<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:34274.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-844
THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DEMOCRACY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 23
Carothers, Thomas, senior associate and director of the Democracy
and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment of International
Peace, Washington, DC.......................................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Gershman, Carl, president, National Endowment for Democracy,
Washington, DC................................................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Halperin, Dr. Morton H., director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society
Institute, executive director, Open Society Policy Center,
Washington, DC................................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Lowenkron, Hon. Barry F., Assistant Secretary for Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, Department of Labor, Washington, DC.... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden............ 85
Lugar, Hon. Richard, U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement 1
Palmer, Hon. Mark, vice-chairman, Freedom House, Washington, DC.. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Human Rights First, prepared statement........................... 76
SUMATE, prepared statement....................................... 80
(iii)
THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DEMOCRACY
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Martinez, Biden, and Sarbanes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. Today the committee will meet to
examine the role of nongovernmental organizations, that is
NGOs, in the development of democracy. Support for democratic
grassroots organizations in many countries around the world has
become a centerpiece of America's international outreach.
The American people see this most clearly in the United
States Government's efforts to set the foundation for democracy
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less well known is our Nation's
broader push for democracy all around the globe. Within the
past 3 years, the so-called Rose Revolution in Georgia, the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan have opened new space for democracy in those
nations, thanks primarily to the efforts of civil society
members and organizations.
Unfortunately, the success of these generally peaceful
``color revolutions'' has prompted a counteroffensive by some
authoritarian regimes against prodemocracy groups. A report I
commissioned from the National Endowment for Democracy notes,
and I quote, ``Representatives of democracy assistance NGOs
have been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even
more vulnerable are local grantees and project partners who
have been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, imprisoned, and
even killed,'' end of quote from the NED report. The report,
entitled ``The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance,'' is
being made available to the public today.
[Editor's note.--The report could not be printed in this
hearing, but will be retained in the permanent record of the
committee.]
A number of governments are tightening the legal
constraints against democracy assistance. In January, President
Vladimir Putin of Russia signed a controversial new law,
imposing heightened controls on local and foreign NGOs
operating in that country. Governments in Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus have followed Russia's lead
in cracking down on NGO activity.
Outside the former Soviet states, China has tightened its
controls against foreign NGOs. And according to the NED report,
Egypt and Zimbabwe have done so, as well.
This issue was brought to my personal attention last
October when I met with Maria Corina Machado, the founder and
executive director of Sumate, an independent democratic civil
society group in Venezuela, which monitors the performance of
Venezuela's electoral institutions. She has been charged with
treason simply for receiving a grant from our own NED.
Unfortunately, authorities in Russia, Venezuela, and other
nations have been able to persuade many of their citizens that
the work of these NGOs is a form of American interventionism
and that opposition to the groups is a reaffirmation of
sovereignty. As the NED report states, NGOs today, compared to
the situation immediately following 1989, face a new reality,
one that is dramatically different. Groups that promote
democracy must come to grips with the fact that they are being
vilified for allegedly promoting regime change.
American-funded democracy promoters should underscore that
democracy is not a singularly American endeavor. The European
Union, the U.N. Democracy Fund, and NED-like initiatives
sponsored by Germany, Taiwan, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, and others are part of the democracy-promotion
community. American democracy groups should stress that they
often work with such organizations and they should cultivate
these relationships.
In this environment, where democracy promoters are
regularly being accused of crossing the line into domestic
partisan politics, they must redouble their efforts to be open
and transparent with the host regimes to assure those regimes
of their nonpartisan intent. At the same time, when these NGOs
come under assault and in pursuit of legitimate activities that
are often protected by international agreements, they should be
flexible and resourceful in finding ways to continue their work
and in marshaling support for expanding the democratic space.
This morning, we are joined by two distinguished panels.
First, we welcome Barry Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
On the second panel, we will hear from Carl Gershman,
president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Ambassador
Mark Palmer, the current vice chairman of Freedom House; Morton
Halperin, director of U.S. Advocacy at the Open Society
Institute; and Thomas Carothers, senior associate and director
of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
We thank our witnesses for coming to the hearing this
morning and we look forward to our discussion with them.
At the time that my distinguished ranking member, Senator
Biden, appears, we will recognize him, of course, for an
opening statement, if he has one at that time. I am delighted
to see Senator Martinez with us today. Do you have any opening
comments?
Senator Martinez. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman, only to
highlight the importance of the issue and to thank you for
holding this important hearing.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Lowenkron, as always, it is good to have you here at
the hearing; you are an old friend of the committee. And we
appreciate the opportunity, once again, to hear from you this
morning and to question you, as the case may be. You may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY F. LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you very much, Chairman Lugar. I am
particularly grateful for the active interest that you and
other members of the committee, Senator Martinez and others,
have shown and are showing on the essential role that NGOs can
play in defense of freedom and development of democracy
worldwide.
President Bush has committed us to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements and institutions across the
globe. And the work of NGOs is crucial to reaching that goal.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I request that my full testimony be
entered into the record.
The Chairman. It will be entered in the record in full.
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you.
When I appeared before this committee, seeking confirmation
as Assistant Secretary, I stated that one of my highest
priorities would be to protect the work of NGOs. The activities
of human rights and democracy NGOs mirror the discussions I had
with Secretary Rice on three main areas of democracy promotion.
One, electoral, the right of assembly, free speech, and
other elements that constitute representative democracy.
Two, good governance, government that is accountable and
willing to accept constraints on power and cede it peacefully.
And three, a flourishing civil society.
There are those in power, however, who do not welcome such
NGOs. The work of these NGOs may vary widely. But what they
have in common is an independent voice distinct from, and at
times in disagreement with, the government's views.
I experience this every day as Assistant Secretary. I often
agree with NGOs; at times, I disagree with them. But I never
view them as a threat to our democratic way of life. Other
governments, however, do feel threatened by NGOs' vital work.
The assessment done by the National Endowment for Democracy
captures this growing challenge. States are developing tools to
subvert, suppress, and silence NGOs. They impose burdensome
registration and tax requirements; charges are vague,
enforcement is arbitrary, fostering a climate of self-
censorship and fear. And when states find these efforts
insufficient, they resort to extra-legal forms of persecution.
Often, these regimes justify their actions by accusations of
treason, espionage, foreign interference, or terrorism; but the
real motivation is political.
From Russia to China to Venezuela, no region has been
spared this push-back. Russia's new restrictive NGO law is now
in effect. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Justice issued
extensive and burdensome regulations, along with dozens of
forms for NGOs to complete on their financial and programmatic
activities. Foreign NGOs appeared to be singled out for even
more extensive reporting requirements.
The Chinese Government studied the role that NGOs played in
the ``color revolutions'' and ordered an investigation into the
activities of foreign and domestic NGOs in China. In Venezuela,
the leadership of the electoral watchdog, Sumate, awaits trial
on charges of conspiracy and treason for accepting a $31,150
grant from the NED for voter education and outreach activities.
I describe other disturbing cases in my written testimony,
including Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, Syria, and Egypt.
Mr. Chairman, when NGOs are under siege, freedom and
democracy are undermined. How then can we best support and
defend the work of NGOs worldwide? We need to push back. We
need to defend the defenders of human rights and democracy. Let
me suggest seven ways.
First, we need to speak out. We must counter what I call
the ``NGO legal equivalency'' argument that all countries
regulate NGO activity in some fashion. There is an enormous
difference between giving NGOs the opportunity to register for
nontax status and demanding that NGOs register to simply
function.
Second, we need to ensure that NGO protection is an
integral part of our diplomacy. We must highlight the
protection of NGOs in our foreign policy and we must multiply
our voices. Time and again, NGOs have told me that their work
would be further protected if others would join us. Russian
NGOs were heartened that German Chancellor Merkel spoke out in
defense of NGOs and met with them while she was in Russia
earlier this year.
Third, we must expand the role of regional organizations in
protecting NGOs. We are developing and enhancing partnerships
with leading regional democracies and working with the European
Union and others to support the work of NGOs.
Fourth, we must maximize global opportunities to raise
concerns about the treatment of NGOs and to take coordinated
action in their defense. We will work with like-minded members
of the new U.N. Human Rights Council. NGOs must retain the same
access to the new body that they had to its predecessor. The
U.N. Democracy Fund will support projects implemented by NGOs.
And the time has come to institutionalize the Community of
Democracies and to use its members to press for the protection
of civil society, including NGOs.
Fifth, we must protect and nurture new organizations that
allow NGOs to flourish. We and our G-8 partners, together with
countries of the broader Middle East, established the Forum for
the Future to advance reforms in the region. At the Bahrain
Ministerial Forum last fall, countries agreed to establish a
Foundation for the Future to help fund NGO activity. And I am
pleased to tell you today that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
agreed to the be the U.S. representative on the foundation's
board.
Sixth, we must ensure that NGOs have the resources they
need to carry out their vital work. We, in government, can
often provide the needed seed money for democracy promotion
programs or assistance to maintain ongoing programs. Here, I
would also want to express my appreciation to the Congress for
its support of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, a program
managed by my Bureau. I call it the ``venture capital'' of
democracy promotion, for it gives us the flexibility to support
innovative NGO programming targeted at key countries and
issues.
Seventh, we should consider elaborating some guiding
principles by which we would assess the behavior of other
governments toward NGOs and which we will take into account in
our bilateral relationships. I would welcome consulting with
the Congress on the drafting of these principles. The
principles could be distilled from basic commitments to rights
enshrined in such documents as the U.N. Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other international documents, including
those of the OSCE.
We would encourage the embrace of the principles by other
countries, as well. These principles could include: That an
individual should be permitted to form, join, and participate
in NGOs of his or her choosing and peaceful exercise of freedom
of expression and assembly; that any restrictions that may be
placed on the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression
and assembly must be consistent with international law; that
governments will not take actions that prevent NGOs from
carrying out their peaceful work without fear of persecution,
intimidation, or discrimination; that laws, administrative
measures, regulations, and procedures governing or affecting
NGOs, should protect, but not impede, the operation of NGOs;
and that they should never be established or enforced for
politically motivated purposes; that NGOs, like all other
elements of a vibrant civil society, should be permitted to
seek and receive financial support from domestic, foreign, and
international entities. And perhaps the most important
principle of all that, whenever NGOs are under siege, it is
imperative that democratic nations act to defend their rights.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Martinez, in closing, I want to
emphasize the value of your active involvement in the worldwide
defense and support of NGOs. Efforts you make to encourage
foreign leaders to press these issues would be extraordinarily
helpful in advancing the goal we all share--a world of
democracy and freedom.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Lowenkron follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Lugar, members of the committee. Thank you for your active
interest in the essential role that nongovernmental organizations play
in the defense of freedom and the development of democracy across the
globe. I welcome this opportunity to highlight the contributions of
NGOs, to share with you our concerns about the restrictions that a
growing number of governments are placing on NGO activities, and to
offer suggestions on how we can protect NGOs' vital work.
I will summarize my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman, and request
that my full testimony be entered into the record.
When I appeared before this committee last September seeking
confirmation as the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, I stated that, if confirmed, one of my highest priorities would
be ``to consult and partner closely with the many dedicated and capable
NGOs working on human rights and democracy.'' I also pledged to ``make
every effort to protect the work'' of NGOs against efforts by foreign
governments to constrain, harass, intimidate, and silence their work.''
As Assistant Secretary, I have had the privilege of meeting with
many NGOs, both here and abroad, and I have greatly benefited from
their information, their insights, and their ideas.
As President Bush stated in his second inaugural address, `` . . .
it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.''
The work of NGOs is crucial to reaching that goal.
A WIDE WORLD OF NGOS
The rise of NGOs as international actors, as well as shapers of
national policy, is one of the most important trends in international
relations. NGOs encompass the entire range of civil society--from
lobbying for better health, protection of the environment, and
advancement of education for all, to delivering humanitarian relief and
securing and protecting basic civil and political rights.
There are NGOs devoted to specific health issues, such as women's
health care or HIV/AIDS. I note the tireless effort and good work of
the Whitman Walker Clinic here in the Washington metropolitan area.
There are also NGOs based thousands of miles away that are battling
these same concerns. For example, the Kenya AIDS NGO Consortium is a
coalition of some 600 NGOs and religious organizations that deal with
AIDS-related activities in Africa. Indeed, the AIDS pandemic has
spawned a host of indigenous NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa.
Environmental NGOs in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
played a vital role in the political, social, and economic changes of
the 1980s. Today, they continue to have an enormous impact in countries
across the globe, pushing for governmental transparency and
accountability which, in turn, can fuel political reform.
Today, my primary focus will be the so-called political NGOs--
those that advocate for human rights and democratic principles and
practices. Although they constitute only a small component of the
global NGO community, they are the ones that draw the most fire from
governments who view them as a threat to their power.
These NGOs build on a legacy of championing human rights through
norm-setting and monitoring. They have helped to shape international
agreements, instruments, institutions, and human rights mechanisms over
decades. NGOs were key to shaping the language of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the United Nations Charter and of the U.N.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights itself. These NGOs courageously
defend human rights activists, often while risking reprisal themselves.
Together with the increasing worldwide demand for greater personal
and political freedom often reflected in the work of these NGOs is the
growing recognition that democracy is the form of government that can
best meet the demands of citizens for dignity, liberty, and equality.
Today, all across the globe, NGOs are helping to establish and
strengthen democracy in three key ways:
<bullet> First, NGOs are working to establish awareness of and
respect for the right of individuals to exercise freedoms of
expression, assembly, and association, which is crucial to
participatory democracy.
<bullet> Second, NGOs are working to ensure that there is a level
playing field upon which candidates for elective office can
compete and that the entire elections process is free and fair.
<bullet> Third, NGOs are working to build and strengthen the rule of
just laws and responsive and accountable institutions of
government so that the rights of individuals are protected
regardless of which persons or parties may be in office at any
given time.
These efforts by NGOs mirror the discussions I have had with
Secretary Rice on democracy promotion in which she outlined the three
main areas that inform our democracy activities: Electoral--the right
of assembly, free speech, and all other elements that constitute
representative democracy; the importance of good governance--a
government by the people that is accountable, transparent, and willing
to accept constraints on power and cede it peacefully; and a
flourishing civil society. NGOs play a vital role in all three areas.
U.S.-based NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the
Center for International Private Enterprise, the American Center for
International Labor Solidarity, the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, IFES and
Freedom House actively promote democracy across the globe. This type of
activity is not unique to the United States. The German political
Stiftungen served as models for the creation of the NED family in the
1980s. The British Westminster Foundation is a leader in democracy
promotion. The Danes promote worker solidarity and labor rights. The
Czech Aide to People in Need actively supports human rights. All of
these efforts are conducted openly and transparently and are consistent
with international standards and practices.
THE PUSH-BACK
Not surprisingly, there are those in power who do not welcome NGOs
and other agents of peaceful, democratic change. After all, the work of
NGOs may vary widely, but what they all have in common is enabling
individuals to come together to create an independent voice distinct
from, and at times in disagreement with, the government's views.
Mr. Chairman, I experience this every day as Assistant Secretary
when I meet with NGOs who want to discuss the U.S. Government's human
rights record here and abroad. I often agree with NGOs. At times, I
disagree with them. But I never view them as a threat to our democratic
way of life. Indeed, their contribution to our debate on America's role
in the world can only strengthen our democratic ideals at home and
advance them abroad.
Other governments, however, feel threatened by their work.
In many countries, we see disturbing attempts to intimidate NGOs
and restrict or shut them down. The recent assessment of the National
Endowment for Democracy captures this growing challenge. The
conclusions are sobering. States are developing and using tools to
subvert, suppress, and silence these organizations. They
invoke or create restrictive laws and regulations. They impose
burdensome registration and tax requirements. Charges are vague, such
as ``disturbing social order,'' and implementation and enforcement are
arbitrary, fostering a climate of self censorship and fear. Governments
play favorites, deeming NGOs ``good'' or ``bad,'' and they treat them
accordingly. NGOs deemed ``good'' are often ones created by governments
themselves--Government Organized NGOs or ``GONGOs.'' The Tunisian
Government established a GONGO staffed by members of its intelligence
service to attend conferences and monitor what is being said about the
government. China sends GONGOs to U.N. NGO functions to defend China's
human rights policies.
When states find that their efforts to pass or apply restrictive
laws and regulations against NGOs are not enough, they resort to
extralegal forms of intimidation or persecution.
Often these regimes justify their actions by accusations of
treason, espionage, subversion, foreign interference, or terrorism.
These are rationalizations; the real motivation is political. This is
not about defending their citizens from harm--this is about protecting
positions of power.
From Russia to China, Zimbabwe to Venezuela, no region has been
spared this push-back. Mr. Chairman, we can point to individual cases
unique to each country. A key impetus for the recent crackdown has been
reaction by many rulers to the ``color revolutions'' of 2003-2005. They
believed that the popular pressure for change was instigated and
directed from abroad through U.S. and other foreign support for NGOs on
the ground. They have not grasped that the ``color revolutions'' were
examples of citizens standing up for their right to free elections and
demanding accountability when election results did not reflect the
clear will of the people because of manipulation.
During my trip to Moscow in early January, the deep suspicion that
Western states had manipulated election outcomes was evident from my
discussions with officials and lawmakers. Our promotion of democracy is
seen as part of a zero-sum game of geopolitical influence. I emphasized
to my Russian interlocutors that they were fundamentally mistaken about
what happened in Ukraine and Georgia, that our NGO funding and
activities there were transparent, fully in keeping with the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's and other
international norms, and designed to help ensure that elections are
free and fair, not to pick winners and losers.
After he had signed the restrictive new NGO law in January, Russian
President Putin acknowledged that NGOs can and do contribute to the
well-being of society, but he added that their financing must be
transparent and efforts to control them by ``foreign puppeteers'' would
not be tolerated.
The new Russian law has the potential to cripple the vital work of
many NGOs, including foreign NGOs there to support the local NGOs, and
could retard Russia's democratic development. The new law is now in
effect. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Justice issued extensive
implementing regulations along with dozens of forms for NGOs to
complete. These detailed reporting requirements on NGOs' financial and
programmatic activities allow for broad review and oversight by Russian
officials that could go beyond international norms. The authorities
have wide discretion to implement the law. The authorities can request
various documents and information or attend any NGO event to verify
that an organization's activities comply with the goals expressed in
its founding documents. Foreign NGOs appear to be singled out for even
more extensive reporting requirements, including quarterly financial
reports and annual reporting on planned activities, subject to review
by authorities. Officials could order a foreign NGO to cease funding a
particular program, ban the NGO from transferring funds to certain
recipients, or shut it down completely. While we are told such measures
would be subject to court approval, this could entail lengthy and
expensive litigation that could cripple an NGO.
The Russian government has claimed that the new NGO law is similar
to United States and other Western regulations regarding civil society.
As a basis for that claim, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has posted an unattributed chart on its Web site comparing
selected provisions from the new NGO law with the laws of the United
States, France, Finland, Israel, and Poland. An NGO called the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law has done a careful analysis
of the chart and the laws of the various countries cited and has found
the contrary. According to this center of legal expertise, the Russian
law is ``substantially different from the laws of the selected
countries'' and is actually ``more restrictive,'' both in terms of the
specific provisions of the Russian law and in its cumulative effect.
We continue to urge the Russian Government to implement the new law
in a way that facilitates, not hinders, the vital work of NGOs and is
in compliance with Russia's international commitments.
Russia is not the only country where NGOs face serious challenges.
In Belarus, the Lukashenko Government increasingly uses tax
inspections and new registration requirements to complicate or deny the
ability of NGOs, independent media, political parties, and minority and
religious organizations to operate legally. All but a handful of human
rights NGOs have been deregistered or denied registration. In February,
Belarussian KGB spokesman, Valeriy Nadtochayev, stated, ``Such
political events inside our country as . . . elections attract the
attention of foreign secret services, diplomats, and representatives of
various nongovernmental organizations and foundations like magnets. All
of them are united by a common task involving the collection of biased
information about events in our country and the creation of newsbreaks,
especially those connected with so-called human rights violations . . .
''
The Chinese Government applies burdensome requirements to groups
attempting to register as NGOs. They must first find a government
agency sponsor before they can register with the Ministry of Civil
Affairs. NGOs must have more than 50 individual members--a catch-22
situation since hosting such large gatherings without a license can
lead to official persecution. This means that groups that do not have
adequate government ties have no hope of meeting legal requirements to
register. The financial requirement of $12,000 makes it difficult for
many nascent, cash-strapped organizations to register. Moreover,
sponsoring agencies and the Ministry of Civil Affairs can refuse
applications without cause or recourse.
The government closely scrutinizes NGOs working in areas that might
challenge its authority or have implications for social stability, such
as groups focused on human rights and discrimination. It is more
amenable to groups that it sees as supporting social welfare efforts
rather than operating in a political role. In this context, some NGOs
are able to develop their own agendas and, in some cases, even
undertake limited advocacy roles in public interest areas like women's
issues, the environment, health, and consumer rights.
The Chinese Government studied the role that NGOs ostensibly played
in the ``color revolutions'' and ordered an investigation into the
activities of both foreign and domestic NGOs in China. The government
also established a task force to monitor the activities of NGOs,
especially those with links overseas.
In Venezuela, the leadership of the electoral watchdog NGO, Sumate,
awaits trial on charges of conspiracy and treason for accepting a
$31,150 grant from the NED for voter education and outreach activities
consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. While Sumate is the most well known target of harassment by the
Venezuelan Government, it is not alone. The government continues to
restrict the ability of NGOs to conduct their activities and to cut off
sources of international support for their work.
In May 2005, Eritrea issued an NGO Administration Proclamation that
imposes taxes on aid, restricts NGOS to relief and rehabilitation work,
increases reporting requirements for foreign and local organizations
and limits international agencies from directly funding local NGOs. All
NGOs must meet demanding annual registration requirements. The few
local NGOs that are allowed to register also face new funding barriers.
In a televised speech last November, Eritrean President, Isaias
Afwerki, stated, ``In many cases, spy agencies of big and powerful
countries use NGOs as smokescreens.'' In March 2006, in the midst of a
devastating drought, Eritrea expelled the United States-based
humanitarian NGO Mercy Corps, the Irish NGO Concern, and the British
NGO Accord.
In March 2005, the Ethiopian Government expelled MI, NDI, and IFES
shortly after their arrival in advance of the May national legislative
and regional council elections. The three organizations had never
before been expelled from any country. They had made numerous attempts
to register with the government. The government cited ``technical
difficulties related to their accreditation and registration'' as
reasons for the expulsions.
Blatantly disregarding the welfare of its people, the concerns of
its neighbors, and the call of the United Nations, the regime in Burma
has not eased, it has increased, restrictions on U.N. agencies and
international NGOs doing humanitarian work in Burma, particularly in
ethnic areas. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres was forced to close
its French Section that was responsible for programs in the conflict-
ridden Mon and Karen states. As the manager of the French Section put
it, ``It appears the Burmese authorities do not want anyone to witness
the abuses they are committing against their own people.''
The cases I mentioned are only a few examples what I call rule by
law--of governments seeking to control, restrict, or shut down the work
of NGOs by appropriating the language of law and the instruments and
institutions of democracy.
When states wield the law as a political weapon or an instrument of
repression against NGOs, they rule by law rather than upholding the
rule of law. The rule of law acts as a check on state power; it is a
system designed to protect the human rights of the individual against
the power of the state. In contrast, rule by law can be an abuse of
power--the manipulation of the law, the judicial system and other
governmental bodies to maintain the power of the rulers over the ruled.
To suppress the work of NGOs, states also employ more blatant forms
of persecution.
Since the uprising and violent suppression in Andijan, Uzbekistan,
in May 2005, the government has harassed, beaten, and jailed dozens of
human rights activists and independent journalists, sentenced numerous
people to prison following trials that did not meet international
standards, and forced many domestic and international NGOs to close,
including Freedom House. Those that continue to operate are severely
restricted. Local NGO employees have been convicted of criminal
offenses for their work, making it virtually impossible for them to
find other jobs.
The Sudanese Government's obstruction of humanitarian assistance
and support for civil society has severely hampered relief efforts in
Darfur. Domestic and international NGOs and humanitarian organizations
are constantly harassed and overburdened with paperwork. The Sudanese
Government has expelled international NGO and humanitarian personnel,
delayed their visas, and placed restrictions on their travel inside
Darfur. Sudanese police and security forces have arrested, threatened,
and physically harmed NGO and humanitarian workers. In April 2006, the
Sudanese Government expelled the Norwegian Refugee Council from Kalma
Camp, the largest internally displaced persons camp in Darfur with over
90,000 internally displaced persons. Prior to its expulsion, the
Norwegian Refugee Council had served for 2 years as the Kalma ``camp
coordinator,'' in charge of coordinating all humanitarian programs and
protection for the camp's residents and serving as a liaison for
community leaders, government officials, humanitarian agencies, and
African Union peacekeepers. On May 31, the South Darfur State Security
Committee approved an agreement allowing the Council to return as camp
coordinator. Nevertheless, Sudanese Government obstructionism caused
Darfur's largest IDP camp to go without a camp coordinator for 2
months, during which time insecurity and tension rose.
The last remaining civil society discussion group in Syria, the
Jamal al-Atassi Forum, has been prevented from meeting for almost a
year and many of its members have been arrested or intimidated into
silence. The forum is a predominantly secular group encouraging dialog
among political parties and civil society to promote reform.
We are concerned that the situation in Egypt for politically active
NGOs is deteriorating. For example, last week, Egyptian civil society
activists Mohammed el-Sharkawi and Karim Shaer were beaten and arrested
for participating in demonstrations in support of the independence of
the judiciary. Reportedly, they were subsequently tortured while in
custody and denied medical treatment. International democracy NGOs
active in Egypt are also facing increasing government pressure.
what we and other democracies can do to defend and support ngos
Mr. Chairman, in today's world, the problems confronting states are
too complex, even for the most powerful states to tackle alone. The
contributions of NGOs are crucial in addressing a host of domestic and
international challenges. Restricting the political space of NGOs only
limits a society's own political and economic growth. A strong nation
fosters the development of NGOs and other elements of a vibrant civil
society; a state that tries to control everything from the center
becomes brittle. A society that allows broad participation by its
citizens in national life is a society that will flourish from the
contributions of its own people.
When NGOs are under siege, freedom and democracy are undermined.
How then can we best support and defend the work of NGOs in
countries across the globe?
The United States must continue to stand up for what President Bush
calls ``the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity,'' and that includes
the exercise by individuals of their rights to freedom of expression,
association, and assembly through their membership in NGOs.
As we monitor and report on conditions for human rights and
democracy in countries worldwide, we in DRL, our posts overseas, and
the State Department, generally, must sharpen our focus on the
increasing pressures governments are putting on NGOs. We must think
creatively about how we might help to open political space for NGOs and
create opportunities for NGOs and their governments to exchange views
in an honest and constructive manner. We must ensure that a
government's treatment of NGOs is an element in our bilateral dialog
and that it factors into the decisions we make on developing our
bilateral relationships.
Mr. Chairman, we need to defend human rights and democracy
promotion. To do so, we need to defend the defenders. In short, we need
to push back. Let me suggest seven ways:
<bullet> First, we need to speak out.
We must be prepared to counter what I call the NGO ``Legal
Equivalency'' argument made by governments that unduly restrict NGOs,
namely that since all countries regulate NGO activity in some fashion,
criticism is unwarranted. For example, there is a difference between
giving NGOs the opportunity to register for nontax status, and
demanding that NGOs register to simply function. Most countries,
including ours, only require notification of registration, not
permission from authorities, in order to operate as a formal, legal
entity.
We must not succumb to arguments that the prime reason that
governments which impose burdensome registration and other reporting
requirements on NGOs is to combat terrorism or other criminal behavior.
All governments have a responsibility to protect their populations from
acts of terrorism and crime, and it is of course appropriate to subject
NGOs to the same laws and requirements generally applicable to all
individuals and organizations. At the end of day, however, a burdensome
registration and reporting process is unlikely to sway determined
terrorist organizations, but very likely to weaken legitimate NGOs.
We must counter false charges that U.S. activities tied to NGOs are
led covertly by the United States and other democracies. We must
reiterate that our support is out in the open and that thousands of
NGOs never even approach our Government. And when they do, it is more
likely than not that they are pressing us on our own behavior, or on
individual cases, and not soliciting funding.
<bullet> Second, we need to ensure that NGO protection is an integral
part of our diplomacy.
We must highlight the protection of NGOs as a legitimate issue on
our government-to-government agenda. This spring, when Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov came to Washington, Secretary Rice had an extensive
discussion with him on our NGO concerns, a discussion in which I
participated. The Secretary raises our concerns in her bilateral
meetings, as do I and many of my colleagues at the State Department.
When I travel, I insist on seeing NGO representatives, as does the
Secretary.
We must also continue to multiply our voices. Time and again NGOs
have told me that their work would be further protected if others would
join us. Russian NGOs were heartened that, just prior to my arrival in
Moscow in January, German Chancellor Merkel paid an official visit and
not only spoke out in defense of NGOs but met with them to hear first-
hand their concerns. In the case of China, my Bureau has taken the
initiative to develop a coordinated approach among all members of the
so-called Bern process--the process that brings together all countries
which have human rights dialogs with China. We meet twice yearly, to
exchange lists of political prisoners, to compare best practices, and
to monitor Chinese behavior toward NGOs.
<bullet> Third, we must expand the role of regional organizations in
protecting NGOs.
Acting in defense and support of NGOs on a bilateral basis is
essential, but it is not sufficient. NGOs are a global phenomenon; they
are facing pressures in countries in every region. I believe that there
is greater scope for us to partner with leading regional democracies
and to work with regional organizations to defend and support the work
of NGOs.
The OSCE and the European Union have adopted some of the most
advanced provisions regarding the role and rights of NGOs, as well as
guidelines on how they can interact and participate in OSCE and
European Union activities.
In the OSCE context, the role of NGOs in pressing for adherence to
democratic standards and practices including monitoring elections
remains vital. We will do all we can to ensure that the defense and
promotion of human rights and democratic principles remain central to
OSCE's mandate.
Every quarter I hold consultations with the European Union on a
host of human rights and democracy issues worldwide. These
consultations are also a good vehicle to take up the cause of NGO
protection.
The OAS has formal structures for NGO participation and Secretary
General Insulza has said that he seeks greater engagement by civil
society organizations. Last month, I held a roundtable with a diverse
group of NGOs from Latin America. The NGOs were in Washington to attend
an OAS ministerial. We intend to build on that dialog through the OAS
and among the NGOs themselves as they press for implementation of the
OAS Democratic Charter.
NGO engagement with the African Union remains limited. However,
prior to the African Union Heads of State Summit July 1-2 in Banjul,
the Australian Union will host a Civil Society Forum and a Women's
Forum. Later this year I hope to travel to Addis Ababa to meet with the
Australian Union and place protection of NGOs on our agenda.
