Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (Chapter
Report, 07/21/1999, GAO/GGD-99-108).
High demand for illegal drugs in the United States has persisted
throughout the 1990s, as has the flow of illegal drugs into this
country. The cost of illegal drug use in this country has been pegged at
about $110 billion annually, including lost jobs and productivity,
health problems, and economic hardships to families. Also, many violent
crimes are drug related. Funding for federal drug control efforts has
risen by nearly 50 percent during the 1990s, reaching about $18 billion
in fiscal year 1999. Funding for the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) nearly doubled, from $806 million in 1990 to about $1.5 billion in
1999. DEA staff grew from 6,000 in 1990 to 8,400 in 1998. During the
1990s, DEA strengthened many of its operations. The agency began to work
more closely with state and local law enforcement and help combat
drug-related violent crime in local communities. DEA intercepted the
communications of drug trafficking groups at home and abroad in order to
target their leaders and dismantle their operations. DEA began to
participate in two interagency programs to investigate major drug
trafficking groups in Latin America and Asia. DEA also changed its
foreign operations by screening and training special foreign policy
units to combat drug trafficking in key foreign countries. DEA has major
responsibilities under the Office of National Drug Control Policy's
national drug control strategy for reducing the drug supply. However,
DEA has yet to develop measurable performance targets for its programs
and initiatives that are consistent with those adopted for the national
strategy. Consequently, it is difficult to assess how successful DEA's
programs have been in reducing the supply of illegal drugs into the
United States. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress;
see: Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s, by
Norman J. Rabkin, Director of Administration of Justice Issues, before
the Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on the Judiciary.
GAO/T-GGD-99-149, July 29 (13 pages).
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-99-108
TITLE: Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s
DATE: 07/21/1999
SUBJECT: Performance measures
Drug trafficking
International relations
Narcotics
Strategic planning
National policies
Law enforcement
Federal/state relations
Interagency relations
Organized crime
IDENTIFIER: DOJ Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program
DEA Mobile Enforcement Team Program
National Drug Control Policy
DEA State and Local Task Force Program
DEA Kingpin Strategy
National Strategy Performance Measurement System
DEA Vetted Unit Program
DEA Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program
ONDCP High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program
Customs Service/DEA/FBI Operation Reciprocity
Customs Service/DEA Operation Limelight
DEA Operation Tiger Trap
DOJ Violent Crime Reduction Program
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to Congressional Requesters July 1999 DRUG CONTROL DEA's
Strategies and Operations in the 1990s GAO/GGD-99-108 United
States General Accounting Office
General Government Division Washington, D.C. 20548 B-279033 July
21, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on
International Narcotics Control United States Senate The Honorable
Bill McCollum Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives As you requested, this report
discusses the strategies and operations of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) in the 1990s. Specifically, the report
discusses (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs,
initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to
carry out its mission, including its efforts to (a) target and
investigate national and international drug traffickers and (b)
help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug
offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2)
whether DEA's goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and
performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control
Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing
needs and allocated the additional staff. It includes a
recommendation to the Attorney General regarding the development
of measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and
dismantling drug trafficking organizations. We are sending copies
of this report to the Honorable Janet F. Reno, Attorney General;
the Honorable Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration; the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey,
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the
Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director of the Office of Management and
Budget; and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of
State. Copies will be made available to others on request. Page 1
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s B-279033 If you have
any questions, please call me or Dan Harris at (202) 512-8777. Key
contributors to the report are acknowledged in appendix III.
Norman J. Rabkin Director, Administration of Justice Issues Page 2
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 3 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary During the
1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted
Purpose at very high levels and continued to
adversely affect American society. The Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP), in its 1999 National Drug Control
Strategy, notes that illegal drugs cost our society about $110
billion annually. The costs of drug abuse include lost jobs and
productivity, health problems, and economic hardships to families.
In addition, many violent crimes are drug related, according to
ONDCP. Funding for federal drug control efforts has increased, in
constant 1999 dollars, by about 49 percent in the 1990s to the
fiscal year 1999 level of about $18 billion. Funding for the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) almost doubled, in constant 1999
dollars, from about $806 million in fiscal year 1990 to about $1.5
billion in fiscal year 1999; the number of DEA staff increased
from about 6,000 in fiscal year 1990 to about 8,400 in fiscal year
1998. In view of the increased funding for federal drug control
efforts and the nation's persistent drug problem, the Chairmen of
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control requested that GAO determine,
among other things, * what major enforcement strategies,
programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the
1990s to carry out its mission; and * whether DEA's strategic
goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance
measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy.
During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of
its Results in Brief operations, i.e., its strategies,
programs, initiatives, and approaches. * DEA expanded its
domestic enforcement operations to work more with state and local
law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related violent
crime in local communities. * DEA implemented an investigative
approach, domestically and internationally, focusing on
intercepting the communications of major drug trafficking
organizations to target the leaders and dismantle their
operations. * DEA started participating in two interagency
programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking
organizations in Latin America and Asia. * DEA changed its
foreign operations by screening and training special foreign
police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign
countries. Page 4 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary DEA has significant
responsibilities for the drug supply reduction portion of ONDCP's
National Drug Control Strategy. DEA's strategic goals and
objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives, in the
1990s have been consistent with the National Drug Control
Strategy. However, DEA has not developed measurable performance
targets for its programs and initiatives that are consistent with
those adopted for the National Strategy. As a result, it is
difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Congress, and
the public to assess how effective DEA has been in achieving its
strategic goals and the effect its programs and initiatives in the
1990s have had on reducing the illegal drug supply. GAO is making
a recommendation to help improve this situation. DEA's overall
mission is to enforce the nation's drug laws and regulations
Background and to bring drug traffickers to
justice. DEA is the lead agency responsible for enforcing the
federal drug control laws and for coordinating and pursuing U.S.
drug investigations in foreign countries. DEA's primary
responsibilities include (1) investigating major drug traffickers
operating at interstate and international levels and criminals and
drug gangs who perpetrate violence in local communities; (2)
managing a national drug intelligence system; (3) seizing and
forfeiting traffickers' assets; (4) coordinating and cooperating
with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on mutual
drug enforcement efforts; and (5) working on drug law enforcement
programs with its counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out
its responsibilities, in December 1998, along with its
headquarters offices, DEA had 21 field divisions throughout the
United States and its territories, each with numerous suboffices,
and 79 offices in 56 foreign countries. At the end of fiscal year
1998, DEA had about 8,400 persons on board, including about 4,300
special agents. Principal Findings Since it was established in
1973, DEA's top priority has been to disrupt and DEA's Enforcement
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. During the 1990s,
DEA Operations Reach From the broadened the focus of its
enforcement operations. DEA now focuses on International Level to
the what it calls the "seamless continuum" of drug
trafficking, with programs Local Level and
initiatives directed at major regional, national, and
international trafficking organizations; violent, street-level
drug gangs and other local community problems; and domestically
cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. Page 5
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary
During the 1990s, DEA increased its emphasis on intercepting
communications between top-level drug traffickers and their
subordinates to identify and target the leaders and dismantle
their operations. DEA also started working with other federal
agencies on two programs to target and investigate major drug
trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia. In 1996, to
improve its effectiveness in several key foreign countries, DEA
began to screen and train special foreign police units. The intent
of this effort is to improve the capabilities of foreign police
and to build trustworthy and reliable foreign antidrug units with
which DEA can work. At the same time, DEA attempted to improve its
effectiveness in the 1990s by giving domestic drug trafficking a
higher priority than in the past, including focusing resources on
regional and "local impact" drug problems. In this regard, during
the 1990s, DEA devoted more resources to its State and Local Task
Force Program. Also, in 1995, DEA established the Mobile
Enforcement Team (MET) Program to assist local police with violent
drug gangs and other local drug problems. The principal objectives
in the National Drug Control Strategy relating to DEA Has Not Yet
DEA are: Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the *
combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and
arrest National Strategy the leaders of illegal
drug syndicates and * disrupt and dismantle major international
drug trafficking organizations and arrest, prosecute, and
incarcerate their leaders. DEA's strategic goals and objectives
and its enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s have been
consistent with the National Strategy. Both the National Strategy
and DEA hope to reduce the illegal drug supply and drug-related
violence by disrupting and dismantling domestic and international
drug trafficking organizations. For domestic drug trafficking
organizations, the National Strategy calls for increasing by 5
points the percentage of drug trafficking organizations disrupted
or dismantled by 2002 as measured against the percentage recorded
in the base year using a prioritized list of designated targets.
It calls for at least a 10 percentage point increase above the
base year by 2007. For international drug trafficking
organizations, the National Strategy calls for achieving by 2002 a
50 percent success rate in the number of organizations disrupted
or dismantled as measured against a designated target list
established in the base year. The Strategy also calls for Page 6
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary
increasing the success rate to 100 percent by 2007 as measured
against the base year list. According to ONDCP and DEA, neither
the domestic nor international designated target lists referred to
above have been developed. Unlike the National Strategy, DEA's
performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 do not contain
performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations. DEA has no annual, mid-, or long-range
measurable performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations. In the absence of such targets, it is
difficult to quantitatively assess DEA's overall effectiveness in
achieving its strategic goals. GAO recommends that the Attorney
General direct the DEA Administrator Recommendation
to work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA
performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets
in the National Drug Control Strategy. DEA provided written
comments on a draft of this report. These comments Agency Comments
and are discussed at the end of chapters 2 and 3. DEA, along with
ONDCP and GAO's Evaluation the Office of Management
and Budget, also provided technical changes and clarifications,
which have been incorporated throughout this report where
appropriate. DEA stated that, overall, the report provides a
detailed and factual background of DEA strategies and special
operations. Although not directly agreeing with GAO's
recommendation, DEA agreed with GAO's principal finding that DEA
had not included measurable performance targets for disrupting or
dismantling drug trafficking organizations in its fiscal years
1999 and 2000 performance plans. However, DEA disagreed with GAO's
draft conclusion that little can be said about DEA's effectiveness
in achieving its strategic goals in the absence of measurable
performance targets. DEA commented that this statement and
supporting information in chapter 3 implied that DEA had not
attempted to develop such targets. DEA pointed out various actions
it was taking relating to GAO's recommendation. DEA said that,
among other things, it has developed "preliminary performance
targets," which it included in its fiscal year 2001 budget
submission to DOJ. Page 7 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary DEA's stated
action is consistent with the intent of GAO's recommendation.
However, because these targets are preliminary and under review
within the executive branch, they are subject to change until
February 2000 when DEA issues its annual budget submission and
performance plan, as part of DOJ's submission, to Congress.
Further, DEA indicated that it cannot finalize its performance
targets and measures until a designated targeted list of drug
trafficking organizations, as called for in the National Strategy,
is completed. Therefore, GAO is retaining its recommendation until
DEA's preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion
in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency
with those in the National Strategy. Page 8
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 9 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents 4 Executive Summary 16
Chapter 1 Drug Use and Supply Trends in the
1990s 16 Introduction
Federal Drug Control Budget in the 1990s
22 1999 National Drug Control Strategy
24 DEA's Mission, Role, and Responsibilities
26 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
29 32 Chapter 2 DEA Modified Its Operational
Strategy in the 1990s 32 DEA Expanded
Its DEA More Involved With State and Local Police
34 DEA Developed an Investigative Approach Focusing on
48 Focus in the 1990s to the Communications of Major
Drug Trafficking Target Local Drug Organizations
Key Changes in DEA's Foreign Operations
54 Dealers in Addition to Conclusions
59 Major Drug Trafficking Agency Comments
60 Organizations 61 Chapter 3 DEA's Strategic
Goals and Objectives, and Its Programs, 61
DEA Has Not Yet Are Consistent With the National
Strategy DEA Has Not Developed Performance Targets Consistent
68 Developed With Those in the National
Strategy Performance Targets Conclusions
78 Recommendation
79 Consistent With the Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation 79 National
Drug Control Strategy 81 Chapter 4 Federal
Budget Formulation Guidance Provides Basis for
81 DEA's Staffing Needs DEA Staffing Needs
Determination Process Fiscal Year 1998 Process for Determining
DEA's Staffing 82 Determination and
Needs Allocation Process for Congress Added Staff for a New
Caribbean Initiative and 95 Changed
Staffing Recommended for Other DEA Fiscal Year 1998
Initiatives DEA's Fiscal Year 1998 Allocation Process Considered a
96 Variety of Factors Page 10
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Conclusions
97 Appendix I: Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field
98 Appendixes Divisions and Foreign Offices Appendix II:
Comments From the Drug Enforcement 163
Administration Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments 167 168 Glossary
Performance Measurement Terms
168 Table 2.1: Budget for and Number of DEA State and
35 Tables Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999
Table 2.2: Number of Law Enforcement Officers on DEA
35 State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1998, as
of the End of Each Fiscal Year Table 2.3: Number of DEA State and
Local Task Force 36 Case Initiations,
Arrests, Convictions, and Seizures, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998
Table 2.4: Geographic Scope of State and Local Task
37 Force Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Table
2.5: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Years 1995
39 to 1999 Table 2.6: Selected Data on MET Deployments, Fiscal
41 Years 1995 Through 1998 Table 2.7: Geographic Scope of MET
Program Cases 44 Initiated During Fiscal
Years 1995 Through 1998 Table 2.8: Funding for DEA's Domestic
Cannabis 46 Eradication/Suppression
Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Table 2.9: Domestic
Cannabis Eradication/Suppression 47 Program
Statistical Results, 1990 Through 1998 Table 2.10: Number of
Electronic Surveillance Orders and 51
Facilities Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998 Table 2.11:
Number of Vetted Units and Officers on Board 57
by Country, as of September 30, 1998 Table 3.1: National Strategy
Goals and Objectives for 63 Which DEA Has
Responsibilities Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals With
66 National Strategy Goals Page 11
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Table 3.3:
Comparison of Selected DEA and National
67 Strategy Objectives Table 3.4: National Drug Control Strategy
Performance 70 Target and Performance
Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Domestic Drug Trafficking
Organizations Table 3.5: National Strategy Performance Target and
71 Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
International Drug Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their
Leaders Table 3.6: National Drug Control Strategy Performance
71 Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
Drug Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs Table 4.1: Comparison of
DEA and DOJ Estimated 91 Additional
DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table
4.2: Comparison of DOJ's Estimates and the
94 President's Request for Additional DEA Total and Special Agent
Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table 4.3: Comparison of the
President's Request and 96 Congress'
Appropriations Guidance for DEA Additional Total and Special Agent
Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress'
Appropriations 97 Guidance and DEA's
New Staffing Allocation for Additional DEA Staffing and Special
Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table I.1: Drug Seizures for
Washington Division and 130 Baltimore
District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Table I.2:
Caribbean Field Division's Use of Wire
159 Intercepts Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean
Division, by 161 Case Type, for Fiscal Years
1997 and 1998 Figure 1.1: Trend in the Number of Current Drug
Users, 17 Figures Aged 12 and Older,
Since 1990 Figure 1.2: Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and
12th 18 Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since
1991 Figure 1.3: Composition of Total Federal Government
23 Funding for Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal Years 1990
Through 1999 Figure 1.4: Budget Trends in Programs for Federal
Drug 24 Control Activities to Reduce Drug
Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Page 12
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Figure 1.5:
DEA's Total Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 27
1990 Through 1999 Figure 1.6: DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years
1990 28 Through 1998, as of the End of
Each Fiscal Year Figure 1.7: Composition by Position Type of
Total 29 Number of DEA On-Board Staff, as
of the End of Fiscal Year 1998 Figure 4.1: Flowchart of DEA's
Fiscal Year 1998 Staffing 84 Needs Determination
Process Figure 4.1: Continued
85 Figure I.1: Los Angeles Division Map
100 Figure I.2: Miami Division Map
108 Figure I.3: New Orleans Division Map
118 Figure I.4: Washington, D. C. Division Map
125 Figure I.5: Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map
133 Figure I.6: La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map
141 Figure I.7: Mexico City, Mexico, Country Office Map
148 Figure I.8: DEA Caribbean Division Map
156 Page 13 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Contents Abbreviations ASAC
Assistant Special Agent in Charge ATF Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms BNP Bolivian National Police BTF
Border Task Force CA country attache CIA Central
Intelligence Agency CNP Colombian National Police DAWN
Drug Abuse Warning Network DEA Drug Enforcement
Administration DOD Department of Defense DOJ
Department of Justice FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FELCN Fuerzas Especiales Para la Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico
FMP field management plan HCL hydrochloride HIDTA
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area IRS Internal Revenue
Service JMD Justice Management Division LSD
lysergic acid diethylamide MET Mobile Enforcement Team
OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force OMB
Office of Management and Budget ONDCP Office of National
Drug Control Policy OPBAT Operation Bahamas, Turks, and
Caicos Islands PCP phencyclidine PME Performance
Measures of Effectiveness RET Regional Enforcement Team
SAC Special Agent in Charge SAMHSA Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration SIU Sensitive
Investigative Unit or Special Investigative Unit SOD
Special Operations Division TKO targeted kingpin
organization VCRP Violent Crime Reduction Program Page 14
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction During the
1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted
at very high levels and have continued to adversely affect
American society in terms of social, economic, and health costs
and drug-related violent crime. During the same period, funding
for federal drug control efforts overall and for the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is dedicated to
controlling the supply of illegal drugs, increased significantly.
According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),
drug Drug Use and Supply use and its consequences threaten
Americans of every socioeconomic Trends in the 1990s
background, geographic region, educational level, and ethnic or
racial identity. Drug abuse and trafficking adversely affect
families, businesses, and neighborhoods; impede education; and
choke criminal justice, health, and social service systems. A
report prepared for ONDCP showed that drug users in the United
States spent an estimated $57 billion for illegal drugs in 1995.1
Other costs to society include lost jobs and productivity, health
problems, and economic hardships to families. ONDCP, in its 1999
National Drug Control Strategy, noted that illegal drugs cost our
society approximately $110 billion each year. On the basis of the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) estimated that in
1997 there were 13.9 million current users2 of illegal drugs in
the United States aged 12 and older, representing 6.4 percent of
the total population. As figure 1.1 shows, this number has
fluctuated somewhat but has remained fairly constant overall since
1990, as have the numbers of current users of cocaine and
marijuana, with 1.5 million cocaine users and 11.1 million
marijuana users in 1997. 1 What America's Users Spend on Illegal
Drugs, 1988-1995; prepared for the Office of National Drug Control
Policy by William Rhodes, Stacia Langenbahn, Ryan Kling, and Paul
Scheiman; September 29, 1997. 2 A current user is an individual
who consumed an illegal drug in the month prior to being
interviewed. Page 16
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Trend in the Number of Current Drug Users, Aged 12
and Older, Since 1990 Source: Preliminary Results from the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, SAMHSA, Department of
Health and Human Services, 1996 and 1997. Page 17
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
As shown in figure 1.2, current drug use among youth rose
significantly from 1992 to 1996. The trend then improved, with
drug use declining for 8th and 10th graders in 1997 and 1998.
Figure 1.2: Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and 12th
Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since 1991 Source: Monitoring
the Future Study, Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan (Dec. 1998). Abuse of illegal drugs has serious
consequences. For example, SAMHSA's Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN) reported 9,310 drug-related deaths in 1996, an increase of
65 percent from the 5,628 deaths reported in 1990. The number of
drug-related hospital emergency room visits reported to DAWN rose
42 percent from 1990 to 1997. There were 371,208 emergency room
episodes in 1990 and 527,058 episodes in 1997. According to DEA
and ONDCP, illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana,
and methamphetamine, have inflicted serious damage and continued
to threaten our nation during the 1990s. National and Page 18
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
international drug trafficking organizations continued to bring
these drugs into the United States, and certain illegal drugs are
clandestinely produced in this country. Drug trafficking gangs and
individuals dealing in drugs, as well as drug users, have caused
violence in local communities. DEA considers cocaine to be the
primary drug threat to the U.S. Cocaine population. Cocaine
use has remained at a relatively constant high level during the
1990s, as indicated by the National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
reported that the use of "crack," a potent and highly addictive
form of cocaine that first became widely available in the 1980s,
also remained at a high level in the 1990s. ONDCP reported in the
summer of 1998 that crack was failing to attract new users,
although established users persisted in using it. Regarding
cocaine trafficking trends, DEA intelligence information shows
that Colombian trafficking organizations, although more fragmented
than in the past, continue to control the worldwide supply of
cocaine. However, Mexican organizations have played an increasing
role in the U.S. cocaine trade in the 1990s. The Southwest Border
is now the primary entry point for cocaine smuggled into the
United States. Heroin is readily available in major cities in the
United States, and its use is Heroin on the rise in many
areas around the country, according to DEA. ONDCP has noted that
the increasing availability of high-purity heroin has made
snorting and smoking more common modes of ingestion than
injection, thereby lowering inhibitions to heroin use. DEA
intelligence information indicates that the heroin available in
the United States comes from Southeast Asia (principally Burma);
Southwest Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and
Turkey); Mexico; and South America (Colombia). Although Southeast
Asian heroin dominated the U.S. market in the 1980s and into the
1990s, Colombian heroin emerged as a significant problem in the
mid-1990s. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized and analyzed
in the United States was Colombian. DEA reported that independent
Colombian drug traffickers established themselves in the U.S.
heroin market by distributing high- quality heroin (frequently
above 90-percent pure), undercutting the price of their
competition, and using long-standing drug distribution networks.
According to DEA, marijuana is the most readily available and
commonly Marijuana used illegal drug in the country. Further, a
resurgence of marijuana trafficking and use has taken place in
urban centers across the United Page 19
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
States. ONDCP noted that this market is driven by a high level of
demand, with users from virtually all age groups, demographic
groups, and income levels. According to DEA intelligence
information, most of the foreign marijuana available here is
smuggled into the country across the Southwest Border. Mexican
drug trafficking organizations are responsible for supplying most
of the foreign marijuana, whether grown in Mexico or shipped
through Mexico from other locations such as Colombia. Marijuana is
also grown domestically in remote outdoor locations in the United
States, including on public lands, and indoors. In the 1990s,
major outdoor marijuana growths have been found in California,
Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington.
DEA uses the term "dangerous drugs" to refer to a broad category
of Methamphetamine and controlled substances other than
cocaine, opiates such as heroin, and Other Dangerous Drugs
cannabis products such as marijuana. The list of dangerous drugs
includes drugs that are illegally produced; drugs legally produced
but diverted to illicit use (e.g., pharmacy thefts, forged
prescriptions, and illegal sales); as well as legally produced
drugs obtained from legitimate channels (e.g., legally and
properly prescribed). Some of the dangerous drugs are
methamphetamine; lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); phencyclidine
(PCP); diazepam (Valium); and flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), commonly
called the "date rape" drug. DEA reports that methamphetamine use
has increased in the 1990s, resulting in a devastating impact on
many communities across the nation. A powerful stimulant,
methamphetamine is the most prevalent synthetic controlled
substance clandestinely manufactured in the United States.
Historically, methamphetamine has more commonly been used in the
western United States, but its use has been spreading to other
areas of the country. According to DEA, methamphetamine suppliers
have traditionally been motorcycle gangs and other independent
groups. However, organized crime groups operating in California,
some with ties to major Mexico- based trafficking organizations,
now dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and
distribution in the United States. Mexican trafficking
organizations use their well-established cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana distribution networks to smuggle methamphetamine
throughout the country. Although large-scale production of
methamphetamine is centered in California, it is increasingly
being produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States. Page
20 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction Trafficking organizations have
continued to supply domestic drug Drug Trafficking
consumers despite short-term achievements by both federal and
foreign Organizations law enforcement agencies
in apprehending individuals and disrupting the flow of illegal
drugs. When confronted with threats to their operations, drug
trafficking organizations have become adept at quickly changing
their modes of operation. For example, as we previously reported,3
when law enforcement agencies have successfully carried out
efforts to intercept drugs being smuggled by aircraft, traffickers
have increased their use of maritime and overland transportation
routes. In another example, DEA reported that a 1989 drug
enforcement operation, which involved the seizure of nearly 40
metric tons of cocaine, led to a new arrangement between Mexican
transportation organizations and Colombian cocaine organizations.
To reduce the complex logistics and vulnerabilities associated
with large cash transactions, Mexican organizations started
receiving part of the cocaine shipments they smuggled for the
Colombians in exchange for their transportation services. By the
mid-1990s, Mexican organizations were receiving up to one-half of
a cocaine shipment as payment. This arrangement radically changed
the role and sphere of influence of the Mexican organizations in
the U.S. cocaine trade. By relinquishing part of each cocaine
shipment, the Colombian organizations ceded a share of the U.S.
cocaine market to the Mexican traffickers. In addition, although
overall violent crime has steadily declined during the Drug-
Related Violent Crime 1990s, many of the violent crimes committed
are drug-related, according to ONDCP. There are no overall
quantitative data on drug-related violent crime and the
relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent crime,
but ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking
drug abuse or trafficking and other crimes, including violent
crimes.4 According to ONDCP, many crimes (e.g., murder, assault,
and robbery) are committed under the influence of drugs or may be
motivated by a need for money to buy drugs. In addition, drug
trafficking and violence often go hand in hand. Competition and
disputes among drug dealers can cause violence, as can the
location of drug markets in disadvantaged areas where legal and
social controls against violence tend to be ineffective. In this
regard, DEA reported in 1996 that violent drug gangs, which were
once largely confined to major cities, had migrated to and/or
emerged in rural areas and small cities throughout the country.
One example cited was 3 Drug Control: Observations on U.S.
Counternarcotics Activities (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249, Sept. 16, 1998).
4 See ONDCP's Fact Sheet: Drug-Related Crime (Apr. 1997, NCJ-
163928). Page 21
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
Vidalia, GA, where a violent crack cocaine gang was linked to
numerous homicides and drive-by shootings. Nevertheless, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that overall violent crime in
the United States in 1997 had fallen more than 21 percent since
1993 and had reached its lowest level in at least 24 years.
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported in
its 1997 Uniform Crime Reports that the murder rate in 1997 had
declined 28 percent since 1993. It also reported that the number
of drug-related murders decreased by 7 percent between 1996 and
1997.5 According to ONDCP, from fiscal years 1990 through 1999 the
federal Federal Drug Control government spent about $143.5
billion, in constant 1999 dollars, on four Budget in the 1990s
functional areas that can be divided between two categories-(1)
those that are aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs and
(2) those that are aimed at reducing the availability or supply of
such drugs in the United States. As figure 1.3 indicates, about
33.8 percent of the total funds were used for drug demand
reduction. About 66.2 percent of the total funds were used for the
three functional areas intended to reduce the drug supply, with
the largest share-49.5 percent-dedicated to domestic law
enforcement programs, 3.8 percent to international programs, and
12.9 percent to interdiction programs. 5 Although the Uniform
Crime Reports contain data on drug-related murder, they do not
contain such data for other types of violent crime, such as
assault, robbery, or rape. Page 22
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.3: Composition of Total Federal Government Funding for
Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999
Note: This figure is based on budget amounts for each fiscal year
converted to constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from
ONDCP data. As figure 1.4 indicates, total funds for federal drug
control activities increased, in constant 1999 dollars, by about
49 percent-from about $12 billion to almost $18 billion-between
fiscal years 1990 and 1999. However, funding trends varied for the
four functional areas. Although funds for the drug demand
reduction functional area generally increased steadily overall by
50 percent from about $3.9 billion in 1990 to about $5.8 billion
in 1999, funding trends for the three drug supply reduction
functional areas were mixed. Funds for domestic law enforcement
programs increased steadily overall by about 66 percent from about
$5.4 billion in 1990 to almost $8.9 billion in 1999. Funds for
interdiction programs fluctuated within the time period,
increasing overall by about 9 percent from about $2.2 billion in
1990 to almost $2.4 billion in 1999. Funds for international
programs increased by 23 percent from 1990 to 1992, to a peak of
$759.1 million; they then decreased by 60 percent to a low of Page
23 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction $303.5 million in
1996; they rose by 163 percent to about $796.9 million in 1999.
Figure 1.4: Budget Trends in Programs for Federal Drug Control
Activities to Reduce Drug Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal Years
1990 Through 1999 Note 1: The budget amounts for fiscal years 1990
through 1998 are actual, and the fiscal year 1999 budget amount is
as enacted. Note 2: The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in
constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from ONDCP data.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), as amended,
established 1999 National Drug ONDCP to set
federal priorities for drug control, implement a National Control
Strategy Drug Control Strategy, and
certify federal drug control budgets. The act specifies that the
National Strategy must be comprehensive and research based;
contain long-range goals and measurable objectives; and seek to
reduce drug use (demand), availability (supply), and related
consequences. Page 24
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
ONDCP has produced annual strategic plans since 1989. These
strategies recognized that no single approach could solve the
nation's drug problem; rather, drug prevention, education, and
treatment must be complemented by drug supply reduction actions
abroad, on our borders, and within the United States. Each
strategy also shared a commitment to maintain and enforce antidrug
laws. In 1998, ONDCP's National Drug Control Strategy established
performance targets to reduce illegal drug use and availability in
the United States by 25 percent by the year 2002 and 50 percent by
2007.6 The strategy focuses on reducing the demand for drugs
through treatment and prevention and attacking the supply of drugs
through domestic law enforcement, interdiction efforts, and
international cooperation. ONDCP's 1999 National Strategy includes
the performance targets and 5 goals along with 31 supporting
objectives intended to serve as the basis for a coherent, long-
term national effort. * Goal 1: Educate and enable America's
youth to reject illegal drugs as well as tobacco and alcohol. *
Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially
reducing drug-related crime and violence. * Goal 3: Reduce the
health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use. * Goal
4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug
threat. * Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.
As discussed in detail in chapter 3, strategic goals 2, 4, and 5
address drug supply reduction and involve drug law enforcement
activities, including those for which DEA is responsible. Goal 2
seeks, among other things, to reduce the rate of drug-related
crime and violence in the United States by 15 percent by the year
2002 and achieve a 30-percent reduction by the year 2007. Goal 4
seeks a 10-percent reduction in the rate at which illegal drugs
successfully enter the United States by the year 2002 and a 20-
percent reduction in this rate by 2007. Goal 5 seeks a 15-percent
reduction in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries by
the year 2002 and a 30- percent reduction by 2007. The goal also
seeks a 20-percent reduction in domestic marijuana cultivation and
methamphetamine production by 2002 and a 50-percent reduction by
2007. 6 The National Drug Control Strategy established 1996 as the
base year for determining percentage reductions in drug use and
availability. Page 25
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
The mission of DEA, which is a component of DOJ, is to (1) enforce
the DEA's Mission, Role, drug laws and regulations of the
United States and bring drug traffickers7 and Responsibilities
to justice and (2) recommend and support nonenforcement programs
aimed at reducing the availability of illegal drugs in domestic
and international markets. DEA is the lead agency responsible for
federal drug law enforcement and for coordinating and pursuing
drug investigations in foreign countries. According to DEA, its
primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement include the
following: * investigating major drug traffickers operating at
interstate and international levels and criminals and drug gangs
who perpetrate violence in local communities; * coordinating and
cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including interstate
and international investigations; * managing a national drug
intelligence system in cooperation with other federal, state,
local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate
strategic and operational drug intelligence information; *
seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers' assets; * coordinating
and cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies and foreign governments on programs designed to reduce
the availability of illegal drugs on the U.S. market through
nonenforcement methods, such as crop eradication, crop
substitution, and the training of foreign officials; and *
operating, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and
U.S. Ambassadors, all programs associated with drug law
enforcement counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out its
mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its headquarters
office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United
States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of December
1998. Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by
a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), were a total of 30 district
offices, 115 resident offices, and 46 posts of duty in the United
States, with at least 1 office in every state. Overseas, DEA had
79 offices in 56 foreign countries. This included 56 country
offices, each headed by a country attach (CA), and 23 resident
offices reporting to the country offices. (App. I contains
profiles 7 Drug traffickers include those organizations and
principal members involved in the growth, manufacture, or
distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for
illicit traffic in the United States. Page 26
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
of the five field divisions and three country offices included in
our review.) In addition, DEA manages a multiagency intelligence
center in El Paso, TX; conducts training at Quantico, VA; and
maintains seven drug analytical laboratories in various regions of
the country and a special drug testing facility in McLean, VA. As
shown in figure 1.5, DEA's budget almost doubled, in constant 1999
dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999 and totaled
about $11.3 billion during that period. Figure 1.5: DEA's Total
Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Note 1: The
budget amounts for fiscal years 1990 through 1998 are actual, and
the fiscal year 1999 budget amount is as enacted. Note 2: The
budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.
Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. Commensurate with its
increased funding, as shown in figure 1.6, the size of DEA's staff
also increased during the 1990s by 40 percent-from 5,995 employees
in 1990 to 8,387 employees in 1998. Page 27
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.6: DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998,
as of the End of Each Fiscal Year Note: According to DEA, on-board
positions are the number of persons employed by DEA at specified
time periods as opposed to the number actually authorized. Source:
Developed by GAO from DEA data. During this period, the number of
intelligence specialists increased by about 116 percent, special
agents by 40 percent, and other positions8 by 32 percent. As shown
in figure 1.7, of the total on-board positions in fiscal year
1998, special agents made up about 51.4 percent, other positions
about 41.8 percent, and intelligence specialists about 6.9
percent. 8 These include diversion investigators and various
professional, administrative, technical, and clerical positions.
Page 28
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.7: Composition by Position Type of Total Number of DEA
On-Board Staff, as of the End of Fiscal Year 1998 Note:
Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
Developed by GAO from DEA data. The Chairmen of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Objectives, Scope, and
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control requested that we
Methodology determine (1) what
major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and
approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its
mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate
national and international drug traffickers and (b) help state and
local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-
related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA's strategic
goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance
measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy;
and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and
allocated the additional staff. We did our review at DEA
headquarters, as well as at DEA offices in five domestic field
divisions and three foreign countries. We also obtained
information from officials representing DOJ, ONDCP, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of State. Because
the funding and other statistical data we collected from DEA and
other agencies and used in this report were used primarily for
background and descriptive purposes and were not directly related
to our findings, conclusions, and recommendation, we did not
independently validate or verify their accuracy and reliability.
Page 29 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction The five DEA
domestic field division offices we visited are located in Los
Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans, LA; San Juan, Puerto Rico
(the Caribbean Division); and Washington, D.C. We also visited one
DEA district office located in Baltimore, MD, which is part of
DEA's Washington, D.C., Field Division. The three DEA foreign
country offices we visited are located in La Paz, Bolivia; Bogota,
Colombia; and Mexico City, Mexico. In Bolivia, we also visited
resident offices in Santa Cruz and Trinidad and the Chimore base
camp. (See app. I.) In Mexico, we also visited the Guadalajara
Resident Office. These locations were judgmentally selected on the
basis of geographic location, differences in the drug threat in
these areas, and a variety of domestic and foreign drug
enforcement operational characteristics. We also obtained
information from the U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Baltimore, Los
Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Puerto Rico; from local police
agencies in Baltimore; Los Angeles; South Miami, FL; Pine Bluff,
AR; and Puerto Rico; and from State Department officials in
Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico. To determine what major enforcement
strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has
implemented to carry out its mission in the 1990s, we collected
and analyzed pertinent DEA, DOJ, and ONDCP documents. We also
interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials in the
selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, and
DOJ and ONDCP officials. We also collected ONDCP and DEA budget
data for each fiscal year from 1990 to 1999, which we adjusted to
constant 1999 dollars where appropriate. In addition, we obtained
and analyzed DEA special agent work-hour statistics; case
initiation data; statistical results (e.g., arrests, convictions,
and seizures) of investigations; and other information relating to
DEA's enforcement programs. We did not evaluate the effectiveness
of the individual strategies, programs, initiatives, and
approaches discussed in chapter 2. To determine whether DEA's
strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and
performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control
Strategy, we analyzed and compared DEA's annual performance plans
for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 with ONDCP's 1998 and 1999 (1)
National Drug Control Strategies, (2) National Drug Control Budget
Summaries, and (3) Performance Measures of Effectiveness reports.
We also reviewed DOJ's (1) Strategic Plan for 1997-2002, (2)
performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and (3) Drug
Control Strategic Plan. We interviewed DEA and ONDCP officials
about their plans and how they interrelated. We used the
Government Performance and Results Act as our basic criteria along
with OMB, DOJ, and our guidance Page 30
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
on the act, including OMB Circular A-11 and our guides for
assessing agency annual performance plans and strategic plans. To
determine how DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing estimates for its
enforcement programs and initiatives were developed, we collected
and analyzed information on the process, criteria DEA used, and
staffing recommendations made during DEA's budget formulation
process. We interviewed DEA officials in headquarters and in the
selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, as
well as DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB officials to obtain information on how
staffing needs were determined and how the budget review process
affected staffing estimates, requests, and allocations. We
reviewed documents dealing with staffing recommendations and
allocations; policies and procedures; DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB budget
reviews; and congressional appropriations. We performed our work
from December 1997 to May 1999 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. In June 1999, we provided
a draft of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of
ONDCP for comment. We also provided relevant sections of the
report to OMB and State Department officials for a review of the
facts that pertain to those agencies. We received written
comments on June 23, 1999, from the Deputy Administrator, DEA,
which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and reprinted in appendix
II. In addition, DEA provided a number of technical changes and
clarifications, which we have incorporated throughout the report
where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, ONDCP's Acting Deputy
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, orally informed us that
ONDCP reviewed the report from a factual standpoint because the
overall conclusions and recommendation are directed at DEA. He
stated that the report was factually correct from ONDCP's
perspective and provided a few technical clarifications, which we
incorporated where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, OMB officials
responsible for examining DEA's budget orally communicated a few
technical comments, which we incorporated in chapter 4. The State
Department's liaison for GAO informed us on June 21, 1999, that
the Department had no comments. Page 31
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Since its creation in 1973,
DEA has focused its efforts primarily on investigating the highest
levels of national and international illegal drug trafficking. In
addition, DEA has supported state and local law enforcement
efforts directed at the lower levels of drug trafficking. In the
1990s, however, DEA revised its strategy to focus its operations
on what it refers to as the "seamless continuum" of drug
trafficking, from international drug trafficking organizations
residing outside the United States to local gangs and individuals
illegally selling drugs on city streets. Consequently, during the
1990s, DEA gave a higher priority than in the past and increased
resources to working with and assisting state and local law
enforcement agencies, including starting a new program to help
combat drug-related violent crime in local communities.
Concurrently, in the 1990s, DEA made the following enhancements to
its already high priority enforcement operations directed at
national and international drug trafficking organizations. * DEA
established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into the Special
Operations Division (SOD), placing greater emphasis on
intercepting communications between top-level drug traffickers and
their subordinates (i.e., attacking the "command and control"
communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to
dismantle their entire trafficking operations. * DEA started
participating in two interagency programs to target and
investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America
and Asia. * DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign
police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign
countries, primarily in Latin America. Since its establishment,
DEA has directed its resources primarily toward DEA Modified Its
disrupting or dismantling major organizations involved in
interstate and Operational Strategy in international drug
trafficking. DEA has concentrated on investigating those
traffickers functioning at the highest levels of these
enterprises, often by the 1990s developing
conspiracy cases for U.S. Attorneys to prosecute and seizing the
traffickers' assets. Federal drug control policymakers considered
this investigative approach to be the most effective for reducing
the illegal drug supply in the United States. Consistent with this
approach, DEA's operational strategy in the early 1990s was to
identify and exploit trafficker vulnerabilities and to disrupt or
dismantle their organizations by conducting investigations leading
to (1) the prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of leaders
and key players in drug organizations and (2) the seizure and
forfeiture of the assets of these organizations. DEA's enforcement
operations were to focus and Page 32
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations apply pressure in four
principal areas: source (production overseas and in the United
States), transit (smuggling of drugs and essential chemicals),
domestic distribution (sales of illegal drugs in the United
States), and proceeds (money and assets derived from
distribution). DEA operations were also to control the
distribution of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs and
prevent the diversion of legally produced controlled substances.
In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of DEA's
policies and strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately
responding to the drug trafficking problem and related violent
crime. The results of the review included recommendations by DEA
SACs and senior managers that DEA refocus its investigative
priorities by increasing its efforts against domestic drug
trafficking, including violent drug organizations, street gangs,
local impact issues, regional trafficking organizations, and
domestically produced illegal drugs, while, at the same time,
continuing to investigate major national and international
trafficking organizations. As a result, in 1995, the DEA
Administrator established the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET)
Program, which focuses a small percentage of DEA's resources on
drug-related violent crime in local communities. Then, in a 1997
memorandum to DEA's field offices, he indicated that over the next
5 years DEA was to focus its operations on the "seamless
continuum" of the organized crime systems that direct drug
trafficking, with agencywide programs and initiatives directed at
* major regional, national, and international cases; * violent
drug organizations, gangs, and local impact issues; and *
domestically cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. According
to DEA, the international aspects of drug trafficking cannot be
separated from the domestic aspects because they are
interdependent and intertwined. The operations of major
trafficking organizations can involve the cultivation and
production of drugs in foreign countries, transportation to the
United States, and eventual distribution on city streets.
Accordingly, the Administrator emphasized that DEA was to target
the highest level drug traffickers and their organizations, as
well as violent, street-level drug gangs operating in communities.
To implement this strategy, DEA was to pursue a vigorous
international enforcement program, while domestically using the
MET Program and other enforcement approaches to combat the threat
and impact of drugs in local communities. The Administrator cited
cooperation with other agencies as a guiding principle for all
aspects of DEA's international operations and domestic operations,
which included Page 33
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations assisting state and local law
enforcement agencies with their most serious drug and drug-related
violence problems. Although DEA has always worked formally and
informally with state and DEA More Involved local law
enforcement agencies, it increased its involvement in, and With
State and Local devoted more resources to, task forces
and other multiagency operations with state and local law
enforcement agencies in the 1990s. Major DEA Police
programs for working with and assisting state and local police on
multiagency operations are the State and Local Task Force Program,
MET Program, and Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
Program. Through its State and Local Task Force Program, which
originated in 1970 State and Local Task Force with DEA's
predecessor agency, DEA coordinates with state and local law
Program enforcement agencies, shares
information, participates in joint investigations, and shares
assets forfeited federally as a result of cases made against drug
dealers. In addition, state and local officers often receive drug
investigation training and enhanced drug enforcement authority.
Throughout the 1990s, DEA substantially increased the number of
its state and local task forces and the number of special agents
assigned to them. DEA's budget for state and local task forces
also increased substantially during this period. Table 2.1 shows
DEA's budget for its state and local task forces and the number of
task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1999. As the table
indicates, DEA spent $45.7 million, in constant 1999 dollars, on
this program in fiscal year 1991 and budgeted $105.5 million for
fiscal year 1999. The total number of DEA-sponsored state and
local task forces increased by about 90 percent during these
years. Page 34 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
Trafficking Organizations Table 2.1: Budget for and Number of DEA
State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999 Fiscal year
Budget (millions)a Funded task forces Provisional
task forcesb Total task forcesc 1991
$45.7 71
23 94 1992
58.2 73
25 98 1993
82.1 75
25 100 1994
92.7 83
20 103 1995
107.5 79
36 115 1996
48.0 92
41 133 1997
158.0 100
51 151 1998
146.5 122
50 172 1999
105.5 131
48 179 aThe budget amounts for each
fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts are
based on actual costs for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 and the
approved budget for fiscal year 1999. The budget amounts for each
year include DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
Program, which DEA could not separate out. The budget amounts for
fiscal years 1997 through 1999 include approximated payroll costs.
bProvisional task forces are operational in the field with
assigned full-time agents but awaiting authorized funding approval
from DEA Headquarters under the State and Local Task Force
Program. cThe numbers of task forces include DEA's state and local
task forces in ONDCP's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. Similarly, as
shown in table 2.2, the number of special agents assigned to DEA-
sponsored state and local task forces increased by about 84
percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1998, while the number of
assigned state and local law enforcement officers increased by
about 34 percent during the same time period. About 22 percent of
DEA's 4,309 special agents in fiscal year 1998 were assigned to
state and local task forces, compared to about 14 percent of the
total 3,542 special agents at DEA in fiscal year 1991. Table 2.2:
Number of Law Enforcement Fiscal year
DEA special agents State and local officers
Officers on DEA State and Local Task 1991
511 1,153 Forces, Fiscal Years
1991 Through 1998, as of the End of Each Fiscal Year 1992
516 1,209 1993
566 1,226 1994
601 1,221 1995
616 1,251 1996
595 1,296 1997
721 1,435 1998
940 1,548 Note: The table
includes the number of DEA special agents and state and local
officers assigned to DEA's state and local task forces in ONDCP's
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program. Source: Developed by
GAO from DEA data. The amount of time spent by DEA special agents
overall on state and local task forces also increased steadily in
the 1990s. DEA special agents spent Page 35
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations about 19.5 percent of all
domestic investigative work hours on these task forces in fiscal
year 1998 compared to about 9.2 percent during fiscal year 1990.1
Table 2.3 shows the number of cases, arrests, convictions, asset
seizures, and drug seizures that resulted from the state and local
task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1998. Table 2.3: Number
of DEA State and
Fiscal years Local Task Force Case Initiations, Activity
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1996 1997 1998 Arrests, Convictions, and
Seizures, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998 Cases initiated
5,294 6,323 5,265 4,256
5,738 5,684 6,622 6,853 Cases closed
4,992 5,383 5,993 5,167
5,130 5,172 5,668 5,854 Arrests
6,648 7,430 6,464 6,036
7,324 7,757 9,902 11,569 Convictions
4,524 4,800 4,987 4,274
4,161 4,597 4,705 5,477 Assets seized
$265 $149 $159 $122 $118
$85 $112 N/A (millions)a Heroin seized
73 77 82 86 72
172 117 111 (kilograms) Cocaine seized
8,683 14,102 5,433 6,031
6,269 7,460 9,687 8,695 (kilograms)
Marijuana seized 22,314 32,392 21,646 20,234 25,005 27,726 24,833
22,933 (kilograms) Methamphetamine 214
145 205 192 254 251
444 464 seized (kilograms) Note 1: Other drugs were
also seized. Note 2: N/A means not available. aThe amounts of
assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.
Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. DEA categorizes each case
as local, regional, domestic, foreign, or international, according
to the geographic scope covered. 2 As shown in table 2.4, a
little over 50 percent of the task force cases initiated in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998 were local and regional. They involved
suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas covered
by the DEA offices conducting the investigations, and most of them
were local violators. Less 1 The work-hour data that DEA provided
us for fiscal year 1998 were not yet complete, and the percentage
of DEA special agent investigative work hours spent on state and
local task forces in fiscal year 1998 may have actually been
greater than 19.5 percent. 2 A local case involves a domestic
target who operates principally within a local geographic area
less extensive than a regional case; a regional case involves a
domestic target who is criminally active throughout the geographic
region of the DEA office conducting the investigation; a domestic
case is an investigation of a target who is active principally
within the jurisdiction of the United States; a foreign case
involves a target active principally outside the jurisdiction of
the United States; and an international case involves a target
whose criminal activities are both domestic and foreign. Page 36
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations than 10 percent of the task
force cases targeted people suspected of drug trafficking on an
international scale. Table 2.4: Geographic Scope of State
Fiscal year 1997 Fiscal year 1998 and Local Task
Force Cases Initiated Scope of case
Number Percent Number Percent During
Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Local
2,401 36.3 2,633 38.4 Regional
992 15.0 979 14.3 Domestic
2,606 39.4 2,612 38.1 Foreign
36 0.5 30 0.4 International
587 8.9 599 8.7 Total
6,622 100.1 6,853 99.9 Note:
Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
Developed by GAO from DEA data. The following are examples of
state and local task force investigations conducted by the Los
Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; and Washington, D.C., field
divisions, respectively, that DEA considered to be successful. *
DEA's task force in Santa Ana, CA, targeted a Mexican
methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution organization
operating throughout southern California. The investigation
employed wiretaps of nine telephones, along with extensive
surveillance, use of informants, and other investigative
techniques. Primarily on the basis of information from the
wiretaps, the task force conducted 11 raids in 4 cities resulting
in the arrest of 27 Mexican nationals on state drug charges and
the seizure of 26 pounds of methamphetamine, 25 gallons of
methamphetamine in solution form (estimated to be the equivalent
of 50 to 100 pounds of methamphetamine), 100 pounds of ephidrine
in powder form, an estimated 164 pounds of ephidrine in solution
form, other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, 3
ounces of cocaine, and about $93,000 in cash. Two methamphetamine
laboratories and four ephidrine extraction laboratories were
seized and dismantled. * In Operation Emerald City, DEA, along
with state and local law enforcement agencies and state regulatory
agencies, targeted a drug trafficking organization that was
selling drugs in a Riviera Beach, FL, bar in 1997. Some of the
biggest known drug dealers in the greater West Palm Beach area had
used the bar and its attached property for drug dealing since the
1960s; and numerous murders, stabbings, drive-by shootings, and
robberies had occurred there over the years. Two leaders of one
drug organization had been arrested, and another organization had
taken control of the bar. DEA obtained a court order allowing
surreptitious entry of the bar and installation of covert closed
circuit television cameras to record drug transactions, identify
traffickers, and afford undercover Page 37
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations officers the ability to buy
drugs while under constant camera surveillance. As a result, 38
people were arrested for violations of federal and state drug
laws. In addition, the bar's liquor license was revoked, and the
business and surrounding property were forfeited to the
government. * DEA's REDRUM ("murder" spelled backward) task force
group, which focuses on drug and drug-related homicide cases,
targeted a violent heroin trafficking organization operating in
New Orleans, LA. DEA conducted the investigation jointly with the
New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division and the FBI. As a
result of the investigation, which included wiretaps,
surveillance, and debriefings of informants, 13 individuals were
indicted on a variety of federal drug, firearms, and murder
charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to trial, and the head
of the organization was found guilty of all charges and received a
life sentence. In addition, five homicides in the city of New
Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-
related assets were seized. According to DEA, the investigation
had a significant local impact by reducing violent crime and
disrupting the flow of heroin into New Orleans. * DEA's Richmond
District Office City Strike Force in Virginia learned about a
trafficking organization bringing Colombian heroin to the Richmond
and Columbus, OH, areas from New York. Through the arrest and
debriefing of drug couriers, the task force obtained evidence
regarding the organization's distribution of more than 100 pounds
of Colombian heroin in the Richmond area over approximately 1
year's time. The task force arrested the 2 heads of the
organization and 24 co-conspirators. Three kilograms of Colombian
heroin and $17,000 were seized. In February 1995, DEA established
the MET Program to help state and Mobile Enforcement Teams local
law enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking
in their communities, particularly crime committed by violent
gangs. This was consistent with the Attorney General's Anti-
Violent Crime Initiative, which was initiated in 1994 to establish
partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies to address major violent crime problems, including gangs.
The MET Program was also consistent with ONDCP's 1995 National
Drug Control Strategy, which cited the program as an example of
how federal agencies would help state and local agencies address
drug trafficking and associated violence. According to DEA
officials, federal assistance through the MET Program was designed
to help overcome two challenges facing state and local agencies in
drug enforcement: Page 38
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations * State and local police
agencies did not have sufficient resources to effectively enforce
drug laws. * Local law enforcement personnel were known to local
drug users and sellers, making undercover drug buys and
penetration of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous.
Unlike DEA's traditional State and Local Task Force Program,
previously discussed, in the MET Program, upon request from local
officials, DEA deploys teams of special agents (referred to as
METs) directly to communities affected by drug-related violence.
The METs are based in DEA field divisions throughout the country.
The METs are to work cooperatively with the requesting local law
enforcement agency-sharing intelligence, coordinating activities,
and sometimes combining staff and other resources-to target drug
gangs and individuals responsible for violent crime. Since its
creation in fiscal year 1995, funds for the MET Program have
totaled about $173 million in constant 1999 dollars. Table 2.5
shows the MET budget, the number of active METs, and the number of
agents authorized for those METs from the inception through fiscal
year 1999. Table 2.5: Selected MET Program Data, MET Fiscal
Years 1995 to 1999
Fiscal years Program data 1995a
1996 1997 1998 1999 METs
19 19 23 24
24 DEA special 167 167
250 250 250 agentsb Budget
d $55.1d $19.7 $46.9
$51.1 (millions) c aFiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month
period. bThe number of special agent positions were authorized as
of the end of each fiscal year, except for fiscal year 1999
positions, which were as of March 1999. c The budget amounts for
each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts
include actual payroll costs for fiscal year 1996 and approximated
payroll costs for fiscal years 1997 through 1999. Other costs are
actual for fiscal years 1996 through 1998 and as approved for
fiscal year 1999. dThe fiscal year 1996 budget includes funds
spent in fiscal year 1995. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.
A typical MET is made up of 8 to 12 DEA special agents. Each MET
operation starts with a request to the local DEA field office from
a police chief, sheriff, or district attorney for assistance in
dealing with drug-related violence. DEA then evaluates the scope
of the problem and the capability of local law enforcement to
address it. Each assessment is supposed to give particular
attention to the violent crime rate in the requesting Page 39
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations community and the impact of
the identified drug group on the violence occurring there. Once
DEA decides to deploy a MET, an action plan is to be developed,
including identification of the suspects to be targeted. Following
this initial planning, the MET is to conduct the deployment
outfitted with the necessary surveillance and technical equipment.
During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law
enforcement officials to investigate and arrest targeted violent
drug offenders. According to DEA officials, the MET generally
collects intelligence, initiates investigations, participates in
undercover operations, makes arrests, seizes assets, and provides
support to local or federal prosecutors. Evidence developed in MET
investigations may also be used to prosecute the same individuals
for related crimes, including murder, assault, or other acts of
violence. According to DEA, each MET deployment plan establishes a
time frame of between 90 and 120 days for completing the
deployment.3 At the time of our review, DEA had 24 METs in 20 of
its 21 domestic field divisions (with the Caribbean Division being
the only exception). Table 2.6 shows the number of MET deployments
and their results from the program's inception in fiscal year 1995
through fiscal year 1998. 3 In discussing a draft of our report,
DEA noted that a review of all 187 MET deployments completed as of
April 20, 1999, showed that the average deployment length was 167
days. Page 40
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.6: Selected Data on
MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998 Fiscal years
Selected data on MET deployments 1995 (6 months)-
1996 1997 1998
Total Requests
112 67 79
258 Deployments initiated
79 46 56
181 Deployments completed
79 45 34
158 Deployments active
0 1 22
23 Arrestsa
1,973 2,200 2,199
6,372 Convictionsb
240 415 1,071
1,726 Cocaine seized (pounds)
95 747 342
1,184 Methamphetamine seized (pounds)
68 115 199
382 Heroin seized (pounds)
3 31 18
52 Marijuana Seized (pounds)
158 493 646
1,297 Assets seized (millions)c
$3.6 $2.7 $3.8
$10.0 aIn addition to DEA arrests, MET deployments from the
program's inception through 1998 also led to a total of 612
arrests by other law enforcement agencies. bAccording to DEA,
actual convictions are higher than these numbers indicate due to
sentencing delays and the lack of reporting of prosecutorial
dispositions in the state systems. Also, the conviction totals may
increase due to the delay between arrest and final disposition. c
The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999
dollars. The yearly amounts, when added, do not equal the total
due to rounding. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. The DEA
offices in Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C.,
had completed 33 MET deployments at the time we made our visits
during 1998. In conducting our work at these offices, we spoke
with local police officials in selected cities-Baltimore, MD; Los
Angeles, CA; Pine Bluff, AR; and South Miami, FL-who had requested
MET deployments. The officials said they were pleased with the
results of the MET deployments and that the accomplishments met
their expectations. Following are summaries of the MET deployments
in these four cities. * A MET deployment conducted for about 2-
1/2 months during 1996 in the Rampart area of Los Angeles targeted
six violent street gangs: 18th Street, Mara Salvatruches, Orphans,
Playboys, Crazy Riders, and Diamonds. In addition to the MET, the
Los Angeles Police Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, and the California Department of Corrections
participated. The operation resulted in 421 arrests, including 144
by DEA's MET, and seizures of 1,200 grams of heroin, 630 grams of
cocaine, 104 pounds of marijuana, 28 weapons, and $70,000 in
currency. According to a Los Angeles Police Department official,
crime statistics (e.g., homicides and aggravated assaults) in the
Rampart area fell immediately after the MET deployment was
completed. However, DEA's post-deployment assessment of violent
crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment
ended to the 6 months prior to the Page 41
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations deployment, showed that
homicides increased from 42 to 47, aggravated assaults increased
from 738 to 1,008, robberies increased from 1,091 to 1,275, and
sex crimes increased from 130 to 207. In addition, the assessment
indicated that drug sales appeared to increase shortly after the
deployment was completed, approaching levels observed before the
deployment started. It further indicated that a significant number
of drug dealers reportedly changed the location of their
distribution activities while remaining in the Rampart area.4 *
The South Miami Police Department requested DEA support in going
after crack cocaine dealers. Initially, the police collected
intelligence, purchased drugs, and arrested 17 street-level drug
dealers. DEA's MET then became involved. The MET bought crack
cocaine from drug dealers who came out to sell the drugs after the
initial arrests had been made. The MET, which deployed for about 3
months in 1998, made 13 arrests (7 for federal prosecution and 6
for state prosecution) and seized 386.7 grams of crack cocaine.
South Miami police officials said some of those arrested had
committed weapons violations and some violence (e.g., assaults,
batteries, and armed robberies) in the past. According to DEA's
post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area,
comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6 months
prior to the deployment, homicides decreased from 1 to 0, assaults
decreased from 11 to 4, aggravated batteries decreased from 9 to
3, and robberies decreased from 14 to 5. The assessment noted that
illegal drug activity in the South Miami area had been greatly
reduced. The assessment further noted that the availability of
crack cocaine in the area had been reduced, as well as drug
distribution in surrounding areas. * A MET deployment conducted
for 6 months during 1997 in Pine Bluff targeted violent
organizations dealing in crack cocaine and methamphetamine. A
total of 46 people were arrested, including 15 who were indicted
by a federal grand jury. Four people were suspects in four
different homicides. Six ounces of crack cocaine were seized,
along with 15 vehicles and $118,026. The Pine Bluff Police Chief
told us that the MET deployment had successfully helped reduce
both the city's homicide rate and its crack cocaine problem.
However, DEA's post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the
area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6
months prior to the deployment, showed that homicides increased
from 4 to 7, assaults increased from 677 to 1,098, rapes increased
from 44 to 51, and robberies increased from 168 to 190. 4 In
discussing a draft of our report, DEA officials said this MET
deployment was not typical. It was conducted during a time when
DEA was refining the program. The Los Angeles Rampart area
deployment focused on a specific area, and DEA now requires each
MET deployment to focus on targeted criminal drug organizations.
Page 42
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations * A MET deployed in eastern
Baltimore for 5 months during 1997 successfully targeted a drug
organization-the M&J Gang-in a housing project. This case resulted
in 81 arrests, many of which were already "in the works" before
the MET deployment, according to Baltimore police officials we
contacted. The officials said the MET deployment also reduced
violent crime in that area. DEA's post-deployment assessment
showed fewer major crimes overall in the area during the 6-month
period starting about 1 month before the deployment ended compared
to the 6 months prior to the deployment. Shootings decreased from
527 to 389, aggravated assaults decreased from 3,273 to 2,950,
robberies decreased from 4,888 to 3,889, burglaries decreased from
5,775 to 5,684, larcenies decreased from 16,475 to 15,976, and
stolen automobiles decreased from 4,851 to 3,213. However, murders
increased from 143 to 156, and rapes increased from 175 to 202.
DEA's assessment also reported that narcotic activity in two areas
covered by the deployment was significantly reduced, and gang-
related criminal activity had decreased in the sections of
Baltimore controlled by the M&J Gang and another drug gang. DEA
officials we met with in the four field division offices told us
that although MET deployments typically focused on local violent
drug offenders, they sometimes led to investigations of higher
level drug traffickers. In response to our request for
quantitative data on this, a DEA headquarters official responded
that it is difficult for DEA to provide statistics on the exact
number of deployments that have led to investigations of higher
level drug traffickers through MET operations because this
information was not systematically maintained in an automated
database. However, DEA did provide us with some examples of MET
deployments that led to higher level drug traffickers. For
example, DEA reported that a MET deployed from DEA's Phoenix
office identified connections in Mexico to MET targets in Lake
Havasu City, AZ, and family members in southern California. The
resulting intelligence revealed that this Mexican-based
organization was responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals
from Mexico to clandestine laboratory sites in southern
California, where methamphetamine was produced. Multiple-pound
quantities of methamphetamine were transported to Lake Havasu
City. According to DEA, the organization was also transporting
large shipments of methamphetamine to Oregon, Washington,
Colorado, and New Mexico. As shown in table 2.7, the MET
deployments conducted in fiscal years 1995 through 1998 resulted
in mostly local and regional drug cases. Local and regional cases
involve suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas
covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. As
expected, given the MET program's purpose, local cases were the
single Page 43 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
Trafficking Organizations largest category, making up about 47
percent of the total during that period. About 6 percent of the
MET cases involved criminals trafficking in drugs on an
international scale. Table 2.7: Geographic Scope of MET Program
Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998 Fiscal year
1995a Fiscal year 1996 Fiscal year 1997
Fiscal Year 1998 Total Scope of case Number
Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Number Percent Local 21 40.4
52 40.0 87 54.4 69 48.6
229 47.3 Regional 18 34.6
38 29.2 32 20.0 38 26.8
126 26.0 Domestic 8 15.4
30 23.1 36 22.5 23 16.2
97 20.0 Foreign 0 0.0
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
0 0.0 International 4 7.7
10 7.7 5 3.1 12 8.5
31 6.4 Other 1 1.9
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1 0.2 Total 52 100.0
130 100.0 160 100.0 142 100.1
484 99.9 Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to
rounding. aFiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period. Source:
Developed by GAO from DEA data. After completing a MET deployment,
DEA may carry out efforts to help a community maintain a lower
level of drug trafficking and violent crime. For example, DEA
offers follow-up training to those communities carrying out drug
demand reduction activities. In addition, if feasible, DEA may
respond to a request for the re-deployment of a MET to prevent
drug- related violent crimes from resurging to the level that
existed prior to the initial deployment. In a June 1998 memorandum
to all SACs of domestic field offices, DEA headquarters directed
that the field divisions proactively promote the MET Program to
increase the number of requests for deployments. The memorandum
stated that despite the MET Program's success, much more could and
should be done to stimulate interest in the program on the part of
state and local law enforcement agencies. The DEA offices were
instructed to collect crime statistics in specific areas within
their geographic boundaries to determine the existence of drug
trafficking problems related to violent crime. After making such
determinations, the DEA SAC or a designated assistant was to
contact the local police chief or sheriff in those areas to
explain the benefits of a MET deployment in their jurisdictions
and inform them of the availability of MET resources. The
memorandum noted that each SAC or assistant was expected to visit
local police officials each month. The memorandum further noted
that each office's proactive MET Program activities would be a
significant factor in the SACs' annual performance appraisals.
