing systems and methods division does? And
why is it so far behind on its corrective actions? And I am
asking unanimous consent to enter this performance report into
the record.
Mr. Wilmot. I would ask that I be able to provide that in
detail in a written comment to you. I think that would be
better serving your time.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. That will be fine. Anyone else have
any questions?
Mr. Burgess?
Mr. Burgess. Dr. Eggenberger, just a brief follow up on
your testimony. You talked about fire protection upgrades must
be completed. I guess these were not completed by the
University of California. They excluded the fire protection
management from their post-restart corrective action plan. Is
that right, and should that have been in there?
Mr. Eggenberger. I will comment on that a little bit, if
you will permit me.
Mr. Burgess. I wish you would.
Mr. Eggenberger. As I mentioned to the ranking member, the
OE project was in development prior to shut down, and it
addressed most of our things. Now, at one time, my
understanding is the fire protection program was in the
operational efficiency project, and as they redid that and
finalized it, they decided to take the fire protection out of
that because it was basically to be done by one separate
department and that they would handle it that way.
Now, it isn't that fire protection is out. It is still in,
but it is not being handled as part of the operational
efficiency program. So our understanding is those items are
still being done at the laboratory. So it isn't lost.
Mr. Burgess. Very well.
On the issue of the slow pace of efforts to stabilize
nuclear materials at Los Alamos, specifically the University of
California--I am still with you, Mr. Eggenberger--I believe the
University of California has extended the original plutonium
stabilization date from 2002 to 2010 at an additional cost of
$78 million.
Why is it important that the University of California
accelerate plans to stabilize nuclear materials, and are there
risks to workers if these stabilization plans are not
accelerated?
Mr. Eggenberger. This stabilization of excess materials
began in 1994, at the laboratory under our Recommendation 94-1,
and at that point in time, we asked around the complex that
actions be taken to stabilize those materials which caused the
most risk to the people and to the workers.
At Los Alamos, they did that, up to a point. They did the
high-risk items, and then there was what was left. What was
left was then prioritized again, and in our view, the highest
risk of what was left was at the end of the line rather than
bringing it up to the first.
They have redone that and brought the high-risk items up.
And given the budgets and given the risk, since it is going
down as we proceed out, we believe that the schedule is
reasonable to go until 2010.
One other, as far as other risks, are that buried in the
transuranics, I guess it is TA-54, I mentioned the Quick to
WIPP Program, which removes those and gets them down to the
Carlsbad facility. That is going again, and it is not quite as
fast, I believe, as DOE would like it to be, but it is on the
way. And there is a lot of effort being put in by NNSA to
continue on that. So, we are reasonably happy with that.
Mr. Burgess. Very well. In the brief time I have left, Mr.
Friedman, do you have any thoughts that you would like to share
with us?
Mr. Friedman. Well, I have been looking at Los Alamos for a
long time, Mr. Burgess, and I share the frustration with the
members of the subcommittee as to making progress.
I suspect--I do want to comment, probably the smartest
thing for me to do would be to stay out of the line of fire,
but let me indulge my passion for danger.
Mr. Stupak, to go back to a point you made earlier, I have
audit inspection investigation responsibility for the entire
departmental laboratory system, including the other weapons
laboratories and the science laboratories and others. And no
one should--there are 14,000 people working at Los Alamos, and
you may have a few bloggers, a number of bloggers, who may be
expressing personal angst. And that is legitimate. They have a
right to do so. But the vast majority of people there are
extraordinarily dedicated, Nobel Prize winners, Enrico Fermi
Prize winners. They are an extraordinary group of people.
I am not suggesting they can't be moved, the function
couldn't be moved. It probably could be physically, but they
are an extraordinary group of people. And my job is actually
going out and being a critic, and here I am saying something in
support of them and in support of the mission.
To compare Los Alamos and say it is imperfect with the
other labs being perfect would not be a correct
characterization. There is no doubt that we have a more
disproportionate number of problems from an IG perspective at
Los Alamos than any other laboratories.
However, there are problems that exist across the complex,
throughout the laboratory system, and it may be in part
inherent in dealing with large numbers of scientists, who are
very dedicated people but may not have a commitment to business
systems that we would like to see in the normal course of
action.
But it would be unfair, I think, to simply say these people
or this operation is impure and the others are pure. There are
problems throughout the complex, many of which mirror perhaps
at a lesser intensity the problems that you find at Los Alamos.