ASEAN has formal guidelines for NGO participation in its
activities. To date, the NGOs affiliated with ASEAN do not tend to have
a democracy or human rights focus, but operate in other fields such as
business and medicine. ASEAN's recent steps to press the regime in
Burma is an encouraging sign that countries in the region are beginning
to recognize that the protection of human rights, and of human rights
defenders, is a legitimate issue, and not one to be dismissed as
interference in the sovereignty of its neighbors. We will encourage
ASEAN to take further steps on this path.
<bullet> Fourth, we must maximize global opportunities to raise
concerns about the treatment of NGOs and take coordinated
action in their defense.
We will work to that end with like-minded members of the new U.N.
Human Rights Council. I would note that in negotiating the creation of
the Council, the United States successfully insisted that NGOs must
retain the same access to the new body that they had to its
predecessor.
The U.N. Democracy Fund, proposed by President Bush in September
2004 and launched in September 2005, is another important instrument
for supporting NGOs. The Fund will support projects implemented by NGOs
as well as governmental and multilateral entities. Recognizing the
important contributions that NGOs make, the designers of the Democracy
Fund ensured that 2 of the 17 members of the fund's advisory board are
NGO representatives. To date, 19 countries have contributed or pledged
approximately $50 million to this voluntary fund. The United States has
contributed $17.9 million to date, and the President's budget has
requested an additional $10 million to support the fund in fiscal year
2007. We have successfully pushed for the fund to focus on support for
NGOs and other elements of civil society in states transitioning to
democracy, complementing existing U.N. programs on free and fair
elections and the rule of law.
The Community of Democracies and the collective action of its
members can be an important focal point within the international
community and international organizations in helping sustain and
protect NGOs across the globe. The time has come to institutionalize
the community itself, and to use its members to press for fundamental
freedoms, including with regard to the protection of NGOs.
<bullet> Fifth, we must protect and nurture new organizations that
allow NGOs to flourish.
Here, let me single out the Middle East. The Forum for the Future
was established in the summer of 2004 at the G-8 Summit in Sea Island,
Georgia. In partnership with the countries of the broader Middle East
and North Africa, the Forum seeks to advance political, economic, and
educational reforms in the region. From its inception, we have pressed
for inclusion of NGOs indigenous to the Middle East. At the first
meeting of the Forum in Rabat, in December 2004, there were five NGOs.
By the time I accompanied Secretary Rice to the second meeting, held in
Bahrain a year later, the 5 had grown to 40. At the conference, leaders
of these NGOs participated, pressing an agenda of political reform,
economic opportunity, educational advancement, and gender equality.
Among those serving on this civil society delegation in Bahrain
were representatives from the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD)--a
dialog led by Italy, Turkey, and Yemen, as well as three NGOS from each
country. The DAD presented the outcomes of discussions and debates held
over the course of the year between civil society leaders and their
government counterparts. The growing DAD network includes hundreds of
civil society leaders from the region. The level and depth of civil
society participation at the forum was historic and positive, and has
set an important precedent for genuine dialog and partnership between
civil society and governments on reform issues.
At Bahrain, all the participating countries agreed to establish a
Foundation for the Future to help fund NGO activity. We did not agree
on a Bahrain declaration of principles, however, because a number of
countries wanted to include in that declaration language to constrain
NGOs. In the end, the United Kingdom as G-8 cosponsor that year,
supported by us and others--walked away from the declaration. Our
reason was simple: We could not cripple in the afternoon what we had
created in the morning. I applaud the host of the next forum, Jordan,
for its unwavering commitment to a continued robust role for NGOs. We
are already acting in concert with the Jordanian Government and others
to ensure that the NGO presence grows for the meeting this December.
<bullet> Sixth, we must ensure that NGOs have the resources they need
to carry out their vital work.
Many NGOs look to a variety of funding sources, both government and
private, to ensure a diverse support base. Many of them never approach
the U.S. Government for any funding at all.
A number of private, grant-making foundations specialize in
supporting the work of other nongovernmental organizations, and here I
cite the MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Open Society
Institute, and other well-known foundations. Organizations such as the
independent, nonprofit Pew Charitable Trusts, the International Crisis
Group, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and its Moscow
Center often fund or produce reports on topics which contribute to
public policy discourse on the development of civil society, conflict
prevention and management, and other goals compatible with advancing
freedom and democracy. We must continue to encourage more private
sector support.
We, in government, can often provide the needed seed money for
democracy promotion programs, or assistance to maintain ongoing
programs. This is a dynamic process that adjusts to new demands,
shifting priorities, and different emphases. We must continue to seek
out innovative solutions that merit our support, for example, programs
that monitor and publicize attacks on NGOs, much as the MacArthur
Foundation, has funded the Berkman Center at Harvard University to
monitor worldwide constraints on Internet freedom.
I also want to express my appreciation to the Congress for its
support of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, a program managed by my
Bureau. I call it the ``venture capital'' of democracy promotion for it
gives us the flexibility to support innovative programming by NGOs
targeted at key countries and issues. We are able to make hundreds of
grants a year to organizations around the world addressing vital
democracy and human rights issues.
All free nations have a stake in the strengthening of civil
societies and the spread of democratic government worldwide, and we
welcome and encourage contributions from other donor countries and
institutions in support of the work of NGOs.
<bullet> Seventh, we should consider elaborating some guiding
principles by which we, as a country, would assess the behavior
of other governments toward NGOs, and which we would take into
account in our bilateral relationships.
I would welcome consulting with Congress on the drafting of these
principles. I would envision a short list of principles--no more than a
page. They would be user-friendly in nonlegalistic language. The
principles would proceed from the premise that NGOs, as elements of a
vibrant civil society, are essential to the development and success of
free societies and that they play a vital role in ensuring accountable,
democratic government. The principles should pass the ``reasonableness
test'' in any open society. We would pledge our own adherence to the
principles and we would of course encourage their embrace by other
countries as well.
I do not see these principles as being duplicative of other
efforts. The best word is still the plainspoken word, and in
plainspoken words, these principles would distill the basic commitments
to the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly
enshrined in such documents as: the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and other international documents such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, relevant International Labor
Organization Conventions, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent OSCE
Copenhagen and Moscow documents, and the European Convention on Human
Rights and relevant documents of the Council of Europe.
Among the possible principles we could elaborate could be:
<bullet> That an individual should be permitted to form, join, and
participate in NGOs of his or her choosing in peaceful exercise
of his or her rights to freedom of expression and assembly.
<bullet> That any restrictions which may be placed on the exercise of
the rights to freedom of expression and assembly must be
consistent with international law.
<bullet> That governments will not take actions that prevent NGOs
from carrying out their peaceful work without fear of
persecution, intimidation, or discrimination.
<bullet> That laws, administrative measures, regulations, and
procedures governing or affecting NGOs should protect--not
impede--their operation, and that they should never be
established or enforced for politically motivated purposes.
<bullet> That NGOs, like all other elements of a vibrant civil
society, should be permitted to seek and receive financial
support from domestic, foreign, and international entities.
<bullet> And, perhaps the most important principle of all, that
whenever NGOs are under siege, it is imperative that democratic
nations act to defend their rights.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in closing I cannot
emphasize enough the value of the continued active involvement of this
committee and of other Members of Congress in the worldwide defense and
support of the work of NGOs. It greatly strengthens my hand when I meet
with foreign officials, to know that I have your strong bipartisan
backing. It is profoundly important that you continue to demonstrate
your support for NGOs and raise concerns about their treatment to
foreign governments. And any efforts you could make to encourage your
counterparts in the legislatures of other democracies to press these
issues and to work in concert on them would be extraordinarily helpful.
As President Bush has said, ``Freedom, by its nature, must be
chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and
the protection of minorities . . . America will not impose our own
style of government on the unwilling. Our goal, instead, is to help
others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their
own way.''
By America's leadership in supporting and defending the work of
NGOs, that is exactly what we are doing--helping men and women across
the globe shape their own destinies in freedom, and by so doing,
helping to build a safer, better world for us all.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary
Lowenkron.
I want to commence a round of questions. We will have a 10-
minute limit in our first round. And I would like to begin by
asking a broad question. How does the Department of State
monitor the effectiveness of NGO promotion programs? Can you
give us some idea of what you believe are the criteria for
success based upon this administration's objectives in
conducting democracy-promotion programs? How do you measure
that overall success? What part do NGOs play in this or,
ideally, what part should they play?
Mr. Lowenkron. Mr. Chairman, we measure it in two ways.
First, when we select the NGOs that we fund, which is generally
through an open competition, our tendency is to favor those
NGOs that have counterparts in host countries. We want to fund
work on the ground. So, there is a tendency for funding a more
active agenda, more active work on the part of NGOs.
We also get quarterly reports from many of these NGOs. It
is a constant give and take. So, we measure when we launch
these programs and when we review these programs.
In terms of the output at the end of the day, we take a
look at such issues as is civil society now growing in
countries where it had not been. So, for example, working with
NDI, have we been able to establish a string, a web of local
NGOs throughout Iraq or with other NGOs in Afghanistan? We look
at electoral results, not in terms of who won or who lost,
because we are not here to pick winners or losers. But in terms
of--is there a level playing field, are there sufficient
observers of elections, is the press free, is it free from
intimidation? These are standards that we can measure, working
closing not only with the NGOs but certainly with our embassies
overseas.
The Chairman. You have touched upon this but can you
describe what the extent of democracy assistance may be from
other international donors, other countries, or other
international organizations? To what extent are the efforts of
the United States supplemented in the international community?
Mr. Lowenkron. Let me say that I have been heartened by the
fact that every year more of our allies, as well as regional
organizations that we partner with, are willing to partner with
us and to advance democracy promotion. Let me give you several
examples.
India joined with the United States. The Indian Prime
Minister and our President both made significant contributions
at the launching of the U.N. Democracy Fund earlier last year--
I believe it was in September of 2005.
I have quarterly meetings, video conferences with my
counterparts in the European Union. And in it, we actually do a
whole tour of global issues, human rights, and democracy
concerns in every continent. And we discuss our strategies, we
discuss our commitments, we discuss the resources that we put
out in the field.
We have cooperated very closely with the European Union to
try to deal with a reprehensible state of affairs in Belarus.
That is another example.
We also work very closely to encourage cooperation across
the globe among nongovernmental organizations. So, for example,
the nongovernmental organizations that were instrumental in the
success of the Community of Democracies meeting in Santiago,
Chile, are now working with NGOs in Mali in order to help them
as they host the Community of Democracies meeting in 2007.
So, we have a whole range of cooperative efforts, two in
particular that I am excited about. One is that we are
beginning to develop relationships with NGOs through the OAS.
The OAS General Secretary wants to see the OAS bring Latin
American NGOs more into the mainstream of democracy promotion.
I have met with these individuals and I am going to develop a
very good relationship, not only with the groups, but we will
also work through the OAS.
And second, we also want to develop a strategic
relationship with the African Union, which is now taking steps
on issues of governments and democracy in the African
continent.
The Chairman. I know that the assistance programs are
spread among various accounts in the State Department, as well
as the USAID, and grants specifically to groups such as the
National Endowment for Democracy, the ASEAN Foundation. How
much money is the United States spending governmentally? Can
you get your arms around that with a democracy programs total?
And to what extent are all of these accounts coordinated in
your Branch or somewhere else in our Government?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, in the aggregate, Senator, the total
is roughly $1.4 billion in democracy promotion.
The Chairman. Each year.
Mr. Lowenkron. Yes. Well, this is the current level.
The Chairman. Current level.
Mr. Lowenkron. The trends have been going up. This year, we
are programming roughly $90 million to support the work of
nongovernmental organizations, excluding the money that we
administer for programs in Iraq. About $600 million--$650
million comes from USAID, and the rest from various programs
like the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Freedom
Support Act.
In terms of getting our arms around it below the aggregate
number, this was central to the Secretary of State's decision
to bring together the various elements of democracy promotion
and development under the structure under Ambassador Tobias.
The Secretary's view--I have had a number of conversations with
her--is that we need to ensure that when democracy funds go to
any country, any region, we need to know how they are allocated
in terms of electoral issues, in support of NGOs, in terms of
governments, as well as development issues. I want a
comprehensive look because we have to make sure that we
maximize the return on our investment in democracy promotion.
The Chairman. Obviously, in instances where the governments
unfriendly to the United States are involved, your reaction
might be one course, but how do you handle in a friendly, even-
handed way the approach to democracy when you are dealing with
autocratic governments that are friendly to our country? This
is constantly before us in one form or another and has been for
decades. But in the current situation, what is your general
view of how to move in those cases?
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you for asking that question. When I
started with the Government at the U.S. Information Agency, the
bureau that I now head had just been created. And these issues
have been with us, as you said, for decades. My view is clear
that we have a voice and a vote at the table on all foreign
policy issues; the Secretary has ensured that. I meet with her
on a regular basis.
When we come to the table, we come with our concerns about
human rights issues, democracy concerns. Others come with the
other elements to the table. So, for example, there are issues
of combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There
are issues involving terrorism. There are regional issues in
the context of dealing with Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian
issue. All of these have to be factored into the equation as we
proceed.
At times, there will be a focus more on one part of the
foreign policy than the other. But the Secretary of State has
made it clear we need to speak out, we need to be active, we
need to support the human rights defendants.
The one issue that we have been heavily involved in is
Egypt. It is clear that there is a movement in Egypt, a good
movement, that is showing progress on economic reform but not
on political reform. And as we are pushing, as we are
supporting the nongovernmental organizations in Egypt, as we
are trying to create open space, there is push-back from
President Mubarak.
What we need to do is to continue our conversations with
President Mubarak while, at the same time, reaching out and
protecting nongovernmental organizations. And this is
replicated with other countries, as well. It is a constant
debate, a tug of war--from in the State Department, as well as
in the administration. I could cite other examples, as well.
The Chairman. Well, one other example that you mentioned--
Egypt was current--would be Pakistan. We have had meetings with
our Foreign Relations Committee members with President
Musharraf during his visits. Clearly, his situation is one in
which there is not a great base of constituent support without
getting into all the details with Pakistan.
Whether one is looking at the military or President
Musharraf or whoever else, a broad number of Pakistanis maybe
are not given an opportunity to vote for any of the above. Yet
at the same time, President Musharraf would argue with, I am
sure, the President of the United States, or with our Secretary
of State, or with us in the committee, that we do not
understand security dilemmas, or how tenuous sometimes just
control, everyone's control, may be at a time when NATO allies
are working close by in Afghanistan. We certainly have great
hopes for continuity of civil government in Pakistan itself.
How do you begin work with a case like that one?
Mr. Lowenkron. What we do is not accept the either/or
argument that some people want to--that we hear from some
foreign leaders and officials. So, it means that even as we
work with the Pakistani Government in the war on terror, even
as we work with them, along with India, to develop new
relations on the subcontinent, we also have to focus on
democracy promotion. And I would put it in kind of five broad
categories.
First, it is the issue of governance. It is working with
President Musharraf to try to open up the political arena so
that you can have the evolution of governmental institutions,
which still are weak.
Second, I think we need to work with the political parties.
You are absolutely right that the political parties themselves
have been in a tug of war with each other and with President
Musharraf. But we need to work with them even at the grassroots
level, to try to look at new leadership, emerging leadership.
This is not going to happen overnight but we need to be able to
foster political party development in Pakistan.
Third, we need to focus on the elections that are coming up
in 2007. We need to work as hard as we can to ensure that those
elections are credible, that they meet our standards for fair
elections.
Fourth, we need to ensure that NGOs can operate in
Pakistan, so they can support the electoral process, as well as
the government's process.
And fifth, we need to recognize that the issue of
governments and the issue of democracy cannot be pursued unless
there is also an opening economically, as well. You cannot have
economic reform in Pakistan without political reform; they have
to go hand in hand.
So, it is a difficult road but it is a multilayered
approach that we need to pursue. We cannot focus solely on one
of those elements.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Martinez, do you have questions of our witness?
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder if you can touch on the issue of--I was very
interested in knowing that you are working with the OAS in the
Latin American region. I am very concerned about, of course,
the ever-decreasing space in the supposedly democratic-elected
Government of Venezuela and the work of Sumate, which the
chairman pointed out has been so important but also so under
siege.
And I am just wondering how--if you could outline for us,
perhaps, what the challenges are that you face in a situation
like Venezuela where, under the aura of a democratic election,
a government functions increasingly autocratically. And of
course, there are elections upcoming this year. So, it is also
of interest to me whether or not there is anything we can
effectively do to assist the electoral process to ensure that
it is a fair and open electoral process.
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, Venezuela is an example, as the
Secretary has put it, of a country where you can win
democratically but you don't govern democratically. When you go
region to region, country to country, there are different
challenges. That is the challenge in Venezuela, the erosion of
liberties, the evisceration of the free press, the weakening of
the judiciary, and, of course, Sumate and others who are being
hounded by the Venezuelan Government for trying to exercise
their basic freedoms.
We need to respond in several ways. I think first we need
to stand by Sumate and we need to stand by these NGOs. The fact
that a trial date has not been set does not mean that they are
out of the woods. And even if at the end of the day the charges
are dropped, there is no indication they will be, but even if
they are dropped, the fact of the matter is that Chavez wins if
NGOs have to spend all their time, their energy, and resources
defending themselves as opposed to defending the rights of the
Venezuelan people.
Second, we need to work with our allies and we need to work
with the OAS. I have been heartened by the fact that over the
last several months, a number of countries in Latin America,
Brazil, and others, have now spoken up, spoken up against what
Chavez is doing. And it is not just the issue of whether or not
we should expropriate businesses. It is the issue of whether
Latin America wants to turn the clock back 30 years and engage
in Chavez's definition of Bolivarian democracy, or whether
Latin American wants to continue in the trajectory, the
positive trajectory that we have had in the last 20 years.
They are pushing back and we need to work with them. We
need to support those voices and we also need to work with the
OAS. And there is a democratic charter that was signed by the
OAS members. And what the OAS General Secretary Insulza wants
to do now is to ensure that governments live up to that charter
and that NGOs play a role in defense of that charter.
I would just note in passing that the Venezuelan Government
has tried to undermine the ability of NGOs to even register to
work in the OAS context. So, I see it both in terms of
supporting the NGOs through our own NGOs but also working with
OAS and other countries.
Senator Martinez. Well, to that point, I appreciate your
answer. It was very complete and confirms, you know, what I
perceived to be the situation there. But at the same time, I
wonder if not here, then how could we ever be successful in
terms of highlighting the need for there to be a fair and open
election? I understand the election is in December. If, in
fact, there is an electoral commission that is rigged, as it
appears there is, is there a possibility that through the work
of NGOs, through the work of, frankly, your portfolio at the
State Department, that we can create a conscience in the region
and the world that this election must be fair and open to all
comers, and that there must be not only the opportunity to go
cast a ballot and that--that ballot was fairly counted, but
also in the lead-up to the election that there be the
opportunity for there to be free expression, for there to be
the opportunity to organize political parties and to, you
know--with opposition people rallying around one candidate,
which is a good thing.
I would also point out, by the way, that turning the clock
back 30 years apparently was rejected by the people of Peru
this week, you know.
Mr. Lowenkron. Absolutely.
Senator Martinez. And I do believe that interference as
now-President-elect Garcia pointed out, imperialism does not
always come from just one big country to the north but it can
come from neighbors.
Mr. Lowenkron. Absolutely.
Senator Martinez. Anyway, if you could comment on the
upcoming election, specifically, and what we might be able to
do to uphold the charter of the OAS on democracy, but also the
very specific yearning ones have to have an opportunity to
participate in a fair and open process.
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, I appreciate that question because
it is not just in the context of Venezuela. But every day we
get questions about, well, was not this election free and fair.
And there are two elements in a free and fair election. It is
not just what happens on election day. It is what happens in
the run up to the election. Can you compete on a level playing
field, which we do not have in Venezuela.
What we, our allies, and the NGOs need to do now is focus
on terms, and continue to focus on the electoral commission. We
need to focus on whether the opposition party, or the
opposition candidate, or the opposition in general, can get
access to media? Can they campaign short of--without violence,
without intimidation, without harassment, without lawsuits? Can
they have a clear playing field, a level playing field?
The Venezuelan Government had a rigged election for their
senate, about 15 percent of the vote. And now they have an
upper chamber. This is the kind of phony democratic practice
that they have, which is then supposed to be presented to the
world to say: See, we had an honest election.
So, we need to highlight it every single step of the way
because, at the end of the day, if it is an uneven playing
field, and at the end of the day Chavez and his party, if they
do win, that was not a free and fair election.
Senator Martinez. There are other countries in which the
political system does not even permit the opportunity for
dissent. I think it is located in this study or this--and I
presume it might be appropriate to ask about this. But in those
entities where the democracy assistance and independent NGOs
are effectively prohibited, I guess that is how they are
described, what opportunity do we have? And I know in places
like Cuba and Zimbabwe, that perhaps we already do work with
some existing NGOs that seek to further the space that may be
available to dissident movements. What can you tell us about
those situations?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, if I could just briefly focus on three
examples.
First in Cuba--in Cuba we have our mission. Our mission is
contact with the members--with the family members of those
dissidents who are still in prison from the crackdown in 2003.
And we will make it clear--clear to the Cuban authorities--that
we will continue to reach out and to provide support to the
family members. We will also engage in a dialog with others who
want to step forward and who want to press for their basic
rights in Cuba.
We will also partner with other countries, the Czechs, for
example. The Czech Republic has done great work reaching out to
the Cuban dissident community. Several of them were even
expelled by Castro. So, we need to focus on it in terms of our
mission and in terms of our close allies and partners. And we
need to keep this front and center.
I, for one, do not believe that we can just wait it out,
wait for some sort of ultimate change, for the biological clock
to solve this problem, because I am concerned for the fate of
those roughly 60 leaders of the dissident community that are
still in prison.
Let me give you another example; that is in Burma. We
support programs in Burma, in the refugee camps in northern
Thailand with the Burmese community. We provide them
assistance. They are also a valuable conduit for information
that comes out of Burma.
We also work with the United Nations. I just met with
Secretary General Annan's special envoy, Gambari, who just came
back and, to our relief, actually got to see Aung San Suu Ky.
But the fact of the matter is that they extended her house
arrest and they are nowhere nearer to starting a national
reconciliation and dialog that we need.
We used our mission in Burma, but we used our programming
outside of Burma. And we also work with the regional countries,
with the ASEAN members, and also with the European Union to try
to have an effective unified voice against the Burmese regime.
And just briefly, the third example is Uzbekistan, where
virtually all the NGOs were thrown out. What we do is we try to
set up a regional base outside of Uzbekistan to try to
coordinate the efforts to help those that are in prison in
Uzbekistan itself.
Senator Martinez. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
We have been joined by our distinguished ranking member,
Senator Biden. And I will call upon him for his opening
statement.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will just go to questions,
if I may, and ask unanimous consent for my statement to be
entered in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for not being
here for your statement. Let me ask you a couple questions as
rapidly as I can.
You are Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
Prior to the fall of the wall, American labor unions played a
major role, particularly in Poland. How do we promote labor
rights in various countries we are engaged with now? And to
what extent is there a coordination with and/or conversations
with the AFL-CIO's efforts along these lines?
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, I do not believe you can have
democracy unless you have a voice for labor. And we work with
the Solidarity Center. In my view, the labor had a great
success story. And there is a great story in Central and
Eastern Europe. We need to replicate that elsewhere around the
globe. We need to replicate that in Africa, in Latin America,
in parts of Asia. We will ensure funding for the Solidarity
Center and labor-related programs.
My Deputy Assistant Secretary, Jeff Krilla, is in Geneva
now with Secretary Chow, to talk about labor issues in the U.N.
context. I think there is a lot of work we need to do in the
context of labor but also in the context of having labor
officers tackle corporate social responsibility, as well.
Senator Biden. But how much encouragement is there? I do
not hear much about the trade union movement being promoted in
the countries you mentioned. Maybe you could tell me what tools
you are using. Do you feel part of the responsibility of your
is office to promote the growth of trade unions in the
countries in question? And if so, what are you doing to do it?
What tools are you using?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, when I mentioned labor, it was in the
context of the right of the force to organization themselves as
fully independent trade unions. And it is in that context that
we fund programs in parts of the world to focus on creating,
nurturing, and sustaining labor union movements.
Senator Biden. Well, to the extent you can submit for the
record those programs that----
Mr. Lowenkron. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden [continuing]. You are funding specifically to
accommodate that. We have a whole lot of assistance programs
that are spread across a number of accounts--the State
Department, USAID, Departments of Defense and Justice, as well
as through funding grants to organizations like the National
Endowment for Democracy and the ASEAN Foundation. Is there a
need for improvement in the coordination of these various
programs?
I think you have a pretty tough job. No one seems to be in
charge in the sense of much coordination. That is not a
criticism, but an observation.
Would we get more bang for the buck if the programs were
more coordinated? Or maybe there is more coordination than I
think. Could you speak to that?
Mr. Lowenkron. Yes. Yes, Senator. We need to get more bang
for the buck. Early on, we had a conversation with the
Secretary of State about how democracy is defined and how funds
are allocated for democracy. I had the same conversation with
USAID and also with my counterparts within the State
Department, Freedom Support Act, and the Middle East
Partnership Initiative. And it is in that context that the
Secretary has decided on this reorganization to create a
structure that brings USAID, State, and all the various
components of State together so we can better coordinate our
efforts.
Each one of these organizations--they have comparative
advantages but there also are overlaps among them. And the way
we have done that in the past is we have developed democracy
strategies. I have sat down with my counterparts in the
regional bureaus, with the National Security Council, with
USAID, to develop democracy strategies.
Senator Biden. Is there democracy strategy in Latin America
and the Caribbean? From 2005 to 2007, political and economic
instability in Latin America has been particularly high in
countries such as Haiti, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. And yet,
during this same period, we have cut funding from $215 million
to $135 million. Is that part of the strategy?
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, I do not have the exact figures
that go to each of the countries in Latin America.
Senator Biden. I have the exact figures for the region.
Mr. Lowenkron. Pardon?
Senator Biden. I have the exact figures for the region. It
is down from $215 million to $135 million. Is that part of your
strategy, to spend less?
Mr. Lowenkron. No. Part of our strategy is to spend more
effectively and in a more coordinated fashion.
Senator Biden. Do you think that is happening?
Mr. Lowenkron. I do not have the specifics on USAIDs
budgeting plans, but with fiscal year 2006 funds, my Bureau is
committed to spend no less than $6 million on democracy and
human rights initiatives in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Peru, Haiti, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Last
year, we spent $300,000 in the region. Thus, while we realize
this as a beginning, my Bureau has increased our human rights
and democracy programming in the region.
Senator Biden. Well, maybe you could submit for the record,
what justification there is for cutting money for any country
in that region. Pick any one country in the entire region that
is covered by the $135 million--show me how spending less there
has done more. OK? That would be a good thing.
With regard to Iran, this administration has requested $75
million for democracy programs in Iran for fiscal year 2006, in
the emergency supplemental, which is currently in conference.
How do you plan to identify these partners inside of Iran? And
how are you going to go about assessing--and I think you should
do this--the capacity for this? And has the executive order,
which currently bans democracy-building activities in Iran been
withdrawn? Has the President withdrawn that executive order?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, in terms of how we go about the issue
of spending democracy money--and I take it your question is
there--are there organizations out there? Is there----
Senator Biden. In Iran.
Mr. Lowenkron [continuing]. In Iran.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Mr. Lowenkron. What we do is, when we submit a statement of
interest, when we publicize a statement of interest for
nongovernmental organizations to compete, they come in with
proposals in which they have counterparts in Iran, either
individuals or organizations, in Iran. And it is in that
context that we fund these programs.
Senator Biden. Are they going to be funded? Has the
executive order been withdrawn?
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, we funded $3 million in democracy
promotion activity last year.
Senator Biden. That is not my question. I know we did. My
question is that you needed a general license to permit
American nongovernmental organizations to financially support a
broad range of civil society, cultural, human rights, democracy
building. Has that ban been lifted?
Mr. Lowenkron. I am sorry. My apologies. You are talking
about the OFAC license.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Mr. Lowenkron. Yes.
Senator Biden. That ban is lifted.
Mr. Lowenkron. Yes. We are now--we have----
Senator Biden. Good.
Mr. Lowenkron [continuing]. We have issued statements of
interest and we are now taking proposals in from NGOs; then we
can proceed.
Senator Biden. Let me shift to Mongolia. Mongolia has been
heralded by many as a success story of democratic development.
As you know, there is endemic corruption in the country, which
prevents Mongolia from qualifying for participation in the
Millennium Challenge Account. And the institutions of
democratic governments remain pretty weak.
Now, the administration cut funding for democracy programs
there, which are different than the millennium challenge
account, from $10 million to $7.5 million. Is that because they
could not be effectively spent or can you tell me the reason
for that cut?
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, I am going to have to take that
question for the record.
Senator Biden. OK. I would appreciate your answer in
writing, if you would.
Mr. Lowenkron. Yes.
[The written information submitted by Mr. Lowenkron
follows:]
Question. Mongolia has been heralded by many as a success story of
democratic development. Yet, endemic corruption continues to prevent
Mongolia from qualifying for participation in the Millennium Challenge
Account, and the institutions of democratic and governance programs
remain very weak. The administration reduced support for democracy and
governance programs from $10 million in FY-04 to $7.5 million in FY-05.
The same amount was requested in FY-06. Why are we reducing United
States funding for democracy programs in Mongolia at this pivotal
moment in its political development?
Answer. Currently, all United States economic assistance to
Mongolia is distributed by USAID, which has identified two priorities:
Private sector-led economic growth and more effective and accountable
governance. Over the past 3 years, good governance assistance has
remained constant at $2.7 million. The decrease in USAID funding from
$10 million to $7.5 million can be attributed to a decline in economic
growth assistance from $7.22 million to $4.8 million in FY-06.
Mongolia's Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) proposal is also
currently under review. To address Mongolia's worsening performance on
corruption, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has officially
notified Mongolia that passage of anticorruption legislation is a
prerequisite for signing a compact. MCC had underscored the importance
of fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law as essential
to the success of any MCA program in promoting economic growth and
reducing poverty. If Mongolian authorities are responsive in enacting
anticorruption legislation, Mongolia also stands to gain aid through
the Millennium Challenge Account.
Mongolia's transformation from authoritarian communism to
democratic governance is a remarkable ongoing success story. But this
transition is far from complete, and many development challenges
remain. Despite achieving peaceful and constitutional transitions of
power between governments since the early 1990s, holding elections that
are largely free and fair, and recording impressive 6-10 percent GDP
growth rates over the past few years, Mongolia's continued democratic
and economic successes hinge on its ability to manage a series of
``good governance'' issues, including establishment of greater
accountability, transparency, and anticorruption measures.
Senior Mongolian officials have also expressed concerns about cuts
in economic assistance levels for Mongolia. We will continue working
actively with Mongolian officials to develop a balanced assistance
program, and given our concerns of corruption, our funding level over
the past 2 years reflects a sustained commitment to helping Mongolia's
democratic development.