According to DEA, the proactive contacts have generated numerous
additional requests for MET assistance, Page 44
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations and the majority of recent
deployments have been the result of such proactive contacts. With
regard to the results of the MET Program, DEA officials reported
decreases in the number of murders, robberies, and aggravated
assaults in local areas covered by the program based on an
analysis of local crime statistics gathered from the targeted
geographic locations before and after 133 deployments that had
been completed as of April 20, 1999.5 According to DEA, its post-
deployment assessments cumulatively showed a 12- percent decline
in murders, 14-percent decline in robberies, and 6-percent decline
in aggravated assaults in the 133 deployment areas during the 6
months after the deployments ended when compared to the 6 months
prior to the deployments. Further, DEA's analysis showed that 28
of the 133 deployment areas had decreases in all 3 major violent
crime categories (i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault)
during the 6 months after the deployments ended, while only 5 of
the areas had increases in all 3 crime categories. (These five
deployments included two of the examples summarized above). In
commenting on these results, DEA noted that the effectiveness of
MET deployments in removing a specific, targeted violent drug
gang, for example, cannot by itself eliminate a community's drug
trafficking problems because DEA cannot continue to control the
deployment areas to prevent other drug dealers from filling the
void that a MET deployment might have created. DEA started
assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in their
Domestic Cannabis efforts to control domestically grown
marijuana in 1979, when it helped Eradication/Suppression
agencies in California and Hawaii. DEA's Domestic Cannabis Program
Eradication/Suppression Program was established in 1982 to more
formally help the states eradicate domestic marijuana while
building cases leading to the arrest and prosecution of growers.
The program became active in all 50 states in 1985. To implement
the program, DEA provides funds to state and local law enforcement
agencies. The funds are to be used by these agencies for program
expenses, such as aircraft rentals and fuel, vehicles, equipment,
supplies, and overtime payments for state and local officers
working on eradication operations. As table 2.8 indicates, funds
provided by DEA for the program increased about 177 percent, in
constant 1999 dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999.
5 According to DEA, 187 deployments had been completed as of April
20, 1999. However, DEA only had FBI Uniform Crime Report
statistical information for the 6-month period following 133 of
the completed deployments. Page 45
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.8: Funding for DEA's
Domestic Dollars in millions Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
Fiscal year
Dollarsa Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999
1990
4.7 1991
16.2 1992
11.5 1993
11.2 1994
10.9 1995
10.7 1996
10.5 1997
13.9 1998
13.7 1999
13.0 aThe fund amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999
dollars. The fund amounts do not include DEA's payroll costs.
Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. DEA encourages state and
local agencies to assume the major responsibility for eradicating
domestic marijuana. In coordinating the program in each state, DEA
is to assist efforts to detect and eradicate marijuana plants
(including coordinating the support of other agencies, arranging
for needed equipment, and helping with surveillance); exchange
intelligence; investigate marijuana trafficking organizations; and
provide training. Table 2.9 shows the statistical results of DEA's
Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program for 1990 through
1998. Page 46 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus
in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major
Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.9: Domestic Cannabis
Eradication/Suppression Program Statistical Results, 1990 Through
1998 Output 1990 1991
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1997 1998a Cultivated outdoor plants 7.3
5.3 7.5 4.0 4.0 3.1
2.8 3.8 2.1 eradicated (millions) Indoor plants
eradicated N/A 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(millions) Ditchweed plants 118.5 133.8
264.2 387.9 504.4 370.3 419.7
237.1 127.9 eradicatedb (millions) Arrests
5,729 9,364 12,639 12,397 13,115
14,274 18,733 17,070 10,507 Weapons
3,210 4,200 5,541 6,062 5,959
4,151 4,699 4,713 7,351 seized Assets seized
(millions)c $47.7 $62.4 $79.7
$58.2 $62.1 $47.3 $39.7 $40.7 $20.9
Note: N/A means not available. aThe 1998 data provided by DEA at
the time of our work were not complete. bDitchweed is uncultivated
marijuana that grows wild. c The amounts of assets seized each
year are in constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from
DEA data. In addition to its State and Local Task Force, MET, and
Domestic Cannabis DEA Works With State and
Eradication/Suppression Programs, DEA also participates in other
Local Agencies on Other multiagency task force
operations involving state and local law Multiagency Operations
enforcement agencies. These include the following: * The
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program is
coordinated by U.S. Attorneys. This program is designed to promote
coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies involved in drug enforcement in each task
force region. The goal of the OCDETF Program is to identify,
investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking
organizations and related enterprises. In fiscal year 1998, DEA
sponsored 847, or 62 percent, and participated in 1,096, or 81
percent, of the 1,356 OCDETF investigations that were initiated.
DOJ reimburses DEA for its expenditures on OCDETF investigations.
For fiscal year 1998, DEA was reimbursed $94.4 million for the
OCDETF Program. * The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
(HIDTA) Program is administered by ONDCP. The mission of the HIDTA
Program is to coordinate drug control efforts among federal,
state, and local agencies in designated areas in order to reduce
drug trafficking in critical regions of the United States. At the
time of our work in September 1998, ONDCP had designated 20 areas
as HIDTAs. According to ONDCP, a HIDTA organization typically
consists of a major task force led by federal agencies, drug and
money laundering task forces led by state or local agencies, a
joint intelligence center and information-sharing network, and
Page 47 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
Trafficking Organizations other supporting initiatives.6 DEA
receives funds from ONDCP based upon its participation in the
HIDTA Program. For fiscal year 1998, DEA received $14.8 million in
direct HIDTA funding. Since it was established, DEA's highest
priority has been to investigate DEA Developed an
major drug trafficking organizations, both domestic and foreign,
Investigative Approach responsible for supplying illegal drugs
consumed in the United States. Over the years, DEA has adopted
various techniques for focusing its efforts on Focusing on the
such investigations. In 1992, DEA started using an investigative
approach Communications of designed to identify and
target drug kingpins and their supporting Major Drug Trafficking
infrastructures, primarily through the use of wiretaps and other
types of Organizations electronic surveillance
within the United States and the use of intelligence information.
DEA called this approach the Kingpin Strategy. This approach,
which has led to the dismantling or disruption of major
trafficking organizations, was later adopted by SOD when it was
established in 1995. More recently, DEA has established the
Regional Enforcement Team (RET) initiative to address regional,
national, and international drug trafficking in small towns and
rural areas within the United States. Developed in 1992, the
Kingpin Strategy targeted major Colombian cocaine The Kingpin
Strategy and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin
trafficking organizations. This strategy was DEA's top priority
and its primary enforcement approach for addressing the national
priority of reducing the availability of illegal drugs in the
United States. The Kingpin Strategy primarily targeted cocaine
trafficking organizations operating out of Medellin and Cali,
Colombia, with most of its focus on one organization referred to
as the Cali cartel. According to DEA, the heads of the Colombian
organizations tightly controlled all aspects of their operations
and telephoned subordinates to give directions. DEA concluded that
this was a weakness in the operations of these organizations. DEA
decided to exploit this weakness by monitoring their
communications and analyzing telephone numbers called to identify
the kingpins and their key subordinates for U.S. and/or foreign
investigation, arrest, and prosecution and for seizure of their
domestic assets. The Office of Major Investigations at DEA
headquarters was responsible for implementing the Kingpin
Strategy. Various intelligence, financial, and operational
functions were consolidated within this office to facilitate
focusing DEA's investigative resources and capabilities on
targeted 6 Drug Control: Information on High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas Program (GAO/GGD-98-188, Sept. 3, 1998). Page 48
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations kingpin organizations (TKO).
The office disseminated tips and leads, collected from
intelligence sources worldwide, to help agents in the field carry
out investigations and enforcement activities. The office
centrally directed, coordinated, oversaw, and funded
investigations that were being carried out in multiple U.S. cities
and foreign countries in cooperation with state, local, and
foreign police. DEA's SOD and its investigative approach evolved
out of the Office of Special Operations Division Major
Investigations and the Kingpin Strategy. According to DEA, the
Kingpin Strategy was enhanced by the creation of SOD as a separate
division. SOD was established at DEA headquarters in August 1995
and given its own budget and additional staff.7 As with the
Kingpin Strategy, SOD's approach focuses on the command and
control communications of major drug trafficking organizations.
However, a major difference is that its scope was expanded beyond
Colombian cocaine and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin
trafficking organizations to coordinate and support investigations
of major organizations trafficking in methamphetamine and
Colombian heroin, as well as organizations trafficking illegal
drugs along the Southwest Border. SOD's primary emphasis currently
is Colombian and Mexican organizations responsible for smuggling
illegal drugs into the United States. Another major difference
from the Kingpin Strategy is that representatives from other law
enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S. Customs Service,
are detailed to SOD. The FBI has had agents detailed to SOD since
1995, and the Deputy SAC of SOD is an FBI agent. Similarly, the
Customs Service has detailed agents to SOD since 1996. Most of
SOD's workload supports cases being conducted by DEA field
offices. However, the SOD SAC told us that the workload was
increasingly supporting FBI and Customs Service cases. The
intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) also
participate by providing drug intelligence to SOD. In addition,
DOJ's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section participates by
providing legal advice to SOD on investigations. Like the Kingpin
Strategy, SOD's investigative approach and initiatives are to
support domestic and foreign investigations of major drug
traffickers and trafficking organizations in two principal ways.
First, SOD is to disseminate tips and leads collected from
intelligence sources worldwide to help agents in the field carry
out investigations and enforcement activities. Second, SOD is to
assist agents in building and coordinating multijurisdictional
drug conspiracy cases that are based primarily on the 7 The DEA
Administrator approved 40 positions, including 31 Special Agent
positions, for the new SOD. Page 49
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations use of wiretaps.
Multijurisdictional efforts, such as Operation Reciprocity
(described later) with 35 wiretaps in 10 U.S. cities, can involve
many different individual investigations across the country. In
May 1999, the SOD SAC estimated that SOD was supporting and
coordinating about 240 cases throughout the United States. He said
that SOD typically had approximately six to eight ongoing major
operations at any one time, each having multiple related cases.
Similar to the Kingpin Strategy, SOD does not control the cases
that it supports; rather, decisionmaking on cases is left to field
supervisors and agents. According to DEA officials, if SOD
determines that field offices in different parts of the country
are conducting investigations related to the same major drug
trafficking organization, it attempts to bring the responsible
agents together to develop the best cases for prosecution. In so
doing, it is to coordinate and guide the agents' efforts,
including their intelligence and electronic surveillance
operations, and assist with intelligence collection and analysis.
SOD essentially funds the same types of investigative activities
as the Office of Major Investigations funded under the Kingpin
Strategy. According to the SOD SAC, SOD provides funds to DEA
field offices primarily for conducting electronic surveillance in
support of investigations. It also funds payments for informants
and drug purchases if doing so is essential to an investigation.
However, he said it does so only when an electronic surveillance
is being conducted or planned and only in connection with an
ongoing case with which SOD is involved. (For example, in the
course of an investigation, an agent may acquire a phone number
that is determined to be connected with a current SOD-funded
investigation.) SOD does not fund individual FBI and Customs drug
investigations, but it does support some of those investigations
through its various activities. SOD is responsible for the
oversight of and guidance for DEA's Title III Collection,
Analysis, and (electronic surveillance) program. In Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Dissemination of Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Congress set forth the circumstances
Intelligence Information under which the interception of wire
and oral communications may be Enhanced
authorized (P.L. 90-351,18 USC 2510, et seq.). SOD is to help
special agents in the field focus their intercept operations on
the best available targets, choose the best telephone numbers for
intercept, correctly conduct the intercepts, make the best use of
collected information, and make the most efficient use of
transcribers and translators. SOD also is to send teams to the
field to assist special agents with their wire intercept
operations. Page 50 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its
Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations According to DEA officials
and data, since the Kingpin Strategy and SOD initiatives have been
in operation, DEA has greatly increased the number of wiretaps and
other electronic surveillances it conducts. The number of
electronic surveillance court orders requested and conducted by
DEA, as shown in table 2.10, increased by 183 percent; and the
number of facilities (e.g., telephone, pager, and fax machine)
covered by the orders increased by 158 percent, from fiscal year
1990 to fiscal year 1998. Most noteworthy is that the number of
orders increased by 30 percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1992
after the Kingpin Strategy was initiated, and they increased by 65
percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1996 after SOD was
established. Table 2.10: Number of Electronic
Orders requested and Surveillance Orders and Facilities Fiscal
year conducted
Facilities covered Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1990
223 219 1998
1991 256
311 1992
332 302 1993
320 320 1994
357 339 1995
330 284 1996
546 584 1997
592 544 1998
631 564 Note: The number of orders
requested and conducted is sometimes greater than the number of
facilities covered because some DEA requests were for extensions
of previous wiretap orders. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA
data. DEA's Special Intelligence Division is to support SOD's
operations by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
intelligence and other information from a variety of sources. For
example, the unit is to analyze and disseminate information from
telephone records and access and disseminate information from DEA,
FBI, and Customs computerized drug intelligence systems. The unit
has expanded both in size and computer and other technological
capability. There were 186 staff in October 1998, including DEA,
FBI, Customs, DOD, and contractor personnel. According to the SOD
SAC, although DEA did not systematically compile Major
International Drug results data on all of the Kingpin
and SOD operations, cases supported, Trafficking Organizations
and leads disseminated, DEA has used both initiatives to
successfully Disrupted dismantle or
disrupt drug trafficking organizations responsible for large
amounts of illegal drugs brought into the United States. For
example, according to DEA, the Kingpin Strategy contributed to
dismantling the Cali cartel, which DEA considered the most
powerful criminal organization that law enforcement has ever
faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel Page 51
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations leaders have been captured by
or surrendered to the Colombian National Police (CNP), with the
exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the
time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through
years of investigations by DEA and other federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies and CNP led to the identification,
indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel
leaders and some of their subordinates on drug charges in Colombia
and the United States. According to DEA, a number of other
successful operations have resulted from the Kingpin Strategy and
SOD initiatives. These include the following: * Operation Tiger
Trap was a joint operation carried out by DEA and the Royal Thai
Police in 1994. Tiger Trap produced U.S. indictments against
members of the 20,000-man Shan United Army, a heroin TKO that
operated the principal trafficking network in the Golden Triangle
area of Thailand, Burma, and Laos for decades. * Zorro I and
Zorro II were multijurisdictional operations involving DEA, the
FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local law enforcement
agencies. Zorro I targeted Colombian drug traffickers based in
Cali, Colombia, and their key subordinates operating in Los
Angeles, New York, and Miami. Zorro I operated from 1992 to 1994
and included 10 DEA domestic field divisions. Zorro II targeted
Mexican transportation groups used by the Colombians, as well as
Colombian distribution cells located throughout the United States.
It operated from 1995 to 1996 and included 14 DEA field divisions.
The two operations relied heavily on the use of wiretaps. There
were 117 wiretaps conducted, generating leads that identified
Colombian distribution cells, Mexican traffickers' command and
control networks, money laundering routes, cocaine cache sites,
and other important information. According to DEA, these
operations disrupted both Colombian and Mexican organizations.
Specifically, Zorro I resulted in 209 arrests, 6.5 tons of cocaine
seized, and $13.5 million seized. Zorro II resulted in 182
arrests, 5.7 tons of cocaine and 1,018 pounds of marijuana seized,
$18.3 million seized, and $2.5 million in assets seized. *
Operation Limelight was a multijurisdictional operation involving
DEA, Customs, and numerous state and local law enforcement
agencies. The operation targeted a Mexican drug transportation and
distribution organization, which intelligence indicated was
responsible for importing over 1- tons of cocaine monthly into the
United States. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997,
included the use of 37 wiretaps and other electronically generated
intelligence, which helped identify groups in Houston and McAllen,
TX; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, CA; New York, NY;
and Chicago, IL. The operation resulted in 48 arrests, 4 tons Page
52 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in the
1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
Trafficking Organizations of cocaine seized, 10,846 pounds of
marijuana seized, and $7.1 million seized. * Operation
Reciprocity was a multijurisdictional investigation involving DEA,
the FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local agencies.
In this operation, DEA combined several independent, but related,
investigations being simultaneously conducted by federal, state,
and local agencies into one investigation and helped other offices
start investigations of other subjects by providing leads. The
operation focused on two independent group heads based in the
Juarez, Mexico, area who were responsible for importing,
transporting, and distributing more than 30 tons of cocaine from
Mexico to Chicago and New York. The operation involved 35 wiretaps
and other electronically generated intelligence information in 10
cities. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997, resulted in 53
arrests, 7.4 tons of cocaine seized, 2,800 pounds of marijuana
seized, and $11.2 million seized. According to DEA, information
from some of the above SOD operations Regional Enforcement
and other intelligence sources indicates that some major drug
trafficking Teams organizations are adapting
to drug law enforcement efforts in large U.S. cities by shifting
their operations to small towns and rural areas within the United
States. DEA investigations and other information have provided
evidence that these trafficking organizations have established
command and control centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment
points in many small communities. Consequently, according to DEA,
these communities have become major distribution centers, as well
as production centers in some cases, for illegal drugs, such as
cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. To respond to
this threat, DEA established the RET initiative in fiscal year
1999, for which Congress provided $13 million and authorized 56
positions. The RETs are designed to be proactive, highly mobile
regional investigative teams whose mission is to (1) target drug
organizations operating or establishing themselves in small towns
and rural areas where there is a lack of sufficient drug law
enforcement resources and (2) better develop and exploit drug
intelligence developed by SOD and other sources. The RET
initiative's objective is to identify and dismantle these drug
organizations before they become entrenched in the communities.
The RETs are similar to METs, previously discussed, only in that
they are mobile teams. The RET initiative differs significantly
from the MET Program in that the RETs are to only target major
drug violators operating at the regional, national, or
international level; while the METs, upon Page 53
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations request from local
authorities, are to assist urban and rural communities in
investigating and eliminating drug-related violence. DEA is
implementing two RETs, which are to become operational in
September 1999, one in Charlotte, NC, and one in Des Moines, IA.
According to DEA, each RET will consist of 22 personnel, including
15 special agents. In addition, the RETs are to be provided with
the investigative equipment and vehicles needed to ensure a high
degree of mobility and capability to support the performance of
even the most complex investigations. According to DEA,
international drug trafficking organizations have Key Changes in
DEA's become the most dangerous organized crime forces in the
world, and Foreign Operations Colombian and Mexican
organizations are the most threatening to the United States. DEA
documents state that such international trafficking organizations
are often headquartered in foreign countries where there is little
or no potential for extradition to the United States. Because of
the international nature of drug trafficking, DEA had 79 offices
in 56 foreign countries as of December 1998. DEA opened 16 offices
in 15 foreign countries, and closed 4 offices in 4 countries, from
fiscal years 1990 through 1998. Each foreign DEA office is part of
the U.S. Embassy's country team. As a country team member, how DEA
operates in a foreign country must be consistent with the
embassy's Mission Program Plan, which is a strategic plan required
by the State Department for U.S. government activities within each
country where there is a U.S. Embassy. Mission Program Plans
discuss the embassies' human rights, democratic, economic, law
enforcement, and other goals, strategies, and objectives,
including efforts to combat drug trafficking. The plan for each
country is to be reviewed and approved by DEA and other agencies
represented on the country team. DEA cannot operate in foreign
countries as it does in the United States because of various
limitations. For example, DEA said its agents cannot make arrests
or conduct electronic surveillances in any foreign country, nor
can they be present during foreign police enforcement operations
without a waiver from the Ambassador.8 DEA's primary goal in the
countries where it operates is, through bilateral law enforcement
8 The Mansfield Amendment, Section 481(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2291(c), regulates the
involvement of U.S. government personnel in foreign drug law
enforcement activities. Page 54
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations cooperation, to disrupt
and/or dismantle the leadership, command, control, and
infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations that threaten the
United States. To accomplish this goal, DEA engages in cooperative
investigations and exchanges intelligence with its host nation
counterparts. In addition, DEA provides training, advice, and
assistance to host nation law enforcement agencies to improve
their effectiveness and make them self-sufficient in investigating
major drug traffickers and combating the production,
transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs. In addition to
SOD operations, DEA has been a participant in two Interagency
International interagency investigative programs that were
established during the 1990s Investigative Programs to
address drug trafficking in certain foreign countries where major
trafficking organizations were based. They are the Linear and
Linkage Approach Programs. Linear Approach Program This
program was established in 1991 as a U.S. interagency forum to
disrupt and dismantle the key organizations in Latin America
responsible for producing and shipping illegal drugs to the United
States. The program's foundation rests on three basic tenets:
focus law enforcement and intelligence community resources on key
targets, foster community collaboration, and enhance host nation
capabilities. The Washington Linear Committee, which comprises 15
organizations and is cochaired by DEA, was designed to help better
coordinate the counterdrug efforts of U.S. Embassy country teams,
field-based regional intelligence centers, and U.S. Military
Commands. The Linear Approach Program initially focused on
Colombian and Mexican cocaine organizations. It has since been
expanded to include other Latin American trafficking organizations
that are primary recipients of significant amounts of drugs
directly from the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
Some of these organizations may traffic in heroin and/or
methamphetamine, in addition to cocaine. DEA reported that, for
the period of 1994 through 1998, 21 main targets of the Linear
Program and 22 associates had been arrested.9 All of the Cali
cartel leaders who were arrested as part of the previously
discussed Kingpin Strategy were also primary targets of the Linear
Approach Program. This program was established in 1992 and has
been DEA's principal Linkage Approach Program international
strategy to address the heroin threat from Asia. The program is
cochaired by DEA. It focuses law enforcement and intelligence
community resources on efforts to disrupt and dismantle major
Asian 9 DEA did not track the number of Linear Approach Program
arrests until 1994. Page 55
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations trafficking organizations
producing heroin for distribution to the United States. Linkage
Approach Program targets are to have a significant role in one of
the Southeast or Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations
and be subject to extradition to, and arrest and prosecution in,
the United States. According to DEA, prior to this program, which
was designed to make use of U.S. drug conspiracy laws, major
Southeast and Southwest Asian traffickers exploited the lack of
conspiracy laws in their own countries by insulating themselves
from the actual drugs. The Linkage Program uses a multinational
and multiagency approach to gather evidence for use in the U.S.
judicial system, securing indictments in federal courts, and
pursuing the extradition of the targeted traffickers to the United
States for prosecution. DEA reported that through 1998, 33 Linkage
Approach Program targets had been arrested, 10 defendants had been
extradited to the United States, and 1 defendant was incarcerated
pending extradition. In 1996, DEA initiated its Vetted Unit
Program, under which foreign police Vetted Units of Foreign
participate in special host country investigative and intelligence
collection Police Established units in selected foreign
countries. According to DEA officials, the foreign police
participants are screened and then trained by DEA with the
intention of enhancing their professionalism and creating an
atmosphere of increased trust and confidence between participating
foreign police and DEA agents working with the vetted units. DEA
believes that these units will (1) enhance the safety of DEA
agents in those participating countries and (2) increase the
sharing of sensitive information between DEA and foreign police.
All foreign police participating in the DEA program must be
successfully "vetted," that is, pass a computerized criminal
background investigation, a security questionnaire and background
interview, medical and psychological screening, polygraph testing,
and urinalysis testing. They then attend a 4- to 5-week DEA
investigative training course in Leesburg, VA. After they are
screened and trained, the vetted foreign police are to receive
ongoing training as well as random polygraph and urinalysis
testing. The Vetted Unit Program initially began in Mexico in May
1996. After the Government of Mexico approved the concept, 21
Mexican police were screened and then trained by DEA. The vetting
process was completed in November 1996, and the Mexico National
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) became operational in January
1997. Page 56 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
Trafficking Organizations DEA then expanded the program to other
countries. For fiscal year 1997, Congress appropriated $20 million
to support vetted units in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In
March 1997, the DEA Administrator authorized immediate
implementation of vetting in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. He also
authorized programs in Brazil and Thailand for 1998. The $20
million appropriation for vetted units in fiscal year 1997 is now
part of DEA's budget base and has recurred each subsequent fiscal
year. According to DEA, as of October 1998, vetted units, which
were designed to engage in intelligence collection, investigations
of drug traffickers, or both, were operational in Bolivia,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Program start-up costs in fiscal years
1997 and 1998 amounted to a total of $7.4 million for Bolivia,
$5.3 million for Colombia, $4.6 million for Mexico, and $4.4
million for Peru.10 According to a DEA official, it took an
average of about 6 months to complete the screening and training
of the foreign police from the time they were identified to DEA as
candidates selected by the host governments for the program,
although the actual length of time varied because of factors such
as limited availability of polygraphers. As shown in table 2.11,
the number of vetted officers varied by country. Each vetted unit
had one or two DEA agents assigned for assistance, liaison, and
case support. Table 2.11: Number of Vetted Units and
Number of Number of
Officers on Board by Country, as of Country
vetted units vetted officers
September 30, 1998 Bolivia
4 172 Colombia
4 112 Mexico
3 232 Peru
2 135 Total
13 651 Source:
Developed by GAO from DEA data. The following summarizes the
status and accomplishments of the existing vetted units under the
program as of September 30, 1998, according to DEA. * Bolivia had
four SIUs with vetted personnel. Three SIUs each had 25 Bolivian
National Police, and a fourth unit had 97 personnel. The SIUs were
located in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Two of the SIUs
collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and arrest targeted
drug traffickers, while the other two SIUs concentrate primarily
on collecting 10 Program start-up costs for the vetted units
included expenditures for such items as recruiting, vetting,
training, equipment, facilities maintenance, salary supplements
for foreign police, operational support, and conducting
investigations. Page 57
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations intelligence. DEA reported
that the Bolivian SIUs' efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted
in 1,206 arrests and seizures of 3,201 kilograms of cocaine
hydrochloride (HCL), 5,392 kilograms of cocaine base, and $15.8
million in assets. * Colombia had 4 vetted units consisting of
112 members. The Major Investigations Unit in Bogota had 39
personnel, including both investigators and prosecutors. This unit
focused on drug trafficking in the major cities of Colombia, such
as Cali, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The Financial Investigation
Unit had 14 investigators who focused on money laundering in
financial institutions in Colombia's major cities. The
Intelligence Group consisted of 39 personnel headquartered in
Bogota and operating in the major drug producing regions. This
unit collected intelligence to support investigations of Colombian
drug trafficking organizations by other CNP units. The fourth
vetted unit, consisting of 20 members, monitors the diversion of
precursor substances from legitimate manufacturers for the
production of illegal drugs. DEA reported that the Colombian
vetted units' efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 63
arrests and seizures of 6,398 kilograms of cocaine HCL and cocaine
base, 6 kilograms of heroin, and $250,000 in U.S. currency. *
Mexico had 3 vetted units made up of 232 vetted and trained
personnel. The Mexico National SIU, operating out of Mexico City,
had 14 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators assigned to collect
intelligence on Mexican drug traffickers. The Border Task Forces
had 106 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators. The task forces
operated out of regional headquarters in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez,
and Monterrey-all along the U.S.- Mexico Border-and Guadalajara.
The task forces had a mission similar to the SIU, but the task
force investigators were also responsible for executing warrants
and making arrests. The narcotics section of the Organized Crime
Unit was made up of 112 Mexican federal attorney- investigators
and narcotics investigators. This unit's mission was to use
information from court-ordered electronic intelligence collection
to investigate high-level drug trafficking groups, as well as
drug-related money laundering groups, throughout Mexico. The
unit's headquarters was in Mexico City, but the assigned personnel
were often located in other cities. DEA did not report the number
of arrests or seizures for the Mexican vetted units, but noted
there had been arrests made in three major organizations,
including one of the largest drug cartels in Mexico. * Peru had 2
vetted units, with a total of 135 personnel. One unit, an
intelligence group, consisted of 52 vetted personnel and
specialized in collecting intelligence and targeting drug
traffickers to support the second unit, the investigation group
with 83 vetted police. Both units were headquartered in Lima and
operated throughout the cocaine production regions of Peru. DEA
reported that the Peruvian vetted units' efforts Page 58
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations through fiscal year 1998
resulted in 199 arrests and seizures of 819 kilograms of cocaine
HCL, 2,297 kilograms of cocaine base, 4,350 gallons of precursor
chemicals, and numerous weapons and ammunition. In commenting on a
draft of our report, DEA officials informed us that as of April
1999, 2 vetted units with 25 and 75 vetted personnel,
respectively, were fully operational in Thailand; 1 vetted unit
with a total of 16 vetted personnel was operational in Brazil; and
vetted antinarcotics police were expected to be operational in
Pakistan in early fiscal year 2000. The officials also noted that
assessments were scheduled for Ecuador and Nigeria in May and
June, respectively, to examine the future suitability of vetted
units in those countries. DEA expanded its enforcement strategy in
the 1990s to focus its Conclusions operations on what it refers
to as the seamless continuum of drug trafficking. It placed
emphasis on investigating gangs, drug dealers, and drug-related
violence in local communities while continuing to target higher
level drug traffickers involved in major national and
international drug trafficking organizations. DEA's programs and
initiatives discussed in this chapter-for example, its state and
local task forces, its MET Program, SOD's initiatives, and its
foreign operations-are consistent with DEA's mission and
responsibilities to enforce the nation's drug laws and bring drug
traffickers to justice, as described in chapter 1. In carrying out
its strategy, DEA's domestic enforcement efforts placed more
emphasis on, and devoted more resources to, assisting and working
with local law enforcement agencies than in the past.
Consequently, funds and staff devoted to DEA's State and Local
Task Force Program increased in the 1990s. Also, although not in
substantial numbers in comparison to DEA's total dollar and staff
resources, DEA began and continued to fund and dedicate agents to
the MET Program during the 1990s. These programs targeted drug
traffickers operating primarily at the local and regional levels.
DEA provided examples of what it considered to be successful
program operations at these levels and reported various program
results, including federal and state arrests and convictions and
seizures of drugs and assets. To improve the effectiveness of its
domestic and international efforts directed at national and
international drug trafficking organizations in the 1990s, DEA
established and invested increased resources in SOD to continue
and enhance the investigative approach initiated under its former
Kingpin Strategy. SOD, like the Kingpin Strategy, emphasizes
targeting the Page 59 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its
Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
Major Drug Trafficking Organizations command and control
communications of major traffickers. Consequently, the number of
DEA electronic surveillances rose significantly in the 1990s. DEA
documented the results of some Kingpin and SOD operations that it
considered to be successful in disrupting and dismantling major
national and international trafficking organizations. However, DEA
did not compile results data on all Kingpin and SOD operations,
cases they supported, or leads they disseminated. DEA also made
changes to improve its foreign efforts directed at international
drug trafficking organizations. In this regard, it has
participated in two major interagency programs established in the
1990s to target major organizations in Latin America and Asia. The
programs have led to the arrests of some high-level drug
traffickers. In addition, the specially trained vetted units of
foreign police initiated in recent years by DEA may help increase
the sharing of information and the trust level between DEA and
foreign police participating in those units. This, in turn, may
help DEA and its foreign counterparts in targeting major
traffickers and disrupting and dismantling trafficking
organizations based in the participating foreign countries, as
indicated by the initial results reported by DEA. In its written
comments on a draft of this report, DEA stated that, overall,
Agency Comments the report provides a detailed and factual
background of DEA strategies and special operations. DEA also
provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which
we incorporated in this chapter and other sections of this report.
