<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:30704.wais]
FOURTH IN A SERIES OF SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS
ON SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER HIGH-RISK ISSUES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-58
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means
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30-704 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
BILL THOMAS, California, Chairman
E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
WALLY HERGER, California SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
JIM MCCRERY, Louisiana BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
DAVE CAMP, Michigan JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota JOHN LEWIS, Georgia
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
SAM JOHNSON, Texas MICHAEL R. MCNULTY, New York
PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
JERRY WELLER, Illinois XAVIER BECERRA, California
KENNY C. HULSHOF, Missouri LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
RON LEWIS, Kentucky EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
MARK FOLEY, Florida STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Ohio
KEVIN BRADY, Texas MIKE THOMPSON, California
THOMAS M. REYNOLDS, New York JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin RAHM EMANUEL, Illinois
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JOHN LINDER, Georgia
BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana
DEVIN NUNES, California
Allison H. Giles, Chief of Staff
Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
JIM MCCRERY, Louisiana, Chairman
E. CLAY SHAW JR., Florida SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
SAM JOHNSON, Texas EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona XAVIER BECERRA, California
KENNY C. HULSHOF, Missouri STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published
in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the official
version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare both
printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of
converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
further refined.
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Advisory of March 8, 2006 announcing the hearing................. 2
WITNESSES
The Honorable Patrick P. O'Carroll, Inspector General, Social
Security Administration........................................ 6
Richard Outland, Branch Chief, Questioned Document Branch,
Forensic Services Division, U.S. Secret Service................
Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner,
Disability and Income Security Programs, Social Security
Administration................................................. 9
Stephen T. Kent, Ph.D., Chairman, Committee on Authentication
Technologies and Their Privacy Implications, National Research
Council, The National Academies................................ 18
Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic Privacy Information Center. 24
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Severn Trent Services, Colmar, PA, Joint Letter.................. 41
FOURTH IN A SERIES OF
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS ON
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER HIGH-RISK ISSUES
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Social Security,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room B-318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim McCrery
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
[The advisory announcing the hearing follows:]
ADVISORY FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTACT: (202) 225-9263
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 8, 2006
SS-13
McCrery Announces Fourth in a
Series of Subcommittee Hearings on
Social Security Number High-Risk Issues
Congressman Jim McCrery, (R-LA), Chairman, Subcommittee on Social
Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the
Subcommittee will hold the fourth in a series of Subcommittee hearings
on Social Security number (SSN) high-risk issues. The hearing will
examine expanding uses of the SSN card and measures to prevent SSN card
fraud. The hearing will take place on Thursday, March 16, 2006, in room
B-318 Rayburn House Office Building, beginning at 10:00 a.m.
In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral
testimony at this hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However,
any individual or organization not scheduled for an oral appearance may
submit a written statement for consideration by the Committee and for
inclusion in the printed record of the hearing.
BACKGROUND:
The SSN was created in 1936 to record earnings and benefits for the
Social Security program. The sole purpose of the SSN card was to show
that an SSN had been issued to the named individual. Originally, the
SSN card had no security features other than the individual's
signature.
Within a decade, the SSN's use grew beyond its original narrow
purpose, and has continued to expand. According to the Social Security
Administration (SSA), the SSN is now the single most widely-used record
identifier for both the government and the private sectors.
As with the SSN, the SSN card's uses also have expanded over the
decades. Currently, one of its most important roles is in work
authorization. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires
employers to document the identity and employment eligibility of their
new hires. For U.S. citizens and some non-citizens, employers may
accept the SSN card as proof of a person's eligibility to work in the
United States.
As the uses of the SSN and the SSN card have increased, security
features have been added to the SSN card to prevent its fraudulent
duplication or alteration. For example, legislation enacted in the
early 1980s required specific changes to the SSN card, and the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)
requires that standards be established and implemented to safeguard SSN
cards from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft. However,
the SSA does not replace all existing SSN cards when a new SSN card
design is adopted, due to workload concerns and the potential burden on
the public. As a result, since 1936, the SSA has issued more than 433
million SSNs, with about 50 different versions of the SSN card--all of
which are still valid.
Despite its adoption for other purposes, the SSN card by itself is
not a personal identity document. The SSN card does not contain
information that would confirm that the person presenting the card is
actually the person whose name and SSN appear on the card. Several
bills introduced in the 109th Congress would mandate significant
changes to the card for that purpose. For example, one proposal would
enhance the security features in the SSN card as part of a package of
changes to the process of confirming the identity and work eligibility
of new hires. However, ideas such as adding photographs, machine-
readable electronic strips, and other features to SSN cards have raised
concerns about the future purpose of the card. Some have expressed
concerns that SSN card may evolve into a form of national
identification.
In announcing the hearing, Chairman McCrery stated, ``Because of
the expanding use of SSNs and SSN cards, they are often transformed
into tools to gain illegal employment and perpetrate identity theft and
other crimes. We need a thorough examination of the appropriateness of
using SSNs in certain roles. It is equally important for us to examine
the potential impact on individual's security and privacy that could
result from changes to the design of the SSN card.''
FOCUS OF THE HEARING:
The Subcommittee will examine the history of SSNs and SSN card use,
the role of the SSN card in work authorization, measures to prevent SSN
card fraud, and the potential effects of transforming the SSN card into
an identification document.
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noted above.
<F-dash>
Chairman MCCRERY. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning, and welcome to our fourth in a series of hearings on
high risk issues related to Social Security numbers (SSNs).
Today, we will examine the expanding uses of the SSN and
options to prevent fraud involving SSN cards, and in the
interests of time, because we are going to have votes coming up
pretty soon, I am going to submit the rest of my opening
statement in writing for the record, and I would yield to my
colleague, the Ranking Member, Mr. Levin.
[The prepared statement of Chairman McCrery follows:]
Opening Statement of The Honorable Jim McCrery, Chairman, and a
Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana
Good morning and welcome to our fourth in a series of hearings on
high-risk issues related to Social Security numbers, or SSNs. Today,
we'll examine the expanding uses of the SSN and options to prevent
fraud involving SSN cards.
Much of our discussion at this hearing will focus on the use of the
SSN and SSN card in employment. Current law requires employers to
verify the identity and employment eligibility of new hires. Employers
may accept an SSN card as one of several documents that a person may
present as proof of employment eligibility, if the card does not bear
either of two legends: ``Not Valid for Employment'' or ``Valid for Work
Only with DHS Authorization.''
After examining a new hire's documents; the employer must accept
them, if the documents reasonably appear to be genuine and belong to
the worker. If an employee uses an SSN card to prove work
authorization, he or she must provide another document to prove his or
her identity, such as a driver's license.
To simplify the process for employers and prevent unauthorized
work, some legislators have proposed making the SSN card the single,
counterfeit and tamper-resistant document employers would be required
to see, replacing all the others. The SSN card would be modified to
contain proof of identity. Employers would use it to access a
government database to verify employment eligibility.
Such a change would greatly expand the role of the SSN card in work
authorization, and it raises a number of essential questions that I
hope we will address today.
First, how confident can we be that a particular SSN was issued
based on accurate information? The answer, as we have learned from
previous hearings, depends on when the SSN card was issued. It wasn't
until 1978 that all SSN applicants were required to provide proof of
their identity, age, and citizen or non-citizen status. Before 2002,
the Social Security Administration did not consistently verify birth
certificates or immigration documents with the issuing agency.
Adding new security features to the SSN card today will not assure
the accuracy of the data originally used to issue an SSN. To raise the
level of accuracy, all SSN cardholders in the workforce would have to
apply for new cards and provide full documentation of their identity,
citizen or non-citizen status, and age. What would this cost? What
impact would this have on the Social Security Administration?
Second, what are the options for designing a counterfeit and
tamper-resistant SSN card? As required by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Social Security Administration is
working with the Department of Homeland Security to improve the
security of SSNs and SSN cards and implement such improvements by June
2006. It is important to establish the range of options for a
counterfeit and tamper-resistant card, the costs of the options,
whether the options will work, as well as non-SSN card options to
verify identity and work authorization.
Third, what are the ramifications of transforming the SSN card into
an identity card? Currently, the SSN card serves only to show that an
SSN was assigned to the individual named on the card. It does not
contain features to prove that the cardholder is the individual named
on the card.
Changing the SSN card into an ID could encourage its use for other
purposes, given the widespread use of the SSN itself in many personal
and financial transactions. Adding identification features to the SSN
card could duplicate efforts already underway to provide secure
identity documentation--such as improved driver's licenses and State-
issued ID cards called for under the REAL ID Act.
Finally, we must be mindful to examine these issues in a greater
context. For example, if employers are ultimately required to verify
SSNs and employment eligibility through a government database (as
required under some proposals), then employers may only need proof of
the worker's identity. The database could confirm the person's SSN and
employment eligibility without the need for an enhanced SSN card.
I look forward to hearing the testimony and recommendations of our
witnesses and welcome the views of my colleagues on these complex
issues. I believe that it is our responsibility as legislators to work
for a balanced, thoughtful approach--one that will deter unauthorized
employment without placing undue burdens on businesses, while
protecting the privacy of our fellow Americans.
<F-dash>
Mr. LEVIN. I will do likewise, so we can hear your
testimony and have an hour to think about it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LEVIN. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levin follows:]
Opening Statement of The Honorable Sander M. Levin, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
Today our Subcommittee has the opportunity to examine two issues--
our ongoing, non-controversial effort to ensure that Social Security
cards are not counterfeited, and the more controversial debate about
whether it is appropriate to make the Social Security card into a
national identification card.
These are issues squarely within the jurisdiction of the Ways &
Means Committee. I am pleased that the Chairman has provided this
opportunity for us to discuss them and to learn more about the
proposals and the issues from our colleagues and a panel of experts.
As the Committee of jurisdiction, it is also our responsibility to
oversee the efforts already underway. As required by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Social Security
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security are currently
identifying options for making Social Security cards more secure, with
the goal of implementing improvements by this June. Each option imposes
certain costs, both in dollars and in loss of personal privacy, so it
is important for our Committee to weigh the costs and benefits and to
keep in close touch with the agencies involved.
I look forward to a frank and thoughtful discussion of these
complex issues.
<F-dash>
Chairman MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. Levin. We are also going
to reverse the order of the panels this morning so that we can
allow these gentlemen to get their testimony in and perhaps go
through a few questions before votes are called, and then, the
first panel, which consists of two of our colleagues, we will
retrieve as we can and then finish the hearing, but that way,
we will not have you all sitting around on your thumbs all
morning.
With that, I would introduce our first panel this morning:
the Honorable Patrick O'Carroll, Inspector General, Social
Security Administration (SSA), and he is accompanied this
morning by Richard Outland, Branch Chief, Questioned Document
Branch, Forensic Services Division, U.S. Secret Service; and
Mr. Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner,
Disability Income Security Programs, the SSA; welcome back,
both of you gentlemen; Stephen Kent, Chairman, Committee on
Authentication Technologies and their Privacy Implications,
National Research Council, the National Academies; and Marc
Rotenberg, President, Electronic Privacy Information Center.
Welcome, all of you gentlemen, and we will begin with Mr.
O'Carroll.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK O'CARROLL, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD
OUTLAND, BRANCH CHIEF, QUESTIONED DOCUMENT BRANCH, FORENSIC
SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. SECRET SERVICE
Mr. O'CARROLL. Good morning, Chairman McCrery, Congressman
Levin. Thank you for inviting me to be here today. I would like
to focus on our investigative efforts with respect to SSN
misuse.
With me today is Mr. Richard Outland, Assistant Chief, U.S.
Secret Service, Forensic Services Division. Based on a
longstanding interagency agreement, when our agents come across
suspected counterfeited Social Security cards, they are
referred to the Secret Service for further forensic
examination. Mr. Outland is here today to answer any technical
questions.
No matter how carefully we protect the SSN, there will be
those who find a way to turn the number to nefarious purposes,
and when they do, our special agents will be there. Our
statutory mission is to protect the SSA's programs and
operations from fraud, and abuse. At the core of that mission
is the protection of the Social Security Trust Funds that
provide benefits to millions of Americans every month.
To that end, 79 percent of our cases we investigated last
year were for program fraud. Still, we are ever mindful of our
obligation to protect the SSN from misuse. In fact, 16 percent
of our investigations involved SSN misuse.
To maximize our resources, we focus our overall SSN misuse
energies in cooperative efforts with other Federal, State, and
local task forces. At last count, we were involved in almost
200 task forces and work groups across the country. For
example, our agents on the Central Florida Identity Theft Task
Force concluded a case last year in which they apprehended 15
members of an identity theft ring. They would obtain lists of
individuals with good credit histories and use the personal
information of those individuals to defraud a variety of
commercial entities in the Orlando area. Twelve of the 15
individuals arrested were sentenced to prison, and all were
ordered to repay more than $2 million to the victims.
Our own internal caseload is no less daunting, and our solo
work is equally impressive. We see allegations of SSN misuse in
myriad forms every day. One such allegation from a SSA district
office concerned a woman who was receiving disability benefits
under two separate SSNs and insisted that she was one half of a
set of identical twins. Our investigators asked her to provide
a copy of her birth certificate, while unbeknownst to her, we
were obtaining one directly from the State Bureau of Vital
Statistics. The one we obtained showed a single birth, and the
altered one she produced had the same control number and
signatures but showed a twin birth.
Before we confronted her with the fact that we had
uncovered her forgery, she had asked her Congressman to
intervene on her behalf and demanded that her nonexistent
twin's benefits be reinstated. We were only too happy to share
the forged birth certificate with the Congressman.
We see SSN misuse cases like this every day. What we see
less frequently, however, are cases involving counterfeit
Social Security cards. While we take such cases very seriously
and have recently disrupted several counterfeit identity
operations, the reality is that the Social Security card serves
as little more than a hard copy record of a number that we all
memorize at an early age.
While the SSN itself is necessary to obtain employment, to
obtain a loan, and for countless other purposes, we rarely, if
ever, are asked to show anyone our Social Security cards. The
card was designed for a single purpose: to provide the holder
with a number used to track earnings and pay benefits.
While the uses of the number have expanded significantly
over the decades, the uses of the card have remained more or
less the same. There is no question that periodic security
improvements to the card are necessary to stay one step ahead
of tech savvy counterfeiters. As long as the use of the card
remains as limited as it has been, it is difficult to justify
the expense that would be incurred in creating a ``counterfeit
card.''
Of course, if Congress decides to expand the uses of the
Social Security card, then, those expenses might become
necessary. If this is Congress' ultimate decision, we will do
everything possible to work with you and the SSA to make the
card as counterfeit-proof as possible. Until then, we will
continue our audit and investigative efforts to combat SSN
misuse and provide the SSA and Congress with timely and
accurate information.
Thank you, and if you have any questions, I will be happy
to answer them.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Carroll follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Patrick P. O'Carroll, Inspector General,
Social Security Administration; accompanied by Richard L. Outland,
Assistant Branch Chief--Questioned Document Branch, Forensic Services
Division, U.S. Secret Service
Good morning, Chairman McCrery, Congressman Levin, and Members of
the Subcommittee. This is our fourth hearing in this series on high-
risk Social Security number (SSN) issues, and I applaud your efforts
and dedication in giving these issues the attention they deserve. The
SSN is a key to American life in many ways, and as we have seen
throughout this series of hearings, its misuse has repercussions that
cause a ripple effect across the American landscape.
