

**POLLING DATA ON EUROPEAN OPINION OF  
AMERICAN POLICIES, VALUES AND PEOPLE**

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**JOINT HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT  
AND THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
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## **POLLING DATA ON EUROPEAN OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICIES, VALUES AND PEOPLE**

**THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2007**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,  
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT, AND  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3:08 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Delahunt (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight) presiding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight will come to order.

Welcome to all.

We have had a series of, I think, very informative hearings regarding attitudes of foreigners toward the United States, and today, we will have another such hearing. This is prompted by a GAO report that stated “anti-Americanism is broadening and deepening,” and it outlined some of the consequences of that particular phenomenon.

For example, the GAO, which is a nonpartisan agency that reports directly to the Congress, concluded that it “can increase foreign public support for terrorism directed at Americans,” that it “can reduce the effectiveness of our military operations,” and it “can hurt our ability to align with other nations in pursuit of common foreign policy objectives”; and they also pointed out that it could put at risk our economic and commercial interests.

Our last hearing, earlier this week, focused on that particular aspect of the GAO’s report. We examined the decline in terms of international visitors to the United States. We noted that in terms of our trade balance, or imbalance, if you will, that historically we had a surplus of some \$27 billion back in 1995, and it has since declined to \$7 billion.

So, again, today, we are conducting a joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Europe, chaired by my good friend and colleague from Florida, Representative Wexler; and I am sure that the testimony that will be elicited will help us ascertain the attitudes of Europeans who, by and large, have been our traditional allies during the course of our history.

I am joined by my good friend and colleague from California, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Dana Rohrabacher, for any opening he might wish to make.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have certainly learned more about polling in this session than I have in all of the other sessions combined, and I am very pleased that now we are going to focus on European public opinion.

I will note my favorite European, who just happened to have been half-American, of course, was Winston Churchill; and I think he had some perspectives on exactly what significance public opinion at any particular moment has to do with the security of a country or the long-term peace and freedom that the people of any country can live in. Of course, he lived during the 1930s, when he was immensely unpopular and frozen out of the British Government and castigated by the British press as being a warmonger and as being someone who was pushing just irrationally toward a confrontation between the Nazi regime in Germany and the British people. Later on, of course, once Hitler acted, his popularity actually changed at that point, and I saw that same—and by the way, there is a quote from Churchill, and that is “Putting one’s ear to the ground does not put a leader in a very inspiring position.” So, while public opinion is certainly important, it should not be the determinant of policy, whether it is public opinion here or whether it is public opinion in other countries.

I realize that since coming here 19 years ago that there is a certain methodology that most political people in this country at least use in order to determine what position they will take on important issues, and of course, that methodology is the wet-finger methodology. Which way is the wind blowing?

That is not how one creates a better world. One creates a better world by, perhaps, bucking what is at that moment an important opinion held by large numbers of people in any society, whether it is our society or Europe, and doing what is right, so that in the long run the situation’s reality will change. We need to create the realities rather than being driven by an attempt to placate people’s momentary aspirations. I saw that firsthand when I worked at the White House for 7 years.

We are discussing European public opinion today, and I was with Ronald Reagan for 7 years in the White House as a special assistant to the President and one of his senior speech writers; and in that responsibility, I had a great deal to do with actually writing many of the President’s diplomatic remarks and also preparing him for foreign visits, often which were to the European continent.

During that time period, I also was able to see the polling data that indicated that Ronald Reagan, as compared to his predecessor, was immensely unpopular with the people of Europe; and in fact, I will submit for the record quotations from the newspapers, the European newspapers, over the last 2 years—actually, over the last 3 or 4 years—but especially the recent newspapers over the last 6 months, indicating how and in what low esteem the people of Europe hold our President and also how Americans have been attacked over and over again and how our policies have been attacked in every newspaper article that I was able to find. In fact, I found very few newspaper articles going the other direction. So that obviously would have an impact on public opinion.

However, let me note it was *deja vu*—as we say, “*deja vu* all over again”—because there it was. I mean, I remember looking at these

same newspapers saying the same horrible things about Ronald Reagan and how he was so belligerent that he was causing the problems in the Cold War instead of trying to bring an end to the Cold War—the same moral equivalency arguments, the same—yes, any mistake that we would happen to make would put us on par with Communist dictatorships just as, perhaps, the mistakes at Abu Ghraib in some way make the American military the same as the 9/11 terrorists.

So, while I respect the idea that public opinion is important, what is most important is to do what is right in building a future.

Ronald Reagan ended the Cold War by having policies that would lead us to momentary confrontation, momentary exercises of will and strength, but in the end, what would create a more peaceful world. That is what was important.

If what we are doing now—if the policies of this government now will lead to a more peaceful world, will in fact lead to more democracy and an alternative, a democratic alternative, to Islamic peoples throughout the world, then perhaps it is worth our being unpopular now. If it does not and it fails, it could be because of incompetence, or it could be a flaw in the goal itself. But with that said, the public opinion, in and of itself, is not the way to judge our policy.

So, with that said, I am interested in hearing what the Europeans think about us, but, you know, I just do not like any lectures from Germans telling me about how we handle wars.

Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the ranking member for his statement, and I now turn to the chair of the European Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Chairman Delahunt.

I want to thank Chairman Delahunt for pushing forward this hearing. I understand this is in a series of hearings where he has investigated public opinion throughout the world and how it relates to American values and our objectives.

I thought what Mr. Rohrabacher said was very intriguing, and I would agree with a great deal of it. I think the points that Mr. Rohrabacher makes are valid in terms that our public policy should not, certainly, be dictated as a result of public opinion in other parts of the world; and just the fact that we may be unpopular does not necessarily indicate that our public policy is incorrect. I think those are all very fair points.

I would like to offer possibly just a little bit different perspective, not in contrast to Mr. Rohrabacher's, but just in terms of analyzing the effect of public policy on our own self-interest, as it seems to me that is where our focus ought to be.

With the historically low European public opinion regarding the United States, does it make it more difficult for us to pursue our own objectives? For instance, the recent decisions made in several of the European capitals to reject American requests for increased troop levels in Afghanistan. Are those decisions based on a genuine disagreement over the policy in Afghanistan or are they substantially related to a very low public opinion in Europe of American policy, and therefore, politically or for whatever the reason, European leaders have decided not to meet those requested troop levels?

I am not offering this in a partisan way, but I do think Democratic control of the Congress does offer us an opportunity in the context particularly of European public policy. And with this opportunity, I think we would be remiss if we did not, in fact, address issues that are important to European public opinion, but are also, of course, equally important to American public opinion like global climate change, the crisis in Darfur, allegations of secret CIA prisons, extraordinary renditions, and the human rights concerns in Guantanamo. These are American issues as much as they are, if not more so in certain ways, European issues.

There is one thing we can do in this Congress that would, in my view, make a dramatic difference in terms of European public opinion, and is also in America's interest; and that is to expand the Visa Waiver Program. Congress should expand the Visa Waiver Program in a way so that our staunchest Eastern and Central European allies; such as Greece, Hungary, Poland, and other new EU countries; would be able to travel. By expanding the program the people of those countries would be able to travel more readily to the United States without going through some of the more onerous visa program requirements and, at the same time, not only maintain but actually enhance American security by adopting some changes to our own immigration programs.

The other part of this, I just want to mention before I stop Mr. Chairman, is that despite the negative public perception of the United States in Europe, and of the Bush administration's policies, is not a full reflection of the transatlantic relationship. The truth of the matter is that many European leaders have, in fact, embraced policies that are very similar, if not identical, to that of the United States.

For instance, I think the President's trip in February 2005 to Brussels was very important, and I compliment the President on that trip. If I understand it correctly, he was the first President to visit EU institutions and pay respect to the European Union as an institution. That changed things quite a bit for the positive.

On Iran, America and Europe have essentially voiced common policy since that time. With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States and Europe, as members of the Quartet, have voiced a common position in isolating Hamas. I hope Europeans stick with that common position.

There are a number of different examples—the Balkans, Belarus, Lebanon, Sudan—that the United States and Europe are, in fact, cooperating a great deal.

So, Mr. Chairman, I compliment you again on bringing up and examining an extremely important topic. I want to thank you for holding this hearing and the witnesses for being here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Chairman Delahunt, I want to thank you for jointly holding today's hearing with the Europe Subcommittee on the "Global Polling Data on Opinion of American Policies, Values and People in Europe." I also want to thank our witnesses for testifying.

Today's hearing is critical because America's failure to address historically low European public opinion regarding the United States directly affects our ability to address global threats. A failure to address this deficiency is in direct contrast to our nation's interests and could prevent our strongest allies from joining with the



United States when we need them the most. For example, recent decisions made in several European capitols rejecting American requests for increased troop levels in Afghanistan are directly related to low public opinion of the United States.

I believe a Democratic led Congress may be the perfect antidote for a European public opinion that does not trust President Bush. To this end, it is incumbent on this Congress to act as a bridge to Europe, repair tattered relationships and address issues such as global climate change and the crisis in Darfur. In addition, we must engage Europeans on issues of concern to their public, including allegations of secret CIA prisons, extraordinary renditions, and human rights concerns in Guantanamo.

In addition, if there is one thing Congress could do to improve our image in Europe it would be to expand the Visa Waiver Program. As of today, this program does not including our staunchest Eastern and Central European allies such as Greece, Hungary, Poland and other new EU Countries. The Visa Waiver Program has immense value for relations between the U.S. and Europe, and an expansion of the program would greatly enhance cultural, economic, political and personal exchanges across the Atlantic.

All is not bleak, despite negative public perception in Europe of the US and President Bush, most European leaders have embraced policies that dovetail with those of America. As the Ranking Member of the Europe Subcommittee over the past four years and now as Chairman, I have witnessed first hand a genuine European desire for a closer relationship—an equal partnership based on shared responsibilities.

America must embrace our allies in Europe, including fully embracing the European Union. As someone who regularly disagrees with President Bush, I am convinced that his trip to Brussels and the EU in January of 2005 was a critical step in improving transatlantic relations. A European Union that is politically, economically and militarily successful is in America's interests and represents an opportunity for a weary American public to have a European partner that shares global burdens, from the promotion of democracy, to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and from addressing global warming to addressing extremism and terrorism.

Too often our European allies are accused of not supporting America's efforts to combat terrorism or not doing enough to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapons program. Those claims are greatly exaggerated and often bear no relation to the truth. The United States and Europe have worked in tandem to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. So far, America and Europe have worked together as Quartet members to isolate the Palestinian government led by Hamas—I hope that cooperation continues. We have also worked together to rebuild and provide security in Afghanistan, and have collaborated extensively in the in the Balkans, Belarus, Lebanon and Sudan. It is critical that these joint efforts continue.

How the United States got to this low point in European public opinion and what needs to be done to reverse this problem, in Europe and globally, are critical issues that must be addressed. Chairman Delahunt, I want to thank you for holding this joint hearing today.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Wexler.

Now I will turn to the ranking member on the European Subcommittee, Mr. Gallegly of California.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just have a short statement, and then I want to take advantage of our witnesses to listen to their expert testimony.

The issue of European perceptions of the United States and American foreign policy is really a very important one. It is certainly preferable for the United States to have good relations with our European allies, not only at the government level, but also among the people of Europe. At the same time, I do not believe we should focus excessively on poll results either in the formulation of our foreign policy or in trying to assess what Europeans really think about Americans.

On the first issue, we all know polls can be manipulated to provide a wide range of results. As was noted in the prepared testimony of Ms. Conway, if we ask Europeans in a vacuum regarding their general views of the United States' policy, the results are quite negative; we can all agree on that. This is obviously colored

by the one issue that is dominating the headlines every day, and that is Iraq, and frankly, regardless of where one falls on this issue, the decision on what the best policy is to pursue the war in Iraq should be based on one and only one factor, what will further the long-term national security interests of the United States and best protect the American people.

In addition, it is easy for Europeans to complain about the United States, which is, in many cases, resented because it is the strongest and most influential country in the world. However, as was pointed out in the prepared testimony, people have a tendency to vote with their feet by where they decide to live, study and work. And in the most revealing and most important of all polls, namely, to which countries they may emigrate, the Europeans still express a deep affection for the United States. In just the 5 years from 2000 to 2005, close to 1 million Europeans became United States permanent residents. This is more than came to the U.S. during the entire decades of the 1970s and the 1980s.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the testimony. I yield back.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Gallegly.

I think there is a common theme that we all articulated, and that is that the polls should not define public policy, but they do provide a tool for American policymakers to craft those policies that, in fact, are in our best national interest.

As my colleagues were speaking, I remember leading up to the invasion of Iraq when the Government of Turkey agreed to allow the American military the use of its bases to invade Iraq through the north; and yet, when the members of the Turkish Parliament went home—for a district work period, presumably—and heard from their constituents about the negative feelings toward the United States and toward this particular policy, they came back and voted to deny the United States access to military bases, requiring a reconfiguration of the military invasion of Iraq by our own military, which I think confirms what I alluded to earlier when I spoke to the GAO's observation that anti-Americanism, or dissatisfaction, if you will, with American policy can hinder, impede and even harm our national security interests.

Having said all of that; it gives me great pleasure to introduce two fine witnesses today with very impressive *curricula vitae*. If I read, we would be here for 15 or 20 minutes, but I am going to just take excerpts.

Let me first introduce Dr. Glenn. He was Executive Director of the Council for European Studies, the leading American professional association for the study of Europe and the social sciences and humanities, based at Columbia University. He joined the German Marshall Fund in 2004 as Director of Foreign Policy, responsible for management of the foreign policy, key institutions in the transatlantic fellowships and research fellowships program. He is also a visiting scholar at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins.

Dr. Glenn holds a Ph.D. and a Master's in Sociology from Harvard and a Bachelor's degree from Oberlin. He completed the postdoctoral Gene Monet Fellowship at the European University

Institute in Florence. He speaks Czech and French, and has limited fluency in Polish and Italian.

Then Ms. Conway. Ms. Conway is one of the most quoted and noted pollsters on the national scene. She is the co-author, along with Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, of *What Women Really Want*. I am going to have to read that book.

She describes herself as a fully recovered attorney. I am making those same valiant efforts myself, Ms. Conway.

She is admitted to practice law in four jurisdictions, is a magna cum laude graduate of Trinity College here in Washington, where she earned a B.A. in Political Science, studied at Oxford and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. She holds a law degree with honors from George Washington University.

She has provided commentary on over 1,000 television shows—ABC, CBS, NBC, PBS, CNN, HBO, and Comedy Central. I am going to have to go and get that clip.

She is a board member of the National Journalism Center, the National Women's History Museum, the New Jersey Republican State Committee, Strategic Planning Committee, the Young Republican National Federation, and Men Against Breast Cancer.

Welcome, Ms. Conway.

Dr. Glenn, would you proceed with your statement?

**STATEMENT OF JOHN K. GLENN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES**

Mr. GLENN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you so much for the invitation to speak to you today. It is a real pleasure and an honor to be here.

I think that public opinion, if I may follow on some of your opening statements, can actually provide valuable insight into how and why Americans and Europeans may see the world differently and the potential for popular support for a range of policy options that exist for a number of pressing problems.

Let me be clear at the outset: Popular opinion cannot tell you what to do. It does not recommend particular courses of action, nor does it predict the future.

I will be referring today to Transatlantic Trends. This is an annual survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a nonpartisan American public policy and grant-making institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Europe, as well as some of our partners. In the 5 minutes that I have here, I would like to just quickly summarize some of the main points in testimony that you have and then make reference, if I may, to some charts that are to my right, your left.

We are now in 2007, 5½ years since September 11, 2001, and we know from public opinion data that the image of the United States and the world has not recovered from the steep decline it took after the war in Iraq. Public debate, as many of you suggested, on both sides of the Atlantic has wrestled with allegations of secret CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence and instability in Iraq, as well as concern about human rights in the United States detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Yet, as Congressman Wexler noted, there have been considerable efforts at the official level to improve relations and to change the tone between Americans and Europe, and indeed, I think that we have considerable information that suggests there are many public policy issues on which the transatlantic divide between Americans and Europeans is not so great, that there is room for Americans and Europeans to work together.

If I may, let me start with the first chart which is on the far side of the charts to my right, to your left, which is European Views of U.S. Leadership in World Affairs. This data starts in 2002, in which year 64 percent of Europeans stated that it was desirable that the United States exert strong global leadership.