I appreciate your giving me the opportunity, Mr. Burgess. I
wanted to clarify that point.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Now I do have a question. Then how do you fix
it? Really? Seriously. I don't want leadership. I don't want
management. How are you going to fix it? Either fix it or close
it. This is just crazy.
Mr. Friedman. Mr. Stupak, I have appeared before you on
several occasions, and we have had animated discussions.
Mr. Stupak. I get animated about this stuff. I mean, there
is so much duplication in our labs. If you take a look the
budgets and that, there is a lot of duplication. I don't think
we need all of this. And every time we come here, it is a
couple of hundred million, a couple hundred million there, a
couple hundred million there, and no one is accountable.
You know, 12 years ago, I was the one talking about, there
seems to be this culture out there--I had been out there a
couple of times--about noncompliance; we will do it how we
think it should be done, The heck with rules, regulations,
Congress and everything else.
Now, today, the witnesses were using the word ``culture.''
and unless you are going to get some social people, social
engineers, whatever you want to call them, out there to fix
this place, let's close it.
Really, seriously, I really believe if you move one or two
tasks out of Los Alamos, they will get the message. Either
clean her up or we will shut her down. I don't know what else
to do. At least that is an idea. You guys got any idea on how
you are going to fix this, other than new management?
Mr. Friedman. Well, let me say this: I respect your point
of view on this. There has been no issue, no action that has
been taken as momentous and as earthshaking in the 20-plus
years that I have been looking at Los Alamos and indeed the
laboratory system than recompeting this contract. And that may
well be the defining moment as to whether Los Alamos can be
salvaged in a way that would satisfy you and the other members
of this subcommittee and others throughout society.
Mr. Stupak. So, I mean, what would a new manager do
different? Let's say, give it to the University of Texas. Since
the Chairman is from Texas, we will give it to that university.
Well, Mr. Burgess, you are from Texas. I would rather see it go
to the University of Michigan.
But let's say, give it to Michigan, give it to the
University of Texas; what really is going to change?
Mr. Friedman. Well, Mr. Stupak, if I knew the answer to
that, I would be bidding on the contract, proposing on the
contract myself. It is going to be the responsibility of all
the proposers. And if the University of California proposes as
well to come up with a proposal that is comprehensive,
complete, represents a change from the status quo, in my
business--I am in the business of advocating change, not
accepting the status quo. That is the business I am in. And the
status quo at Los Alamos is unacceptable. I don't think there
is any question about that.
So if I were on the panel that evaluates the proposals that
the NNSA will be receiving, I would be looking for innovation,
substantive, significant, deep-seated innovation in the way
that Los Alamos goes about its business, as a primary criteria
for making the decision as to who will manage Los Alamos for
the next 7 years or decade or whatever the case might be.
Mr. Stupak. I just think, if you have a model--You know, I
am from Michigan, so we know about cars. If you buy a model,
year after year, you buy an Oldsmobile, and it keeps breaking
down, keeps breaking down, keeps breaking down, you don't go
back and keep buying an Oldsmobile. Sooner or later, you go buy
maybe a Buick or maybe go buy a Datsun. I don't know what the
heck you buy.
But it just seems to me that we are just repeating the same
old things. And I don't see anything so unique and exclusive to
Los Alamos that it can't be done somewhere else. If we've got
this problem for I don't know how many years it has been now--I
have only been here 12 years. I hate to see, like Mr. Dingell
has been here forever, and he has got much more frustration
than I have.
Mr. Whitfield. I do think it is significant that we do have
an RFP out there, and we cannot afford the status quo anymore.
I would ask also unanimous consent that we keep the record
open for 7 days for any members who have opening statements. I
would also ask unanimous consent, our staff submit to the NNSA
three questions relating to removal of material at TA-18,
material at TA-55, and another question relating to Los Alamos
TA-18, additional questions. You all submitted answers. So I am
asking unanimous consent that we enter this into the record as
well.
With that, this meeting, this hearing----
Mr. Stupak. Could I ask one more question? Do we have any
blogs in support of Mr. Nanos? We don't, do we?
Mr. Friedman. No, no.
Mr. Stupak. We do?
Mr. Freidman. I am not in the blog business. I have been
accused of a lot of things, but not that. There are people who
have entered the blog system in support of Dr. Nanos, yes.
Mr. Stupak. I didn't want just the negative blogs in there.
Thanks.
Mr. Whitfield. This concludes today's hearing. Thank you
very much for your time and testimony. Of course, we will be
having another hearing with the University of California and a
whistleblower panel.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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