Much of my testimony in the first three hearings has centered on
largely administrative issues. At the first hearing, we discussed
enumeration, the process by which the Social Security Administration
(SSA) issues SSNs; at the second hearing, we discussed SSN misuse in
the context of misreported wages, particularly by foreign-born workers
without authorization to work in the United States; and, at the third
hearing earlier this month, we discussed enumeration of foreign-born
individuals and the payment of benefits to those born or residing
abroad.
Today, I would like to discuss our investigative efforts to combat
SSN misuse in all forms. Our Office of Investigations (OI) is dedicated
to preventing and detecting fraud against SSA's programs and
operations, and SSN misuse is an important facet of that overall
investigative effort. Obviously, with finite resources, and with many
areas of responsibility, including program fraud, employee fraud,
contract fraud, and others, we are mindful that our primary
responsibility is to protect the Trust Funds that provide benefits to
millions of Americans every month. At the same time, our responsibility
to protect the integrity of the SSN cannot be overstated. We strive
continuously to strike an appropriate balance.
To give you some sense of how we strike that balance, consider that
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
received about 85,000 allegations of fraud, 84 percent of which
involved fraud against a Social Security program, such as disability
insurance benefits. Approximately 13 percent--almost 11,000
allegations--involved SSN misuse. It is important to understand that
these SSN misuse allegations are limited to incidents of SSN misuse
involving a Social Security program or otherwise directly related to
the administration of the Social Security Act. Allegations of pure
identity theft, financial fraud, and other non-SSA-related crimes are
referred to appropriate sources, and are not included in this total.
Looking at actual investigations conducted during FY 2005, OI
opened approximately 9,500 cases, of which 79 percent involved crimes
against Social Security programs, while just over 16 percent involved
SSN misuse. Thus, while we actually investigate a higher proportion of
allegations in the SSN misuse category than in the program fraud
category, we still invest more than four times more resources in
program fraud than in SSN misuse. The results of an audit we will issue
shortly, in which we provide an estimate of the rate of overpayments in
Social Security's disability programs, underscores the importance of
our emphasis on program fraud. Our statutory mission is to protect SSA
programs and operations, and to the extent that an allegation of SSN
misuse does not touch on those programs, our resources do not generally
allow us to pursue it.
We do, however, play a role in the overall government effort to
protect against SSN misuse in a multijurisdictional context. Our
affirmative and aggressive approach to SSN misuse of this type is
designed to maximize our resources through the effective use of task
forces, workgroups, and other cooperative efforts.
At this time, our investigators across the country are members of
almost 200 task forces and workgroups in all ten of our field
divisions. These groups, comprised of Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies, pool resources and, when permitted, share
information to accomplish more than each member could ever accomplish
on its own. The groups range from Joint Terrorism Task Forces run by
United States Attorneys, to white collar crime groups, to financial
fraud workgroups.
The work done by these groups is astounding. For example, our
agents on the Central Florida Identity Theft task force, a group
comprised of ten law enforcement agencies, concluded a case last year
in which they apprehended fifteen members of an identity fraud ring who
would obtain lists of individuals with good credit histories, and use
the personal information of those individuals to defraud a variety of
commercial entities in the Orlando area. Twelve of the fifteen
individuals arrested were sentenced to prison terms, and the total
restitution ordered to victims exceeded $2 million.
In another case, our New York Field Division, working on a task
force with other agencies including the U.S. Secret Service,
investigated the hijacking of a deceased Social Security beneficiary's
bank account. The complex investigation revealed that the subjects not
only continued to receive the deceased woman's benefits--totaling some
$80,000--but also used her bank account to launder counterfeit checks
created with the help of a corrupt bank employee. They then went on to
steal other SSNs and identities and open additional accounts, which
they would use both to create additional fraudulent checks and to
launder them. In all, they cashed about $300,000 in bad checks and
opened credit card accounts from which they stole another $100,000.
Since cases like this represent an opportunity to achieve a
significant return with only minimal investment of resources--our agent
in this ten-agency task force still maintains a ``normal'' caseload--we
can afford to contribute substantially to the overall effort to stop
SSNs being used as instruments of a crime. If each of the 200 task
forces in which we participate makes only a few cases like this each
year, we are able to have a far greater effect than we could ever have
working alone.
However, our day-to-day program-related SSN misuse caseload is no
less daunting, and our solo work is equally impressive. We see
allegations of SSN misuse in its myriad forms come in every day by
phone, fax, e-mail, and in electronic referrals from SSA employees. One
such referral from an SSA District Office concerned a woman who was
confronted by SSA with the fact that she appeared to be receiving
disability benefits under two separate SSNs. Each set of benefits was
going to the same name, the same address, and for the same disability,
but under two different SSNs. The woman informed SSA, and subsequently
our investigators, that she had a twin sister. Despite the fact that
both sets of benefits were going to the same address, the woman alleged
that she and her identical twin were estranged and did not speak.
Our investigators obtained a copy of the woman's birth certificate
from the state vital records office. It showed that hers had been a
single birth, not a twin birth. Additional investigation uncovered no
other evidence that a twin had ever existed. Our investigators asked
the woman to provide a copy of her birth certificate, and she
eventually provided the same document we had obtained from the state
without her knowledge. It had the same control number and the same
signatures, but the altered copy she provided showed a twin birth. We
recontacted the vital statistics office and confirmed that no official
change had been made since we'd obtained our copy. The woman, unaware
that we had her original birth certificate, continued to demand that
her duplicate benefits be reinstated, even going so far as to write to
her Congressman to demand that he intercede on her behalf. We showed
the Congressman the two versions of the birth certificate, and that
ended the woman's ill-conceived mission.
In another case, our investigation revealed that a woman had been
working full-time since 1978 under one SSN and receiving Title XVI
disability payments since 1973 under a second SSN. From 1978 until
2001, she worked full-time for various healthcare agencies while
certifying each year to SSA that she was not working. In 2001, the
woman applied for Title II disability benefits under the first SSN,
based on her extensive work history. A Title XVI claims representative
recognized the woman during her appointment to apply for Title II
benefits, and referred the case to OIG. She later admitted to OIG
agents that she had been working for 23 years while receiving Title XVI
payments. She eventually pled guilty to theft of government funds and
making false statements, and was sentenced in May 2005 to 6 months'
incarceration in federal prison, 6 months' home detention with an
electronic monitoring device, and 5 years' probation, and was ordered
to pay full restitution of $166,767.
While SSN misuse cases like these are made by our investigators
every day, we encounter cases involving counterfeit Social Security
cards much less frequently. The practical reality is that most of us
were issued our Social Security cards not long after we were born, and
we long ago committed our SSNs to memory. But the cards themselves were
probably placed in a drawer or box many years ago, and have rarely been
seen or used since. Almost every entity imaginable, from government, to
medical facilities and insurance carriers, to creditors, to employers
and beyond may and often do ask for SSNs; but rarely, if ever, do they
ask to see the card itself.
Our work reviewing SSA's automated employee verification services,
such as the Social Security Number Verification Service (SSNVS),
further underscores this reality. Employers seeking to confirm the SSN
of a current or prospective employee need only take advantage of this
service to go online and match the employee's name, SSN, date of birth,
and gender against SSA's records--all without ever laying eyes on an
actual Social Security card. Of course, for verification services such
as SSNVS to be truly effective, we must be confident that the
information in SSA's databases is as accurate as possible, and our
prior audit work has revealed that this may not always be the case.
Nevertheless, SSNVS and other verification services even further
minimize the need to carry or present the card. Indeed, today, the card
is little more than a ``hard copy'' of a number that is already
contained in various databases throughout society and government. This
is consistent with the purpose for which the card was created 70 years
ago, and while there should always be security enhancements made to
stay one step ahead of tech-savvy counterfeiters, it would be hard to
justify the expense involved in replacing all Social Security cards
with ``hard'' cards as long as their utility remains as limited as it
is.
From time to time, there is talk of expanding the card's use beyond
its current functions, and obviously, this issue is one for Congress to
debate. If a decision is made to transform the Social Security card
into something more than it is, significant improvements may then have
to made in the document. Moreover, it could create a significant new
workload for SSA--one that might fall outside of the Agency's current
and historical function, or even further heighten the tension between
service and integrity.
Whatever Congress may determine is an appropriate role for the
Social Security card to play, our office is happy to provide whatever
audit and investigative work might prove helpful. In the interim, we
will continue our tireless efforts to prevent and detect misuse of the
Social Security number as well as the Social Security card itself.
<F-dash>
Chairman MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. O'Carroll. Mr.
Streckewald.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK G. STRECKEWALD, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER FOR PROGRAM POLICY, OFFICE OF DISABILITY AND
INCOME SECURITY PROGRAMS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. STRECKEWALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin. Thank
you for inviting me here today to discuss the SSA's enumeration
process. This is the process used to assign a SSN to an
individual. This series of Subcommittee hearings highlights the
importance of this core agency function. I will summarize my
written statement and will ask that it be included for the
record.
The Social Security card was never intended and does not
serve as a personal identification document; that is, the card
does not establish that the person presenting it is actually
the person whose name and SSN appear on the card. Although the
SSA has made many changes to make it counterfeit-resistant, the
card does not contain information that would allow the card to
be used as proof of identity.
Beginning in 1983, the Social Security Act (P.L. 74-271)
required that SSN cards be made of banknote paper and to the
maximum extent practicable, be a card that cannot be
counterfeited. The SSA worked with the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing, the Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to design a card that met these requirements. All
Social Security cards issued since October 1983 incorporate a
number of security features intended to make the card
counterfeit-resistant and tamper-proof.
Some of these features include but are not limited to a
tamper-proof, marbleized background, intaglio printing in some
areas of the printing in the card, and colored planchets, which
are small disks, randomly displayed on the card. Obviously,
some security features have not been made public; other
features--some features have been made public; others have not
in order to protect the security of the card.
As required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (P.L. 108-458), the SSA, in
consultation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), formed a task force to establish requirements that will
further improve the security of SSNs and cards. The task force
is considering a wide range of security features that would
strengthen the Social Security card, and we will develop a plan
for implementing the task force recommendations.
Last year, we estimated that a card with enhanced security
features, such as biometric identifiers, would cost
approximately $25 per card, not including the startup
investments associated with the purchase of equipment needed to
produce and issue this type of card. While any estimate would
ultimately depend upon the details of the proposal, last year's
estimate of replacing cards for 240 million cardholders
nationwide was approximately $9.5 billion.
Currently, however, we know the cost of issuing an SSN card
has increased by approximately $3 due to new requirements for
additional verification of evidence. So, we anticipate an
increase in the total cost estimate when we update our figures
to reflect current dollar costs.
It is important to note that just as a SSN card does
establish identity, neither does it always reflect the
individual's current authorization status. The SSN card only
reflects an individual's work authorization status at the time
the card was issued. It is a snapshot in time. An individual's
work authorization status may change over the years, and DHS
has sole jurisdiction over the work authorization for
noncitizens.
Over the years, the SSA has made continued enhancements to
the Social Security card. Due to the substantial cost of
replacing all cards in use, older versions of the card remain
valid. Thus, there are about 50 different variations of the SSN
card in use that have been issued since 1936.
In addition to the changes the SSA made after September 11,
which I have outlined in previous hearings before the
Subcommittee, the IRTPA contains several additional provisions
to strengthen the integrity of our enumeration process. Two key
provisions include the implementation of limits on the number
of replacement cards an individual can receive, three per year
and ten per lifetime.
With limited exceptions and the addition of death and fraud
indicators to SSN verification routines for employers, State
agencies issuing drivers' licenses and identity cards and other
verification routines as determined to be appropriate. The SSA
implemented the restrictions on replacement SSN cards effective
December 17, 2005, as required by the IRTPA law. In addition,
we place death indicators on our SSN verification services with
the Department of Motor Vehicles and employers on March 6,
2006, also ahead of time, required by the law. We continue to
work to ensure that fraud indicators will be addressed, added
to the SSN verification by December 2007, which is the
legislatively mandated date.
In conclusion, we must remember that with all of the
improvements in the assignment of SSNs, the Social Security
card is still just a record of the SSN assigned to the
individual, and it is not an identity document. I look forward
to working with you to continue to improve the SSA's processes,
and I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Streckewald follows:]
Statement of Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner,
Disability and Income Security Programs, Social Security Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me today to discuss the Social Security
Administration's (SSA's) enumeration process. This is the process used
to assign a Social Security Number (SSN) to an individual. This series
of hearings the Subcommittee is holding have served to highlight the
importance of this core agency function. As stewards of the Social
Security program, one of our strategic objectives is to strengthen the
integrity of the enumeration process. We recognize that protection of
the SSN is one of the top issues facing SSA management, and I am
pleased to have the opportunity to discuss SSA's enumeration process.
History of the Social Security Number and Card
The Social Security Number is a nine-digit number, used to identify
the record of earnings an individual has in employment or self-
employment. A numbering system that is based on digits allows for the
orderly assignment of numbers and for the potential assignment of as
many as 900 million unique SSNs excluding the 900 series reserved for
the use of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). SSA has assigned over
436 million SSNs since 1936.
At the time the Social Security card was developed, its only
purpose was to provide a record of the number that had been assigned to
the individual so that employers could accurately report the earnings
of people who worked in jobs covered under the new Social Security
program. This is still the primary purpose for which SSA assigns a
number and issues a card.
The card was never intended and does not serve as a personal
identification document--that is, the card does not establish that the
person presenting it is actually the person whose name and SSN appear
on the card. Although SSA has made many changes to make it counterfeit
resistant, the card does not contain information that would allow the
card to be used as proof of identity.
Use of the SSN Expands Over Time
The purpose of the SSN and card was narrowly drawn at the beginning
of the program. However, the use of the SSN as a convenient means of
identifying records in large systems of records increased over the
years. In 1943, Executive Order 9397 required Federal agencies to use
the SSN in any new record system maintained on individuals. Using the
SSN as an identifier in federal record systems proved to be an early
reflection of what has become an enduring trend expanding the uses of
the SSN.
The simplicity and efficiency of using a seemingly unique number
that most people already possessed encouraged widespread use of the SSN
by both government agencies and private enterprises. As record-keeping
and business systems moved to automated data processing, the
characteristics of the SSN made it a popular choice for record
identification. In 1961, the Federal Civil Service Commission
established a numerical identification system for all Federal employees
using the SSN as the identification number. The next year, the IRS
decided to begin using the SSN as its taxpayer identification number
(TIN) for individuals. In 1967, the Defense Department adopted the SSN
as the service number for military personnel. At the same time, use of
the SSN for computer and other accounting systems spread throughout
State and local governments and to the private sector, especially to
banks, credit bureaus, hospitals, and educational institutions. There
were no legislative restrictions on the use of the SSN at that time.