Senator Biden. And Kazakhstan. Vice President Cheney
expressed ``admiration for all that's been accomplished here in
Kazakhstan,'' yet we think it has one of the worst records on
all counts. Does the Vice President speak for the
administration? And is this the position the administration,
one of admiration with regard to that country?
Mr. Lowenkron. Senator, my work on democracy promotion is
in the context of sitting with the Secretary of State, working
with the Secretary of State. So, I can address it in that
context.
Senator Biden. That would be helpful.
Mr. Lowenkron. And in that context, the question that the
Secretary always asks me is not is the country bad or good.
Tell me about the trajectory. And even if it is weak, is it
slowly heading in the right direction? Or is it not heading in
the right direction? Are there backsliding countries?
Kazakhstan is very much still in this picture. In August of
last year, the good news is that there was a constitutional
council in August of last year that determined that legislation
passed by the parliament to restrict NGOs was unconstitutional.
And in September of last year, President Nazarbayev said, ``I
do not object to that ruling and that ruling will stand.''
They have taken tentative steps on political reform but
there is still a long way to go. The picture throughout Central
Asia is a mixed picture. Better than Kyrgyzstan, a lot worse
than Uzbekistan.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from
Delaware
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing to examine our
efforts to promote democracy around the world, and the role of
nongovernmental organizations as our partners in this effort.
In his second inaugural address, the President spoke eloquently
about the need to advance democracy. And in our struggle against
terrorism, and in promoting security and stability, the administration
is right: Democracy is our most powerful weapon.
But I am concerned that we are not getting it right.
Fairly or not, the administration has created the impression around
the world that it believes democracy can be imposed by force. And it
has created the perception that it equates democracy with elections.
We have to recognize that democracy can't be imposed by force from
the outside. Instead we should work with moderates from the inside, and
over the long haul.
And we must understand that an election does not a democracy make.
In the Middle East, Islamist groups have made huge strides--Hamas
in the Palestinian territories, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
religious parties in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon. Holding elections
without doing the hard work of building democratic institutions may
leave us less, not more, secure.
A democracy must rest on the foundation of a strong civil society--
on building the institutions of democracy: Political parties, effective
government, independent media and judicial systems, nongovernmental
organizations, and civil society. Yes, elections are important, but so
is support for things like grassroots governance, human rights, and
education for girls. We must put more emphasis on this necessary,
comprehensive approach.
A case in point is Iraq. President Bush has spoken of Iraq being a
``beacon of freedom'' in the Middle East. But unfortunately--and
inexplicably--he has not put his money where his mouth is. Last summer,
this committee heard from both the International Republican Institute
and the National Democratic Institute that their critical programs in
Iraq were in jeopardy--precisely as Iraqi negotiators were burning the
midnight oil to hash out their constitution--if they did not receive
additional funding. Senators Lugar, Kennedy, and I managed to get each
of the institutes an additional $28 million through appropriations last
year--and we are working to increase the funding by $104 million in the
Emergency Supplemental. But the situation of these groups remains
extremely precarious.
I realize that many of our nongovernmental partners recognize the
need for a comprehensive approach--and it is because of their good
work, dedication, and courage that we have seen many of the gains that
we have. I will be interested in learning more this morning about their
efforts.
But our aid programs in places like Egypt and Pakistan, for
example, have lagged in supporting democratic institution building. And
Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced a significant decrease
in democracy assistance funding--nearly 66 percent since 2005--even as
political and economic instability has increased.
So, the question in my mind is, ``What more do we need to do?'' Or,
perhaps more appropriately, ``What do we need to do more effectively?''
Again, I thank the chairman for calling this hearing today. I look
forward to a productive and helpful exchange on how we can work
together on this critical issue.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Secretary Lowenkron, let me just pick up that last
question-and-answer situation. I remember 20 years ago, in this
committee, a hearing that we had that was a question with
regard to the Philippines. And we were simply exploring, as we
are today, a number of situations. There were two very vital
players in the State Department. Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Armitage
came before the committee and were, I thought, passionate in
their thoughts about
potential developments in the Philippines, views that were not
necessarily shared by then-President Ferdinand Marcos and his
Government at the time.
Now, one difference between discussing the Philippines at
that point and, say, Uzbekistan today, or central Asian
countries, as you have said, is that at least in the
Philippines, there appeared to be some tradition, or structure,
or institutions that were important, if you were going to have
a so-called free and fair election. It might not occur, in any
event, but at least there was a context in which it was
conceivable. Under the best of the circumstances, it might
occur.
Whereas, in some of the instances that we have been
discussing this morning, there does not appear to be that kind
of institutional structure. This has led some critics of
democracy movements to suggest that the United States is
preoccupied with having elections, which may, in certain
contexts, simply be very polarizing affairs. Some have
characterized, for example, the elections in Iraq in that way,
leaving aside the overall strategy that may be involved there.
They have said that it does in fact define who is a Shiite, who
is a Sunni, who is a Kurd. It does not necessarily lead to
institution building, in which the Iraqi Government now is
moving ardently to try to see the context or maybe even to have
some revisions of the constitution.
In the case, for example, of Iran, some have pointed out
that the current president did come through an election. But
they also, of course, point out that the mullah not only
screens the numbers of candidates but eliminated almost
everybody who had been participating in a democratic way in the
previous legislature.
So even after you press for freedom for elections, it is
not really clear in some cases what you have. And that seems to
me to be an important development in the last 20 years, as
those who have opposed democracy have become more
sophisticated. Maybe that is not the correct word. There simply
were not institutional frameworks there that looked toward law
as we know it, or human rights, or equal rights, or what have
you.
In this context, what are you doing in your Department as
you survey the scene of the predicament of democracy beyond the
talk of having free and fair elections; that is, try and
provide the ballot paper, the registration process, all the
rest that are rudiments of this? What do you do with regard to
the context in which these ballots might be occurring?
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, Senator, if I can make several points.
First, what we do in my Bureau and also working with the
Secretary and my colleagues in the Department is that we do
focus on elections but we also focus on governance. As the
Secretary has put it, what happens the day after an election is
just as important as what happens before the election.
But we also need to work on civil society. We have to
ensure that the roots that were established can kind of open
it--open up the system--particularly in a system where they did
not have such practices in the past, to try to make it more
fertile so democracy could take root and elections can proceed
apace. That is for elections and democracy promotion. As I tell
people who work for me, this is uneven. We are going to have
setbacks. Some states will backslide. Some states will exploit
their victories, such as what happened in Venezuela.
But we cannot be deterred. We have to focus on governance
issues. And we have to focus on civil society.
If I may, I would like to make one point about getting the
soil ready for democracy. And I will be brief.
When President Bush pressed for reform, for change, in the
greater Middle East, we developed a proposal to establish this
forum for the future in the Middle East that I mentioned in my
statement. We, with our G-8 partners and with several countries
in the countries in the region, we were told this was never
going to have any effect. At worst, you have Iraq in slow
motion. These regimes would collapse and this is not a part of
the world that has ever exercised these kinds of basic rights.
In December of 2004, at the first meeting of the forum,
there were only five NGO leaders in Rabat. When I accompanied
Secretary Rice to Bahrain last year, there were more than 40.
And so you are now having the centers of a civil society
building in the Middle East. And the Jordanian Government,
which is going to host the next one in December, has pledged to
actually not only increase the number but the quality and the
influence of NGOs to kind of flesh out civil society.
So, it cannot just be about elections all the time, I
agree.
The Chairman. Let me just ask one more question. Recently,
at an Aspen Institute conference in which Members of Congress
were discussing democracy in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
that part of the world, there was testimony from some on the
Iranian picture. They are getting fairly good reception of
Radio Free Europe coming out of Prague. And that was an
interesting thought. Their feeling was essentially that the
public diplomacy efforts, which the United States has been
involved in, were sometimes heard in the country, and that
there is not that degree of repression in which signals are not
ever found or heard. The remnants of the program in Prague
seemed to have a great deal more resonance.
I raise this question because, as a part of the building of
the background, the institutions, and the framework for free
and fair elections, the whole public diplomacy effort seems to
me to be extremely important and one in which we regularly have
testimony before this committee. Things are not going
particularly well, although those trying to do them ardently
and passionately point out how difficult it is and the strains
that they are under.
What is your own take on this? This is obviously a side
issue for you, and I think probably an important one. And maybe
you are engaged in your department in some public diplomacy of
your own.
Mr. Lowenkron. Well, two things. First of all, I do think
Radio Farda through RFE, I think, is doing a terrific job. And
it is my understanding that we want to explore as many avenues
as possible, because we have not had eyes or ears or footprints
in Iran for a quarter of a century.
In terms of public diplomacy, I tell everybody in my staff
that we can debate democracy promotion among ourselves and we
know that it is elections, civil society, and governance. But
unless we go out and talk about it, unless we talk about the
relationships we are forging with key allies and institutions,
nobody is going to hear about it.
And what will exist out of the press is what I fear is kind
of a caricature that the United States in a simple-minded
fashion runs around and says, I want an election tomorrow, and
that is it. There is no thought out strategy. There is no
effort to develop the basis or the foundations of it. And there
is more that needs to be done, absolutely.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you very much for your
testimony today and for your responses to our questions. We
look forward to working with you, because it is an area
obviously in which the committee shares your passion and
interest. We appreciate your coming.
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just ask Senator Biden, do you have--
--
Senator Biden. No, no. I just wanted to express my thanks,
as well. I think you have done a good job there. You are
devoted to this effort, and you have been straightforward about
it, and I appreciate that.
As clarification, I may not have asked the question
correctly about general licenses versus specific licenses. I
know of no general license that has been issued but maybe there
has been, from Treasury. My staff will clarify that question
with you. I do not want to hold you up now.
Mr. Lowenkron. Thank you, Senator. I will get back to you
on that and all the other questions.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The Chair would like to call now our second panel of
distinguished witnesses. These will include Mr. Carl Gershman,
president of the National Endowment for Democracy; the
Honorable Mark Palmer, vice-chairman of Freedom House; Dr.
Morton Halperin, director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society
Institute; and Mr. Thomas Carothers, senior associate and
director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming today. I
want to make just one general announcement for the benefit of
the members and staff and audience. It is likely that we will
have a rollcall vote on the floor of the Senate at about 10:45,
which is 10 minutes from now, plus or minus minutes as the case
may be. When that happens, we will have a short recess of the
committee so that all members can hear the full testimony of
each of you, who will be in the process of giving testimony, I
suspect, at that point. And we will return then to make certain
we hear the full testimony and have questions afterwards.
Second, I would like, before I call upon Carl Gershman, to
recognize again the extraordinary report that has just been
issued by the National Endowment for Democracy and that is
being made public, as has been mentioned before, today. This
report came in large part at the request of our committee for
NED to delve into many of the issues that we have been
discussing already here this morning and that you will discuss,
I am certain, in your testimony.
So, we appreciate the work of NED, specifically, in
providing this report not only to us but to the general public.
We will find it extremely useful as a framework for this debate
for further initiatives.
At this point, it is my privilege to call upon Carl
Gershman, with the thought that I had served for 9 years on the
board of NED, and admired his leadership in that period, as
well as subsequently. We are delighted to have you here this
morning.
Let me just say each of you will have opening statements.
Your full statements will be made a part of the record. And I
will ask you to proceed with summaries, hopefully within the
10-minute period each, if that is reasonable.
Carl.
STATEMENT OF CARL GERSHMAN, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR
DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gershman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is great to
see you again. And I want to reiterate the sentiments you
expressed. It was a great pleasure for us to have had you on
the board for 9 years. We miss you. Although I must say I
really do not miss the fact that you used to go on the floor
periodically every year to defend our budget. And the fact that
you do not have to do that every year now is also something
that we welcome.
And it is great to see Senator Biden and also to note that
two of your colleagues on the committee, Senator Sarbanes, is
now a very active member of the NED board, and Senator Coleman
is a new member of the NED board. And we welcome them.
I also want to take this opportunity just to thank once
again, as mentioned in the report, the International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law for its assistance in preparing this report.
The report notes that we are dealing with a new environment
today. And I might note that today is the 24th anniversary of
President Reagan's address at Westminster, where he launched
this whole effort.
In that time, a great deal has changed; there has obviously
been a great expansion of democracy. But now, partly as a
result of that expansion, we are dealing with a new problem.
Many of the countries where old dictatorships fell but have not
really successfully made the transition to democracy--we call
them hybrid regimes--now have kind of a mixture of autocratic
elements that has spaces for civil society and political
opposition parties to operate.
In some of the cases, such as Yugoslavia in 2000, and
Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, independent groups rightly
use those spaces to expand their opportunities and to achieve
breakthroughs. And that is one of the reasons we are faced with
this problem today, as you noted in your introductory remarks.
So, I want to begin by saying that I think the problem we
are dealing with today is an inevitable problem. We have long
faced the problem of dictatorships, which block any kind of
assistance to NGOs or even the ability of NGOs to exist. What
we have today is a struggle that exists in many of these
countries. And I am reminded of the statement that President
Lincoln made when he was campaigning and debating Senator
Stephen Douglas, where he said that no government can
permanently be half-slave and half-free; it will have to be one
way or the other. And the governments will seek to maximiize
their power and people who want freedom will seek to enlarge
political space.
And that is an inevitable struggle. And I think that is
what we are dealing with in this report and in this hearing.
The methods by which these hybrid regimes or semi-
autocratic governments seek to control civil society are
becoming more sophisticated. And we spell it out in the report:
The registration requirements, the restrictions on political
activities, the interference in NGOs' internal affairs, the
establishment of fake NGOs, GONGOs, the restrictions on foreign
funding, the harassment of individual activists.
I have just returned from Russia where I was meeting with
many of the activists, and they explained to me that the laws
sometimes are vague and require the NGOs to negotiate with
representatives in the president's office for their very
survival. So, it gives the government the opportunity to
control these groups.
Senator Martinez was asking about Venezuela. Just
yesterday, a law modeled on the Russian law was introduced in
the Venezuelan parliament, and is being debated today, as we
speak, in the Venezuelan parliament. And this law, again,
establishes mandatory registration requirements, which could be
used in the same way that the Russians plan to use the
registration process there. There is a new enforcement body.
The NGOs will be interfered with in their internal affairs. And
the law will be applied selectively. This is the great fear
that people have.
Another recent development is that a body established in
Ukraine, the Bahrain Institute for Political Development,
required NDI to clear its contacts with local groups with that
body. And they refused to do that and were restricted in that
way, and NDI was forced to leave the country. So, this is a
fairly expanding problem.
But I want to keep it in perspective and to note that we
are dealing here with maybe 20 or 25 countries that exist in
this hybrid category. Many of these governments are defensive.
They feel they have to restrict political participation in this
way. Otherwise, they feel they will not be able to survive; and
the activists are resilient.
The response to this problem needs to take place at three
different levels: The tactical level, which is the response
undertaken by NGOs, by newspapers, by independent parties, by
trade unions, at the grassroots level; the response of the
international assistance organizations, such as NDI and IRI and
our other two institutes, labor and business; and finally, the
response at the level of the NED, the funding agencies which
seek to directly assist these NGOs. It is different in every
case.
And I would just like to note that even in a country like
Belarus, where you have onerous legislation that has been
passed, it has not stopped the ability of NGOs to function, nor
has it prevented the NED or its institutes from assisting
democrats in Belarus. The groups continue to operate, even
though they do not have registration. And until now, at least,
nobody has been arrested for doing that.
The borders of the country are relatively open. And so, the
ability of groups in other countries to provide assistance to
democrats in Belarus is possible and is taking place.
Newspapers are publishing in exile. The Internet is used very,
very actively. And so, a very active democratic movement
continues to exist, even in a country like Belarus, which is
much worse than Russia is today. So, I think in that sense, the
situation needs to be put in context.
The way these new laws affect the international NGOs
requires them in many cases to engage in their own kind of
diplomacy when they are on the ground in countries, to explain
who they are, to engage with broad political forces, including
political forces that might be part of the ruling
establishment. Sometimes, where it is not possible for them to
function in countries like in Belarus, they leave, but they
function from outside. IRI is functioning in Belarus from an
outside office and NDI from an office in Kiev.
I just want to underline that it is possible, even in the
tougher situations, to try to continue to be active here. And
the NED, in part because the NED is a nongovernmental entity,
which can operate flexibly, it can continue to provide funding,
sometimes directly to NGOs still in Belarus, but sometimes
through intermediaries based in exile.
I should note, Mr. Chairman, we have a board meeting
tomorrow. There are 283 proposals in this board book for
tomorrow's meeting. The work is expanding. There are many
proposals in this book, in Zimbabwe, in China, in Belarus, in
Russia, in Venezuela, in Egypt; all of the countries that are
discussed in this report.
So in no way--I want to underline this--in no way are these
restrictions stopping us, but more importantly, are they
stopping the Democrats on the ground who, as I say, are
resilient and are prepared to take risks to continue to fight
for democracy.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the report also speaks about the
response that has to take place at what we call the political
level and the normative level. On the political level what we
urge is that, in addition to the funding of these activities,
that the United States and Congress treat democracy work the
way you have treated human rights work in the past, where you
have protected people and you have linked our relations with
countries to the readiness of these countries to permit NGOs to
function. And also, for institutions like our party institutes,
and other institutes, and the NED to provide assistance; in
other words, to permit democracy assistance.
In this respect, I want to call attention to the G-8
meeting that is taking place next month in St. Petersburg. And
to note that before the G-8 meeting in Moscow on July 11 and
12, the NGOs and the democratic civil society and political
groups will be meeting in Moscow to try to rally support for
their cause. And they are inviting international participants.
And Members of the Congress will be invited, as well as from
the other G-8 countries and other countries in Europe and
elsewhere.
And we hope that this can become not only a rallying point
for the Democrats in Russia, but also an opportunity to engage
with Russian Democrats and to establish a long-term strategy
for assisting. This is one of the things that I heard most
repeatedly from Democrats when I was in Russia. They do not
want just a statement here. They do not want to be forgotten
after the G-8. They need support in a steady way, in every way
that we can provide it.
I might note that President Putin has spoken about making
the ruble convertible. He is obviously very interested in the
way Russia can enlarge its economy, possibly become part of the
World Trade Organization. And this gives us leverage in that
situation to try to protect the NGOs. And we have to try to
look for that kind of leverage in every situation.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, we speak about the need for
action at the normative level. And what that means is that we
think it is important for the international community to accept
democracy assistance, the kind of assistance that is provided
by the community of institutions that the Congress supports,
private foundations in Europe and elsewhere, as you noted, that
this is part of the international assistance today. And its
violation should be seen as a violation of an international
norm. And we urge the Community of Democracies to take hold of
this issue, to approve democracy assistance as a norm of
international activity, and to carry that norm and support for
that norm into the United Nations and into the regional bodies
to have it accepted by the international community.
In closing, I just want to note something that Ludmilla
Alexyva, the head of Moscow Helsinki Group, said in Moscow on
May 12, the 30th anniversary of the Moscow Helsinki Group's
establishment in 1976. She said, ``Times are tough today. But
let us remember that back then we were just 11 people with a
typewriter. And look what happened.'' And I think we have to
keep that perspective as we move forward.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gershman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for
Democracy, Washington, DC
Chairman Lugar, ranking member Biden, and members of the committee.
Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to the committee for the
opportunity to address you on such a vital matter, and particularly to
thank each of you for your commitment to the mission of the National
Endowment for Democracy and for your strong support for our program
over the years. Mr. Chairman, you made a personal commitment to the
Endowment through your exemplary service to the NED board during the
1990s, and we are delighted that Senator Sarbanes has continued in that
tradition of active involvement in our work. We should note that
Senator Coleman has become the newest member of our board and we very
much look forward to his contribution in the years ahead.
Today I want to address a serious issue that is the subject of a
report that NED is releasing today. The report is entitled, ``The
Backlash Against Democracy Assistance,'' and it was written in response
to the concerns raised by Senator Lugar in a letter to us last November
about reports of the growing efforts of foreign governments to impede
U.S. programs for democracy assistance.
My testimony presents, in part, a distillation of the report's main
findings. Senator Lugar's letter expressed particular concern about
restrictions on democracy assistance in such countries as Belarus,
Uzbekistan, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and China. Subsequent
developments, including legislation in Russia that imposes new
restrictions on nongovernmental organizations, have further highlighted
this disturbing trend.
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
Since the inception of the National Endowment for Democracy, the
environment for democracy promotion work has changed profoundly. Most
developments have been positive, justifying the NED's mission,
validating its approaches, and facilitating continuing work in the
field. These changes include:
<bullet> A dramatic increase in the number of viable democracies,
providing regional partners and improving access to previously
closed states, particularly in the former Soviet bloc;
<bullet> The collapse of any viable alternative to democracy as a
legitimate political order;
<bullet> A robust bipartisan consensus within the United States on
the desirability and effectiveness of democracy assistance
through nongovernmental efforts;
<bullet> The expansion and increasing international acceptance of
democracy assistance; and
<bullet> The growing cooperation among democracies in providing such
assistance.
Yet certain adverse factors have arisen which, while not
threatening to reverse the democratic trend, do present challenges to
democracy assistance. These include:
<bullet> The emergence of semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes
characterized by superficially democratic processes that
disguise and help legitimate authoritarian rule;
<bullet> The emergence of new actors and agencies committed to
undermining, countering, and reversing democratic progress; and
<bullet> New restrictive measures of a legal and extra-legal nature,
specifically directed against democracy promotion groups.
The efforts of foreign governments to impede democracy assistance--
from legal constraints on NGOs to extra-legal forms of harassment--have
intensified and now seriously impede democracy assistance in a number
of states. This backlash is particularly pronounced in the former
Soviet states of Eurasia as well as in China, Venezuela, Egypt, and
Zimbabwe. Representatives of democracy assistance NGOs have been
harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are
local grantees and project partners who have been threatened,
assaulted, prosecuted, and imprisoned.
In addition to impeding democracy assistance efforts, regimes are
adopting proactive approaches, channeling funds to antidemocratic
forces and using fake NGOs to frustrate genuine democratization. All of
this has had a ``chilling effect'' on democracy assistance,
intimidating some groups, and making it more difficult for them to
receive and utilize international assistance and solidarity. These
actions seriously threaten the ability of Democrats abroad, operating
peacefully and openly, to continue to work with U.S. organizations that
receive congressional funding in order to carry out their mandate.
Despite these disturbing developments, which in some cases are
prompting practitioners in the field to revert to methods used in
closed societies during the 1980s, democracy assistance NGOs are today
active in more countries than ever before. The new climate has actually
validated the mission and the nongovernmental structure of the NED
``family,'' which has proven its ability to work effectively in
sensitive and repressive political climates.
Democracy assistance NGOs have long been active within a diverse
range of states--from closed societies to fragile or emerging
democracies--for which the strategies, operating procedures, and
funding arrangements honed over more than 20 years remain relevant and
effective. The NED family, in particular, has extensive experience of
channeling assistance to dissidents, labor unions, human rights
activists, and other advocates for democratic change within repressive
societies.
THREATS TO DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: CONTEXT AND CHARACTER
Repressive regimes have always sought to prohibit, frustrate, or
undermine the activities of democratic and civil society groups and
individual activists. Under the totalitarian regimes of the 20th
century, political repression took extreme forms, including the mass
arrest, incarceration, and physical liquidation of opponents.
More recently, however, the ``color revolutions'' in Serbia,
Georgia, Ukraine, and arguably, Kyrgyzstan, have demonstrably alarmed
authoritarian governments, alerting them to the precariousness of their
hybrid, pseudodemocratic regimes. The scenario of popular protests,
mobilized through opposition groups and NGOs, pressuring ruling elites
to surrender state power, had a chastening effect and prompted a
reassessment of strategies and ``political technologies'' required to
maintain authoritarian rule.
It is pertinent here to raise the issue of the association of
democracy assistance with regime change, a position taken by honest, if
impatient, advocates of democracy, as well as by more malicious
critics. This misleading equation has been taken up by authoritarian
rulers to deny the legitimacy of democracy assistance and to portray
these efforts as an instrument of foreign policy designed to undermine
U.S. adversaries.
NED's position has always been that regime change and democracy
assistance are not synonymous. Democracy assistance does not actively
promote domestic policy agendas or champion opposition forces.
Achieving democracy is the purpose of democracy assistance groups'
efforts, and the fall or removal of a nondemocratic regime does not
automatically produce democracy as an outcome. The replacement of
Batista by Castro or the Shah by Khomeini makes that clear.
Democracy assistance focuses not on determining short-term or
partisan outcomes in the sense of changing regimes or backing certain
parties or candidates in elections. The outcomes we work toward are
those of strengthening democracy, safeguarding human rights, and
enhancing democratic institutions, practices, and culture. So our
objective is not regime change per se. To be sure, ending a
dictatorship can provide the space and opportunity for people to build
democracy, but that is a long-term and arduous task, entailing a
process of work, learning, and the cultivation of civic values and
institutions of governance that enable pluralist societies to resolve
differences through peaceful means.
Ukraine's Orange Revolution serves as a powerful reminder that
democracy promotion is a process, not an event. NED and its institutes
actively invested resources in sustaining democratic and civil society
groups for 15 years prior to the democratic breakthrough, demonstrating
the need for a long-term approach. In addition, such breakthroughs
confirm the benefits of a ``venture capital'' approach whereby ``seed
funding'' is provided to democratic and civil society groups in
countries and contexts that initially appear unpromising for democratic
change.
Still, it is important to note that the offensive against
democratization, and particularly against forms of internationally-
funded democracy assistance, predates the color revolutions.
Ominously, there is growing evidence of collusion and collaboration
on the part of authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine democracy
assistance and independent civil society groups. We see this in the
marked similarity between legislation restricting NGO activity and the
sharing of Internet monitoring and censorship technologies.
In this regard, we draw the committee's attention to the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), comprising Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This organization is emerging
as the core of what has been called an ``authoritarian
internationale''--an axis of antidemocratic regimes--across Eurasia. We
note with particular concern that at its forthcoming summit on June 15,
in Shanghai, the organization is expected to embrace the Islamic
Republic of Iran as a new member.
Disturbing countertrends and tendencies have emerged in part as a
reaction to the success of democracy promotion in general and, in some
cases, to the efficacy of the modus operandi of the NED and its
institutes, in particular. While such adverse factors do not threaten a
reversal of the historic trend towards democracy, they do represent
serious setbacks in specific countries and regions, particularly in the
former Soviet Union.
LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL MEASURES
Of course, governments may legitimately seek to regulate foreign
funding of domestic political actors and/or to regulate NGOs. Most
democracies have regulations governing and, to some extent, restricting
foreign funding and interference in domestic political affairs. But
they exist in a context of genuine political pluralism and
institutional checks and balances. Nor, of course, are they designed to
suffocate or impede relatively young and still-fragile civil society
organizations.
Our report details the legal restrictions being imposed on
democracy assistance NGOs, drawing heavily on research undertaken by
the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law,\1\ for which we are
especially grateful. In practice, of course, legal constraints are
supplemented and reinforced by extra-legal sanctions, ranging from
surveillance and harassment to expulsion of democracy assistance NGOs.
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\1\ For further details of ICNL's distinctive and pioneering work
on these issues, go to
http://www.icnl.org/.
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Democracy assistance groups have experienced the following legal
and extra-legal constraints:
1. Restrictions on the right to associate and freedom to form NGOs:
In China and Vietnam, NGO operations are strictly monitored and
controlled, and subject to arbitrary interference by the authorities.
2. Impediments to registration and denial of legal status: In
Belarus,NGOs have waited over a year only to be denied registration
without explanation. Russia's NGO law requires foreign and--de facto--
domestic NGOs to reregister with a state agency which will examine
their activities before determining whether they can continue
operations.
3. Restrictions on foreign funding and domestic financing: In
Venezuela, the Chavez regime is prosecuting civil society activists
from Sumate, a voter education NGO, on charges of ``conspiracy''
resulting from a NED grant to promote education on electoral rights
prior to the 2004 recall referendum.
4. Ongoing threats through use of discretionary power: Some
regimes, as in Egypt, retain discretionary powers to shut down civil
society groups, keeping NGOs in a political limbo in which they are
apparently tolerated but remain vulnerable to arbitrary termination.
5. Restrictions on political activities: Governments consistently
equate democracy assistance with oppositional activity, ``regime
change'' or political subversion. Zimbabwe denies registration to
groups receiving foreign funding for ``promotion and protection of
human rights and political governance issues.''
6. Arbitrary interference in NGO internal affairs: In China, civil
society groups are frequently impeded and harassed by bureaucratic red
tape, visits by the tax inspectorate, and other below-the-radar
tactics.
7. Establishment of ``parallel'' organizations or ersatz NGOs:
Repressive governments have sought to undermine the NGO sector by
establishing captive NGOs, or Government-Organized NGOs (GONGOs), as in
Tunisia, where state-sponsored GONGOs monitor the activities of
independent NGOs.
8. Harassment, prosecution, and deportation of civil society
activists: Individuals engaged in certain NGO activities can be held
criminally liable and fined or imprisoned. In Uzbekistan, approximately
200 domestic nonprofit organizations have been closed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE GROUPS
The impact of the above measures on democracy assistance is, to use
a phrase frequently used by respondents, one of a ``chilling effect,''
with some democratic activists and groups deterred and intimidated from
engaging with United States, European, and other sources of democracy
assistance and solidarity. While programs often continue in the face of
repressive actions, partners and grantees nevertheless become more
cautious, circumspect, and wary of adopting a high profile. In some
countries, for example, NED grantees have asked program officers not to
visit them for fear of drawing the attention of the authorities. In
other instances, prospective program partners or grantees have
suggested that while they need external assistance and are willing to
work with or accept grants from democracy promotion groups, the risks
are too great to do so.
Yet these instances are relatively rare and practitioners in the
field are not encountering obstacles qualitatively different from
challenges previously experienced (and generally overcome) in closed or
authoritarian societies. What does seem to be different and problematic
is, first, the emergence of a twilight zone of uncertainty in which
programs are prone to arbitrary interference or cancellation; and,
second, the growing prevalence of low-intensity harassment, including
arbitrary tax inspections, onerous reporting requirements, and
ostentatious surveillance by security services.
The new repressive climate in certain states has, in fact,
highlighted the benefits of nongovernmental and civil society-based
approaches. Maintaining and highlighting independence from government,
such initiatives demonstrate that democracy promotion is generally most
effective when undertaken by nongovernmental organizations,
particularly in regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia where
official United States support is sometimes shunned.
Unlike official government agencies often constrained by diplomatic
or security considerations, democracy promotion NGOs, operating openly
but largely below the radar screen, are able to avoid compromising the
integrity and efficacy of programs. Groups like the NED are able to
engage and fund unlicensed organizations that tend to undertake cutting
edge programs but cannot ordinarily access official funds. Democracy
promotion NGOs are not constrained by the diplomatic considerations
that affect governmental initiatives.
Nongovernmental groups have a greater facility in adapting flexibly
and swiftly to deteriorating or repressive conditions. When democracy
assistance aid is primarily channeled through official conduits, using
bilateral agreements, its impact and effectiveness are blunted. In some
regimes, governmental programs' reliance on the approval of host-
country authorities virtually guarantees such programs will be
compromised.