We saw that number plummet. In 2003, that number was down to 45. It dropped down in 2004 to 36, which is essentially where it has remained since then.

The negatives follow a similar pattern. They start at 31 percent of Europeans having a negative view of the United States in 2002. Those numbers skyrocket up to 58 percent in 2004, and they have stayed relatively constant for the past 3 years. Among the European countries, the greatest decline was in Germany, one of our traditionally staunchest allies.

Now, in some ways, when I look at that chart, the thing that strikes me is the persistence since 2004 of those feelings. In 2005, following the reelection of President Bush and the efforts to mend relations along the lines exactly as Congressman Wexler mentioned, we asked Europeans and Americans if they felt relations had changed in the wake of those efforts. Yet, unfortunately, it appears that Europeans were largely unmoved by them. Fifty-two percent of Europeans in June 2005 said that relations had largely stayed the same, and it is this pattern that we see that in many ways sets the context for the broader discussion.

Now, in making sense out of this, many ask, is this anti-Americanism? There, I would like to point you to the second chart that we have here. The top line of that chart is the same line of U.S. approval from the first chart. It starts at 64 and it goes down to 37, roughly staying the same from 2004.

The bottom line, our views of President Bush's leadership in international affairs, those numbers start at 38, which admittedly is not a high point to start in, but they drop; and they also stayed at 21 percent, to 24 to 18 last year.

What I think is important about that chart is the gap between views of the United States and views of President Bush. We see that this difference, this distinction in European minds between their feelings about the United States which, of course, are driven by U.S. policies and its views of the President are, however, not identical with its views of the President. I sometimes think of that gap being the reservoir for recovery, if you will, the room that there is among Europeans, who continue to want to feel positively about the United States, but who are concerned about its policies.

I know that you have heard from Andy Kohut of the Pew Research Center, and I respect his work greatly, but I would like to disagree with him and suggest that this trend data that we see here suggests that the pattern we are seeing represents strong disagreement with U.S. policies, but not necessarily a kind of hard-

ening of anti-Americanism, a generalizing of those critical views into something deeper and more enduring that might concern us all.

Now, in the testimony I spend some time talking about European views of United States policies because, as someone who focuses on foreign policy, indeed, our differences, our similarities on what we are trying to do seem to be essential.

Let me start at the beginning, as one must, with Iraq. This will come as no surprise to you, in listening to your opening statements, that Europeans have been extraordinarily critical of our decision to go to war in Iraq. In 2004, transatlantic trends showed that 80 percent of Europeans felt that the war in Iraq was not worth the loss of life and other costs of attacking Iraq. Seventy-three percent of Europeans felt that the war in Iraq increased the threat of terrorism around the world.

There is little reason for us to think that those numbers have changed since then. Yet, it is worth asking, how do Europeans see United States policies beyond the war in Iraq? Has it so strongly been identified with the United States in the eyes of the world that there is no longer any room for us to get along?

I would like to review very briefly—you have the data, and I would love to talk with you about it more in the question-and-answer session—European attitudes in three areas, threat perception, democracy promotion, and Iran.

The first is—and the chart is here in the testimony that I submitted to you—we ask every year, “How do you see some of the most pressing global threats?” These include things like international terrorism, the prospect of Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons, the violence and instability in Iraq, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, economic downturn, and the like.

Now, if you read the newspapers, you might have the sense that we are coming from completely different points of view in how we see the world. Yet, what we found striking in 2006 was that the most pressing global threat for Americans and Europeans alike was international terrorism. The greatest increase we saw from last year was in the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which would suggest to me that in many ways we are not as far apart as we might think in terms of how we see the world.

I would be happy to talk with you about a range of those other threats.

Now, indeed, the President’s policies in the Middle East and more broadly have been anchored around the notion of democracy promotion. This is a policy of which there is a very long tradition of United States-European close cooperation, perhaps most symbolized in recent times by the cooperation, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in Eastern Europe, in bringing democracy to former Communist Eastern Europe, into the Western fold, into supporting these new democracies.

Now, at this time of European criticism of the United States, I think it is worth asking, “How do Europeans feel about democracy promotion? How do Americans feel?” We asked Europeans if they felt it was the role of the European Union to promote democracy and Americans if it was the role of the United States, and if I may,

I would like to direct your attention to the third chart to my right here.

What is striking about this is, when you ask them about their role, 71 percent of Europeans say it should be the role of the European Union to promote democracy. In 2006, only 45 percent of Americans say that as well. There is a lot to talk about within those numbers, but I think it suggests that where there are the most fundamental values that we share—the value of democracy, the importance of having democratic allies and the potential for having new democracies in the world for creating a more peaceful world—we see strong European support.

In the testimony, you will see some data about the means by which we promote democracy. I would love to go into details on them, but I think you will see that of many of the common policies that we think about—monitoring elections, supporting civil society groups—these are things that we actually agree upon. Military force, on both sides of the Atlantic, receives the smallest support.

On Iran, as Congressman Wexler said, our data shows that Americans and Europeans agree. Indeed, our close cooperation on Iran is often taken to be the most prominent sign that Americans and Europeans can work together beyond Iraq, and that is our willingness to cooperate around the U.N. Security Council, to pressure Iran through international institutions to give up its nuclear weapons.

Now, we are in the midst of that, and there is a lot of uncertainty. I am not predicting the future here, but we know that 84 percent of Europeans and 79 percent of Americans felt that current efforts should continue. A very small number on both sides of the Atlantic at this point support either simply accepting a nuclear Iran or military action.

Indeed, what is striking to me is that Americans and Europeans even agree on whom best can handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons; 47 percent of Europeans and 36 percent of Americans—that is the largest percentage on both sides of the Atlantic—believe that the United Nations is the most appropriate institution. Within the testimony, there is some more data about some of the other institutions.

Let me talk briefly about values. Often you will hear that the real problem is that Americans and Europeans have different values, and they will turn to public opinion data to talk about that. And this will often be along the lines of, Americans are more religious or Europeans are more secular, we are more individualistic, where Europeans are more collectively minded; we believe more in the free market, they believe more in a social welfare model.

On an issue of foreign affairs, I would like to suggest to you the question on my mind, which is, do we have sufficient values to work together? In 2004, 1 year after the war in Iraq, we asked Americans and Europeans, “Do you feel that the United States and the European Union have sufficient values to cooperate?” Indeed, 60 percent of Europeans and 71 percent of Americans felt that they do share enough common values.

On the question of cooperation, it has been striking; 82 percent of Europeans and 91 percent of Americans agree to the statement, “When our country acts on a national security issue, it is critical

that we do so together with our closest allies.” Now, let me nuance that. The great divider is often the question of the use of force in international affairs and the question of legitimacy.

We also asked Europeans and Americans, “Would you agree or disagree with the following statement: Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice.” Let me point you to the fourth chart to my right. Here is a portrait of one of our more striking differences: To that statement, 78 percent of Americans agree, “Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice”; 62 percent of Europeans felt that they could agree with that statement.

Now, this has led some to speculate that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus, but if I may, I would like to suggest that the issue at hand in many ways is that of legitimacy and how we pursue our policies, not simply what we do.

The role of the United Nations is often evoked in this debate, and popular opinion is straightforward. Sixty-one percent of Americans and 71 percent of Europeans view the U.N. favorably. Where we differ, however, is on the necessity of the United Nations in providing legitimacy to military force. When asked if it is justified to bypass the United Nations when the vital interests of their country are involved, 59 percent of Americans agreed, compared to 44 percent of Europeans in 2004; and I think in many ways we have very real differences about the role of military force and how we think about it that reflect our histories. But I think just as compelling are the ways that we think about legitimacy and the way we think about the role of international institutions when pursuing our interests.

I will not go into it in my presentation, but there is a section in the testimony about how different we are today from the past, using data on public views toward NATO, which are often taken, especially in Europe, as the key indicator of how Europeans feel about the United States or the transatlantic alliance. That is, if you feel positively about NATO, then you feel positively about the transatlantic alliance.

That data shows rises and falls over time, and there are some predictable moments. Around the Pershing missile crisis in 1981, views of NATO dropped; around the end of the Cold War in 1989, views of NATO dropped, and around the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, but in each of those cases, we see a rebound in those views back up to popular levels of support.

Now the question in front of us today is: Will we see a rebound in our future? I think that is the question we want to talk about.

I would like to end with a brief reference to the differences that exist in popular opinion versus elite opinion. When you travel in transatlantic policy circles, it is easy these days to have the sense that anti-United States feelings have largely played themselves out among European policy elites.

European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, said last year, “The situation as far as our bilateral relationships is almost perfect. What we have begun to think about is how to resolve together the many problems which are an international agenda.”

So no more talking about the problems between us, and these global issues that I talked about—democracy promotion, Iran, glob-

al threats such as international terrorism—that we are facing; these are the issues that I think are occupying the transatlantic agenda today.

There is a survey that I cite in the testimony of European elites; that is, members of the European Parliament, and members of the Parliament show that they support United States global leadership much more strongly than the general public in Europe. And so, in many ways, the question in my mind is, how can we see the role of European leaders in helping to move European public opinion, as well as the policies that we pursue.

Now, I have suggested there is a gap between the elite and the working level, if you will, or the general public. It is hard to tell exactly what that means. This may just simply be a time lag. Policies take place; people react to them and process them over time. It may mean, on the other hand, that Europeans have made their minds up about President Bush and we will only see a change after 2008.

I would like to end by observing, I think quite consistent with many of the comments, that public opinion is only one of the factors that shapes foreign policy. It is a factor that is influential under some conditions at some times, and those are largely around elections, elections here and elections there. And this year, I see we have got important elections upcoming in France, in Turkey.

We can expect a leadership change in the United Kingdom, and I think that this new leadership in Europe will be decisive in determining the future of European attitudes toward the United States and the potential for transatlantic cooperation.

Thank you very much. I look forward to talking with you more.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Glenn, for that very informative testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glenn follows:]



**TESTIMONY FOR JOHN K. GLENN  
DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY  
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN  
RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT  
Thursday, March 23, 2007**


Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for your invitation to speak with you today. Let me begin with a brief summary. Public opinion data shows that, five and a half years since September 11, 2001 the image of the United States in the world has not recovered from its steep decline after the war in Iraq. Public debate on both sides of the Atlantic has wrestled with allegations of secret CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence in Iraq, and concerns about human rights in the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Yet at the official level there have been efforts at rapprochement, shifting the policy agenda toward global threats and concerns on which the transatlantic divide may not be as great. Public opinion can provide valuable insight into how and why Americans and Europeans may see the world differently, as well as the reservoir of support for particular policy options. At the same time, it cannot recommend particular courses of action, nor can it predict the future. I hope that you will find this data useful to you in your debates about current U.S. policies and look forward to our discussion.

*Transatlantic Trends* is an annual survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Europe, and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation. The survey is based on a representative sample of public opinion of 1,000 people in the United States and twelve European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The most recent, the fifth annual survey was conducted on June 6-24, 2006.

The polling is conducted by a professional survey research firm, TNS Opinion, to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews. For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with a 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country.

**Persistent decline in European views of the United States since 2002**

Since 2002, we have tracked attitudes toward U.S. global leadership and have observed a dramatic reversal in European attitudes. The proportions of Europeans who view U.S. leadership in world affairs as desirable has reversed since 2002, from 64% positive to 37% this year, and from 31% negative to 57%. Chart 1 below indicates that European positive attitudes toward U.S. global leadership fell to this level in 2004 and have remained virtually unchanged over the past three years.



Among European countries, the greatest decline was in Germany, from 68% positive in 2002 to 43% in 2006. Only three European countries currently view U.S. leadership more positively than negatively: the Netherlands (51% to 44%), Romania (47% to 35%), and the United Kingdom (48% to 45%).


In 2005, we asked Europeans if they felt relations had changed after the President’s diplomatic efforts to mend relations in his second term. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Paris in February 2005 in an effort to change the tone and improve relations with Europe, and President Bush traveled to Europe three times in the first six months of his second term. He became the first American President to officially visit the European Union, declaring in Brussels, “The alliance of Europe and North America is the main pillar of our security.” Yet, Europeans appear to have been unmoved by these efforts. Asked in June 2005, 52% of Europeans said that relations had stayed the same. Americans agreed, with 50% saying relations had stayed the same.

**Is this anti-Americanism?**

There were those in Europe who suggested that the re-election of President Bush in 2004 would transform what had previously been anti-Bush feelings linked to the war in Iraq into anti-Americanism. I know that this Committee has heard testimony from Andrew Kohut at the Pew Research Center, and although I admire his work, I'd like respectfully disagree with his view that we are seeing a new anti-Americanism. The trend data in *Transatlantic Trends* suggests that what we are seeing is not anti-Americanism, per se, so much as strong disagreement with what America is doing in the world today. Anti-Americanism, if we take the concept seriously, should refer to something broader and presumably more enduring than attitudes or views toward particular U.S. policies, more similar to other forms of prejudice such as anti-Semitism and racism.

We have observed however that Europeans continue to distinguish between their views of President Bush and their views of the United States more generally. While European attitudes toward President Bush's handling of international affairs have fallen from 38% positive in 2002 to 18% in 2006, there is a 19-point gap between this figure and their evaluation of U.S. leadership in world affairs.

**Views of U.S. leadership vs. Views of President Bush**




You'll notice that his gap has generally persisted over five years, and thus the data suggests that European views of President Bush have not become generalized into views of the United States broadly or become a new form of anti-Americanism. To be clear, views of the United States are certainly driven by views of the policies of its president, but they are not identical.

**Europeans views of U.S. policies in Iraq and in the world**

It has been widely observed that Europeans viewed the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq negatively. This is supported by our own data as well. Asked in 2004, 80% of Europeans felt that the war in Iraq was not worth the loss of life and other costs of attacking Iraq. 73% of Europeans felt that the war in Iraq increased the threat of terrorism around the world. There is little reason to believe that those numbers have become more positive. Yet, it is worth asking, how do Europeans see U.S. policies beyond the war in Iraq? I'd like to briefly review European attitudes in three areas: threat perception, democracy promotion, and Iran.

**Threat Perception:** We have asked every year how Americans and Europeans view likely threats over the next ten years, and we have found that American and European threat perception is similar, perhaps surprisingly so given widespread debate about our differences. Large majorities — topping 70% of Americans and Europeans — continue to agree on the importance of a wide range of international threats in the next 10 years, including international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, the global spread of disease such as avian flu, global warming, and the growing power of China.




The greatest threat for both Americans and Europeans is international terrorism, with 97% of Americans and 94% of Europeans seeing it as an important or extremely


important threat. The largest shifts in threat perceptions since last year were increases on both sides of the Atlantic in those who see Islamic fundamentalism as an “extremely important” threat (+13 percentage-points of Americans, +11 percentage-points of Europeans).

**Democracy Promotion:** At the rhetorical level, the United States and the European Union have identified democracy promotion as a strategic priority for transatlantic cooperation. The two partners have recently cooperated closely in the Western Balkans on the final status of Kosovo, the contested presidential election in Belarus, and efforts to relieve suffering in Sudan. Yet developments in the Middle East such as the elections of a Hamas-led government in Palestine and a government in Lebanon including Hezbollah have raised new challenges for democracy promotion.


Strikingly, our data suggests that more Europeans than Americans support promoting democracy. We asked Europeans if it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries and Americans if it should be the role of the United States and, remarkably, more Europeans than Americans support the goal of democracy promotion. 71% of Europeans agreed, compared with 45% percent of Americans in 2006.



Now you might say, perhaps we mean different things by “democracy promotion,” but our data suggests otherwise. Asked whether they would support one or more policy options to promote democracy, Americans and Europeans show strong support for less intrusive options such as monitoring elections (79% of Europeans, 67% of Americans) and supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations, and religious groups (77% of Europeans, 71% of Americans). Support declined when asked about more intrusive or severe options, such as economic sanctions, supporting political dissidents, political sanctions, and use of military force which received the lowest support among Americans (34%) and Europeans (24%).