Statutory Provision Relating to the Public Sector
The first explicit statutory authority to issue SSNs was enacted in
1972. Prior to that time, SSNs were issued pursuant to administrative
procedures that the Agency had established. Subsequent Congresses have
enacted legislation requiring individuals to have an SSN in order to
receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, and food stamps. Additional
legislation authorized States to use the SSN in the administration of
tax, general public assistance, driver's license, and motor vehicle
registration laws.
Partly in response to concerns about the proliferation of the use
of the SSN, Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974. It provided that,
except when disclosure is required by Federal statute or by state or
local statute or regulation adopted prior to January 1975, no Federal,
State, or local government could withhold a right, privilege or benefit
from a person simply because the person refused to furnish his or her
SSN.
In the 1980s and 1990s, new legislation authorized additional
governmental uses of the SSN, including income and eligibility
verification, military draft registration, and for operators of stores
that redeem food stamps. Legislation was also enacted that required
taxpayers to provide the SSNs of dependents on tax returns.
A further expansion of the government's use of the SSN was included
in welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996. In order to improve
child support enforcement, Congress required the SSN to be recorded in
a broad array of records, including applications for professional
licenses and marriage licenses, and placed in the record of divorce
decrees, support orders, and paternity determinations.
Use of the SSN by the Private Sector
Generally, there are no restrictions in Federal law on the use of
the SSN by the private sector. Businesses may ask for a customer's SSN
for such things as renting a video, applying for credit cards,
obtaining medical services, and applying for public utilities.
Customers may refuse to provide their number; however, a business may,
in turn, decline to furnish the product or service.
Continuing advances in computer technology, the ready availability
of computerized data, and rapidly increasing use of the internet have
encouraged the growth of information brokers who amass and sell large
volumes of personal information, including SSNs collected by
businesses. When possible, information brokers store and retrieve
information about an individual by that individual's SSN because the
SSN provides an easy method of maintaining computerized records and can
be used to compare those records with other business systems which may
also use the SSN as a file identifier.
Contemporary Challenges Regarding the Use of the SSN
The use of the SSN has become widespread in our society. The
cumulative effect has been that the SSN has become the most widely used
identifier by both government and the private sector in establishing
and maintaining information about a given individual in various public
as well as private record systems. An unintended consequence is that
the SSN has also become a tool used by those intent on stealing another
person's identity or creating a false identity. We are very concerned
about the misuse of the SSN, and we work closely with SSA's Inspector
General, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to
help deter identity theft and assist in the apprehension and conviction
of those who engage in this crime.
Assignment of the SSN
The Number
Prior to 1972, SSNs and cards were issued in our local field
offices. Since 1972, SSNs have been issued centrally.
Generally, to obtain an SSN, individuals must apply for an SSN by
filing a signed Form SS-5 ``Application for a Social Security Card''
and by submitting the required evidence. Currently, all applicants for
an original number and card must submit evidence of age, identity, and
United States citizenship or alien status to a Social Security field
office (FO). FO personnel assist with the completion of the SS-5
application. Applicants for replacement Social Security cards must
submit evidence of identity, and foreign born applicants must also
provide evidence of their immigration status. The SS-5 application
includes information about the applicant's name, mailing address,
citizenship, sex, race/ethnic description (optional), date and place of
birth, mother's maiden name and SSN, and father's name and SSN.
However, a parent's SSN is only required for applicants for an original
SSN who are under age 18.
While the information required on the SS-5 application has remained
essentially the same over the years, the law and enumeration process
have changed to ensure that SSA assigns SSNs only to eligible
individuals. To strengthen the process, SSA has instituted additional
safeguards to prevent a person from fraudulently obtaining an SSN. For
example:
<bullet> SSA verifies immigration status with DHS before assigning
an SSN to a non-citizen.
<bullet> SSA requires a mandatory in-office interview with all
applicants age 12 or older since the majority of individuals born in
the U.S. have been assigned an SSN by the time they reached age 12.
<bullet> As a result of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Public Law (P.L.)108-458, SSA
implemented policy changes effective December 17, 2005 that restrict
the issuance of replacement SSN cards to no more than three per year
and no more than ten per lifetime; establish minimum verification
standards for documents submitted in support of an application for an
SSN; and require independent verification of birth records of
individuals of all ages applying for an original SSN card.
<bullet> Effective November 2005, we added systems edits to our
Enumeration at Birth (EAB) program so that children who have not yet
been given a first name in the hospital are not assigned a Social
Security Number until the parent submits documentation of the child's
name. SSA has also implemented additional safeguards designed to
prevent the assignment of multiple SSNs to the same child.
I would also like to highlight some earlier changes that SSA
implemented over the years to strengthen the enumeration process.
At the inception of the program, all SSNs were assigned and cards
issued based solely on information provided by the applicant. Evidence
of identity was not required. Over time, as the use of the number was
expanded for other purposes, SSA recognized that changes were necessary
to protect the integrity of the card and enumeration process. Beginning
in November 1971, persons age 55 and over applying for an SSN for the
first time were required to submit evidence of identity. As of April
1974, non-citizens were required to submit documentary evidence of age,
identity and immigration status. This made it more difficult to obtain
a card on the basis of a false identity. SSA was also concerned that
individuals who had been assigned SSNs for purposes other than work
might use the card to obtain unauthorized employment. Therefore, in
July 1974, we began to annotate our records to reflect the fact that a
non-citizen had been issued an SSN for nonwork purposes. Several years
later, the integrity of the SSN was further improved. In May 1978, we
began requiring all SSN applicants to provide evidence of age, identity
and United States citizenship or non-citizen status.
Enumeration at Birth Process (EAB)
Because of increased demand for SSNs for children at earlier ages
due to tax and banking requirements, SSA developed the EAB process in
1987. SSA recognized that all the information needed to process an SSN
application for a newborn was gathered by hospital employees at the
child's birth and verified with the respective bureaus of vital
statistics. Nearly three-quarters of all requests for an original SSN
are now completed through this process.
This program is available in the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and allows parents to indicate on the birth
certificate form whether they want an SSN assigned to their newborn
child. When a parent requests an SSN for a child, the State vital
statistics office receives the request with the birth registration data
from the hospital and then forwards this information to SSA. Under
these procedures, the parent is not required to file a separate
application for an SSN for the child. Based on the information the
State forwards to SSA, we assign an SSN and issue a card for the child.
It is important to note that EAB is a voluntary program on the part
of the hospitals and the States and other jurisdictions. No law
requires state or hospital participation. The program is administered
under the provisions of a contract between each state and SSA. SSA
reimburses the states for participation on a per item basis (currently
$2.04 for each birth record). EAB is a far more secure way to enumerate
newborns. In addition, the program provides significant savings to the
Federal government and a convenient service option for the public.
Enumeration at Entry (EAE)
To reduce fraud and improve government efficiency, SSA inaugurated
our Enumeration-at-Entry process in October 2002. Under this process,
SSA has entered into agreements with DHS and the Department of State
(DOS) for those agencies to assist SSA in enumerating aliens. To assist
SSA, DOS collects enumeration data as part of the immigration process.
When the immigrant enters the United States, DHS notifies SSA and the
card is issued.
Social Security Cards
In the beginning of the Social Security program, no special efforts
were needed to prevent the Social Security card from being
counterfeited. However, as the card's use expanded and technology
improved, counterfeiting became a concern. Beginning in 1983, the
Social Security Act required that SSN cards be made of banknote paper,
and to the maximum extent practicable be a card that cannot be
counterfeited. SSA worked with the Bureau of Engraving and Printing,
the Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to design a
card that met these requirements.
All Social Security cards issued since October 1983 incorporate a
number of security features intended to make the card counterfeit-
resistant and tamper-proof. Some of these features include, but are not
limited to, a tamper-proof marbleized background; Intaglio printing in
some areas of the card; and colored planchettes (small discs) randomly
displayed on the card. Obviously, while some security features have
been made public, other features have not in order to protect the
security of the card.
The immigration and welfare reform legislation passed in 1996
required SSA to develop a prototype of a new card as well as study and
report on different methods for improving the Social Security card
process. In 1997, SSA issued a report to Congress on ``Options for
Enhancing the Social Security Card,'' and earlier this year provided
the Subcommittee with an update on some of the findings in the report.
As you are aware, the expertise of counterfeiters and the wide
availability of state-of-the-art technology make it increasingly
difficult to develop and maintain a document that cannot be
counterfeited, despite best efforts to guard against such incidents.
Therefore, SSA continues to evaluate new technology as it becomes
available to determine if additional features should be included.
As required by P.L. 108-458, SSA, in consultation with DHS, has
formed a taskforce to establish requirements that will further improve
the security of Social Security numbers and cards. Since current law
requires the card to be printed on banknote paper, the taskforce is
limited to consideration of improvements to this type of card. The
taskforce includes representation from DHS and several other agencies,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State and
the Government Printing Office. The taskforce is considering a wide
range of security features that would strengthen the Social Security
card, and we will develop a plan for implementing the taskforce
recommendations.
The cost of replacing the current SSN card with a new version that
includes enhanced security features would depend upon features to be
included, e.g. biometric identifiers, and the universe of card-holders
needing a new card. The cost of the card itself is minimal. The cost is
driven by the cost of verifying the identity of the person applying for
the card and, in the case of aliens, determining the immigration status
and work authorization.
Last year, we estimated a card with enhanced security features such
as biometric identifiers would cost approximately $25.00 per card, not
including the start-up investments associated with the purchase of
equipment needed to produce and issue this type of card. While any
estimate would ultimately depend on the details of the proposal, last
year's estimate for replacing cards for 240 million cardholders
nationwide was approximately $9.5 billion. Currently however we know
that the cost of issuing SSN cards has increased by approximately
$3.00, due to new requirements for additional verification of evidence,
so we anticipate an increase in the total cost estimate when we update
our figures to reflect current dollar costs.
Legends on the SSN Cards
I would now like to discuss the relationship between the Social
Security card and work authorization. The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) makes it illegal for an employer to
knowingly hire anyone not legally permitted to work in the United
States. Under IRCA, all employers are required to verify the identity
and employment eligibility of all new employees regardless of
citizenship or national origin. There are a number of documents
specified in the law and DHS regulations which may be used for this
purpose. Some documents, such as a United States passport, establish
both employment eligibility and identity. Others, including a Social
Security card without a restrictive legend, can be used to establish
employment eligibility but do not establish identity and must be
accompanied by an identification document, such as a State driver's
license.
It is important to note that, just as the Social Security number or
card does not establish identity, neither does it always reflect an
individual's current work authorization status. The SSN card only
reflects an individual's work authorization status at the time the card
was issued--it is a snapshot in time. An individual's work
authorization status may change over the years, and the DHS has sole
jurisdiction over work authorization determinations for noncitizens.
The vast majority of original Social Security cards are issued to
United States citizens or to non-citizens who have been permanently
authorized to work in the United States. These cards show only the name
and SSN of the individual.
Unlike the cards issued to United States citizens or to non-
citizens who have been permanently authorized to work in the United
States, cards issued to non-citizens who are not authorized to work or
who are only temporarily authorized to work bear one of two legends
describing work authorization status at the time the card was issued.
``Not Valid for Employment''
Initially, SSA issued the same type of Social Security card to
everyone, whether or not the individuals were authorized to work. In
1974, SSA began assigning SSNs for nonwork purposes, but the card was
not specifically annotated. Beginning in May 1982, SSA started issuing
cards printed with the legend ``Not Valid for Employment'' to non-
citizens who are not authorized to work. This was due to the increasing
need for individuals to have SSNs for nonwork purposes and concerns
that such individuals might otherwise use their SSNs for work. With
this restrictive legend appearing on a card, employers were able, for
the first time, to determine whether the individual to whom the card
was issued was authorized to work. Of course, an employer could not
rely solely on the card to establish that the person presenting the
card was the person to whom the SSN was assigned.
Cards containing this legend are often referred to as ``nonwork
SSNs.'' In October 2003, SSA significantly tightened the rules
concerning issuance of nonwork SSNs. SSA only issues such an SSN when
1)a Federal statute or regulation requires an SSN to receive a
particular benefit or service, which an alien has otherwise established
entitlement; or 2) a State or local law requires an SSN to get public
assistance benefits, to which the alien has otherwise established
entitlement and for which all other requirements have been met.
``Valid for Work Only with DHS Authorization''
Beginning in September 1992, SSA began issuing cards with the
legend ``Valid for Work Only with INS Authorization'' to noncitizens
lawfully in the United States with temporary authorization to work.
This legend has been changed to ``Valid for Work Only with DHS
Authorization'' to reflect the change from ``INS'' to ``DHS''. In these
cases, employers must look at the non-citizen's DHS documents to
determine if the individual has current work authorization. In addition
a participating employer may use the DHS employment eligibility
verification service, known as the Basic Pilot, to confirm employment
eligibility for newly hired employees, which includes verification with
SSA records and for noncitizens, with DHS records.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, SSA issued approximately 5.4 million
original cards. Of these, 4.3 million were issued to United States
citizens. Approximately 1.1 million cards were issued to non-citizens
with temporary or permanent work authorization.
Over the years SSA has made continual enhancements to the Social
Security card. Because of the substantial cost of replacing all cards
in use, older versions of the card remain valid. Thus, there are about
50 different variations of the SSN card that have been issued since
1936.
NonWork SSNs
SSA also issues cards to aliens legally in the United States but
who are not authorized to work by DHS. Last year SSA issued fewer than
15,000 of this type of non-work card. Each year as required by Section
414 of the Illegal Immigration Reform Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208, SSA
reports to Congress the number of SSNs assigned to aliens who were not
authorized to work in the United States when the card was issued for
whom we receive Form W-2s. The most recent report stated that earnings
were credited to 555,227 SSNs assigned to non-citizens who did not have
authority to work in the United States at the time the SSN was
assigned. It is important to note that since the work authorization
status of a non-citizen may change, an earnings report under a nonwork
SSN does not necessarily mean that unauthorized work was performed.
Additional Efforts to Strengthen the Enumeration Process
SSA has taken a number of steps to further strengthen the processes
associated with assigning SSNs. You will recall that SSA formed a high-
level response team to develop recommendations on enumeration policy
and procedure in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. As previously reported to this Subcommittee, implementation
of many of the team's recommendations has strengthened our capability
to prevent those with criminal intent from obtaining and using SSNs and
SSN cards. As mentioned earlier in my testimony, beginning June 1,
2002, SSA began verifying birth records with the issuing agency for all
United States born SSN applicants age one or older. In addition,
beginning in July 2002, SSA began verifying the authenticity of all
immigration status with DHS before assigning SSNs to non-citizens.
We also continue to look for additional ways to make the
enumeration process more efficient and secure. In November 2002, SSA
piloted a Social Security Card Center in Brooklyn, New York. The Card
Center represents a joint effort by SSA, SSA's Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
collaboration of these parties is intended to strengthen SSN
application procedures, and to ensure that applications are processed
with a high degree of integrity, efficiency and expertise.
In April 2005, SSA established another Social Security Card Center
in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Las Vegas Social Security Card Center is
dedicated exclusively to helping Las Vegas Valley and southern Nevada
residents apply for a new or replacement Social Security Card. SSA
plans to open additional centers as resources permit over the next
several years based on SSN workloads and other service delivery
factors.