Page 60 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet Developed
Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control
Strategy DEA's strategic goals and objectives, along with its
enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s discussed in
chapter 2, are consistent with the strategic goals of ONDCP's
National Drug Control Strategy. Both the National Strategy and DEA
hope to reduce illegal drug supply and drug- related crime and
violence by disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
organizations. The National Strategy contains mid- and long-term
measurable performance targets1 for 2002 and 2007 that identify
the extent to which the National Strategy seeks to disrupt and
dismantle drug trafficking organizations. However, DEA has not yet
established comparable measurable performance targets for its
operations. Throughout this chapter, we use footnotes to explain
various planning and performance measurement terms as defined by
OMB, ONDCP, and DOJ. We also include a glossary at the end of this
report, which provides an alphabetical listing of the various
planning and performance measurement terms used in this report and
their definitions. DEA's strategic goals and objectives, and
enhanced programs and DEA's Strategic Goals
initiatives in the 1990s for carrying out its mission are
consistent with the and Objectives, and Its National Strategy's
strategic goals and objectives defining a 10-year commitment to
reduce drug abuse. DEA's mission, as described in chapter
Programs, Are 1, is an important element of
the National Strategy and DEA, through the Consistent With the
implementation of its programs and initiatives as discussed in
chapter 2, is National Strategy a major
participant in the National Strategy. As discussed below, we
reviewed the National Strategy's strategic goals and objectives,
and compared them with DEA's strategic goals and objectives and
its programs for consistency. ONDCP has produced National
Strategies annually since 1989. Since 1996, National Strategy
Goals and the National Strategy has included five strategic goals
(listed in ch. 1) and Objectives related
strategic objectives. These goals and objectives are the basis for
a long-term national antidrug effort aimed at reducing the supply
of and demand for illicit drugs and the consequences of drug abuse
and trafficking. The goals define the major directives of the
strategy. The objectives, which are more narrowly focused,
stipulate the specific ways in which goals are to be obtained. The
1998 strategy provided a 10-year plan to reduce illegal drug use
and availability by 50 percent by the year 2007. 1 A performance
target, as defined by ONDCP for the purpose of the National
Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved; it is a
measurable level of performance against which actual achievement
can be compared. Page 61
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy The 1999 National Strategy also continued
the goals but eliminated 1 objective, reducing the total number of
objectives to 31. The National Strategy is intended to guide the
approximately 50 federal agencies with drug control
responsibilities. DEA has significant responsibilities for helping
to achieve the following three National Strategy goals.2 *
Strategy goal 2: Increase the safety of American citizens by
substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. *
Strategy goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers
from the drug threat. * Strategy goal 5: Break foreign and
domestic drug sources of supply. For these 3 strategy goals, the
National Strategy has 15 supporting objectives, at least 10 of
which relate to DEA. Table 3.1 identifies the strategy goals and
objectives for which DEA has responsibilities. 2 DEA has a small
drug demand reduction program ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999)
that supports strategy goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth
to reject illegal drugs as well as the use of alcohol and tobacco.
Page 62
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Table 3.1: National Strategy Goals and
Objectives for Which DEA Has Responsibilities Strategy goals
Strategy objectives Strategy goal 2-Increase the safety of
American citizens by Objective 1-Strengthen law
enforcement-including federal, state, substantially reducing drug-
related crime and violence. and local drug task
forces-to combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal
organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leaders of illegal
drug syndicates. Objective 2-Improve the ability of High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) to counter drug trafficking.
Objective 3-Help law enforcement to disrupt money laundering and
seize and forfeit criminal assets. Strategy goal 4-Shield
America's air, land, and sea frontiers Objective 1-Conduct
flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, from the drug
threat. and seize
illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at its borders.
Objective 2-Improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S.
drug law enforcement programs with particular emphasis on the
Southwest Border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Objective 3-Improve bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico
as well as other cocaine and heroin transit-zone countries in
order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
Strategy goal 5-Break foreign and domestic drug sources of
Objective 1-Produce a net reduction in the worldwide cultivation
of supply.
coca, opium, and marijuana and in the production of other illegal
drugs, especially methamphetamine. Objective 2-Disrupt and
dismantle major international drug trafficking organizations and
arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders. Objective 3-
Support and complement source country drug control efforts and
strengthen source country political will and drug control
capabilities. Objective 4-Develop and support bilateral, regional,
and multilateral initiatives and mobilize international
organizational efforts against all aspects of illegal drug
production, trafficking, and abuse. Source: GAO analysis of
ONDCP's 1998 Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) document
and DEA's performance plan for fiscal year 2000. Page 63
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Recently, as part of its reauthorization
legislation,3 ONDCP became responsible for monitoring the
consistency between the drug-related goals and objectives of drug
control agencies to ensure that their goals and budgets support
and are fully consistent with the National Strategy. In its
National Drug Control Budget Summary for 1999, ONDCP reported that
DEA has various programs and initiatives that support strategy
goals 1,4 2, 4, and 5. DEA's most recent planning document is its
performance plan for fiscal DEA's Strategic Goals and year
2000,5 which it issued in February 1999, in response to the
Objectives Government Performance and Results
Act of 19936 (the Results Act).7 That plan contains information on
DEA's vision, mission, strategic goals, strategic objectives, and
performance indicators.8 DEA listed three strategic goals and nine
strategic objectives for carrying out its mission: * DEA
strategic goal 1-disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command,
control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and
traffickers of illicit drugs; * DEA strategic goal 2-reduce the
impact of crime and violence that is the result of drug
trafficking activity by providing federal investigative resources
to assist local communities; and * DEA strategic goal 3-
facilitate drug law enforcement efforts directed against major
drug trafficking organizations by cooperating and coordinating
with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and
intelligence counterparts. 3 Office of National Drug Control
Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681- 670 (1998). 4 DEA has a small drug demand reduction program
($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999) that supports strategy goal 1:
Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well
as the use of alcohol and tobacco. 5 Drug Enforcement
Administration GPRA Annual Performance Plan FY 2000, February
1999. 6 P.L. 103-62. 7 DOJ prepares strategic and annual
performance plans to meet the requirements of the Results Act and
requires its component organizations, such as DEA, to prepare
annual performance plans even though they are not required to do
so under the Act. DOJ considers its components' performance plans
to be an integral part of the department's annual summary
performance plan. 8 A performance indicator, as defined by OMB for
the purposes of the Results Act, means a particular value or
characteristic used to measure output or outcome. Performance
indicators are associated with performance goals in the annual
performance plan. Page 64
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Along with its strategic goals, DEA listed
the following nine strategic objectives: * DEA strategic
objective 1--attack the command and control of international and
domestic drug trafficking organizations through the arrest,
prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of their criminal
leaders and surrogates; * DEA strategic objective 2-concentrate
enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt,
dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups operating from
Mexico; * DEA strategic objective 3-direct enforcement efforts at
the escalating threat posed by heroin; * DEA strategic objective
4-address the dual threats presented by methamphetamine and
resurgence in marijuana trafficking; * DEA strategic objective 5-
assist local law enforcement by deploying METs into communities
where drug trafficking and related violent crime are rampant; *
DEA strategic objective 6-prevent the diversion of controlled
substances and control the distribution of chemicals used to
manufacture illicit drugs; * DEA strategic objective 7-enhance
intelligence programs to facilitate information sharing and
develop new methods to structure and define drug trafficking
organizations; * DEA strategic objective 8-support interdiction
efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United
States; and * DEA strategic objective 9--seize and forfeit assets
and proceeds derived from drug trafficking. DEA did not align each
of its objectives with any particular goals. Because DEA is the
nation's lead drug enforcement agency, its strategic Comparison of
DEA goals and objectives and its programs should be
consistent with the Strategic Goals and National
Strategy. Table 3.2 shows DEA's strategic goals compared to
Objectives, and Its National Strategy goals for drug
supply reduction. Programs, With the National Strategy Page 65
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals
With National Strategy Goals DEA strategic goals
National Strategy goals for drug supply reduction DEA strategic
goal 1-In order to safeguard Americans, DEA
National Strategy goal 2-Increase the safety of American citizens
will disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and
by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of
illicit drugs that threaten Americans and erode the quality of
life in our National Strategy goal 4-Shield America's
air, land, and sea communities.
frontiers from the drug threat. DEA strategic goal 2-In order to
reduce the impact of crime and National Strategy goal
5-Break foreign and domestic drug violence that is the result of
drug trafficking activity, DEA will sources of supply.
provide federal investigative resources to assist local
communities. DEA strategic goal 3-In order to facilitate drug law
enforcement efforts directed against major drug trafficking
organizations, DEA will cooperate and coordinate with our federal,
state, local, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence
counterparts Source: GAO analysis of ONDCP's 1999 National Drug
Control Strategy and DEA's performance plan for fiscal year 2000.
DEA's first strategic goal aimed at dismantling and disrupting
drug trafficking organizations is consistent with National
Strategy goal 4, which calls for shielding America's air, land,
and sea frontiers from the drug threat, as well as with goal 5,
which calls for breaking foreign and domestic sources of drug
supply. DEA's goal for dismantling and disrupting trafficking
organizations applies to all drug trafficking organizations
regardless of where they operate-in the United States, in drug
transshipment areas, at U.S. border areas, and in foreign
countries. Similarly, DEA's strategic goal 2, which calls for
providing federal investigative resources to local communities for
reducing drug-related crime and violence, is consistent with
National Strategy goal 2, which also calls for reducing drug-
related crime and violence. DEA's strategic goal 3, which calls
for DEA to cooperate and coordinate with federal, state, local,
and foreign law enforcement and intelligence counterparts, is
consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5. By
coordinating and cooperating with other law enforcement and
intelligence groups, DEA's coordinated efforts reach out in
support of the National Strategy's three supply reduction goals.
As with its goals, DEA's strategic objectives are also consistent
with the objectives of the National Strategy. For example, as can
be seen in table 3.3, various DEA strategic objectives for
dismantling and disrupting domestic and international drug
trafficking organizations, providing Page 66
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy assistance to local communities to reduce
drug-related violence, and supporting drug interdiction efforts
align with National Strategy objectives. Table 3.3: Comparison of
Selected DEA and National Strategy Objectives DEA strategic
objectives
National Strategy objectives Assist local law enforcement by
deploying METs into communities Strengthen law
enforcement, including federal, state, and local where drug
trafficking and related violence are rampant (DEA
drug task forces, to combat drug-related violence, disrupt
criminal strategic objective 5).
organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leader of illegal drug
syndicates (National Strategy objective 1 for goal 2). Concentrate
enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt,
dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups
Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize
operating from Mexico (DEA strategic objective 2).
illegal drugs in transit to the United States and U.S. borders
(National strategy objective 1 for goal 4). Support interdiction
efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United
States (DEA strategic objective 8).
Disrupt and dismantle major international drug trafficking
organizations and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders
Attack the command and control of international and domestic drug
(National Strategy objective 2 for goal 5). trafficking
organizations through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
incarceration of their criminal leaders and surrogates (DEA
strategic objective 1). Source: GAO's analysis of ONDCP's 1999
National Drug Control Strategy and DEA's performance plan for
fiscal year 2000. In addition, as with its strategic goals and
objectives, DEA's programs and initiatives in the 1990s as
discussed in chapter 2 are also consistent with the goals of the
National Strategy. During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed
important aspects of its operations, that is, its strategies,
programs, initiatives, and approaches. * DEA gave a higher
priority than in the past to and increased resources for working
with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies
through its State and Local Task Force Program and started the MET
Program to help combat drugrelated violent crime in local
communities. * DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which
evolved into SOD, placing greater emphasis on intercepting
communications between top-level drug traffickers and their
subordinates (i.e., attacking the "command and control"
communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to
dismantle their entire trafficking operations. * DEA started
participating in two interagency programs-Linear Approach and
Linkage Approach-to target and investigate major drug trafficking
organizations in Latin America and Asia. * DEA helped establish,
train, and fund special foreign police units to combat drug
trafficking in certain key foreign counties, primarily in Latin
America. Page 67
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy These and other drug law enforcement
programs and initiatives discussed in detail in chapter 2 are
consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5 previously
discussed in this chapter and described in table 3.1. For example,
DEA's MET Program, started in 1995, is consistent with National
Strategy goal 2, which calls for increasing the safety of American
citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and
violence. The 1999 National Strategy established performance
targets calling for DEA Has Not specific
increases in the percentage of drug trafficking organizations
Developed disrupted and dismantled. These
targets are measurable and can be used to assess the collective
performance of drug control agencies responsible Performance
Targets for achieving them. However, although DEA is
the lead drug enforcement Consistent With Those agency, it has not
established similar measurable performance targets for in the
National its own operations. Strategy
To measure the effectiveness and performance of the National
Strategy, ONDCP established 5 and 10 year performance targets and
performance measures.9 These performance targets and measures are
intended, in part, to enable policymakers, program managers, and
the public to determine efforts that are contributing to the
strategic goals and objectives of the National Strategy. To track
and measure progress in achieving the strategic goals and National
Strategy strategic objectives of the National
Strategy, ONDCP issued its Performance Measurement
Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system in February
1998.10 System This system is a 10-year
plan that identifies performance targets and related performance
measures as the means for assessing the progress of the National
Strategy in achieving its strategic goals and objectives. The PME
system contains 97 performance targets. Although originally
undertaken as a policy decision to bring more accountability to
drug policy, the PME system is now grounded in legislation. The
Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998
requires ONDCP to submit an annual report to Congress on the PME
system. ONDCP issued its first annual status report in February
1999.11 9 A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for the
purposes of the National Strategy, means data, variables, and
events used to track progress toward performance targets. Measures
show how progress toward targets will be tracked. 10 Performance
Measures of Effectiveness, A System for Assessing the Performance
of the National Drug Control Strategy, 19982007, Office of
National Drug Control Policy, Feb. 1998. 11 National Drug Control
Strategy 1999 Performance Measures of Effectiveness:
Implementation and Findings, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, Feb. 1999. Page 68
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Beginning in 1996, interagency working
groups involving federal agencies, including DEA, along with
outside experts developed the PME performance targets through a
consensual process. The performance targets were incorporated into
the PME plan issued in February 1998. After the initial PME plan
was issued, interagency working groups, including those involving
DEA, continued developing, refining, and implementing the PME
system during 1998. The working groups, among other things,
focused on * developing specific action plans identifying the
responsibilities of each agency in working towards the PME
performance targets and * identifying annual targets that
correspond to the achievement of the 5 and 10 year performance
targets. For each performance target, the PME system identifies a
"reporting agency" (or "agencies" when there is shared
responsibility) and "supporting agencies." A reporting agency(s)
is required to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving the
performance target. However, the reporting agency is not
necessarily the only agency responsible for achieving the target.
Supporting agencies are to assist with data collection and
assessment or have programs that contribute to achieving the
target. The initial 1998 PME system document identified
performance targets relating to disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations and arresting drug traffickers. These
performance targets called for specific percentage increases in
the number of domestic and international drug trafficking
organizations disrupted or dismantled and the number of drug
traffickers arrested by 2002 and 2007. DEA was designated as the
sole reporting agency for performance targets aimed at decreasing
the capabilities of domestic and international drug trafficking
organizations and traffickers. DEA shared reporting-agency
responsibilities with HIDTAs for the performance target aimed at
drug trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat
assessments. As a result of the PME implementation process in
1998, changes were made to performance targets for drug
trafficking organizations and drug traffickers. These changes were
reported in the 1999 PME report. The performance target for
domestic drug traffickers was deleted. The target for
international drug traffickers was combined with the target for
international drug trafficking organizations to focus on one
manageable Page 69 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet
Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug
Control Strategy target. In addition, DEA was deleted as a
reporting agency for the performance target aimed at drug
trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat assessments.
Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the performance targets and related
performance measures for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations, along with the current status of
achieving the targets as reported by ONDCP in its 1999 PME report.
Table 3.4: National Drug Control Strategy Performance Target and
Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Domestic Drug
Trafficking Organizations Performance target
Performance measure ONDCP current
status statement Target: By 2002, using a prioritized list
Measure: The percentage of targeted Data source: To be
determined. of domestic drug law enforcement
organizations on the counterdrug community designated targets,
increase community's designated target list that are
Relevant data: None by 5 points the percentage of drug
disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise organizations disrupted,
dismantled, or rendered ineffective, measured annually.
Status: ONDCP will charter an interagency otherwise rendered
ineffective as
working group to develop a consolidated measured against the
percentage Reporting agency: DEA
Major Drug Trafficking Organization Target recorded in the 1997
base year. By 2007,
List. The working group will more clearly increase the target
percentage by at Supporting federal agencies: Department
define what constitutes a major drug least 10 points above the
base year. of Defense (DOD), Department of State,
trafficking organization and what criteria will FBI, U.S. Customs
Service, and the be used to determine when an
organization Department of the Treasury. has
been disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise rendered ineffective.
Since no such list currently exits, the base year will need to be
adjusted once the list has been developed. Annual performance
targets will be constructed after the target list has been
developed. Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME
report. Page 70 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet
Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug
Control Strategy Table 3.5: National Strategy Performance Target
and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
International Drug Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their
Leaders Performance target
Performance measure ONDCP current
status statement Target: By 2002, measuring against the
Measure: The percentage of designated Data Source: To
be determined. prioritized list of community designated
drug trafficking organizations dismantled or targets established
in the 1998 base year, significantly disrupted either
through the Relevant Data: None achieve a 50 percent success
rate of incarceration of their principal leaders or
targeted organizations dismantled or through the
substantial seizure of their Status: This target was
revised by significantly disrupted by either (1) having
assets or the incarceration of their network combining two
targets-trafficking their principal leaders arrested and
key associates, measured annually. organizations and
traffickers-identified in incarcerated or otherwise rendered
the initial 1998 PME plan. Annual ineffective; or (2) making
substantial seizures Reporting agency: DEA
performance targets are under of those organizations' narcotics,
money, or
development. other assets, or arrests of their key network
Supporting federal agencies: Central associates, that
significantly impair their Intelligence Agency (CIA), DOD,
FBI, and ability to operate at normal levels for an the
U.S. Customs Service. extended period of time. By 2007, increase
the success rate to 100 percent as measured against the 1998 base
year list. For additional targets added to the list after the 1998
base year, achieve a similar success rate of at least 10 percent
per year as measured against the year in which they were added to
the list. Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME
report. Table 3.6: National Drug Control Strategy Performance
Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Drug
Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs Performance target
Performance measure ONDCP current
status statement Target: By 2002, increase the proportion of
Measure: The proportion of identified drug Data
Source: HIDTA threat assessments will drug trafficking
organizations disrupted or trafficking organizations
disrupted or serve as the foundation of the list.
dismantled as identified in HIDTA threat dismantled by or
within HIDTAs. assessments by 15 percent above the
Relevant Data: The Bureau of Justice proportion in the 1997 base
year. By 2007, Reporting agency: Each HIDTA
Statistics collects data on the number of increase the proportion
disrupted or
traffickers convicted and sentenced. In 1991, dismantled to 30
percent above the base Supporting federal agencies: DEA,
DOD, drug trafficking offenses accounted for 19 year
ratio. Department of State,
FBI, U.S. Customs percent of all defendants convicted.
Service, and the Department of the Treasury.
Status: The ONDCP HIDTA Director will develop a consolidated list
of the number of drug trafficking organizations targeted by each
HIDTA. This HIDTA target will be prepared prior to the beginning
of each year. At the end of each year, ONDCP will measure the
proportion of those targeted organizations that have been
disrupted or dismantled. After the base year proportion has been
determined for 1997, the annual target will be revised to reflect
the target proportion for each year. Page 71
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control
Strategy PME report. As can be seen in the tables, the National
Strategy performance targets and measures are quantifiable and
outcome oriented and can be readily used to assess performance
following collection of proposed baseline data on lists of drug
trafficking organizations. DEA, with assistance from supporting
agencies such as the FBI, is to report progress by the drug law
enforcement community in dismantling or disrupting a percentage of
identified domestic and international drug trafficking
organizations. However, ONDCP, in reporting on the current status
of the performance targets for which DEA is the reporting agency,
noted that data on drug trafficking organizations needed to assess
performance had not been identified nor had annual performance
targets been established. Further, according to ONDCP and DEA,
neither the domestic nor international designated target lists
referred to in tables 3.4 and 3.5 have been developed. According
to ONDCP officials, DEA and various supporting agencies are
working toward developing lists of domestic and foreign drug
trafficking organizations for use in pursuing the performance
targets. ONDCP officials said that the time frames for reporting
on performance targets for dismantling and disrupting drug
trafficking organizations and their leaders are (1) 1999 for
defining organizations and developing trafficker lists, (2) 2000
for collecting data, and (3) 2001 for reporting on data and
gauging performance. According to ONDCP's 1999 report, its PME
system tracks the performance of the numerous programs that
support each strategy goal and objective. The accomplishment of
National Strategy goals and objectives generally require the
contributions of many agency programs. The PME system does not
track an individual agency's performance nor is it designed to do
so. According to ONDCP, agencies such as DEA are required to track
their own performance through their Results Act plans, and these
plans should be consistent with the National Strategy and the PME
system. Over the years, DEA has used arrest and seizure data
(drugs and assets) DEA Goals Do Not Include along with examples
of significant enforcement accomplishments, such as Measurable
Performance descriptions of successful operations, to
demonstrate its effectiveness in Targets
carrying out its enforcement programs and initiatives. However,
these data are not useful indicators for reporting on results
because arrest and seizure data relate to outputs (activities) and
not to outcomes (results). These arrest and seizure data do not
present a picture of overall Page 72
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy performance or of DEA's level of success in
achieving its goals. Further, the use of arrest data as a
performance indicator can be misleading without information on the
significance of the arrests and the extent to which they lead to
prosecutions and convictions. In addition, using arrest data as a
performance target can lead to undesirable consequences when law
enforcement agencies place undue emphasis on increasing the
numbers of arrests at the expense of developing quality
investigations. More recently, with passage of the Results Act,
DEA has been attempting to go beyond reporting outputs to
reporting outcomes. In response to the Results Act, DEA prepared
annual performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 that
contain information on its strategic goals and objectives and its
performance indicators.12 DEA's Performance Plan for In its
fiscal year 1999 performance plan issued in January 1998, DEA
Fiscal Year 1999 described its strategic goals,
strategies for achieving those goals, annual goals, and
performance indicators. DEA associated these goals, strategies,
and performance indicators with its various programs and
initiatives. For example, DEA's strategic goals for "enforcement"
provided that DEA will "... disrupt/dismantle the leadership,
command, control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs,
and traffickers, of licit and illicit drugs that threaten
Americans and American interests." Under this goal, DEA's primary
strategy provided that DEA will "... implement drug law
enforcement strategies that target and attack the leadership and
infrastructure of major drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of
licit and illicit drugs that threaten America." Under its
strategic goal for enforcement and related strategy, DEA listed
annual goals for its domestic enforcement program, including its
Southwest Border, Caribbean Corridor, methamphetamine, and heroin
initiatives. These annual goals generally stated that DEA would
continue or increase its investigative efforts leading to
increased arrests and seizures and a reduction in the trafficking
capability of drug organizations. For 12 Among other requirements,
the Results Act requires that performance plans (1) establish
performance goals; (2) express those goals in an objective,
quantifiable, and measurable form, unless OMB approves otherwise;
(3) establish performance indicators for assessing progress toward
or achievement of the goals; and (4) provide a basis for comparing
actual program results with the established goals. Page 73
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy example, DEA's annual goal for its general
enforcement activities, including its Southwest Border initiative,
stated that: "DEA will continue its investigative efforts,
including the application of forfeiture laws, especially along the
Southwest border. This will produce an increase in the number of
arrests, removals, and seizures. The primary outcome will be a
reduction in the trafficking capability of drug organizations,
particularly those associated with the Mexican Federation, that
use the southwest border in transshipment." To assess the extent
to which it was accomplishing its strategic and annual goals to
reduce trafficking capability, DEA's plan listed performance
indicators that were not results oriented. DEA planned to measure
performance, using data on total numbers of arrests and total
number of major criminal enterprises and other drug trafficking
organizations disrupted or dismantled. However, DEA did not
identify performance targets for its goals, such as the proportion
of identified drug trafficking organizations to be disrupted and
dismantled, against which its performance could be assessed. DEA's
fiscal year 1999 plan had no annual, mid- or long-range
performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations. DEA noted in its performance plan for
fiscal year 1999 that data on the number of drug trafficking
organizations had not been previously collected and reported and
would be available by March 1, 1998. But it never reported these
data in its subsequent performance plan for fiscal year 2000. DEA
also pointed out that although several of its performance
indicators were in the developmental stage, their establishment
would help to provide the framework for future evaluations of
DEA's efforts. DEA's Performance Plan for DEA organized its
fiscal year 2000 performance plan-issued in February Fiscal Year
2000 1999-differently from its 1999 plan to align it
with its three major budget activities-enforcement, investigative
support, and program direction. DEA organized its fiscal year 2000
plan around what it identified as its three core business systems:
(1) enforcement of federal laws and investigations, (2)
investigative support, and (3) program direction. Along with
information on its 3 core business systems and 15 subsystems, the
plan, as previously described, listed DEA's strategic goals and
objectives. However, unlike its 1999 performance plan, the fiscal
year 2000 plan did not have clearly identifiable annual goals. For
its core business system for the enforcement of federal laws and
investigation, DEA listed the following: Page 74
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy "Through effective enforcement effort, DEA
will disrupt/dismantle the command & control, and infrastructure
of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit
drugs that threaten Americans and American interests, including
providing enforcement assistance to American Communities to fight
drug-related crime and violence." Related to its core business
system for enforcement, DEA's fiscal year 2000 performance plan
listed a strategic goal and objectives for disrupting drug
trafficking organizations. DEA's description of its core business
system and its strategic goal and objective are similar. However,
as with its fiscal year 1999 plan, DEA's fiscal year 2000 plan
does not include annual, mid- or long-range measurable performance
targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
organizations. Although DEA does not have a performance target for
dismantling international drug trafficking organizations, it does
have a performance indicator that may lead to a performance target
that is consistent with the target in the National Strategy. DEA's
fiscal year 2000 performance plan contains a performance indicator
specifying that DEA plans to use data on the number of targeted
organizations disrupted or dismantled as a result of DEA
involvement in foreign investigations compared to the total number
of targeted organizations as a basis for measuring performance.
The plan notes, however, that DEA is currently not collecting data
for this performance indicator but expects to do so during fiscal
year 1999. For domestic drug trafficking organizations, DEA's plan
does not include a performance indicator that is quantifiable and
results oriented similar to the one it specified for international
drug organizations. DEA has no performance indicator specifying
that it will measure performance on the basis of the number of
targeted domestic organizations disrupted and dismantled compared
to the total number of targeted organizations. Further, DEA's
fiscal year 2000 performance plan does not indicate that DEA plans
to collect data on domestic drug trafficking organizations for
development of a performance target that is consistent with the
target in the National Strategy. It is unclear whether DEA plans
to develop a performance target for its program aimed at
disrupting and dismantling domestic drug trafficking that would be
consistent with the performance target and the national effort
called for in the National Strategy. DEA's fiscal year 2000
performance plan indicates that DEA will be reporting on prior
year arrests resulting in prosecutions and convictions as a
performance indicator for measuring its enforcement efforts. As
required by DOJ policy, to avoid perceptions of "bounty hunting"
DEA and other DOJ component organizations cannot specify
performance targets for arrests. However, DOJ's policy would not
preclude DEA from developing a Page 75
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy performance target and performance indicator
for domestic drug trafficking organizations consistent with those
in the National Strategy. The National Strategy performance
targets do not involve projecting increased numbers of arrests;
rather, they call for increasing the percentage of targeted drug
trafficking organizations dismantled or disrupted. In addition to
the lack of result-oriented performance indicators and performance
targets for its programs aimed at domestic drug trafficking
organizations, DEA's plan lacks performance targets and related
performance indicators for other mission-critical programs. For
example, DEA's core business system for enforcement and one of its
strategic goals call for assistance to local communities to reduce
drug-related crime and violence. However, DEA has not established
a performance target and performance indicator that could be used
to measure the results of its assistance to local communities. In
this regard, DEA has a strategic objective calling for assistance
to local law enforcement by deploying METs, discussed in chapter
2, into communities where drug trafficking and related crime are
rampant. However, DEA has not identified a performance target and
performance indicator to measure the results of its MET Program
even though, as discussed in chapter 2, resources dedicated to
METs and other forms of assistance to local law enforcement have
continued to grow in the 1990s. Thus, it is unclear how DEA will
measure the results of its strategic objective calling for MET
deployments. In the program accomplishment and highlight section
of its performance plan for fiscal year 2000, DEA states that
"[t]he effect of METs in reducing violent crime has been clearly
established in 1998." The plan further points out that a
comparison of violent crime statistics before and after MET
deployments indicated reductions in violent crime in areas where
MET deployments occurred. Using this type of results-oriented
data, DEA should be able to specify a performance indicator that,
when tied to a measurable performance target, could be used to
assess the results of the MET Program in terms of actual versus
expected performance. In August 1998, DEA's Chief for Executive
Policy and Strategic Planning, told us that DEA had not yet
identified the performance goals and indicators it will ultimately
use. She told us that at the direction of the Administrator, DEA
was planning to bring its field representatives together with
headquarters officials to obtain their views and input on DEA's
goals, strategies, and performance indicators. In April 1999, she
told us that the meeting with field representatives, which was
initially planned for the fall of 1998 but was delayed pending
hiring of a contractor, was expected to be Page 76
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy held by the summer of 1999. However, with
the recent resignation of DEA's Administrator, these plans were
placed on hold and not addressed in DEA comments on a draft of
this report. In addition, in April 1999, DEA's Chief for Executive
Policy and Strategic Planning told us that DEA would have to work
with DOJ in developing performance goals and indicators. In this
regard, she said that DEA would be following the direction
provided by DOJ in its departmentwide drug strategy.13 She also
pointed out that ONDCP had not yet established a baseline (agreed-
upon target list) for its National Strategy performance targets
aimed at disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking
organizations. In commenting on a draft of this report in June
1999, DEA pointed out that DEA (1) has developed preliminary
performance targets that were included in DEA's fiscal year 2001
budget submission to DOJ; (2) had established a working group
consisting of representatives from its operations, strategic
planning and executive policy, and resource management staffs to
further refine its performance targets; and (3) is working with
other DOJ components to develop performance targets and
measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the
National Strategy. Measuring and evaluating the impact of drug law
enforcement efforts is Difficulties in Measuring difficult for
several reasons. First, antidrug efforts are often conducted by
Drug Law Enforcement many agencies and are mutually
supportive. It is difficult to isolate the Outcomes
contributions of a single agency or program, such as DEA's
domestic enforcement program aimed at disrupting and dismantling
major drug traffickers, from activities of other law enforcement
agencies. Other factors that DEA has little control over, such as
drug demand reduction efforts, may also affect drug trafficking
operations. Second, the clandestine nature of drug production,
trafficking, and use limits the quality and quantity of data that
can be collected to measure program performance. History has shown
that drug trafficking organizations continually change their
methods, patterns, and operations as law enforcement concentrates
its resources and efforts on a specific region or method. Drug law
enforcement agencies must continuously deal with unknown and
imprecise data, such as the number of drug trafficking
organizations and the amount of illegal drugs being trafficked. 13
Drug Control Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Justice, March 31,
1998. Page 77
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy Third, some of the data that are currently
collected are not very useful in assessing the performance of
individual programs and agency efforts. As previously mentioned,
data collected on arrests, drug seizures, and assets forfeited
generally measure enforcement outputs but not outcomes. Further,
data collected on drug availability and consumption are generally
not designed to measure the performance of a single program or
agency, and such data are influenced by other factors in addition
to enforcement efforts. DEA's strategic goals and objectives as
well as its programs and initiatives Conclusions are consistent
with the National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA has not
developed performance targets for its programs and initiatives
aimed at disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations
and arresting their leaders. We recognize the complexity and
difficulty of measuring outcomes and impact for drug law
enforcement agencies operating in a clandestine drug trafficking
environment. Nevertheless, without measurable performance targets
and related performance indicators for its mission-critical
programs, it is difficult for program managers, policymakers, and
others to quantitatively assess DEA's overall effectiveness and
the extent to which DEA's programs are contributing to its
strategic goals and objectives and those of the National Strategy.