**Iran:** We asked Americans and Europeans about policy options in Iran, seen by some as the most prominent example of recent greater transatlantic consultation. The United States and the European Union (led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have sought to coordinate their policies to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to bring Iran to the United Nations Security Council. 79% of Americans and 84% Europeans agree that efforts by the United States and the European Union to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only 12% of Europeans and 16% of Americans who feel we should simply accept a nuclear Iran.



When asked who can best handle the issue of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, the largest percentage of Europeans (47%) and Americans (36%) agree on the United Nations.

**Who can best handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons?**




**Do Americans and Europeans have different values?**

Some argue that differences in values explain European attitudes toward the United States: Americans are different and Europeans dislike us for those differences. The arguments usually suggest that we are too religious, while they are secular; we believe in military force, while they believe in negotiation; we are individualistic, while European are seen as collectively-minded; and we believe in risk and the free market, while they believe in security and the welfare state. While there are doubtless very real differences across the Atlantic, in my personal opinion, differences among European countries, as well as differences among different parts of the United States, are likely to be as significant. The issue, from a foreign policy perspective, is can we work together?

We asked Europeans and Americans in 2004, one year after the war in Iraq, if they felt that the United States and European Union have enough common values to be able to cooperate on international problems. 60% of Europeans and 71% of Americans felt that we do share enough common values.


**The U.S. and EU have enough values to cooperate on international problems**



On the question of cooperation, 82% of Europeans and 91% of Americans agreed in 2006 that, when our country acts on a national security issue, it is critical that we do so together with our closest allies. Yet, let me provide data that highlights the real challenge for transatlantic cooperation, the use of force in international affairs.

**Use of force and legitimacy:** We asked Europeans and Americans, would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice.” Remarkably, 78% of Americans agreed with this statement, compared with 35% of Europeans.

**Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice**



These different views on the use of force have led some to speculate that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus, but even the author of this turn of phrase, Robert Kagan in the afterward to the paperback edition of “Of Paradise and Power” concedes that the one thing he underestimated was the power of legitimacy. For many Europeans, the matter of legitimacy is a question not only of what the United States does, but how it does it. The role of the United Nations is often invoked in this debate. Our data in *Transatlantic Trends* shows that majorities on both sides of the Atlantic (61% of Americans and 71% of Europeans) view the UN favorably. We differ however on the necessity of the United Nations in providing legitimacy to military force. When asked if it is justified to bypass the United Nations when the vital interests of their country are involved, 59% of Americans agreed, compared with 44% of Europeans in 2004.


**How different are current trends from the past?**

The data presented here on European attitudes toward U.S. policies are well-served by taking a historical perspective. We know that views of the United States have fluctuated over time and might remember, for example, critical attitudes toward the United States during the war in Vietnam. While there have been deep drops, there have been recoveries. Is the current situation different? Admittedly, this question can only be partially answered by public opinion polls that cannot explain why change takes place.



While the first *Transatlantic Trends* survey was conducted in 2002, there is considerable longitudinal public opinion data that provides insight. European attitudes toward NATO are often taken as indicators of the transatlantic relationship in general, and our survey's question on NATO reflects the current decline in European attitudes, with a drop from 69% of Europeans who feel that NATO is essential to their country's security in 2002 to 55% in 2006. The chart below places that question in historical perspective for four countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom), using data from Professor Richard Eichenberg of Tufts University, who also works with us on *Transatlantic Trends*.

#### Is NATO still essential?



This chart shows that European attitudes toward NATO dropped around the Pershing missile crisis in 1981, the end of the cold war in 1989, and the wars in the Balkans in the mid-1990s. But in each case, European attitudes rebounded, and they may do so again.

#### A gap between elites and the general public?

In conclusion, I'd like to offer a few personal thoughts on the future of European attitudes toward the United States. In the transatlantic policy world, one has the sense that anti-US feelings in Europe have largely played themselves out. The European Union Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, said last year, "the situation, as far as, our bilateral relationships, is almost perfect. What have to begin to think is how to resolve together the many problems, which are an international agenda, so no more talking about problems between us." European Commission President Jose

Manuel Barroso observed, "EU-U.S. relations have strengthened considerably over the last year and we are working together systematically to address common economic, political, and environmental challenges." A recent survey of members of the European Parliament and European Commission, using the same questionnaire as Transatlantic Trends, found that European elites support U.S. global leadership much more strongly than the general public.<sup>1</sup>

The public opinion data presented here suggests there remains a gap between elite level improvement in relations at the working level and the general public. This gap may simply reflect a time lag in the perception of change, especially if political leaders continue to declare their desire to leave behind the bitterness around Iraq. On the other hand, the persistence of negative views of President Bush among Europeans may indicate that their minds are made up, that change will only be possible with a new president after 2008. Public opinion is notably only one of many factors shaping foreign policy, a factor that is influential under some conditions, such as elections. We should look closely to coming European elections in France and Turkey, as well as the anticipated change in leadership in the United Kingdom. The new leadership in Europe will be decisive in determining the future of European attitudes toward the United States and the potential for transatlantic cooperation.

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<sup>1</sup> See European Elite Survey, [www.affairinternazionali.it](http://www.affairinternazionali.it) for the full data and analysis.

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS  
KEY FINDINGS 2006



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

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TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

*Key Findings 2006*

Five years after September 11, 2001, the image of the United States in the eyes of the world has not recovered from its steep decline after the war in Iraq. Yet at the official level there have been efforts at rapprochement, shifting the transatlantic policy agenda toward the challenges of emerging global threats and concerns. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Daniel Fried declared last fall, “The relationship between the United States and Europe is focused less on itself...and more on putting that relationship to work.”<sup>1</sup> Similarly, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso recently observed, “EU-U.S. relations have strengthened considerably over the last year, and we are working together systematically to address common economic, political, and environmental challenges.”<sup>2</sup> In this year’s *Transatlantic Trends*, our fifth annual survey, we analyze whether and how this spirit of working together at the official level is reflected in American and European public opinion on a range of global threats and policy issues.

Cooperation between the United States and the European Union (led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons is perhaps the most prominent example of greater consultation and policy coordination. The United States and the European Union have also been working closely in the past year in the Balkans, Belarus, and Sudan. At the same time, public debate on both sides of the Atlantic has wrestled with allegations of secret CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence in Iraq, and concerns about human rights in the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The recently thwarted attack on transatlantic flights from London raises the following question: Is there a gap in the threat perception of Americans and Europeans concerning international terrorism and Islamic

fundamentalism? Do they draw the line on civil liberties differently when asked about granting greater governmental authority in the effort to prevent terrorism? What do they think their governments should do about the threat of a nuclear Iran, especially if diplomacy fails? How do they view the growing power of China or increased immigration within their own borders? Do they still support NATO in light of this fall’s summit addressing its future? Given instability in the Middle East, how do Americans and Europeans feel about democracy promotion and its chances in the region?

The prospects for transatlantic cooperation will be shaped in part by domestic developments within the United States and Europe. We explored differences in the United States between Democrats and Republicans on Iran, democracy promotion, and civil liberties in light of the upcoming midterm elections. Despite the rejections of the proposed constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, we found continued strong support across Europe for EU global leadership and reforms such as a new EU foreign minister. Contrary to public concerns about “enlargement fatigue,” our results suggest that Europeans see positive benefits from enlargement of the EU’s borders. At the same time, Europeans remain divided over strengthening their military forces and ambivalent about Turkey joining the EU. In addition, this year’s survey includes two new countries, Romania and Bulgaria, that could join the EU as early as 2007. We also devote close attention to Turkey, which appears to be turning away from the United States and Europe in the face of increasing instability and violence on its borders in the Middle East.

*Transatlantic Trends* is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Press Center Briefing, New York, September 15, 2005. <http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/53530.htm>

<sup>2</sup> EU-U.S. Summit, Vienna 2006. [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/us/sum06\\_06/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/index.htm)

conducted in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundação BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

**KEY FINDINGS OF THIS SURVEY INCLUDE:<sup>3</sup>**

- ☞ Large majorities of Americans and Europeans agree on the importance of global threats, with the largest increase over the past year in those who see Islamic fundamentalism as an “extremely important” threat, led by the United Kingdom, where the increase was 22 percentage points.
- ☞ While support for EU leadership in world affairs has remained strong since 2002, Europeans are divided over how it should play a larger role, with 46% who agree that the EU should strengthen its military power and 51% who disagree.
- ☞ Sixty-five percent of Europeans agree that the EU should have its own foreign minister, one of the key reforms put forth in the proposed constitutional treaty.
- ☞ Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 84% of Europeans agree that efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only 15% of Americans and 5% of Europeans seeing military action as the best option.
- ☞ If non-military options toward Iran should fail, 53% of Americans who support efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would support military action, compared with 45% of Europeans. Fifty-four percent of French respondents, though, would support military action if non-military options fail.
- ☞ Americans and Europeans show broad agreement on where to compromise on civil liberties, opposing greater governmental authority to monitor citizens’ telephone calls as part of the effort to prevent terrorism but supporting greater authority to monitor communications on the Internet and install surveillance cameras in public places. They disagree about whether to grant greater governmental authority to monitor banking transactions, with more Americans opposed than Europeans.
- ☞ There is a partisan divide within the United States on civil liberties, with a majority of Democrats opposing greater government authority to monitor telephone calls, communications on the Internet, and banking transactions as part of the effort to prevent terrorism, all of which a majority of Republicans support. The parties agree, however, on greater government authority to install surveillance cameras in public places.
- ☞ Fifty-six percent of Americans and Europeans do not feel that the values of Islam are compatible with the values of democracy. However, majorities also agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups, not with Islam in general. Sixty-six percent of Democrats and 59% of Republicans agree.
- ☞ European support for NATO has declined from 69% in 2002 to 53% in 2006, with large declines in countries traditionally perceived as strong supporters of NATO—Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey.
- ☞ Sixty-three percent of Europeans agree that further enlargement of the European Union will help it to play a more important role in world affairs, and 62% agree that further enlargement will promote peace and democracy along its borders.
- ☞ Turkey has cooled toward the United States and Europe but warmed toward Iran. On a 100-point “thermometer” scale, Turkish “warmth” toward the United States declined from 28 degrees in 2004 to 20 in 2006, and toward the European Union from 52 degrees to 15. Over the same period, Turkish warmth toward Iran rose from 34 degrees to 43.

<sup>3</sup> Unless otherwise noted, Europe-wide percentages refer to EU2, except in sections one, three, and four where we discuss long-term trends, and questions where we examine the opinions of current EU members.





TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section One: Trends in Transatlantic Relations

Although U.S. and European policymakers report that official relations have improved in the past year, most observers argue that the image of the United States and President Bush among the European publics has not improved since their strong opposition to the war in Iraq in 2003.<sup>4</sup> New German Chancellor Angela Merkel changed the tenor of U.S.-German relations, but her warm visits to Washington and welcome of President Bush to Germany were accompanied by persistent concerns about the alleged CIA rendition of a German citizen and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. How has public opinion responded to change at the official level? Have negative attitudes in Europe toward President Bush, as some warned, led to negative views of the United States in general? Is the decline in views of the United States reflected in European views of NATO?

**PERSISTENT DECLINE IN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 2002**

The proportions of Europeans who view U.S. leadership in world affairs as desirable has reversed since 2002, from 64% positive to 37% this year, and from 31% negative to 57%. Among European countries, the greatest decline was in Germany, from 68% positive in 2002 to 43% in 2006. Since 2004, this reversal has remained virtually unchanged. Only three European countries currently view U.S. leadership more positively than negatively: the Netherlands (51% to 44%), Romania (47% to 35%), and the United Kingdom (48% to 45%). Similarly, when asked to evaluate their feelings of warmth toward the United States on a 100-point thermometer scale, Europeans ratings declined from 64 degrees in 2002 to 51 in 2006. (See chart #1)



<sup>4</sup>See *America Against the World: How we are different and why we are disliked*, Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, New York: Times Books, 2006.



**EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO DISTINGUISH VIEWS OF PRESIDENT BUSH FROM THE U.S.**

Europeans continue to distinguish between their views of President Bush and their views of the United States more generally. While European attitudes toward President Bush's handling of international affairs have fallen from 38% positive in 2002 to 18% in 2006, there is a 19-point gap between this figure and their evaluation of U.S. leadership in world affairs. This gap has generally persisted over five years. Negative attitudes toward President Bush also have risen in the United States, where, for the first time since 2002, more Americans disapprove (58%) than approve (40%) of President Bush's handling of international affairs. As one would expect, a far greater number of Democrats (83%) disapprove than Republicans (19%), with greater negatives in both parties since last year. (See chart #2 on page 5)


**EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR NATO DECLINES**

The percentage of Europeans who agree that NATO is essential for their country's security has declined each year since 2002, from 69% that year to 35% in 2006. The largest declines have come in countries traditionally

perceived as strong supporters of NATO; in Germany, support fell from 74% in 2002 to 56% in 2006, and in Italy, support dropped from 68% in 2002 to 52% in 2006. In Poland support fell from 64% in 2002 to 48% in 2006, and in Turkey, support dropped from 53% in 2004 to 44% in 2006.<sup>1</sup> In the United States, support for NATO rose from 56% in 2002 to 61% in 2006. (See chart #3)

**EUROPEANS WANT TO BE MORE INDEPENDENT, AMERICANS BEGINNING TO AGREE**

A majority of Europeans (55%) support a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union (compared to 50% in 2004). While the largest percentage of Americans want closer relations, this has dropped from 60% in 2004 to 45% in 2006, and those who wish to take a more independent approach have increased from 20% in 2004 to 30% in 2006. Romania (51%) and Poland (41%) have the highest support for closer relations in Europe. Only in France and Italy were there increases in support for closer relations since last year, with France seeing a nine percentage-point increase (to 30%) and Italy seeing a six percentage-point increase (to 35%).






TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Two: Challenges and Threats on the Global Agenda

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, recently described the transatlantic agenda, saying "what [we] have begun to think [about] is how to resolve together the many problems, which are an international agenda."<sup>6</sup> Yet, do Americans and Europeans see today's world in the same way? After years of different approaches toward Iran's

nuclear program, the United States and the European Union (led by France, Germany, and United Kingdom) agreed upon a common transatlantic position last year, transforming the situation. Concerns about international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism were heightened again after the subway bombings in London last July, attacks on European embassies and consulates in the Middle East following a Danish newspaper publishing



<sup>6</sup>Speech at Brussels Forum 2006, April 28, 2006. [http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/template/transcript\\_detail.cfm?id=2](http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/template/transcript_detail.cfm?id=2)

cartoons satirizing the prophet Mohammed, and the recently thwarted plot to bomb transatlantic airliners. In this section, we devote attention to support for policy options on dealing with Iran. We also explore American and European attitudes toward immigration, global warming, economic downturn, and China's rising power. Threat perceptions raise questions about what to do, especially concerning civil liberties, a complex issue involving different traditions, institutions, and policies. The prospects for transatlantic cooperation will depend in part on developments within the United States and Europe, so we highlight variations within Europe as well as partisan differences in the United States.


**AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS AGREE ON GLOBAL THREATS**

Large majorities—topping 70% of Americans and Europeans—continue to agree on the importance of a wide

range of international threats in the next 10 years, including international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, the global spread of disease such as avian flu, global warming, the growing power of China, and violence and instability in Iraq. The intensity of threat perception is higher among Americans than Europeans on all threats but global warming. (See chart #4 on page 7)

**INCREASED CONCERN ABOUT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM**

The largest shifts in threat perceptions since last year were increases on both sides of the Atlantic in those who see Islamic fundamentalism as an “extremely important” threat (+13 percentage-points of Americans, -11 percentage-points of Europeans). The largest increases among Europeans were in the United Kingdom (+22 percentage-points), Italy (+19 percentage-points), and Spain (+12 percentage-points).



**IRAN GREATER THREAT THAN IRAQ**

Larger percentages of Americans and Europeans see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as an "extremely important" threat (75% and 58%, respectively) than continued violence and instability in Iraq (56% and 45%, respectively). Among Europeans, the highest percentages of respondents who see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as an extremely important threat are in Portugal (69%), Spain (68%), Germany (67%), and Poland (64%). On Iraq, the highest intensities of threat perception in Europe are in Spain (53%) and the United Kingdom (52%). For more information on American and European attitudes toward Iran, see the accompanying section on page 10.