SSN Verification Processes
Many diverse organizations request SSN verifications for various
purposes. SSA must consider each request to determine whether to deny
or permit verification and what information, if any, may be disclosed.
SSA also must consider each request to ensure that the proper
safeguards are in place to protect the information being disclosed. SSA
must also be reimbursed for any work not related to the administration
of our programs. Of course, by law, we cannot fulfill requests for non-
program purposes if doing so would impede our mission.
For many years, most SSN verifications were processed in our field
offices. This was a manual process which was highly labor intensive. In
1983, SSA implemented the Employee Verification Service (EVS) in order
to better manage the verification workloads. Since then SSA has
provided additional ways to access SSN verification routines as
technology has evolved.
Employers
Employers are our primary requestors for SSN verifications because
they must accurately report wage information for the people they
employ. One of SSA's core business processes is maintaining the
accuracy of earnings for all workers to ensure that they receive credit
for the work on which FICA taxes were paid. Accurate earnings
information is important because a worker's earnings record is the
basis for computing retirement, survivors, and disability benefits.
SSA has successfully provided SSN verification services to the
employer community for many years. Employers can verify SSNs for their
employees by telephone, by submitting paper listings or by magnetic
media.
To further improve our service to employers, SSA piloted an online
service, known as Social Security Number Verification Service (SSNVS),
in April 2002. In June 2005, SSA expanded the availability of this
service to all employers. This optional, free and secure Internet
service provides employers with an immediate response for a limited
number of SSN verification requests or a next business day response for
high volume SSN verification requests.
As mentioned earlier in my testimony, employers may participate in
the Basic Pilot program, an ongoing joint initiative in which SSA
supports DHS in assisting participating employers in confirming
employment eligibility for newly hired employees. Participating
employers may use the automated system to verify SSNs and alien
registration or admission numbers through verification checks of SSA
and DHS databases.
In 2005, through the EVS, SSNVS, and Basic Pilot programs, we
estimate we provided a total of 67 million employer verifications, up
from 62 million in 2004.
Federal and State Agencies
Many Federal, State, and local agencies request SSN verification
services for numerous purposes, from issuing food stamps to tracking
convicted felons. Some of the agencies receive information as a result
of legislation. Some of these organizations include, but are not
limited to:
<bullet> The Department of Education
<bullet> The Department of Justice
<bullet> The Office of Child Support Enforcement
<bullet> The Internal Revenue Service
<bullet> The Department of Veterans Affairs
<bullet> The Selective Service System
<bullet> Any Federal agency which uses the SSN as a numerical
identifier in their record system
<bullet> Federal, State, and local agencies for validating the SSN
used in administering income or health maintenance programs
<bullet> Federal, State, and local agencies where SSN use is
authorized under Federal statute and they are involved in programs such
as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and
Unemployment Insurance
<bullet> State Motor Vehicle Agencies
<bullet> Prisons
<bullet> Law enforcement fugitive felon operations
<bullet> SSA OIG.
SSA provides verifications to some State agencies, such as State
motor vehicle licensing agencies via the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA).
Third Parties
Under the Privacy Act, SSA may verify or release SSNs to third
parties that have obtained the written consent of the number holder,
regardless of the purpose of the request. SSA has been providing such
third party verifications for many years through existing verification
processes.
Impact of Public Law 108-458
Section 7213 of P.L. 108-458 contains several provisions to
strengthen the integrity of our enumeration process. Two key provisions
include the implementation of limits on the number of replacement SSN
cards an individual can receive to three per year and ten per lifetime
with limited exceptions and the addition of death and fraud indicators
to SSN verification routines for employers, State agencies issuing
driver's licenses and identity cards, and other verification routines
as determined to be appropriate.
As I mentioned previously, SSA implemented the restrictions on
replacement SSN cards effective December 17, 2005 as required by IRTPA.
In addition, although most death records were already available to
employers and DMVs through our SSN verification services, we have also
added the State death records that were previously restricted as
authorized by IRTPA. Those additional death records were added to SSN
verification routines on March 6, 2006, well before the implementation
deadline set by IRTPA. We continue to work to ensure that fraud
indicators will be added to the SSN verification routines by December
2007.
Section 7213 of IRTPA also required SSA to establish minimum
standards for verification of documents submitted in connection with an
SSN. To this end, SSA established rigorous new standards for evidence
of U.S. citizenship and identity submitted in connection with an
application for an SSN.
IRTPA also required SSA to form an interagency taskforce
specifically charged with establishing security requirements, including
standards for safeguarding SSN cards from counterfeiting, tampering,
alteration and theft. This interagency taskforce is working to improve
the security features included on the current banknote card. SSA will
prepare for implementation of the taskforce recommendations by June
2006.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Social Security number was originally intended
as a means to provide a record of the earnings of people who worked in
jobs covered under the new Social Security program. We must remember
that with all the improvements in the assignment of SSNs, the Social
Security card is still just a record of the SSN assigned to the
individual and not an identity document.
However, as we all know, the use of the SSN for other purposes has
grown significantly over the years. The challenge we face is to balance
SSA's commitment to assigning numbers quickly and accurately to
individuals who qualify for them and need them to work, with the
equally important need to maintain the integrity of the enumeration
system to prevent SSN fraud and misuse.
I want to thank the Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for
inviting me here today, and I look forward to working with you to
continue to improve SSA's processes.
I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.
<F-dash>
Chairman MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. Streckewald. Dr. Kent.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN T. KENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
SCIENTIST, INFORMATION SECURITY, BBN TECHNOLOGIES; AND
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR
PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIES
Dr. KENT. Good morning, Chairman McCrery, Congressman
Levin. I am Steve Kent, Vice President and Chief Scientist, for
Information Security at BBN Technologies. I served as the Chair
of the Committee on Authentication Technologies and their
Privacy Implications for the National Research Council, the
operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences.
The study Committee authored two reports: ``IDs, Not That
Easy, Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems,'' on which
you have asked me to testify, and ``Who Goes There:
Authentication Through The Lens Of Privacy.'' It is a pleasure
to be here to discuss these reports with you. I will try to
briefly summarize my written testimony which I submitted for
the record.
First, some general observations: developing identity
systems is much more complex than it initially appears. Several
key policy questions must first be answered, among them what
problem is the system supposed to solve, and how will it try to
solve the problem? How authentication will be achieved has to
be looked at; who would be users of the system, who will rely
on it, what types of uses will be allowed, and what legal
structures protect the integrity of a system.
Implicit in all these are that we are dealing with a
system, not just ID cards. Success, therefore, depends not only
on the card technology we use but on all of the ways the system
components have to work together. The high cost of fixing or
even abandoning a system makes it essential that potential
ramifications are explored very thoroughly prior to making
decisions about design details and deployment of a system.
Let me address a few of the specific questions that you
posed. There are a number of technical challenges associated
with building a counterfeit resistant, long lasting, easily
replaceable ID card. No method of ensuring that the person
presenting the card is the proper owner can be completely
reliable. A key decision for any system of this sort would be
determining an acceptable threshold of false rejection and
false acceptances, none of which are going to be zero in any
practical technology.
Second, any large scale identity system designed for a
specific purpose is almost always used for other, secondary
purposes. The ID may be used for verification unrelated to the
original purposes. The data collected may be used in ways that
have little to do with the original purpose.
These unplanned uses often cause problems. For example,
security and privacy protections that were designed for the
original use might not align with the needs of a secondary use.
Data collected for the primary use might not be appropriate in
terms of quality or reliability for a secondary use.
For the primary user, the existence of secondary uses can
make it difficult to respond to a detected attack on the
system. The range of possible reasons for the attack grows with
secondary uses, making it more difficult to determine how to
respond. The ID system databases hacked, for instance, was in
an individual trying to get a fake ID for purchasing alcohol or
someone with more nefarious purposes in mind.
Third, the privacy implications of large scale identity
systems are significant. A major challenge to privacy is the
ability to cross-reference databases in different systems tied
to an ID, even when the primary system is privacy-preserving.
Another problem is that of identity theft. To lessen the impact
on privacy, a number of steps can be taken, including being
clear about the system's purpose, minimizing the scope and
retention of collected data, and clarifying who will have
access to data, and, of course, providing means for individuals
to check on and correct information stored about them to
rectify errors in the system.
Fourth, identity establishment itself is a challenging but
critical part of the process. Of particular concern is the fact
that fundamental documents, foundational documents like birth
certificates that are required to establish identity for other
identity documents are themselves subject to fraud and forgery.
Moving to digital credentials or biometrics will not change
some of the basic avenues of attack against a large scale
identity system. As a result, the issuing process itself will
remain extremely vulnerable. The best any new system can
provide is a compelling connection with some previous
verification of identity, and that is usually imperfect.
Finally, while our reports did not address the specific
concerns you asked about with regard to modifying the SSN card
to help prevent unauthorized immigrants from gaining lawful
employment, the framework we presented in our study I think can
be applied to this topic.
It is important to note that layering a new system on top
of the primary use of the SSN card would not intrinsically add
to the testimony of the data that was collected for that
original purpose. The data has the same quality and reliability
that it had prior to the addition of the new system and the
introduction of higher quality credentials in a physical sense.
In conclusion, as the title of our report suggested, IDs,
Not That Easy, none of the issues raised by development and
deployment of large scale identity systems are simple. The
questions posed in our report should be carefully and
thoroughly applied, not only from a privacy perspective but
from a security, usability and effectiveness perspective as
well.
Thank you. That concludes my comments. I will be happy to
take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kent follows:]
Statement of Stephen T. Kent, Ph.D., Chairman, Committee on
Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications, National
Research Council, The National Academies
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is
Stephen Kent. I am Vice President and Chief Scientist for Information
Security at BBN Technologies and served as the chair of the Committee
on Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications of the
National Research Council. This study committee authored the two
reports, IDs--Not That Easy: Questions About Nationwide Identity
Systems and Who Goes There? Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy,
on which you have asked me to testify. The National Research Council is
the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy
of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on
matters of science and technology.
It is a pleasure to be here to discuss these reports on large-scale
identity systems. By way of background: the study committee originally
planned to do only the Who Goes There? report. We decided on the IDs
report about half-way through our study process after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. In the wake of those attacks, numerous
proposals for what identity systems could or should accomplish with
respect to counterterrorism began circulating in the policy community
and the media. The study committee believed that the persistence of
public discussion about possible new ID systems and the expectation
that other proposals would continue to be offered argued for an
informed analysis and critique of the concept of a nationwide or large-
scale identity system. The brief report on IDs was the result. It was
intended to catalyze a broader discussion, and I am happy to be here
today to continue that discussion.
I will start with a brief overview of the highlights of the IDs
report and then address some of the specific issues that you asked me
to consider in my testimony today.
Perhaps the most important message of our work on ID systems is
that designing and building systems to ascertain identity is much more
complex than it might appear and is indeed why we titled our IDs report
``Not That Easy.''
A primary consideration is to understand the goals of a large-scale
identity system. Before any decisions can be made about whether to
attempt some kind of system, the question of precisely what is being
discussed and what purpose it will serve must be answered. What problem
or problems is the proposed system meant to solve? The high-level
policy questions that the IDs report outlines include the following:
<bullet> What is the purpose of the system? What problem or
problems is it attempting to address?
<bullet> What is the scope of the population that would be issued
an ID? Related to this, how would the identities of these individuals
be authenticated?
<bullet> What is the scope of the data that would be gathered
about individuals in support of issuing an ID and how would it be
correlated to data about them in any databases associated with the
system?
<bullet> Who would be the users of the system? By this we mean not
only those who would be issued an ID, but the government agencies,
perhaps state and local governments, or even the private sector
organizations that might rely on the IDs. What entities would be
allowed to use the system? Who could contribute, view, and/or edit the
data in the system?
<bullet> What types of use would be allowed? Who could demand an
ID? Under what circumstances? What types of database queries about
individuals would be permitted? Would data mining or analysis of the
information collected be permitted? Who would be allowed to do such
analysis? For what purposes?
<bullet> Would enrollment in and/or identification by the system
(even if the individual had not formally been enrolled) be mandatory or
voluntary?
<bullet> What legal structures protect the system's integrity as
well as the ID holder's privacy and due process rights? What structures
determine the government and relying parties' liability for system
misuse or failure?
Answers to all of these questions (and more) will have
ramifications for the technological underpinnings of the system,
including what levels and kinds of system security will be required.
Implicit in all of these questions is the notion of a ``system''
and not merely an ``ID card.'' The fact that any identity management
proposal necessarily implies a ``system'' may be one of the most
important (and less discussed) aspects of many of the identity system
proposals that we have seen. These systems, at the scale that they are
proposed, necessarily imply the linking together of many social, legal,
and technological components in complex and interdependent ways. The
success or failure of such a system is dependent not just on the
individual components (for example, the ID cards that are used, or the
biometric readers put in place) but on the ways they work, or do not
work, together. For example, are card readers located where they need
to be? How well do the readers operate under various environmental and
load scenarios? Who will operate the systems and how will they be
trained and vetted? Do enrollment policies align with the security
needs envisioned for the system? And so on. How well these
interdependencies are controlled along with the mitigation of security
vulnerabilities and the unintended consequences of the deployment of a
system, will be critical factors in its overall effectiveness.
In addition to the questions above, the committee outlined several
cautions to bear in mind when considering the deployment of a large-
scale identity system:
<bullet> Given the costs, design challenges, and risks to security
and privacy, there should be broad agreement in advance on what problem
or problems the system would address.
<bullet> The goals of the system should be clearly and publicly
identified and agreed upon, with input sought from all stakeholders.
<bullet> Care must be taken to explore completely the potential
ramifications of deploying a large-scale identity system, because the
costs of fixing, redesigning, or even abandoning a system after broad
deployment would likely be extremely high.
That is a brief overview of some of the highlights from the IDs
report. The study committee urged that proponents of large-scale
identity systems present a compelling case addressing the issues raised
in these reports and solicit input from a broad range of stakeholder
communities. The IDs report elaborates on these issues and also
considers some of the technological and security challenges inherent in
large-scale identity systems. Some of the issues you asked me to
address in my testimony today are more specific than what I have
presented here so far, and to the extent that our reports address them,
I will briefly discuss them.
Tamper-Proof ID Cards
Cards are often suggested as a means of binding an ``identity''
within a system to an individual. The question being: if someone
presents a valid card, how do you know first, that the card is valid,
and second, that the card belongs to the person presenting it? To the
first question, the goal of a counterfeit-resistant, long-lasting,
easily-replaceable ID card presents difficult technical challenges.
Magnetic stripe cards are trivially easy to counterfeit. Memory cards
or smart cards are more difficult, but not impossible, to duplicate or
forge. Use of cryptographic technologies and digital signatures can
help, but for any technology, some degree of imperfection will exist. I
have already mentioned that a key notion to keep in mind is that these
systems are in fact systems--they would likely encompass databases,
processes and procedures, cards, card readers, architectural
requirements, security needs, and much more, not to mention the people
who are a part of any technical system. Any ID card that is issued is
only a component of the system. One question that must always be asked
is what is the perceived threat? By threat I mean what set of
adversaries do we believe we need to thwart, what are their
capabilities, and what are their goals? If we cannot answer that
question, we have no rational basis for deciding if any proposed system
will likely be adequate, or whether it will be overkill.