ONDCP has set specific measurable performance targets in the
National Strategy for achieving strategic goals that it shares
with DEA. DEA has worked with ONDCP and other federal drug control
agencies to develop performance targets for the National Strategy
and for measuring the progress of federal efforts toward those
targets. However, although DEA is the lead federal drug
enforcement agency and reporting agency for several National
Strategy performance targets, it has not established similar
measurable performance targets for its own operations. In this
regard, DEA has not established similar measurable performance
targets for its operations in either its fiscal years 1999 or 2000
annual performance plans although, as discussed below, it stated
in its comments on a draft of this report that it has developed
preliminary targets for inclusion in its fiscal year 2001
performance plan. Measurable DEA performance targets, once
finalized, coupled with continued refinement of the National
Strategy performance targets on the basis of DEA input and
leadership, along with DOJ guidance, should bring DEA and ONDCP
closer in pursuing their shared goals and objectives for
disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. Such
Page 78 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet Developed
Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control
Strategy performance targets also should provide DEA with a better
basis for measuring its own progress in achieving its mission and
for making decisions regarding its resource needs and priorities
as discussed in the next chapter. We recommend that the Attorney
General direct the DEA Administrator to Recommendation
work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA
performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets
in the National Drug Control Strategy. In its written comments on
a draft of this report, although not directly Agency Comments and
agreeing with our recommendation, DEA agreed with our principal
finding Our Evaluation regarding measurable
performance targets. However, it disagreed with our draft
conclusion relating to the finding, pointed out actions it was
taking relating to our recommendation, and requested guidance on
bringing closure to the recommendation. DEA agreed with our
principal finding that it had not included measurable performance
targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
organizations in its fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans.
However, it disagreed with our draft conclusion that "In the
absence of such targets, little can said about DEA's effectiveness
in achieving its strategic goals." DEA indicated that this
statement and supporting information in this chapter gave the
impression that DEA had not attempted to develop performance
targets. DEA said that it has developed "preliminary performance
targets" that have been included in its fiscal year 2001 budget
submission to DOJ and that are to be refined for inclusion in
subsequent budgets. To further refine its performance targets, DEA
said that it had established a working group consisting of
representatives from its operations, strategic planning and
executive policy, and resource management staffs. DEA also noted
that it is working with other DOJ components to develop
performance targets and measurements that will be consistent with
the targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. To recognize
these actions, we added them to the pertinent section of this
chapter as an update to information previously provided by DEA. We
also modified our draft conclusion that little can be said about
DEA's effectiveness without performance targets to clarify our
intent that it is difficult to quantitatively assess DEA's overall
effectiveness without such targets. Page 79
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
Drug Control Strategy DEA's stated actions are consistent with the
intent of our recommendation. However, because DEA performance
targets are preliminary and under review within the executive
branch, they are subject to change until February 2000 when DEA
issues its annual budget submission and performance plan, as part
of DOJ's submission, to Congress. Further, DEA indicated that it
cannot finalize its performance targets and measures until a
designated targeted list of international drug trafficking
organizations, as called for in the National Strategy, is
completed. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation until
DEA's preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion
in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency
with those in the National Strategy. DEA and ONDCP also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated in this chapter where
appropriate. Page 80 GAO/GGD-99-
108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's Staffing Needs
Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998 In order
to carry out its mission and operations during the 1990s,
including the programs and initiatives discussed in chapter 2 and
the strategies discussed in chapter 3, DEA received funds to staff
its operations through several sources. These included its annual
appropriations salaries and expenses budget; DOJ's Violent Crime
Reduction Program (VCRP);1 and other reimbursable programs, such
as OCDETF. This chapter focuses on the process used to determine
and allocate additional DEA positions provided through its
salaries and expenses budget. Specifically, it discusses the
process used in fiscal year 1998, which was, according to DEA and
DOJ officials, generally typical of the approach DEA has used in
other years. The process used to determine the need for and to
allocate additional DEA staff is linked to the federal budget
formulation and execution process and reflects federal laws and
budget guidelines promulgated by OMB. In fiscal year 1998, the DEA
process considered field input, changes in drug abuse and drug
trafficking patterns, and the Administrator's priorities to
prepare its staffing enhancement estimates for its budget
submission to DOJ. DEA's submission to DOJ estimated the need for
989 new total positions, including 399 special agent positions. As
a result of reviews by DOJ, OMB, and ONDCP and consideration of
the resources provided in DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation,2
the President's fiscal year 1998 budget, which was submitted to
Congress in February 1997, requested a total of 345 new positions
for DEA, including 168 special agent positions. Congress provided
531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent
positions, with guidance as to how the positions were to be
allocated. DEA senior management then determined the allocation of
additional staff, considering congressional guidance and such
other factors as field office prior requests. The process used to
determine the staffing resources necessary to carry Federal Budget
out DEA's mission is generally typical of the federal budget
processes and Formulation Guidance procedures that federal
agencies are expected to follow. These processes and procedures
are established in federal law and budget guidelines Provides
Basis for promulgated by OMB. DEA Staffing Needs
Determination Process Each legislative session, the president is
required by law to submit a budget to Congress. The Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, 1 VCRP was established by the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-
322, as amended). 2 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
1997, P.L. 104-208 and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863 (1996). Page 81
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 provides the legal basis for the president's budget,
prescribes much of its content, and defines the roles of the
president and the agencies in the process. During budget
formulation, the president establishes general budget and fiscal
policy guidelines. Policy guidance is given to agencies for the
upcoming budget year and later to provide initial guidelines for
preparation of agency budget requests. OMB Circular A-11 provides
instructions on the preparation of agency submissions required for
OMB and presidential review of budget estimates and for
formulation of the president's budget. The budget formulation
process begins at the lowest organizational levels of a federal
agency and moves to the higher levels. A consolidated agencywide
budget is prepared for submission to OMB. This approach is typical
of federal agencies, although some have elaborate planning
processes that allow for objectives established at the top to
guide budget preparation. OMB reviews agency requests according to
a process that includes several stages-(1) staff review, (2)
director's review, (3) passback, (4) appeals, and (5) final
decisions. The final budget is prepared and printed by OMB for
submission to Congress no later than the first Monday in February
of each year, as required by law. According to DEA and DOJ
officials, the DEA fiscal year 1998 staffing Fiscal Year 1998
needs determination process began in the summer of 1995 and was
typical Process for of DEA's staffing determination
process. Prior to the commencement of the official budget
formulation process, DEA domestic and foreign field Determining
DEA's offices provided estimates of their staffing needs to DEA
headquarters Staffing Needs program staff. Program and
budget staff reviewed and considered these estimates in the
development of DEA's budget submission with staffing estimates,
which were sent to DOJ in June 1996. In accordance with the
federal budget process, DOJ and OMB reviewed DEA's budget
submission and staffing estimates, which resulted in some changes
in the estimates. ONDCP reviewed DOJ's budget submission to OMB as
part of the national drug budget certification process,3 which is
distinct from, but occurs simultaneously with, the budget
formulation process and may also affect DEA's staffing estimates.
Figure 4.1 depicts DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing determination
process. 3 The Drug Budget Certification process was established
by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690. The
act required that the ONDCP director certify, in writing, that
drug budget submissions to ONDCP from program managers, agency
heads, and department heads with national drug control program
responsibilities are adequate to implement the objectives of the
National Drug Strategy for the budget request year. Page 82
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 [Figure 4.1 begins on the next page.] Page 83
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 Figure 4.1: Flowchart of DEA's Fiscal Year 1998
Staffing Needs Determination Process 1995
1996 Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May DEA 12
3 4 DOJ OMB Legend: 1
DEA: Aug.-Oct. 3 DEA: Apr.-May
4 DEA: May Domestic and foreign field In accordance with
the Administrator approved Pre-budget staffing
estimate offices prepared and budget
formulation process, the budget submission/ preparation
process submitted staffing estimates
DEA headquarters program staffing estimates. to DEA
headquarters. and budget staff prepared and revised,
on the basis of Budget formulation process
the Administrator's 5 DEA: June 2 DEA: Dec.-Apr.
comments, DEA's FY 98 Budget submission/ DEA
headquarters initiative-based submission
staffing estimates were program and budget staff and
staffing estimates. sent to DOJ. reviewed field office
submissions and began development of staffing
6 DOJ: June-Aug. DOJ budget staff estimates.
received, reviewed, and analyzed DEA submission/staffing estimates
and sent them back to DEA. Page 84
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 Figure 4.1: Continued 1996
1997 June July Aug. Sept.
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.
Feb. 5
11 7 6 8
10 12 9
$ Budget 13 14 15 7 DEA: Aug. 9
OMB: Sept.-Dec. 10 DOJ: Dec.
14 OMB: Dec.-Jan. DEA reviewed DOJ's OMB budget staff
DOJ budget staff reviewed OMB prepared final
budget budget staff analysis. reviewed and analyzed
OMB's passback and sent submission with
assistance DEA administrator DEA's budget submission/
DOJ's interpretation of the from and review by DEA
participated in Attorney staffing estimates.
passback to DEA. and DOJ. General's
hearing and subsequently presented OMB staff sent their
results DEA's appeal. to the OMB Director.
11 DEA: Dec. 15 OMB: Feb. DEA
prepared its appeal to OMB transmitted budget the
OMB passback and submission to President 8
DOJ: Aug.-Sept. OMB Director reviewed
sent it to DOJ. for submission to
Congress Attorney General held examiners' recommendations.
on Feb. 6th. DEA budget hearing and on receipt of DEA appeal
OMB Director generally 12 DOJ: Dec. reviewed it
and made her discusses the overall DEA
submitted its appeal, final decision. federal budget
with including the DEA appeal, to the
President at this time. OMB DOJ sent DEA budget
submission/staffing OMB prepared DEA/DOJ
13 OMB: Dec. estimates to OMB. passback.
OMB reviewed DEA/DOJ's passback appeal, including OMB sent DEA/DOJ
staffing estimates. passback to DOJ
DOJ and OMB agreed on an overall spending level for the
department, and DOJ distributed the appeal amounts. Source: GAO
analysis of DEA, OMB, and other information. Page 85
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing process began in the
summer of 1995. Each DEA Domestic and Foreign DEA domestic field
division submitted a field management plan (FMP), Field Offices
Provided and foreign offices followed a less structured
and more informal staffing Staffing Estimates request
process. In an August 1995 memorandum to its domestic field
divisions, DEA headquarters provided direction and guidelines for
preparation of the fiscal year 1996-1997 FMPs. DEA requested
detailed, specific, and realistic enhancements for fiscal year
1998 for use in the formulation of DEA's fiscal year 1998
budget/staffing submission. According to DEA officials, an FMP is
supposed to be based on the Administrator's vision statement,
which is provided to the field divisions; the local SAC's vision
statement, which has previously been reviewed and approved by DEA
headquarters; and the drug threat that the division expects to
confront. The 1995 memorandum directed each field division to
indicate the resources it would need. Through the FMPs, which were
due in October 1995, DEA's domestic field divisions requested a
total of 591 positions, including 369 special agent positions.
According to DEA officials, recommendations and requests for DEA
foreign office staffing enhancements and new foreign offices for
fiscal year 1998 came from a variety of sources, including DEA
country attachs (CA)4 and the foreign country through the U.S.
Ambassador. Each of the four foreign sections (Central America and
the Caribbean, Europe and the Middle East, Far East, and South
America) within the Office of International Operations at DEA
headquarters was tasked with identifying the issues, including
staffing needs, within specific countries. In March 1996,
according to a DEA official, the International Operations staff,
including the Chief, Deputy Chief, and section heads of
International Operations, met to discuss recommendations from the
four sections. The official said that to assess and justify
staffing requests for their respective regions, DEA foreign
section staff used regional and individual DEA country plans, as
well as foreign situation and quarterly trends in trafficking
reports, which provided context and background. Foreign
operational needs were discussed in terms of DEA's goals and
objectives and prioritized. DEA officials told us that
International Operations 4 DEA provided the following description
of the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD 38) Process.
NSDD 38 requires DEA to gain an ambassador's approval prior to
opening an office or adding additional positions to an existing
office. Before seeking ambassadorial approval under NSDD 38, DOJ
policy requires that DEA obtain approval from DOJ's Executive
Office of National Security. Various bureaus within the State
Department are to provide an ambassador with advice pertaining to
any NSDD 38 request, but the ambassador is the final approving
authority. As a matter of course, an ambassador is to seek host
nation consent prior to granting NSDD 38 approval. Page 86
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 communicated the results of this meeting (as a
discussion document) to DEA's budget section. In accordance with
the federal budget formulation process, DEA budget DEA's Fiscal
Year 1998 staff prepared the agency's spring budget
submission to DOJ, including Budget Submission to DOJ staffing
estimates. After review and approval by its executive staff and
the Included Estimates of Administrator, DEA sent DOJ its
budget submission, which included 6 Additional Staff Needed
initiatives with identified additional staffing needs of 9895
total positions; 399 were special agent positions, and 590 were
support positions. For preparing DEA's budget submission to DOJ,
DOJ budget officials said DOJ provides instructions and usually
guidance; and, according to DEA officials, the DEA Administrator
also usually provides guidance. Although the documents sent to the
agencies varied each year, DOJ provides written planning guidance
and instructions in April, about 17 months prior to the beginning
of the budget year. However, officials said that informal guidance
was usually available earlier. The DEA Administrator may also
issue a budget call memorandum to all program managers listing his
priorities. According to DEA and DOJ budget officials, for its
fiscal year 1998 guidance, DOJ used an amended version of its
fiscal year 1997 guidance. In addition, DEA budget officials said
that the DEA Administrator sent out a budget call memorandum in
February 1996 indicating his priorities. However, DEA budget
officials said that they actually began to develop DEA's fiscal
year 1998 budget submission/staffing estimates in December 1995,
prior to the guidance, and continued to work through May 1996. As
part of this process, officials said that DEA budget staff
considered the needs of field and headquarters offices, analyzed
information on emerging drug trends, and held discussions with DEA
program managers. Budget staff said that after canvassing the
program managers, they presented the proposed budget submission
and staffing request to the Administrator in March 1996. According
to these staff, on the basis of the Administrator's comments, they
then prepared DEA's final fiscal year 1998 budget
submission/staffing request to DOJ, which DEA's Executive Staff
and the Administrator reviewed and approved in May. In June 1996,
DEA sent its fiscal year 1998 budget request with estimates of
additional staffing needs to DOJ. In its submission, DEA estimated
a 5 This number does not include positions to be funded through
DEA's Diversion Fee Account, which are included in a separate
program-specific budget request. DEA enforces the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-513) as
it applies to the registration of handlers of controlled
substances (e.g., manufacturers, distributors, importers,
exporters, and others). Page 87
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 need for 989 additional positions, including 399 special
agent positions and 590 support positions (e.g., diversion
investigators, chemists, intelligence analysts, and professional
and clerical staff). DEA identified, prioritized, and requested
funding, including staffing enhancements, for six specific
initiatives. * Countering violent crime: This included staffing
estimates (193 total/98 special agents) for the MET Program and
for converting 8 provisional state and local task forces to
program-funded status. * Methamphetamine strategy: This
initiative included estimated staffing enhancements (279 total/127
special agents), including positions to convert 7 provisional
state and local task forces to program-funded status, to fund a
comprehensive approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. *
Southwest Border project: This included estimated staffing
enhancements (212 total/96 special agents) to continue DOJ's
interagency strategy against drug trafficking on the Southwest
Border. * Domestic heroin enforcement: This initiative included
estimated staffing enhancements (104 total/53 special agents) to
continue implementation of DEA's 5-year heroin strategy. *
International crime: This included estimated staffing enhancements
(76 total/25 special agents) to (1) open DEA country offices in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Vientiane, Laos; Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates; Lisbon, Portugal; and Managua, Nicaragua; (2) provide
additional support to DEA offices in Mexico City, Panama City, New
Delhi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong; and (3) establish an International
Chemical Control Center in order to address the growing
international aspects of drug production, transshipment, and
trafficking. * Investigative shortfalls: This initiative included
estimates of resources and staffing enhancements (125 total)
needed to replace lost asset forfeiture revenues, provide support
staff for domestic field offices, and provide additional basic and
refresher training for special agents and DEA support staff. The
submission included justifications for each initiative and
reflected DEA's internal budget/staffing determination process.
For example, on the basis of changing trends and input from the
field, DEA's fiscal year 1998 budget submission proposed a
methamphetamine initiative,6 including domestic and international
staff enhancements, to fund a comprehensive 6 According to
officials, however, DEA did not wait for the completion of the
fiscal year 1998 budget cycle to address the methamphetamine
problem. Although DEA had no base budget for the methamphetamine
problem in 1996, it dedicated 405,000 agent hours, or the
equivalent of 195 full-time agents, to methamphetamine
investigations in fiscal year 1995. The hours dedicated to
methamphetamine were expected to rise in fiscal year 1996. Page 88
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. To justify
its fiscal year 1998 estimates, DEA provided (1) DAWN data that
indicated a steady increase in the number of methamphetamine-
related emergency room episodes and deaths and (2) statistics
indicating an increased use of and trafficking in methamphetamine
and the proliferation of clandestine drug laboratories in both
traditional and new locations. In accordance with the budget
formulation process, DEA's fiscal year 1998 DOJ Changed Staffing
budget submission was reviewed by DOJ Justice Management Division
Estimates for DEA's (JMD) budget staff and the Attorney
General between June and August, Initiatives 1996.
According to DOJ budget staff, as in other years, to assess DEA's
fiscal year 1998 enhancements and the corresponding
justifications, the budget staff considered the (1) overall
illegal drug situation at the time, including drug trends and
patterns; (2) link between the specific request and ONDCP, DOJ,
and DEA goals, strategies, and indicators; (3) facts and arguments
used by DEA to justify the request; and (4) level of resources
requested relative to the justified need, including prior year
appropriations. As a result of their analysis of DEA's fiscal year
1998 budget submission, DOJ budget staff estimated that DEA would
need 771 additional positions, including 311 special agents, to
support the 6 initiatives. This was 218 fewer total positions,
including 88 special agent positions, than DEA estimated. Over
half of the difference between DEA's and DOJ's estimates can be
accounted for by DOJ's not having included positions to convert
certain state and local task forces to permanent funding status
under the violent crime and methamphetamine initiatives. DOJ
argued that (1) local entities must continue to contribute to
these efforts to maintain the integrity of the intergovernmental
relationship; (2) additional resources were available to these
entities through other DOJ state and local grant programs; and (3)
in the case of the methamphetamine initiative, further assessment
was needed before conversions were made. DOJ budget staff
recommended fewer positions than DEA for five of the DEA
initiatives but concurred with DEA's staffing estimates for the
investigative shortfall initiative. These recommended changes in
staffing estimates, including the justifications provided, are
summarized below. * Violent crime: In addition to not including
positions to convert state and local task forces to permanent
status, as previously discussed, budget staff recommended fewer
additional agent positions for the MET Program. DOJ staff
concluded that four new MET teams for deployment to areas with
higher numbers of outstanding requests were sufficient to keep the
waiting time for a MET deployment to acceptable limits. Page 89
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 * Methamphetamine: Most of the difference between DEA's
and DOJ's staffing estimates for this initiative can be attributed
to DOJ's not including positions for state and local task force
conversion. DOJ also did not recommend additional chemists,
concluding that DEA had sufficient chemist resources; or an
additional agent for demand reduction to increase public awareness
of methamphetamine, given DEA's other critical needs. Budget staff
recommended 2 DEA clandestine lab regional training teams to teach
26 classes annually, rather than 4 teams to teach 40 classes
annually. * Southwest Border: DOJ budget staff did not recommend
5 additional chemists and 14 additional support staff, which were
included in DEA's submission. DOJ concluded that DEA had
sufficient resources to meet these needs. * Domestic heroin:
Asserting that DEA had sufficient chemists to meet its desired
staffing ratio, DOJ budget staff did not recommend the five
chemists and two clerical support positions included in DEA's
estimates for this initiative. * International: DOJ budget staff
recommended 22 fewer total positions, including 6 fewer special
agent positions, than DEA estimated for this initiative. More than
half of these 22 positions (2 chemists, 4 foreign diversion
investigators, and 6 support staff) were to establish an
International Chemical Control Center. DOJ argued that DEA could
use chemists from other places to meet these needs and use
diversion investigators from key locations in other parts of the
world to provide intelligence to the Center. DOJ also did not
recommend opening new DEA offices in Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, or Lisbon, Portugal, contending that DEA lacked
"substantive rationale" for offices in these locations. DOJ's
estimates also included no staffing enhancements for Bangkok,
Thailand, asserting that DEA had sufficient staffing resources to
assist Thai police in collecting intelligence about the emerging
methamphetamine problem and no additional special agent for
Panama, concluding that DEA had not provided "substantive reasons"
for that agent. The DOJ budget staff review was followed on August
2, 1996, by the Attorney General's hearing7 on DEA's fiscal year
1998 budget submission. Three working days before the hearing, DOJ
budget officials provided their analysis to DEA. According to DOJ
budget officials, during the hearing DEA had the opportunity to
appeal DOJ's proposed changes in DEA's 7 The hearing is usually
attended by the Attorney General, the DEA Administrator, the DOJ
budget analyst, and JMD officials. Page 90
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 submission and to provide additional information to
justify its budget initiatives and enhancements before the
Attorney General's final decision. On August 12, 1996, the
Administrator submitted an appeal to the Attorney General in which
he requested reconsideration of some of the DOJ budget staff's
recommended changes. The appeal asserted DEA's need for staff
positions to convert certain state and local task forces,
associated with its violent crime reduction and methamphetamine
efforts, from provisional to program-funded status. It also
addressed DEA's need for resources for its clandestine laboratory
cleanup efforts; items previously funded partially by asset
forfeiture funds, including awards to informants and marijuana
eradication efforts; and in-service training. Nevertheless, for
fiscal year 1998, the estimates for additional staffing for DEA
included in DOJ's OMB submission were the same as those
recommended by DOJ budget staff and previously discussed. Table
4.1 shows the differences between DEA's estimates for additional
staffing and those proposed to OMB by DOJ. Table 4.1: Comparison
of DEA and DOJ
Additional total and special agent positions Estimated Additional
DEA Total and DEA
staffing DOJ's DEA staffing Special Agent Positions
for Fiscal Year 1998
estimates to DOJ estimates to OMB June 1996
September 1996 Special Special Initiative
Total agents Total agents Violent crime
193 98 94 48
Methamphetamine 279 127
208 96 Southwest Border
212 96 193 96 Domestic
heroin 104 53
97 53 International crime
76 25 54 18
Investigative shortfall 125 0
125 0 Total
989 399 771 311 Source: DEA
Fiscal Year 1998 Spring Planning Estimates, June 1996, and DEA
Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management and Budget Submission,
September 1996. DEA's fiscal year 1998 budget submission was sent
to OMB for review in OMB Specified Minimum
September 1996 as part of DOJ's budget request. According to OMB
Funding for Certain DEA officials, an OMB
budget examiner initially reviewed the DOJ budget Initiatives, but
Indicated No submission, and the results were presented to and
reviewed by the OMB Staffing Levels
policy officials. Generally, a complete set of budget proposals is
presented to the president by early December for his approval.
Subsequently, OMB staff prepares the agency passbacks. An OMB
official described OMB's approach to DOJ's fiscal year 1998 budget
submission as "flexible." That is, as in other years, OMB made
suggestions regarding specific DOJ activities, providing DOJ with
an Page 91 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's Staffing Needs
Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998 overall
dollar level and specifying minimum funding for certain funding
floors. OMB officials said that OMB did not make account-level
recommendations, leaving those decisions to the Attorney General
to ensure that the budget reflected DOJ's priorities. By early
December 1996, OMB sent DOJ's fiscal year 1998 passback in which
it recommended an overall DOJ budget lower than DOJ's submission.
For DEA, the passback specified minimum funding for the
methamphetamine strategy, the Southwest Border project, and the
domestic heroin strategy, but it did not discuss specific staffing
estimates or foreign enhancements. Prior to the passback, DEA had
received its fiscal year 1997 appropriation, but we were unable to
ascertain how it affected the passback. According to DOJ budget
officials, DOJ reviewed OMB's fiscal year 1998 DEA/DOJ Reviewed
OMB DOJ passback to determine what could be funded
according to the Passback and Appealed It Attorney General's
priorities. They said that as a result of OMB's specifying With
Some Success funding levels for DEA's methamphetamine,
Southwest Border, and heroin initiatives, no funds for the
enhancements in other initiatives were available within the DEA
budget submission. The DOJ budget officials said that they then
sent DOJ's interpretation-which was based on the Attorney
General's priorities-of the OMB passback to DEA. According to DOJ
budget section officials, DEA developed its appeal to the OMB
passback and then presented it to OMB, through DOJ, in early
December 1996. DEA's specific staffing-related appeals and
outcomes were as follows: * Methamphetamine initiative: DEA
requested additional resources, including 131 positions. DOJ and
OMB agreed to a slight increase in the funded amount to cover 74
positions. * Southwest Border initiative: DEA sought 131
additional positions, including 90 special agents. DOJ and OMB
agreed to increase the funded amount to cover the additional
agents. OMB and DOJ officials reported that the method used to
settle appeals varied from year to year. In fiscal year 1998, OMB
and DOJ agreed on an overall spending level on appeal and DOJ's
spread of the increase, which provided DEA with funding to cover
additional positions for both the methamphetamine and Southwest
Border initiatives described above. Page 92
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 Concurrent with departmental and OMB reviews of budget
submissions, ONDCP Certified DOJ/DEA each agency with a drug
mission is required by the drug budget Budget Submission
certification process to submit a drug control budget to ONDCP.
However, in 1996, due to the appointment of a new ONDCP Director
and the reformulation and consequent late release of ONDCP's drug
strategy, the national drug budget certification process did not
follow ONDCP's established procedures and schedule. Specifically,
ONDCP requested only one fiscal year 1998 budget submission in
September 1996, coincident with the OMB deadline. On November 8,
1996, while OMB was reviewing DOJ's budget submission, DOJ sent
its budget request to ONDCP. On November 18, 1996, for
consideration before finalizing DOJ's fiscal year 1998 budget
request, the ONDCP Director advised the Attorney General of two
DEA program initiatives that did not appear to have been included
in DOJ's submission. The initiatives in question were (1) the
continued expansion of vetted law enforcement units in key source
and transit countries and (2) a request for additional resources
for DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. The
Director's letter did not specifically discuss staffing related to
the initiatives.8 Final ONDCP budget certification was withheld
until ONDCP reviewed DOJ's final budget submission. According to
DOJ and ONDCP officials, DEA received sufficient resources in its
fiscal year 1997 appropriation to address the ONDCP Director's
concerns. Therefore, on the basis of ONDCP's final review, the
Director notified the Attorney General on February 7, 1997-1 day
after the President submitted the fiscal year 1998 budget request-
that the resources requested by DOJ were certified as adequate to
implement the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control
Strategy. The President submitted his fiscal year 1998 budget to
Congress on The President's Fiscal Year February 6, 1997. As a
result of the iterative process between DEA/DOJ 1998 Budget
Submission and OMB over DEA staffing estimates and after
consideration of the resources provided in DEA's fiscal year 1997
appropriation,9 the President's budget requested 345 new
positions, including 168 special agents, for DEA domestic offices.
As shown in table 4.2, the number of total positions requested was
approximately one-half the number DOJ 8 Although no specific
mention of DEA staffing was made in the ONDCP certification
correspondence for fiscal year 1998, DEA officials indicated that
during fiscal year 1998, DEA acted on the ONDCP Director's
recommendations for additional staffing for DEA offices in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and Nassau. 9
DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation, as part of DOJ's
appropriation, was enacted on September 30, 1996. See Department
of Justice Appropriations Act of 1997, P.L. 104-208; and H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 104- 863. Page 93
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 initially estimated in its OMB submission. The number of
special agents requested was approximately 50 percent of the
original DOJ estimates. Some of the differences between the DOJ
estimates and the DEA staffing request in the President's budget
submission reflected changes recommended by DOJ or OMB, which were
previously discussed. However, other revisions took into account
DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation. For example, according to
DOJ officials, although DEA's international crime initiative was
not included in the President's budget submission for fiscal year
1998, DEA was able to staff the Vientiane and Managua offices,
included in that initiative, with fiscal year 1997 funds from the
Source Country Initiative.10 In addition, because Congress
provided almost twice the funds for the MET Program requested by
DEA in fiscal year 1997, the program was fully funded (130 agents
were provided) as of that year. Additional funds for the MET
Program, which had been included in the fiscal year 1998 violent
crime initiative, were no longer necessary. Table 4.2: Comparison
of DOJ's
Additional total and special agent positions Estimates and the
President's Request
DOJ's DEA staffing President's DEA
staffing for Additional DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for
Fiscal Year 1998
estimates to OMB request to
Congress September 1996
February 1997 Special
Special Initiative
Total agents Total
agents Violent crime
94 48 a
a Methamphetamine
208 96 74
60 Southwest Border
193 96 192
96 Domestic heroin
97 53 60
12 International crime
54 18 a
a Investigative shortfall
125 0 19
0 Total
771 311 345
168 aThe conference report for DEA's fiscal year 1997
appropriation provided an additional 75 agents for source
countries and 130 special agents for the MET Program, thereby
addressing at least some of DOJ's initial estimates for the
violent crime and international crime initiatives (H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 104-863). Source: DEA Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management
and Budget Submission, September 1996, and DEA Fiscal Year 1998
Authorization and Budget Request to Congress. 10 The conference
report for DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation included a source
country/international strategy, which provided an additional 75
agents, to increase on-site DEA agents in source countries. See
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863. Page 94
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 As shown in table 4.3, the conference committee
recommended 531 Congress Added Staff additional
positions, of which 240 were special agent positions. On the for a
New Caribbean basis of the recommendations of the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the conference
committee also provided guidance as to how Initiative and Changed
those positions were to be allocated, including a new Caribbean
initiative. Staffing Recommended for Other DEA
During the fiscal year 1998 appropriations process, the House
Initiatives Appropriations Committee
recommended, and Congress approved as part of the conference
committee's report on DEA's appropriation, a new Caribbean
initiative, which was not included in the President's budget.
According to the House Appropriations Committee report, this
initiative was proposed to address the increase in drug
trafficking throughout the Caribbean. The initiative provided 60
additional DEA special agents for Puerto Rico, the Northern
Caribbean, and south Florida. In addition, the conference
committee recommended additional positions, above the President's
request, for the heroin and investigative shortfall initiatives.
On the basis of the Senate Appropriations Committee's
recommendation, the Conference Committee's report included 120 new
positions, 24 of which were special agents (twice the number of
total and special agent positions in the President's budget
request), to continue efforts to reduce heroin trafficking within
the United States. The Conference Committee also identified the
need for 85 additional intelligence analysts for the investigative
shortfall initiative. The President signed DEA/DOJ's fiscal year
1998 appropriation into law on November 26, 1996. Page 95
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 Table 4.3: Comparison of the President's Request and
Congress'
Additional total and special agent positions Appropriations
Guidance for DEA
Fiscal year 1998 DOJ Additional Total and Special Agent
appropriation conference Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
President's DEA staffing report with DEA staffing
request to Congress guidance February 1997
November 1997 Special Special
Initiative Total
agents Total agents Methamphetamine
74a 60 74 60b
Southwest Border 192
96 192 96 Domestic heroin
60 12 120 24c
Investigative shortfall 19
0 85 0 Caribbean
N/A N/A 60 60 Total
345 168 531 240 Notes:
N/A-Initiative not included at that point in the process.
aFourteen of the positions were requested through VCRP. bThe
conference report called for 54 special agents in accordance with
the House report. The House report also identified six additional
agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training. Fourteen
positions were provided through VCRP. cThe conference report
called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate report.
The Senate language specified that 24 of the positions be special
agents. Source: DEA FY 1998 Authorization and Budget Request to
Congress; the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L.
105-119 (1997); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-
207; and S. Rep. No. 105-48. After receipt of its annual
appropriation, DEA is responsible for budget DEA's Fiscal Year
1998 execution and the allocation of new staff. In addition to the
guidance Allocation Process provided by
Congress, DEA officials said they consider factors, such as
recently changing drug trends, to determine that allocation.