**BROAD AGREEMENT ON WHERE TO COMPROMISE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES**


Although public debate might lead one to expect that Americans and Europeans have different views of how

to respond to terrorism, we found broad agreement on both sides of the Atlantic on where to draw the line on civil liberties. Fifty-nine percent of both Americans and Europeans oppose greater governmental authority to monitor citizens' telephone calls as part of the effort to prevent terrorism. Americans and Europeans also agree that governments should have greater authority to monitor communications on the Internet (54% of both Americans and Europeans in favor) and to install surveillance cameras in public places (71% of Americans and 78% of Europeans in favor). They disagree about greater authority to monitor banking transactions, with 58% of Americans opposed and 50% of Europeans in favor. (See chart 45)

**SPLIT BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES**

Within the United States, there is a partisan divide on granting the government greater authority as part of

*continued on page 12*



### AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN VIEWS ON IRAN

How willing are Americans and Europeans to support the full range of policy options surrounding Iran, especially should negotiations and a possible UN resolution fail to halt its nuclear program? We asked questions about support for the current initiatives to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as potential future options, including economic incentives, economic and political sanctions, and, ultimately, military force if diplomatic options should fail. By considering support for current and future options, we can assess the overall potential support among American and European publics for the use of force, as well as for accepting a nuclear Iran.


**MAJORITIES SUPPORT CURRENT EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR IRAN**

Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 84% Europeans agree that efforts by the United States and the European Union to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue. When asked about the best option for doing so, the largest percentage of Americans (36%) presently prefers economic sanctions while the largest percentage of Europeans (46%) prefers economic incentives. Only very small percentages of both Americans (15%) and Europeans (5%) feel that military action is currently the best option. (See chart #7)

**IF NON-MILITARY OPTIONS FAIL, AMERICANS AND FRENCH SUPPORT MILITARY FORCE IN IRAN**

If non-military options fail, 53% of Americans who support efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would support military action, compared with 45% of Europeans. In France, Germany, and The United Kingdom, the countries leading negotiations



with Iran for the EU, 54% of French respondents would also support military action if non-military options fail, followed by 46% of British and 40% of German respondents. The largest percentages in the United States (36%) and Europe (47%) agree that the United Nations can best handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons. This is true both for respondents who are willing to accept a nuclear Iran and for those who support military force against Iran. Only 9% of Europeans believe that the



United States can best handle the issue, compared with 22% of Americans. (See chart #8)

**FACED WITH POLICY OPTIONS, MORE AMERICANS WILLING TO CONSIDER FORCE IN IRAN**

An aggregate portrait of American and European support for current and future policy options on Iran reveals that 45% of Americans would support the use of force either now or if non-military options should fail, while 35% of Americans would accept a nuclear Iran, and 20% are uncertain about what to do. Europeans (E11) are nearly evenly divided between 37% who would support the use of force



either now or should non-military options fail, and 38% who would accept a nuclear Iran, with 25% who are uncertain what to do. Among Turkish respondents, only 10% would support the use of force either now or if non-military options should fail, while 56% would accept a nuclear Iran, and 34% are uncertain about what to do. (See chart #9 on page 11)

**AMERICANS AGREE ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR IRAN BUT DIVIDED OVER MILITARY OPTION**

In the United States, Democrats and Republicans overwhelmingly agree (73% and 88%, respectively) that efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only small minorities of both parties who feel that military action is the best option (15% of Democrats and 19% of Republicans). The parties diverge over what to do if non-military options should fail: 70% of Republicans but only 41% of Democrats would support military action under those circumstances. The parties also differ regarding who can best handle the issue, with largest percentage of Democrats (46%) supporting the United Nations, and the largest percentage of Republicans (34%) favoring the United States. (See chart #10)




Chart 10

*continued from page 9*

efforts to prevent terrorism. Majorities of Democrats oppose greater government authority to monitor telephone calls (78%), monitor communications on the Internet (55%), and monitor citizens' banking transactions (71%), whereas majorities of Republicans support greater government authority on each issue (61% in favor of monitoring telephone calls, 72% of monitoring communications on the Internet, and 56% of monitoring banking transactions). Majorities of both parties (65% of Democrats and 80% of Republicans) support greater government authority to install surveillance cameras in public places. (See chart #6 on page 9)


**AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEE RISE OF CHINA DIFFERENTLY**

When asked to evaluate their feelings of warmth toward China on a 100-point thermometer scale, American and European ratings were virtually identical (46 degrees to 15, respectively). But 38% of Americans, compared with 27% of Europeans, feel that the rise of China is an "extremely important threat" in the next 10 years. In the United States, the largest percentage of respondents are more concerned by the threat posed by growing Chinese military power (35%), while in Europe, the largest percentage of respondents is more concerned by

the threat posed by the growing Chinese economy (37%). Among Europeans, the highest perception of threat from the Chinese economy is in France (53%), Portugal (52%), and Italy (51%). Within the United States, Democrats are more concerned about the economic (37%) than military threat (28%), and Republicans are more concerned about the military (42%) than economic threat (21%). (See chart #11)

**IMMIGRATION SEEN AS A THREAT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC**

Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 76% of Europeans agree that large numbers of immigrants coming into their country is an important threat. On both sides of the Atlantic, the percentages of those who see immigration as an "extremely important" threat has increased since 2005, from 35% to 42% in the United States, and from 27% to 32% in Europe. Many more Republicans (51%) than Democrats (29%) agree, and among Europeans, the highest percentages that see immigration as an extremely important threat are in Spain (49%, an increase from 28% in 2005), the United Kingdom (42%), and Portugal (41%).







TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS



Section Three: Democracy Promotion

The United States and the European Union declared at their 2006 annual summit, “we recognize that the advance of democracy is a strategic priority of our age.”<sup>7</sup> The two partners have cooperated closely in the Western Balkans on the final status of Kosovo, the contested presidential election in Belarus, and efforts to relieve suffering in Sudan. Yet the elections of a Hamas-led government in Palestine and a government in Lebanon including Hezbollah have raised difficult questions about democracy promotion in the Middle East and about the compatibility of Islam and democracy, a complex issue relating to views of religion and state. Last year’s *Transatlantic Trends* found that more Europeans than Americans supported democracy promotion while both sides strongly preferred “soft power” options. This year,

we probed further, to see whether these findings were stable and how deep public support is, given the continued challenges in the Middle East.

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SOFTENS

When asked whether it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, 71% of Europeans agreed, a figure nearly unchanged from 2005. Forty-five percent of Americans agreed when asked if it should be the role of the United States, a decline of seven percentage-points from last year. As in 2005, breakdown by U.S. party affiliation shows a strong partisan divide, with only 35% of Democrats agreeing compared to 64% of Republicans. These percentages



<sup>7</sup>Vienna Summit Declaration, EU-US Summit, June 21, 2006. [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/us/sum06\\_06/docs/decl\\_final\\_210606.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/docs/decl_final_210606.pdf)

reflect declines in support in both parties (minus-eight percentage-points among Democrats and minus-12 percentage-points among Republicans). (See charts #12 and #13)


**DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FORCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY**


Asked whether they would support one or more policy options to promote democracy, Americans and Europeans show strong support for less intrusive options such as monitoring elections (79% of Europeans, 67% of Americans) and supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations, and religious groups (77% of Europeans, 71% of Americans). Support declined when asked about more intrusive or severe options, such as economic sanctions, supporting political dissidents, political sanctions, and use of military force. These percentages remain largely unchanged from

last year, with the exception of support for military force, which declined eight percentage-points among Europeans to 24%. In the United States, support for military force continued to show a strong partisan divide, with the support of 28% of Democrats and 54% of Republicans. (See charts #14, and #15 on page 16)

**SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNLESS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS ELECTED**

Fifty nine percent of Americans and 60% of Europeans would continue to support democracy promotion even if the countries in question would be more likely to oppose U.S. or EU policies. When asked if they would continue to hold these views even if it was likely that these countries would elect Islamic fundamentalist leaders, 53% of Americans agree, while European support drops to 33%. Notably, 54% of Turkish respondents agree, a percentage almost identical to Americans.





**INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY DUE TO PARTICULAR ISLAMIC GROUPS**

Fifty six percent of Americans and Europeans (E12) feel the values of Islam are not compatible with the values of their country's democracy. The highest percentages among Europeans were in Germany (67%), Slovakia (63%), and Spain and Italy (62%). Forty-five percent of Turkish respondents feel the values of Islam are not compatible with democracy, which may reflect their

country's long debate on secularism. Sixty percent of both Americans and Europeans (E12) who hold these views feel that the problem is with particular Islamic groups, not with Islam in general. While the largest percentages of both Democrats and Republicans feel that the values of Islam are not compatible with democracy, many more Republicans (67%) than Democrats (47%) hold this view. Sixty-six percent of Democrats and 59% of Republicans agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Four: A Period of "Reflection" in Europe


Since the rejection of the proposed constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the European Union has been in a period of "reflection" about its future. Riots by second-generation immigrant youth in France last fall raised questions about multiculturalism and Europe's economic prospects. Policymakers debated "enlargement fatigue," wondering whether the EU could continue to admit new members on its borders and remain a coherent international actor. Romania and Bulgaria moved closer to joining the EU, and Turkey and Croatia were invited to begin accession negotiations, but questions were raised about when Turkey would be ready to join. Turkish politicians, in turn, warned that frustrations over accession could turn Turkey away from the EU and the West. How have these widespread concerns

and debates shaped attitudes toward the EU's role in international affairs? Given strong support for EU global leadership, how willing are Europeans to play a military role in international affairs? Are Europeans as skeptical toward further enlargement as their politicians?

**STRONG SUPPORT BUT DECLINING INTENSITY FOR EU LEADERSHIP AMONG CORE MEMBERS**

Overall support for the European Union to exert strong leadership in world affairs has remained very strong since 2002, with 81% of respondents seeing EU leadership as desirable in 2002 and 76% feeling the same in 2005. The intensity of this support, however, has dropped considerably in some of the founding members of the European Union, with the percentage of French

*continued on page 20*



**IS TURKEY TURNING AWAY FROM THE WEST?**

Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül warned recently that Turkey is at risk of turning away from its traditional alliances in the West, that "moderate liberal people [in Turkey] are becoming anti-American and anti-EU," especially "young, dynamic, educated, and economically active people." Although the European Union invited Turkey to begin accession negotiations in October 2005, the initial steps have been characterized by frustration over the unresolved situation in Cyprus and public skepticism about Turkey's candidacy voiced by some European politicians. The sense that Turkey was not welcome was reinforced by the change in the French constitution last year to require a referendum for future enlargements after Romania and Bulgaria. U.S.-Turkish official relations have been strained, and Turkey has repeatedly expressed concerns with the instability on its borders with Iraq and with U.S. policies in the Middle East. In this time of uncertainty about Turkey's future in the EU and its border relations, can we observe trends in public opinion?

**TURKEY COOLING TOWARD U.S. AND EU, WARMING TOWARD IRAN**

Turkish feelings toward the United States and Europe have cooled since 2004, with a warmth reading toward the United States declining from 28 degrees in 2004 to 20 in 2006 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and from 52 degrees to 45 toward the European Union. Over the same period, the warmth reading of Turkish feelings toward Iran has risen from 34 degrees to 43, and their feelings toward the Palestinians have declined from 52 degrees to 47. (See chart #17)

**YOUNGER TURKS WARMER TOWARD BOTH U.S. AND EU**

Younger Turks, however, have warmer feelings toward both the United States and the European Union than the national averages, with a thermometer reading among 18 to 24-year-olds of 27 degrees toward the





Chart 17

<sup>2</sup> "Anti-west backlash is gaining pace, warns Turkish minister," *Tarbiyat Times*, July 20, 2005, page 11.

United States and 48 degrees toward the European Union. Overall, warmth toward both the United States and the European Union was negatively correlated with age, suggesting that the younger Turks are not more anti-American or anti-EU than older generations.



**DECLINING SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN TURKEY**

While a majority of Turkish respondents continue to see membership as a good thing, the percentage of Turks who see Turkey's membership as a good thing has fallen each year from 73% in 2004 to 54% in 2006, while the percentage of Turkish respondents who see Turkey's membership as a bad thing has increased from 9% to 22% over that same time. (See chart #18).

**TURKEY MOST CRITICAL OF BUSH AND NEGATIVE TOWARD EU LEADERSHIP**

Among Europeans, Turkey has the lowest approval rating for President Bush's handling of international policies, with only seven percent approving and 81% disapproving. The strongest negative feelings toward U.S. leadership in world affairs were also found in Turkey, where 56% of respondents viewed U.S. leadership as "very undesirable." At the same time, Turkish support for strong EU leadership in world affairs also dropped, from 50% in 2005 to 35% in 2006.

**DOWNWARD TREND IN TURKISH SUPPORT FOR NATO**

While 53% agreed with the statement that NATO is still essential for Turkey's security in 2004 and 52% in 2005, only 44% of Turkish respondents agreed in 2006. This percentage, while no longer a majority, remains the largest percentage of Turkish respondents.

continued from page 17

respondents who see EU leadership as “very desirable” dropping from 40% in 2002 to 24% in 2006. Similarly, this percentage has dropped in Italy from 53% in 2002 to 31% in 2006 and in the Netherlands from 42% to 36% in 2006. Only Germany, among the founding members surveyed, has remained constant, with 27% in 2002 and 31% in 2006.

**WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR EU FOREIGN MINISTER**

Sixty-five percent of Europeans agree that the EU should have its own foreign minister—one of the key reforms put forth in the proposed constitutional treaty—even if their country might not always agree with the positions taken. Support is highest in Spain (79%) and Italy (71%) and lowest in Slovakia (48%) and the United Kingdom (52%). (See chart #16 on page 17)

**COMPETING VIEWS ABOUT DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS**

When asked whether the EU should strengthen its military power in order to play a larger role in the world, 46% of Europeans agree and 51% disagree. As past *Transatlantic Trends* surveys have suggested, this disagreement reflects competing views of the EU as an international actor between those who feel the EU should increase its military power and those who feel the EU should concentrate on economic power. The highest support for strengthening military power is found in Portugal (68%), France (56%), and Poland (51%), with the lowest support in Germany (35%).

**EUROPEANS FEEL FURTHER ENLARGEMENT WILL HELP EU IN WORLD AFFAIRS**

Majorities of Europeans agree that further enlargement of the European Union will help it play a more important




Chart 19


role in world affairs (63%). The largest percentages are found in countries about to join the EU, Romania (85%) and Bulgaria (82%), followed by Spain (78%), Poland (77%), Portugal (74%), and Slovakia (73%). Similarly, a majority of Europeans agree that further enlargement will promote peace and democracy along its borders (62%). At the same time, a majority of Europeans feel that further enlargement will make it even more difficult to develop a common European identity (58%). (See chart #19)

**"NEW" EU MEMBERS NOT A COHERENT BLOC**

New and prospective EU members surveyed—Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania,—do not appear as a group to hold significantly different views on the EU or the United States from the European averages. The percentages of Poles and Romanians who support strong EU leadership in world affairs (70% and 66%, respectively) is close to the European average of 76%, while the percentages are lower in Bulgaria and Slovakia (56% and 50%, respectively). Yet Poland and Romania also show the highest support for President Bush's policies (40% and 42%, respectively), where Bulgaria and Slovakia (20% and 23%, respectively) are closer to the European average of 18%.

**NEGATIVE TRENDS IN EUROPEAN VIEWS ABOUT TURKEY JOINING THE EU**

When asked whether Turkey's membership in the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad, the largest percentage of Europeans continue to feel it would be neither good nor bad (40%, a figure unchanged since 2004). Among those who have an opinion, however, there has been a reversal in the percentages who see Turkey's membership as a good or bad thing—those who see Turkey's membership as a good thing have fallen each year from 30% in 2004 to 21% in 2006, and those who see Turkey's membership as a bad thing have grown from 20% in 2004 to 32% in 2006. The largest increases in negative views since 2004 have been in Slovakia (+21 percentage-points), the Netherlands (+18 percentage-points), and Germany and Spain (+14 percentage-points each). (See chart #20)



**AMERICANS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STRONG EU LEADERSHIP**

Americans continue to feel positively about the European Union and to support strong EU leadership in the world. Americans registered an increase in their feelings of warmth toward the EU from 53 degrees to 60 on a 100-point thermometer scale between 2002 and 2006. Seventy-six percent of Americans also support strong leadership for the EU in world affairs in 2006 (nearly unchanged from 79% in 2002). There is no partisan difference on this issue, with 75% of both Republicans and Democrats agreeing.





TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

*Section Five: Conclusion*

Although the image of the United States has not recovered among Europeans, this year's *Transatlantic Trends* suggests that American and European views of international threats and challenges may not be so far apart. Concerns about Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have risen on both sides of the Atlantic in the past year. There is strong support for continuing efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, although there are likely to be differences should military force become a serious option. Iran may offer a good case for the development of a common European foreign policy since public opinion is relatively united, yet Europeans remain divided about how the EU should play a larger role in the world. Americans and Europeans seem to agree on where to compromise on civil liberties in the effort to prevent terrorism, although a closer look at the United States shows significant differences between Republicans and Democrats. While China's rising power is viewed differently, with more Americans than Europeans concerned about a potential military threat, both are concerned about the compatibility of Islam and democracy and agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups.

The United States and its European allies will debate NATO's future this fall at the Riga summit at a time when we find declining support for the alliance in Europe. This is perhaps most worrisome when this trend is led by notable declines in public support among traditionally strong supporters of NATO, including Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey. Public support for NATO, other surveys show, has rebounded after comparable low periods in the past (around the Pershing missile crisis in 1981, the end of the cold war in 1989, and the war in the Balkans in the mid-1990s) and may do so again.

Trends in Turkey offer a sobering picture. Turkish respondents appear to be cooling toward both the U.S. and the EU, while warming toward Iran. Support for NATO has declined each year since 2004, as has support for joining the EU. Yet, these trends are not reflected in more critical attitudes in Turkey's younger generation, which has the most positive attitude toward both. American and European relations with Turkey, at a time when frustrations are growing about EU membership and instability on its borders, may prove vital to the prospects for transatlantic cooperation surrounding progress in the Middle East.

Looking ahead, the gap between the reported improvement in transatlantic relations at the official level and persistent negative views among European publics may simply reflect a time lag in the perception of change, especially if political leaders continue to declare their desire to leave behind the bitterness around Iraq. On the other hand, the persistence of negative views of President Bush among Europeans may indicate that their minds are made up, that change will only be possible with a new president after 2008. We have explored differences among European countries to show the contours of public opinion on a range of issues. There are also differences across the political spectrum and among European policymakers, themes which are explored in another, related survey project.<sup>3</sup> Public opinion is only one of many factors shaping foreign policy, a factor that is influential under some conditions, such as elections. We should look closely to this fall's midterm elections in the United States and to next year's presidential elections in France as politicians seek to gauge the public mood and their support for future policies.

<sup>3</sup> European Elite Survey, a project of the Compagnia di San Paolo. Please see [www.waffarinternazionali.it](http://www.waffarinternazionali.it) for the full data and analysis.



**TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS**

*Notes*



**TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS**

*Notes*

**METHODOLOGY:**

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face to face interviews. In all countries a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 6, 2006, and June 24, 2006.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sample (n=12044), the margin of error is plus or minus 1 percentage point. The average response rate for all 13 countries surveyed was 23.4%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, comparative data are reproduced from *Transatlantic Trends 2003-2005* and/or from *Worldviews 2002* ([www.transatlantictrends.org](http://www.transatlantictrends.org)).


When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the time of printing, data for years 2002 through 2004 are available through ICPSR. For more information please consult the ICPSR catalog at [www.icpsr.umich.edu](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu).

**NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES:**

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part of the EU9, and the E10 average is listed as part of the E12. For additional information on the composition of the European averages, please consult the table below.

**TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES:**

YEAR	AVERAGE	COUNTRIES
2002	EU6	France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and The United Kingdom
2003	EU7	Same as the EU6 with the addition of Portugal
2004-2006	EU9	Same as the EU7 with the addition of Slovakia and Spain
2004-2005	E10	Same as the EU9 with the addition of Turkey
2006	E11	Same as EU9 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania
2006	E12	Same as E10 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania



**TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS**

[www.transatlantictrends.org](http://www.transatlantictrends.org)

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A project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand that we have three votes. We are going to have to move here—maybe we have 10 minutes—so that we can accommodate Ms. Conway's statement, and then we will recess for about a half an hour. We would ask the two of you to indulge us, and we will come back as expeditiously as possible.

Ms. Conway.

**STATEMENT OF KELLYANNE CONWAY, J.D., CEO AND  
PRESIDENT, THE POLLING COMPANY, INC.**

Ms. CONWAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for hosting Dr. Glenn and me this afternoon. It is a privilege and a pleasure to be before you to address the matter of European public opinion of the United States, its policies, its values, and its people.

Just as is the case here in the United States, public opinion in Europe is shaped by any number of factors—social, historic, economic, religious, cultural, political, and may I remind us all, of individual and personal considerations as well.

As my colleague, Dr. Glenn, has said using a different set of words, polls are a snapshot in time. They basically are grounded in the moment of their capture. They are instructive, but they are not dispositive.

Polls are important in this country because they allow us and particularly our elected officials a touchstone into the motivations, frustrations, desires, expectations, opinions, and sometimes just basic knowledge levels, or lack thereof, on any number of issues facing Americans who are now such a diverse and large populace that polls end up being one of the last measurements that we have as a way to understand what a large swath of them feel at any given time on any given matter.

The responses to public opinion data are as dynamic as the people who offer those responses. Public opinion data are not static; they are ever-changing because the issues that inspire them, and I would even say the people who respond about the issues, are ever-changing. Therefore, I think polls should be treated as one tool in the well-stocked arsenal that informs public policy decision-making.

With respect to the specific matter of European public opinion toward the United States, its leaders, its people, and its values, I believe that we need to look at the 230-year history that exists between our Nation and that continent to put any one polling statistic in a fuller context.

We are a nation whose history with Europe has been one that has been filled with treaties, wars, a competitive free market spirit and activity, but certainly also conflict; an international exchange of commerce and ideas, but also, at times, intellectual, if not emotional and financial turmoil and competition as well.

Therefore, it should surprise no one that Europeans in 2007 or at any time in modern history have opinions toward the United States that are deeply held, passionate and, to some extent, fixed. But European disapproval of some American policies and some American leaders is not a new phenomenon.

In 1983, *Newsweek* reported in one of its polls that just one-quarter of French citizens said that they approved of United States poli-

cies. The year 1983 was exactly 20 years before the Iraq war started, so I think that one of the mainstays of my testimony today should be that a pollster's job, in part, is to show us the difference between causation and coincidence with respect to public opinion data.

Too often, people look at a polling statistic and say, "Aha, this is why that is so," and 10 or 15 people come up with 10 or 15 different reasons as to why the polling statistic came out as it did. That somehow confuses causation with coincidence because you need to find a causal nexus between the question that was asked, the result that was given, and the effect and consequence that it bears.

In fact, the number of Europeans who have had "negative impressions" of the United States has steadily increased over the last 8 years, which is twice the length of the Iraq war itself, which met its fourth anniversary this week, so it is a steady increase in negativity that preceded the Iraq war and actually preceded even George W. Bush's time in the Presidency. I think it is worth examining.

My colleague, Dr. Glenn, made a very smart reference to some of the distinctions with respect to European public opinion on matters as different as the Iranian situation, secret prisons by the CIA, the situation at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay, and certainly—I will add one—the United States involvement with the Israeli-Hezbollah war. You find all across Europe that these citizens who are talking to pollsters are also making such distinctions in their responses. There is a marked difference in the "strongly disapproved," indeed, the greatest indictment, "the most stinging rebuke" that one can give a pollster in response to a question on policy.

You find a tremendous distinction among those Europeans offering strong disapproval with respect to the war in Iraq as opposed to the United States involvement in dealing with North Korea and Iran on nuclear weapons and certainly its involvement with the Israeli-Hezbollah war.

Again, so as not to take any one figure or any one polling statistic and expand it unnecessarily outward and too broadly is to really look at it on a case-by-case, specific basis, because it seems that that would only be the fair and judicious way to treat European public opinion since those Europeans talking to the pollsters themselves have made such distinctions in their responses.

It is also important to note that polling questions like that are rich—they are very good because they ask people not to respond to "feel good" phraseology, but in effect, they ask a series of polling questions that deal with specific disagreements and situations, actual physical conflicts and diplomatic disagreements that were measured, rather than broader concepts or broader American values. For that reason, among others, it is very important to not expand unnecessarily or even confuse unduly some of these responses with some broader assault on American values and America and her people.

We do not find that in the polling data. In fact, my colleague today and colleagues who have testified before this committee recently, with the exception of perhaps one, have not gone as far as

to say that these broad negative sentiments have metastasized, if you will, into some hardened anti-Americanism. In fact, one could argue it is hardly astonishing that the United States, as the world's military and economic superpower, engenders a certain amount of suspicion, if not jealousy, by people around the globe, including those who live under democratic or parliamentary rule.

While it may be true, and I acknowledge completely that not all dissatisfaction among Europeans can be explained through envy or power struggles, it is a telling facet of the views that should not be readily dismissed; and I think one of the most telling statistics that enlivens that part of my testimony are the results that came from the Pew Research Project in 2004. When they asked people all across Europe and the United States the following question, and I quote, "Would it be a good or a bad thing if the European Union became as powerful as the United States?" Ninety percent of the French said it would be a good thing, 70 percent of Germany said it would be a good thing, 67 percent of people in Russia and 67, same number, in Turkey said it would be a good thing. Hence, the desire to be on parity with the United States as the world's greatest military and economic superpower seems to be a natural desire of our European brethren across the pond.

It is part of my written testimony, but I feel that it is important to just give you a few examples of headlines that people in nations across Europe and even Asia have been exposed to prior to responding to pollsters as to their—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ms. Conway, excuse me. If I may interrupt for a moment, we have maybe 2 or 3 more minutes. If you need more time when we return, I have no reluctance in providing you that time, but if possible—

Ms. CONWAY. Yes, sir, I think I can accommodate that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Ms. CONWAY. Thank you.

These headlines include: "America finally waking up to its horrific failure in Iraq"; "America will thrive after Iraq. It is the locals who will suffer"; "America has acted stupidly in Iraq," claims U.S. diplomat"; "America's Defeat in Iraq Will Cost Russia; Total Chaos Moving in to Replace the Mono-polar World."

This is important because people read these headlines and then tell pollsters what it is they think of the United States, and it becomes a circular—it becomes almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. Essentially, the sequence is, "This is what our press has said of the United States. So, what do you think about the United States?" I think that also adds some context.

Consider the extreme saturation of press regarding the situations in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, where more respondents in European nations several years ago had heard about the situation in Abu Ghraib than those in the United States. And I assure you, as somebody who was living and breathing in the United States at that time, it was not for lack of press coverage of Abu Ghraib in this country that fewer people here had heard of it than in Europe.

Mr. Chairman, we also have recent data from the Iraqis released this very month, after some of your other experts testified before this committee. Iraqis, by 49 percent to 26 percent, told pollsters that they prefer to live under the current presidency than under



former President Saddam Hussein, and, in fact, the favorability rating of the new Iraqi President has jumped from 29 percent to 43 percent in just 5 short months.

According to the same survey, only 27 percent of Iraqis believe their country has disintegrated into civil war, and one-third of the Iraqi people believe that President Bush is sending the troops in to bring security and stability back to Iraq.

This is not intended to be a personal or even a professional public opinion statement on the troop surge in Iraq so much as to say that when we examine European opinions of the United States, we ought to be looking at Iraqi opinions of the situation in Iraq, at a very minimum.

Mr. Chairman, if I may as a final point, I believe that the most telling information that we have with respect to European opinions of the United States, its policies and its people come not through public opinion statistics so much as through—not so much what Europeans tell pollsters as how Europeans relate to Americans. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports that, between 2005 and 2006, nearly 1 million Europeans obtained legal permanent residence status in the United States. That is higher than the same number of Europeans who emigrated permanently to this country in the 1970s and the 1980s, and it is on track to beat the figures all through the 1990s with respect to this entire decade.

The undeniable enthusiasm across the European nations for United States goods and services has increased dramatically. Thirty-six percent of all McDonald's corporate profits last year alone came from Europe, and in fact, McDonald's had reportedly achieved its best European sales in 15 years in 2006.

More generally, the EU maintains the United States as one of its top trading partners, and our exchange equals nearly 40 percent of all world trade according to the European Union/European Commission's figures' own statistics on its Web site.

Just like in this country, it is very difficult to walk down a street in most European cities and not find a Starbucks, not find United States goods and services being offered and, indeed, not run into indigenous peoples of that country wearing T-shirts that say "U-S of A" and not with red circles and slashes amidst them, either.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the like-mindedness between our peoples has also been found in some of the economic data where very large numbers—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ms. Conway, I am sorry, but we have only a minute left. Thank you.

Ms. CONWAY [continuing]. Of Americans and Europeans say the best system on which to base the future of the world is the free market.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Conway follows:]

**Testimony of Kellyanne Conway**  
 President and CEO, **the polling company™, inc.**

*Polling Data on European Opinion of American Policies, Values and People*  
 presented to:

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations,  
 Human Rights, and Oversight, and the Subcommittee on Europe  
 Thursday, March 22, 2007 3:00PM

Thank you, Mister Chairman, for inviting me to address this Committee regarding European public opinion of the United States, its people, policies and values.

Recent headlines around the globe have breathlessly declared that large majorities of Europeans have a “mostly negative” view of the United States and its policies. Before we seal the scroll on European opinion of America, it is important to consider the greater contexts within which those ratings were cast, the survey questions and methodologies that engendered such responses, and other facts and figures that would seem to soften, if not belie, the intensity of those claims.

Just as it is the case in the United States, public opinion in Europe is shaped by social, economic, cultural, historic, political and individual factors. As such, it is not advisable to certify the “opinions” of a whole class of people based on a few inquiries that ask respondents to react or pigeon-hole their feelings into a simple “yes or no,” “agree or disagree” construct. It may be wise, as is attempted below, to more deeply examine the genesis of these opinions and to consider other survey data that suggest a more nuanced, and in some cases more hopeful, outlook of European opinion of the United States.

***Recent European Opinion Research***

All polling data is grounded in the moment of its capture, and tempered by the circumstances attending that moment. The larger cultural, political, economic, religious and social conditions must be considered when assessing opinion data. With over 230 years of complex history filled with treaties, wars, American aid and an international exchange of commerce and ideas, it should surprise no one that Europeans have strong, even passionate, opinions regarding the United State’s policies, values and people.

The numbers of Europeans who have “positive impressions” of America have declined over the last eight years even before the Iraq War, which just this week marked its

Pew Data Favorable Opinions of the United States						
Populous	1999/2000 <sup>1</sup>	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Great Britain</b>	83%	75%	70%	58%	55%	56%
<b>France</b>	62%	63%	43%	37%	43%	39%
<b>Germany</b>	78%	61%	45%	38%	41%	37%
<b>Spain</b>	50%	--	38%	--	41%	23%

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Data reported by the Pew Global Attitudes Project

fourth anniversary. However, the high levels of “satisfaction” Europeans reported with the United States in the 1990’s may themselves be aberrational, considering even recent 20<sup>th</sup> century history. For example, in 1983, a *Newsweek* poll found that just one-quarter of French citizens approved of U.S. policies.<sup>2</sup>

Recently, this Committee heard from Dr. Steven Kull of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), who testified about the BBC World Service poll. That survey’s results suggested that vast majorities of citizens in Europe held “mainly

<b>BBC 2006 Data European Views of United States Influence on the World</b>				
<b>Populous</b>	<b>Mainly Positive</b>	<b>Mainly Negative</b>	<b>Depends/ Neither, Neutral (Vol.)</b>	<b>Don't Know (Vol.)</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>3%</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Russia</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>59%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>9%</b>

negative” views of the United States’ influence on the world. That question is broad and vague. It also failed to invite respondents to express ambivalence or uncertainty by not including a listed option of “neutral” or “depends.” Even with this omission, some respondents in Europe, including double-digit figures in countries like Italy and Portugal, volunteered those answer choices.