To the question of ensuring that the person presenting the card is
the same person identified with the card, a picture on the front of the
card might be some assurance, but people sometimes have a hard time
matching faces to pictures. ``Two-factor authentication'' in which an
individual presents a card along with additional information (such as a
PIN or thumbprint--either of which could be compared to data on the
card) is another possibility. Another scenario might be to have the
person interact with a biometric scanner and present the card that
contains reference information for the biometric in question. Both
pieces of information are validated in combination against a backend
server. This, however, creates a requirement for high availability and
a dependence on a secure, reliable network and communications
infrastructure. Also, unless the scanner is itself a secure device (and
known to be so through some kind of formal evaluation process) or the
scanner is closely monitored, the system may be compromised. Even then,
the system will not be fool-proof. (I am informed, by the way, that the
NRC is conducting a large study on biometric systems that should be
released later this year)
A decision on thresholds for false rejection and false acceptance
rates (which is, first, a policy decision) will need to be made--and
those thresholds cannot really be zero for any technology. Moreover,
even the best-designed systems are subject to social engineering (there
are numerous examples of personnel being tricked into issuing
credentials without adequate proof of identity or authorization) and
insider threat attacks--and thus one cannot rely on technological
solutions alone. The entire system and implications of policy decisions
at all levels must be thought through carefully.
Secondary Uses
One of the challenges that arises repeatedly with a large-scale
identity system designed for a specific purpose (or set of purposes) is
that there are almost always forces in play that push the systems to be
used for things that they were not originally designed for. A familiar
example of this is the state driver's license, which does not merely
enable one to legally drive on public roads, but is also relied on to
provide ``proof of age'' for alcohol purchases and ``proof of
identity'' to board an aircraft for domestic travel in the U.S.
Most systems do not explicitly guard against secondary uses,
although occasionally there are legal requirements or contractual
relationships that limit secondary use (such as credit card
agreements.) There are at least two ways in which secondary use might
happen. In some cases, the card presented may be used for additional
verification purposes in contexts unrelated to the original purposes.
In other instances, the data collected in support of card issuance may
be used in ways that have little to do with the original purpose.
Unintended uses of an identity system and its associated technologies
can always have inadvertent side effects. There are numerous examples
in the literature of this, and the expansion over time in use of the
Social Security Number (SSN) is a well-known instance. For example, the
proposed ID might become the new, de facto photo ID for individuals,
potentially exposing SSNs to a very wide range of organizations at a
time when states are eliminating the SSN from driver's licenses.
If any new ID system is deployed, chances are that there will be
uses found for it that were not originally intended. While this might
seem an efficiency on the surface, in fact, such unplanned-for multiple
uses may cause problems.
<bullet> A particular challenge resulting from unplanned-for uses
is when technology or an ID system designed for a specific security
context, user population, and so on is used (intentionally or
unintentionally) without a determination as to whether the original
security, privacy, and usage assumptions still hold in the new context.
Secondary uses are implicitly relying on whatever assurances, security
models, and privacy protections the original designers and implementers
were working with. These may not align with the needs of the secondary
user. For example, access to a health club may require a different
usability or privacy model than access to secured facilities at an
airport. One size cannot fit all.
<bullet> A significant context consideration is the security of
the system. The original system was designed with a particular threat
model in mind; this threat model may not apply to secondary uses of the
system.
<bullet> Another problem is that the data collected for the
original purposes may not be what is needed, or at the appropriate
quality or reliability levels, for the new secondary uses.
<bullet> Depending on inappropriate assumptions is not a challenge
just for the secondary user, but also for the primary users of the
system. An ID system that is used for multiple purposes with multiple
types of threats, not all of which were designed or planned for, can
make it difficult to respond to a known attack on the system. This is
because with secondary uses, the universe of possible motivations
behind the attack is much larger, making it difficult to ascertain what
is an appropriate response to an attack. If your database is hacked,
was it individuals desiring a fake ID to purchase alcohol, for example,
or individuals with more nefarious purposes in mind?
Privacy Consequences
The privacy implications of large-scale identity systems can be
significant. While casual discussions of IDs or ID cards may assume
simple, unique pairings of information and individuals, the reality is
often more complicated. A major privacy challenge, even when a given
system has been designed and is operating in a secure and privacy-
sensitive fashion, is the ability to cross-reference and link
information across databases in different systems. In many cases, an
identity in a given system will include a common cross-reference, such
as a Social Security Number, that makes it trivially easy to link it to
other identities associated with other systems (presumably designed for
other purposes.) In addition, questions arise as to how reliable the
linking would be--some institutions may not mind if suggested linkages
are only approximate (for example, a vendor attempting to do targeted
marketing), whereas others demand high levels of accuracy.
Identity theft is also a major concern, especially in the case of
centralized databases or systems used for multiple purposes--the more
useful or ``powerful'' an ID is the more tempting it is as a target.
Identity theft is an individual's fraudulent claim that he or she is
the person to whom the information in the system refers, allowing him
or her to derive some benefit from another party who is relying on that
claim. One reason for the problem is the expanded use of SSNs for
purposes that were not originally intended coupled with the assumption
that they are `secret' or should act as a `key.'
When designing a system to lessen impacts on personal privacy, the
study committee made a number of recommendations, including:
<bullet> Be clear about the purposes of the system.
<bullet> Minimize the scope of the data collected to that which is
essential for the purpose of the ID system.
<bullet> Minimize the retention interval for data collected in
association with use of the card.
<bullet> Clarify who will have access to the collected data.
<bullet> Clarify what kinds of access to and use of the data are
allowed.
<bullet> Ensure that use of the system is audited to protect
against illegitimate uses as well as to monitor for security threats.
<bullet> Provide means for individuals to check on and correct the
information stored about them.
All of that said, many times there are important uses of data that
are unanticipated when the data are collected. For these as for other
important uses, it is a question of balancing the risks to privacy and
confidentiality against the benefits of the uses, especially when the
uses are for research to inform public policies or for national
security. The Academies have long studied the issues here for important
research uses of data. A recent study is Expanding Access to Research
Data: Reconciling Risks and Opportunities from the Academies' Committee
on National Statistics. For the case of national security purposes, the
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board has joined with the
Committee on Law and Justice and the Committee on National Statistics
to launch a major study to balance the risks and benefits. The
Academies would be pleased to offer more information on these and other
studies that may be relevant to your inquiry or to help with further
investigations of interest to you.
Identity Establishment
The establishment of an identity in an identity-system is another
challenging but critical part of the process. There is a tangled web of
government-issued identity documents used as foundational documents
that allow the government and other organizations to issue other
identity documents. Many of these foundational documents, used to
acquire an SSN or Passport, for example, are subject to fraud and
forgery themselves. Birth certificates are particularly problematic, in
that they are issued by thousands of different jurisdictions across the
country, making them both easy to forge and difficult to verify and
thus very poor to use as an identification document from a security
perspective. Moreover, no aspect of a birth certificate binds it to an
individual in any strong security sense. The types of possible attacks
on identity documents vary and include the following:
<bullet> An individual acting as an impostor.
<bullet> Forged or fraudulent documents.
<bullet> Tampering with existing documents.
<bullet> Compromise of confidential information (for example, in
an identity system database) that is then used to create a false
identity.
<bullet> Modification of computerized records to support a false
identity.
Moving to, for example, digital credentials or biometrics will not
change these basic avenues of attack and fraud. As technology and
perhaps ID cards become ever more sophisticated, the issuing process
will remain extremely important. All the security in the world cannot
overcome deficiencies in this step--the system will only be as good as
the data that goes into it. The best that any system can provide is a
compelling connection with some previous verification of identity.
Essentially, trust in the integrity of the system is based not so much
on any single verification when an individual presents a claim of
identity as it is on increasing confidence when multiple transactions
happen over time and all previous transactions with that particular
individual have worked out.
Other Questions
You asked me to comment in particular on the issue of modifying the
SSN card so that it is tamper- and counterfeit-resistant as part of
efforts to prevent unauthorized immigrants from gaining lawful
employment in the United States. While the National Research Council's
reports did not address this specific question, such an approach
clearly falls within the realm of large-scale identity systems that the
study committee was considering. The framework that we presented can be
applied to this question.
For example, once the purpose of a system is clearly articulated--
in this case the prevention of unauthorized people from gaining lawful
employment in the United States--then a next question to ask is what
information would accomplish the goal of ascertaining whether an
individual is qualified to work in the United States? Who has that
data? Who collects it? Who can access it? If a system with that sort of
data were deployed, how would it be regulated? What penalties or
liabilities would be associated with misuse? How could individuals
correct their own data within the system? What kinds of security would
be needed? What are the likely threat models for such a system? How
could potential threats of identity theft (in this case ``worker-
identity'') be mitigated? Who would be authorized to ask to see the ID
card associated with this system? Are there other likely abuses and how
could the possibility of those be mitigated? If the system is to be
built on top of another existing identity system (such as the SSN)--
which poses its own very serious challenges since this basically would
be an unintended, unplanned-for, not designed-for use of the SSN--then
what can be assumed about the underlying data in the current system?
Layering even the best current security on top of old data only gives
the old data an appearance of being more trustworthy--the data has the
same quality and reliability that it had prior to the security being
added.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, our study committee
wrestled with questions of identity, authentication, identification,
and large identity systems for many months--not new issues, but ones
that were brought into sharp focus after September 11, 2001. In the
study I have described, we have attempted to lay out our thinking and
analysis of these issues. As the report title, IDs--Not That Easy,
suggests, none of these issues is simple, and any large-scale identity
system poses numerous questions that should be carefully thought
through--not only from a privacy perspective, but also from security,
usability, and effectiveness perspectives. Our reports attempt to lay
out some of these questions that must be addressed and to illustrate
the complexities that can arise.
You can find more information about these and related studies on
the Web site of the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of
the National Research Council at http://www.cstb.org.
Thank you. That concludes my comments. I would be happy to take any
questions you may have.
<F-dash>
Chairman MCCRERY. Thank you, Dr. Kent. Mr. Rotenberg.
STATEMENT OF MARC ROTENBERG, PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER
Mr. ROTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Levin.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Marc
Rotenberg. I am President of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center. We are a public interest research group here in
Washington. We have done a lot of work related to the SSN. I
also teach privacy law at Georgetown Law Center.
I would like to briefly summarize my testimony and ask that
the statement be included in the record.
The key points I would like to make this morning concern
the history of the effort to restrict the use of the SSN
precisely so that it would not form the basis for a national
identity card. As you well know, when the number was first
established for the purpose of accounting for the SSA
contributions, the first regulation that was issued by the the
SSA was to make clear that this was not a card for
identification purposes.
Now, the particular concern about the possible misuse of
the SSN was taken up in 1973 in a very important report by the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This report
more than 30 years ago identified the possible misuse of the
SSN to link together record systems across government agencies
and with private sector record systems.
As a consequence of that investigation, Congress enacted in
1974 the Privacy Act (P.L. 93-579). The Privacy Act, among the
various things that it did, set out clear prohibitions on the
collection and use of the SSN. Although people at that point in
time did not use the phrase identity theft, I think it was a
very wise decision on the part of the Congress to limit the use
of the SSN, because what we have seen now, 30 years later, is
that the broad dissemination of the Social Security number
within the United States has contributed to what is now the
number one crime. The crime of identity theft is a $53 billion
crime, according to a 2004 report of the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).
Now, since the passage of the Privacy Act, it is obviously
the case that the uses of the SSN have expanded by both
government agencies and in the private sector, but I think it
is important to note at the same time that the Congress and the
States and the FTC have taken measures to try to limit the use
of the SSN, recognizing that it does create an increased risk
of identity theft. I think one of the witnesses spoke earlier
about the provision that in effect took the SSN off the State
driver's license so that the driver's license would not become
the link to other record systems.
Now, certainly, steps can be taken to enhance the Social
Security card so that the likelihood of counterfeiting and
tampering are diminished, and I think everyone including
privacy organizations would favor those measures. The concern
here on the privacy side is that the number becomes the basis
for linking together different record systems; so, for example,
if it becomes the basis for employment eligibility
determinations, which could be made by DHS, every employee in
the United States, not just immigrants to this country, would
be required to present their Social Security card as a
condition of establishing eligibility for employment, and I
think this is something that was clearly never anticipated in
the use of the number. I very much support the testimony of Dr.
Kent and the work of the National Research Council.
As these uses are expanded to determine citizenship, for
example, or to determine employment eligibility, the increasing
risks of misuse expand as well, as do the targets of
opportunity and incentives for people to take advantage of the
SSN and use it in ways that will cause actual harm and crime to
individuals.
So, our recommendation to you today, particularly in the
context of a series of hearings that look at high risk issues
associated with the use of the SSN, is to ensure that there are
adequate security and privacy safeguards for current uses and
to avoid new uses that might introduce new risks and new
dangers to American consumers.
There is a good reason, I believe, that people in this
country in particular are very uneasy about a national identity
card, and it is part of our longstanding traditional that we
would not, as a general matter, expect to live in a country
where the government could say in effect please present your
identity and prove to us who you are.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify this
morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rotenberg follows:]
Statement of Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic
Privacy Information Center
Introduction
Chairman McCrery, Ranking Member Levin, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the high-risk
issues surrounding Social Security numbers.
My name is Marc Rotenberg and I am Executive Director of the
Electronic Privacy Information Center. EPIC is a non-partisan research
organization based in Washington, D.C.\1\ Founded in 1994, EPIC has
participated in leading cases involving the privacy of the Social
Security Number (SSN) and has frequently testified in Congress about
the need to establish privacy safeguards for the Social Security Number
to prevent the misuse of personal information.\2\ Last year, I
testified on H.R. 98, the Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social
Security Protection Act of 2005 and urged Members to reject the use of
the SSN as a national identifier and to ensure the development of
adequate privacy and security safeguard to address the growing crisis
of identity theft.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ EPIC maintains an archive of information about the SSN online
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/.
\2\ See, e.g., Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993)
(``Since the passage of the Privacy Act, an individual's concern over
his SSN's confidentiality and misuse has become significantly more
compelling''); Beacon Journal v. Akron, 70 Ohio St. 3d 605 (Ohio 1994)
(``the high potential for fraud and victimization caused by the
unchecked release of city employee SSNs outweighs the minimal
information about governmental processes gained through the release of
the SSNs''); Testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director,
Electronic Privacy Information Center, at a Joint Hearing on Social
Security Numbers and Identity Theft, Joint Hearing Before the House
Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security (Nov. 8, 2001)
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/testimony_11_08_2001.html;
Testimony of Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Legislative Counsel, EPIC, at a Joint
Hearing on Preserving the Integrity of Social Security Numbers and
Preventing Their Misuse by Terrorists and Identity Thieves Before the
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security and the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
(Sept. 19, 2002) available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/
ssntestimony 9.19.02.html.