Considered a Variety of Factors For
fiscal year 1998, according to a DEA official involved in the
allocation process that year, DEA's Executive Policy and Strategic
Planning, Operations Division, Financial Management Division, and
Office of Resource Management staff prepared a draft allocation
for the additional resources provided in DEA's appropriation. The
official indicated that among the factors considered in
determining the allocation of additional staff were congressional
direction; the number of agents added by Congress, broken out by
mission and team; FMPs and any other written requests from the
field divisions; DEA and DOJ strategies, initiatives, and
priorities, including the Southwest Border and methamphetamine
plans; actual hours worked by agents on particular types of cases;
and drug trends that had emerged since the original fiscal year
1998 budget submission. The recommendations were sent to the DEA
Administrator for review and final approval. Page 96
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
Year 1998 DEA allocated 531 new positions, including 240 special
agent positions, for the 5 initiatives included in its
appropriation. As shown in table 4.4, DEA's fiscal year 1998
staffing allocation followed Congress' appropriations guidance.
Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress'
Additional total and special agent positions Appropriations
Guidance and DEA's
Fiscal year 1998 DOJ New Staffing Allocation for Additional DEA
Staffing and Special Agent
appropriation conference Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
report and DEA staffing DEA fiscal year 1998 guidance
staffing allocation November 1997 February
1998 Special Special Initiative
Total agents Total agents
Methamphetamine 74a
60 74 60 Southwest Border
192 96 192 96
Domestic heroin 120
24b 120 24 Investigative shortfall
85 0 85 0
Caribbean 60
60 60 60 Total
531 240 531 240c aThe
conference report called for the 54 special agents in accordance
with the House report. The House report also identified six
additional agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training.
Fourteen positions were provided through VCRP. bThe conference
report called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate
report. The Senate language specified that 24 of the positions be
special agents. cDEA also allocated 45 additional positions
provided through other funding sources for a total of 576
positions allocated, of which 245 were special agents. Source: The
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L. 105-119 (1997);
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-207; S. Rep. No.
105-48; and DEA. The process used for determining DEA's staffing
needs, as carried out in Conclusions
fiscal year 1998, was systematically linked to its budget
formulation process. The DEA process was typical of and consistent
with the processes and procedures that federal agencies are
expected to follow, according to federal laws and regulations and
procedures promulgated by OMB. Moreover, the DEA process
considered factors related to DEA's ability to carry out its
mission, including emerging drug trafficking trends, staffing
requests from the field, the Administrator's vision statement, and
the SAC's vision statement from each field office. Once Congress
approved DEA's fiscal year 1998 appropriation, DEA senior
management systematically determined the allocation of the
additional staff to headquarters and field offices, taking into
consideration congressional guidance and such factors as field
office requests. Page 97
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices During
our review, we visited four Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
domestic field divisions-Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans,
LA; and Washington, D.C./Baltimore, MD. We also visited three
foreign country offices-Bogota, Colombia; LaPaz, Bolivia; and
Mexico City, Mexico-and the Caribbean (Puerto Rico) Division,
which has both foreign and domestic responsibilities. The
following profiles provide a snapshot of each division/office at
the time we performed our work at those locations between February
and September 1998. The profiles include information, as of that
time (unless otherwise noted), on the (1) geographic region
covered by each division/office and its organizational structure;
(2) drug trafficking situation and threat faced by each
division/office; (3) enforcement response of each division/office
in terms of priorities, programs, and initiatives; and (4)
enforcement statistics and case examples. Many of the programs
and initiatives referred to in the profiles are generally
described in chapter 2 of this report. We developed the profiles
on the basis of information-including various documents and
statistical data-provided by DEA field officials, although we
could not always obtain comparable information from all
divisions/offices. We did not independently verify the accuracy of
the information provided. Page 98
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Los
Angeles Division DEA's Los Angeles Division covers a vast
geographic area that includes Geographic Region and portions
of California and all of Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, the
Organizational Structure Republic of Palau, and American Samoa.
Los Angeles has the busiest maritime container port complexes in
the United States at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. Los
Angeles International airport is the third busiest in the world.
In addition, there are major airports in Orange and San Bernardino
Counties, Las Vegas, and Honolulu. California and Nevada are also
served by an extensive highway system. The Los Angeles Division is
headed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), two Associate SACs, and
seven Assistant SACs (ASACs). It includes the division office,
three district offices, four resident offices, and three posts of
duty, as shown in figure I.1.1 1 The maps included in the profiles
in this appendix are not drawn precisely to scale. Page 99
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.1: Los Angeles Division Map Reno Pacific
South Lake Tahoe Ocean Nevada California Las Vegas Honolulu Maui
Ventura Hawaii
Los Angeles Riverside Hilo
Santa Ana Guam Division office District office Resident office
Post of duty Source: DEA's Los Angeles Division. Page 100
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
time of our visit in February 1998, the division was authorized to
have 445 staff, including 283 special agents. There also were 114
state and local officers from various law enforcement agencies
assigned to task forces operated by the division. According to
DEA, the region covered by the Los Angeles Division is one
Overview of Drug of the most significant worldwide
centers of drug trafficking, money Trafficking Situation and
laundering, and drug-related violence. The region serves as a
source, Threat transit area and distribution
site for a variety of illegal drugs. The division's size,
multiplicity of jurisdictions, and ethnic diversity all pose law
enforcement challenges, as do its myriad entry points and transit
corridors. The proximity to the Southwest Border makes the region
easily accessible to trafficking organizations bringing cocaine,
heroin, and other drugs into the United States. The region is also
a major source of methamphetamine clandestinely produced in
laboratories and high-grade marijuana cultivated in outdoor and
indoor operations. In addition, DEA reported that much of the
region is plagued by drug-related violent crime, often gang
related, and that most of California's violent gang activity is in
Los Angeles county. Cocaine At the time of
our review, DEA considered cocaine to be one of the biggest drug
trafficking problems for the division. Los Angeles is a major
transshipment point for cocaine en route to other parts of the
United States and Canada. Cocaine is smuggled into Southern
California primarily across the U.S.-Mexico border. According to
DEA, Mexican drug trafficking organizations smuggle most of the
cocaine coming into and through Los Angeles. Although Colombian
traffickers control the worldwide supply of cocaine, they prefer
to move their cocaine into Mexico and sell it to Mexican
organizations. Cocaine traffickers use various means, such as
automobiles and tractor-trailers with hidden compartments, to move
cocaine across the border. Other points of entry for cocaine
include airports and maritime ports in the region. DEA reported
that traffickers were using "stash houses" to store cocaine in Los
Angeles and Riverside counties. From these stash houses, cocaine
was being distributed locally or moved to other destinations in
the United States and Canada. Mobile street gangs were involved in
handling the local cocaine distribution. These gangs were also
transporting cocaine and crack cocaine to other destinations. Page
101 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the time of our
review, Mexican heroin was the heroin of choice for Heroin
users in the area covered by the Los Angeles Division, according
to DEA. Heroin was also coming into the region from Southeast Asia
(principally Thailand and the Philippines) and Canada, and to a
lesser extent from Southwest Asia/Middle East (Turkey, Pakistan,
Lebanon) and Colombia. Although heroin was being smuggled into the
country in a variety of ways, DEA reported that most was arriving
in maritime containers or aircraft for passengers or cargo. Also,
according to DEA, black tar heroin and Mexican brown heroin, the
most available and popular form of heroin in the Los Angeles area,
were both supplied by Mexican traffickers. Trafficking in
Southeast Asian heroin, which was being imported into the Los
Angeles area and transshipped to the East Coast, was dominated by
Thai nationals and Thailand-based Nigerian traffickers.
Methamphetamine and Other At the time of our review,
methamphetamine was the most manufactured Dangerous Drugs
and distributed illegal drug in the geographic area covered by the
Los Angeles division, according to DEA. It is the division's top
enforcement priority. Although methamphetamine trafficking takes
place throughout the region, it is predominantly concentrated in
Riverside and San Bernardino counties, where there has been a
tremendous increase in clandestine methamphetamine laboratories.
These two counties have been designated as the methamphetamine
capital of the nation. The division's most serious methamphetamine
threat is from Mexican drug trafficking organizations that
dominate the production of high-quality methamphetamine in
southern California. At the time of our review, DEA reported that
the number of Mexican methamphetamine laboratories was increasing
at an alarming rate. Other individuals were operating small,
unsophisticated methamphetamine laboratories that made up most of
the clandestine laboratories in southern California. The diversion
of legitimately produced controlled substances is also a serious
threat in the region, particularly in the Los Angeles area.
Numerous means are used to divert these drugs to local abusers and
traffickers. At the time of our review, traffickers were shipping
the drugs throughout the United States and abroad, according to
DEA. Other dangerous drugs are also trafficked in the area covered
by the division, including PCP and LSD. Marijuana
According to DEA, marijuana importation, cultivation, and
trafficking remain an ongoing enforcement challenge throughout the
division. Marijuana is prolific throughout the region, and Los
Angeles is a major Page 102
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
transshipment area for marijuana destined for other parts of the
United States. Mexican trafficking organizations smuggle marijuana
into the region. DEA reported that these organizations had
cornered the wholesale and retail distribution markets for
marijuana in Southern and Central California. Colombian
organizations also were involved in marijuana trafficking, using
Mexican organizations to transport marijuana across the U.S.-
Mexico border. Domestic cultivation also is a problem, with high-
grade marijuana being grown in outdoor gardens and on farms in
Hawaii, California, and Nevada. According to DEA, Hawaii leads the
nation in domestic marijuana cultivation. The division reported
seeing an increase in the number of large-scale indoor operations
in California and Nevada. At the time of our review, the Los
Angeles Division reported operating Priorities, Programs, and
various programs and initiatives in response to the drug
trafficking threat Initiatives in the region. The
division was working with other federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies to carry out its programs and initiatives.
For fiscal year 1998, the division's goal was to focus available
resources on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting criminal
drug enterprises, their support systems, and the individuals
responsible for their origin and proliferation. Another priority
of the division was to use federal asset forfeiture laws to affect
criminal organizations by seizing proceeds derived from their
criminal activity. Division resources to carry out its programs
and initiatives included task force operations, an asset
forfeiture group, an intelligence program, a drug diversion
control program,2 investigative initiatives aimed at gangs
involved in drug-related violent crimes, Mobile Enforcement Team
(MET) Program operations, the Southwest Border Initiative, and a
methamphetamine initiative. At the time of our review, the
division had planned to continue expanding its Title III
(electronic surveillance) program; promote greater cooperation in
developing joint investigations with other federal, state, and
local agencies aimed at the highest level of drug trafficking; and
widen the scope of interagency task forces. 2 DEA's drug diversion
control program is designed to enforce federal laws and
regulations controlling the legal production and distribution of
legitimately manufactured controlled substances; prevent and
detect, through criminal, civil, and administrative actions, the
diversion of controlled substances from legitimate channels; and
control the diversion of legally produced precursor and essential
chemicals to the illicit manufacture of drugs. Page 103
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
division office in Los Angeles had nine enforcement groups at the
time of our review. According to the SAC, three of the groups were
working on the Southwest Border Initiative,3 a major drug
enforcement operation along and across the Mexican border using
resources from DEA, FBI, the Customs Service, and state and local
law enforcement agencies. The office also had groups focusing on
Southeast Asian heroin, Mexican heroin, drugs primarily from
Southeast Asia and Europe, methamphetamine, and violent drug
trafficking groups. In addition to the enforcement groups, the
division office had support groups, including technical
operations, asset removal, intelligence, and diversion control.
The division's district offices, resident offices, and posts of
duty all had enforcement groups focusing primarily on specific
drug trafficking problems in their areas. For example, the
Riverside district office, with four enforcement groups,
concentrated on methamphetamine trafficking and the Southwest
Border Initiative. These outlying offices are encouraged to
cooperate and conduct joint efforts with state and local law
enforcement agencies in developing cases and conducting other
operations. The division had state and local task forces in
Riverside, Santa Ana, Reno, Las Vegas, Honolulu, Saipan, and Guam.
Though not part of a DEA-funded state and local task force, the
Ventura office assisted three narcotics task forces in its area.
Also, DEA's group at Los Angeles International airport was an
informal task force with officers from the Los Angeles Police
Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office working
together with DEA special agents. At the time of our review, the
division had one MET that it was using to target organizations
engaged in violent drug-related crimes, particularly with regard
to cocaine and crack cocaine trafficking. In commenting on a draft
of our report, DEA officials informed us that a second MET was
established in October 1998. The officials also informed us that
as of May 1999, the first MET had 10 special agents assigned to
it, and the second MET had 11 special agents assigned. Further, as
of May 1999, the first MET had received 19 requests for assistance
since 1995 and was deployed for 14. Since its inception, the
second MET had received two requests for assistance and was
deployed for both. 3 In addition, four DEA special agents were
assigned to a Southwest Border Initiative group located at the Los
Angeles FBI office. Page 104
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
division is a major participant in the Los Angeles High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), which is the largest HIDTA in the
country. At the time of our review, a DEA Associate SAC headed the
Southern California Drug Task Force (SCDTF) in the HIDTA, and a
DEA ASAC headed one of three SCDTF divisions. The SCDTF is a
multiagency, integrated task force that comprised 105 federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers, including 40 DEA
special agents, at the time of our review. SCDTF's primary
objective is to conduct investigations targeting major drug
trafficking organizations that operate on a regional, national,
and international level. The Los Angeles HIDTA's fiscal year 1998
strategy referred to SCDTF as the "cornerstone" of the HIDTA. DEA
also had an intelligence group assigned to SCDTF, as well as staff
assigned to other Los Angeles HIDTA units. Other major programs
and initiatives being implemented by DEA's Los Angeles Division at
the time of our review included the following: (1) the
Methamphetamine Strategy, which was aimed at major domestic and
Mexican traffickers involved in producing methamphetamine and
other dangerous drugs and was being carried out with state and
local law enforcement agencies; (2) money laundering
investigations and seizures of criminally derived drug-related
assets, which were carried out in conjunction with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Customs Service, Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), and California Bureau of Narcotics
Enforcement; and (3) the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
Program (marijuana program), particularly initiatives conducted in
cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies in
Hawaii. Most of the division's resources have been devoted to
cases involving cocaine, methamphetamine, and other dangerous
drugs. For example, in fiscal year 1997, the division's special
agents spent about 35.7 percent of their investigative work hours
on cocaine cases and about 35.7 percent on cases involving
dangerous drugs, including methamphetamine. In fiscal year 1998,
they spent about 33.2 percent of their investigative work hours on
cocaine cases and about 41.8 percent on cases involving dangerous
drugs, including methamphetamine. Enforcement activity results
reported by the Los Angeles Division Enforcement Statistics and
indicated that the division initiated 1,573 cases in fiscal year
1997 and 1,446 Case Examples cases in fiscal year
1998. The division reported 1,892 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and
2,214 arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division also reported
seizing approximately 4,500 kilograms of cocaine, 25 kilograms of
heroin, 16,400 kilograms of marijuana, and 268 kilograms of
methamphetamine in Page 105
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices fiscal
year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division reported seizing
approximately 4,656 kilograms of cocaine, 59 kilograms of heroin,
9,235 kilograms of marijuana, and 673 kilograms of
methamphetamine. In addition, the division reported seizing assets
amounting to $52.4 million in fiscal year 1997 and assets
amounting to $122.2 million in fiscal year 1998. Further, the
division reported seizing 87 clandestine laboratories in fiscal
year 1997 and 90 clandestine laboratories in fiscal year 1998. The
following are two examples of what the Los Angeles Division
considered to be successful major investigations. * DEA's Los
Angeles Division conducted an investigation targeting a Mexican-
based cocaine trafficking organization operating in the Los
Angeles area. The organization was responsible for smuggling large
quantities of cocaine into the United States from Mexico,
stockpiling it in the Los Angeles area, and distributing it
throughout the United States. Members of the organization
collected drug proceeds and transported the money to Mexico. The
investigation involved the wire interception of 29 cellular
telephones and the electronic interception of 19 digital paging
devices. It resulted in the arrest of 52 individuals and seizures
of over $15 million, 3.5 tons of cocaine, and 570 pounds of
marijuana. On the basis of leads developed from this
investigation, DEA offices in San Diego, San Francisco, Chicago,
New York, and Calexico, Mexico initiated related investigations
and wiretaps. Surveillance teams comprising state and local
agencies assisted DEA with this investigation. * DEA's Los
Angeles Division and Islamabad Country Office worked with the
Pakistan Antinarcotics Force to conduct a controlled delivery4 of
Southwest Asian heroin. DEA, U.S. Customs agents, local law
enforcement officers, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were
subsequently involved in the arrest of several drug traffickers.
The operation resulted in the seizure of 106 kilograms of
Southwest Asian heroin and approximately $509,000 in U.S.
currency, as well as three arrests in the United States, three in
Canada, and one in Pakistan. 4 A controlled delivery is an
investigative tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a
shipment of illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual
seizure. Page 106
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Miami
Division DEA's Miami Division is responsible for federal drug law
enforcement in Geographic Region and Florida, the Bahamas,
the Cayman Islands, and Cuba. The division's 8,462 Organizational
Structure miles of coastline and 14 deep-water ports have made
it very attractive for maritime smugglers, and its 18 commercial
cargo and passenger carrier airports also pose a smuggling threat.
The Miami Division, which is headed by a SAC, 2 Associate SACs,
and 8 ASACs, includes the division office, 3 district offices, 10
resident offices, 1 post of duty, and 1 country office, as shown
in figure I.2. Page 107
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.2: Miami Division Map Pensacola
Jacksonville Tallahassee Panama City
Gainesville Florida Orlando Tampa Ft. Pierce Freeport W. Palm
Beach Ft. Myers Ft. Lauderdale Miami
Bahamas Nassau Key Largo Key West Division office Country office
District office Resident office Post of duty Cuba Source: DEA's
Miami Division. Page 108
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
time of our visit in June 1998, the division was authorized to
have 600 staff, including 400 special agents. In addition, there
were 99 staff from state and local agencies authorized for various
task forces and groups in the division, including 92 law
enforcement officers. According to DEA, at the time of our review,
South Florida continued to be Overview of Drug one of
the principal gateways for cocaine entering the United States. The
Trafficking Situation and Miami Division reported that South
American drug traffickers were Threat
shifting their trafficking patterns back to routes in the
Caribbean, as evidenced by the amount of trafficking activity in
the Bahamas and Florida. Further, as Colombian traffickers have
become increasingly involved in heroin trafficking, Miami
International Airport became the principal port of entry for
Colombian heroin into the United States. Other drugs were also a
concern of the division. For example, DEA reported that marijuana
trafficking through the Caribbean has traditionally been a
problem, and there had been an increase in the amounts of
marijuana and methamphetamine from the Southwest Border being
transshipped through central and northern Florida. DEA also
reported an increase in the production of methamphetamine in
clandestine laboratories in the Florida area. Cocaine
The Miami Division reported that as drug law enforcement efforts
increased along the Southwest Border in recent years, South
Florida became the North American command and control center for
major South American trafficking organizations. Colombians
dominate the major South Florida drug-smuggling organizations, and
they continued to finance and control the wholesale cocaine
distribution market in the area. The division further reported
that drug intelligence indicated that the Colombian traffickers
did not completely trust Mexican trafficking organizations;
consequently, cocaine trafficking patterns had begun to shift in
1997 and 1998. Once again, large shipments of cocaine were being
sent from South America, through Mexico and the Caribbean, to
South Florida. The Caribbean serves as a major transit zone for
cocaine from Central and South America, and Florida is a
significant importation and transit area for cocaine smuggled
through the Bahamas. According to DEA, airdrops of cocaine from
planes coming directly from Colombia to the Bahamas were taking
place at an accelerating rate in 1998. The primary threat,
however, was "go-fast" boats and pleasure craft. Such vessels were
being used to carry up to 1,500 kilograms of cocaine through the
Bahamas to the United States. Small commercial cargo vessels were
also being used to smuggle drugs through the Bahamas. Page 109
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Cocaine
was also smuggled in other ways into the area covered by the
division. For example, DEA reported that aircraft were used to
smuggle cocaine directly into Florida from the Eastern Caribbean.
Maritime smuggling continued to be a significant factor, including
the shipment of cocaine hidden within containerized cargo on ships
travelling from South America to Florida. There also were
indications that the Florida Keys were increasingly being used as
an off-load point for Cuban traffickers. According to DEA, crack
cocaine was the most significant problem for the division's
offices outside South Florida. South Florida traffickers were
supplying most of the state, except for the Florida panhandle
area, which was being supplied by trafficking organizations along
the Southwest Border. Heroin According to
DEA, the drug threat in the area covered by the Miami Division has
expanded to include increased heroin importation from South
America to the United States through Florida. Opium poppy
cultivation and heroin trafficking have become part of the
Colombian illegal drug trade, and Colombian traffickers were
increasing their efforts to sell multikilogram quantities of
heroin to distributors in the United States. Miami International
Airport replaced New York's John F. Kennedy Airport as the
principal port of entry for Colombian heroin into the United
States. Another significant heroin smuggling route was from the
Caribbean directly to Orlando, where the heroin was then
transported through Florida and on to large markets in major
northeastern cities. Methamphetamine and Other According to
DEA, methamphetamine trafficking and use had increased Dangerous
Drugs throughout Florida, particularly in central and
northern Florida. Mexican organizations in Florida were the
primary sources of methamphetamine. DEA reported that most of
these organizations had ties to similar organizations in Southern
California and/or Mexico where they were obtaining the drug. In
addition to smuggling methamphetamine into Florida, local
organizations were becoming increasingly adept at clandestinely
manufacturing it. DEA also reported there was a great amount of
drug-related violence associated with the distribution and use of
methamphetamine. The diversion of legal pharmaceutical drugs to
illegal channels continued to be a problem in Florida. Physicians
and pharmacists were the source of most of these drugs through
activities such as indiscriminate and illegal prescribing
practices and forged prescriptions. In addition, numerous chemical
companies and brokers in Florida were diverting and supplying Page
110 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices chemicals used by
clandestine laboratory operators to produce methamphetamine,
cocaine, and heroin. Marijuana Marijuana was widely
available throughout the area covered by the division, according
to DEA. Although marijuana trafficking through the Caribbean has
traditionally been a concern, the division also reported an
increase in the amount of marijuana coming from the Southwest
Border and being transshipped through central and northern
Florida. Traffickers were using a variety of smuggling routes and
methods to bring marijuana into Florida. For example, DEA reported
that trafficking groups were transshipping marijuana from Colombia
through Florida using private vessels. Other traffickers were
using commercial trucks to bring marijuana into Florida from Texas
and Mexico. Smaller quantities of marijuana were being dispatched
in luggage on commercial airline flights or via AMTRAK.
Additionally, Federal Express and other package delivery services
were frequently used to transport small quantities of marijuana. A
large percentage of the marijuana consumed in South Florida was
being grown locally. DEA reported that indoor marijuana
cultivation had reached record levels. Typically, indoor growing
operations were located in private residences and consisted of
about 200 to 300 plants. Larger indoor operations consisting of up
to 10,000 plants were becoming more prevalent. Outdoor growing
operations, sometimes amounting to several thousand plants, were
usually located on private property in more rural areas or on
protected forest land. Money Laundering According to DEA, South
Florida continues to be a major center for Colombian drug
traffickers' money laundering activities. At the time of our
review, recent financial investigations indicated that traffickers
were using electronic fund transfers to move narcotics proceeds
from the United States to Central and South America. Traffickers
were also using both legitimate and illegitimate import/export
businesses to purchase products with illegal drug proceeds for
export mostly to South America, thus hiding the source of the
proceeds and providing additional profit. Intelligence also
indicated that smuggling of large shipments of bulk United States
currency from Florida to Colombia has continued. In recent cases,
traffickers wrapped and shipped bulk currency in hollowed
appliances and containers. At times, these bulk shipments were
sent to Colombia via third countries, such as Venezuela or Panama.
Page 111 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The Miami Division's
traditional priority has been regional, national, and Priorities,
Programs, and international investigations aimed at disrupting
the ability of major South Initiatives American
traffickers to import and distribute cocaine, as well as their
ability to move the proceeds of their operations to South America.
The division believes such investigations have become increasingly
important as drug trafficking through the Caribbean has increased.
In this regard, the division's management plans, at the time of
our review, called for it to (1) direct investigative efforts
towards major international organizations, targeting every aspect
of their operations; and (2) increase cooperative efforts with
foreign counterparts as well as other federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies. The plan also called for the division
to (1) attack street-level drug gangs through the MET Program,
task forces, and drug enforcement training for state and local
officers; and (2) continue to take a proactive role with the
media, business and community groups, and schools to increase
awareness of DEA's mission and the dangers of drug abuse. At the
time of our review, the division office in Miami had eight
enforcement groups as well as four HIDTA task force groups and two
METs. In addition to these groups, the division office had a
diversion control group and support groups, including technical
operations, asset removal, and intelligence. The division's
outlying district, country, and resident offices had various
enforcement groups, including eight state and local task forces
and a HIDTA task force group. Also, the Orlando and Tampa district
offices each had a diversion control group. The Miami Division
received 62 new positions in fiscal year 1998. Most of these
positions resulted from a congressional appropriation designed to
increase DEA's efforts against drug trafficking in the Caribbean
and Florida (referred to as the Caribbean initiative). The
additional positions were added to offices throughout the
division, particularly in South Florida, the Bahamas, and the
Florida Keys. The division office's four HIDTA task force groups
were part of the Miami HIDTA established in 1990. The Miami
HIDTA's fiscal year 1998 goals were to reduce drug trafficking,
money laundering, and drug-related crime and violence as well as
to prevent and reduce drug abuse. DEA officials said that all four
HIDTA groups focused primarily on Colombian cocaine cases.
However, one group also investigated indoor marijuana growing
operations, and another group also conducted "street sweeps" with
City of Miami and Miami-Dade police. Miami HIDTA task force group
participants Page 112 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices included special
agents from DEA, Customs, IRS, and the FBI as well as officers
from various state and local law enforcement agencies. The Central
Florida HIDTA was established in Orlando, FL, in 1998. Its fiscal
year 1998 mission was to measurably reduce drug trafficking and
related money laundering and apprehend violent drug fugitives,
thereby reducing the impact of drug-related crimes in Central
Florida. As part of this HIDTA, the Miami Division's Orlando
District Office operated a multiagency heroin task force, and its
Tampa District Office managed a multiagency methamphetamine task
force. Financial investigations are a priority of the division.
Enforcement groups have carried out investigations targeting money
launderers, such as Operation Cali-Man, and also initiated
Operation Greenskeeper to penetrate major trafficking
organizations by offering money laundering services to
traffickers. In addition, the division reestablished its asset
removal group, whose primary goal was to provide asset forfeiture
training to special agents and task force officers. The division
planned that this group would expand its role to support the
division's financial investigations and then eventually assume a
proactive role in conducting and assisting financial
investigations. The division's efforts to combat marijuana
trafficking included investigations of organizations responsible
for smuggling marijuana into the United States, transporting
marijuana to Florida from the Southwest Border, and transporting
marijuana to other locations within the United States. DEA offices
located in the Florida Panhandle, for example, participated in
Operation Pipeline with state and local agencies to interdict
marijuana being shipped on Florida highways. In addition, the
division participated in DEA's marijuana eradication program to
assist in the detection and eradication of marijuana plants grown
in Florida. DEA provided the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE) with $320,000 to implement this program in fiscal year
1998. The division's marijuana eradication program manager in
Tallahassee, along with DEA field coordinators in various district
and resident offices, are to work with the FDLE and maintain
liaison with the various federal, state, and local agencies
involved in the program to coordinate their activities. DEA also
participates in eradication operations and investigations of
growers and provides program training. The Miami Division had two
METs at the time of our review. The first was established in
February 1995 and the second in February 1997. Each MET Page 113
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices had 12
special agents. According to the ASAC responsible for the METs,
in assessing a request from a police chief or sheriff for MET
assistance, the teams decide whether they can make an impact on
the drug-related violence in the community. The assessment
includes, but is not limited to, the extent of drug-related
violence as measured by criteria such as the murder rate and the
number of violent gangs. At the time of our review, the first MET
had been deployed to four local communities in the geographic area
covered by the division; the second MET had completed deployments
to three local communities and was conducting a fourth. At the
time of our review, another major program conducted by the Miami
Division was Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands (OPBAT).
OPBAT was designed to interdict illegal drugs being shipped
through the Bahamas to the United States. The division's Nassau
Country Office works with the Bahamian police, U.S. Coast Guard,
and U.S. Army to carry out this operation. The DEA ASAC
responsible for OPBAT said it is basically a response force. Some
patrols are conducted, but OPBAT personnel primarily react to
specific intelligence about drug shipments. Most of the division's
resources have been devoted to cocaine cases. For example, in
fiscal year 1997, the division's special agents spent about 71.6
percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine cases. In
fiscal year 1998, they spent about 70.6 percent of their
investigative work hours on cocaine cases. The Miami Division
reported 3,945 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 3,417 Enforcement
Statistics and arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division
reported seizing 17,860 kilograms Case Examples of
cocaine, 34.1 kilograms of heroin, and 14,935 kilograms of
marijuana in fiscal year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division
reported seizing 24,484 kilograms of cocaine, 96 kilograms of
heroin, and 26,849 kilograms of marijuana. The division also
reported that 108,178 marijuana plants were eradicated in calendar
year 1997, and 55,311 marijuana plants were eradicated in calendar
year 1998. In addition, the division reported seized assets
totaling $142 million in fiscal year 1997 and $68 million in
fiscal year 1998. Operation Zorro II is an example of what DEA
officials considered a successful major investigation by the Miami
Division. Operation Zorro II targeted Colombian drug trafficking
organization cell or group heads responsible for importing and
distributing large shipments of cocaine and laundering money
throughout the United States. The groups were associated with the
Colombian Cali cartel. Operation Zorro II consisted of joint
investigations initiated by DEA offices in Miami, New York, and
Los Page 114 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Angeles in
coordination with DEA Headquarters' Special Operations Division
(SOD) and the Department of Justice, targeting the Colombian group
heads in their respective cities. In addition, DEA's Miami
Division worked jointly with the City of Miami Police Department
and received assistance from several other local law enforcement
agencies during this operation. Operation Zorro II was conducted
in three phases. During the first phase, Miami Division special
agents arrested 26 group members responsible for importing and
distributing throughout the United States multithousand- kilogram
quantities of cocaine. During the second phase, the special agents
used Title III (electronic surveillance) intercepts to monitor the
activities of the money launderers associated with the
organization. As a result of this phase of the investigation, 11
Colombian money launderers were indicted and arrested, and over $1
million in cash and assets were seized. Finally, during the third
phase, the special agents targeted the distribution networks that
were assisting the organization in distributing multikilogram
quantities of cocaine in the South Florida area. An additional 11
defendants were indicted. At the time of our review, a total of 47
arrests had been made in Miami as part of Operation Zorro II.
Another example of what DEA officials considered a successful
major investigation involved the Miami Division's district office
in Orlando, FL. Working in cooperation with the division's Fort
Lauderdale office, special agents in Orlando identified a drug
trafficking organization headed by two individuals, including a
transportation specialist for Colombian drug traffickers. The
transportation specialist's primary role was to accept delivery of
drugs in Puerto Rico, store the drugs, and later transport the
drugs to central Florida and other regions of the United States.
The Orlando office led an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force (OCDETF) investigation targeting this trafficking
organization, and representatives of the Customs Service, IRS,
Marshal's Service, Postal Service, and local law enforcement
agencies participated. The investigation revealed that from 1994
through June 1998 (the time of our visit), the organization had
transported over 166,000 kilograms of cocaine and about 200
kilograms of heroin from Colombia, via Puerto Rico, into the
United States. Cocaine and heroin were distributed and sold in
Miami, New York, Orlando, and Charleston, SC, as well as in Puerto
Rico. The investigation also uncovered numerous acts of violence
committed by organization members, including three homicides. Page
115 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the time of our
review, DEA reported that the investigation had resulted in the
arrest of 61 individuals, including both of the principal targets.