Indeed, the consensus on the desirability and legitimacy of
democracy promotion and civil society-oriented approaches in particular
now extends beyond the United States. The advantages of a
nongovernmental approach are informing and inspiring current efforts to
restructure the European Union's work in this field, while leading
members of the European Parliament have been campaigning for a
``European NED.''
THE RESPONSE OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE GROUPS
Democracy assistance groups have in some circumstances been forced
to change their modus operandi and adapt practices they have previously
employed in formerly or currently closed societies. Such efforts
include financing in partnership with non-American groups, running
trainings and other programs in adjacent territories, and channeling
support through exile groups.
Different contexts demand different responses, but democracy
assistance NGOs have always worked within a diverse range of situations
and states--closed societies, authoritarian and semiauthoritarian or
hybrid regimes, and fragile or emerging democracies--for which the
strategies, operating procedures, and funding arrangements honed over
more than 20 years remain relevant and effective.
The NED has extensive experience of channeling aid and assistance
to dissidents, labor unions, intellectual and civic groups, and other
agencies for democratic change. Many of these initiatives take
advantage of the Internet and other forms of communication that were
unavailable to democratic activists in the communist bloc only two
decades ago.
New technologies and forms of communication, including the
Internet, e-mail, cellular and satellite phone technologies, have
dramatically improved the provision of information and facilitated
innovative funding of Democrats in closed, authoritarian or backsliding
societies. They have enhanced contacts and coordination between
actors--democracy promotion groups, donors, funders, grantees, and
project partners. Thus, while new restrictions undoubtedly impede or at
least complicate the provision of democracy assistance, in other
respects conditions have actually improved.
Democracy assistance groups have also been innovative in response
to new challenges, including:
<bullet> Improving communication and coordination between civil
society groups in the field, and developing common responses
and strategies in the face of new restrictions;
<bullet> Engaging reform-minded elements within state bureaucracies
in hybrid or semiauthoritarian regimes where backsliding is an
ever-present possibility;
<bullet> Engaging activists from new democracies to work in countries
where their personal experience has great resonance,
generalizes best practice, and helps puncture the myth that
democracy promotion is an attempt by the United States to
impose democracy; and
<bullet> Promoting multilateral approaches that help reduce the
``Made in USA'' profile of democracy assistance and also
leverage additional resources.
SUGGESTED RESPONSES FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
It is worth recalling that the backlash against democracy promotion
inadvertently acts as a reminder that this is not an uncontested field
or a one-way process and that it is the success of our efforts that has
prompted the current reaction. Yet the evidence of democracy assistance
groups' resourcefulness and adaptability, allied with the remarkable
resilience and application of grassroots democratic activists, provide
strong grounds for cautious optimism that these challenges will be
overcome. In this process, the support of the U.S. Congress will be a
significant factor.
Consequently, in response to the new backlash, Congress should:
<bullet> Ensure that adequate funds for democracy assistance are
appropriated, and be wary of rewarding regimes for ostensibly
democratic but cosmetic change;
<bullet> Urge the administration to issue with other members of the
G-8, a memorandum raising concerns over Russia's democratic
retrenchment;
<bullet> Promote a rigorous policy of linkage, by associating a
state's treatment of Democrats and civil society groups to the
political and economic dimensions of interstate relations,
including: tightening eligibility criteria for membership of
international associations of democracies; and making foreign
assistance and trade benefits conditional on democratic
performance; and
<bullet> Encourage the administration, working through the Community
of Democracies, to gain acceptance of democracy promotion as a
normative practice within the international system. The
Community in turn should reaffirm and further elaborate its
founding Warsaw Declaration, which endorsed democracy
promotion, and to seek approval for the Declaration from
governments, parliaments, regional forums, and global
institutions, including the United Nations.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for that historical
perspective. You mentioned 24 years ago and President Reagan's
administration. The audience does not understand the NDI, the
National Democratic Institute; the IRI, the International
Republican Institute; and the Chamber of Commerce and Labor
components. Senator Biden asked very appropriately about the
labor component today in terms of your current administration's
work. All four of these are contributing in a remarkable way
and are learning a great deal from each other during the
process.
It is a pleasure now to recognize another gentleman whom I
had the privilege of sitting next to at the board meetings of
that entity for quite a long while. This followed a
distinguished diplomatic career that he had commenced a long
time ago.
It is a real privilege to have you again, Mark, before our
committee today. Would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PALMER, VICE-CHAIRMAN, FREEDOM HOUSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Senator. And thank you and Senator
Biden for holding this hearing. You are both long-time
supporters of democracy promotion and I want to thank you for
that.
In my view, our NGOs operate in two different universes,
one in which the dictator is still in power and the other in
which he has been ousted. And different strategies and tactics
flow from those two different situations.
I wanted this morning--and my testimony focuses on what to
do while the dictators are still in power, because in my view
that is the most difficult, most challenging, most important
situation that our NGOs face and paradoxically, in my view,
receives fewer, historically at least, has received fewer
resources, less boldness, less imagination, not only by our
NGOs but by many administrations.
We have now an immense body of knowledge about how to oust
dictators peacefully. Freedom House, my organization, recently
published a study, ``How Freedom Is Won,'' which covers 67
different transitions. And it states, and I want to quote,
``that far more often than is generally understood, the change
agent is broad-based, nonviolent civic resistance, which
employs tactics such as boycotts, mass protests, blockades,
strikes, and civil disobedience to delegitimize authoritarian
rules and erode their sources of support, including the loyalty
of their armed defenders.''
Top down reform by dictators is, in my view, infrequent. It
is an exception. There are virtually no cases of a dictator
remaining in power and becoming a Democrat. I would like to be
corrected about that but I do not know of many, if any, cases
of that.
Generally, dictators need to be and have been forced out.
And the key question is, what kind of force is used? And the
conclusion of Freedom House's study, and I think probably all
four of us would agree, is that when nonviolent force is used,
it works in the sense both that you have been able to get rid
of dictators through nonviolent force. And most importantly,
what comes afterwards is, in accordance with the findings of
this study, a democratic, durable, peaceful regime. Whereas
when force has been used, most often you find a new regime
emerge which itself is based on the use of force and is not
democratic.
In my view, facilitating the creation of such national
movements should be the primary objective of our NGOs in this
field. Unfortunately, our NGOs and their governmental and
private funders have not made a priority of funding groups that
are focused on nonviolent resistance or on activist youth
groups that have provided much of the courage and dynamism of
successful struggles.
In my view, at least 50 percent of democracy funding should
be directed to the world's remaining 45 dictatorships. These
are the real problem for the United States. They are our
strategic enemies. In almost all cases, they are behind all of
the problems that we face in the world.
So, I wanted quickly to go through an action agenda of
things that I think we could do, because I think the best
response to what Carl has very well outlined in terms of the
current situation in many of these countries, which is a kind
of reaction, the best defense is a good offense, in my
judgment. And I think we need bold new proposals, new
initiatives to meet these challenges.
First, communication is a tremendously important tool. It
is the key to building noncooperation and the organization of
such broad coalitions for those inside a dictatorship, to
realize that they are not alone. For example, in China, where
we know there were 87,000 major protests last year, according
to official statistics, if you could link up those who are
protesting, the farmers and the workers, those who are against
corruption, those who want independent trade unions, farmer
organizations, leading democratic lawyers, intellectuals, and
students, if you could link them altogether through
communications, we would have the beginning of a national
movement to get the Communists out and have the Democrats in.
I want to quickly say there are three ways that I think
that could be done. First, the Internet, as we know, is now an
extraordinary tool. The dictators, of course, know that and are
trying to block it, including cooperating among themselves. Hu
Jintao is now working with a Supreme Leader Kharmenei in Iran
to block the use of the Internet.
What I think would be possible would be a massive effort
against what is called the Great Firewall of China, the
massive, now global, Internet project. Some of my Chinese-
American friends in the last few years have developed some very
good software and techniques to defeat this censorship. And
they have proposed to your colleagues here on the Hill and to
the administration an NGO global Internet freedom consortium
with funding of $50 million a year, which I strongly support.
They have demonstrated in action that they can defeat this
firewall. The BBG is now using their services with regard to
the Iranian firewall. I think this needs major effort given the
scale of the effort on the other side where you have 50,000, at
least 50,000, Chinese Government-hired people censoring the
Internet. We need an equally massive effort on our side to
ensure a free Internet.
Second, I strongly feel that there is a role for
independent media. Most of our NGO funding is focused on
training. But what really matters is actually having
independent media; particularly, I would say, having
independent radio and television stations, but other forms of
independence, as well. For example, it would be really
wonderful if the young Iranian students movement had their own
voice, their own radio station. Well, they do not. And Radio
Farda is no substitute.
A representative of Radio Farda was quoted in the
Washington Post this week as saying, and I quote, ``that the
topic of `should the mullahs be overthrown' is an unacceptable
topic for Radio Farda.'' Well, if Radio Farda cannot talk about
it, at least the Iranian students should be able to talk about
what is most on the minds of at least 70 to 80 percent of the
Iranian people who do not accept a theocratic dictatorship in
their country and want to find peaceful ways of getting rid of
it. We ought to be able to help them talk about that among
themselves.
So, I propose an independent TV and radio fund be
established with its own independent board to ensure that the
stations adhere to international broadcasting standards and
promote nonviolent transitions to democracy. I think a fund of
$100 million a year could be well spent.
Third, in the communications field, telephones and cell
phones offer an extraordinary underutilized and understudied
way of promoting democracy inside dictatorships. My Chinese-
American friends, for example, have the phone numbers of
500,000 Chinese who work in jails, torturing prisoners, who
work in the regime repressing democratic movements, and are
able to actually call them.
But we need a democracy technology fund to really develop
this field; that is, for example, to develop some new
technologies, the use of mass text messaging devices to call
people to and manage demonstrations, to do the equivalent of
what now has created immense excitement in the Middle East. The
equivalent of the American Idol shows are now on Middle Eastern
television. And people are able, through their cell phones and
text messaging, to vote for their idols, their singers and
dancers that they want to support.
In the digital era, we can disintermediate the dictators by
organizing direct referenda, even elections, through cell
phones and other technologies.
Now, let me move away from communications and say that
another area on my own action agenda would be very much
enhanced support for students. Students really are the moving
force from Indonesia to Hungary. When I was there in Budapest,
it was very clear it was the students really more than anyone
else who were behind change.
And I do not think, as I look at NGO programs, I do not see
enough money going to students. I really think that is an
underutilized resource. And I really believe that we need--and
some students at Indiana University in your own State have
organized something called Students for Global Democracy. I
really believe that if we could get the world's democratic
universities together, the students of those universities
together, and give them the money to in turn help student
movements inside Iran, China, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and
elsewhere, that that could make an immense difference. And I
think $50 million would be well spent in that regard.
The next item on my agenda, Mr. Chairman, is the ADVANCE
Democracy Act, which is supported by a number of your
colleagues here in the Senate and passed the House last year.
And it would turn my old institution, the State Department,
into a real fighting, freedom house kind of place. It would
make of our embassies a real asset, an ally for NGOs inside
these 45 dictatorships.
It would transform our diplomacy permanently. I think this
administration is very sympathetic to what you and Senator
Biden believe in. But who knows what will come next? We are a
nation, unfortunately, of flavors. And I do not know what the
flavor will be 3 years from now. There has been a
countermovement against democracy support. I think we need the
ADVANCE Democracy Act to make permanent certain changes in the
way our diplomacy is conducted. And specifically, we need plans
for each of the 45 dictatorships, which this act would require,
working with NGOs to develop these plans to bring about
permanent change.
Next on my own list would be Sullivan Principles for
Democracy. We do not think normally of our corporations as
NGOs, but they are often the most powerful nongovernmental
presence of the democracies inside these dictatorships. I think
that our key NGOs, NED and others, ought to sit down with you
here in the Congress, with the executive branch, and with other
key democratic governments and key corporate leaders, to
establish a business community for democracy and to develop a
code similar to the Sullivan Principles which would require of
our corporations that they support democracy in China and
elsewhere.
For example, it would be entirely possible for the huge
number of companies financed from outside China by democratic
country origin companies to allow trade unions. Senator Biden,
you talked about the importance of trade unions. I could not
agree more. In Serbia, in Poland, in many places, workers are
the key change agent, along with students. And in China now,
the workers are showing a real serious interest in defending
their rights. These 87,000 demonstrations last year are an
extraordinary thing.
So, if our companies in China would begin to allow labor
organizing inside their premises, that would make a huge
difference. And I think that is something that we ought to
support.
Let me finally say, Mr. Chairman, that it was exactly 25
years ago this year that a small group of us here in Washington
began meeting--Dante Fascell and Lane Kirkland and others. And
that led to the creation of our new democracy institutions, as
you mentioned, and to the speech that President Reagan gave
that I spent a lot of time working on.
I think we are now at a moment when we need a similar burst
of thought and creation. Because we have been at this for 25
years, it is time to appoint an independent body. And the
ADVANCE Democracy Act proposes that a democracy promotion human
rights advisory board be established. And I think Secretary
Rice is working on this, that a body be established of
independent people to look at how we are spending this $1.4
billion, ask ourselves some really basic, zero-based questions.
Is the money going to the right place or not? Do we need more?
Which I personally think we do.
In sum, what should our priorities be over the next 25
years, with the goal of making dictators an extinct species,
which I think is entirely doable if we put our minds to it.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Palmer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark Palmer, Vice-Chairman, Freedom House,
Washington, DC
Achieving a 100 percent democratic world is possible over the next
quarter century--but only with radical strengthening of our primary
frontline fighters for freedom.
We can build upon our nongovernmental organizations' strong base of
experience and success. From Freedom House rallying the democratic
world against fascism beginning in 1940, to the League of Women's
Voters building democracy in post-World War II Europe and Japan,
through the German political party stiftungen's contributions to
Portugal and Spain's breakthroughs to democracy in the 1970s, to
America's own new democracy promotion institutions' contributions
beginning in the early 1980s, NGOs have assisted a massive expansion in
freedom. Over the 33 years of its annual Freedom in the World survey,
Freedom House finds that the percentage of not-free countries has been
cut in half.
Our NGOs have been essential players in many, but by no means all
of these breakthroughs. I can attest firsthand to the critical role
which the AFL-CIO played in building and bolstering solidarity in
Poland and the National Democratic Institute played in training fellow
Democrats in the living room of the Ambassador's residence in a still-
communist Hungary. From my days marching in the civil rights movement
here, to a foreign service career focused on and in dictatorships, to
many years on the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy,
Freedom House, the Council for a Community of Democracies, to work with
innumerable Chinese, Saudi, Libyan, and other democracy groups, to
researching and writing a book about how to achieve universal
democracy, and over a decade as an investor in emerging markets, what
have I learned about NGOs in the promotion of democracy?
NGOs operate in two different universes--where the dictator is
still in power, and where he has been ousted. Different strategies and
tactics should flow from this fact.
Let us focus on the stage of dictatorship as it is, in my view, by
far the most important and challenging, but paradoxically has had and
has less NGO resources, imagination, and boldness. And to the extent
NGOs are active on dictatorships the vocabulary is often wrong.
We have an immense body of knowledge now about how dictators leave
power and durable democracy ensues. A recent Freedom House study, ``How
Freedom Is Won,'' covers 67 transitions and finds that ``far more often
than is generally understood, the change agent is broad-based,
nonviolent civic resistance--which employs tactics such as boycotts,
mass protests, blockades, strikes, and civil disobedience to
delegitimate authoritarian rulers and erode their sources of support,
including the loyalty of their armed defenders.'' Top down reform by
dictators is the infrequent exception; there are virtually no cases of
a dictator becoming a Democrat and remaining in power. Generally,
dictators have been and need to be forced out. As the study also finds,
there is a clear relationship between the type of force used and
durable democracy emerging. Violence engenders successor governments
based on violent repression of their people. Broad-based coalitions
committed to the strategic use of nonviolent force have been the best
avenue for freedom's march.
Facilitating the creation of such national movements should be the
primary objective of our NGOs. Unfortunately, our NGOs and their
governmental and private funders, have not made a priority of funding
groups that are focused on nonviolent resistance or on activist youth
groups that have provided much of the courage and dynamism of
successful struggles.
In general, the priority for funding of our NGOs has been for
countries which already have ousted the dictator. While there has been
some progress in recent years, the disparities remain striking.
Programs for China, with over 60 percent of the world's people still
living under a dictator, are the most striking with around 1 percent of
USG democracy funding, and a hunk of that agreed to with the Chinese
authorities as has also been the case with Egypt, Pakistan, and some
other key dictatorships. The cause of promoting real political progress
in Saudi Arabia gets virtually no funding. North Korea was getting
virtually none until Congress pushed through a specific act, which has
been true of other not-free countries, as well. Our foundations,
corporations, and other private donors are even more reluctant to fund
democracy programs for dictatorships. Yet, the most fundamental
challenges to American national interests all emanate from the world's
remaining dictatorships--from weapons of mass destruction, to regional
instability, to energy dependence, to harboring and funding terrorists.
At least 50 percent of democracy funding should be directed to the
world's remaining 45 dictatorships. Some have long argued that the
repressive conditions inside dictatorships make more programs and
spending impossible. This stems from a congenital and breathtaking lack
of imagination and boldness. Our NGOs did over $30 million of
programming in Serbia helping a broad-based coalition of particularly
younger Serbs to oust Milosevic peacefully. We should have programs and
funding of similar or larger scale for each of the remaining
dictatorships. As conditions in each of them vary, we will need to
consult with local Democrats to tailor make each national program. But
here are some of the tools which will help.
COMMUNICATIONS
The key to building the will for noncooperation and the
organization of a coalition is for those inside a dictatorship to
realize they are not alone, to facilitate communications among them and
with their allies outside. In China, for example, if those who
conducted some 87,000 major protests last year, those who want to
organize independent trade unions, farmers organizations, and leading
democratic lawyers, intellectuals and students could be linked
together, and they could synchronize their actions on a national basis.
<bullet> The Internet provides an extraordinary new means for such
just such communication. Dictators have recognized that fact
and are repressing its use--individually and increasingly
collectively--for example, Chinese Communist, Hu Jintao, is now
helping Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. The Saudi's Abdullah
has long allowed just one Internet pipe into that country.
Fortunately, American NGOs, particularly Chinese-Americans
Ph.D.s in computer sciences, have developed ways and are having
success in defeating the Great Firewall of China. The BBG
recently recognized their success on China and has started
working with them on Iran. But a much larger, global program is
required. These same Chinese-Americans have proposed a Global
Internet Freedom project which is scalable and can be applied
to any dictatorship. To defeat the massive efforts on the other
side, including in the case of China--over 50,000 censors--we
should fund this United States NGO Global Internet Freedom
Consortium project with $50 million per annum.
<bullet> The U.S. Government-run radios and television make important
contributions in this struggle, but there is a huge unmet
opportunity in independent radio and television. Our NGO
funding for media is overwhelmingly for training. Imagine the
credibility and influence if Iran's national student movement
had its own radio, and therefore voice. Similarly, an open
radio broadcasting platform for North Korea, produced by
Koreans for Koreans, could have a huge impact. The ``Washington
Post'' this week quoted a Radio Farda representative saying
that ``should the mullahs be overthrown'' would be an
unacceptable topic for Farda. But a nonviolent overthrow is
precisely the main topic on the minds of a majority of
Iranians. I propose an Independent TV and Radio Fund be
established, with its own board, to ensure that stations
receiving support adhere to international broadcasting
standards and promote nonviolent transitions to democracy. Such
a fund could easily and wisely spend $100 million per year.
<bullet> Telephones, including cell phones, are another major and
largely underexplored and supported means for communications
and organization within dictatorships and with the outside
world. For example, one American NGO has proposed a massive
program of calling the personal and official phones of those
persecuting people in China to explain that what they are doing
is morally wrong and that they will be held accountable when
the rule of law and democracy arrives. This group states that
it has over 500,000 such phone numbers and success with its
limited resources in talking with some people. I believe a
Democracy Technology Fund devoted to uses and programs for
existing technologies like cell phones and developing new
technologies (mass text messaging devices to call people to and
manage demonstrations) for communications among democrats could
wisely spend another $50 million per annum. Immense excitement
and ``voter'' participation in American Idol clones on a Middle
Eastern television show that popular referenda can be done via
cell phones and text messaging. The digital world can
disintermediate the dictators by organizing direct referenda,
even elections.
STUDENTS
From Indonesia to Hungary, and more recently from Serbia, to
Ukraine and Nepal, students and young people have been at the forefront
of a majority of peaceful ousters of dictators over the past four
decades. Those who founded Students for Global Democracy at Indiana
University recognized that students outside dictatorships can help. For
students from democratic countries to show solidarity by visiting their
colleagues inside dictatorships, and--where they are willing to take
the risks to join in demonstrations, sit-ins, and other nonviolent
actions, could make a massive difference--just as northern students
like me gave encouragement to those on the front line in the South
during our own civil rights struggle, merely by our presence. Training
by young people experienced in nonviolent conflict for those inside is
increasingly taking place but is still underfunded. And funding, direct
or indirect, of student and youth groups committed to action is even
more grossly underfunded. We need a special Students for Global
Democracy Fund which would be run by student and youth leaders from
democratic universities and groups across the democratic world--who
would give direct financial assistance to their colleagues inside the
not-free countries. The middle-aged, both inside our existing NGOs and
within governments, somehow are not comfortable aiding students and
youth. Another $50 million per year would be money very well spent.
ADVANCE DEMOCRACY ACT
As a Chinese dissident said last month to President Bush, the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing should be more welcoming to Chinese Democrats. The
Act would require the State Department and our embassies to meet and
work with local Democrats and NGOs to develop long-term strategies for
harnessing U.S. Government resources to promote democracies in each
not-free country. Inside all 45 dictatorships there are upwards of 100
embassies of democratic countries. Beginning with American embassies,
they should be key partners for local and foreign NGOs. The ADVANCE
Democracy Act, which was passed by the House last year with broad
bipartisan support and is now before the Senate, would transform our
embassies into freedom houses and our ambassadors and other diplomats
into active, trained supporters of nonviolent campaigns for democracy.
Unfortunately, in too many cases, embassies--and the larger United
States foreign policy apparatus--are not playing the role they should.
In the case of Uzbekistan, for instance, while the U.S. Government
should be praised for calling for an international inquiry into the
events in Andijian, they have been strangely silent on following
through with targeted sanctions aimed at key supporters of the regime.
Most of the NGOs active in the country have been kicked out, and the
U.S. Government has yet to authorize a continuation of efforts of
Freedom House, ABA, Internews, and others, to provide a lifeline to
human rights defenders and other activists within the country. Indeed,
the latest USAID strategy for the entire Central Asia region makes no
mention of a need to provide support to frontline human rights
defenders in any country in Central Asia at all in the future. On the
other hand, our Interest Section in Cuba and Embassy in Zimbabwe are
showing some of the creative methods that can be applied. The Act also
provides the Community of Democracies the ability to become an alliance
of democratic actors, not just talkers, and provides funding for its
affiliated NGO--the International Center for Democratic Transition,
which was established to transfer the experience of successful
transitions to those still under repression.
TIME AND SPACE
Dictators are far more vulnerable than most recognize. Their ouster
is virtually never predicted by the world's cognoscenti and sometimes
happens with breathtaking speed. But often building the individual will
and national coalition to oust one takes time and experiences setbacks.
Once they are ousted, the most dramatic improvements in freedom tend to
come quickly in the successful transitions, but time is often required
for real consolidation. NGOs and their supporters therefore need
programs which persevere, sometimes over a decade and more, on either
side of the ouster. Similarly, they need space, to be as present inside
as possible. We should establish and maintain a diplomatic presence
inside every dictatorship, including Tehran and Pyongyang, to assist
local and our own NGOs. Our goal should be to open, not further close
off these repressed societies and to do so through every form of
exchange. By not dealing with them in this brief testimony, I do not
mean to underestimate the critical importance of many traditional NGO
programs designed to open these countries and build civil society. Over
time and with expanding space, we should move from general assistance
to civil society forces, to targeted assistance focused on education
and training in civic nonviolent resistance, to assistance for cohesive
civic coalitions through which such resistance is expressed. And when
the ouster occurs, we should not abandon our democracy programs too
soon, as we are on the verge of doing in Serbia.
SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES FOR DEMOCRACY
We do not think of our corporations as NGOs, but they are often the
most powerful nongovernmental presence of the democracies inside
dictatorships. I propose that key human rights and democracy NGOs and
key democratic governments meet with leading businessmen to formulate a
code of conduct for businesses inside dictatorships, and establish a
Business Community for Democracy to work with the Community of
Democracy and its NGO partners to enforce the code. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides a good basis for such a code. For
example, the Declaration provides workers the right to organize
independent unions and our companies could and should allow labor
organizing within their factories and other enterprises inside
dictatorships. Organized workers, with students, have been the most
powerful agents of change in numerous successful nonviolent campaigns.
Trade unions are critical NGOs. It would be appropriate for all S & P
listed companies to contribute $250,000 each to a Global Democracy Fund
to ensure the BDC has real clout, with companies contributing to
censorship and other problems like Google, CISCO, and Microsoft
contributing substantially more. There would be ``safety in numbers''
for each of these companies vis-a-vis their Chinese and other dictator
hosts.
It has been precisely 25 years since a small group met here in
Washington to conceive and push through major new democracy promotion
organizations: NED, CIPE, IRI, NDI, as well as the AFL-CIO's already
existing programs. As one of those present at that moment of creation
and active in this field since then, I think the time has come for
another moment of creation and another push. Immense progress has been
made and with another quarter century's effort we could finish the job.
The House and Senate sponsors of the ADVANCE Democracy Act propose that
a Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Advisory Board be established to
review and make recommendations regarding the overall United States
strategy for promoting democracy and human rights. We need an
independent, in-depth, zero-based look at what works and what our
priorities should be for the future.
The administration states that we are now spending $1.4 billion on
democracy promotion. While that is certainly a substantial increase
over previous years, why are the sorts of initiatives I have outlined
not receiving serious or any funding? Why do NGO programs focused on
dictatorships get well under 50 percent of the money? Is $1.4 billion
insufficient? Do our priorities need fixing? Do we need to support new
NGOs and should some of the existing ones lose their funding? Painful
as some of these choices may be, the task is of such fundamental
strategic importance to the United States and the entire world that we
should not shrink from basic questions.
At the same time, we should not allow the complexities of
Afghanistan and Iraq to obscure the successes of nonviolent democracy
promotion or to sap our will to persevere. Making dictators an extinct
species has been and can be done without firing a shot in almost all
situations. A world without dictators would be peaceful, prosperous,
and just. Surely that goal is worth sustained commitment and
substantial funding by the American people for their NGOs--the heirs of
Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Lech Walesa in this noble
struggle.
The Chairman. On that ringing high note, we will take a
recess for about 10 minutes while Senators vote. And then we
will return for Dr. Halperin's testimony.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize in advance
to the panel. I have agreed to meet with a group of democratic
leaders relating to a matter on the floor. And I am not sure I
will be back before the panel is over. That was supposed to
take place after the first vote but it may not. If it does not,
I will be back. I apologize if I do not get back.
[Recess: 11:03 a.m. to 11:18 a.m.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order again. Thank
you.
We will proceed now to the testimony of Dr. Halperin. It is
a pleasure, as always, to have you before the committee, sir,
and we look forward to your words today.
STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, DIRECTOR OF U.S. ADVOCACY,
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OPEN SOCIETY POLICY
CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Halperin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear again before this
committee, in this case to discuss the role of NGOs in helping
individuals and governments to get on the path to democracy and
to remain on that path. And I want to say I agree with the
previous witness that helping countries get on that path is
very important. But I guess I would give equal emphasis to
helping countries stay on that path. I think that is an equally
difficult and important challenge.
And the Open Society Institute and its related entities,
often referred to collectively as the Soros Foundation Network
after its founder and patron, George Soros, plays, I think, a
unique role in that process. And I appreciate the opportunity
to have a few minutes to discuss that here with the committee.
In more than 20 years that the network has functioned, it
has adopted some principles which we think explain why it has
been effective and which we think are worth emulation by other
groups. And in my prepared statement, I provided some specific
examples of how those principles work.
The network has been in operation since 1984. And over that
period of time, it has spent approximately $5 billion in over
70 countries in the support of development of open societies.
Almost all of that work is done through local foundations
operating in the country where the network is functioning.
As a fundamental principle, we rely on the judgment of
local boards and staff that decide what should be done and who
carry on the activities. The network does not impose a strategy
but gives grants to local foundations after evaluating the
locally-developed strategy and then provides programmatic and
technical assistance, in addition to financial support. We
think this distinctive way of operating is in fact the key to
the successes that we have.
A second general principle is that we operate in a strictly
nonpartisan manner. We are not in the business of favoring one
political party, faction, or candidate over another. And we do
not advocate for ``regime change.'' In the few instances in
which the network has been involved in election-related
activities, it is to promote an honest and level playing field.
Our elections activities are transparent. And information is
disseminated openly, not to ensure any particular outcome, but
to try to provide an equal opportunity for all. And that was
the case in Ukraine recently, a matter which has received a lot
of attention, not only in Ukraine but in Russia and other
countries in the region.
A third principle is that we operate independent of the
U.S. Government and any other government. It is not our mission
to implement the policies of any government. Like many donors,
however, there are times when we support the efforts of
government to promote reforms in their own countries,
particularly in the earliest stages of the transition to
democracy. Such is the case now in Liberia, where the Soros
Network is working very closely with the United Nations
Development Fund to provide assistance in various ways to the
new democratically elected Government of Nigeria.
Throughout the network's history, there has been numerous
instances where U.S. Government democracy assistance has
complemented OSI's efforts to promote an open society. And at
various times and in various places, the Soros Foundation
Network has cofunded initiatives with the U.S. Government and
other governments in such areas as civil society development,
public health, and education. Bosnia is a good example of where
we have been working with local governments and other
governments over a long period of time; and where we think it
is solely yielding results in consolidating democracy in that
country.
The last general principle I mention is that we believe
that private, nongovernmental funding directed at local groups
is always an essential element of democracy building.
Government funding, especially from major powers such as the
United States, is most likely to be effective if it comes
through entities like the National Endowment for Humanities and
its related institutions, rather than from governments
directly. However, government funding given to American and
local NGOs can play an important role. But when the U.S.
Government is providing such assistance, we believe it must pay
careful heed to what we are hearing from the local NGOs in a
particular country.
In Egypt, for example, the message is very clear. Local
NGOs desperately want assistance, including assistance from the
U.S. Government, because they think that assists them in
establishing their legitimacy and their ability to struggle for
democracy. In Iran, on the other hand, I think we are hearing
the opposite from those struggling for democracy in that
country--that any hint that they are associated with the United
States, and particularly with the perceived policy of regime
change, is the kiss of death for those NGOs. And I think in
those circumstances we should do things like the radio
broadcasts that have been discussed, but we should be careful
not to taint NGOs, who are signaling that they need to show a
separation from the United States.