#### *European Opinion Research Regarding the U.S. and its Policies in Context*

European disapproval of American policies is not a new phenomenon. Throughout our history, American foreign policy has been questioned by our allies and enemies in Europe. It is important to remember that while the E.U. and U.S. have many similar interests we also have divergent ones, and it is naïve to assume that members of any nation outside of the U.S. would enthusiastically applaud all – or even most -- of our actions.

<sup>2</sup> “What the World Thinks of America” (July 11, 1983) *Newsweek*

For example, people in many European nations resist the United States' goal to assist free peoples in their quest to self-govern. In a 2005 Ipsos- Public Affairs poll, vast majorities of citizens in Europe were convinced that the U.S. should not "promote the establishment of democratic governments in other countries." This idea was disliked by 84% of the French public, 80% of Germans, 53% of Italians, 60% of Spanish citizens and 66% of those in Great Britain. One might wonder why nations who enjoy a degree of personal liberty and free market economies would deny the same to others around the globe.

A recent poll<sup>3</sup> by Dr. Kull's group, though he included only in the global aggregate in his own testimony before this Committee, demonstrated that U.S. handling of the situation in Iraq was rejected with considerably intensity by citizens surveyed in seven European countries, while other aspects of U.S. foreign policy were criticized with less intensity. For example, French respondents were 22 points less likely to say they "strongly disapproved" of America's policies regarding Iran's nuclear program than those who "strongly disapproved" of America's role in Iraq (79%-57%). U.S. policy concerning Iran stood apart as an area where fewer Europeans were disapproving of U.S. actions, as was also the case with the Israeli-Hezbollah war.

Populous	BBC 2006 Data Percentage of European Citizens who "Strongly Disapproved" Of the U.S. Government's Handling of...					
	The War in Iraq	Iran's Nuclear Program	The Israeli-Hezbollah War	Detainees in Guantanamo	North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program	Global Warming or Climate Change
United States	40%	25%	26%	29%	21%	37%
France	79%	57%	63%	67%	50%	74%
Germany	66%	34%	46%	70%	31%	66%
Great Britain	57%	35%	41%	51%	25%	61%
Italy	63%	38%	47%	64%	37%	56%
Portugal	61%	34%	46%	66%	30%	65%
Turkey	62%	52%	61%	63%	48%	45%
Russia	50%	28%	29%	31%	24%	16%

This survey received considerable attention from the domestic and international press, and was championed by President George W. Bush's detractors as a measure of his foreign policy failures. Still, it is imperative to note that policies dealing with actual physical conflict or specific diplomatic disagreements were measured, rather than broader concepts that go to the heart of American values or her people.

<sup>3</sup> BBC by Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and GlobeScan from November 2006 to January 2007

In earlier polls, when instances of U.S. aid and diplomatic goodwill are tested, Europeans do not necessarily have a negative view. In fact, some news stories like U.S. aid to tsunami victims in Asia in 2005, and support of democracy in the Middle East caused majorities or near majorities in a variety of European countries to view the United States more positively. Responsible polling of European opinions of American policy should take into consideration the full range of United States actions throughout the world, instead of focusing on easy targets of discord.

Populous	Pew 2005 Data Percentage Lead to Have a More Favorable View of the United States after World Events		
	January Elections in Iraq	U.S. Aid to Tsunami Victims	President Bush's Calls for Democracy in Middle East
Great Britain	40%	44%	47%
France	35%	51%	43%
Germany	50%	66%	71%
Spain	23%	46%	45%
Netherlands	55%	62%	65%
Russia	11%	61%	24%

It is hardly astonishing that the United States, as the world's superpower in both military might and economic prowess, elicits negative views from competing nations. While it may be true that not all of the dissatisfaction Europeans feel towards the United States can be explained by envy or power struggles, it is a telling facet of their views that should not be so readily dismissed.

It seems that many Europeans are simply uncomfortable with the fact America is in the most powerful position, a gnawing truth that was acknowledged by majorities of citizens in five European countries when asked whether it would be "a good or a bad thing if the European Union Became as Powerful as the U.S.?" As the nearby chart demonstrates, these figures rose significantly in countries other than the chief U.S. ally Great Britain. Interestingly, of those who wanted increases in the E.U.'s power in each of those nations majorities were also in favor of Europe having to "pay the costs of taking greater responsibility for international problems" in a separate question.

Populous	Pew 2004 Data "Would it be a Good or a Bad Thing if the European Union Became as Powerful as the U.S.?"	
	Good Thing	Bad Thing
France	90%	9%
Germany	70%	22%
Russia	67%	12%
Turkey	67%	21%
Britain	50%	39%
United States	33%	50%

Further, the noted anti-American sentiments of influential leaders in media and politics throughout Europe cannot be extracted from this equation. News broadcasts and articles across the European Continent negatively present the United States' foreign policy on a consistent, indeed daily, basis. Consider the tone and substance of these British headlines from major newspapers in the fall of 2006 alone, "America Finally Waking Up to its Horrific Failure in Iraq<sup>4</sup>," "America Will Thrive After Iraq; it is the Locals Who Will Suffer<sup>5</sup>," and "America Has Acted Stupidly in Iraq, Claims U.S. Diplomat.<sup>6</sup>" In Russia, *Defense and Security Digest*, a military strategy magazine read by public opinion leaders throughout the country ran a story titled: "America's Defeat in Iraq Will Cost Russia; Total Chaos Moving in to Replace the Mono-polar World."<sup>7</sup>

Just this month, the Prime Minister of France, Dominique de Villepin, was quoted in the *Agence France Presse* (France's global news agency similar to *Associated Press*) saying that although the U.S. remains the number one power in the world, "The war in Iraq marked a turning point. It shattered America's image. It undermined the image of the West as a whole." He went on to imply that the United States is trying to establish its own "world order" stating, "None can impose a new world order on their own" and by advocating "true global governance."<sup>8</sup>

This blatant anti-American sentiment in the press is not a European phenomenon. In China, the government's official news source Xinhua, reported that "only the occupying troops should be held responsible" for the "current chaotic state in Iraq."<sup>9</sup> These are only a few examples of how Europeans and other global citizens are exposed to a barrage of negative press regarding the United States generally, and its involvement in Iraq specifically.

Consider the extreme saturation of press regarding the alleged abuses by U.S. Soldiers in Guantanamo and at Abu Ghraib, compared to the more positive news story of American aid to Pakistan after the October 2005 Earthquake. The Pew Global Attitudes project found in 2006 that eye-popping majorities in every major European nation admitted familiarity with reports of prison abuses, considerably (in some cases 20 and 30 points more likely) more likely than those who stated with the story of Pakistani aid.

Pew 2006 Data Regarding Saturation of News Stories Regarding U.S. in European Nations			
Populous	Iraq and Guantanamo Prison Abuses	U.S. Aid to Pakistan after Earthquake	Difference
United States	76%	69%	+7%
Great Britain	90%	73%	+17%
France	88%	63%	+25%
Germany	98%	66%	+32%
Spain	90%	55%	+35%

<sup>4</sup> *The Guardian*, October 18, 2006

<sup>5</sup> *The Financial Times*, November 7, 2006

<sup>6</sup> *Daily Mail*, October 23, 2006

<sup>7</sup> *Defense and Security Digest* December 20, 2006

<sup>8</sup> *Agence France Presse*, March 16, 2007

<sup>9</sup> Reprinted by the *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, December 20, 2006 "Xinhua commentary: US "most important factor" causing chaos in Iraq"

**Note that even more respondents in European nations had heard about the situation in Abu Ghraib a few years ago than those in the United States.** This one comparison is perhaps illustrative of the typically myopic and gloomy focus on the United States by the European media which would naturally lead to higher rates of disapproval for the subject of so much negative press.

Interestingly, Europeans are not really that satisfied with their own countries either. This month, The Financial Times and Harris released the results of a poll, finding that just 25% of those who live in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain were convinced their life has improved since their country joined the European Union. Further, in 2005, The Pew Global Attitudes project

Populous	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Spain	51%	44%
Great Britain	44%	51%
Turkey	55%	41%
France	28%	71%
Russia	23%	71%
Germany	25%	73%
United States	39%	57%

found marked discontent among Europeans, especially in France, Germany, and Russia where 7 in 10 adults reported they were unhappy with their national conditions. Thus European unhappiness with conditions abroad is mirrored at home, perhaps exposing a more general, boundary-less pessimism that is not confined to attitudes about the U.S.

And in a contemporary example of how actions speak louder than words, one might consider the millions of Europeans who visit the U.S. each year, are educated here and indeed, immigrate altogether. The U.S. hosts over half a million foreign students for post-secondary education, mostly from Asia. However, during the 2004-2005 school year, E.U. countries Germany and Turkey were among the top ten countries sending students.<sup>10</sup> Interestingly, there are twice as many students from Europe studying in the U.S. as there are Americans pursuing education in Europe.<sup>11</sup>

Further, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports that from 2000-2005 nearly one million (904,529) Europeans obtained legal permanent resident status. In that five-year period, more Europeans immigrated than during 1970-1979 (825,590) and 1980-1989 (668,866), and the 2000's are on track to beat the decade totals for the 1990's (1,348,612).

The undeniable enthusiasm across Europe for U.S. goods and services has increased dramatically over the past few decades, including recently, and more U.S.-based companies have established European presences and expansions that have led to direct access to these goods and employment opportunities for many Europeans. Interestingly, iconic American brands have continued to increase their reach across Europe. For example, McDonald's achieved its best European sales in 15 years in 2006; European sales account for 36% of the corporation's profit.<sup>12</sup> More generally, the E.U. and the

<sup>10</sup> "Foreign Enrollment in USA Steadies" (November 12, 2006) *USA Today*

<sup>11</sup> "The learning lag." (July 7, 2006) *Wall Street Journal*.

<sup>12</sup> "Strongest European sales in 15 years." (February 5, 2007) *Brand Strategy*. "McDonald's has a shake-up image of Europe." (March 5, 2007) *Financial Times*.

United States remain top trading partners (in both goods and services) with our exchange equaling nearly 40% of all world trade.<sup>13</sup>

Further, opinion research also shows that many Europeans believe that a good life (or at least similar quality of life) awaits an immigrant to the U.S. from their country. Four-in-ten residents of Great Britain (41%) reported to the Pew Global Attitude's Project released in 2005 that UK residents who move to the US will have a "better life" and additional 35% thought their new life would be comparable to living in the UK, neither better nor worse. Only 6% said life in the U.S. would be worse as compared to that in the UK.

#### *Iraqis Weigh In*

Europeans, however, are not the only voices that should be considered when discussing external views toward American foreign policy and in this case, the effect of that policy on the Iraqis themselves. Surely, attitudes of the Iraqis themselves provide compelling if not more dispositive information about the true state of affairs there.

Earlier this month, British researchers at Opinion Research Business (a respected Market Research firm that paid for the survey) released a survey of over 5,000 Iraqi citizens. The results of this comprehensive examination belie many of the major press accounts *outside* of Iraq that claim to describe life in Iraq and in the more arrogant, presumptuous accounts, to speak on behalf of the Iraqi people. Although significant numbers have been personally touched by the sectarian violence, (38% have had a family member, friend or colleague murdered) have demonstrated a genuine level of optimism about the state or their country.

In fact, Iraqis prefer their lives under President Nouri al-Malkiki's government to Saddam Husain's rule by 23 points (49%-26%), with 16% reporting no difference. Further, the President is receiving increased support, as his favorability rating has jumped from 29% in September of 2006 to 43% in February of this year. Only 27% of Iraqis believe their country has disintegrated into civil war and one-third (33%) of the Iraqi people believed that President Bush is sending the 20,000+ troop surge to "bring security and stability back to Iraq."

<sup>13</sup> European Union, European Commission Figures, accessed at [www.ec.europa.eu](http://www.ec.europa.eu)



*European Opinions of Americans and American Values*

Too often, European attitudes towards America and Americans have been confused with negative assessments of the actions or personalities of its leaders. Recent and historical polling data clearly points to a divide between those two attitudes. We find that vast majorities of the public in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia have favorable opinions of Americans. Spain stands alone as having less than a majority (37%) of its public in favor of the U.S. Admittedly, these measures are with little intensity and have declined in recent years. However, it is clear that Europeans' unease with the leaders and policies of the U.S. at any given time do not simply extend en masse to the American people.

Populous	Favorability Rating	
	The United States	Americans
United States	77%	85%
Great Britain	56%	69%
France	39%	65%
Germany	37%	66%
Spain	23%	37%
Russia	43%	57%

**In fact, Europeans widely associate many positive traits and values with Americans.** Although percentages between European nations varied widely, when asked about a list of seven characteristics, **large majorities identified Americans as “hardworking” and “inventive.”** To a lesser degree, pluralities saw the people of the United States as “honest,” most reflecting the number of our own citizens who agreed with the assessment. Admittedly, Americans also were seen as both “greedy” and “violent” in several countries, but again these figures were in parity with Americans' own peek-in-the-mirror self-evaluations and with far less agreement than the positive traits. This appraisal of Americans and their values should be regarded as strong affirmation of specific views, which are superior to general measures of “favorability” that deny the survey respondent an expression of more nuanced or multidimensional views on the U.S. as a populous.

Populous	Positive Characteristics			Negative Characteristics			
	Hardworking	Inventive	Honest	Greedy	Violent	Rude	Immoral
United States	85%	81%	63%	70%	49%	35%	39%
Great Britain	76%	64%	57%	64%	53%	29%	26%
France	89%	76%	57%	31%	63%	36%	37%
Germany	67%	76%	52%	49%	49%	12%	31%
Netherlands	84%	69%	46%	67%	60%	26%	38%
Spain	74%	53%	45%	58%	60%	39%	36%
Russia	72%	56%	32%	60%	54%	48%	42%
Turkey	61%	54%	16%	68%	70%	53%	57%

Europeans may respect and extol many American characteristics; however, there are areas of marked differences. As early as 2001, Pew Research Center for the People and Press found that of those who felt American and European interests had grown further apart; majorities in Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and France claimed that “increasingly different social and cultural values” were an important factor in that divide.

One of those divisions is certainly religious. In 2005, Pew Research Center found that pluralities of Europeans felt that Americans were too religious, while nearly six-in-ten (58%) of Americans believed that they were “not religious enough.” Further, in 2003, 58% of Americans reported that it was necessary to “believe in God in order to be moral,” this view was shared by only 33% of those in Germany, 27% of Italians, 25% of those in Great Britain and 13% of the French.

Populous	Too Religious	Not Religious Enough
United States	21%	58%
France	61%	26%
Netherlands	57%	25%
Great Britain	39%	31%
Spain	31%	40%
Russia	27%	38%

Although our mores can be different, Americans and Europeans share many of the same cultural and political values and few could legitimately deny that the U.S. has more in common with Europe than it does with less industrialized or non-Western nations. One

Populous	Free Market System is Best for Future of World		Large Companies Have Too Much Influence Over our Nation	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
United States	71%	24%	85%	13%
France	36%	50%	86%	10%
Germany	65%	32%	77%	22%
Great Britain	66%	27%	80%	16%
Italy	59%	31%	76%	18%
Spain	63%	28%	84%	10%

example is the like-mindedness between citizens of Europe and the U.S. on basic values of economics. PIPA and GlobeScan found comparable numbers of Europeans and Americans agree that the free market is the “best system on which to base the future of the world.” The exception was France. Further, there was a nearly unified fear among peoples on both continents of large companies exacting too much influence on governments across the U.S. and Europe.

*In closing, although the overall opinions of “America” among some Europeans, has declined recently, it is important to consider these polling results in context of their question wording and larger cultural influences and natural differences. Widespread anti-American sentiment in the global press and voiced by opinion leaders, as well as timeless resentment toward the United States as a superpower must be factored into any serious and objective consideration of such data. Survey questions that focus only or mainly on contentious situations, isolated events, or actual individuals act more as a monochrome than the necessary kaleidoscope through which such complex opinions should be evaluated.*

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Ms. Conway.

[Recess.]

Mr. DELAHUNT. I want to thank the witnesses for indulging members of the committee. If you can bear with us for another moment, we will await the arrival of the ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher, and then we will go to my friend from New Jersey, a new member on the committee, a new member here in Congress and one that is already making his mark, Mr. Sires from New Jersey.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And here comes the unique, redoubtable—I am going to call on Mr. Rohrabacher to inquire of the witnesses, and as I indicated, we will then proceed to Mr. Sires, and then I will wrap it up.