Fifty- six of the individuals had been convicted in federal court,
and 4 were convicted in state court. The drug transportation
specialist and another individual were each sentenced in federal
court to life in prison, and several organization members received
prison sentences exceeding 20 years. Over 800 kilograms of
cocaine; 1 kilogram of heroin; numerous firearms; over $19 million
in U.S. currency; and $4 million in real estate, cars, and boats
were seized. In addition, two of the homicides were solved. Page
116 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices New Orleans Division
DEA's New Orleans Division is responsible for federal drug law
Geographic Region and enforcement in the states of Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi Organizational Structure
and covers an area of 205,882 square miles within 10 federal
judicial districts. Although largely rural and heavily forested,
the division has seven metropolitan areas within its jurisdiction.
Three of the states border the Gulf of Mexico and provide
substantial maritime access to the interior portion of the region.
The New Orleans Division, which is headed by a SAC and five ASACs,
includes the division office, two district offices, eight resident
offices, and three posts of duty, as shown on figure I.3. Page 117
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.3: New Orleans Division Map Fayetteville Fort Smith Huntsville
Little Rock Oxford Arkansas Birmingham Mississippi Alabama
Shreveport
Montgomery Jackson Louisiana Mobile Gulfport Baton Rouge Lafayette
New Orleans Division office District office Resident office Post
of duty Source: DEA's New Orleans Division. Page 118
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
time of our visit in March 1998, the division was authorized to
have 220 staff, including 136 special agents. In addition, there
were 141 staff from state and local agencies authorized for
various task forces and groups in the division, including 133 law
enforcement officers. According to DEA, the major drug-producing
countries of Central and Overview of Drug South
America have a significant impact on the New Orleans Division
Trafficking Situation and because of its proximity to the Gulf
Coast. Ports on the Gulf coastline and Threat
vast waterways, which are not patrolled, provide opportunities for
smuggling, thereby making the area potentially attractive to drug
traffickers. Cocaine Cocaine and crack
cocaine pose the most significant drug threats in the area covered
by the division, according to DEA. At the time of our review,
cocaine was readily available, with distribution and use trends
either stable at high levels or increasing in every metropolitan
area, while crack cocaine continued to make inroads into rural
areas. DEA reported that Colombian and Mexican organizations
operating out of Texas were responsible for bringing in most of
the cocaine. Local cocaine trafficking organizations varied
widely. Some organizations were loose- knit local violators with
ties to traffickers in the source areas, while others were well-
organized small groups with well-established markets. Some of the
organizations were in the form of "street gangs" modeled after,
and affiliated with, certain Los Angeles gangs. Violence common
with gang activity was occurring in some areas within the
division. Heroin At the time of our review,
heroin was not considered a significant threat to most of the area
covered by the New Orleans Division, according to DEA. Heroin
availability and trafficking were confined mainly to the Greater
New Orleans area. However, there were indications that higher
purity Colombian heroin in the New Orleans area was surfacing.
Methamphetamine and Other DEA reported that the manufacture and
use of methamphetamine have Dangerous Drugs continued
to grow. DEA identified several organizations that were bringing
methamphetamine into the area from California, Arizona, and Texas.
Methamphetamine laboratories have proliferated, especially in
Arkansas. The diversion of legal drugs to illicit use was
occurring primarily at the pharmacy and practitioner level,
according to DEA. Such diversion resulted from indiscriminate
prescribing and dispensing of drugs, forgeries, illegal call-ins
of prescriptions, and people "doctor-shopping" to Page 119
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices obtain
numerous prescriptions. Diverted drugs were either being sold or
used by individuals. Marijuana According to
DEA, marijuana is the most widely abused drug in the area covered
by the division, and the profit margin for marijuana trafficking
is second only to that of cocaine. Although most of the marijuana
encountered was coming from Mexico, at the time of our review, DEA
reported that a substantial portion was domestically cultivated,
and marijuana cultivation was extensive in each of the four states
in the division's area. The New Orleans Division's management plan
called for it to focus Priorities, Programs, and enforcement
activities, beginning in fiscal year 1998, on (1) disrupting the
Initiatives flow of drugs in the area covered by
the division and (2) responding more effectively to drug-related
crime and the attendant violence plaguing its communities. The
plan's domestic operational strategy attempted to strike a balance
between major regional cases with interstate ties and local impact
cases targeting violent drug organizations and gangs. The
cornerstone of the division's plan is increased cooperation with
counterpart law enforcement agencies at all levels, making optimum
use of resources available in programs such as OCDETF, HIDTA, and
MET. According to the division's SAC, although cooperation with
state and local police agencies has long been a hallmark of DEA,
his intent was to make DEA more visible, accessible, and "user
friendly" to such agencies. He noted that unilateral DEA
investigations would become a thing of the past, and every
involved agency would benefit by pooling its resources. As part of
the plan, the SAC directed all the offices in the New Orleans
Division to develop a targeting strategy for all types of drugs in
their areas. Individuals and organizations are to be identified
and prioritized for joint investigations with federal, state, and
local agencies. The division's enforcement components are to use
the various resources available through the OCDETF and HIDTA
Programs. According to the SAC, he is committed to aggressively
pursuing joint federal, state, and local investigations where
productive and practical. At the time of our review, the New
Orleans Division had 12 state and local task forces in the 4
states it covers.5 Two of the state and local task forces were at
the division office in New Orleans, and, according to DEA, one of
5 Four of the 12 task forces were provisional, awaiting authorized
funding approval from DEA Headquarters. Page 120
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices these
worked mostly OCDETF conspiracy cases. This task force was staffed
by four DEA special agents, including a supervisor, and seven
officers from local police and sheriff's departments. The other
state and local task force at the division office was called the
REDRUM ("murder" spelled backward) task force. It was established
in 1992 to identify and dismantle the most violent groups involved
in drug- related crimes in the city of New Orleans. At the time of
our visit, the task force was staffed by six DEA special agents
(including a supervisor), a deputy U.S. Marshal, an INS agent, a
Louisiana state police officer, a New Orleans police department
homicide detective, and a National Guard intelligence analyst. In
addition to carrying out the REDRUM mission, the task force
sometimes conducts drug investigations that do not involve
violence. The New Orleans Division had two METs at the time of our
review. According to the division's management plan, the major
portion of the division's response to the cocaine and crack
cocaine problems is an enhanced MET Program, with a second MET
added. The division's first MET was established in 1995, and the
second MET became operational at the start of fiscal year 1998.
Each MET was made up of 10 DEA special agents. Between May 1995
and March 1998, the METs had been deployed to nine local
communities in the geographic area covered by the division. The
deployments were short-term operations conducted to identify and
arrest local violent drug dealers. The division had six HIDTA task
force groups in three states at the time of our review. In
December 1996, ONDCP established the Gulf Coast HIDTA in the
states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana to reduce the impact
of Gulf Coast drug trafficking on other parts of the United States
and to reduce violent drug trafficking in the three-state area.
DEA is one of many agencies participating in the Gulf Coast HIDTA.
In participating, DEA carries out its own mission and strategies
in coordination with other agencies participating on multiagency
teams. The division office had one enforcement group made up
entirely of DEA special agents who concentrated primarily on
interstate and international drug investigations. According to DEA
officials, most of the group's cases involve high-level drug
traffickers and result in federal drug conspiracy charges. This
group had more OCDETF cases than any other group in the division.
The group was staffed with nine DEA special agents, including a
supervisor. Page 121 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Most of the
division's resources have been devoted to cocaine cases. For
example, in fiscal year 1997, the division's special agents spent
about 68.6 percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine
cases. In fiscal year 1998, they spent about 71.9 percent of their
investigative work hours on cocaine cases. The division made 1,864
arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 2,286 arrests in Enforcement
Statistics and fiscal year 1998. In addition, the division made
688 seizures of assets Case Examples valued at
$12.5 million in fiscal year 1997 and 644 seizures of assets
valued at $11.5 million in fiscal year 1998. In fiscal year 1997,
the division opened 839 cases and closed 563 cases. In fiscal year
1998, it opened 950 cases and closed 356 cases. An example of what
the New Orleans Division considered a successful major
investigation involved the REDRUM task force. In 1996, the task
force initiated an investigation targeting a violent heroin
trafficking organization operating in the city of New Orleans.
This case evolved into an OCDETF investigation and was worked
jointly with the New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division
and the FBI. Various investigative techniques were used,
including conducting two federally court-authorized wiretaps. As a
result, 13 people were indicted by a federal grand jury in the
Eastern District of Louisiana for violations including murder,
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise,6 conspiracy, and
other drug-related charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to
trial. In June 1997, the head of the organization was found guilty
of all charges and received a life sentence. According to DEA, as
a result of this investigation five homicides in the city of New
Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-
related assets were seized. DEA also reported that this
investigation significantly reduced violent crime locally and
disrupted the flow of heroin into the inner city. Another example
of what the division considered a successful major case involved
the Mobile, AL, resident office. In 1997, the resident office
collaborated with a U.S. Customs Service undercover group in
"Operation Skymaster" to initiate an investigation of an
individual who was seeking transportation for a multikilogram
shipment of cocaine from South America to the United States. After
a series of undercover meetings in Alabama and Florida, a fake
delivery of cocaine took place. Since that time, the investigation
has resulted in the arrest of 26 individuals and the 6 The federal
Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (21 U.S.C. 848) is directed
at major drug traffickers and the forfeiture of their assets. A
person is considered as engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise if he or she occupies a position of authority over five
or more people engaged in a series of drug violations from which
substantial income is derived. Page 122
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of approximately $145,000 in U.S. currency and 8 vehicles. The
investigation identified international smugglers of multikilogram
quantities of cocaine as well as the recipients of the cocaine in
Alabama, Florida, and Michigan. The case led to several domestic
investigations in Florida, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Page 123 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Washington Division
and Baltimore District Office The Washington Division is located
on the East Coast corridor between Geographic Region and two
major drug import cities, Miami and New York. Its area of
Organizational Structure responsibility extends through
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Colombia.
Three international airports, two international seaports, railway
systems, and an extensive interstate highway network provide
commercial and noncommercial transit to and through the region.
The area's population is ethnically diverse and international,
with urban, suburban, and rural communities. At the time of our
July 1998 visit, the division, which was headed by a SAC and five
ASACs, comprised the division office in Washington, D.C.; two
district offices; three resident offices; and seven posts of duty,
as shown on figure I.4. Page 124
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.4: Washington, D. C. Division Map Wheeling Hagerstown Maryland
Clarksburg Baltimore
Winchester West Virginia
Washington, D.C. Charleston Salisbury Virginia Richmond Roanoke
Newport News Abingdon
Norfolk Division office District office Resident office Post of
duty Source: DEA's Washington Division. As of March 1998, the
Washington Division had 262 staff, including 158 special agents.
In response to the interests of the congressional requesters, this
section also provides information on the Baltimore District
Office, which is part of the Washington Division. At the time of
our review, the office included two of the division's seven posts
of duty, as shown on figure I.4. As of March 1998, it had 60
staff, including 39 special agents. Page 125
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
Washington region, according to DEA officials, is both a drug
transit Overview of Drug zone between Miami and
New York and a final destination point for drugs, Trafficking
Situation and serving as a secondary distribution
region. Cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and Threat
methamphetamine are available throughout the area. The most
significant threat is cocaine and crack distribution, dominated
primarily by Dominican traffickers, and the violence associated
with these activities. However, the division has recently seen a
dramatic increase in heroin trafficking and distribution. Jamaican
traffickers also threatened the region because of their wide-
ranging distribution of marijuana and other drugs. Also available
are LSD, MDMA (Ecstasy), Rohypnol, Ketamine, and GHB,7 drugs that
are consumed at "raves,"8 in nightclubs, and on college campuses.
According to DEA officials, three levels of drug violators operate
in the Washington division's area of responsibility. These include
(1) major international organizations; (2) mid-level
organizations, which include major national and regional
organizations, usually made up of longtime local traffickers; and
(3) retail groups, including street-level violators and violent
drug gangs. The majority of the violators are mid- and retail-
level. Small neighborhood-based drug trafficking groups or "crews"
use violence to control their areas and protect their drug
trafficking enterprises from rival groups. Baltimore Overview
Baltimore, according to DEA, although primarily a consumer drug
market, is also a drug source for smaller Maryland cities and
towns, including Annapolis, Hagerstown, and Salisbury. Cocaine,
heroin, and marijuana are the primary drug threats to the area.
Typically, drugs are transported into Baltimore from Miami, New
York, and other source states by car, train, airline, bus, or
sometimes via ship through the port. However, DEA officials
indicated that airports are relied upon less, possibly due to past
enforcement successes. Traffickers tended to be street- to mid-
level violators. Cocaine Trafficking in Baltimore At the time of
our review, according to DEA, cocaine was a major drug of choice
in the Baltimore area, and the urban crack threat was migrating to
smaller towns and cities throughout the surrounding suburban
jurisdictions. Generally, local independent dealers go to New York
City 7 MDMA (methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine) has hallucinogenic
effects. Rohypnol (flunitrazepam), smuggled primarily from Mexico,
is a depressant not approved for sale in the United States.
Ketamine is an animal tranquilizer with legitimate uses in
veterinary medicine. GHB (gamma hydroxy butyrate) is used as a
date rape drug. 8 A rave is a party designed to enhance a
hallucinogenic experience through music and behavior. Page 126
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices weekly,
buy 2 to 3 kilograms of cocaine from Dominican sources, bring the
drugs back to Baltimore, and distribute them over a several block
area. These distributors have no ties to larger organizations. Law
enforcement officials reportedly believed that youth gangs were
increasingly involved in drug distribution and related criminal
activity, primarily violent crime. Heroin Trafficking in Baltimore
Baltimore is also one of the largest and most active heroin
markets in the country, according to both DEA and ONDCP. Dominican
traffickers bring wholesale quantities of high-quality Colombian
heroin into the city, and Nigerians distribute Southeast Asian
heroin from Thailand. Traffickers are street- to mid-level
violators, distributing drugs in open-air drug markets and in
housing projects. Violence has increased, even at the lower level
of drug street sales. Moreover, in 1996, the Drug Abuse Warning
Network9 (DAWN) reported that Baltimore had the highest rate of
heroin-related emergency room episodes per 100,000 population.
Marijuana Trafficking in According to DEA, marijuana is
transported into the Maryland area from Baltimore
the Southwest border states and Mexico. Much of the marijuana
entering the area is conveyed by individuals using highways and
mass transportation. Jamaicans supply wholesale quantities of
marijuana in Baltimore. In addition, marijuana is also cultivated
along Maryland's Eastern Shore. At the time of our review, the
majority of the Washington Division's efforts Priorities,
Programs, and were, according to DEA, directed toward
violent drug trafficking gangs. In Initiatives
Baltimore, an Assistant U.S. Attorney said that since the mid-
1990s, that office had received cases involving violence from DEA.
Moreover, DEA and the U.S. Attorney were responding to requests
for assistance and now prosecuting cases from the state's
attorneys' offices in order to obtain higher federal penalties for
defendants. The division's and Baltimore district office's
targeting of drug trafficking gangs was reflected in the
distribution of its investigative work hours. By geographic scope,
combined domestic and local cases for fiscal years 1997 and 1998
accounted for about two-thirds of the total investigative work
hours expended each year by the division and more than one-half
and two- thirds of the total investigative work hours,
respectively, for those years, expended by the district office.
Investigative work hours expended on international and regional
cases, in contrast, accounted for approximately 30 percent of the
division's investigative work hours and almost 40 percent 9 Since
the early 1970s, DAWN has collected information on patients
seeking hospital emergency room treatment related to illegal drug
use or nonmedical use of legal drugs. Page 127
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices and 30
percent of the district's investigative work hours in those years,
respectively. By type of organizations targeted, the division
expended the greatest portion of its investigative work hours on
independent traffickers (31 percent and 42 percent for fiscal
years 1997 and 1998, respectively). The Baltimore Office expended
the greatest portion of its investigative work hours on violent
organizations (almost one-third) in both fiscal years 1997 and
1998. As indicated above, cocaine and heroin presented the major
drug threats to the region. By drug, both the division and the
Baltimore district work- hour statistics for fiscal years 1997 and
1998 reflect the cocaine and heroin threats. Each year, the
division expended more than half its investigative work hours on
cocaine-related cases and about 20 percent of its investigative
work hours on heroin-related cases. The Baltimore office also
spent about half its investigative work hours each year on
cocaine-related cases and 33 percent on heroin-related cases. As
proposed in its 1998-2000 Field Management Plan, the number of
Washington Division cases accepted as OCDETF cases increased in
fiscal year 1998. During that year, the division had 73 of its
cases accepted as OCDETF cases compared to 36 cases in 1997, an
increase of 103 percent. Similarly, the percentage of the
division's investigative work hours, by source of case, expended
on OCDETF cases increased from about 29 percent in fiscal year
1997 to 31 percent in fiscal year 1998. Most of the division's
higher level cases were handled through OCDETF. The Baltimore
District Office reported 6 cases accepted as OCDETF cases in
fiscal year 1997 and 22 in fiscal year 1998. The Washington
Division's 1998-2000 plan also called for the continued targeting
of violent drug traffickers through the MET Program. The division
had 1 MET team that had 10 special agents. In fiscal years 1997
and 1998, the team conducted deployments in Washington, D.C.;
Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA. Division
officials emphasized to us the importance of their undertaking
enforcement efforts with state and local law enforcement agencies
to address the drug problems of the region. According to these
officials, the division worked with approximately 240 state and
local law enforcement agencies in Washington, D.C., and the 3
states in its area of responsibility. In addition, the division
was involved in training state and local law enforcement personnel
throughout the division. The Baltimore District Office had a task
force, including DEA agents and Baltimore City police Page 128
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
officers, which investigated major heroin distribution networks or
distributors in open-air markets. In fiscal year 1998, 10 HIDTA
task forces were operating within the division's area of
responsibility, including 3 led by the Baltimore District Office.
The latter three comprised law enforcement officers from DEA, the
Baltimore Police Department, the Baltimore County Police
Department, the Maryland State Police, and other local police
agencies. One task force investigated violent drug traffickers and
trafficking organizations that affected safety in the Baltimore
metropolitan area; the second concentrated on major heroin and
cocaine traffickers and targets of opportunity; and the third
conducted interdiction operations-"hit and runs"-targeting the
movement of drug and currency shipments at the
Baltimore/Washington International Airport and the train and bus
stations. During fiscal year 1998, the Washington Division also
participated in several special enforcement programs coordinated
by DEA Headquarters. The Division reported that in fiscal year
1998, 20 investigations had resulted from its participation in a
special enforcement program that focused on traffickers operating
in the United States under the direction of Colombian, Dominican,
and/or Mexican drug organizations. As part of another such
program, the Baltimore District Office investigated West African
drug trafficking organizations dealing in heroin, their foreign
sources of supply, and their distributors within the United
States. In addition, the division participated in DEA's Domestic
Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. However, this effort was
undertaken state by state. The Baltimore and Richmond District
Offices and the Charleston, WV, Resident Office each provided
assistance to drug enforcement groups in their respective states.
As a result of its efforts, the Washington Division reported 2,056
Enforcement Statistics and defendants arrested in fiscal year
1997 and 2,156 defendants arrested in Case Examples
fiscal year 1998. Approximately 60 percent of those arrested in
both years were categorized as being involved in cocaine-related
cases. In fiscal year 1997, almost 50 percent (985) of the
defendants arrested were categorized as independent traffickers,
19 percent as associated with violent crime organizations (382),
and 15 percent (309) as involved in criminal organizations. Fiscal
year1998 data showed the continued predominance of independent
traffickers, 51 percent (1,093), among defendants arrested; this
compared to defendants associated with violent crime
organizations, 13 percent (275), or criminal organizations, 12
percent (251). Page 129
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
Baltimore Office reported 745 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 705
arrests in fiscal year 1998. For these fiscal years, respectively,
55 and 61 percent of these arrests were cocaine-related, and 22
and 20 percent were heroin-related. In addition, DEA reported
defendants arrested in OCDETF cases in which the Washington
Division participated-409 in fiscal year 1997 and 729 in fiscal
year 1998. Over half of the arrests each year were cocaine-
related. The Baltimore Office reported 100 and 248 defendants
arrested in OCDETF cases in fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
respectively. For fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the division and the
Baltimore Office reported drug seizures of cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana, as well as other dangerous drugs. These data are
presented in table I.1. Table I.1: Drug Seizures for Washington
Division and Baltimore District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and
1998 Washington Division Baltimore District
Office Fiscal year Fiscal year
Drug seized 1997
1998 1997 1998 Heroin (Kgs)
17.7 14.8 12.4
9.6 Cocaine (Kgs)
1,158.2 125.9 1,053.6
56.8 Marijuana (Kgs)
254.8 401.4 159.3
127.8 Hashish (Kgs)
1.0 5.7 1.0
1.4 Stimulants (D.U.)
313,328 303,602 15,988
27,637 Depressants (D.U.)
10,936 1,799 782
587 Hallucinogens (D.U.)
13,922 10,860 305
43 Other narcotics (D.U.)
7,886 4,083 7,231
38 Note: D.U. refers to dosage unit. Source: DEA. As a result of
its fiscal years 1997 and 1998 MET deployments in Washington,
D.C.; Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA, at the
time of our visit, the Washington Division reported 165 arrests,
in total. These deployments resulted in the seizure of about 2.5
kilograms of crack, 1.8 kilograms of cocaine, 176 grams of heroin,
and 1.2 kilograms of marijuana, as well as a number of weapons,
more than $34,000 in cash, and over $120,000 in assets. This
included the Baltimore deployment, which accounted for 81
defendants arrested and 950 grams of crack, 501 grams of cocaine,
176 grams of heroin, and 453.5 grams of marijuana seized. The
Washington Division's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
Program, carried out by the DEA office with state and local law
enforcement within the three states in the division's area of
responsibility, resulted in the eradication of marijuana plants
and arrests. For example, in Page 130
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices calendar
year 1997, with the support of DEA's Baltimore Office, DEA
reported that 4,826 marijuana plants (836 cultivated indoors and
3,990 cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 120 persons were
arrested in Maryland. In calendar year 1998, DEA reported that
3,442 marijuana plants (2,724 cultivated indoors and 718
cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 89 persons were
arrested. In addition, the Division also provided the following
examples of cases it considered successful. * The Baltimore
Office conducted an investigation with the Baltimore City Police
and the Offices of the U.S. Attorney and local State's Attorney
that led to the conviction of local drug dealer on such charges as
conspiracy to murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering
enterprise, murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise, attempted
murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise, conspiracy to
retaliate against a witness, and conspiracy to distribute heroin
and cocaine. In addition, nine other members of the organization
were found guilty of a variety of charges, including conspiracy to
murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering enterprise and
conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine. Evidence of 10
murders was presented at the trials. Moreover, according to DEA,
witnesses testified that the dealer sold $30,000 worth of heroin
and cocaine a day in the Eastern District of Baltimore City.
Sixty-six arrests were made during this investigation. The
Division identified this case as an OCDETF case. * According to
DEA, in the investigation of one trafficker, DEA, with other state
and local agencies-the Fairfax County, VA, Police Department;
Arlington County, VA, Police Department; Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police Department; and Maryland State Police-
dismantled a violent drug distribution organization in the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and solved the attempted
murder of a Maryland State trooper. In December 1995, while
transporting a kilogram of cocaine from New York to Washington,
D.C., in a vehicle owned by the trafficker, a long-time kilogram-
level cocaine distributor in the District was stopped and arrested
by a Maryland State trooper. Subsequently, the distributor
conspired with other individuals to kill that trooper to eliminate
him as a witness in an upcoming trial; however, the wrong trooper
was shot. During March 1997, investigations by the Fairfax,
Arlington, and Washington, D.C., Police Departments focused on the
trafficker's cocaine activities. DEA reported that the
distributor was involved in a conspiracy, with others, to
distribute cocaine in the Washington, D.C., area, and launder the
proceeds through legitimate businesses. As a result of this
investigation, a total of 18 individuals were found guilty of
various charges, and nearly half a million dollars in criminally
acquired assets were seized. Page 131
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Bogota,
Colombia, Country Office At the time of our visit in July 1998,
DEA's Bogota, Colombia Country Geographic Regional and Office
was the second largest DEA office in South America. It covers the
Organizational Structure country of Colombia, which is bordered
by the Caribbean Sea, Pacific Ocean, and four other countries and
divided by the Andes Mountains. The Bogota Country Office, which
is headed by a Country Attach, includes a DEA resident office in
Barranquilla, Colombia, as shown in figure I.5. Page 132
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.5: Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map Caribbean Sea
Barranquilla Venezuela Bogota North Pacific Ocean Colombia Brazil
Ecuador Peru Country office Resident office Source: DEA's Bogota,
Colombia, Country Office. The country office was staffed with 65
DEA personnel, including 43 special agents. Also, representatives
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Customs
Service, FBI, IRS, Secret Service, and the Department of Defense
(DOD) were working with DEA in Colombia. DEA had two enforcement
groups and an intelligence group located in Bogota and one
enforcement group in the Barranquilla office. Page 133
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA is a
member of the U.S. Embassy's Bogota Country Team, which is headed
by the Ambassador and consists of U.S. agencies attached to the
embassy in Colombia. DEA works with Colombian law enforcement
authorities, primarily the Colombian National Police (CNP), to
carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. However,
DEA agents in Colombia do not have police authority and cannot
make arrests or seize drugs in that country.10 According to DEA,
Colombian drug traffickers continue to supply most of Overview of
Drug the world's cocaine. However, Colombian
trafficking organizations had Trafficking Situation and become
much more fragmented in the 1990s. In the past, large Colombian
Threat cartels controlled the cocaine
industry. There are now numerous independent traffickers and
organizations with decentralized operations. According to DEA,
clandestine laboratories in Colombia are used to convert cocaine
base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) for eventual export to the
United States and Europe. The cocaine base is either imported from
other countries, primarily Peru, or made from coca leaves grown in
Colombia. The cocaine laboratories are primarily located in jungle
areas southeast of the Andes Mountains in Colombia, referred to by
DEA as the Colombian Source Zone. After processing, the cocaine is
typically flown across the Andes mountains to northwest Colombia
for further transport out of Colombia. The major cocaine
transportation points in northwest Colombia, according to DEA, are
located in an area that includes the Pacific and Caribbean coasts
and all of Colombia's major population centers. The transportation
points include clandestine airstrips, major airports, seaports,
and locations from which small "go-fast" boats and commercial
containerized cargo vessels can transport cocaine. Preferred
transshipment areas for drugs originating from Colombia are Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, and Puerto
Rico. Mexico- and Caribbean-based transportation groups are
involved in shipping cocaine to the United States. The diversion
of chemicals essential to cocaine production continues to increase
in Colombia, according to DEA. For the most part, these chemicals
are legally imported into Colombia from the United States, 10 We
recently reported on the narcotics situation in Colombia, U.S. and
Colombian efforts to address drug trafficking activities in
Colombia, and the continuing challenges each government faces to
combat these activities: Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From
Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/NSIAD-99- 136, June 22, 1999).
Page 134
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Europe,
and the Far East. They are then diverted for the production of
cocaine. The availability of heroin produced in Colombia and
smuggled into the United States dramatically increased in recent
years, according to DEA. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized
and analyzed in the United States was Colombian. The Colombian
heroin trade is dominated by trafficking groups operating
independently of the major cocaine trafficking organizations.
Colombia's climate allows for year-round cultivation of opium
poppies, from which opium gum is processed into heroin in
clandestine laboratories throughout the country. At the time of
our review, according to DEA, the majority of the heroin produced
in Colombia was being exported through the international airports
in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and, to a lesser extent, Barranquilla.
DEA estimated that about 90 percent of the Colombian heroin
destined for the United States was transported via couriers (also
known as "mules") on commercial airlines. Miami, Dallas, and New
York City were principal "gateways" for Colombian heroin entering
the United States. Heroin traffickers were also transporting
heroin into the United States through other countries in South and
Central America and the Caribbean. The primary method of smuggling
heroin was ingestion or concealment on the couriers' bodies. The
heroin might also have been concealed in such items as false-sided
luggage, clothing, food, or equipment. Insurgent guerrilla groups
have been associated with cocaine and heroin trafficking in
Colombia. Guerrillas have provided security for cocaine
laboratories, opium poppy fields, and clandestine airstrips. They
have also been known to charge a "tax" for guarding coca and opium
poppy fields, for permission to transport opium gum or morphine to
sites for sale within the guerilla territory, for kilograms of
coca leaf sold to produce cocaine base, and for kilograms of
cocaine exported from the Colombian Source Zone. The "tax" has
often been paid in weapons instead of currency. According to DEA,
the guerillas have increased the risk of conducting drug
enforcement operations. For example, a guerilla ambush of a CNP
unit at a clandestine airstrip and cocaine storage complex in
March 1998 left one CNP officer dead, two officers wounded, and
five officers captured. According to DEA, marijuana is exported in
tons from Colombia to the United States and Europe. It is
reportedly grown in mountain ranges near the Colombian Caribbean
coast and is usually compressed into bales. The primary method of
transportation is containerized commercial cargo and commercial
cargo vessels departing from ports on the northern coast of Page
135 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Colombia. It might be
off-loaded at sea onto smaller ships or speedboats for delivery to
locations in Mexico and onward transport to the United States. The
Bogota Country Office is involved in activities to combat the
Priorities, Programs, and Colombian drug trafficking threat
and support DEA's South America Initiatives
Regional Plan.11 The September 1997 South America Regional Plan
contains the following seven objectives: * identify, investigate,
and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; * support
U.S. domestic investigations; * enhance host nation counterdrug
capabilities; * develop a country intelligence program; *
control essential chemicals; * conduct financial investigations;
and * promote regional counterdrug cooperation. DEA's Bogota
Country Office also supports the U.S. Embassy's Flow Reduction
Strategy, which is designed to reduce the flow of cocaine and
heroin from Colombia. This strategy is carried out by the
embassy's Bogota Country Team. The goal of the strategy, which
focuses on the Colombian Source Zone southeast of the Andes
Mountains, is to reduce the amount of cocaine crossing the Andes
into northwest Colombia by 50 percent. The Flow Reduction Strategy
concentrates on eradicating coca plants and opium poppies,
destroying cocaine laboratories, and controlling the
transportation of cocaine base and HCL into and out of the
Colombian Source Zone by aircraft or rivercraft. For its part, DEA
focuses primarily on the organizations responsible for controlling
the manufacture and transportation of cocaine, while the State
Department is responsible for eradication efforts. At the time of
our review, DEA was involved in three intelligence initiatives
focused on the Colombian Source Zone. * Information
Analysis/Operations Center (IA/OC): The IA/OC was created to
collect drug intelligence from U.S. and Colombian agencies and
other sources, particularly regarding the production and
transportation of cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone; serve as a
focal point for U.S. and Colombian agencies' requests for
information; and support drug enforcement operations in the
Colombian Source Zone. The center was 11 DEA's South America
Regional Plan, which is updated periodically, provides strategic
guidance for DEA's operations in South American countries,
including Colombia and Bolivia. Page 136
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices staffed
by DEA, Customs, and U.S. military personnel at the time of our
review. * Operation Papagayo: The objective of this operation is
to intercept traffickers' communications in the Colombian Source
Zone to help identify organizations controlling the manufacture
and transportation of cocaine. The operation is conducted by a
vetted or screened CNP unit that is to share the collected
intelligence with DEA. * Operation Selva Verde: The objective of
this operation is to identify the organizations manufacturing
cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone, locate and destroy their
laboratories, collect evidence and intelligence, and arrest those
involved. CNP, Colombian military, and DEA personnel operating in
the Colombian Source Zone collect intelligence and provide it to
IA/OC. Using this and other intelligence, IA/OC identifies targets
for enforcement operations. CNP jungle units, in coordination with
the Colombian military, then raid the targeted cocaine
laboratories. Evidence and intelligence collected at the raided
laboratories are used to help identify the trafficking
organizations involved. The DEA office in Bogota had committed one
of its enforcement groups to investigations of major drug
traffickers, including those on DEA's list of major targets in
Colombia. The DEA agents in this group work with a CNP Special
Investigative Unit (SIU), which was vetted by DEA. The SIU
collects intelligence and targets and investigates major
traffickers. At the time of our visit, another Colombian SIU had
been vetted by DEA and was starting to work with this DEA
enforcement group. This SIU was established to target major money
laundering organizations, and an IRS agent assigned to the embassy
was slated to assist the SIU. There were three vetted Colombian
prosecutors assigned to work with the two SIUs. At the time of our
review, DEA's other enforcement group in Bogota was committed to
working with CNP on several different programs, including the
major programs discussed below. * Aircraft Control Program
(Operation Gemini Clipper): This is a CNP- operated general
aviation aircraft inspection and enforcement program designed to
help identify trafficking organizations using aircraft to
transport illegal drugs. The program is based on a requirement by
the Colombian government that all general aviation aircraft in
Colombia be registered and inspected. Under the program, CNP
inspects aircraft and their registrations, immobilizes or seizes
aircraft found to be illegal, and collects information to help
identify those responsible for using the aircraft to transport
drugs. Page 137 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices * Chemical Control
Program: A DEA diversion investigator and special agent were
working with a CNP chemical control unit. This unit, which was
vetted by DEA in 1998, audits companies authorized to legally
import the chemicals essential to cocaine processing and companies
that distribute chemicals in Colombia. The unit is authorized to
seize or immobilize unauthorized or illegal chemicals and can
coordinate with another Colombian government agency to revoke the
licenses of chemical importers violating the law. * Heroin
Program: DEA and CNP established a heroin task force to focus on
Colombian heroin trafficking organizations. The CNP on this task
force were not vetted at the time of our visit. Although the task
force primarily concentrates on heroin transportation
organizations, it has also identified and targeted heroin
laboratories, according to DEA. The Bogota Country Office reported
the following as significant Enforcement Statistics and
accomplishments for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Case Examples *
Operation Papagayo was established, and CNP officers assigned to
this operation identified 13 different drug trafficking
organizations. * Operation Selva Verde destroyed 189 cocaine
laboratories. * CNP vetted units carried out 10 major
investigations with DEA domestic offices. One of the vetted units'
investigations produced the first two "controlled deliveries"12 of
cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the United States. This
investigation resulted in 17 arrests in Cali, Colombia, as well as
wiretaps in Miami and Newark. * The vetted units had a total of
17 investigations; 30 arrests that DEA considered significant; and
seizures of 2,666 kilograms of cocaine, 1.5 kilograms of heroin,
520 real estate properties, 17 vehicles, and $4.6 million in U.S.
currency. * The Aircraft Control Program resulted in 29 aircraft
seized by CNP in calendar year 1997, with a value estimated at $57
million. During calendar year 1998, 81 aircraft were grounded or
seized, 10 of which were returned due to innocent third party
ownership. In addition, 5 stolen aircraft were recovered in 1998.