\3\ Testimony of Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic Privacy
Information Center, at a Hearing on H.R. 98, the ``Illegal Immigration
Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of 2005'' before the
House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security,
and Claims (May 12, 2005) available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/
51205.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Security numbers have become a classic example of ``mission
creep,'' where a program designed for a specific, limited purpose has
been transformed for additional, unintended purposes, some times with
disastrous results. The pervasiveness of the SSN and its use to both
identify and authenticate individuals threatens privacy and financial
security. Recent efforts to expand employment verification programs
based upon SSN identification would turn the SSN into a national
identifier, subjecting Americans to a national tracking systems and
also heightening the risks of identity theft. There are additional
risks associated with some of the technological features that the
proponents of an ``upgraded'' Social Security card have suggested. As
the New York Times reported yesterday, RFID chips that are being added
to identity cards including the U.S. passport, are apparently subject
to computer viruses and other forms of attack.\4\ These risks
associated with the expanded use of the Social Security Number and
identification cards underscore the importance of the hearing today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ John Markoff, ``Study Says Chips in ID Tags Are Vulnerable to
Viruses,'' New York Times, March 15, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
History of SSN Use
The Social Security Number (SSN) was created in 1936 for the
purpose of administering the Social Security laws. SSNs were intended
solely to track workers' contributions to the social security fund.
Legislators and the public were immediately distrustful of such a
tracking system, which can be used to index a vast amount of personal
information and track the behavior of citizens. Public concern over the
potential abuse of the SSN was so high that the first regulation issued
by the new Social Security Board declared that the SSN was for the
exclusive use of the Social Security system.
Over time, however, legislation allowed the SSN to be used for
purposes unrelated to the administration of the Social Security system.
For example, in 1961 Congress authorized the Internal Revenue Service
to use SSNs as taxpayer identification numbers.
A major government report on privacy in 1973 outlined many of the
concerns with the use and misuse of the Social Security Number that
show a striking resemblance to the problems we face today. Although the
term ``identify theft'' was not yet in use, Records Computers and the
Rights of Citizens described the risks of a ``Standard Universal
Identifier,'' how the number was promoting invasive profiling, and that
many of the uses were clearly inconsistent with the original purpose of
the 1936 Act. The report recommended several limitations on the use of
the SSN and specifically said that legislation should be adopted
``prohibiting use of an SSN, or any number represented as an SSN for
promotional or commercial purposes.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens,'' Report of
the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems,
U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare 125-35 (MIT 1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In enacting the landmark Privacy Act of 1974, Congress recognized
the dangers of widespread use of SSNs as universal identifiers, and
enacted provisions to limit the uses of the SSN. The Senate Committee
report stated that the widespread use of SSNs as universal identifiers
in the public and private sectors is ``one of the most serious
manifestations of privacy concerns in the Nation.'' Short of
prohibiting the use of the SSN outright, Section 7 of the Privacy Act
provides that any agency requesting an individual to disclose his SSN
must ``inform that individual whether that disclosure is mandatory or
voluntary, by what statutory authority such number is solicited, and
what uses will be made of it.'' This provision attempts to limit the
use of the number to only those purposes where there is clear legal
authority to collect the SSN. It was hoped that citizens, fully
informed that the disclosure was not required by law and facing no loss
of opportunity in failing to provide the SSN, would be unlikely to
provide an SSN and institutions would not pursue the SSN as a form of
identification.
The SSN as a National ID Number Erodes Privacy
Contrary to the clear intent of the Privacy Act, legislation
considered this term has proposed to build the SSN and the Social
Security card into a national ID. H.R. 98, for example, would create a
de facto national identity card. Despite any disclaimers that the card
was not to be used for identification, employers required to verify the
information on the card (which would bear a photograph and a machine-
readable unique identifier) would likely rely upon these ``fraud
prevention measures'' as practical identification requirements. It is
important to note that the SSN and its basic card are not intended to
be used for authentication and identification purposes today, and yet
far too many entities rely upon it for just those purposes. Adding the
trappings of an identification document to it, including photographs
and machine-readable technology, only reinforces the card's status as a
badge of identity.
Furthermore, using the SSN for employment verification would
necessarily require the building of a vast database of nearly all
people employed within the country, which could be easily indexed and
correlated with other databases via the SSN. It is precisely this use
of the SSN that the drafters of the Privacy Act sought to prevent. H.R.
98 proposed that the database be available to Homeland Security for
``any other purpose the Secretary of Homeland Security deems to be an
the national security interests of the United States.'' This vague
clause perfectly illustrates ``mission creep,'' and highlights the risk
that a national database, based on SSNs, established for one purpose
could quickly be transformed into an open-ended system of national
surveillance.
A mandatory, national index of all people employed within the U.S.
would allow the tracking of individuals on an unprecedented scale. Each
person applying for a job would be subject to a status determination by
a government agency with each application. In essence, a person's life
and livelihood would be determined by a database kept by the federal
government--a database grounded in a flawed system of identification
never intended for the purpose.
Identity Theft
Nor are the uses of a universal identifier limited to government
uses. In fact, it is commercial enterprises that have made the SSN
synonymous with an individual's identity. Despite the fact that the
cards were never intended to be used for identification purposes, they
are considered the ``keys to the kingdom'' for records about individual
consumers.
The financial services sector, for instance, has created a system
of files containing personal and financial information on nearly ninety
percent of the American adult population, keyed to individuals' SSNs.
This information is sold and traded freely, with virtually no legal
limitations. This widespread use, combined with lax verification
procedures and aggressive credit marketing that lead to widespread
identity theft.
Credit grantors rely upon the SSN to authenticate a credit
applicant's identity; many cases of identity theft occur when thieves
apply using a stolen SSN and their own name. Despite the fact that the
names, addresses, or telephone numbers of the thief and victim do not
match, accounts are opened and credit granted using only the SSN as a
means of authentication. EPIC has detailed many of these cases in other
testimony.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (Credit
reporting agencies issued credit reports to identity thief based on SSN
match despite address, birth date, and name discrepancies); Dimezza v.
First USA Bank, Inc., 103 F. Supp.2d 1296 (D. N.M. 2000) (same). See
also United States v. Peyton, 353 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (Credit
issued based solely on SSN and name, despite clear location
discrepancies); Aylward v. Fleet Bank, 122 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same); Vazquez-Garcia v. Trans Union De P.R., Inc., 222 F. Supp.2d 150
(D. P.R. 2002) (same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The root of this problem is that the SSN is used not only to tell
the credit issuer who the applicant is, but also to verify the
applicant's identity. This would be like using the exact same series of
characters as both the username and password on an email account. The
fact that this practice provides little security should not be a
surprise.
The printing of SSNs on government-issued drivers licenses provided
yet another opening for identity thieves. A thief who stole your wallet
could also easily steal your identity, with name, address, diver's
license number, and SSN in one easy place. Congress recognized this
threat and in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, prevented the printing of SSNs on drivers licenses and other
government-issued ID.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Pub. L. No. 108-408 7211-7214, 118 Stat. 3638, 3825-3832
(2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Experiences
The debate on national identification cards is not restricted to
the United States. Fierce debates have erupted in other countries over
the adoption of national ID cards. The problems presented by such cards
in the UK, France, and many other nations are the same problems that we
would face here--convenient categorization of individuals' records, to
be used or abused by governments or those who obtain access to
government records.
The protests against the UK national ID cards are strong, and from
esteemed sources such as the London School of Economics,\8\ yet they
address a system that is even less problematic than one that could use
the SSN as a national ID. In the UK, for example, the national ID card
would be a voluntary document. And in Ireland, a proposal to establish
national was recently rejected.\9\ Here in the U.S., SSNs are most
frequently assigned at birth. We would be putting in place a system
mandating ownership of a machine-readable photo ID, a step that other
parts of the world, even those less opposed to government interference
in personal affairs, seem loath to take.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ London School of Economics, The Identity Report: an assessment
of the UK Identity Cards Bill and its implications (2005) at http://
is2.lse.ac.uk/IDcard/identityreport.pdf.
\9\ EPIC prepares an extensive annual survey of international
developments concerning privacy protection, including the debates over
identity documents. See Privacy and Human Rights: An International
Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments (EPIC 2004), available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-
82586&als[theme]=Privacy%20
and%20Human%20Rights&headline=PHR2004#_Toc396491834 (``Identity
systems'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measures to Prevent Fraud
The need to present such a card at every employment encounter, and
possibly also for homeland security purposes, would also likely
increase the need to carry the card on one's person, rolling back the
benefits achieved by taking the SSN off of driver's licenses. The
reason that the SSN can so easily be used for fraud is not that the
card lacks anti-counterfeiting measures; it is the fact that the card
is being used as an identifier in so many contexts that it should not
be. Efforts to protect the SSN and its holders should therefore be
focused upon limiting its uses and disclosures.
Several states have, in recent years, established new privacy
protections for SSNs. These laws demonstrate that major government and
private sector entities can still operate in environments where
disclosure and use of the SSN is limited. They also provide examples of
protections that should be considered at the federal level. For
example, Colorado, Arizona, and California all have laws that broadly
restrict the disclosure and use of the SSN by both government and
private actors. These laws encourage agencies and businesses to use
different identifiers for their specific purposes, reducing the
vulnerability that the disclosure of any one identifier may create.\10\
Arizona's law also prohibits the printing of the SSN on material mailed
to Arizona residents, reducing the threat of fraud from intercepted
correspondence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Colo. Rev. Stat 24-72.3-102; Ariz. Rev. Stat. 44-1373;
Cal. Civ. Code 1798.85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other states, including New York and West Virginia, have statutes
that limit the use of the SSN as a student ID number.\11\ This reduces
the vulnerability of students to identity theft and protecting the
privacy of students whose personal information is collected in
databases, and whose grades are often publicly posted, indexed by their
student ID numbers.Similar laws exist in Arizona, Rhode Island,
Wisconsin, and Kentucky.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ N.Y. Educ. Law 2-b; W. Va. Code Ann. 18-2-5f.
\12\ Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-1823; R.I. Gen. Laws 16-38-5.1; Wis.
Stat. Ann. 36.11(35); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 156.160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress and this Committee has likewise moved to protect the SSN;
just this session, Chairman Shaw and many other members of this
Committee introduced legislation that would have added protections on a
federal level. We hope that the Committee will be able to act on these
proposals this session
These various proposals all tend towards limiting the uses of the
SSN, in notable contrast to proposals that expand SSN uses and thus
expand individuals' vulnerability. We therefore urge the Committee to
regard cautiously any attempt to expand the use of the SSN beyond its
already overextended purposes.
Conclusion
The expanded use of the Social Security Number is fueling the
increase in identity theft in the United States and placing the privacy
of American citizens are great risk. The widespread use of the SSN has
made it too easy for government agencies, businesses, and even
criminals to create detailed profiles of individuals Americans.
Congress wisely sought to limit the use of the Social Security Number
when it passed the Privacy Act of 1974, and the states have since
established additional safeguards. While new techniques may address
some of the security and privacy issues associated with the expanded
use of the Social Security card, it clear that these techniques also
create new privacy and security risks. We urge the Committee to
consider very carefully the high-risk issues associated with the use of
the Social Security Number. Every system of identification is subject
to error, misuse, and exploitation.
______
Attachment
Inside Risks: Real ID, Real Trouble?
by Marc Rotenberg
According to the report of the 9/11 Commission, all but one of the
911 1 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification, some by
fraud. Acquisition of these forms of identification would have assisted
them in boarding commercial flights, renting cars, and other
activities. As a result, the Commission and some lawmakers concluded it
was necessary for the federal government to set technical standards for
the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such
as driver's licenses. The result was the Real ID Act of 2005.
The new law states that beginning in 2008, ``a Federal agency may
not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or
identification card issued by a State to any person unless the State is
meeting the requirements of this section.'' This means the Department
of Homeland Security will issue the technical standards for the
issuance of the state driver's license. The practical impact, as CNET
explained, is that ``Starting three years from now, if you live or work
in the United States, you'll need a federally approved ID card to
travel on an airplane, open a bank account, collect Social Security
payments, or take advantage of nearly any government service.'' And
even some of the more conservative commentators in the U.S. have
expressed concerns about ``mission creep.''
Several objections have been raised about the plan, including
privacy and cost, but the most significant concern may be security. As
Bruce Schneier has explained, ``The biggest risk of a national ID
system is the database. Any national ID card assumes the existence of a
national database . . . large databases always have errors and outdated
information.'' Even if the identity documents are maintained in the
states, problems are likely.
One example concerns the vulnerability of the state agencies that
collect the personal information used to produce the license. In 2005,
the burglary of a Las Vegas Department of Motor Vehicles put thousands
of driver's license holders at risk for identity theft. The information
of at least 8,738 license and ID card holders was stolen, and reports
of identity theft have already surfaced. Another report uncovered 10
``license-for-bribe'' schemes in state DMVs in 2004.
Not surprisingly, the administrators of the state license systems
are among those most concerned about the proposal. As the director of
Driver Services in Iowa said, ``It's one thing to present a document;
it's another thing to accept the document as valid. Verifying digital
record information is going to be difficult.'' The National Conference
of State Legislatures was more emphatic, ``The Real ID Act would cause
chaos and backlogs in thousands of state offices across the country,
making the nation less secure.''
The National Academy of Sciences anticipated many of these
challenges in 2002, stating that the U.S. should carefully consider the
goals of nationwide ID system: ``The goals of a nationwide
identification system should be clarified before any proposal moves
forward. Proposals should be subject to strict public scrutiny and a
thorough engineering review, because the social and economic costs of
fixing an ID system after it is in place would be enormous.''
The problems of building reliable systems for identification are
not unique to the U.S. Many countries are confronting similar
questions. In Great Britain, a national debate continues about the
creation of a new identity card. The government contends the card is
essential for combating crime, illegal immigration, and identity theft,
and can be achieved for an operating cost of 584million pounds per
year. But a report from the London School of Economics challenged a
number of the government positions and a subsequent report found
further problems with the ID plan.
The U.K. group concluded, ``ID requirements may actually make
matters worse.'' The LSE report cited a recent high-profile breach:
``Even as cards are promised to be more secure, attacks become much
more sophisticated. Most recently, Russian security agents arrested
policemen and civilians suspected of forging Kremlin security passes
that guaranteed entrance to President Vladimir Putin's offices.''
Systems of identification remain central to many forms of security
But designing secure systems that do not introduce new risks is proving
more difficult than many policymakers had imagined. Perhaps it's time
for the proponents of expanded identification systems to adopt the
cautionary line from Hippocrates: ``First, do no harm.''
______
Marc Rotenberg (rotenberg@epic.org) is executive director of the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the former director of
the ACM Washington Office: an expanded version of this column appears
at www.epic.org.
<F-dash>
Chairman MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. Rotenberg, and thank you
all for providing excellent testimony and raising some good
questions and considerations as we try to sort our way through
sometimes conflicting national needs and the desires of our
constituents and folks that are concerned about immigration,
about illegal immigration, and about terrorism.
We find ourselves kind of going in circles, it seems to me,
as we talk about these issues. On the one hand, we all want to
protect our border. We want to make sure that people are here
legally and working legally, but we also recognize the dangers
that Mr. Rotenberg and Dr. Kent pointed out of expanding the
uses of the SSN and thereby increasing the opportunity for
fraud.