Dana?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for a series of—and I will have to admit, this has been a very unique concept of laying the foundation for whatever, for what we do in the future is trying to get a grasp of the way other people think about—

Mr. DELAHUNT. If my friend would yield for just a moment.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I want to reiterate and state for the record that I think it was Ms. Conway that made the statement, we are not—I don't think any member, Republican or Democrat, would suggest that, you know, polls should determine policy. That clearly is unacceptable, but it does give us an analytical tool in terms of the equation, if you will, of formulating policy, something to reflect on and think about, particularly in light of what the GAO has said, and I tried to give the example of the actions of the Turkish Parliament leading up to the war. It caused great consternation to the American military. Let me be clear, I voted against the resolution, and my friend from California and I have very disparate views of the issue of Iraq, but again, I think we can agree, as much information as we can glean is important.

With that, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. I have noted that differences in whether or not Americans are willing to go to war in order to further justice, and I noted that they actually they—the polling, that suggested the support for actually promoting democracy and backing up democracy with our European friends. There are certain things that come to mind that if someone wants to philosophically back up democracy but may be not willing to then do what is necessary to actually make that real, which is what that indicates to me. There was a very famous political thinker whose name now escapes me who once said, “If you are going to champion the oppressed, you had better be willing to take on the oppressor.” And who is that that said that? Well, it sounds like Ronald Reagan. But it wasn't because I didn't write that. Anyway, the bottom line is that if, yeah, it is one thing to be theoretically against something or for something, but it is another thing to support those let's say uncomfortable and challenging commitments that you have to make in order to achieve that philosophical end. And so as I said, it is interesting that our European friends again—according to the polling we just heard in this room—support us in what we are trying to do about Iran, but we will see that once it becomes uncomfortable,

how much support that we have, and that again is what really counts, not what someone's gut instinct is, but what they will actually support in terms of risk and treasure, once that decision has to be made. In terms of the envy factor, there is another old saying that says that, in terms of who is determining policy when we are actually looking at the world and who is the person—who are the individuals, who are the people who will determine what direction you go, and who knows the most about what direction you are going; there is the saying about the lead sled dog has the best view. However, there is an expression that sort of goes like this, it is the lead sled dog, however, that will get bit on the fanny or something like that. But that is very indicative. The fact is, so long as we are this lead sled dog, we will have a better view perhaps than other people of other nations as to what the challenges are because it is up to us to really face those challenges and lead the way or no one will lead the way. And it is also clear that other people who are in part of the team don't like to be the second and third and fourth sled dog and will make their presence felt. So with all of that set in mind, I really have enjoyed seeing a more in-depth perspective of what we are talking about, and I would like to ask, how much of this polling—was some of it done—when we say we can't make the polls make the determination, but the only exception to that Mr. Chairman that I would say is that we—maybe if we are talking about Poland, yeah, the Poles from Poland, maybe we need to talk about them. How much of this was done—were people in Poland part of these recordings and questions?

Mr. GLENN. May I?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure.

Mr. GLENN. Thank you. Let me assure you that indeed, the Poles were part of the poll. There were 13 countries in Europe that were part of that, and we believe, indeed, they are representative; they reach from Spain and Portugal, on one end, to the big players, the U.K. Germany and France, as well as Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Turkey. And indeed, I would suggest that there are on many issues, big differences within Europe on how they view things. And the new members of the European Union, Poland, Romania, are indeed much more favorable to the United States. We did some briefings at the State Department with this data last September, and one of my colleagues joked, if all of Europe felt like Romania, your job would be a lot easier. And indeed, we see there is a legacy in the history of U.S. support during the Cold War for these regimes. But if I may use that as a way of saying that the U.S. support during the Cold War is really one of the legacies of democracy promotion. And it is a legacy that is shared by Americans and Europeans in the West and really; the issue that drove us at that time was not simply, could we overflow the Soviet Union by any means, but how could we support dissidents in those regimes? How could we contain the Soviet Union? So while I think those values of the support for democracy promotion are very important, I would love if you would get a chance, on page six, there is a question about the means by which we promote democracy. There is a chart. And I think that the issue in some ways is that Americans and Europeans can agree that democracy is a value of ours, and democracy is a value in our foreign policy. And what we most often think

about when we talk about democracy promotion, Americans and Europeans have surprising similar views. We talk about monitoring elections in new countries. We talk about supporting those civil society groups that I was talking about. Sometimes we talk about economic sanctions or political sanctions or supporting dissidents, and every now and then, the question of military force comes up. And I think what we see is that Americans and Europeans alike strongly support soft power options and indeed, when the cost of the way that we do this rises, Americans and Europeans as well struggle with how to make that decision. And if I may, I would come back to the question of, it is not only what we do, but I think the data suggests it is how we do things and the importance of the role of legitimacy and the role at times of international institutions we see.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. I think that reflects and not just policy inclinations, but it also reflects people's moral and personal views on life. And I think there are some fundamental differences in the way some of our Western European friends think about that and the way we do. I was sitting on an airplane just about 2 months ago, and next to me was a German fellow who happened to have two young children. And of course, I have triplets at home that are 1 month away from being 3 years old, okay, and so—and he had some fairly—his children were like 2 years old and 4 years old or something like that. And we were discussing how we, you know, we are trying to make sure that they were able to see the right thing. He said, "You have to watch out for the cartoons they watch," and I said, "Yes, that is right. There is a lot of gratuitous violence in cartoons, and I am concerned about that, gratuitous violence in cartoons, and people beating each other over the head and things like that. That is not good for a child." And he goes, "Oh, yes, well, even *Bambi*, the mother died in *Bambi* and was killed in *Bambi*." This is the German guy who is telling me this, and I turned to him and said, "Well, yeah, that was real life. That wasn't gratuitous violence. That was real life. You know, deer get shot by hunters in real life. Animals get killed in real life. And it wasn't just gratuitous violence in *Bambi*." And he turned to me, and he said, "Well, I want to shield my children from that aspect of real life." And I said to myself, I didn't want to make him mad or I didn't want him to think I was being aggressive to him, but I said to him—I said to myself, well, yeah, that probably means that when they grow up, they are not going to be equipped to meet the challenges in real life that require some sort of use of force or violence because it is now not part of their reality.

Well, force and violence is part of the reality we live with. And I think that perhaps our European friends maybe went through so much turmoil in World War I and World War II, and their houses were destroyed that now they just want to take that reality away from—shield their children from it and take that reality away, where in the United States, we saw the force and violence of World War II and World War I as being something that helped protect our country and didn't lead to the massive destruction of our society that happened there in Europe. So I think that is a very fascinating psychological thing that is going on as we look at these fig-

ures, and I give the young lady one chance to close up on mine comments. Do you have any comments on my perceptions there?

Ms. CONWAY. Well, part of my written testimony that I did not actually address in my opening statement goes somewhat to what you are saying, Congressman, with respect to the different religions and religious values held among Europeans and Americans. And I believe my colleague, Dr. Glenn, was talking about how some people dismissively say that the United States is more religious or Europe is more secular. But there are data that illustrate that point a little bit more vividly. The Pew Research Center found that pluralities of Europeans felt that Americans were too religious while 6 in 10 Americans believe that Europeans were not "religious enough." And I think that is—and then also in a different poll, 58 percent of Americans reported that it was necessary to "believe in God in order to be moral," but that view was shared by 33 percent of those in Germany, 27 percent of Italians, 25 percent of those in Great Britain and 13 percent of the French. The only reason I point this out is not to get into a debate about how religious different peoples are so much as, what is the role of religion, and how important is it? What is the depth of religiosity, if you will, adherence to a particular moral point of view, moral construct and the practice of that through traditional participation in formal services? So I think that is important. Just to show the differences culturally is to show one with respect to religiosity. Also I think somewhat telling is, when Europeans are asked questions with respect to how much they think a certain word or description applies to Americans, it was—if I may indulge you for a moment—it was quite telling that majorities of Europeans believe Americans are "hard-working and inventive." Fewer of them thought that Americans were honest, and they were also seen as greedy and violent to put a point on it. But again, these are just across-the-board denunciations of Americans and our values and our policies, and that is quite telling as well. So it seems that there is tremendous agreement here today anyway that all of this should be put into a larger context rather than rely on just a single poll, polling question or a set of data.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for these very interesting hearings. I am really enjoying this committee. I appreciate the fact that we have all these people come before us. I have a couple of questions, and one has to do with China, the growth of China as a world economic power in terms of how the Europeans view China. There seems to be a perception in Europe that Europe is threatened by China; it is not as much threatened by the American economy. What is that based on? Is it the fact that we conduct ourselves with probably more scruples on the economic side than China? Or we don't copy everything? So, you know, I was just wondering. Would you comment on that?

Mr. GLENN. Certainly. I think that the rise of China has become an issue that has actually preoccupied both sides of the Atlantic, and yet, interestingly, we tend to see it in different ways. Among

those lists of global threats that I mentioned in my introductory comments, we ask about whether people see the rising power of China to be a threat. Now it turns out that approximately 88 percent of Americans say, yes, they do. Now that is compared to 73 percent of Europeans. Now, let me emphasize, 73 percent and 88 percent are really high numbers on both sides of the Atlantic. But we went further than that, and we asked, "What kind of threat do you think China is? Do you think China is an economic threat? Is China a military threat? Or is China not a threat at all?" And here is where we see some interesting differences in the way that Americans and Europeans see the world. The largest percent of Americans, 35 percent, see China as a military threat; 29 percent see it as an economic threat. And those numbers are almost reversed if you look at Europeans; 37 percent of Europeans see it as an economic threat, and 22 percent of Europeans see it as a military threat. I think in some ways it reflects two things: The first thing it reflects is our very different presentation around the world today. Europeans don't have militaries in China, in Asia, and so there is a different way that their military forces are exposed to the Chinese military threat. And as a result, they have different thoughts and a different relationship to the question of Taiwan. And at the same time, I think that both Americans and Europeans are struggling to understand the potential economic rise of China.

Now there are a lot of different views about what that rise will mean. There are a lot of different views about what the future potential will be. But we see that it has become an issue more and more. Where it becomes a potential for misunderstanding is something like we saw last year with the European effort to lift the arms embargo on China. What was most striking about that to me was the Europeans' surprise at the American reaction. The Americans said, "We can't do this. This is not a good idea. This is not in our national interest." In some ways, I think it pointed out just how essential it is to understand how we see the world differently so that regardless of whether we have different views on it, we can coordinate our policies better, and we won't be surprised by the reactions of others.

Ms. CONWAY. Sir, the only thing I would add to that is those data are very important and likely incontrovertible. A question that hasn't been asked in some time is: What kind of threat does China's increasing power pose to a quality of life to people throughout the globe or to that subset of Americans who believe that China does not have the best human rights record? And those questions really were much more commonly asked in the 1990s than I have seen of them in the last couple of years, and I hope that as the debate on China and its increasing strength as perhaps a military and/or financial player in the world landscape is further scrutinized, that we don't lose sight of the fact that some would also like to know what its practice is with respect to human rights.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. The war in Europe—the war in Iraq seems to be very unpopular in Europe, I stated that before. I am wondering, is it because of the proximity to Iraq or is it because the large population of Muslims in Europe that we see? Can you just comment on that?

Ms. CONWAY. It is probably several things, Congressman. And again, at the risk of confusing causation with coincidence through my own testimony, I don't have data in front of me that have asked Europeans specifically as a follow-up question to those who expressed dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, asking them in open-ended fashion, "Why did you just say that? Why specifically do you disagree or strongly disagree with the war in Iraq or the United States involvement in Iraq?" Then you would open it up to a whole well spring of different answers, maybe of the kind that you have suggested, such as, "because we have a large Muslim population here in Great Britain, therefore we believe this is a war against Muslims, and we are against it," or, "because we are closer geographically to Iraq than is the United States." Or I think some of it is more to the point of what we have seen in other polling questions, which is there is a bit of—a bit of equivocation with respect to the support of Europeans on the matter of the United States' goal of trying to assist free people in establishing their own rule of law and self-governance. In a 2005 poll, a vast majority of citizens in Europe were convinced that the United States should not "promote the establishment of democratic governments in other countries." That idea, that principle of the U.S. promoting the establishment of democratic governments in other countries, which is what the United States is trying to do in Iraq, was disliked by 84 percent of the French public, 80 percent of Germans, 53 percent of Italians, 63 percent of Spanish, 66 percent of those in Great Britain. And so if that general principle is being denied and dismissed by these European populations, then one could argue that the specific example of that principle and action in Iraq is also being regarded with some disfavor.

Mr. GLENN. Thank you, Congressman. It is a really important question, how we understand Iraq. And indeed, we have some data but not full data that could answer the direct question you have. But I would like to suggest a couple of things if I may. The proximity issue was most striking and most relevant to Turkey. Turkey shares a border with Iraq, which was an important part of understanding their concern. They feared instability on their borders because of the Kurdish population that is divided in that region among some of the neighboring states there. And so there are very real issues for the Turks that have to do with the fact that Iraq is their next door neighbor. I don't think the Muslim population in Europe, per se, is driving it; in part because the populations come from different places. In France, the largest Muslim population would be coming from their former colonies in Algeria, for example. In Germany, it is from visiting Turkish workers. So there were certainly those at the time who feared that a Muslim street might rise up, if you will, but we didn't see that anywhere.

I think in large part, if I may, it would bring us back to the concerns of legitimacy and the question of how we did things. Some of the more interesting polling data we have on this comes from 2004, the year after the war in Iraq began, when we said to France, Germany and Spain—I think we asked why, but I have the data in front of me here—"Would you have troops in Iraq under a U.N. mandate?" If you remember, France and Germany were some of the greatest opposers of that effort. But 63 percent of Frenchmen



and 50 percent of Germans said that they would support troops—their own troops—in Iraq under a U.N. mandate. We asked them as well, “Would you support using military action in a future Iraq-like scenario if there was international approval by the U.N.?” Eighty-two percent of Europeans said, “Yes.” If there was approval by NATO, because the U.N. is of course not the only relevant international institution at hand, once again 72 percent of Europeans said yes. So there was a certain concern on the part of some Europeans, and I would emphasize that, on the question of international legitimacy. And the reason I emphasize it, even though the concerns in Europe are widespread, indeed it is of course proper to recognize that we have British, Polish, Danish, Dutch troops in it that are active and still are in parts of Iraq so there are some important differences within Europe as well.

Mr. SIRES. Could I ask one?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes.

Mr. SIRES. Do you have any polling data on Turkey, Jordan and the European Union, country by—does the proximity there also play a little bit—you are polling everything I assume in Europe.

Mr. GLENN. You have asked a question that really caught our eye last year, so I will be very brief on this. But indeed, there is a lot of data that we have been capturing on Turkey that I would love to refer you to in the Key Findings Report in the testimony. We have indeed, and some of the most striking findings have been the change in Turkey’s EU membership, as it becomes closer to actually becoming a member. If you remember, it was just last year that Turkey was invited to begin the negotiation process. But over the past 3 years, we have seen a cooling of European views toward Turkey joining and the cooling of Turkish views. They dropped from 73 percent of Europeans who say that Turkey’s membership is a good thing to 54 percent of that in—excuse me, I am misspeaking. Those are Turks; 73 percent of Turks say this is a good thing versus 54 percent of Turks who say so afterwards. And we are seeing a downward trend in support in Europe as well, and I think that this is a cause for great concern. I think that there are those of us who hope that Turkey joining the EU could be a securing of a Muslim country that is based on secular law within Western institutions, could be securing a country that has been one of our allies in NATO for decades, westward. And there are some concerns we see now in some of our data that suggests that Turkey may be at a tipping point. Perhaps there are some parts of Turkish society that are turning away from the West and looking toward the East. And from a purely personal perspective, I feel great concern about that and I feel it is sort of this kind of polling data compels us to think seriously about our policies toward Turkey and how we can seek to bring Turks into Western institutions as one of the leading Western secular—or at least secular Muslim democracies.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Sires. Let me just echo my own concern about the cooling of both the Turks vis-a-vis the European Union and the European attitudes because I do share—I do share that concern in a very profound way, particularly when one reflects on the role that Turkey has played in its relationship with the

United States over time. They were our ally in Korea. I just reminded my friend and colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher, they have consistently been supportive of Israel. They have a level of democracy, albeit with issues, unknown elsewhere in the Middle East. And that is why these polls are so valuable because it informs us. And, in fact, hopefully Mr. Rohrabacher will be accompanying me along with a number of other Members of Congress at the end of next week to Germany to meet with members of the German Bundestag, and I intend to make this a priority. I will lead the delegation, and I will make this a priority and reinforce what I think is a general consensus here in this Congress about the need to enhance and strengthen our relationship with Turkey. So I appreciate that brilliant testimony, Mr. Glenn, because obviously it reflects my own views.

