Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman of its Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs, today spoke in support of the U.S. – India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement currently being considered by the Senate.  Dodd is serving as the manager of the bill on the Senate floor today. 

The full text of Dodd’s remarks as prepared for delivery is below:

Mr. President, I rise to urge passage of H.R. 7081, approving the U.S.-India Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.  On Saturday, the House of Representatives passed this bill by a margin of 298-to-116, a resounding vote of support for the agreement.

This agreement with India is as important as it is historic. 

It enables the United States and India to chart a new course in relations between our two great democracies.  There are compelling geopolitical reasons to move forward in this relationship.  India has become a major actor in the world, and it increasingly sees itself in concert with other global powers, rather than in opposition to them. 

Indian Prime Minister Singh, who visited Washington just last week, has devoted energy and political courage in forging this agreement, and in seeking approval for it in India.  Put simply, he has placed himself and his political party on the line. 

In India, the political symbolism of the agreement is extremely important.  It addresses the most divisive and long-standing issue between our two countries.  Most important, the agreement addresses India as an equal – a point that looms large in India, where there are strong memories of a colonial past and of tensions with the United States during the Cold War.

Some of the debate in India focused on whether the agreement with the United States would hamper India’s nuclear weapons program.  But much of the give-and-take was really about a more basic question – whether it was really time for India to work cooperatively with Western countries.  Reaching an accord on nuclear status has been wrenching for India, despite the favorable terms that some say India obtained. 

This agreement is indicative of a new era in Indian foreign policy – an era in which India will see all the world’s powers as potential partners in efforts to address its own needs and the needs of others.  I believe that this new era will bring increased stability and progress to South Asia.  I see the bill before us as approving far more than just a nuclear agreement.  Among other things, it will set the stage for a stronger U.S.-India relationship.

Mr. President, the Committee on Foreign Relations held an in-depth hearing on the U.S.-India agreement last month.  The Committee, along with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, worked closely with the Administration to address technical concerns expressed about the agreement.  This extraordinary consultation resulted in a bill that will improve U.S. implementation of the accord and assure that nuclear non-proliferation remains at the core of U.S. foreign policy.  Our Committee approved a bill identical to the House-passed bill by a vote of nineteen-to-two.

This agreement is not a partisan issue.  President Clinton launched the initiative, and President Bush pushed it to fruition.  It had strong support on both sides of the aisle in 2006, when we voted on the Henry J. Hyde Act, establishing the underlying principles and requirements of this accord.  Indeed, 85 members of the Senate supported the Hyde Act, and only 12 voted against it.  I believe the resulting agreement has strong support today.

Mr. President, throughout our work on this agreement we have sought to address concerns expressed in the United States as well as in India.  Some nuclear non-proliferation experts have voiced a fear that it would lead India – and then India’s neighbors – to increase the production of nuclear weapons.  Some experts have warned that giving India the right of peaceful nuclear commerce, despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, could undermine the world’s willingness to abide by that vital treaty and to enforce compliance with it.  We have been consistently vigilant to such risks, and the Hyde Act and this bill give us the tools to remain so in the future.

The process that led to the U.S.-India agreement was undertaken with an eye to achieving progress on non-proliferation issues.  Pursuant to a declaration issued in July 2005 by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh:

• India has improved its export control law and regulations;

• India has moved to adhere to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime;

• India has affirmed that it will not transfer equipment or technology for uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing to any country that does not already have a full-scale, functioning capability;

• India has reaffirmed, both to the United States and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;

• India has initialed, and intends to sign, a safeguards agreement with the IAEA;

• India has begun to negotiate an Additional Protocol to that safeguards agreement; and

• India will bring under IAEA safeguards over a dozen existing or planned nuclear facilities that were not previously subject to safeguards.

The bill before the Senate provides additional measures that guide the implementation of the agreement:

• It reaffirms that our approval of the agreement is based on U.S. interpretations of its terms.  In other words, it reffirms that President Bush’s assurances to India about nuclear fuel supplies are a political commitment – and are not legally binding.

• It requires the President to certify that approving this agreement is consistent with our obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to assist or encourage India to produce nuclear weapons. 

• Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue any licenses under this agreement, India’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA must first enter into force.  In addition, India must file a declaration of civilian nuclear facilities under the safeguards agreement that is not “materially inconsistent” with the separation plan that India issued in 2006.  We know that there will be some changes, because the 2006 plan envisioned safeguards beginning that year – rather than two years later.  But the bill before us guards against a declaration that flatly contradicts India’s promises.

• The bill also requires prompt notification of the Foreign Relations Committee if India should diverge from its separation plan in implementing its safeguards agreement.

• The bill establishes a procedure for Congressional review – and possible rejection – of any “subsequent arrangement” under the agreement that would allow India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel that was derived from U.S.-supplied reactor fuel or produced with U.S.-supplied equipment.  Article 6 of the India agreement anticipates such a subsequent arrangement if India builds a new reprocessing facility dedicated to its civilian nuclear power sector.  Congress should have a special role in this, because spent fuel reprocessing can produce weapons-grade plutonium.  This is an improvement over current law, which allows such arrangements to take effect fifteen days after public notice is given in the Federal Register.

• The bill requires the President to certify that it is U.S. policy to work in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to achieve further restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment or technology.

• The bill also directs the President to seek international agreement on procedures to guard against the diversion of heavy water from civilian to military programs.  The India agreement has protections for heavy water that the United States may supply, or that is produced with U.S.-supplied equipment.  We need to get supplier countries to adopt similar standards.

• And the bill requires regular reports on the Executive branch’s progress in its efforts on enrichment and reprocessing limits and on protecting against heavy water diversion.

Mr. President, I would like to thank the Administration for working so closely with us on this bill.  Our intention all along was to produce legislation that would serve our national interests.  This bill – like the Hyde Act– is the product of our desire to address nuclear non-proliferation and our great desire to see a new page turned in U.S.-Indian relations.

In closing, I would also like to thank my colleagues, particularly Chairman Berman in the House, as well as the staff of the House and Senate committees, who did so much to make this bill worthy of our strong support.  We were concerned that the late arrival of the agreement to the Congress would not allow enough time to make necessary improvements and secure passage.  All of those involved have done an extraordinary job in enabling us to approve the agreement this month, rather than forcing a delay until next year.

The U.S.-India agreement deserves our strong endorsement.  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

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