So, it is a complex question, and I appreciate the sunlight
that you all have brought to this question. Let us assume for
the moment that we could make a card that is much more
foolproof than the current card, and that would be very
difficult to copy. Even if we had that, let us look at the
question of employment eligibility and using that in employment
eligibility, because several Members of Congress have already
introduced proposals that would require employers to check a
government database to confirm an employee's work
authorization.
Some of those proposals combine that with an enhanced SSN
card that could be used to access the employment eligibility
verification system. How effective do you all think such a
system would be in preventing unauthorized noncitizens from
illegally obtaining employment? Would we get the desired result
from the bucks that we expend to put that system in place?
Mr. ROTENBERG. Well, one of the key issues, Mr. Chairman,
in that question, and this is also addressed in the National
Research Council report, concerns the quality of the underlying
data. The proposal which you are referring to, which I think is
H.R. 98, would try to, in effect, transform the SSN card into
an identity document and enable employers to query a national
database, which I believe would be maintained by DHS, to
determine the eligibility of a person who is seeking employment
in the United States.
It is possible, certainly, to enhance the card through
photographs and biometric means to make it into a quasi-
identity document. I think it would raise privacy issues, but
it would not resolve the question as to the accuracy of the
underlying data. I think it is very easy to imagine,
particularly with a lot of foreign names, that misspellings and
mispronunciations could easily lead to errors in these systems.
Now, that is not necessarily a reason not for doing it, but
I think it does underscore the need to, as Dr. Kent said, look
beyond the card and to establish this as a system problem and
to understand whether or not those databases would support good
decisions.
Chairman MCCRERY. Let me just interject for a moment,
because we ought not too easily set aside these suggestions in
today's world of extremely capable technology. You have
mentioned foreign names, and it is easy to get them mixed up.
On a computer it is pretty specific. You have to type in
exactly the right name. So, if you do that, and you send it to
this database, it is not going to get confused; it is going to
spit back exactly that name and whether it is authorized or
not. So, I do not buy that.
Do you have any other problems that you see with this
system being able to correctly identify whether a person in
this--I understand the underlying data may be wrong. I do not
think we can ever fix that. Well, I do not think as a practical
matter we can ever fix that. Assuming that the--well, never
mind the underlying data; we can at least say whether the
database has this person in it as authorized to work, can't we?
It might be expensive, but we can do that, can we not? These
gentlemen are nodding. Dr. Kent.
Dr. KENT. Well, Mr. Chairman, one question that would come
to mind immediately is whether everyone would be issued such a
credential or only whether people who were immigrants were
supposed to have such a credential.
Chairman MCCRERY. That is a good question, and we will get
to that.
Dr. KENT. If we assume that only people who were immigrants
are supposed to have it, then the burden, I would assume, on
the employer is to make an initial determination of whether or
not somebody applying for a job is or is not a citizen. Then
the question is what existing credentials do they use for that
purpose?
If I have to present a birth certificate, then, we
encounter all of the residual vulnerabilities associated with
birth certificate forgery when people do not go to the extent
that the earlier witnesses testified that you can do if you are
working hard in a forensic case to deal with fraud or something
like that, which the average employer would not be able to do.
So, there are a lot of questions we would have to answer to
really be able to determine that.
Chairman MCCRERY. Admittedly, people could find ways to
fabricate authentication and thereby get on the database as an
authorized worker. Would this system reduce the likelihood that
somebody could get a job in the country if that person were
here illegally and unauthorized to work?
Dr. KENT. It is hard to say----
Chairman MCCRERY. Sure.
Dr. KENT. --without looking at all the details, but----
Chairman MCCRERY. The next question is how much would it
reduce it?
Dr. KENT. Yes.
Chairman MCCRERY. That is an easy question to answer. Sure
it would, but would the bang for the buck be worth it? That is
the real question.
Dr. KENT. I think that is where an extensive study needs to
be undertaken to try to predict whether or not you would be
getting, as you say, good bang for the buck out of such a
system.
Chairman MCCRERY. Mr. O'Carroll, Mr. Outland, do you have
thoughts on this?
Mr. O'CARROLL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it's sort of a twofold
question, the first part asking in terms of designing a card
that would be tamper-resistant, difficult to counterfeit,
whatever.
What we are finding is basically anything that has been
engineered can be reengineered, and that is kind of our take on
any of the expense that would go into coming up with a more
counterfeit-proof card. It is really going to be pretty
difficult, and the result on it is probably not going to be as
good as one would hope.
So, what we are kind of in agreement with you on is that it
is the underlying data that is the most important. Right now,
what Social Security is using with DHS as the basic pilot, the
SSA is verifying the SSN. The DHS is verifying the work status
on it. There are other documents the employer can ask for, as
an example, a DHS I-9. They are running the SSN. They are
getting a verification back on it, and we are finding that that
type of information is going to be much more current than
anything you could embed on a card that is going to keep
requiring people to come back to have their cards updated and
information like that, which is a whole other workload,
assuming that we could come up with a tamper-proof card.
Rick?
Mr. OUTLAND. Yes, Congressman, adding a photograph or a
machine readable technology to the current card would obviously
include changing the substrate from the banknote paper to a
plastic substrate, say a polycarbonate or even a Teslin.
Now, while I have seen counterfeit documents produced on
driver's licenses on Teslin and PVC, there are security
features that are available that will make it more difficult
for the counterfeiter to reproduce those. So, I agree with you.
It can be done. You can produce a more difficult card. Given
the document as it is right now on banknote paper, there are
security features that can be added to that today at a nominal
cost to also make it----
Chairman MCCRERY. Yes, a $10 bill, for example.
Mr. OUTLAND. Correct.
Chairman MCCRERY. We have just done it. I saw one the other
day. It is very weird looking.
[Laughter.]
Chairman MCCRERY. I suppose it is better.
Mr. OUTLAND. Yes.
Chairman MCCRERY. Well, I want to give--you heard that.
That is the House Democratic Cloakroom advising Republicans and
Democrats we have votes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LEVIN. You can stay if you want.
[Laughter.]
Chairman MCCRERY. I am going to yield. I have more
questions, but I am going to yield to my good friend and
colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, for any questions he might
have.
Mr. LEVIN. Just a few, and then, I guess--maybe I will be
very brief so Mr. Pomeroy can--the more I hear of this, in a
sense the more confusing it is, though you are very articulate.
It is not very--it is not clear to me what the issues really
are. I take it there are numbers of citizens in the United
States, of the United States, who do not have a SSN.
Mr. STRECKEWALD. There are--I am sorry, there are many, did
you say? I could not quite hear you.
Mr. LEVIN. There are many.
Mr. STRECKEWALD. We do not believe there are too many
people, citizens of the United States that do not have a Social
Security card, because most parents get them right away for
their newborn babies for tax purposes, and everybody else has
one for work and for Social Security purposes.
Mr. LEVIN. Before that started, I take it there are some
people here, citizens, who do not have a SSN, maybe older
people, right?
Mr. STRECKEWALD. Well, most of our elderly, at one point or
another, came into our offices to get benefits. Even those that
did not work, there were some early provisions in Social
Security for spouses' benefits if they did not work which still
exist today. There were some for Medicare. So, I believe that
you would find that most elderly citizens----
Mr. LEVIN. Most.
Mr. STRECKEWALD. --have SSNs, if not all.
Mr. LEVIN. If we had an ID program, it would mean that
there would be people who would not otherwise seek a SSN who
would have to become participants in the program, right?
Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes; I think what I hear you saying is, if
we decided to issue a new card, there would be some people who
normally would not be coming in to get a card, and we would not
see them, because they are perfectly fine. Right now they do
not need to show their card. They are retired or whatever. If
they were asked to come in and get a new card, we would see a
lot more people than we normally see for the general
replacement card traffic.
Mr. LEVIN. Okay; secondly, if there were not an issue in
this country about people who are working here, who are not
here legally, would there be this issue of a national ID card?
You are not sure.
Mr. STRECKEWALD. At Social Security, from that perspective,
I am not sure. I would defer to the investigators and the
experts at the table.
Mr. LEVIN. Well, maybe you do not want to answer that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LEVIN. It is okay. The next thing that is rather
confusing is that part of the problem seems to be that a lot of
employers do not want to check the status, legal or illegal. Is
that not true? Yes, it is true.
Mr. STRECKEWALD. I mean, in our experience, I think, the
Inspector General's experience, that is definitely true.
Mr. LEVIN. So, if we have a card, it does not matter what
you call it, it does not get at the issue of whether we are
going to have an effective system of requirement when there is
a larger issue as to whether or not people want to accurately
and effectively check the status of people, right?
Mr. STRECKEWALD. For things to change from where they are
now, there would probably have to be more enforcement on that
part of the process; that they would have to check it and
verify it.
Mr. LEVIN. Just to finish, let us say we had an ID card
today, and we had a system that any employer who did not verify
and use the system, punch into the computer would be guilty of
a high misdemeanor, let us say, for example--I assume that
would be a somewhat controversial proposition, would it not?
Mr. O'CARROLL. Yes, I would agree, because as it stands
now, there are laws requiring employers to verify SSNs and
provide valid numbers, and employers do not. There has not been
very much enforcement done on that.
Mr. LEVIN. Thank you.
Chairman MCCRERY. Mr. Pomeroy.
Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
Thank you for putting together this hearing, and the very
interesting panel that majority staff selected has really done
a nice job here of collecting a range of views on the proposal.
When I was in the State Legislature, now 25 years ago, we
passed a law that the North Dakota driver's license number is
the SSN. It was simple, easy, everyone remembers.
They changed that law. They really, upon further
reflection, we really did not want Social Security kind of
being a national ID, a national identifier; privacy today,
privacy issues, identity theft issues, lots of things led the
legislature to correctly, in my view, make that change.
I do think this issue presents in front of us very
squarely, this would be moving the Social Security card to a
national ID card. Now, whether or not that is the full intent
of the proposal, I think that that is the effect of it. I have
concerns about it in that respect, and I think that the panel
has given voice to some of the reasons why one might want to
think twice about that.
Another concern I have got is budgetary. This $9 billion
cost of implementation is advanced at a time when the
Administration has proposed changes in Social Security that
would kick out of eligibility for survivors' benefits 16- and
17-year-olds. When my father died, I was 19, but I got benefits
all the way through college. That was pre-1983. In 1983, we
limited it to the 18th year.
I think depriving Social Security benefits to someone 16 is
just wrong, absolutely wrong. If we cannot afford to pay 16-
year-olds when they lose their Dad, I do not think we can
afford $9 billion in these fancy cards; simple as that.
So, I have got some very deep reservations about this
proposal. I thank the Chairman for letting me express them. I
yield back.
Chairman MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. Pomeroy. Gentlemen, we are
going to have some other questions that we would like to submit
to you in writing if that is okay, and that would allow you to
leave when we recess in just a few minutes and not just hang
around, because we are going to have votes until at least noon,
it looks like.
However, I do want to point out to Mr. Pomeroy my
observation that what some are proposing and what we are
discussing here today is an enhanced SSN card, and then using
that for purposes of employment verification or work
authorization verification. I do not view that as a national ID
card. I do not think it would be tantamount to a national ID
card necessarily, because unlike, say, a driver's license,
which we have to carry on our person if we drive or if we want
to cash a check or whatever, one would not have to carry their
Social Security card.
Only when he is applying for employment would he have to
get it out of his safe in his house, or his drawer, or
whatever, and take it down to that place of employment and say
``here.'' Then, once that is done, he takes it back, and puts
it back in his house in a safe place under his underwear or
whatever.
[Laughter.]
Unless he is burglarized, his SSN is safe with him, just as
safe as it is today, where the employer has to have it in any
event; he does not have to see the card, but he has to have
that number.
So, I think it is perhaps a bit of a jump to equate what we
are talking about today with a national ID card and all of the
ramifications of that. Would you disagree with my observations?
Mr. POMEROY. I think you make your point well, but my
thought is in the end, if you need this identification card
before you can get a job that we have taken a big step toward a
national ID card concept, I think. I also do not know about,
well, what other--unless we prohibit it in the legislation
itself, what other groups may require the use of this
particular card, because it would have--it would be the most
advanced card in the marketplace, what other groups might
require it for other purposes unless, again, we restrict it.
Chairman MCCRERY. Yes, well, that is a potential problem,
but anyway, this is an interesting subject and an important
subject, so I thank the witnesses very much for your testimony,
and if you all have any thoughts on what I and Mr. Pomeroy just
talked about, feel free to include those in your responses to
written questions. Thank you very much. The hearing will be in
recess until votes are concluded and we can muster the first
panel.
[Recess.]
Chairman MCCRERY. The Committee will come to order. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:48 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions submitted by Chairman McCrery to the Honorable
Jo Anne B. Barnhart and her responses follow:]
Question: If Congress were to require employers to verify an
employee's name, SSN, and employment eligibility through a government
database, would we still need to enhance the SSN card to prevent
unauthorized work by non-citizens? Would some form of identification,
(e.g., a driver's license or immigration card from the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security) plus confirmation from the system be enough to
identify individuals who do not have authorization to work in the
United States? How much value would an enhanced SSN card add to such a
system?
Answer: By using the Basic Pilot or a similar government database
which accesses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) work
authorization information, employers have access to the most current
work authorization data available, because DHS' work authorization data
is more current than the information on the Social Security number
(SSN) card. Therefore, requiring employers to verify employees' work
authorization through such a database, would render the SSN card,
enhanced or not, of little additional value in proving current work
authorization.
To address the issue of identity, employers would still need to
verify an employee's identity by examining an identity document listed
on the Form 1-9 and be alert for identity fraud situations. The Social
Security card itself was never intended and does not serve as a
personal identification document; that is, the card does not establish
that the person presenting the card is actually the person whose name
and SSN appear on the card.
Question: In his testimony, Mr. Streckewald said that replacing
cards for 240 million cardholders nationwide would cost approximately
$9.5 billion. How much would it cost if the agency issues new cards
only to people in the workforce? What are your thoughts on allowing the
SSA to charge a fee to offset some or all of those costs--what are the
arguments for and against such an option?
Answer: Last year we estimated a card with enhanced security
features, such as biometric identifiers, would cost approximately
$25.00 per card. This estimate does not include the startup investments
associated with the purchase of equipment needed to produce and issue
such a card. Based on this information, our most recent 5-year estimate
regarding the issuance of new enhanced cards to 170 million current
workers and 5 million new workers annually is approximately $6.7
billion to replace the cards within 5 years and $7.4 billion to replace
the cards within 2 years. This estimate includes all startup and
ongoing costs.
More recent data, however, shows that the cost of issuing Social
Security cards has increased by at least $3.00, due, in part, to new
requirements for verification of evidence. We will update our estimate
when we have accumulated sufficient baseline data. In addition, when
formulating an estimate based on a particular proposal, we would have
to consider the details of the proposal, including the type of card
enhancements required and the amount of time given to issue the
enhanced card.
Finally, charging a fee for issuing these new Social Security
cards, while ultimately a policy decision, would result in significant
additional costs for the Social Security Administration (SSA). It would
involve explaining and collecting the fee, obtaining credit card
authorization if necessary, entering remittance of the payment into an
automated system, and issuing a receipt of payment. In addition,
charging a fee would involve SSA periodically setting a fee schedule
and reconciling these offsetting collections. All of these actions
would result in a considerable increase in the cost of issuing a Social
Security card.