And we think, as I have said, that we need to be prepared
to stay for the long haul, that a single election does not
democracy make, even two elections. And our work in Bulgaria,
as well as many other countries, shows that an extended
participation, building up open society institutions, youth
groups, other kinds of advocacy groups, is important to the
process.
And equally important is what has been discussed so far by
the other people who have testified; that is, support for NGOs.
OSI itself is often subject to attack in various countries. We
have had our foundations closed in a few countries and have
moved them just out of reach of those dictators, as the
endowment. We have also worked with the U.S. Government and
with other NGOs to try to fight against these laws in Russia
and other countries; and to try to fight for their women in
application and have provided assistance to NGOs struggling to
maintain themselves.
I also want to express my support for the position that the
administration witness indicated support for, and that is to
make sure that in the new Human Rights Council, NGOs have the
same right of access as they had in the old commission. I
cannot help but note that the U.S. Government would be in a
better position to endorse and support that position, if it had
stood for election to the Human Rights Council. But it is not
too late for the administration to appoint a special high-level
ambassador to attend those talks and to lead the fight at those
talks, as an observer nation, to maintain the role of NGOs in
that process.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate all that you and this committee
have done to support democracy promotion and particularly the
work of NGOs. And I would be pleased to respond to questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Director of U.S.
Advocacy, Open Society Institute, Executive Director, Open Society
Policy Center, Washington, DC
I much appreciate this opportunity to appear before this
distinguished committee to participate in your consideration of how
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can help individuals and
governments get on the path to democracy and remain on that path. The
Open Society Institute and its related entities, often referred to
collectively as the Soros Foundations Network, after its founder and
patron George Soros, plays a unique role in this process. I and my
colleagues very much welcome this opportunity to explain our approach
and to provide some examples of what we have done in the more than 20
years that the Network has functioned. I want to lay out some general
principles and then to illustrate how the Foundations Network works by
describing briefly our efforts in a few specific countries.
The Soros Foundations Network has been in operation since 1984. In
the last decade alone, the Network has expended approximately $5
billion in over 70 countries to support the development of open
societies. Most of our work is done through local foundations in the
countries in which the Network is operating. As a fundamental
principle, we rely on the judgments of local boards and staff that
decide what should be done and who carries out the activities. The
Network does not impose a strategy but grants funds to local
foundations after evaluating strategies developed locally and provides
programmatic and technical assistance in addition to financial support.
We think that this distinctive way of operating is the key to the
success of our efforts.
A second general principle is that the Network operates in a
strictly nonpartisan manner. We are not in the business of favoring one
political party, faction, or candidate over another, and we do not
provide support for ``regime change.'' In the few instances in which
the Network has engaged in election-related activity, it is to promote
an honest and level playing field. Our efforts in the elections area
are related to transparency and information dissemination, not to
ensure any particular outcome. I will describe one such set of efforts
in Ukraine in 2004, shortly.
A third principle is that the Network operates independently of the
United States Government and of any other government. It is not our
mission to implement the policy of any government. Like many donors,
however, there are times when we have supported the efforts of
governments to promote reform in their own countries, particularly in
the earliest stages of the transition to democracy. Such is the case in
Liberia, where we have teamed with the United Nations to create a
Capacity Building Fund to support the reform efforts of President
Sirleaf. I will discuss this ongoing effort, as well.
Throughout the Network's history, there have been numerous
instances where U.S. Government democracy assistance has complemented
OSI's efforts to promote an open society. At various times and in
various places, the Soros Foundations Network has co-funded initiatives
with the U.S. Government and other governments in areas such as civil
society development, public health, and education. Bosnia, where we
have been working with the local governments and other governments over
a long period, is one example where this cooperation is yielding
results, as I shall discuss.
Our ability to work effectively with the U.S. Government has varied
over time. At the current moment, perceived association with the U.S.
Government is not always helpful. The last general principle I will
mention is that we believe that private, nongovernmental funding
directed to local groups is always an essential element of democracy
building. Government funding, especially from a major power such as the
United States, is most likely to be effective if it comes through
entities like the National Endowment for Democracies and its associated
institutes rather than from the government directly. However,
government funds given to support American and local NGOs can also play
an important role.
I would be pleased in the question period to elaborate further on
these general principles and to explain in more detail how the Soros
Foundations Network operates. However, I would like to use my remaining
time to illustrate our operational approach by focusing on a few
specific cases. These reports are very different in style precisely
because they reflect, as does all our work, direct input from the local
Soros Foundation. I thought this was a useful way to underscore our
conviction that local leaders must be allowed to speak for themselves
and to present the challenges and opportunities as they see them.
UKRAINE
Because of its nonpartisan mandate and concrete programmatic
orientation, the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF, the Kyiv-
based Soros body in Ukraine) viewed the recent elections as more of a
means than an end. The elections were considered a significant
institutional milestone, to be sure, but one which presented a
challenge to be sure that IRF remained faithful to its key priorities.
Those efforts focused on election-monitoring (most notably via an exit
poll that they helped spearhead with other donors), voter education,
public opinion analysis and regional debates, and guarantees of voter
rights.
2004 Presidential election
The IRF supported complex programming during the presidential
contest of 2004. Needless to say, the funded projects did not seek to
support a particular candidate, but worked to create an environment
conducive to compliance with Ukrainian electoral law, respect of
voters' rights, and open access to information. A few key examples of
their work:
<bullet> Monitoring election financing: Identifying the total cost of
the candidates' campaigns, the distribution of federal
electoral funds, and the transparency and accountability of
both;
<bullet> Monitoring media coverage of the election period;
<bullet> Supporting NGO coalitions, working on voter rights and civic
engagement; and
<bullet> Supporting exit polls (widely viewed to be the crucial
impetus for the mobilization of the Orange electorate in
protesting the election's falsified results).
2006 Parliamentary election
During the March 2006 parliamentary elections the IRF supported
many of the same initiatives as discussed above, including key exit
polls which provided laudably accurate results. In light of the
increased power of Ukraine's parliament due to constitutional reform,
the foundation focused on enhancing the quality and availability of
information and analyses of party platforms so that voters could make,
as the IRF called it, a ``deliberate choice.'' Amid this effort,
Ukrainian NGOs were provided with support to enable them to study
campaign promises and party political records on concrete issues and to
distribute the findings to the media and on the Internet. Public forums
were held all over Ukraine about the results, with journalists,
experts, and average citizens participating. IRF also supported a
series of round tables, debates, and interviews with leading
politicians that were broadcast on television and the radio. Not only
did this effort improve the quality of information provided to
Ukrainian citizens, it also set a higher standard for public scrutiny
of political choices. Correspondingly, the initiative encouraged
Ukrainian politicians to establish a political culture characterized by
competing public policies, programs and individuals, rather than vague
populist pledges.
Other International Renaissance Foundation activities
The areas focused upon by the foundation during the recent
electoral period--freedom of expression, transparency and
accountability, and human rights work, broadly defined--are those in
which the foundation has had a long-term interest and which constitute
the core of Network-supported activities. The IRF also supports
projects and programs which foster the development of civil society and
promote the rule of law and the independence of mass media. For
instance, the IRF has provided funding to diversify information sources
for civil society, democratize education and public health, and protect
minority rights.
A major advocate for transparency in Ukraine, IRF is a model of
transparency itself, openly conducting tenders for its funding and
informing the public regularly of its activities through press
conferences, bulletins, and Internet publications.
Several key examples of the IRF's current work include:
<bullet> Supporting legal aid and creating a pilot network of legal
aid centers (in most parts of the former Soviet Union, a formal
system of legal aid is absent);
<bullet> Supporting publication of a seminal report on the state of
human rights in Ukraine, prepared by a network of Ukrainian
human rights organizations;
<bullet> Supporting public access to government information through
information requests to various public bodies and legal action
against those bodies which refuse to release requested material
(In part, due to this effort, the Ministry of Justice recently
affirmed that the widespread practice of secret decrees was
illegal.); and
<bullet> Supporting a pilot testing initiative in 33 universities to
eliminate the rampant corruption inherent in entrance
examinations.
BULGARIA
The Open Society Institute has been the primary private funder of
NGOs in Bulgaria for the last 16 years and has consistently promoted
the fundamental values and processes of liberal democracy. These
programs demonstrate the importance of a long-term commitment to help
institutionalize key elements of democracy over time and to create the
needed civil society components.
The foundation has played a decisive role in creating and
maintaining the infrastructure of Bulgaria's civil society. It has
founded more than 20 NGOs and has provided support to more than 50
others. These organizations constitute the most active segment of
Bulgaria's civic sector and include watchdog groups, think tanks,
grassroots NGOs, and educational institutions such as the American
University in Bulgaria.
Among the keys achievements of the foundation are the following:
<bullet> Opening the world for a generation of students, academics,
and intellectuals through scholarships, exchange programs, and
fellowships; close to 4,000 individual grants have been
awarded, many of them to opinion-leaders and decision-makers in
Bulgaria;
<bullet> Filling voids in Bulgaria's public life with books,
publications, and information resources; the translation
program single-handedly made available the basics of
philosophy, sociology, political science, anthropology (more
than 200 titles), subjects that had been ``closed'' by the
communist regime;
<bullet> Dramatically improving the civic awareness and skills of NGO
practitioners, civil servants, and politicians at the central
and local levels;
<bullet> Calling attention to the plight of the country's Roma
citizens and supported a broad program of advocacy, self-help,
and social service to that community; OSI also initiated the
Decade of Roma Inclusion (with the World Bank as partner),
which led the Bulgarian Government to adopt an $800 million 10-
year program for improving housing conditions for the Roma
minority;
<bullet> Initiating public debates on issues previously left off the
agenda, such as access to justice, the rights of people with
mental, intellectual, and physical disabilities, and palliative
care; and
<bullet> Introducing innovative approaches to social problems piloted
in other countries, such as community policing, diversity
management in local government and minority community centers.
Many of these were later institutionalized within government
agencies.
Here are some specifics on a few key programs:
Human rights
OSI has been a major architect of the human rights infrastructure
in Bulgaria. It helped create and maintain a network of human rights
NGOs, which produced the first voices promoting radical reforms to the
old totalitarian system. Through public awareness raising and strategic
litigation, these organizations have brought about a sea-change in
Bulgaria's public sphere, including the adoption of modern regulations
on antidiscrimination and access to public information.
Rule of Law
OSI has promoted equal access to justice for all citizens. The
foundation initiated the first research studies on this issue,
advocated for the new law on Legal Aid (adopted in 2005), and supported
a network of NGOs providing free legal advice to vulnerable social
groups. It also supported public interest lawsuits on a variety of
issues. OSI has established a number of legal clinics and helped design
national standards for clinical legal education. Much of this work has
been done in partnership with USAID-funded programs (specifically ABA-
CEELI) and the European Union.
Media
During the first 7 years of Bulgaria's transition to democracy, OSI
promoted the development of independent media by providing funding,
training, and expertise to reporters and editors. These efforts
included the development of a code of ethics and support for
investigative journalism. In 1998, the foundation established the Media
Development Center, which is dedicated to the development of a
professional journalist community in the country. OSI continues to
support diversity in media by helping Roma journalists break into
mainstream news outlets.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1992-2006
The Soros Foundation Network activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
illustrates the diverse roles which the Network plays in responding to
threats and opportunities and in empowering a local population to seek
its own path to democracy.
Work began during the siege of Sarajevo begun in November 1992. In
December 1992, a $50 million gift by George Soros was given to UNHCR
for redistribution to international NGOs to address the desperate
humanitarian situation. The intent was not only to help alleviate the
suffering of those in need of humanitarian assistance; the foundation
also hoped to attract international humanitarian NGOs to work in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and, through their presence, provide international
witnesses who would speak out against the war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in connection with the policies of ethnic cleansing.
Among the projects funded in Sarajevo through the Soros humanitarian
fund was one which established a new water system; another that
connected 60 percent of the homes to natural gas for heating and
cooking purposes; another that brought seeds to Sarajevo to permit
residents to grow vegetables on terraces and in gardens; and another,
kept secret during the war so as not to endanger those involved with
it, that increased the electricity supply to Sarajevo by 30 percent to
ensure uninterrupted operation for hospitals, the central bakery, the
TV station, the Presidency, and other facilities necessary for the
survival of the city.
Humanitarian assistance activities during this period of necessity
focused on bare survival in times of war. Foundation projects included
donations of equipment and supplies, medical facilities, food aid, and
clothing for the most badly affected groups; establishment of e-mail
links in many institutions, scholarships, computer courses in Zenica,
Mostar, and Sarajevo, pen-pal project with Sarajevo children, solar
lamps to academics and intellectuals, hospitals, and morgues, and an
open phone line so relatives and friends from around the world could
call in.
From 1995-1999, with the relative normalization of the situation
following the Dayton Peace Accords, the focus moved to building civil
society and institutions from the remains of the war. A new local board
was appointed from people all over Bosnia and Herzegovina (not only
Sarajevo, now that people could travel). Opening of a branch office in
Banja Luka brought new challenges of working within Republika Srpska,
new media, new NGOs, more projects to fight nationalism and the high
influence of Milosevic and Karadzic. Among the new programs:
<bullet> Priority shifted to education and cultural programs
involving young people (anti-brain-drain);
<bullet> Creating highly specialized centers for media, law,
contemporary art, management, and information technology;
children education centers;
<bullet> Publishing program supported together by the foundation and
modern Bosnia and Herzegovina literature, as well as authors in
social and natural sciences;
<bullet> Over $8 million supporting independent media (print and
electronic) on the premise that there can be no democracy
without free media ensuring a truly autonomous space for open
public dialog on key social and political issues; and
<bullet> Other programs included debate and library programs, as well
as thousand of grants given to high school and university
students, journalists and scientists, professors, musicians,
writers, economists, painters, actors and directors, persons
with disabilities, doctors, engineers, IT specialists, and
linguists.
Beginning in 2000, the foundation began to focus on a limited
number of areas identified as priorities on the road toward open
society. The current approach is the determination to work on long-term
projects with clear targets which would contribute to a systemic change
in the society. An important element of the new approach is various
forms of partnership and cofinancing with other international
organizations/agencies. Priorities have been selected on the basis of
an assessment of the relative significance of the subject matter for
the democratization process.
The priorities are youth and long-term education reform, promoting
rule of law and good governance, and protecting minorities and other
vulnerable groups. The foundation prioritized youth since they can
serve as advocates of a better and more open society, and long-term
education reform programs, since they use ``top-down'' and ``bottom-
up'' approaches equally, thus improving both levels at the same time.
The impact is felt at the system level in its institutions and at the
local level in the schools themselves.
The second priority--building an open society through the promotion
of the rule of law and principles of good governance--is the focus of
the law program and the local governance program. The law program is
dedicated to creating an ambience that would lead toward the rule of
law, in general, as well as human rights protection and improvements in
knowledge and skills of those who are supposed to be the pillars of the
rule of law in society. Promoting a culture of transparency and
accountability among local authorities and strengthening democratic
values through civic participation in decision making is at the core of
the local governance program.
The third priority concerns minorities and other vulnerable groups.
The Roma Program tries to bridge the gap that still divides the Roma
and the rest of society, through capacity building in Roma
associations, inclusion of Roma children into the education system, as
well as protection and support to Roma culture and ethnic identity.
Although statistically they are not a minority, women qualify as a
``vulnerable group'' on the basis of their position in society. The
women's program promotes upgrading women's human rights, equality, and
empowerment, while also focusing on combating violence against women.
In 2000, the foundation undertook a huge research project called
``Developing the New Policies of International Support in Bosnia and
Herzegovina--Lessons (Not) Learned,'' that ended with an international
conference and publication of a book.
In 2005, the foundation conducted a democracy assessment project
which aimed to provide systematic evidence of the actual state of the
democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's methodology, the
assessment represents the first-time research done by local people and
not international organizations; by identifying weaknesses of current
political practice, the assessment also provides a platform for an
already established NGO coalition, supported together by the foundation
and USAID, that pursues the promotion of ``issue-based'' instead of
``ethnic-based'' voting as the country approaches general elections in
October 2006. This assessment also created the base for a further,
continuous engagement of the foundation in the monitoring of democratic
development in the country.
INDONESIA
While Suharto was in power, the Network assisted media in Indonesia
by supporting publications under attack by the regime and by connecting
radio stations across the archipelago and enabling them to form a
network, known as 68H, capable of broadcasting national newscasts. Our
support was provided through the Media Development Loan Fund which was
established by OSI in the mid-1990s, and is now an independent
organization that OSI continues to support. At the outset, the radio
network in Indonesia provided connections by Internet to about 150
stations; today, it continues to operate with about 300 member stations
connected by satellite. We are currently supporting 68H by providing
funds to radio stations damaged by the recent earthquake. Now, the Open
Society Institute's primary grantee in Indonesia is Yayasan Tifa, one
of the largest grant-giving indigenous foundations in the country. Soon
after the fall of Suharto, OSI brought together a group of Indonesian
public intellectuals, NGO leaders, and other like-minded persons to
formally launch a foundation that would promote open society values.
OSI was the sole funder for the first years; now Tifa has been able to
attract other funds, though OSI is still the main funder.
Through this foundation, OSI supports programs in the areas of
human rights, local governance, media, conflict prevention, pluralism,
and access to justice in the most populous Muslim country in the world.
In each programmatic area, Tifa begins the process of defining its
strategy by consulting with NGOs and civil society organizations about
what the local communities and individuals feel are the issues of
greatest concern and need. The foundation, staffed completely by local
Indonesians, develops its program and grant-making strategies from this
initial feedback. The grant decisions are then made by a combination of
recommendations by program officers to Tifa's senior administration and
members of the board of directors, who are also all Indonesians.
Two of the priorities of OSI in Indonesia have been support for the
peace process in Aceh and support to local media.
Revitalizing and Supporting Civil Society in Aceh 2005-2006
Tifa made a number of grants to help civil society respond after
the tsunami. These included:
<bullet> A meeting of civil society groups in Aceh--140 members of
civil society and donor institutions met to discuss priorities
and strategy;
<bullet> A meeting of religious leaders--600 religious leaders from
Aceh and surrounding districts met and wrote a letter of
recommended actions to government officials;
<bullet> Providing grants to rebuild structure of NGOs effected by
the tsunami;
<bullet> Partnering with women's organizations to help them foster a
stronger role for women in the post-conflict society through
providing model quality programming for their community; and
<bullet> Supporting advocacy NGOs that focus on budget monitoring and
corruption watch.
Tifa also developed a Conflict Prevention: Early Warning System
(EWS) based on the view expressed by interim Tifa executive director,
Budi Santoso, that, ``If conflict prevention is done by strengthening
communal rights of local people and enlightening them to democratic
values, we believe that they can work for preventing conflict.''
The EWS teams in Aceh, Ambon, and West Kalimantan organize networks
of local people (multi-stakeholder network, both at the village and
district level) to analyze the situation on the ground to better
forecast the potential of conflict or tension in their area. They are
also trained to analyze the potential of using local capacity to settle
conflicts.
Tifa and EWS Jakarta are working to rebuild the Aceh EWS post-
tsunami. They will begin by developing baseline data and conflict
mapping and then reorganize the network or organizations committed to
EWS. There have been several NGOs that have voiced their commitment to
EWS; Tifa feels it is important to support.
The post-tsunami peace agreement is fragile and facing a most
difficult time with the reintegration of the Indonesian military and
separatist movements' members back into the community. There are many
unresolved issues, including alleged unequal compensation that appears
to favor the ex-separatists versus their victims. Meanwhile,
reconciliation is an urgent need. Tifa is supporting the ulemas
(religious leaders) to make a community reconciliation plan by
consulting all of the conflicting parties, including the government,
military, police, and ex-separatist members. The perpetrators are being
asked for forgiveness before the community with a promise to make
peace, in a local ritual called ``pesijeu.'' This locally organized
peace and reconciliation effort has been attempted in several areas,
such as Aceh Utara, Aceh Barat Daya, and Aceh Besar. Tifa has worked
with religious organizations in Aceh, namely Rabitha Taliban, HUDA, and
Insafuddin, to bring about this peace and reconciliation effort.
Independent media
A second major area of Tifa's work is supporting independent media.
Among the key activities:
<bullet> In 2005, Tifa supported nine local media organizations.
<bullet> Most support goes to community radios outside of Jakarta to
help the grassroots stay better informed.
<bullet> The long-term goal is to help the community radio stations
draft legislation that will regulate and support the use of
community radio as part of the community development process.
<bullet> Example: COMBINE Research Institute of Yogyakarta helps
communication between grassroots and mainstream through
activists and advocates who use radio and multiple forms of
media.
LIBERIA IN TRANSITION
After a quarter century of war, corruption, state failure, and
massive human rights abuses, Liberia is taking the difficult but
necessary first steps toward reform. The new President, the first
female elected to the post on the African continent, is motivating
international actors, West African states, and Liberia's citizens for
participation in a package of needed and possible reforms. Prospects
for Liberia's future appear positive at the moment. Failure would
undoubtedly contribute to regional
instability, a proliferation of mercenaries, further exploitation of
Liberia's natural resources and a return to war. The present juncture,
where a fair and democratic electoral process has culminated in
prospects for development rather than for ethnic-based conflict, is a
rare and catalytic opportunity to help forge a beacon of stability in
an otherwise tense regional context.
The unique architecture of the Open Society Network provides a
readily accessible and locally informed means to support and help
sustain transition in Liberia. A combination of local representation
and expertise and international policy experience ensures a locally
owned process for capacity building and sustainable reform in the
country. In addition, thematic expertise in the network in such areas
as public heath, revenue transparency, and independent media increases
the depth and breadth of Open Society engagement.
The distinctive and multilayered architecture helps to prioritize
and amplify Liberian voices. The Open Society Initiative for West
Africa (OSIWA), a regional foundation of the Soros foundation network
supported nongovernmental and community-based organization in Liberia
during the turbulent years of war. OSIWA held a
consultative meeting in Monrovia in March 2006 to reengage with
partners, listen to the needs of local communities, and deepen its
commitment to Liberia. The OSIWA delegation visited the newly
established Truth and Reconciliation Commission, legislators,
government ministries, and international agencies such as the United
Nations Mission in Liberia. The visit offered a means to develop a
calibrated strategy of engagement centered on the core value of
entrenching local solutions to local challenges.
The following examples illustrate the range and characteristics of
the strategy:
An urgent need for accountability, justice and reconciliation--
requires an accessible Truth and Reconciliation Commission. OSIWA
provided a grant to the Commission, thereby allowing activities to
begin while it raises funds regionally and internationally. Network
offices in Washington, New York, and Brussels complement the grant by
coordinating fundraising tours and visits with the Diaspora for
commissioners.
Responding to a need for amalgamation among civil society actors
and ethics training to avoid corruption in the sector--OSIWA programs
are working with civil society actors on coalition building and will
create a forum for civil society organizations to meet counterparts in
neighboring countries such as Sierra Leone to share best practices.
Support to civil society not only provides opportunities to grow a new
tier of civil society leaders, but also ensures the development of
watchdogs that are a critical element of open and democratic space.
Capacity building is an essential element of reconstruction.--OSIWA
and the Open Society Institute (OSI) in New York support the UNDP-
administered Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support Project. The
project provides support to the Government in its efforts to attract
Liberian experts to manage key public service positions and to initiate
a series of major reforms needed to transform and restore the twin
attributes of efficiency and integrity to the Liberian public service.
Additionally, OSI supports the Center for Global Development which is
assisting Liberians in a project to implement an economic strategy and
partner coordination mechanism, and assisting with IMF and World Bank
negotiations.
Reforms are of course impossible without the requisite funding.
Lost revenue from corrupt extractive industries in the past drained the
Liberia economy.--OSI provides funds to the International Senior
Lawyer's Project to support their review of the Firestone and Mittal
Steel contracts on behalf of the Government of Liberia.
Raising the living standards of a deeply impoverished populace will
assist in peace building and alleviate suffering.--OSIWA and the
Network Public Health Program are jointly funding programs to map the
legal framework for HIV/AIDS and supporting projects for communities to
heal from massive gender-based violence, a hallmark of the war years.
Education can counter the ignorance that fuels ethnic-based
rivalries.--The war largely destroyed infrastructure including schools.
OSI therefore supports the Liberia Educational Trust, which makes
small- and medium-sized grants to Liberian community-based
organizations to rebuild schools, provide scholarships, distribute
teaching materials, develop teachers' capacity, and support accelerated
learning programs for older war-affected youth.
Independent media offers a valuable tool for social dialog.--OSIWA
has just launched West African Democracy Radio, an outfit linking
community stations in the Mano River Union (Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone). The radio is the first of its kind and allows sharing among and
within communities engaged in peace building.
Local, national, regional, and international advocacy is an
essential ingredient in motivating support for all reform activities.--
OSIWA and OSI representative offices in New York, Washington, DC, and
Brussels have joined forces to raise the profile of Liberian voices
among the diverse actors assisting the country.
In conclusion, OSI, particularly OSIWA, holds firm to the belief
that democratization is a participatory process that must involve
indigenous voices, not generic solutions provided by outsiders who lack
local knowledge and often do not involve the populations they claim to
serve. The multilayered and multidimensional input provided by the Open
Society Network enshrines local ownership and local capacity building
necessary to affect positive change.
CLOSING REMARKS
These words, Mr. Chairman, accurately reflect the view, not only of
OSIWA as it relates to Liberia, but of the network as a whole as it
seeks to support civil society struggling to establish and maintain
democratic regimes.
I want to close by expressing the appreciation of the Network for
all that you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee do to promote respect
for human rights and to help people struggle for democracy. We are
grateful for the opportunity to describe what the Soros Network does
and what its philosophy is and to participate in this important
discussion.
I would be pleased to answer your questions and to provide any
additional information that members of the committee might wish to have
made part of this record.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for your testimony
and for your thoughtful comments about our committee. We
appreciate that.
Mr. Carothers, would you proceed with your testimony?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS CAROTHERS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR OF
THE DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Carothers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify at this hearing. And I
also want to thank you personally for your deep and sustained
interest in democracy promotion over the years.
The subject of democracy promotion has in recent years
moved to the center stage of American foreign policy as a
result of the heightened awareness of the strong connections
between the advance of democracy in the world and vital U.S.
national interests. The U.S. Government is devoting greater
resources today than ever before to the task of supporting
democracy abroad.
Nongovernmental organizations play a crucial role in
implementing many U.S. democracy assistance programs. Yet many
organizations involved in the democracy field are encountering
significant obstacles and difficulties in the current
international context. Understanding these new challenges and
their causes is
crucial to improving the effectiveness of democracy promotion
efforts, both governmental and nongovernmental alike.
As the chairman has indicated in his opening statement,
resistance to and measures opposing democracy aid are
multiplying in the world. This is not just occurring in
governments or in countries where the governments are hostile
to the United States. Perhaps the leading proponent of such
measures is a government which is one of our G-8 partners, the
Government of Russia.
In part, these actions are due, as the chairman mentioned
in his opening statement, as a reaction to the color
revolutions that have occurred in different countries in recent
years. But I think the picture is more complicated than that
and it is important that we understand the full range of causes
that are at work.
In addition to the color revolutions, we also have to note
the fact that the Bush administration's emphasis on the Iraq
war as the leading edge of its democracy promotion policy in
the Middle East has closely associated democracy promotion with
the assertion of American military power and security
interests. With the United States intervention in Iraq
unfortunately viewed as illegitimate in most parts of the
world, the legitimacy of the general concept of democracy
promotion has suffered accordingly.
Although these two developments, the color revolutions and
the Iraq war, are essentially unconnected, their simultaneous
or relatively simultaneous occurrence has caused many people in
the world, as well as many authoritarian and semi-authoritarian
governments, to take a new and much harder look at U.S.
democracy promotion activities on their territory.
Second, the status of the United States as a symbol of
democracy and human rights in the world has been greatly
damaged by the abuses committed by the United States military
and intelligence personnel in Iraq, in Afghanistan, at
Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere. And our reputation as a promoter
of democracy and a symbol of democracy has also been hurt by
other elements of the war on terrorism, including the secret
rendition of foreign terrorism suspects to countries that
regularly practice torture, reliable reports of covert prisons
in Europe, governmental eavesdropping without court warrants
within the United States, and so forth.
Unfortunately, U.S. abuses empower foreign leaders to say
to U.S. democracy promoters who are trying to get them to
conform to standards of human rights and democracy: Who are you
to tell us what to do in this regard?
Third, I also have to note the high price of oil and gas is
bolstering the position that many nondemocratic governments
around the world, especially in the former Soviet Union, and
the Middle East, but also in Africa and Latin America. Almost
all oil-rich states outside Europe and North America are
autocratic. And the surge of oil and gas revenues that they are
enjoying are strengthening their hand at home.
Moreover, some of these governments, particularly in
Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, are taking advantage of this
revenue windfall to fund their own cross-border political work.
They are passing money to political allies or favorites to help
influence the domestic politics of nearby countries in ways
they hope will be favorable to their own interests. This
challenging new context creates a number of imperatives, both
for nongovernmental organizations and the U.S. Government
alike.
Quickly, with respect to nongovernment organizations, I
think first these organizations, whether funded by the U.S.
Government or in some cases privately funded, must adjust to
operating in a context of heightened suspicion about democracy
promotion generally and United States-funded efforts, in
particular. In some cases, this means choosing between the path
of greater secrecy or less transparency on the one hand and
more openness. And I have watched some of the democracy
promotion organization face this choice. And I think it is very
important that these organizations try to communicate more
fully and effectively with citizens in host countries about
what they do and why they do it and not take the path of
secrecy.
Misunderstanding about the nature of democracy aid is very
common in recipient countries. And many democracy promotion
organizations have not taken serious steps to change that
situation.
Second, it means that democracy promotion groups need to
refine their strategies for pushing back against push-back. Now
in some cases, this means pushing back hard and publicly
against measures to block democracy aid. In other cases, such
sort of active push-back will only fuel national sentiments and
be counterproductive. Figuring out the right approach in
different situations is difficult but crucial.
Third, U.S. democracy promotion organizations, as they
develop their strategies and tactics for pushing back, have to
be reasonable and realistic about what sort of access they
expect in host countries. The United States and all other
established democracies do put some limits on the political
activities of foreign organizations operating within their
borders. Expecting other governments to allow greater access to
foreign organizations not allowed by the United States in the
political realm is unrealistic, especially in situations of
tense relations between the United States and the country in
question.
With respect to the U.S. Government and its response to
this challenging context, I would emphasize five things. First,
the U.S. Government must not make the mistake of confusing
regime change with democracy promotion. Regime change policies
in which the U.S. Government seeks to oust foreign governments
it views as hostile to U.S. interests, whether through military
force or diplomatic and economic pressure, fail to gain
international legitimacy. And they contaminate democracy
promotion when they are presented as such.
The danger of such confusion is especially high today with
regard to Iran. It is extremely difficult and potentially
counterproductive for the United States to try to carry out
democracy promotion activities in Iran if the underlying
motivation is regime change.