I am just reading over the written testimony of both of you, and I see an inconsistency. So maybe I can pose a long question. And you just alluded to it, Ms. Conway. You read a portion—and I am speaking to democracy promotion, the concept of democracy promotion. And maybe this goes to the question of the how, but you begin on page 3 by saying, “For example, people in many European nations resist the United States’ goal to assist free peoples in their quest to self-govern.” I would translate that into democracy promotion. “In a 2005 Ipsos Public Affairs poll, vast majorities of citizens in Europe were convinced that the U.S. should not ‘promote the establishment of democratic governments in other countries.’ This idea was disliked by 84% of the French, 80% of Germans, 53% of Italians, 60% of Spanish citizens and 66% of those in Great Britain.” You conclude the paragraph with this sentence: “One might wonder why nations who enjoy a degree of personal liberty and free market economies would deny the same to others around the globe.”

Dr. Glenn, on page 5 of your testimony, you make this observation in writing: “At the rhetorical level, the United States and the European Union have identified democracy promotion as a strategic priority for transatlantic cooperation.” You then go on to say in the next paragraph: “Strikingly, our data suggests that more Europeans than Americans support promoting democracy.” That is totally at odds with the testimony by Ms. Conway. You go on further to say: “We asked Europeans if it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries and Americans if it should be the role of the United States and, remarkably, more Europeans than Americans support the goal of democracy promotion. 71% of Europeans agree, compared with 45% of people from our own country. Who is right? How do we reconcile these two views? And maybe, Dr. Glenn, we can compare the methodology that you might have used to this other Ipsos Public Affairs poll. Why this great disparity? And maybe I am misinterpreting what Ms. Conway is inferring here, but try to educate me.

Mr. GLENN. Absolutely. With pleasure. Thank you for bringing up the issue. I mean, the main difference is, of course, that the Ipsos poll asked Europeans, “Should it be the role of the United States to promote democracy?” And we asked Europeans, “Should it be the role of the European Union?” So, in part, that difference is explained by a different question and concerns that Europeans

have about the United States right now and its policy of democracy promotion. Let me offer three points on really how we might understand some of those differences. The first is, as I have said, I think we see on the classic policies by which you promote democracy, Americans and Europeans actually quite often agree, and the greatest recent experiment in democracy promotion in my mind or the most successful is what I mean to say, has really been the enlargement of the European Union to the countries of the former Communist Bloc. The amount of Euros in this case that the European Union has devoted toward helping build new sustained new democratic institutions help modify, bring together market economies in these countries that can be anchored within the European sphere, is dramatic and is unprecedented. The idea of a Europe whole and free, there are those who say it hasn't been seen since the Holy Roman Empire. So I think Europeans' commitment to democracy must be evaluated in light of their enlargement policy that has been so successful. I think the challenge has been rather straightforward for us.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If I may interrupt, Dr. Glenn, for a moment.

Mr. GLENN. Surely.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is important to explain to us the enlargement policy in accession to the EU is predicated on a number of what I think we would embrace as democratic values.

Mr. GLENN. Absolutely.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, please expand.

Mr. GLENN. Thank you very much. The countries of Eastern Europe, of course, once they overthrew the dictatorships after the fall of the Berlin Wall, their aim was to join the European Union as a way of anchoring themselves in the West, and yet the European Union told them, we are an institution of members, and all our members share common values and institutions. And as you rightly say, Chairman Delahunt, there were three criteria by which you could join the European Union. You must first demonstrate yourself to have democratic institutions, and in many cases, that has to do with recognizing elections regardless of the results, as well as the protection of minorities and minority views within those countries. This has to do with having strong and demonstrable market economies that can compete and be part of the European Union, recognizing the role that a successful economy often plays in supporting democracy, and lastly was the ability to take on the laws and institutions of the European Union. These three so-called—they are called the Copenhagen criteria, as known by the name of the summit at which they were agreed upon. And the offer of membership has in many ways been one of the greatest beacons for these countries. Democracies and especially new democracies can be fragile. It is easy, we know this from other parts of the world, to see democracies slide, back slide, to see new authoritarian leaders rise again. And it is in many ways the promise of membership in the European Union that anchored these countries and prevented the kind of back sliding that we have seen in parts of Latin America, in parts of Africa and enabled these countries to really anchor themselves within firmly the Western around the European sphere. And so I think the enlargement policy, as you rightly say, I think we agree on this very much, has been one of the most pow-

erful tools for promoting and sustaining democracy. If I may only in brief, I think the challenge has been around our policies in the Middle East. Again, I am speaking purely personally, not based on our data per se, but the challenge has been the identification of democracy promotion with regime change, and there we see one of the greatest struggles. And I often find that democracy promoters have to go back to the basics and explain that we have decades of history together working to support dissidents in Eastern Europe, working to support free thought and individual expression in many parts of the world. And in some ways, our democracy institutions are modeled after the European Union ones. And so I think that we indeed—here is a moment of taking a look at the broader historical history and the common values that we Americans and Europeans share. We may disagree on the role of military force, but we have so many broader values that we have shown our demonstrative cooperation in the past, and I think democracy promotion is one of those ways that, because of that history, offers us a way forward as well.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Glenn.

Ms. Conway, do you disagree with the data produced by Dr. Glenn? Or do you have a different definition of democracy promotion?

Ms. CONWAY. Mr. Chairman, if I may address that question in the context of your original question to Dr. Glenn with respect to reconciling or preferring perhaps one of the results over the other, I don't think that the differing results are a matter of methodology. The methodologies of Dr. Glenn's polling of the German Marshall Fund are very solid, as were, it seems, the Ipsos Public Affairs methodology from the 2005 survey that I referenced on page 3 of my testimony. They had over 1,000 interviews per European nation, with yielding fairly low margins of error. So methodologies are not in question. I think it is a difference of question construction, and not that either question is biased; in fact, neither question is biased. They are just different. And they asked different audiences about their views toward the other nations', or in this case continents', ability to promote democracy. In the one question by Ipsos Public Affairs in 2005, they are asking Europeans to point a finger at the United States and say, "Do you believe they should be in the business of 'promoting the establishment of democratic governments in other countries,' yes or no?" And then in Dr. Glenn's polling data, Europeans were asked to hold the mirror up to themselves, and they were asked whether they believe in supporting democracy promotion.

I think, secondly, there are differing definitions among Europeans and Americans at this time, as perhaps there has always been, with respect to democracy promotion. The easier definitions come with relieving suffering in Sudan or monitoring elections in countries that are having elections for their first or second or third times in their nation's histories. That is different from perhaps democracy promotion as President Bush sees it as total regime change and deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq. So there are differing—there are differing definitions in this very country about democracy promotion. There are differing definitions across the European nations about democracy.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you would agree with Dr. Glenn then, that the question posed by the poll that you referred to reflects the attitude of Europeans relative to regime change as opposed to the promotion of democracy?

Ms. CONWAY. I think, given the fact that that poll was taken in 2005 at the height of the regime change undertakings and the attempted democratization of Iraq, yes, I think it is fair to say that, it is fair to conclude that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But again, and if I can, I don't mean to interrupt, but we can have a conversation here because this is an informal hearing. I think Dr. Glenn referred to it earlier in terms—the values are clearly the same or about the same, and it is a question of the how. And that is where there clearly is a divergence.

Ms. CONWAY. I think it is a classic means versus ends dichotomy, to put it in a cultural context.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The reality is, there is great divergence here in the United States.

Ms. CONWAY. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, it has changed over time, clearly, but there was relatively vigorous debate in terms of the political parties about the authorization resolution to go into Iraq. So I think that when you suggest that we might wonder why nations who enjoy a degree of personal liberty and free market would deny the same to others; that might be a bit harsh. But I understand—I understand the point that you are making. But again, we talk about values, and I guess the problem that Europeans and I think a majority of the American people might have in terms of democracy promotion as distinguished from regime change is that regime change is rather selective, and we develop into an inconsistent pattern. Some of our closest allies—and you referenced earlier and that is what provoked me to think about this—are probably the most egregious human rights violators on the planet. And yet they are our allies. One only has to review our own Department of State's human rights reports. Saudi Arabia is not a bastion of the rights for women, and you have an expertise in that particular area. And we talk about democracy promotion, and I remember being excited about Secretary Rice going to Egypt and speaking forthrightly about the need for democracy. And now we hear silence, particularly in light of media reports coming out relative to the suppression of press, torture, et cetera, et cetera.

I mean, part of the coalition of the willing was Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. I mean, you know, Islom Karimov would not be considered by most a paragon of, you know, democratic expression. So when we talk about values, is there an inconsistency in terms of what Europeans see between our rhetoric and then our actions? And does this create for us at least in some part, in some measure, the negative opinions that appear to be—and my concern is, appear to be consistent and possibly potentially hardening to the point where, in the future, it creates all of the problems that were mentioned in the GAO report?

Ms. CONWAY. Mr. Chairman, if I may, because my third point on the original question, which I think is in direct response to what you are saying now, sir, is that the responses to the question that was given to the Ipsos Public Affairs poll and the response to the

question about democracy promotion in Dr. Glenn's poll to me exposed quite unintentionally the difference in European attitudes toward democracy promotion depending on who is doing the promoting. Europeans were very enthusiastic about democracy promotion when it was asked of them, "Do you believe Europeans should promote democracy?" versus when they were asked, "Do you believe the United States should promote democracy?" And I think that is a very important distinction here because again, that does expose a little bit of the soft underbelly of hesitance. It could be everything from hesitation to reticence to envy as to why people in Europe don't want the United States to "promote the establishment of democratic governments in other countries," where no mention is made of Iraq or regime change but actually just that principle. We can't extract that principle from that current situation in 2005. There is no questioning that in answering that, people heard that. But at the same time, the principle was embraced very enthusiastically by the Europeans when they could do the promoting versus when the United States could do the promoting.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Glenn?

Mr. GLENN. I think that you, Chairman Delahunt, have very nicely summarized in many ways the controversy that is swirling down the concept of democracy promotion. You have echoed what I think of as the challenge—or described very well, what I think of as the challenge for democracy promotion to the Middle East. But when we think of—and there it is, a moment where we see Americans and Europeans seeming to look at the world differently. Yet I would like to suggest to you that there is another front on which that is happening, and that is in Russia and China. And indeed, Americans and Europeans perhaps we see democracy promotion a little differently. I think our polling data, which has been stable over a couple of years, suggests those differences aren't as great among the general public as one might think. But what we see is we see that in the wake of the so-called colored revolutions in Ukraine, in Georgia, we have seen a Russia—a recently sort of reassertive Russia and China seeking to counteract both United States and European efforts with restrictive registration laws, with challenges to the ability of American and European democracy promotion organizations alike, be they Freedom House or the Friedrich Ebert Foundation operating in Moscow. And so I think that in some ways, it depends always on from where you look. I always tell my European colleagues when they say, ah, yes, but we do it differently. I say, well, that may be true, but I think if we both look, I am not sure that Russia and China would think so.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You talk about the elites, the political elite having gotten past the brouhaha surrounding the initial invasion of Iraq, et cetera, but in a democracy, it will be public opinion over time that will influence the political elite. It does it pretty well here, okay? I am sure that Ms. Conway can testify to that, as a well-known Republican pollster. We all like to know what the people are thinking, and the reference I made earlier to the example of Turkey, the executive making a commitment—I remember there was \$33 billion of American assistance that were promised, and that didn't work. They went home, and they heard from their public. So while it is only a tool, I think it is very important for us

to understand where they are coming from, what they are thinking because I—you know, the elites—governments come and go, you know, Delahunt, Rohrabacher and Sires, we are not going to be here forever, well, maybe one of us will be here forever. But not me. But the reality is, the hardening of public opinion—this goes back to I think what we were all echoing—will impact policy both bilateral policy and multilateral policy coming from other nations and other multilateral institutions toward the United States. That is why I would suggest that we have got to be, you know, aware of it and factor in our decisions. So I am not quite as optimistic as you are that the elites have got it, that we are not the bad guys, and that consistent low negative opinion, if it continues over a period of time, and maybe—maybe that will change once there is a new administration. Maybe it will, but I mean, when you see a gap of 20 points consistently between the approval ratings for President Bush and in attitudes about America, that is consequential. Mr. Zogby was here earlier at another hearing, and he talked about Latin America. And his samples were all about the elites in those countries, the political and economic elites. And you know, the President had a negative or disapproval rating around 82 or 83 percent. What I am concerned about, and I think all of my colleagues are, that that does start to morph into a hardening of public attitudes that eventually will impact the policy decisions of those governments over a period of time that adversely impact our vital national interests. And I am not suggesting you are an elite. You are advocating. I am still not comfortable.

Mr. GLENN. Well, if I may, two things. The first is the question of change in many ways, will this change and how so? Now, I can't predict the future, and the polling data can't predict the future. But I think that seeing a change among the elites may anticipate the potential for change among the European public if European leaders are willing to stand up and say, we may disagree on Iraq, but there are these other issues that are too pressing for us to let go by the wayside because of Iraq. There are too many things we have to do together. So that is the first question is that of change. But let me echo your concern by reference to a point that was raised earlier here which was the difficulty that Europeans are having getting more troops committed to Afghanistan. Now Afghanistan is a situation with a U.N. mandate. Afghanistan is a situation in which we went in together for a commonly agreed upon purpose because of a shared sense that we had together. And unfortunately, it has become challenging for European leaders because of their popular opinion.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because of the public opinion that is being brought to bear by those European publics on their governments, and they are backing off.

Mr. GLENN. That is right. It is unfortunate because indeed—

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is very unfortunate.

Mr. GLENN. They are distinct situations, but it is hard sometimes for the European leaders to make those choices if they see public opinion turning so heavily against them.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, getting back to democracy promotion, in your testimony, and I think you, too, Ms. Conway, alluded to human rights, and the public debate on both sides of the Atlantic,

you know, speaks about the secret CIA prisons, extraordinary renditions. In fact, my memory is that just recently there has been indictments by Italy and Germany, I believe, indictments of CIA agents. Has there been any polling issue data on those issues and its impact on European opinion? That goes to my concern about that inconsistency that I alluded to earlier where we share the values, but the Europeans don't think we are living up to the values.

Ms. CONWAY. I have no such polling data here, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to do a search of that and certainly contact your staff if we were able to uncover some.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We would appreciate that.

Dr. Glenn, are you aware of—

Mr. GLENN. We don't have the data directly for the past years on that. And indeed, we will do the same. I think that what we know from reading the European debate, from listening to the European Parliament, the discussions within the European Parliament, within the national Parliaments in Europe is how volatile this issue has been. Italy has been one of the most striking cases in which the question of the collaboration of Italian officials with Americans on this policy has been a very big issue. And we see it coming back to that in which Italian elected officials say to Americans, I would wish to help you out, but I am struck struggling with public opinion at home. And we know that these issues are very powerful, and in some ways, I think their emotional resonance comes from the kind of the things you are talking about, Chairman Delahunt, the sense of a difference between values and policies.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, I am going to conclude. I appreciate your forbearance. But I want to note for the record—and you, Ms. Conway, alluded to a *Newsweek* poll back in 1983, saying that only 25 percent of French citizens approved of United States policy. But I want to reassure the gentleman to my left, at least to my physical left, that I went and I did some research, and I know that he is a great admirer of President Reagan, that according to a poll by a very respected polling agency, a group called SOFRES, in 1987, 47 percent of the French citizens had a favorable opinion of President Reagan while only 18 percent viewed him unfavorably. If President Bush had those ratings right now, things might be different. And with that, unless you—

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Let me just note that, 3 years earlier, the polling data was far different in France.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I haven't seen it yet, but I am going to see it. Thank you very much, and thank you both for your testimony. It has been a very worthwhile hearing for us.

Ms. CONWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GLENN. Thank you so much.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]