Question: What would be the effect on SSA's workloads of issuing
enhanced SSN cards to everybody who is seeking employment in the United
States? How many employees would it require to process the workload?
Answer: Issuing new enhanced cards to everyone seeking employment
in the United States would have a significant impact on SSA's workloads
until all individuals in the workforce have been issued a new card. We
estimate that the initial workload would require about 13,000
additional employees. This equates to approximately 20 percent of SSA's
current workforce. Absorbing this work without additional staff would
require a reduction of 20 percent of the work we currently process,
including retirement claims, disability claims and eligibility reviews.
This estimate does not reflect the increased time our employees must
spend with Social Security card applicants due to the new requirements
for verification of documents which began in December 2005. We
anticipate our workforce requirement would increase as a result of this
recent change, but we need to develop a longitudinal baseline of actual
data before revising our estimates.
Question: Another witness at the hearing, Dr. Kent, stated that
``layering even the best current security on top of old data only gives
the old data an appearance of being more trustworthy.'' Is the SSN
system a good database upon which to build an employment authorization
card? What changes, if any, would need to be made to the SSA's data to
provide reliable validation of identity and employment authorization?
Answer: Social Security's databases do not contain current
information about employment eligibility, because there is no SSA
program need to maintain such information. SSA is able to verify
current work authorization only when SSA records reflect that the
individual is a U.S. citizen, because U.S. citizens have permanent work
authorization. For all non-citizens, SSA's databases contain only a
``snapshot in time'' of employment eligibility as of the date the SSN
card was issued. SSA's records are updated only when a non-citizen
submits a new application requesting a change to the information in his
or her record and provides evidence supporting the change. Therefore,
DHS' work authorization data is the only reliable source for validating
the current employment eligibility of non-citizens.
We believe an employment eligibility verification system, such as
the current Basic Pilot, is the best tool for employers to verify
employees' current work authorization status. Such a system uses the
data contained in SSA and DHS databases in a way that allows each
agency to maintain only the data necessary for the administration of
their respective programs. As a result, each agency is able to focus on
its own business processes, including the collection, integrity and
accuracy of certain information. If these databases were to be
combined, one agency would be burdened with the management of data
which it does not collect, cannot verify and which is not related to
its business purposes.
In addition, a combined database would be less accurate than two
separate databases since combining the data would involve transmitting
updated information from the source data base. At any point in time,
some data on the combined database would be out of sync with the source
database that contains the most current information.
Finally, we note that an essential component of any employment
verification system is to confirm the identity of the individual
seeking employment verification. SSA databases do not contain identity
information and, thus, are not suited to this critical function.
Question: Currently the SSA issues a special series of SSNs to non-
citizens who are assigned SSNs through the ``enumeration-at-entry''
program. If the SSA were to dedicate a special series of SSNs to
individuals who have no authorization to work, or only temporary
authorization to work, at the time the SSN is issued, would that help
employers identify non-citizens who are unauthorized to work in the
United States?
Answer: SSA has considered using special series numbers for
temporary non-citizen workers and those non-citizens admitted without
work authorization. Our analysis showed that a special series for
temporary workers would be of limited value in providing meaningful
work authorization information to employers because immigration and
authorization to work status may expire, be renewed or changed to
another status by DHS. Thus, employers looking at a card or SSN with a
special series designated for temporary workers would still need to
verify current work authorization.
Other concerns to be considered with numbers that identify certain
categories of non-citizens include the following:
<bullet> Providing new, special series SSNs for all aliens in the
United States who have no work authorization or temporary work
authorization, and who have already been issued an SSN, would present a
staggering workload for SSA.
<bullet> SSA would also be required to assign new SSNs to non-
citizens when their immigration status changes. The volume of new SSNs
which would be required to assign multiple numbers to many non-citizens
would create a number of issues, including:
<bullet> Running out of numbers. (SSA currently has enough
SSNs for nearly 70 years. Assigning multiple numbers to non-
citizens would require setting aside large blocks of numbers,
which would significantly deplete the supply of SSNs available
to citizens.)
<bullet> Complex cross-referencing of multiple numbers by
SSA and all other governmental and non-governmental agencies
that use the SSN.
Question: If Congress were to require the SSA to record information
on when a temporary immigrant's authorization to work in the United
States expired as part of its voluntary SSN verification services,
would that help employers identify non-citizens who are unauthorized to
work in the United States?
Answer: In keeping with DHS' mission and authority, DHS has the
most current information on immigration and work authorization status.
We believe that giving employers access to DHS' work authorization
data, through an employment eligibility verification system such as the
Basic Pilot, would be the most accurate way for an employer to
determine an employee's current work authorization status.
While such information might be helpful to employers, requiring SSA
to maintain such information would be problematic. Maintaining work
authorization expiration information in SSA's records would expand
SSA's mission to include a business purpose that would concurrently
fall under the purview of DHS. Even if SSA were required to maintain
such information in its records, SSA would not be responsible for
granting work authorization status or determining the duration of such
status. Therefore, SSA would be unable to respond to employer questions
or to resolve issues related to the verification of that information.
[Questions submitted by Chairman McCrery to the Honorable Patrick
P. O'Carroll and his responses follow:]
Question: Is there such a thing as a counterfeit proof card? How
would you define a minimum threshold for a counterfeit and tamper
``resistant'' card?
Answer: We do not believe there is such a thing as a perfectly
counterfeit-proof Social Security card. Certainly, with each new
security feature, the card would be more tamper-resistant. However, we
are uncertain as to whether trying to make the card more counterfeit-
resistant is worth the costs of improving and reissuing such cards.
As a person ages, there are modifications in appearance such as
weight gain or loss, changes in hair and facial appearance, and so on.
Because of this, photographs often are not as reliable as other
biometric alternatives. We believe that digitized fingerprints would be
more reliable than photographs as scientific data suggests that a
person's fingerprints do not substantially change after age 3. In
addition, new photographs would need to be taken periodically to stay
current with an individual's physiological changes. We also are
concerned about the effect on SSA's Enumeration at Birth program of
requiring such a card.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) will need sufficient time
to design an enhanced card. It will need to determine which biometric
features are to be captured, ensure proper data linkage with the
Department of Homeland Security, and issue the new card to tens of
millions of individuals. This will create a significant administrative
and cost burden for SSA. A more viable alternative might be to issue
the new card only to new applicants, to those current number holders
who apply for benefits in the future, and to those current number
holders who request the new biometric card.
If the Social Security card is machine readable, then other public
and private sector entities will need to procure equipment that can
read the biometrics on the new cards. The costs to these entities, in
terms of equipment and training, would need to be considered.
Question: There is much concern that non-citizens who are
unauthorized to work are using counterfeit SSN cards and false or
stolen SSNs in order to illegally gain employment in the United States.
Is it the SSNs themselves, or SSN cards, that are most often used in
connection with unauthorized employment?
Answer: Under current law, the SSN card is not a required document
when an individual is applying for a job. If an applicant submits an
SSN card to an employer, that employer may not identify a counterfeit
card. Whether or not the employer views the actual SSN card, real-time
verification with SSA of the name and SSN the applicant provides could
assist in preventing theft of an individual's SSN or use of a false
number. In addition, active deterrence, in the form of possible
apprehension for false use of an SSN, would further decrease SSN
misuse.
Although we do not capture this specific information about SSN
misuse in our case management system, it has been the experience of our
investigators that SSNs themselves, rather than Social Security cards,
are most often used in connection with unauthorized employment.
Question: In your testimony, you said that your prior audit work
has revealed inaccuracies in the SSA's SSN database that could affect
the Agency's ability to provide employment eligibility verification
services. Could you elaborate on what you found?
Answer: In our audit Compliance with Policies and Procedures When
Processing Noncitizen Social Security Number Applications at Foreign
Service Posts (A-08-04-14060, August 30, 2004), we found that SSA
personnel classified 12 percent of the applicants enumerated at Foreign
Service posts during our audit period as noncitizens, even though
documents provided by the applicants showed them to be United States
citizens. For these cases, the SSA employee recorded that United States
citizens born abroad were noncitizens. We have additional audits that
have identified similar issues. However, we have not performed a review
of the overall accuracy of SSA's enumeration database. We do have a
review ongoing in this area and will report the results when we have
completed our review.
[Questions submitted by Chairman McCrery to the Dr. Peter Blair of
the National Research Council and his responses follow:]
Question: Dr. Kent stated in his testimony that there are almost
always forces that push identification systems to be used in ways for
which they were not originally designed or intended. What do you think
could be some of the unintended consequences of adding identity
information, such as a photograph or other biometric information, to
SSN cards?
Answer: The general issue of unintended consequences from the
deployment of any large-scale identity system is described in the
reports that Dr. Kent cited in his earlier testimony. Absent strong
technical and policy countermeasures and disincentives, the use of an
ID card, ID number, or ID system can expand greatly, just as has
happened with the SSN and the state driver's license. Potential
unplanned-for uses depend in part on the purpose of the system, what
information is contained in any related databases, and what possession
of an ID is meant to signify. Adding biometric information to the ID
system implies another level of complexity with all of the attendant
challenges surrounding enrollment, capture of biometric information,
reliability, accuracy, and so on. To the extent that an ID system is
made reliable and accurate, it is that much more tempting a target for
attacks or simply for uses for which it was not designed. Predicting
what specific secondary uses might arise for any particular ID system
is difficult absent a more complete description of that system.
Question: If the role of the SSN card was expanded so that it
provided proof of identity, would it become a more desirable target for
identity thieves or others who seek to commit crimes using the SSN?
Would the potential damage that could be done if an SSN is stolen by
greater? How could we protect individuals, businesses, and the
government against this?
Answer: To the extent that an expanded SSN card becomes more
valuable--in this case ``proof'' of identity would be a valuable
commodity--the more likely it is to be a target for identity thieves as
they seek to take advantage of the new functionality. Increasing the
value of the SSN card might also raise its profile, even apart from any
new credentialing that it could offer, and thus increase the frequency
with which it is a target of traditional sorts of identity theft and
fraud. Identity theft is already a major challenge by virtue of the
link between the SSN and other readily available types of personal
information and access to credit. Finding ways to cut these links so
that identity credentials in one system cannot be easily used in
another might offer some protection. On the other hand, this could
insert friction and decrease efficiency of some transactions.
Question: What documents available today should employers use to
verify the identity of their employees?
Answer: Our reports do not address this question specifically. To
the extent that employers need to use an ad hoc or formalized identity
system when hiring, questions that would help guide the choice of
documents to use include: what specific problems need to be addressed
(in this case, presumably, establishing work eligibility), what is the
extent of the problem (affording some sense of costs and benefits), how
could a particular identity system address that problem, and what other
solutions (apart from a formalized new identity system) might address
the problem?
Question: How would you define a national identification system? If
Congress were to add certain features to the SSN card, such as a photo
or other biometric information, and to require its use to obtain
employment, do you think it would meet that definition?
Answer: Our reports do not draw a clear distinction because any
large-scale identify system poses numerous challenges and policy
questions that must be addressed. For some systems, such as those
deployed only to allow access to a particular business building for
example, the scope and scale is fairly limited and the policy issues
are primarily specific to that business or that location. However, in
any system that is deployed to encompass large portions of the
population for more general purposes much more rigor and attention to
the questions outlined in IDs--Not That Easy are needed. In this sense,
then, there are already several nationwide identity systems, each
serving different purposes, including passports, driver licenses, and
present-day SSN cards/numbers. In short, changing the SSN card's
features and functionality would create a national identification
system much as the existing systems listed above have, but the label is
much less important than is sorting through the policy and technical
challenges of any large-scale identity system.
Question: Members of Congress have introduced proposals that would
require millions of employers across the United States to access an
employment eligibility verification database operated by the
government. What concerns would you have about the privacy and security
of such a database? What is the track record on maintaining the
security of such a database?
Answer: Such a database would presumably be one element of a large-
scale identity system and all of the issues raised in our two reports
would apply. Securing the database is only part of the challenge.
Depending on the purposes of the system and the specific content of the
database, such a database could be an extremely high-value target for a
wide variety of people ranging from tax avoiders to identity thieves to
national security risks. Just as with a state driver's license system,
the value of this database as a target will be dependent on what value
the credential offers; the more things the credential is useful for,
the higher value target the database is likely to be.
An early question to ask is how is membership in the database
ascertained and verified? That is, what process determines whether an
individual is eligible to work? Then, additional questions include:
What individuals, organizations, and institutions would have legitimate
access to the database? How would that access be facilitated? Who would
verify the legitimacy of these individuals, organizations, and
institutions? What opportunities for redress would there be if
erroneous data ends up in the database? Where would liability for
mistakes reside? All of these points, and many others, introduce
various sorts of privacy and security vulnerabilities into the system.
And, experience suggests that even applying the best security and
privacy protections available will not protect against so-called
``social engineering'' attacks or hacks (such as bribes). That said,
protection against attacks is only one part of the challenge. Having
policies, procedures, and technical capabilities in place to discover
that an attack has taken or is taking place as well as procedures in
place to respond effectively is also critically important. Virtually
any large, valuable database will be the target of some kind of attack
and no such database can be 100% secure; therefore clearly thinking
through how to respond in the event of an attack, disclosure, or simple
failure is a key component of building secure and reliable systems.
<F-dash>
[Submissions for the record follow:]
Severn Trent Services
Colmar, Pennsylvania 18915
March 27, 2006
The Honorable Bill Thomas
Chairman
Committee on Ways and Means
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Chairman Thomas:
I am writing on behalf of our company in support of H.R. 1708, the
Clean Water Investment and Infrastructure Security Act. Severn Trent
Services has a global presence and is a $600 million business employing
2,350 personnel providing water and wastewater equipment and services
to communities and industrial customers around the world. The company's
broad range of products and services is concentrated around
disinfection, instrumentation, and filtration technologies, pipeline
analysis, rehabilitation and repair services, contract operating
services and state-of-the-art residential metering products and
services. Severn Trent Services is a member of the Severn Trent Plc
(London: SVT.L) group of companies. An international environmental
services leader, Severn Trent is a FTSE 100 company.
We should all be concerned about the deteriorating state of our
nation's water and wastewater infrastructure. Nearly $1 trillion
dollars need to be invested over the next 20 years to repair,
rehabilitate, replace and upgrade our nation's network of water and
wastewater treatment plants, collection systems and distribution lines.
Failure to stem this looming crisis will cause significant public
health and economic harm to our country.
H.R. 1708 will allow communities across the nation to partner with
the private sector in funding critical water infrastructure activities
by removing water and wastewater projects from the state volume caps
for private activity bonds. This is the least expensive option for
addressing a growing national crisis and ensuring that all Americans
are guaranteed a safe, reliable water infrastructure system. We urge
Congress to move expeditiously on this proposal and thank you for your
leadership in this matter.
Sincerely,
Steve Hinkle
Credit Manager
Michael P. Isabell
Business Unit Manager
Linda D. Slack
Administative Assistant
Nadia Abbott
Marketing Manager
Barbara Ferns
Principal Electrochlorination Engineer
<all>