Second, the United States must get its house in order with
regard to violations by U.S. military and intelligence
personnel of the rights of foreign detainees and prisoners
abroad. The repeated tendency of the Bush administration to
downplay serious abuses by U.S. personnel, to fail to pursue
responsibility up the chain of command, and to not take clear
steps at the top to make sure there is no ambiguity about the
impermissibility of torture by U.S. personnel must be reversed
if U.S. democracy promotion efforts are to operate from a base
of significant credibility in the world.
Third, the Bush administration must steer clear of its
growing habit of taking sides in foreign elections, whether
through statements of preference about electoral outcomes by
United States ambassadors, as has occurred in several Latin
American countries in recent years, or aid programs which are
designed to make the incumbent party look good against a
challenger that the United States disfavors, as occurred prior
to the recent Palestinian elections.
Fourth, the Bush administration must reduce the glaring
double standard in democracy promotion in which unfriendly
nondemocracies are singled out for pointed attention to their
political failings, while those nondemocracies that are helpful
to the United States, economically or in security terms, get
close to a free pass. To give just one recent example, the weak
United States response to the manipulated 2005 elections in
both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan undercut the United States
assertion of democratic principles in Belarus.
Finally, and in closing, the U.S. Government must give
greater emphasis and prominence to efforts to work in
partnership with European governments and international
organizations on democracy promotion. Although the United
States is a leading actor in democracy promotion, it is only
one of many in what has become a widely populated field.
Portraying the United States as a city on the hill or having a
uniquely special calling for democracy promotion sends the
incorrect and unhelpful message to the world that democracy
promotion is all about the assertion of the United States and
its interests, rather than something that nearly all
established democracies are concerned with and involved in.
If a freedom agenda is to be effective, it must not be a
solely U.S. agenda but a global one.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carothers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Carothers, Senior Associate and Director
of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. The
subject of democracy promotion has in recent years moved to the center
stage of U.S. foreign policy as a result of the heightened awareness of
the strong connections between the state of democracy in the world and
vital U.S. national interests. The U.S. Government is devoting greater
resources than ever before to the task of supporting democracy abroad.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in
implementing U.S. democracy assistance programs. Many organizations
involved in the democracy field are encountering significant obstacles
and difficulties in the current international context, some of which
are the result of problematic U.S. policies and some of which are the
result of causes outside the control of the United States.
Understanding these new challenges and their causes is crucial to
improving the effectiveness of all democracy promotion efforts,
governmental and nongovernmental alike.
THE CHALLENGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Democracy promotion is never easy. In the past several years,
however, a number of events and trends have rendered the overall
context for democracy promotion unusually challenging.
First, suspicion about and resistance to U.S. democracy promotion
activities in developing countries and postcommunist countries is at an
all-time high. Democracy building work has long been greeted with
skepticism abroad by persons unsure about the true motivations of
democracy promoters and wary of what sometimes appears to them as
foreign-sponsored political interference. But a combination of two
different developments in the past several years has greatly increased
such negative attitudes around the world:
<bullet> The Bush administration's emphasis on the Iraq war as the
leading wedge of its democracy promotion policy in the Middle
East has closely associated democracy promotion with the
assertion of American military power and security interests.
With the United States intervention in Iraq viewed as
illegitimate in most parts of the world, the legitimacy of the
general concept of democracy promotion has suffered
accordingly.
<bullet> The recent ``color revolutions'' in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan have also contributed to growing global unease about
democracy promotion. The dramatic, inspiring political
breakthroughs in these countries were an important advance for
democracy. Yet, as accounts of U.S. support for key civic and
political opposition groups in these countries spread, so too
did the incorrect but seductive idea that the United States was
the shadowy guiding hand behind those events.
Although these two developments--the Iraq war and the color
revolutions--were unconnected, their coincidence has caused many
authoritarian and semiauthoritarian governments to take a new, much
harder look at U.S. democracy promotion activities on their territory.
Many governments have started actively pushing back against democracy
assistance, arguing that blocking such programs is
necessary to defend their national security against what they portray
as a United States bent on carrying out regime change against
governments it does not like.
Although this new pushback against democracy promotion is occurring
in many places, including Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the most
concerted resistance is coming from Russia. Russian President Vladimir
Putin has mounted a major campaign against Western democracy promotion,
not only taking a series of punitive measures to limit the activities
of Western democracy groups in Russia but also encouraging neighboring
governments, especially those in Central Asia, to do the same.
Nondemocratic governments have often put up obstacles to democracy
promotion. This is the first time since the cold war, however, that a
major government has made such a systematic and public campaign against
democracy aid and worked across borders to enlist other governments in
the cause. The fact that the campaign is originating not from a hostile
government but from one of the United States's G-8 partners is
especially significant.
Second, the high price of oil and gas is bolstering the position of
many nondemocratic governments around the world, especially in the
former Soviet Union and the Middle East, but also in Africa and Latin
America. Almost all oil-rich states outside Europe and North America
are autocratic; the surge of oil and gas revenues they are currently
enjoying is helping strengthen their hand at home. Moreover, some of
these governments, particularly those in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela,
are taking advantage of this revenue windfall to fund their own cross-
border political work. They are passing money to political allies or
favorites to help influence the domestic politics of nearby countries
in ways they hope will be favorable to their own interests. More than
almost any other single factor, a significantly lower price of oil
would be a tremendous boost to the fortunes of democracy abroad.
Third, again for the first time since the end of the cold war,
democracy no longer enjoys an unchallenged place on the international
scene as the only political system viewed as successful and credible.
China's continued economic success has elevated the ``strong-hand''
political approach to managing economic development as an attractive
model in many parts of the developing world. Authoritarian leaders in
the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere justify their repressive tactics
by citing the Chinese example. Citizens in some countries with poor
development records show a willingness to sacrifice some of their
freedoms for the possibility of better economic development. Although
Russia's recent economic growth is substantially due to high energy
prices, President Putin has received much of the credit for it,
bolstering his popularity and contributing to the growing appeal of the
strong-hand political model.
Fourth, the status of the United States as a symbol of democracy
and as a leading promoter of democracy has been greatly damaged by the
abuses committed by U.S. military and intelligence personnel in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere, as well as by other
elements of the war on terrorism, such as the secret rendition of
foreign terrorism suspects to countries that regularly practice
torture, reliable reports of covert prisons in Europe, and governmental
eavesdropping without court warrants within the United States. The
damage to America's image has been enormous, a fact that is plainly and
painfully obvious to anyone who is internationally aware, either abroad
or at home, but which the administration refuses to acknowledge. The
widespread perception that the war on terrorism entails the frequent
violation of individuals' rights by the U.S. Government sharply
contradicts President Bush's efforts to tell the world that liberty is
the best antidote for terrorism.
Fifth, a narrower development, but one that goes to the heart of
the United States push for democracy abroad, is the success of Islamist
groups in two recent elections in the Middle East, in Egypt, and the
Palestinian territories. The surprisingly strong showing of Egypt's
Muslim Brotherhood and the victory of Hamas reopened old debates about
whether democratization in the Middle East might actually be harmful to
American interests by allowing Islamists parties or groups to come to
power. Some commentators and some quiet voices in the U.S. Government
have reacted by urging the administration to retreat from its embrace
of a democracy agenda for the Middle East. The United States now faces
some very hard choices about whether to sacrifice its commitment to
democracy for the sake of opposing political forces it believes are
dangerous to U.S. interests.
The fact that the international context for U.S. democracy
promotion work has become more difficult does not mean that the United
States should give up trying to support democracy's advance in the
world. But it does mean that U.S. democracy promotion actors,
nongovernmental and governmental alike, must take adaptive steps.
IMPERATIVES FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN DEMOCRACY
PROMOTION
U.S. nongovernmental organizations engaged in democracy promotion
should do several things to respond to this unusually challenging
international environment for their work.
First, they must adjust to operating in contexts of heightened
suspicion about democracy promotion generally and about U.S.-funded
efforts, specifically. This means they need to communicate more fully
and effectively with citizens in host countries about what they do and
why they do it. Misunderstanding about the nature of democracy aid is
very common in recipient countries and many democracy promotion
organizations have not taken serious steps to change that situation.
Rather than assuming that most people will be neutral or favorably
inclined toward democracy promotion work, as many democracy promoters
seem to do, they need to proceed from the assumption that many people,
both political elites and ordinary citizens, will start with a negative
view of any U.S. organization working on democracy issues.
It also means that democracy promotion groups need to refine
strategies for pushing back against pushback. In some cases, pushing
back hard and publicly against measures to block outside democracy aid
will be the right approach. In other cases, it will only fuel
nationalist sentiments and be counterproductive. Figuring out what is
the right approach in different situations is difficult but crucial.
Also critical is knowing when to push for broader diplomatic support
from the U.S. Government against resistant host governments. The recent
United States effort to counteract the Kremlin's proposal to prohibit
Western organizations from operating representative offices in Russia
was successful but had the quality of an improvised campaign rather
than one drawing upon a well-planned response strategy to democracy
pushback. Furthermore, as they develop their strategies and tactics for
pushing back, U.S. democracy groups need to be reasonable and realistic
about what sort of access they expect to get in host countries. The
United States and all other established democracies put limits on the
political activities of foreign organizations operating within their
borders. Expecting other governments to allow greater access to foreign
organizations than that allowed by the United States is unrealistic,
especially in situations of tense relations between the United States
and the country in question.
Second, U.S. democracy promotion groups must focus attention on the
fact that they can no longer assume a majority of citizens in countries
where they work believe that democracy is necessarily the best possible
political system. Dissatisfaction with the social and economic
performance of new democratic systems is rife in the developing world.
The growing attractiveness of the ``strong-hand'' model in many places
means that democracy promoters must think about how to engage citizens
in host countries in fundamental debates about the strengths and
weaknesses of competing systems. Simplistic civic educational efforts
extolling the virtues of democracy are inadequate; more sophisticated
efforts that explore the complexities of the issues at stake are
needed, especially efforts that seek to reach youth.
Third, given the sensitivities in many societies about U.S.
Government intentions with respect to democracy and political change,
U.S. nongovernmental organizations must take advantage of their
organizational (though often not financial) independence from the U.S.
Government to reach out to political actors in other societies who may
be important parts of potential democratic processes but are wary of
close contact with the U.S. Government. A good example in this regard
are moderate Islamist parties and groups in the Middle East and parts
of South and Southeast Asia. Such parties and groups often have a
crucial role to play in political life but prefer to keep their
distance from the U.S. Government. U.S. nongovernmental organizations
can establish important lines of communication with such groups,
helping expose them to democratic practices and norms as well as
increasing understanding in both directions about intentions and
outlooks. They may be able to do the same with populist movements and
leaders in other parts of the world, especially Latin America and
Central and Southeastern Europe.
IMPERATIVES FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
Although this hearing is focused on the democracy-promotion role of
publicly and privately funded NGOs, the role of the U.S. Government in
democracy promotion is so crucial, and has in recent years been so
troubled, that I feel impelled to note, at least briefly, several
imperatives for the U.S. Government as well.
First, the U.S. Government must not make the mistake of confusing
regime change with democracy promotion. Regime change policies, in
which the U.S. Government seeks to oust foreign governments it views as
hostile to U.S. interests, whether through military force or diplomatic
and economic pressure, fail to gain international legitimacy and
contaminate democracy promotion when they are presented as democracy
promotion efforts.
Second, the United States must get its house in order with regard
to violations by U.S. military and intelligence personnel of the rights
of foreign detainees and prisoners abroad. The repeated tendency of the
Bush administration to downplay serious abuses by U.S. personnel, to
fail to pursue responsibility up the chain of command, and to not take
clear steps at the top to make sure there is no ambiguity about the
impermissibility of torture by U.S. personnel must be reversed if U.S.
democracy promotion efforts are to operate from any base of significant
credibility.
Third, the Bush administration must steer clear of its growing
habit of taking sides in foreign elections, whether through statements
of preference about electoral outcomes by U.S. ambassadors (as has
occurred in several Latin American countries) or aid programs which are
designed to make the incumbent party look good against a challenger the
United States happens to disfavor (as occurred prior to the recent
Palestinian elections).
Fourth, the Bush administration must reduce the glaring double
standard in democracy promotion in which unfriendly nondemocracies are
singled out for pointed attention to their political failings while
those nondemocracies that are helpful to U.S. economic and security
interests get a free pass. The weak United States response to the
manipulated 2005 elections in both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for
example, undercuts the United States assertion of democratic principles
in Belarus. The same kinds of disparities also hurt U.S. democracy
policies in the Middle East. Perfect consistency in democracy-related
policies is not possible given the varying mix of U.S national
interests in different parts of the world. Yet, at least some effort to
push harder on friendly autocratic regimes that are undermining
democratic reforms is necessary to give credibility to forceful U.S.
criticisms of unfriendly autocratic regimes.
Fifth, the U.S. Government must give greater emphasis and
prominence to efforts to work in partnership with European governments
and international organizations on democracy promotion. Although the
United States is a leading actor in democracy promotion, it is only one
of many in what has become a very widely populated field. Portraying
the United States as a ``city on a hill'' or having a uniquely special
calling for democracy promotion sends the incorrect and unhelpful
message to the world that democracy promotion is all about the
assertion of U.S. power and interests rather than something that nearly
all established democracies are concerned with and involved in. If a
``freedom agenda'' is to be effective it must not be a U.S. agenda but
a global one.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Carothers, for
your testimony.
I will proceed to a round of questions. We will have 10
minutes each.
Let me start by asking you, Mr. Gershman; you mentioned
that at the board meeting of NED tomorrow there will be 283
proposals. Characterize: Where do these proposals come from,
and what kind of proposals are they? In other words, what do
they propose to do? Can you give some idea? There is a huge
number of groups that is apparently interested in promoting
democracy in some fashion. Who are these people?
Mr. Gershman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It gives me also an
opportunity to brief Senator Sarbanes on the meeting tomorrow,
since he will be there.
The Chairman. Try to get him up to speed for the agenda.
Mr. Gershman. Right. I have not had a chance of speaking
with him before the meeting.
The proposals that the NED supports are of two kinds. Some
of them are programs of the four institutes, and they are all
over the world in all of the major regions, which is to say
East Asia, both Southeast and Northeast Asia. South Asia is now
treated as a separate region. We did not do that when you were
on the board. Also Africa and Latin America, Central Europe
with a special focus on the Balkan region, the former Soviet
Union, which involves the Caucasus and Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, as well as Central Asia, and then, of course, the
vastly growing area, which is really the main change since you
were on the board, Senator, which is the Middle East.
And so, the institutes come in for funding for these
proposals. You know, it is the things that they really cannot
get government money to do, if they want to go to the State
Department or AID or other places. But then we have a vast
aspect of the NED program, which are independent, indigenous
NGOs. Many of them operate--some of them in Burma or in North
Korea or operating in exile in Cuba. Obviously many of them
operating, as I mentioned in Belarus, without registration. But
wherever they exist and want the support, they come to us, they
come for support.
A lot has been said about Iran this morning. But let me
just note one of the proposals in the book on Iran--very
interesting, given all the sensitivities that have been
expressed this morning. It is a Web site that has been
established here by two daughters of an Iranian Democrat, who
was assassinated in 1991, in memoriam to their father. It is
really a memorial Web site, which documents the executions of
9,000 people by the Islamic regime starting in 1979. And it is
a Web site which people in Iran can write in to provide new
information. And they have had over a million hits on it
already. It was just opened in January. And it is becoming a
substitute for a truth and reconciliation process in Iran. And
this is an Iranian initiative and I think it is a very
important one.
But there are many initiatives of this kind that seek to
take advantage of whatever available space that exists. The
independent libraries movement in Cuba, independent workers,
newspapers and NGOs focusing on human rights in Belarus, many
groups in Russia which are focusing on all the problems that we
are aware of there. Many groups in Venezuela, as worried as
they are about this new law that I mentioned this morning, they
are not hesitating to come to the NED for support and want to
mobilize support in Latin America, obviously, to defend their
right to receive such support. And the OAS and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights are very sympathetic to the
NGOs in Venezuela, and we need to work with them.
So, it is global and it is in all these different areas of
not just the work that the institutes do, but independent
media, human rights, civic education, conflict resolution,
groups that are working on all of these different areas
depending on the situation.
And let me maybe just say one more word. The NED, in
thinking about the world, divides up the countries in which we
are active into four different categories. I understood the
topic for this morning's hearing to be really on the category
of semiauthoritarian, what we call hybrid regimes. That is
really what we are talking about. But also in the category of
countries where the NED is active are the countries that Mark
Palmer talked about, the dictatorships, but also then what we
might call emerging democracies. And then, finally, countries
that have been through terrible conflict, and where they really
had all of the institutions, and the state structures
destroyed, and where you really need a process of rebuilding
after conflict, where it is state building, as well as NGOs and
civil society trying to do their share.
And that is really a fourth and very, very difficult
category of country, countries, like Liberia, and Sierra Leone,
and Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq in the Balkan region, and
so forth. This is another very important category of country.
But in order to understand what needs to be done, it is
important to disaggregate these different situations.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate your response because it
shows the vibrancy of people throughout the world who are
interested----
Mr. Gershman. Absolutely.
The Chairman [continuing]. And who come to the NED board to
try to gain some substance, some backing for a variety of
proposals, including, for instance, the Web site you suggested
of the two ladies in Iran, and all sorts of indigenous forces
quite apart from the labor unions, the Chamber of Commerce, the
Republicans, the Democrats.
Part of the genius of that whole idea was that these would
all be combined. And it is good to know that they are vibrant
after 25 years; likewise, they are proposing consistently new
approaches.
But I appreciate that answer because it illuminates for our
public record the degree and the scope of responses.
I wanted to pick up on that a little bit with you,
Ambassador Palmer, because you had some thoughts about the
Internet. For example, you mentioned that the Chinese
reportedly have 50,000 persons attempting to censor the
Internet and that there is some affinity between this and
Iranian authorities, maybe others in between.
Now without, you know, going into all the nitty gritty of
this, it would be fascinating if we could, but how effective
are these new ideas of software or Web sites that somehow get
around the 50,000 people in China or however many there are in
Iran? What degree of confidence do you or anybody else have at
Freedom House in the efficacy of this business?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I am pleased to report, Senator, that the
Dutch foreign ministry has some confidence in the ability to
get around it. And they funded a Freedom House project for Iran
precisely to do this, to get around--I think they gave us
$900,000. So----
The Chairman. The Dutch foreign ministry?
Mr. Palmer. Yes. Isn't that interesting, an American NGO
getting funding from a European government? The answer is not
simple. That is, you cannot just do one thing to defeat the
great China wall, firewall, or what the Iranian thugs are
doing. You have to work at it every day. You have to change e-
mail addresses all the time. You have to keep switching
servers. It requires manpower but it can be done.
My Chinese-American--Ph.D. in computer engineering from
Princeton and MIT--friends who have been without any
compensation, spending the last several years doing exactly
this report extraordinary success in people being able to get
around. And part of the theory behind the project that I
mentioned, for large-scale financing, is to create a kind of
firewall outside the country through which Chinese, or Iranian,
or Saudi, or other Internet users could go so that the regime
could not trace them. Once they got through the firewall, they
would not know where they had gone. That is, were they using
Google, normal Google, or what were they doing? They would be
free on the other side of this new firewall to operate the way
a normal human being should be free to operate on the Internet.
So, we believe that with adequate resources and with the
brains that exist here and abroad, because many Chinese and
Iranians--Iran has the second largest number of users of blogs
in the world. It is an extraordinarily active Internet-using
country. And China will shortly be the largest Internet user in
the world--larger than the United States. It is just about to
pass the United States on the Internet front.
And there are many smart people inside each of these
countries, working away at the same thing and succeeding to
extraordinary degrees. But it does require manpower and some
money. And if we could do it on a larger scale, we really could
assure Internet freedom globally.
The Chairman. Just following up on another aspect of this,
you talked about the TV and radio work that might be done by
Iranian students. How does that happen anywhere in the world,
or how could it happen?
Mr. Palmer. Well, it does not cost, fortunately, a huge
amount of money to have a student radio station. The particular
situation of Iran would mean that the station would have to
broadcast from outside Iran. But it could get much of its
information from inside Iran. There is still enough porousness
that a lot of the programming could come from inside.
We estimate that for $2.5 million a year, you could do a
hell of a student radio station. Just to cite an example, the
Swedish aid agency funded a talk radio station in Iraq, which
is the No. 1 radio in Iraq. It is called Radio Dijla and it is
open to everybody. Everybody can get on it. And that is why it
is the most popular radio station in Iraq today.
We think that we could do something similar on the Iranian
side with an offshore radio station run by the student
movement.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank the panel. And I also want to thank the NED for the
report that they have submitted in response to the chairman's
inquiry.
I would like to put this question: How important is it for
the NGOs that are engaged in democracy encouragement to be
perceived as not carrying out a governmental policy?
Mr. Gershman. The question is the U.S. governmental policy
or their own government?
Senator Sarbanes. I guess in this context, the U.S.
Government.
Mr. Gershman. Well, I think it is critically important,
critically important.
Senator Sarbanes. Do the others agree with that?
Dr. Halperin. Yes. I think absolutely they have to be seen
as functioning for themselves and I think have to design their
own plan, which will be effective in their own country.
Mr. Palmer. I am not sure I agree with that. I think it is
very important that the U.S. Government be seen to be its own
democratizing agent, radical democratizing agent. And for NGOs
to work closely with our embassies, for example, my experience,
and I have been on both sides, both working as a diplomat and
working on the NGO side, I think on the whole is a good thing.
But as Tom mentioned, and I agree with him, the Iraq situation
has complicated our image as a government and made it sometimes
more difficult.
But I would rather see a partnership rather than, you know,
we have to stay away from each other; that is, embassies stay
away from our NGOs.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Carothers.
Mr. Carothers. It is a very good question and I appreciate
it, Senator Sarbanes. I think how we use the term NGOs here,
and know it often is perceived in the world are very different.
Some of these nongovernmental organizations like the U.S. party
institutes are funded by the State Department, USAID, and the
National Endowment for Democracy. So when they go to another
country, in some cases they are carrying out a State Department
policy in the country in which the State Department has made
some money available for that. Sometimes they are operating
with a great degree of freedom that comes from having NED
money. And sometimes they are carrying out a USAID-sponsored
initiative.
How are the people in that country supposed to get it
clear? It is not always clear to the people in that country.
And so if, say, NDI is training different political parties in
Morocco and the Islamist party wonders who are you and why are
you doing this, it is probably a complicated answer. It may be
that USAID decided that NDI should be training Moroccan
political parties. Maybe it is a special grant from the State
Department. Maybe it is a grant from the National Endowment for
Democracy.
In general, I think these organizations are more effective
if there is a certain amount of space between them and the U.S.
Government. And they can say we are acting on the basis of our
own prodemocracy agenda. Yes, we are funded by the Government
but we are not carrying out specific policies at the direction
of the State Department or USAID. We have a certain amount of
independence that allows us to make choices about whom to work
with and what to do that are based on our own agenda and not
the U.S. Government's.
Senator Sarbanes. Three of the four of you, at least, think
that it is important to have some room in between the
government and the NGO. My next question is: Has the perception
changed with respect to democracy promotion so that these NGOs
are increasingly seen as an agent of the U.S. Government?
Mr. Gershman. Senator, let me just clarify one point. First
of all, in relation to what Mark Palmer said--I was not saying
that the United States should not be seen as supporting
democracy. But they should be seen as supporting, if they are
supporting it, authentic Democrats who are supporting their own
agenda and not implementing a U.S. agenda. That was my only
point.
Similarly, I think that it is very important to distinguish
different kinds of NGOs. In my testimony this morning, I said
that the laws that are being adopted by the governments are
affecting indigenous NGOs and newspapers and parties and trade
unions. It even affects them differently but it affects them on
one level. And then you have, I think, what Tom Carothers was
just referring to, which was the U.S. democracy assistance
implementers, like NDI and IRI, that operate in country. And
then you have an institution like the NED, which is an
independent, nongovernmental grant-making institution.
In all of these cases, I think the independence is
important. I think it was very wise to take the NED out of the
U.S. Government so it could have that kind of independence. I
do think, getting at your question, that when the United States
makes democracy promotion so central to its foreign policy
objectives and to its national security, it will be seen by
some people as if this is implementing a U.S. objective, even
though we were there long before, and we are going to be there
hopefully long after this particular period passes. And we must
be seen as following a consistent, long-term democracy agenda
and not to have any other agendas. I think our credibility is
at stake in doing that. I think we have established a good
track record of credibility. But inevitably, in the current
situation, you are going to have this problem.
I will just say one other thing, though. The governments
that will use arguments that Tom Carothers spelled out, many of
these governments are looking for pretexts to oppose what we
do. They are going to be attacking the U.S. Government for its
policies. And it may be more difficult to respond, given the
current circumstances.
One issue that Tom did not mention, which they use in the
Middle East and other Muslim countries, is the threat of
Islamism. And you have many dictators that will say that--that
is the problem and that is why we want to oppose democracy.
I think these are pretext. I think there are fundamental
problems that we are facing which will be there, you know,
regardless of some of the political issues that these
governments may raise, which is the basic desire on the part of
these semiautocratic governments to hold on to power and to
resist any effort from below which might challenge that power.
But I think the answer to your question is yes, it probably
is more of a problem today in terms of associations with U.S.
policy than it was before, precisely because this U.S. policy
has made democracy promotion such a central objective.
Senator Sarbanes. Does anyone else want to add anything to
that?
Mr. Carothers. I would. I think you put your finger on the
central point, which is the following. Currently, the U.S.
Government would like to make democracy promotion central to
American foreign policy. Yet it is doing so at a time at which
America's credibility as a democracy promoter, both due to the
war in Iraq and due to American actions on the war on
terrorism, I believe is at an historic low. There is a central
contradiction there.
If American democracy promotion organizations are held too
close to the U.S. Government, they are going to be contaminated
by that contradiction. I think some space is important. And I
think that there are differences between operating, let us say,
NED funding than operating with State Department funding. The
greater the independence they have at this current juncture,
the greater they are going to be able to stay away from the
accusation that they are simply carrying out the policy of the
government whose democracy credentials are suspect in many
parts of the world.
Senator Sarbanes. Did you want to add anything?
Dr. Halperin. Just let me say I think the--I agree with all
of that. I think this additional point, which I think was
actually made before, that because our policy is selective,
that is, we seem to press governments that we do not like about
their democracy policies and shy away from criticizing
countries that we do like, even when we do start down that
path; and I think Egypt is the clearest case. You know, the
President said, I think correctly, that the policy of many
different administrations since the end of World War II to
support dictatorships in that region had to be seen as a failed
policy and our policy was now going to be to support a
transition to democracy.
And then Egyptians, I think partly responding to that,
tried to organize and participate in the election. The Egyptian
Government did not permit that. And the U.S. Government turned
a blind eye to that and suggested it was satisfied. And I think
all of those elements of being tougher with our enemies than
with our friends, promising and encouraging people to come out
and then, in effect, not supporting them. All of those, I
think, undercuts the effectiveness of a democracy policy.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you think to be perceived as
consistent, we have to have a program in every country? Suppose
we significantly reduce the list and said we can only do a few
things, and so we will focus on a few countries and get away
from doing something everywhere, which then raises some of
these related questions that you have now talked about. Or does
the pressure to demonstrate consistency require that there be a
position and a program in every country?
Dr. Halperin. If I could start, Senator, I do not think we
need a program in every country. I think my view is we ought to
be consistent, again in what President Bush has said, to make
it clear that we have aspirations to see democracy established
in every country on the globe, but that we recognize that that
has to be a largely indigenous effort of the people in each
country, and that we will try to provide support to the degree,
(A) that our resources permit it; and (B) to the degree that
the people in that country working for democracy want our
support.
And taking those two elements in account, I think we can
have very different policies in different countries and still
be consistent with our basic principles.
Senator Sarbanes. Mark, you wanted to speak to that?
Mr. Palmer. I think we should have a program in every
country. It is possible. The intelligence community, the
academic community, the journalistic community, everybody has
failed consistently to predict any single democratic transition
from a dictator to democracy. I do not know of any exception to
that. We totally miss every prediction.
What does that mean in this context? Well, to me what it
means is that you simply do not know which of these many
countries--let us say there are 100 countries still out there
that are still either not free or very partially part-free. You
do not know which one is coming next. You know they are coming
but you do not know which. And you do not know where,
therefore, some extra effort could make a difference to the
local people who are trying to have a breakthrough.
So, I would say that at a minimum, we need to be present in
all 45 dictatorships, not-free countries using Freedom House's
definition of not-free. And then beyond that, I think--and I
take the point that Mort made earlier--that it is not enough to
just get the dictators out. You have to stay the course. And I
think very often you have to stay the course for a full decade,
sometimes maybe longer. Democracy does not, as we know in this
country, always come very fast.
So, I would say that particularly in key countries in
transition, after the dictator has gone, like Serbia today, we
should stay the course. We at Freedom House are very concerned
that the U.S. Government is cutting back its funding for
democracy promotion in Serbia. And I think personally that is a
mistake. It is too soon in Serbia. And that would be the case,
I think, in a number of other critical situations.
Mr. Gershman. Senator, I think in responding to your
question, it is just very important to distinguish between what
the Government does and what can be done through institutions
like the National Endowment for Democracy. And the Government
is--and this is one of the reasons why we were taken out of the
Government again. The Government is going to have many
different kinds of interests, security interests, economic
interests, and so forth. And it is going to pursue those
interests with some governments that are not democratic. That
is inevitable.
And should it be pushing for democracy? How should it push
for democracy in those situations? The Government will have to
decide what it can do. But we know what our job is and our job
is to be engaged in those countries, supporting democratic
forces, democratic movements, regardless of whether they are
friendly tyrants or unfriendly tyrants. We have to have a
consistent approach.
And in a certain sense, the establishment of an institution
like the NED allows our country to walk and chew gum at the
same time. It can do what governments have to do. It can do
more than what governments generally do, when it has
ambassadors like Mark Palmer and a country like Hungary. But
also, it has the capacity, independent of the government, to
pursue a consistent approach to supporting democratic forces in
the world.
Mr. Carothers. If I could comment. I think the perception
and the reality of inconsistency comes much more from American
diplomatic statements and stances than it does from whether or
not we have programs in particular countries or not. When the
United States President or the Secretary of State singles out a
list of countries and says these are the six or eight greatest
tyrannies in the world, and those countries happen to only be
countries that are unfriendly to the United States, whereas
other countries, which are equally or in some cases more
tyrannical, like Saudi Arabia, are not on that list, people in
the world see and are facing a reality of inconsistency and
double standards.
And so the perception of double standards comes much more
at the diplomatic level. When critical statements are made
about Belarus, but then soft-pedal statements are made about
Kazakhstan, people in the world watch that and say the
explanation is obvious. Where there is oil, you soft pedal.
Where there is no oil, you come down hard. How else can we
understand this?
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Thank
you very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Let me just pick up on the dialog that just ensued with
Senator Sarbanes' question. It would seem to me, although it
may be a historic time, inaccurate that, picking up your point,
Mr. Gershman, governments sometimes are inconsistent in terms
of either their idealism or their practical realities. In other
words, they have a problem, day by day, of managing the
security of the country and the rest of the world.
And as you gave us the idea of walking and chewing gum at
the same time, so there may be a very important role to be
played by NGOs--that they are really able to maintain maybe
more consistency with regard to the democratic dream, if we
know in a sophisticated way how that might be furthered. And
sometimes they are going to be at variance with some of the
governments that are supporting them and giving them money, or
by the context of legislation in which they are involved, and
that--that is understood. In other words, it may be that the
Secretary of State will not be furious at the NED because you
have a program that is running off somewhere, even while the
diplomatic corps may have been countenancing some activity
which would seem to be very adverse to that.
And I suspect that in the best of all worlds, there would
be a purity of truth and justice in all of this, but that has
not characterized American diplomacy in any administration I
can remember, having heard a good number of people testify
before this committee. At this particular stage, I am intrigued
by Mr. Halperin's observation, which I think is impractically
true, that there may be a difference between the embrace that
we give to democratic advocates in Egypt for the moment and
those in Iran.
Now, in this Aspen Institute conference I just mentioned in
which some of us have been arguing about this type of thing,
those arose specifically with regard to those two countries.
And the thought that was that however ardently we feel about
democracy in Iran, embracing those who are on the firing line,
so to speak, out there, it can be deadly for them. They may
need to get out of the country rather rapidly.
On the other hand, we have been discussing today, student
radio and the Internet, freeing that up and so forth. This is
somewhat more of an indirect way of support for persons who may
not really want to be embraced by a United States organization.
But it is an important point, because there are many arguing in
the Congress right now that what we ought to be involved in
doing is, in fact, organizing people in Iran, or people outside
of Iran, to go to Iran. And at least many people that I listen
to, who are very sophisticated, say that just is not a very
good idea in this particular instance.
In Egypt, maybe there is a variety of responses that are
different, given the context. I am just curious because you,
all four of you, deal with these issues every day. Is there
this degree of sophistication in the NGO movement? What kind of
advice do you give those who are, say, in the diplomatic
movement with regard to this? And is there some dialog, whether
it be covert, quite apart from overt, so that we all understand
each other, because it seems to me very important that we do.
Mr. Halperin, do you have any observations, having sort of
intrigued us to begin with, with this Egypt-Iran contrast?
Dr. Halperin. Yes, I think people do. Certainly the NGOs
understand the difference. And Egypt, you know, is a major
recipient of American economic and military assistance. The
Egyptian Government is eager not to lose the congressional
support for that assistance. And I think that people in Egypt
understand the degree to which the government is cracking down,
if it is noticed in Washington that the government is cracking
down, the government is also going to be able to crack down on
those people because it needs the support of the United States
Government.
In the case of Iran, the government exists on anti-
Americanism. And if we taint the people struggling for
democracy, I think we hurt them. And they say that to us. I
mean, there are many people who have informal contact with
people in Iran. And I think it is the overwhelming majority of
the people in that country who want democracy. And they will
tell you every statement by us about regime, by the U.S.
Government, about regime change and the hint that we are
secretly providing money to those people undercuts their
efforts and strengthens the dictatorship.
So, you do not have to listen too carefully to hear those
clear messages. Now, that does not mean that we should not be
doing things about Iran. I think we should be broadcasting. I
think we should be supporting the student broadcasters. I think
if there are groups in Iran that want money from the National
Endowment for Democracy, there should not be a budget
constraint on how much money comes.
So, I am not suggesting that there are not things that we
cannot do to support Democrats in Iran and other countries in a
parallel situation.
The Chairman. Yes, Carl.
Mr. Gershman. Senator, just first on Iran, what we have
heard from many people is that even though the government lives
off of anti-Americanism. When people go to Iran, they say that
the people are more pro-American than almost any other country
in the world. And what they want to hear--they would like to
hear some words of support. They would like the United States
and Europe and other countries to recognize that they exist and
to endorse their aspirations. That can be done. I do not think
that is necessarily going to hurt them. And this is what we are
hearing from people, which is what they want. Obviously, we
will tailor what we do to what is possible in terms of
providing assistance.
One other point that I just want to make. When I talked
about the different functions of government and nongovernmental
organizations, I want to underline that one of the central
points in the report that we presented to you is the policy of
linkage. And we hope that even where our Government has
relatively friendly relations with other countries, that it
will use those friendly relations or whatever relations exist
to provide support for the kind of work that we do.
And that may very well mean that it cannot do both at the
same time. But we need ambassadors. We need a State Department.
We need a government, even economic ministers, as I mentioned
in my testimony, where Russia right now is going to be looking
to the West for economic cooperation, that we will get their
attention if we note that democracy and political rights are
necessary if a country is going to move into the WTO, if it is
going to make its currency convertible and so forth that we
need to use all the leverage that we have on these governments
to keep the spaces open. And that is a governmental
responsibility, as well as a responsibility of private
organizations and citizens to speak out.
The Chairman. Yes. Mark.
Mr. Palmer. I entirely agree with what Carl just said. And
let me just take it one step further, that it is really
critical for us to be present as a government in Tehran, and I
would add in Pyongyang. In any dictatorship, by definition it
is much harder to help create the space and to have a dialog
with the people that you most care about if you are not there.
When I arrived in Budapest as Ambassador, almost the first
thing I did in 1986 was to sit down with the two leading
Democrats in the country and ask them what I could do to help
them. And I think that is the beginning of wisdom, in answer to
your question, of how to avoid doing things that are going to
harm young Iranians or young anybody else.
You ask them what they want you to do and what they are
comfortable with doing. And if they are comfortable with being
associated with you, either in the form of NED, or Freedom
House, or the U.S. Government, or whatever, then you do it. If
they are not, you do not. But you have to at least be able to
talk to them. And right now, we are not even there.
There are 35 Iranian diplomats in this town right now,
working in the Pakistani Interests section. There is not a
single American in the Swiss Embassy in our Interests section
in Tehran. I mean, that is just absolutely ridiculous. And I
have met repeatedly the Iranian diplomats who are here in
Washington, and they are doing what an embassy should do. They
are going around. They are doing public diplomacy. They are
having meetings. I just sponsored--I just hosted a dinner for
two ayatollahs. And these guys from the embassy from their
Interests section were there, doing what I would have--what I
did do in Budapest.
I mean, why are we not in Tehran? Why are we not in
Pyongyang? I think you agree with that, Senator. But anyway, I
just wanted to say as an NGO representative today, it is very,
very important for us to be on the scene in these places, never
to withdraw, voluntarily at least.
Dr. Halperin. Senator, can I just make one point? I want to
strongly endorse the comments about the ADVANCE Democracy Act.
I think it can play an enormous difference. And I would hope
that we could support that and find a way to move it forward.
The Chairman. Let me just ask, picking up from a comment
that Carl Gershman made, just playing the devil's advocate for
a moment. Some commentators in Russia would say that although
they certainly would not favor what they see to be an
authoritarian push by the Putin Government, on the other hand,
they appreciate that in approval-disapproval polls of Vladimir
Putin, he is doing well in Russia. He does much better than
most other Russian leaders presently.
So, we ask: Why is this so? Well, some people would say
that he has brought a degree of stability and security to the
situation. He has cracked down on robber barons or however one
wants to characterize those, who at least ordinary people feel
have taken off the assets of the state in abnormal ways, and in
sort of a popular way has fought for the populace. Some would
even say he has brought back a prestige for Russia that might
have been lost in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet
Union.
So for example, in that particular instance, without
prejudging what is going to occur there, presumably somebody
else will be elected president of the country in the next
election. But at the same time, if he were to run for
reelection, many people would say he would be very likely to be
reelected in a free and fair election.
He could--much as Ferdinand Marcos as cited before. After
we had all these hearings in our committee, President Marcos
went on American television in a November talk show, and called
a snap election, and challenged everybody to come over and
watch it, to observe that he was going to win, and that he was
popular, and so forth.
Now, probably, President Putin would not resort to those
sorts of situations but, nevertheless, this is a reasonably
popular regime. Having said that, why are we concerned about
that? And you raise the question, perhaps as the WTO membership
is sought or currency convertibility or--these are points of
leverage. But then others would argue that, after all, it might
be better for Russia, as we have already accepted China into
the WTO, to come into the trading atmosphere, that if you are
really looking for dialog, openness, people rubbing shoulders,
that Russians as a part of this would be healthier than
Russians outside of it.
And so, you know, again and again we get into arguments
over what are the points of leverage or what are the points of
openness. I do not have a strong belief one way or another. I
am just raising the fact that it appears to me that some
arguments that we have not heard today sort of transpire on
this.
You know, getting back to just the Russian case itself, and
we raised the WTO and that business, some would say that for
years we have been watching the Jackson Vanik Act. We have
finally liberated Ukraine from that in the last few months but
it was an arduous procedure. That was the single most important
element in dialog most of us had with Ukrainian officials in
the post-election period with President Yvschenko. You know, it
is very difficult to get one of those things on. A lot of
people see a lot of leverage in various ways, for whatever
cause that may be involved.
And so I ask you, you know, stick with me for a moment,
where does leverage lie in these things? Because in the report
that NED has given, and you brought some pretty stringent
points, when you get to the action steps for Congress, if we
enacted all of that simultaneously, we might be accused of
being fairly heavy-handed or obtuse or not really opposed to
openness and dialog but inhibiting it very substantially.
Can you give some more thinking to that?
Mr. Gershman. Well, I think the point was made in the
report that each of these situations has to be addressed on a
case-by-case basis. And there will be different points of
leverage in every one. And I do not think we are recommending a
policy that you would consider to be rash. But we are
recommending that where we do have that leverage, we should use
it.
There is going to be a meeting in Moscow, July 11 and 12,
as I said, called the ``other Russia.'' There is another
Russia. I am not suggesting or saying that it represents the
majority. Nobody knows that. But it is the ``other Russia.'' It
is the democratic Russia. If we have leverage in that situation
because of the issues that you mentioned, I think that we
should try to use that leverage so that when they implement
this NGO law, they do not put these civil society groups out of
business. That is what they can do. They have given themselves
leverage over them. We have leverage in this situation. I
believe we have to, and we should, use that leverage or use the
leverage that Mort talked about in Egypt. I mean, where we have
it, we should use it.
On the issue of popularity, I just want to say that in some
countries today, that popularity rests on a sea of oil and
higher oil prices. When I was just in Russia, I did see all the
things you just said about the return of Russia to greatness
and so forth. I also saw a country that is in deep trouble over
demographics, over many, many serious problems. The long-term
future is not necessarily a bright future. And I believe it is
in the interest of Russia and it will be good for Russia to
really become a more democratic country and to become more
integrated into the world. But it is not going to do that if it
is allowed to move forward with Putin's economic program while
at the same time it crushes political opposition, civil
society, and all the other institutions that we associate with
democracy.
The Chairman. Yes. Mark.
Mr. Palmer. I think if we look at the record of broad-scale
economic sanctions on the whole, they have not worked very well
and that we really need to rethink the whole area of sanctions.
What we most want to help the Democrats inside these countries
is to open the countries up, to integrate them, to increase the
space for personal freedom. Investment and trade help in that
regard; it is not the full answer but it helps.
I think we need new sanctions, smart-targeted sanctions at
the people who are responsible for the depredations, at the
dictator and the people, the support mechanisms around him. And
it is possible to design those smart sanctions. We are doing
some of them already. The Treasury Department's asset program,
I think is great. We have begun to develop a practice of
actually bringing these guys to justice with Taylor and
Miloscevic.
I personally strongly favor the creation of a ``crime of
dictatorship'' under which we would collect data and eventually
indict and try all dictators for violations of basic human
rights, which are guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, under their own constitution.
So, I think there are a new set of sanctions that would
make a lot more sense than keeping people out of the WTO.
The Chairman. Thomas.
Dr. Halperin. Senator, I agree with that. I think that we
need to use our leverage effectively where we have it and not
use it in ways that cut access. I think it is not an accident
that most of the surviving dictatorships in the world are
countries that we imposed an economic embargo on. I think that
just does not work.
But I think what we need to do is to work more towards
positive incentives for countries to get on the path of
democracy and stay on the path of democracy. And I must say
participation in the G-8 seems to me should have been one of
those. And when we invited the Russians in, it seems to me they
were very close to the line. They have long since gone in the
other direction. And I think we should have considered, much
more carefully, telling the Russians that this was not the
moment for them to chair the G-8, after all. ASEAN said that to
the Burmese Government. And even the African Union said it, at
least temporarily, to Sudan.
So, I think we lost a real opportunity there to send a
message. We heard strong support today for the Community of
Democracies. I think we ought to be doing more to make that
something that countries really want to be a part of and that
therefore they will question whether they can participate. And
I think linking that to NGO standards is a good idea, in saying
to countries: You will not be able to continue to be part of
the Community of Democracies if you move against allowing your
NGOs to operate.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation is, I think, another
program that moves very much in that direction. It says to
countries: Substantial American economic assistance requires
you to govern justly and to involve your NGOs in the process of
designing the program that we are going to support.
So, I think positive incentives to countries, that if you
behave as democracies, there is a path to better economic
development, to greater participation in the world, is likely
to be more effective than broad sanctions.
The Chairman. Let me just ask this question, because a
comment has been made about the importance of dialog with
leadership. As you just mentioned, Mr. Halperin or Mr. Palmer,
that sanctions, per se, may not work with many situations. It
is possible, however, that if we were able to enter into some
dialog with countries, even those that are very hostile, there
would be some entry. Now, by and large, you are correct in
engaging my prejudices in that direction. But it is a
legitimate argument.
For the moment, obviously, our Government has decided in
the case of Iran--and we have discussed Iran a good bit today--
to become more involved, to come up to the table with the
European three. Thoughts have been given that Russia and China
have been broadly consulted about a common program that we
might be able to support, both in those negotiations and
perhaps in further United Nations Security Council activity.
And that has been characterized as new.
And there are many reports about how Secretary Rice has
been persuasive with the President. Only history will tell.
But just to take another more difficult example in North
Korea, certainly the Chinese have taken the position that they
do not want to see so-called regime change. They do not want to
go through the process of many North Koreans heading into
China. If there is to be a miserable government, they want it
to be in North Korea, to deal with it, even to the point of
providing huge resources of food and energy to keep everybody
alive.
Younger South Koreans feel about the same way. They do not
want to see a violent overthrow. They want to see an evolution,
apparently, which makes diplomacy very difficult in the Six
Party Talks without there being some more direct engagement
with the North Koreans.
And yet this is clearly not a process that is going to
necessarily lead to democracy in this particular case. It may
be a national security or international security problem
dealing with weapons of mass destruction and some movement back
into the world community. And therefore, as you make
distinctions, Mr. Gershman, of countries that are
dictatorships, as opposed to those that are in between or
hopeless or so forth, it is probably important to try to think
through where we head, quite apart from how we advise others.
This may be beyond the scope of the NGOs and the democracy
movements. To what extent could you make the case that the
NGOs, in fact, even if our official diplomats are not involved
in direct dialog or communication, serve a very helpful purpose
in being involved? It occurs to me there have been many cases
in which NGOs have had contacts with governments, not on behalf
of our country or anything, but they have sort of kept the
conversation alive. They have made suggestions that were
helpful. This may lead to world peace or to some equanimity in
cases that may have been very, very difficult. And is this
still a further item in the case to be made for NGOs and
democracy, that there is a diplomatic front?
Yes, Mr. Carothers.
Mr. Carothers. I think it is. A good example of that comes
in the Muslim world, where a number of U.S. democracy promotion
organizations have been able to develop pretty fruitful
contacts and relationships with modern Islamist groups, who are
often not comfortable having direct contacts with the U.S.
Government or want to keep that to a minimum but do participate
in programs.
I was in Indonesia doing some research. And I met with the
small Islamist party, which is quite a fundamentalist party
there. And they are very hostile to the U.S. Government in
various ways. Yet they are participating in U.S. party training
programs. I asked them, ``Who would you rather have as your
closer friend, the International Republican Institute or the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?'' And they laughed a little bit.
And they said, ``Well, the International Republic Institute
seems to be able to teach us a lot more about how to win an
election. So, we enjoy taking part in the training.''
And by being included, they did not feel quite as hostile
as their instinct is towards the U.S. Government and realized
something about the U.S. approach democracy, which is something
about tolerance, and tolerance of different points of views, a
message they are not getting from other parts of the U.S.
Government at this point.
So, I think there is a role for U.S. nongovernmental
organizations that have a fair amount of independence from the
U.S. Government to go out and make those kind of contacts and
facilitate a broader dialog with other societies.
Dr. Halperin. Mr. Chairman, in relation to North Korea, I
think it is more complicated, because I am favor of the U.S.
Government both engaging more with North Korea. I think we
ought to negotiate a peace treaty. I think we ought to open an
embassy there. And at the same time, I think we ought to speak
out more forcefully about the human rights situation in North
Korea. It is probably the worst country on earth now. And yet
you hear much less about the human rights situation there than
you do in other countries.
Congress has spoken a little bit about it. But I think
there is more to be done. I think we need to put pressure on
them and on the Chinese, who are not honoring their obligations
under the Refugee Act to allow refugees from North Korea who
come there, be seen by the U.N., and move to other countries.
And we have only begun to take refugees from North Korea.
But I think in terms of NGO contact, certainly third party
contact with the government, to try to understand better what
it is about is perfectly legitimate and useful but I am really
about what might be viewed as contacts with NGOs in North
Korea, because I do not think there are any. I do not think
that is a country which leaves any space for legitimate NGOs.
And therefore, I think we need to be careful that we do not
seem to be giving legitimacy to what are, in fact, government
entities by having our NGOs have relationships with them.
The Chairman. That may be so. So, let me just add a
footnote. For instance, the World Food Program works in North
Korea. Now, this is not a democracy NGO. But my good friend,
Jim Morris, as head of that, I know, has made a number of trips
there. This has been helpful for my understanding. I learn what
he has seen, who he has visited with.
Likewise, we have had staff members from our committee who
went with the distinguished group to the Yongbyon facility in
North Korea. They were looking at weapons of mass destruction
situations. But nevertheless, it was an unusual dialog with
some people who are right on the front of one of the major
things we are doing. And this appears to me to be important.
And this is why I sort of zeroed in a little bit on that.
Granted, they were not talking about democracy or
performing in the next election. But if North Korea is the
worst case, the question is, how do you open it up at all? Who
gets in and begins to talk? This is important.
Yes, Mark.
Mr. Palmer. Armand Hammer, who was my teacher in a way in
this field, who was a great scoundrel, he knew more dictators
than anybody else I ever met. He knew Lenin and Stalin. He knew
King Idris. He knew Qaddafi. I mean, he--Occidental Petroleum
and Armand, dealt with everybody.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. And Armand said to me about dictators--that
they are extremely distrustful and lonely men. They do not
trust their own family. They do not trust their security
services. They do not trust those who are supposedly part of
their regime, whatever it is.
So, I think almost any way that you can get in and talk
both to that lonely man, evil man, but any way, to that man and
at least as important to those around him, the better it is.
Because what we really know now from watching these systems
collapse is that they are weak, really weak. And there is every
opportunity to implode them, if you can get in their knickers.
But you have to get in the knickers. And if it is NGOs that do
that, terrific. But in any way that you can get in there and
fool around, the better it is.
The Chairman. Carl.
Mr. Gershman. North Korea--one point I would like to make
is that it is a unique situation. It is, as Mort suggested,
probably the most closed country in the world. But it also
exists across the border from South Korea. And you have a
single culture divided by a political system, which I think
underlies more clearly than anything else the relative virtues
of those systems.
And what makes the situation in North Korea so incredibly
unstable, in my view, is that they have imposed a complete
information blockade in order to enforce the view, which the
regime constantly feeds to the people, that they live in
paradise and that across the border people live in hell.
If you can break the information blockade, even in a
marginal way--and I think it is happening even with people
leaving, refugees, and then going back. And now North Koreans
who have left are broadcasting back into North Korea. If you
break the information blockade and it becomes clear that
everything that the regime has been saying is a complete lie, I
think that is a very destabilizing factor. And that is part of
the reality. There is nothing we can do to change that because
there is no way, under current circumstances, whether you
support engagement or whether you support human rights,
ultimately that isolation is going to be ended. And that is a
very destabilizing thing.
One final point, though, which I think in this case some
NGOs, more policy groups than NGOs working on democracy, have
been promoting, but some of them are human rights
organizations, is to begin to explore the possibility of a
Helsinki process for Northeast Asia involving North Korea, so
that you can begin to link the security negotiations to the
basket three human rights provisions in the way that Helsinki
did back in 1975.
I realize that there is, in a sense, a certain
contradiction in that, because North Korea is such an insecure
regime. But part of the Helsinki process, as we know, had to do
with recognition of borders, state-to state relations. This
would be part of the package. But it should not be part of the
package if it is not linked, in my view, to opening up human
contacts. And I think that is possible. And I would hope that
the Congress would even consider a way in which a Helsinki
process dealing with North Korea can be initiated. I think the
administration might even be very interested in that.
The Chairman. Well, that is a good suggestion along with,
once again, reinforcing the communications suggestions that
several of you have made today that are really critically
important. I suppose that there are cases that are not as
extreme as North Korea in all of this. It is very possible
that, as some of you have pointed out, there has been greater
preoccupation with students, as well as exchanges of all sorts,
scholarships, this sort of thing.
One of the things we have been gripped with here in this
committee is the problem since 9/11 imposed by Homeland
Security or the visa regime or immigration or so forth, in
which a number of foreign students coming to the United States
have been inhibited in that quest and have gone to other
countries instead to pursue their studies.
And furthermore, as opposed to boosting the numbers, we
have been doing well just to maintain the numbers or to get
back to where we were. That has been particularly true of
students from Middle Eastern countries, but sometimes it has
been even more difficult for Chinese students and others whom
we are discussing today.
Now there are clearly, and I accept the fact, we have heard
it vividly from testimony, problems with many young people.
Some are maybe studying to be terrorists and to do us in, in
the process. So, I appreciate those who are arguing in terms of
our security that we really cannot have just sort of a free
coming and going.
On the other hand, there is clearly a case to be made that
the students who have come to the United States, whether they
like this or not, or whether they imbibe in all of our culture,
make a difference upon their return within their home
countries. So, I am really hopeful that we can move strongly in
that direction, too, as part of the democracy movement. And the
NGOs in various ways are extremely important in this aspect,
quite apart from the technical work you may be doing in
democracies generally.
I think likewise in Russia--and I had a conference not long
ago with Mr. Karagonov, who many of you know is a very
interesting and sometimes leading intellectual. He was
lamenting the fact that the dialog among intellectuals, among
persons of very diverse views, has not broken down. It has just
almost dissipated entirely, with regard to the United States.
Those who are talking about the ``other Russia'' or the ``new
Russia'' or so forth, they would be like Mr. Karagonov. They
are very much involved always in each Russian regime or each
iteration of this. And that is true of others who are survivors
of the process.
But I have a feeling they are lonely. They are looking for
a dialog. They would like to see more visitors and persons such
as yourselves and others who come from the NGO community, as
well as Members of Congress and others. And it is one of those
circumstances in which you cannot do everything at once. Today
this is a good opportunity to catalog a list of things to think
about, to do in terms of our Government or in terms of our
legislative effort or at least our understanding and support of
what you are able to do independently with the finances that
come from right-thinking people who want to help.
Well, let me thank you again for your interesting testimony
and, more importantly, your responses to our questions and the
dialog that we have had. We look forward to staying in close
touch with all four of you and your organizations. And as you
have suggestions, do not wait for the next hearing. Write to me
or the committee or our staff, because we are eager to hear and
are receptive.
Thank you and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Human Rights First Submitted for the Record
Human Rights First thanks the Foreign Relations Committee for
convening this important and timely hearing on the role of
nongovernmental organizations in the development of democracy. We are
grateful for the opportunity to share with the committee not only our
own views, but also the perspectives and experiences of some of our
international partners who are human rights leaders in their own
countries. This testimony, consistent with our organization's focus and
particular concern, centers on the role of local human rights defenders
in the promotion of democracy.
Democracy promotion today is championed as a remedy for many of the
world's ills--from poverty to war and terrorism--vociferously and
eloquently by the Bush administration, and also by an increasing number
of the world's governments and multilateral institutions. Human Rights
First welcomes this increased international focus on democracy
promotion at all levels, recognizing the strong correlation between
democratic forms of governance and respect for internationally-
recognized human rights standards.
At the same time, we are concerned that all too often,
authoritarian governments claim to be making progress on building
democracy when the reality is that they are masking their
authoritarianism with false democratic trappings. Furthermore, as the
emergence in several countries of popularly elected governments which
nevertheless fail to respect basic human rights reminds us, elections
alone do not automatically guarantee improved human rights conditions.
Independent human rights activists therefore have a dual role in
their societies: To be both advocates for the essential elements of
democratic development and, at the same time, vigilant watchdogs
concerning the integrity of any democratic progress that may be claimed
to have taken place.
We submit that the primary measure of progress toward democracy
must be success in the promotion and protection of human rights. Years
of experience have taught us that exactly at the most critical moments
of democratic transformation, when accurate reporting about human
rights performance is most badly needed, too many governments instead
work to stifle independent, often critical, voices.
Human Rights First's mission to protect and promote human rights is
rooted in the premise that global security and stability depend on
long-term efforts to advance justice, human dignity, and respect for
the rule of law in every part of the world. Since our establishment in
1978, Human Rights First has worked in the United States and abroad to
support human rights activists who, at great risk to their own liberty
and security, fight for basic freedoms and peaceful change in their
countries.
It is no accident that in countries in transition from
authoritarianism to democracy, the agendas of political reformers and
champions of democracy and of human rights activists tend to converge.
Indeed, the agenda championed by those fighting autocracy is rooted in
human rights--in implementing the basic freedoms of expression,
assembly, and association, and more broadly in restoring the rule of
law and creating the core institutions of a functioning democracy: A
free press, an independent judiciary, and systemic checks on executive
power.
Human rights activists share, and also champion, these demands
because they are also necessary for ensuring respect for basic human
rights. These local human rights defenders inside countries that are
undergoing democratic transition or still contending with entrenched
and resilient authoritarianism have an essential role to play as
independent evaluators and guarantors of democratic progress--and their
voices must be protected.
We are reminded again and again that despite the efforts of
repressive governments to maintain control over and restrict the
activities of these human rights activists, such efforts are ultimately
futile because basic human rights standards--the concrete objectives
that the activists are striving to implement--exist beyond the scope of
control of any single government, and enjoy support from governments
and nongovernmental bodies around the world. But in many parts of the
world, much more needs to be done to ensure that human rights defenders
are protected from retribution for their critical work.
Below, we illustrate several examples of the efforts being made by
human rights defenders, and the significant challenges that many of
them still face. The examples from the four countries cited represent
the kinds of harassment and physical attacks on individuals, and
actions against independent human rights organizations, that remain all
too common across many parts of the world.
INDONESIA
One of Indonesia's foremost human rights defenders, Munir Said
Thalib, died on September 7, 2004, after he was poisoned with arsenic
during a flight to the Netherlands. Known throughout Indonesia simply
as Munir, this activist was known for his fearless advocacy and careful
research on human rights violations. A trial led to the conviction of a
pilot named Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto on December 20, 2005. The
judge noted that there was a need to investigate former senior
intelligence officials implicated in the murder, but there has been
little follow up since the verdict.
One of Munir's greatest impacts came from his refusal to show fear,
despite repeated threats and prior attempts on his life. His murder,
and the failure to hold those who planned or ordered it responsible,
remains a major setback for human rights and democratization in
Indonesia.
THAILAND
In a similar case in Thailand, leading Muslim lawyer, Somchai
Neelaphaijit, disappeared in March 2004, just days after filing a
complaint against the police for torturing several of his clients. His
body has never been found. One policeman was sentenced to 4 years in
connection with the disappearance, but he was charged only with
coercion, not kidnapping or murder. Four others were acquitted due to
lack of evidence following a highly inadequate police investigation.
Somchai is one of at least 20 human rights defenders killed in
Thailand in the last 5 years. Most were local activists who organized
their communities to take on locally powerful figures in conflicts over
land, forests, or other natural resources. One local activist, who had
survived multiple bullet wounds in one attack and later watched a
colleague die as a result of another, told Human Rights First, ``This
is government by force, not democracy. Defending our rights, we started
with a small issue and began to fight, and found big men.''
RUSSIA
Over the past year, Russian authorities have stepped up efforts to
weaken independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in
promoting democracy and human rights. On January 10, 2006, President
Putin signed a new law regulating the activities of all NGOs operating
in Russia. Under this law, government agencies are authorized to deny
registration to domestic and foreign organizations--or force them to
close down altogether--on loosely defined grounds. Using the vague and
sweeping provisions of this law, human rights defenders who have been
the target of politically motivated prosecutions or smear campaigns
could be prohibited from holding leadership positions or being actively
involved with human rights groups.
No single case exemplifies the mounting legal pressures exerted on
Russian human rights organizations better than the multifaceted
persecution endured by the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS).
The government campaign to discredit and ultimately close the
organization has included the use of tax and administrative challenges
and the criminal prosecution of Stanislav Dmitrievsky, the managing
director of RCFS, under a counter-extremism law. On February 3, 2006, a
court in Nizhny Novgorod convicted Dmitrievsky, who is also editor-in-
chief of the newspaper, Pravozaschita, of violating a law intended to
combat religious and nationalist extremists who incite hatred and
violence against minority groups. The conviction sets a dangerous
example for all Russians--including human rights defenders and
independent journalists--who exercise their right to question and
criticize government policies.
COLOMBIA
A central premise of Colombia's 3-year-old ``democratic security
policy'' is that there is no internal armed conflict, but rather simply
a ``war against terrorism.'' As part of the government's ``war on
terror,'' hundreds of nonviolent human rights defenders, community
leaders, and trade unionists have been arrested and arbitrarily
detained, often based solely on the information provided by paid
informants. On September 17, 2004, sociologist, Alfredo Correa, was
killed by alleged paramilitaries in Baranquilla, Atlantico Department.
He had been detained by the security forces in June and released in
July after claims that he was a member of the FARC guerrilla group
proved unfounded.
On May 24, 2006, 22 individuals on the front lines of the fight for
democracy and human rights around the world came together at the third
annual Human Rights Defenders Policy Forum cohosted by Human Rights
First and the Carter Center. This year's Policy Forum, a 3-day
conference in Atlanta followed by 2 days of meetings attended by many
of these leading human rights defenders in Washington, focused
specifically on the relationship between democracy promotion and
respect for human rights. Participants identified the following trends
in democracy promotion efforts:
(1) Rather than rejecting democracy outright, many authoritarian
governments adopt the language of democracy and human rights for their
own purposes. Imitation or ``hollow'' democracies, where dictators pay
lip service to democratic ideals, have allowed autocratic governments
to receive the support of the international community, including many
democratic states. Authoritarian governments may also create state-
sponsored ``nongovernmental organizations'' to provide the
international community with a false sense of the freedom with which
civil society operates inside the country. External donors may
inadvertently help to create and sustain imitation democratic
institutions that consolidate authoritarianism, rather than diminish
it.
(2) Authoritarian governments also suggest that ``premature''
democracy would produce negative effects for the country and delay the
transition to meaningful democracy. Western governments accept this
self-serving reasoning all too readily and therefore hesitate to push
for democratic reforms.
(3) Other factors tend to encourage the international community to
overlook undemocratic state practices, such as the exploitation of
natural resources, including oil and gas, and strategic partnerships in
the ``war against terror.''
(4) Inconsistent messages in democracy promotion result from these
influences. Such double standards undermine the impact of these
programs, while fueling cynicism and rising anti-Western and
antidemocratic sentiments in authoritarian states.
(5) Authoritarian governments propagate the idea of being a
``fortress under siege surrounded by enemies,'' which enables them to
subvert their internal critics from civil society and independent media
and to dismiss external criticism of poor human rights conditions as
aimed at undermining national interests and sovereignty.
(6) Democratization is seriously undermined when democratic
governments that seek to promote democracy and human rights abroad fail
to respect human rights in their own practices, such as by condoning
torture, secret detention, detention without trial, or other denials of
due process.
(7) Elections without attention to long-term, sustainable,
institutional human rights safeguards, including civic education, an
independent media, enjoyment of basic freedoms of expression and
association, and an independent judiciary risk the election of populist
leaders who do not respect human rights and who actively undermine
democracy once in office.
(8) In many countries, the transition to democracy has been
accompanied by economic hardship and a growing gap between the rich and
the poor, leading to erosion of public support for democratization.
However, poverty is not always caused by a lack of resources, but often
linked to poor management of public resources and an absence of
democratic control on public goods.
(9) Provision of technical assistance to governments has been
meaningless in countries where civil society is being suffocated and in
contexts where governments lack the political will to implement human
rights reform. The training of journalists in the absence of a free and
independent media, or of judges where there is no independent judiciary
is ineffective or even counterproductive. Training and other programs
should be geared toward the creation of a free media and an independent
judiciary as priorities.
(10) Where human rights standards and principles are not enshrined
in a constitution and safeguarded by an independent judiciary,
nominally democratic structures--such as local and national elective
bodies--are passing laws that infringe on the rights of women and
minorities.
In short, while free and fair elections undoubtedly offer a sign of
hope to many, they alone are not enough. Strengthening of rule of law
and democratic institutions, and ensuring a greater focus on
implementing and upholding human rights in transitional societies, are
necessary to better ensure democratic progress. What is needed most is
a renewed commitment to uphold international human rights standards
through both bilateral and multilateral channels, long after the
headlines and media spotlight on elections have faded.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the above concerns, the Policy Forum participants
crafted the following recommendations directed at leading democracies
and other institutions at the forefront of democracy promotion:
(1) Demonstrate consistency in promoting human rights and
fundamental freedoms in each region, applying the same standards across
the region yet using different tools in different countries depending
on the specific national context, human rights track record, and
participation of respective governments in international organizations.
(2) Democratic states should work together--unilateral calls for
democracy are less effective. The United States and the European Union
have to elaborate detailed, well-conceived, and clear policies aimed at
reversing authoritarian developments and deterioration of human rights.
Ideally, this should be a common policy implemented by the United
States, the European Union, and other leading democracies.
(3) Do not abandon new democracies simply because an election has
taken place; rather, continue supporting human rights defenders and
work with them to develop independent human rights organizations and to
build state institutions that legitimately protect human rights and
promote democratic principles. International funding commitments to
promote democracy should likewise prioritize long-term, sustainable
support for true democratic institutions.
(4) Focus support on promotion of media that is independent of
political or commercial influence and provides information on public
affairs, governance, and international standards. Access to information
is universally cited as one of the most important aspects of a true
democracy.
(5) Ensure that indigenous and other disadvantaged or marginalized
groups with limited access to democratic institutions and education are
included in all democratic processes.
(6) Democratic governments and intergovernmental organizations
should demonstrate their strong solidarity with human rights defenders
and effectively intervene on all levels in those cases when defenders
come under threat from authoritarian regimes. They should increase the
visibility of human rights defenders, and engage them in regular dialog
as effective monitors of democracy promotion programs.
(7) Governments should stop using security concerns as pretexts to
undermine democracy and human rights; such efforts are ultimately
counterproductive and self-defeating.
(8) Democratic governments should reaffirm their own commitments to
human rights standards, including cooperation with international and
regional mechanisms, and call for the same by democratizing states. The
U.N. human rights protection system should be reinforced. The newly
created Human Rights Council should renew and strengthen the mandates
of the special procedures, including special rapporteurs and
representatives.
(9) Human rights organizations promote, defend, and sustain
democracy. Besides providing resources and aid directly to such
organizations, the international community should exact prompt and
effective pressure on governments that attempt to restrict NGO human
rights activities--including through adoption of legislation--and
maximize their opportunities to build strong roots and constituencies
of support within their own countries.
(10) Democratic countries should adopt targeted diplomatic and
economic sanctions against individual public officials from
authoritarian states that are responsible for gross human rights abuses
and involved in corruption.
Human Rights First appreciates the interest of the committee in
these important issues, and welcomes this opportunity to submit our
testimony in writing as part of the hearing record.
______
Prepared Statement of SUMATE Submitted for the Record
SUMATE thanks the Foreign Relations Committee for convening this
important hearing on the role of nongovernmental organizations in the
development of democracy. We are grateful for the opportunity to share
with the committee our own views. This testimony centers on the role of
NGOs in the promotion of democracy and the challenges that human rights
defenders face in their work.
I. INTRODUCTION
SUMATE is a Venezuelan citizens' movement that defends democracy by
the permanent exercise of citizens' rights and the demand for faithful
observance of the law.
SUMATE has pursued the following activities toward building a
culture of democracy in Venezuela:
1. Promote citizens' participation in public affairs.
2. Promote citizens' supervision over governmental administration.
3. Provide support to democratic institutional systems, especially
to carry out transparent electoral processes.
4. Broaden awareness of Venezuela and of SUMATE's programs among
citizens at international level.
5. Manage aptitudes and resources of the organization to ensure
feasibility.
II. THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES FOR
THE PROMOTION, PROTECTION, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY
The human rights instruments enshrine rights and fundamental
freedoms that the states must respect, protect, promote, and guarantee
for all persons under their jurisdiction, individually and in
association with others. The work of human rights defenders is
fundamental for the universal implementation of those rights and
freedoms, and for the consolidation of democratic institutions.
This vital role of human rights defenders has over the years become
more recognized. However, this progress has been achieved at a high
price: The defenders themselves have increasingly become targets of
attacks and their rights are violated in many countries. Human rights
defenders are often subjected to physical attacks, acts of
intimidation, and other forms of repression.
In some cases, criminal prosecution and judicial repression are
being used to silence human rights defenders and to pressure them into
discontinuing their activities. In other cases, laws, regulations, and
administrative practices impose lengthy registration procedures or
restrictions on the right to obtain funding for human rights
activities, particularly from outside the country.\1\ Freedoms of
speech, association, and assembly are being threatened by these
actions. SUMATE firmly believes that the denial of rights, such as
freedom of association as well as repressive actions against human
rights defenders, has serious implications for the promotion and
protection of human rights and democracy.
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\1\ Human rights defenders need adequate resources to carry out
their activities. They frequently depend on donations from individuals,
private foundations, corporations, and governments to conduct their
work, but often face extensive government control and arbitrary
limitations. Restrictions on receiving funds by human rights
organizations have often been imposed as a measure to impede their
activities for the protection of human rights. States have often raised
this as an issue of national security or sovereignty. But promotion of
human rights and fundamental freedoms can hardly be seen as
interference in the internal affairs of the state or an infringement of
the sovereignty of the state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this context, it is important to note that the work of human
rights defenders has been recognized by several international
organizations:
1. The Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society To Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms \2\ (hereinafter ``the
U.N. Declaration'') establishes: ``Everyone has the right,
individually, and in association with others, to promote and to strive
for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms at the national and international levels.'' \3\ It also
provides that:
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\2\ General Assembly resolution 53/144.
\3\ Article 1.
<bullet> Everyone has the right, individually, and in association
with others, to participate in peaceful activities against
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
<bullet> The state shall take all necessary measures to ensure the
protection by the competent authorities of everyone,
individually, and in association with others, against any
violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse
discrimination, pressure, or any other arbitrary action as a
consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights
referred to in the Declaration.
<bullet> In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and
in association with others, to be protected effectively under
national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful
means, activities and acts, including those by omission,
attributable to states that result in violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as acts of violence
perpetrated by groups or individuals that affect the enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.\4\
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\4\ Article 12.
2. The human rights organs of the inter-American system have
repeatedly highlighted the importance of the work of those persons who
promote and seek the protection and attainment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as well as the oversight of democratic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
institutions. These organs have emphasized that:
<bullet> ``Human rights defenders play a leading role in the process
of pursuing the full attainment of the rule of law and the
strengthening of democracy''; and
<bullet> ``Human rights defenders play an irreplaceable role in
building a solid and lasting democratic society.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the
Americas (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev.1, March 2006).
3. On June 15, 2004, the Council of the European Union established
the Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, \6\ which underline that
individuals, groups, and organs of society all play important parts in
furthering the cause of human rights, and support the principles
contained in the U.N. Declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The full text of the Guidelines is available at http://
ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesDefenders.pdf.
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However, it must be noted that despite these international
mechanisms of protection, in recent years the danger and insecurity
human rights defenders face have worsened in many countries.
III. PROBLEMS FACED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
1. The use of legal actions against human rights defenders
SUMATE would like to draw particular attention to the situation of
human rights defenders in Venezuela, where judicial processes are
increasingly being used to punish them and impede their work.
Since 2003, criminal charges have been filed against several
Venezuelan human rights and prodemocracy NGOs for having raised and
utilized funds from foreign sources. Our case clearly illustrates this
point.
On February 15, 2004, the President of Venezuela publicly accused
SUMATE of ``conspiracy and treason.'' On March 4, 2004, in clear
response to the above accusation, the Sixth National Prosecutor opened
an investigation against the most visible members of SUMATE: Its
founders--Alejandro Plaz and Maria Corina Machado, and Luis Enrique
Palacios and Ricardo Estevez. They were charged with ``conspiracy to
destroy the country's republican form of government.''
The sole basis for this accusation was having sought and obtained
funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Funds from the
NED were used exclusively for educational activities such as: Workshops
on democratic principles and citizen's rights, and television and radio
ads, which were designed to inform the general public on the various
mechanisms established in the Bolivarian Constitution for political and
civic participation.
Plaz, Machado, Palacios, and Estevez were also charged--under
Venezuelan Criminal Code, Article 132--of requesting foreign
intervention in Venezuela's domestic political affairs. An unlikely
charge given that SUMATE's sole intention was to raise funds to finance
the legitimate exercise of constitutionally and internationally
recognized citizens' rights and the legal promotion of political
participation.
According to the law, Plaz, Machado, Palacios, and Estevez should
be tried by a mix court consisting of three (3) people: A judge and two
citizens designated randomly (the jurors). Nevertheless, on Nov. 2,
2005, in clear breach of the law, Judge Elias Alvarez ruled that the
SUMATE trial would be judged by him--without the participation of
jurors.
On February 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals upheld the motion
presented by the defense of Maria Carina Machado, against the
constitution of the Seventh Trial Court as a unipersonal court. The
appeals court found that Judge Alvarez's pretension was inappropriate
and it decided as follows:
<bullet> It voided the act which constituted the court without
jurors.
<bullet> It ordered a new call to potential jurors, and if this were
not feasible, mandated a new drawing.
<bullet> It ordered the case to be sent to a different court.
While the above ruling delayed the case for a few months, the case
is set to resume in the very near future as a new judge has now been
selected.
The context of the renewed proceeding is likely to be quite
different now that the government has introduced--and will likely force
passage of--a highly restrictive draft Law on International
Cooperation.\7\
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\7\ Anteproyecto de Ley de Cooperacion Internacional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The use of legislative measures against human rights defenders
In Venezuela, a new draft law regulating NGOs strengthens control
over civil society institutions, in particular those that are funded
from abroad.
It is our opinion that a number of the provisions in the draft law
do not conform to international legal standards governing freedom of
association and basic civic liberties. The likely adoption of this
restrictive instrument will result in the gross violation of human
rights and will have a harmful impact on civil society and democratic
practices in Venezuela. Our main areas of concern are as follows:
1.1. The draft law imposes restrictive conditions on civil society
institutions in violation of constitutional and international law.--The
current draft violates the constitutional precepts related to the
freedom of association and citizen's right to participate in public
affairs. Articles 52, 62, and 132 of the Venezuelan Constitution
provide:
``Article 52: Everyone has the right to assemble for lawful
purposes, in accordance with law. The state is obligated to facilitate
the exercise of this right.''
``Article 62: All citizens have the right to participate freely in
public affairs, either directly or through their elected
representatives.
``The participation of the people in forming, carrying out, and
controlling the management of public affairs is the necessary way of
achieving the involvement to ensure their complete development, both
individual and collective. It is the obligation of the state and the
duty of society to facilitate the generation of optimum conditions for
putting this into practice.''
``Article 132: Everyone has a duty to fulfill his or her social
responsibilities and participate together in the political, civic, and
community life of the country, promoting and protecting human rights as
the foundation of democratic coexistence and social peace.''
Additionally, SUMATE notes that according to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), any act that tends to impede the
association of human rights defenders, or in any way impedes the
purposes for which they have formally associated, is a direct attack on
the defense of human rights.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the
Americas . . . op.cit . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the draft law restricts the right of freedom to
association as guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 22(1) of the ICCPR states: ``Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his
interest.''
In addition to this, it is counter to the U.N. Declaration, which
establishes:
``Article 13: Everyone has the right, individually and in
association with others, to solicit, receive, and utilize resources for
the express purpose or promoting and protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with article
3 of the present Declaration.''
1.2. It is not necessary. Venezuela already has a legal framework
that governs NGOs activities.--A complete and effective regulatory
frame already regulates the activities of Civil Society Organizations,
universities, unions, companies, and cooperative organizations. In
addition to the standard requirements placed on NGOs to acquire legal
status, these organizations will also have to register in a new,
integrated registry controlled by the government. Registration would be
a precondition to achieve national recognition to be able to perform
activities of cooperation to receive funding and to enjoy tax benefits.
1.3. It provides for excessive government intervention in the
activities of NGOs. The current draft imposes a wide range of
restrictive conditions on the management, operations, and financing of
NGOs and will allow authorities to intervene relations at the
international level--including funding and activities at the domestic
level.--Under the terms of this draft, specifically, as it refers to
the creation of the Integrated Registry System, rigorous state control
is guaranteed. Far from promoting the civil society, such controls
would significantly hamper the participation of citizens in social
matters. For instance, given the intent of article two, the national
government would have a say on the decisions of NGOs, universities or
unions in matters as basic as receiving donations or provisioning of
bibliographical material or even the purchase and use of computers. The
exchange of information among international entities would also be
subject to controls. The issue of invitations for speakers, and the
attendance to international forums, would be controlled by the state in
those cases in which the resources for these activities come from
international cooperation.
1.4. It promotes bureaucracy. The draft law contemplates two
governmental agencies to control the NGOs activities.--The first one
will be the entity charged with receiving all documentation and
incorporation files of the NGOs. NGOs will have to inform this entity
on their organization and management, sources, and uses of their
resources. This entity would be in a position to audit any aspect of
the NGOs operation at any point in time. A second entity would be
charged with providing financing for programs, projects, international
attendance, and any other activities that the government undertakes in
the area of international cooperation. The disbursement of these funds
would be according to the priorities set by the government's foreign
policy (and its interpretation of ``the national interest'').
1.5. It is selective in scope. Instead of imposing restrictive
conditions on civil society institutions, the Venezuelan National
Assembly should regulate the disproportionate use of public monies in
other countries.--The awarding of grants for not-for-profit civic
projects and activities by foreign donors is a practice commonly
accepted throughout the world. Our country, with its deep democratic
tradition, should not be an exception. If this source of financing is
ultimately banned, it would be impossible for organizations working in
the area of human rights to operate. History proves that at this stage
of political, social, and economical development, countries such as
ours benefit from the constructive involvement of individuals and NGOs
focused on the promotion of democratic practices. It is unconscionable
to respond to this natural development and expectation with a
legislated witch hunt against those seeking greater freedom.
It must be mentioned that it is essential to establish strict rules
to ensure the transparency and adequate oversight of the government's
discretionary international ``cooperation'' activities. These unchecked
flows need to be brought under better supervision. Here we refer to
such things as the $100 million oil donation to Bolivia and Argentina;
the oil agreements with Cuba; the donation of heating oil to ``the poor
people'' of the United States or England, the urea shipments to
Nicaragua's Sandinista party, and the funding of Bolivarian circles
around the world.
IV. TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Based on the international standards established by the legal and
normative instruments in the field of human rights:
1. SUMATE emphasizes the important role that individuals,
nongovernmental organizations, and groups play in the promotion and
protection of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.
2. SUMATE expresses its gravest concern over efforts to suppress
democracy promotion activities and demand these actions should cease.
Furthermore, any existing legal restrictions in this regard should be
expeditiously repealed.\9\
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\9\ Legislation in the name of national security, public order, or
emergency must not be allowed to silence dissent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. SUMATE has identified the following priorities for a strategic
approach to the situation and role of human rights defenders:
3.1. Governments must acknowledge the legitimacy and value of the
work of human rights defenders.
3.2. In accordance with human rights instruments adopted within the
United Nations system, as well as those at the regional level, all
members of the international community shall fulfill their obligation
to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction of any kind.
3.3. All countries must adhere to and comply with the relevant
international norms and standards, in particular the U.N. Declaration.
States must fully implement the principles included in this Declaration
through the following actions:
<bullet> The adoption of the Declaration by national parliaments;
<bullet> The dissemination of human rights information; and
<bullet> The implementation of awareness-raising and solidarity
campaigns with defenders.
3.4. The international community should exert effective pressure on
governments that attempt to restrict NGO activities (including through
adoption of legislation). Sufficient attention has not been given to
modification of national laws that contradict the principles of
international instruments and commitments applicable in the field of
human rights.
3.5. The international community should adopt a mechanism of
systematic alert on cases of repression against human rights defenders.
3.6. The collaboration between universal and regional mechanisms
for the protection of human rights is fundamental for ensuring a
coordinated and effective strategy of protection of human rights
defenders worldwide.
4. SUMATE would also like to recommend the following actions in
support of the aforementioned objectives:
<bullet> Condemning threats and attacks against human rights
defenders; and
<bullet> Maintaining contacts with human rights defenders;
<bullet> Attending and observing trials of human rights defenders;
<bullet> Providing, as and where appropriate, visible recognition to
human rights defenders;
<bullet> Assisting in the establishment of networks of human rights
defenders at an international level, including by facilitating
meetings of human rights defenders;
<bullet> Seeking to ensure that human rights defenders can access
resources, including financial, from abroad.
SUMATE appreciates the interest of the committee in these important
issues, and welcomes this opportunity to submit our testimony in
writing as part of the hearing record.
______
Responses of Barry Lowenkron to Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
Question. Please clarify your reply regarding the current status of
OFAC licensing regulations for the work of United States
nongovernmental organizations to financially support a broad range of
civil society, cultural, human rights, and democracy-building
activities in Iran.
(a) If there is a general license covering nongovernmental
organization activities, please describe which organizations are
eligible and what activities are permitted.
(b) If there is not general license, please describe the average
wait time for nongovernmental organizations to obtain specific
licenses, the number of license applications received and the number of
licenses issued since January 2002. Do you believe the absence of a
general license and specific licensing process has prevented NGOs from
applying for specific licenses. Does the administration intend to issue
a specific license for NGO activity in Iran?
Answer. Under the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) Iranian
Transactions Regulations, most commercial and financial activities with
Iran by United States persons are prohibited absent a license. In order
to facilitate democracy-building activities, OFAC issued a license to
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and its grantees
in July 2005 to cover DRL-funded programs in Iran. Currently, the
license is limited to DRL ``and U.S. persons receiving grants from
DRL.'' DRL awarded S4 million to six different grantees for programs in
Iran; these programs represent the first Department-funded democracy
and human rights programs in Iran since 1979.
As the fiscal year 2006 foreign appropriations bill and the fiscal
year 2006 supplemental provide funding to the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs (NEA) and DRL to advance democracy in Iran, in order to
facilitate Iran democracy programs, DRL and NEA will ask that OFAC
issue a new license to cover activities funded by both NEA and DRL
under this program. In addition, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs (ECA) will ask that OFAC issue a separate license to ECA and
its grantees, modeled on the existing DRL license, to cover ECA-
sponsored human rights projects, democracy, educational and cultural
exchange programs, and other programs aimed at furthering Iranians'
appreciation of democratic values and practice through exchange and
other activities.
In order to better facilitate non-USG-funded NGOs applying for a
license from OFAC to do work in Iran, OFAC will issue a Statement of
Licensing policy to be posted on OFAC's Web site. The State Department
will also post information on its Web site explaining the process and
directing potential applicants to the OFAC Statement of Licensing
Policy. OFAC retains records of all license requests. For more specific
information regarding licensing processing we would refer you to the
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Question. The administration requested funds in the fiscal year
2006 supplemental for democracy programs in Iran.
(a) How do you plan on identifying partners inside of Iran? How
will you assess their capacity and credibility? Is there a way to
provide funding without stigmatizing or undermining their work?
(b) What role do you anticipate Iranian exile groups will play in
implementing this program? Please identify and describe those Iranian
exile groups you have consulted.
Answer. The Department of State will spend the S20 million
Democracy Fund to promote human rights and democracy in Iran. The two
Bureaus managing these programs, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor (DRL) and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will
concentrate programming on political party development, labor, civil
society, human rights and rule of law. DRL-funded programs administered
by my Bureau support respect for freedom of association and speech, and
more open and free participation in the political process. Presently,
DRL grants funds to established United States NGOs and academic
institutions that work with individuals and organizations inside Iran.
Projects focus on influential democratic actors and groups, including
labor, women, and students. For practical reasons of safety, we are
cautious about publicizing our work with governments and activists
across the globe to protect human rights. We would, of course, be happy
to provide a classified briefing for the committee.
The desire for an active civil society in Iran has not been
diminished by the numerous attempts by the Iranian Government to
silence human rights and democracy activists. Iranians know that their
government may punish them for voicing their views on the Internet or
in the newspaper, and yet journalists continue to write provocative
pieces that demonstrate tremendous moral courage, and thousands of
other Iranians post their thoughts on Web blogs every day. They gather
on the streets to demand better working conditions and equal rights for
women although the forceful reaction of the regime's thugs is a bitter
reality. Iranians have found ways to endure in a system that strives to
deprive them of their legitimate rights--and we are confident that they
will also find ways to change that system.
The State Department regularly meets with members of the Iranian
diaspora community. We see exile groups as one of many sources of
information about Iran and Iranian people, but recognize that many
individuals have not been back to Iran since the revolution. Although
the funding of exile groups has not been a major focus of these
efforts, we are willing to consider qualified proposals submitted by
any credible organization.
Question. Russia has been hostile to the use of Organization for
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election monitors in former
Soviet republics. Recently, Moscow started financing its own group of
election ``monitors'' who routinely ignore the findings of other
international observers and return results that match the Kremlin's
desired outcome. The most glaring example of this phenomenon occurred
recently following Belarus' so-called elections.
(a) What is the United States doing to preserve the integrity of
election monitoring missions mounted by the OSCE and other
international bodies?
(b) What can be done to ensure that the findings of legitimate
election monitors are not obscured by the claims of politically-
motivated observers?
Answer. Russia has used two different approaches to try to undercut
the reports of Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) election monitoring missions: Sending separate Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) monitoring teams to cover elections in some
CIS states, for example Ukraine and Belarus, and routinely publicly
criticizing ODIHR for alleged bias and methodological flaws--a claim we
completely reject. Under the first approach, for instance, the CIS
teams issued separate reports proclaiming the first round of the
October 2004 Ukrainian Presidential elections and March 2006 Belarusian
elections ``free and fair,'' in marked contrast to ODIHR's very
critical reports. In addition, Russia has recently decided to
participate more actively on ODIHR observation missions, and sent a
considerable number of Russian observers to ODIHR missions, including
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan late last year. We welcome Russian
participation in ODIHR monitoring missions, because it will help Moscow
better understand the methodology and recognize the strengths and
impartiality of the process, and that the standards applied are
identical in the West as well as CIS countries. However, Russia also
clearly hopes to influence, i.e., tone down, ODIHR's criticism of the
conduct of elections particularly in CIS states. Russia has used the
reports of its own observers as a basis for accusing ODIHR of making
biased, predetermined negative politicized evaluations of various
elections, and has further argued that ODIHR team evaluations should
have no standing in OSCE because they do not represent participating
state consensus positions.
The United States, the European Union and other OSCE states
publicly, emphatically, and consistently reject such Russian (and other
CIS) accusations against DDIHR. We believe that the current methodology
of the OSCE, which is the ``gold standard'' emulated by other
international monitors such as those from the European Union, provides
objective and unbiased assessments of electoral practices in
participating states both east and west of Vienna. If an evaluation is
critical, it is because the concrete circumstances of the election
required it, and not because of any inherent bias or predetermined
conclusion. Critical comments have been made, for example, of some
aspects of recent U.S. elections that were assessed by DDIHR.
We believe that ODIHR's methodology itself works to protect against
tainting by politically motivated observers within its missions. Its
assessments are objective and accurate precisely because ODIHR's
missions include large numbers of observers all operating under the
same rules that get a statistically meaningful sample. In addition,
ODIHR makes every effort to organize its observers into mixed
nationality teams, which must reach consensus on their observations, to
dilute any politically motivated reports made by individuals or
secondees of particular countries. ODIHR has also codified its practice
of limiting the total number of participants of a given nationality in
an electoral monitoring mission to 10 percent of the overall team's
size, preventing any one country from unduly swaying the evaluation of
an election mission.
Efforts to make significant changes in how ODIHR conducts election
monitoring, in particular how it appoints election mission heads and
when and with what focus it issues its evaluations, can only be
achieved via an OSCE consensus decision. The United States, joined by a
majority of other participating states, has made unambiguously clear
that it will reject any proposal that might undermine ODIHR's election-
related efforts.
Question. Mongolia has been heralded by many as a success story of
democratic development. Yet, endemic corruption continues to prevent
Mongolia from qualifying for participation in the Millennium Challenge
Account, and the institutions of democratic and governance programs
remain very weak. The administration reduced support for democracy and
governance programs from $10 million in fiscal year 2004 to $7.5
million in fiscal year 2005. The same amount was requested in fiscal
year 2006. Why are we reducing United States funding for democracy
programs in Mongolia at this pivotal moment in its political
development?
Answer. Currently, all United States economic assistance to
Mongolia is distributed by USAID, which has identified two priorities:
Private sector-led economic growth and more effective and accountable
governance. Over the past 3 years, good governance assistance has
remained constant at $2.7 million. The decrease in USAID funding from
$10 million to $7.5 million can be attributed to a decline in economic
growth assistance from $7.22 million to $4.8 million in fiscal year
2006.
Mongolia's Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) proposal is also
currently under review. To address Mongolia's worsening performance on
corruption, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has officially
notified Mongolia that passage of anticorruption legislation is a
prerequisite for signing a compact. MCC has underscored the importance
of fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law as essential
to the success of any MCA program in promoting economic growth and
reducing poverty. If Mongolian authorities are responsive in enacting
anticorruption legislation, Mongolia also stands to gain aid through
the Millennium Challenge Account.
Mongolia's transformation from authoritarian communism to
democratic governance is a remarkable ongoing success story. But this
transition is far from complete, and many development challenges
remain. Despite achieving peaceful and constitutional transitions of
power between governments since the early 1990s, holding elections that
are largely free and fair, and recording impressive 6-10 percent GDP
growth rates over the past few years, Mongolia's continued democratic
and economic success hinges on its ability to manage a series of ``good
governance'' issues, including establishment of greater accountability,
transparency, and anticorruption measures.
Senior Mongolian officials have also expressed concerns about cuts
in economic assistance levels for Mongolia. We will continue working
actively with Mongolian officials to develop a balanced assistance
program, and given our concerns of corruption, our funding level over
the past 2 years reflects a sustained commitment to helping Mongolia's
democratic development.
Question. Please provide information on positions abroad, by post,
that were designated as ``labor'' positions in fiscal year 2004 and are
currently so designated (in fiscal year 2006).
Answer. The following positions were designated as ``labor
officer'' in fiscal year 2004: Ankara; Beijing; Berlin; Bridgetown;
Canberra; Geneva; Guatemala City; Jakarta; Johannesburg; La Paz; Lagos;
London; Mexico City; Nairobi; Ottawa; Paris; Rome; San Salvador;
Santiago; Sao Paulo; Tokyo; Tunis; USEU Brussels; and Warsaw.
Officers assigned to some other political or economic positions
overseas have labor responsibilities in their portfolios. Some of these
positions are ``dual designated'' as either political/labor or
economic/labor, including, for instance, ones in Baghdad, Bangkok, and
Hanoi.
All positions designated as ``labor officer'' in 2004 continue,
with the following exceptions:
<bullet> Bureau of African Affairs--The Lagos position was abolished
in 2004. AF has agreed that a new political position in Abuja
will also have labor responsibilities. This is in process.
<bullet> Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs--The Tokyo position
has been abolished as of July, 2006.
<bullet> Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs--The full-time
Berlin labor position will be eliminated in July, 2007. A lower
ranking economic position will be designated as having labor
responsibilities. The Warsaw position is being eliminated.
<bullet> Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs--A labor position was
established in Brasilia, while the labor position in Sao Paulo
was abolished. By virtue of global repositioning, there will be
a new political officer position established in Managua. This
position will also have labor responsibilities.
Question. Please describe how the Secretary's ``transformational
diplomacy'' initiative will affect labor-designated positions. What is
the process for reviewing such positions, and what are the criteria
being used?
Answer. Secretary Rice defined the objective of transformational
diplomacy this way: ``To work with our many partners around the world
to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond
to the needs of their people--and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system.''
One important way of helping to realize the Secretary's objectives
is through repositioning our employees globally to successfully meet
the challenges that transformational diplomacy presents. We are
expanding the role and function of the
current labor officer positions to include a wider range of
transformational responsibilities in such areas as human rights,
democracy, and other regional and transnational political and economic
issues. In many cases, this reflects a continuation of a process that
had already begun.
Under the Global Repositioning Initiative, an integral element of
the Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy, the Department is
shifting its resources to more effectively and efficiently deal with
transformational issues globally. The Department is reviewing the work
and location of current labor officer positions. Positions with
significant labor responsibilities will continue to be labor-designated
assignments for which officers will receive labor training.
<all>