* The Chemical Control Program produced the first two arrests of
chemical diverters in Colombia. In addition, the Colombian
government revoked five chemical licenses during this period. In
fiscal year 1997, 26.7 tons of chemicals were seized by the CNP
chemical control unit; and in fiscal year 1998, the CNP unit
seized 2,191 tons of solid chemicals and about 1.5 million gallons
of liquid chemicals. 12 A controlled delivery is an investigative
tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a shipment of
illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual seizure.
Page 138
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices * The
heroin task force destroyed 11 heroin laboratories and seized 237
kilograms of heroin, 55 kilograms of morphine, and 85.5 kilograms
of opium. * Since its inception in October 1997, the Airport
Passenger and Cargo Inspection Program had yielded 175 arrests and
seizures of 911 kilograms of cocaine and 58 kilograms of heroin. *
The Barranquilla Resident Office reported drug seizures of 16,133
kilograms of cocaine, 18 kilograms of heroin, 22 kilograms of
morphine, 17 kilograms of opium, and 17 metric tons of marijuana.
This office also contributed to the seizure of 12,741 kilograms of
cocaine, 2 kilograms of heroin, and 2 tons of marijuana being
smuggled outside of Colombia. According to DEA, a major success in
Colombia was the dismantlement of the Cali cartel, which DEA
considered to be the most powerful criminal organization that law
enforcement had ever faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel
leaders have been captured by or surrendered to CNP, with the
exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the
time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through
years of investigations by DEA, CNP, and other federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies led to the identification,
indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel
leaders on drug charges in Colombia. Page 139
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices La Paz,
Bolivia, Country Office At the time of our visit in July 1998, the
La Paz, Bolivia, Country Office was Geographic Region and
DEA's second largest foreign office worldwide. The Office covers
the Organizational Structure country of Bolivia, which is
surrounded by the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
and Peru. The Office, which is headed by a Country Attach,
included resident offices in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Trinidad,
Bolivia, as shown on figure I.6. Page 140
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.6: La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map Brazil Peru Trinidad
Bolivia La Paz Cochabamba Santa Cruz Chile
Paraguay Argentina Country office Resident office Source: DEA's La
Paz, Bolivia, Country Office. The country office was staffed with
114 personnel, including 43 special agents. Some of these
personnel were located at a Bolivian police camp in the Chapare
region where coca is grown. In addition, representatives from DOD
were assigned to work with DEA in Bolivia. The U.S. Ambassador is
responsible for the drug control efforts of all U.S. agencies in
Bolivia. The U.S. Embassy gives a high priority to drug control
activities, such as the State Department's crop eradication
efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development's support
for alternative Page 141
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
development activities enabling farmers to support themselves and
their families without the need to cultivate coca, and DEA's drug
enforcement programs and operations. In carrying out its
responsibilities, DEA works with and assists Bolivian law
enforcement authorities. However, DEA special agents in Bolivia do
not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize drugs
in that country. DEA reported that coca leaf cultivation continues
in Bolivia. Bolivia is also Overview of Drug a source
country for cocaine, which is processed from coca leaves and
Trafficking Situation and smuggled into the United States and
Europe.13 Threat Coca cultivation in Bolivia occurs primarily in
two areas-the Chapare region in the Cochabamba Department and the
Yungas region situated in the Altiplano of the La Paz Department.
DEA estimated that 90 to 95 percent of the coca leaves produced in
the Chapare region, Bolivia's major cultivation area, is illegally
processed into cocaine products. Most of the coca leaf cultivated
in the Yungas region is cultivated in accordance with Bolivian law
for legal consumption. After Bolivian peasants harvest their coca
fields, the leaves are dried and packaged in 100-pound bags. Low-
echelon producers or the coca growers themselves process the dried
leaves into cocaine base in clandestine laboratories, mostly in
the Chapare region. The cocaine base is sold to buyers who act as
agents for cocaine trafficking organizations and consolidate
shipments for transport out of the Chapare. In the past, according
to DEA, the cocaine base was primarily transported out of Bolivia,
usually to Colombia, for further processing into cocaine HCL. In
recent years, however, Bolivian trafficking organizations have
begun producing cocaine HCL in clandestine laboratories as well as
distributing Bolivian-produced cocaine. At the time of our review,
DEA reported that traffickers were moving cocaine base out of the
Chapare region, primarily to the Santa Cruz and El Beni regions of
Bolivia, using a variety of land, river, and air transportation
methods. Once the cocaine base reaches the Santa Cruz and El Beni
regions, it is either processed locally into cocaine HCL or
transported into Brazil or Colombia for processing. 13 Coca has
deep cultural roots in Bolivia, where it has been cultivated for
at least 2,000 years. Today, coca cultivation and consumption
still have considerable cultural and economic importance, and even
legal acceptance, in Bolivia. At the time of our review, it was
estimated that 400,000 to 500,000 Bolivians chewed coca leaf to
alleviate the effects of cold, hunger, fatigue, and altitude
sickness. A type of tea is also brewed from coca. In general, the
leaf is a focus for rituals and social occasions. Page 142
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
According to DEA, at the time of our review, several Bolivian
family-based transportation/production networks dominated cocaine
trafficking in the country. The networks were managing the
majority of cocaine moved within Bolivia as well as the cocaine
shipped out of the country. The trafficking networks were
financing cocaine base purchases from Chapare- based suppliers,
arranging for transportation from the Chapare, operating base
purification and/or cocaine laboratories, and consolidating large
shipments for international transport. A few of these networks
still dealt with Colombian drug organizations; but Bolivians were
also working with traffickers from other countries, such as
Brazil, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, and Nigeria. During the
1990s, the La Paz Country Office shifted from conducting
Priorities, Programs, and predominantly "jungle operations"
in Operation Snowcap-which Initiatives
identified and destroyed cocaine base laboratories and interdicted
cocaine base shipments-to placing increased emphasis on
identifying, targeting, and investigating cocaine trafficking
organizations. Using funds appropriated for DEA's Andean Ridge
Initiatives and vetted Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) of the
Bolivian National Police (BNP), DEA reported that drug
intelligence collection efforts in Bolivia have been enhanced; and
the investigative capabilities of BNP's Special Forces for the
Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (Fuerzas Especiales Para la
Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico, or FELCN) have been improved with more
personnel, additional equipment, and better training. The La Paz
Country office's programs and initiatives were designed to combat
the Bolivian drug trafficking threat and support DEA's South
America Regional Plan.14 The South America Regional Plan contains
the following seven objectives: * identify, investigate, and
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; * support U.S.
domestic investigations; * enhance host nation counterdrug
capabilities; * develop a country intelligence program; *
control essential chemicals; * conduct financial investigations;
and * promote regional counterdrug cooperation. According to DEA,
at the time of our review, the country office's priority was
investigating Bolivia-based drug trafficking organizations with 14
DEA's South America Regional Plan, which is updated periodically,
provides strategic guidance for DEA's operations in South American
countries, including Bolivia and Colombia. Page 143
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
connections to the United States. However, DEA officials said this
has become more difficult. In the past, there was a link from
Bolivia to the United States through Colombia. At the time of our
review, however, fewer Colombian drug traffickers were involved
with the Bolivian cocaine trade, and Bolivian traffickers were
dealing with people from a number of different countries. The
country office was focusing most of its operations in two areas:
the Chapare region, where most of the cocaine base comes from, and
the Santa Cruz area, where most of the cocaine HCL comes from. The
country office, according to DEA, was working closely with FELCN
to carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. FELCN
exercises operational control over various Bolivian drug law
enforcement units, such as the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (Unidad
Movil de Policia Rural, or UMOPAR); Financial Investigative Unit
(FIU); Grupo de Inteligencia y Operaciones Especial (GIOE),
FELCN's intelligence arm; and Grupo Investigaciones de Substancias
Quimicas (GISUQ), FELCN's Chemical Investigations Group. The
police units are supported by the Bolivian Air Force's Red Devil
Task Force, which provides aviation support, and the Bolivian
Navy's Blue Devil Task Force, which patrols rivers. At the time of
our review, FELCN/UMOPAR units were stationed throughout Bolivia
and were based primarily in the Chapare region, Trinidad, and the
Yungas region. Members of UMOPAR are considered specialists in
paramilitary counterdrug operations, including jungle patrol and
reconnaissance, air insertions, mobile roadblocks in rural areas,
and river operations. DEA started Operation Gatekeeper primarily
to focus UMOPAR resources on interdicting cocaine base leaving the
Chapare. With specialized teams of police conducting mobile
roadblocks on highways, Operation Gatekeeper provides a rapid
response in areas of Bolivia where intelligence indicates the
movement of large quantities of drugs or chemicals. In 1998,
UMOPAR established new mobile enforcement teams (called Border
Enforcement Teams), headquartered in La Paz, to conduct
intelligence-driven drug interdiction operations, including
roadblocks, along Bolivia's borders with Chile, Peru, Brazil, and
Argentina. DEA refers to this program as Operation GRIRMO. At the
time of our review, FELCN/GIOE had 3 SIUs with approximately 75
vetted personnel. The SIUs were located in Cochabamba, La Paz, and
Santa Cruz. They were collecting information through surveillance
operations, with special emphasis on violators operating at the
highest levels. The intelligence was being used to help
investigate and dismantle Page 144
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices major
drug trafficking organizations in support of both Bolivian and
U.S. drug enforcement objectives. The La Paz, Bolivia, Country
Attach told us that he believed the Bolivian SIUs are helping to
create a DEA-like organization in Bolivia. He said the vetting
process for members of these units is similar to DEA's hiring
process, and the SIUs consist of police with integrity, training,
expertise, equipment, and other tools needed to successfully
conduct drug enforcement operations. He said DEA is building the
infrastructure of FELCN and trying to do more intelligence-driven
investigations of drug trafficking organizations. In addition, the
following efforts were ongoing at the time of our review,
according to DEA: * The country office had established a Major
Violators Task Force with FELCN officers. This program focused on
arresting high-level traffickers involved in transporting cocaine
and dismantling their organizations. Task force operations were
being carried out in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa Cruz. *
Operation Argus had consistently been the most valuable
intelligence resource in Bolivia, according to DEA. This FELCN
intelligence operation was feeding actionable intelligence to
FELCN/GIOE, which led to arrests and seizures in numerous cases.
The program has been funded almost entirely by DOD and the State
Department and was expanded to several locations in Bolivia. *
Operation Camba is an enforcement and intelligence-gathering
program that was targeting drug traffickers who used trains in
Bolivia's Santa Cruz and Tarija Departments to transport cocaine
and precursor chemicals to and from the Bolivian frontiers with
Brazil and Argentina. According to DEA, Operation Camba enabled
the country office and FELCN to gather extensive intelligence
that, combined with enforcement operations, significantly
increased seizures of cocaine and precursor chemicals being
transported on Bolivian trains. * FELCN/FIU is responsible for
investigating money laundering and other links between finances
and drug trafficking and for providing case support when financial
assets are seized in drug investigations. According to DEA, the
country office has been working with the FIU to refine a 1998
Bolivian money laundering law to help make it fully functional. *
According to DEA, the country office had a diversion investigator
working with FELCN/GISUQ, which is responsible for investigating
violations of Bolivia's laws against trafficking in chemicals
essential to processing cocaine. GISUQ intercepts contraband
chemicals entering Bolivia from Page 145
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices foreign
countries, develops intelligence concerning precursor chemical
diverters throughout Bolivia, has operated checkpoints to seize
precursor chemicals in the Chapare, and investigates established
chemical handlers in conjunction with the Bolivian National
Directorate for the Control of Chemicals. * Operation Mugshot is
an airport intelligence program that was being conducted by the
country office. In the program, names from passengers' passports
and airport employee lists were being run through DEA's worldwide
computer database containing information on known and suspected
drug traffickers. * Operation Civic Action Plan is a television,
radio, and poster campaign that advertised rewards for information
about drug trafficking. * Operation Education was designed to
develop schools for Bolivian law enforcement personnel to enhance
their investigative capability through specialized training. *
Through Operation Night Watch, the country office assisted in
restructuring FELCN to make it a more effective and less
bureaucratic organization. The La Paz Country Office provided us
with the results of drug Enforcement Statistics and
enforcement operations in Bolivia during fiscal years 1997 and
1998. Case Examples In fiscal year 1997, the country office
initiated 219 investigations. Of this total, 99 investigations
involved cocaine HCL, 90 involved cocaine base, 26 involved
cocaine-related chemicals, 3 involved marijuana, and 1 involved
heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident Office initiated 94 of the
investigations; the Cochabamba Resident Office initiated 93
investigations; and the office in La Paz initiated 32
investigations. The country office reported that BNP made 1,483
arrests and seized 11,452 kilograms of cocaine HCL and base during
fiscal year 1997 in association with DEA's activities in Bolivia.
In fiscal year 1998, the country office initiated 487
investigations. Of these, 483 investigations involved cocaine, 3
involved marijuana, and 1 involved heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident
Office initiated 262 of the 487 investigations, the Cochabamba
Resident Office initiated 156 investigations, the Trinidad
Resident Office initiated 12 investigations, and the office in La
Paz initiated 57 investigations. BNP made 2,112 arrests and seized
11,554 kilograms of cocaine base and HCL during fiscal year 1998
in association with DEA's activities in Bolivia. An example of
what DEA officials considered a successful investigation involved
the Santa Cruz resident office. In May 1997, DEA and BNP's FELCN
initiated an investigation into the cocaine air shipment
activities of Page 146 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices a Bolivian
trafficking organization. Intelligence revealed that the
organization was shipping multihundred-kilogram loads of cocaine
to a Brazilian organization located in Campo Grande, Brazil,
several times a month. In addition, through intelligence, DEA and
FELCN were able to identify the majority of the members of the
organization and their operating areas. In October 1997,
information surfaced about a scheduled air shipment of cocaine by
the Bolivian organization. On the basis of this information, in
November 1997 a joint operation resulted in the arrest of the
Bolivian organization's head and 17 members of his organization.
In addition, 354.4 kilograms of cocaine base and $1.4 million in
trafficker- owned assets were seized. In another example provided
by DEA officials, 602 kilograms of cocaine base were seized in
July 1997 at a checkpoint in the Yungas region. This drug seizure,
along with subsequent arrests and document seizures, led to the
discovery of a large, multifaceted trafficking organization.
Document analysis and related research of personal telephone
directories, financial documents, business papers, and personal
papers seized from members of the organization revealed a network
of drug and illicit chemical traffickers numbering over 100
persons. Investigative developments revealed that the organization
was responsible for the full range of cocaine trafficking,
including obtaining cocaine-essential chemicals, operating cocaine
base laboratories, transporting cocaine base out of the Chapare
region for further processing into HCL, and shipping the drugs out
of Bolivia. Although the majority of the organization members
identified were Bolivian nationals, other possible targets were
located in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United States. Arrests tied to this cocaine trafficking
organization numbered over 55, and the value of seized assets
exceeded $1 million. Page 147
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Mexico
City, Mexico, Country Office DEA's Mexico City Country Office
covers all of Mexico, which is Geographic Region and
approximately 761,600 square miles in size, or about three times
larger Organizational Structure than Texas.
Mexico has a 2,000-mile border with the United States, 5,804 miles
of coastline, and is situated between the United States and the
South American countries that supply much of the illegal drugs
smuggled into the United States. At the time of our visit in
September 1998, the Mexico City Country Office, which was headed
by a Country Attach, included seven resident offices spread
throughout Mexico, as shown in figure I.7.15 Figure I.7: Mexico
City, Mexico, Country Tijuana Office Map Ciudad Juarez
Hermosillo Gulf of Mexico
Mexico Monterrey Mazatln Guadalajara
Merida Pacific Ocean
Mexico City Country office Resident office Source: DEA's Mexico
City, Mexico, Country Office. 15 The country office had resident
offices in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Ciudad Juarez, Mazatl n,
Merida, Monterrey, and Tijuana. Page 148
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices There
were 88 DEA staff authorized, 45 of which were special agent
positions. The Government of Mexico limits the number of special
agents DEA can have in Mexico, and it permitted DEA to increase
the number of special agents in the country from 39 to 45 in July
1997. Also, representatives from the FBI and DOD were assigned to
the country office. DEA is the principal U.S. agency for drug
investigation and drug intelligence coordination in Mexico. DEA
works with Mexican law enforcement authorities to carry out drug
enforcement and intelligence operations. DEA agents in Mexico do
not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize drugs
in that country.16 According to the State Department, no country
poses a more immediate Overview of Drug drug threat to
the United States than Mexico. Mexico is the principal Trafficking
Situation and transit country for cocaine entering the United
States, with an estimate of Threat almost 60
percent of the U.S. cocaine supply smuggled across the U.S.-
Mexico border in 1998, typically coming from Colombia through
Mexico. Mexico is also a major source country for heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamine. Since the late 1980s, according to
DEA, the Mexican/Central American corridor has been the primary
smuggling route for cocaine destined for the United States from
source countries in South America. Cocaine is shipped to Mexico in
various ways (e.g., in fishing vessels, in containerized cargo on
commercial ships, and on small planes and trucks). Once in Mexico,
most of the cocaine is smuggled into the United States by vehicle.
In recent years, Mexican drug trafficking organizations have
expanded their cocaine operations. According to DEA, Mexican
trafficking groups were once solely transporters for Colombian
cocaine traffickers. In the early 1990s, however, major Mexican
organizations began receiving payment in cocaine for their
services. These organizations ultimately emerged as wholesale
distributors of cocaine within the United States, significantly
increasing their profit margin. Mexico has been a significant
source of heroin used in the United States for many years,
according to DEA. Analysis of drug seizures indicates that 14
percent of the heroin available in the United Sates is produced in
Mexico. Opium poppy cultivation takes place in the central and 16
In June 1998, we reported on the status of counternarcotics
activities in Mexico: Drug Control: U.S.- Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts Face Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30,
1998). We later updated that report in congressional testimony:
Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities
(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-98, March 4, 1999). Page 149
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southwestern parts of the country. Clandestine laboratories are
used to produce heroin from opium with essential chemicals that
are widely available in Mexico. DEA reported that Mexico has also
been increasingly used as a transit country for heroin from other
source countries. According to DEA, Mexico is the primary foreign
supplier of marijuana to the United States, and Mexican
organizations have been involved with marijuana trafficking for
decades. Marijuana is cultivated in Mexico, with the heaviest
concentration in the western states. In recent years, growers have
increased their efficiency and are cultivating higher grade
marijuana, which commands a higher price in the United States.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations, according to DEA, have
expanded their methamphetamine operations, using their well-
established cocaine, heroin, and marijuana distribution networks
to dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and
distribution in recent years. At the time of our review, DEA
estimated that the majority of the methamphetamine available in
the United States was either produced in Mexico and transported to
the United States or manufactured in the United States by Mexican
drug traffickers. DEA reported that Mexican drug trafficking
organizations are becoming stronger. According to DEA, Mexican
organizations have billions of dollars in assets and have at their
disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications
equipment, and weapons that rival the capabilities of some
legitimate governments. One such Mexican organization generated
tens of millions of dollars in profits per week. The State
Department reported that Mexico has become a major money
laundering center. Drug trafficking organizations launder the
proceeds of illegal drug sales in legitimate businesses in both
Mexico and the United States. They favor transportation and other
industries that can be used to facilitate drug, cash, and arms
smuggling and other types of illegal activities. DEA reported that
Mexican traffickers are also a growing threat to citizens within
Mexico and the United States because of their willingness to
murder and intimidate witnesses and public officials. According to
the Justice Department, the number of threats to U.S. law
enforcement officials in Mexico has also increased. Page 150
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
Mexico City Country Office maintains liaison with Mexican law
Priorities, Programs, and enforcement and intelligence
organizations, and it promotes interagency Initiatives
cooperation and coordination in the areas of drug law enforcement
activities and intelligence collection and dissemination. The
country office's mission is to (1) coordinate with Mexican law
enforcement authorities on investigations directed against major
drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, (2) collaborate in
developing a connection to the United States for the
investigations initiated in Mexico, and (3) engage in cooperative
"institution building" to improve the capabilities and
effectiveness of Mexican drug law enforcement authorities. The
office's work plan cited the following priorities for fiscal year
1998: * develop focused intelligence-gathering activities, *
increase the impact of counterdrug efforts in Central America on
drug trafficking in the United States, * enhance host nation
counterdrug capabilities, and * initiate regional counterdrug
cooperation. According to DEA's Country Attach, the country office
focuses on investigating major drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico involved in supplying illegal drugs to the United States.
He said that at the time of our visit, the Mexico City Country
Office had a list of 10 major targets, and virtually all of the
office's efforts were devoted to investigations of these targets.
In these investigations, the country office was attempting to
attack the "command and control" communications of targeted
organizations and was working closely with DEA's Special
Operations Division at headquarters. Another priority of the
Mexico City Country Office has been the attempt to locate a
fugitive accused of participating in the June 1994 murder of a DEA
special agent in Arizona. According to DEA, the country office has
dedicated all available staff and equipment, in coordination with
and in support of the Mexican government, to apprehend this
fugitive. The Country Attach told us that the key change to DEA's
operations in Mexico in the 1990s was the establishment of Mexican
vetted units for drug law enforcement. He said this was a dramatic
departure from the way the country office previously operated and
coordinated with Mexican law enforcement authorities. At the time
of our review, DEA's Mexico office was essentially working only
with the vetted units, which are part of the Mexican Special
Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) and include personnel
assigned to the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) and the Page 151
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Border
Task Forces (BTF). FEADS reports to Mexico's Office of the
Attorney General (PGR). OCU, located in Mexico City, is the
principal agency responsible for enforcing a Mexican organized
crime law passed in November 1996 covering drug trafficking, money
laundering, conspiracy, electronic surveillance, and organized
crime corruption. The narcotics section of OCU has vetted
personnel whose mission is to investigate high-level drug
trafficking groups, as well as drug-related money laundering
groups, throughout Mexico. OCU is also the umbrella agency for the
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), which has vetted personnel.
The SIU collects and analyzes intelligence from various sources,
develops investigations against major organizations, and
disseminates actionable information to other law enforcement
units. At the time of our review, the BTFs were investigating what
DEA considered the most significant drug trafficking organizations
along the U.S.-Mexico border as well as a major organization in
Central Mexico considered key to the booming U.S. methamphetamine
trade.17 The primary work of the BTFs is intelligence; i.e., they
gather, analyze, integrate, and interpret information from various
sources. The FEADS officers assigned to the BTFs are vetted; and,
at the time of our work, they were assigned to BTF locations in
Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, and Guadalajara and their
respective suboffices in several other locations in Mexico. Mexico
passed a law in May 1996, and expanded it in December 1997,
establishing trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals as a
criminal offense. These chemicals can be used in the production of
heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs of abuse. The implementation
of the law and development of an administrative infrastructure for
enforcing it were under way at the time of our visit. As part of
the U.S. assistance and training to Mexico for carrying out the
law, the country office was participating in a Bilateral Chemical
Control Working Group and encouraging the establishment of Mexican
chemical control programs. The country office was also working
with specialized chemical control units in FEADS and CENDRO, a
Mexican intelligence unit, to exchange chemical import/export
information and other intelligence. In addition, the BTF that 17
The Guadalajara BTF was instrumental in apprehending two brothers
who headed this organization in June 1998. As of May 1999, the
brothers were incarcerated in Mexico awaiting extradition to the
United States. Page 152
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Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA
works with in Guadalajara was considered to be the first Mexican
chemical task force and had targeted the Amezcua-Contreras
organization, which DEA reported as the most powerful and dominant
methamphetamine trafficking organization in Mexico. The country
office also participates in the U.S. Embassy's Money Laundering
Task Force. Membership includes the FBI, Customs, IRS, and the
Economic, Political, and Narcotics Affairs sections of the
embassy. The task force oversees joint financial investigations,
provides training to Mexican counterparts, and coordinates an
exchange of information with Mexico. In addition, the task force
encouraged the Mexican government to develop major investigations
to test Mexico's May 1996 law making money laundering a criminal
offense. Also located at the country office is an Information
Analysis Center (IAC) that develops tactical intelligence for
interdicting drugs and chemicals being smuggled. According to DEA,
the IAC interacts daily with CENDRO and an antismuggling unit of
the Mexican military. The IAC is staffed with DEA intelligence
analysts, DOD analysts and computer support personnel, a Customs
air officer, and assigned liaison personnel from an intelligence
agency. At the time of our review, DEA special agents in the
Mexico City Country Office were spending the majority of their
investigative work hours on programs and initiatives involving
cocaine. During fiscal year 1997, cocaine operations accounted
for 71.4 percent of the special agents' reported investigative
work hours. In fiscal year 1998, the special agents reported
spending 62.8 percent of their investigative work hours on
operations involving cocaine. The Mexico City Country Office
provided us with a statistical summary of Enforcement Statistics
and the results of its operations during fiscal years 1997 and
1998. Case Examples In fiscal year 1997, the country office
initiated 90 investigations. The office's operations resulted in
57 arrests, 26 of which were related to cocaine and 23 of which
were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures of
approximately 4,025 kilograms of cocaine, 3 kilograms of heroin,
24,290 kilograms of marijuana, and 264,314 dosage units of
dangerous drugs such as amphetamines. In fiscal year 1998, the
country office initiated 77 investigations, 44 of which were
related to cocaine and 23 of which were related to marijuana. The
office's operations resulted in five arrests, of which three were
related Page 153 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices to cocaine and two
were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures of 573
kilograms of cocaine, 26 kilograms of heroin, 860 kilograms of
marijuana, and 64,000 dosage units of dangerous drugs. An example
of what DEA considered a successful major investigation involved
the Mexican drug trafficking organization known as the Gulf
cartel. This organization transported cocaine, marijuana, and
heroin into the United States from Mexico and was closely aligned
with the Colombian Cali cartel. The organization was headquartered
in both Matamoros and Monterrey, Mexico, and had significant
influence in the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Quintana
Roo, and Veracruz. DEA, in conjunction with the FBI and the
Customs Service, initiated an investigation that was expanded to
include task forces from U.S. federal, state, and local agencies
and international agencies. The Mexican Attorney General's Office
took the lead in the investigation, arrested several key
organization members, and provided valuable information from
cooperating defendants and intelligence sources. DEA's Monterrey
resident office cultivated and used informants, resulting in the
arrest of other organization members and, eventually, the head of
the organization. The individuals were indicted on 30 counts of
drug and money laundering violations. After the arrest of the Gulf
cartel's leader, another individual took control of the
organization. DEA's Monterrey office took the lead in an
investigation that involved DEA domestic offices, the FBI, U.S.
Attorneys' Offices, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. The
new organization head was arrested and charged with numerous drug
and money laundering violations. At the time of our review, he was
incarcerated in a Mexican prison. Despite the incarceration of the
second leader, the Gulf cartel continued to bring ton quantities
of cocaine into the United States, according to DEA. Thus, at the
time of our review, investigations of the remaining organization
members were being conducted and coordinated by U.S. and Mexican
law enforcement agencies, including DEA's Monterrey office. Page
154 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Caribbean Division
Established in October 1995, the Caribbean Division is unique in
that it has Geographic Region and both foreign and domestic
responsibilities. The Division's area of Organizational Structure
responsibility is the entire Eastern Caribbean Corridor, including
the commonwealth of Puerto Rico;18 the U.S. Virgin Islands; and
the countries of Barbados, the Netherlands Antilles (Curacao), and
Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Hispaniola (the Dominican Republic
and Haiti) in the Central Caribbean and Jamaica in the Western
Caribbean. At the time of our visit in September 1998, the
division's field office, which was headed by a SAC and two ASACs,
was located in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It also had six foreign
county offices and three domestic resident offices, as shown in
figure I.8. 18 Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth, in
union with the United States. Page 155
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
I.8: DEA Caribbean Division Map Cuba Haiti Dominican
San Juan Republic
St. Thomas Jamaica
Puerto U.S.
Virgin Port-Au-Prince Santo Domingo
Rico Islands Kingston
Ponce St. Croix Barbados Bridgetown Division
office
Curacao (Netherlands Antilles) Country office Resident office Port
of Trinidad Spain and
Colombia
Venezuela
Tobago Source: DEA's Caribbean Division. As of March 1998, the
division's 161 staff (140 in domestic offices, 21 in foreign
offices) included 105 special agents (87 domestic and 18 foreign),
12 domestic intelligence staff, 13 diversion staff, and 31 other
support staff.19 According to DEA, in recent years the Caribbean
Corridor has reemerged Overview of Drug
as a major trafficking route between Colombia and the continental
United Trafficking Situation and States. In
1995, the El Paso Intelligence Center estimated that Threat
approximately 100 drug trafficking organizations were working in
the Caribbean area. Caribbean drug organizations are generally
multinational, but dominated primarily by Colombians, who were the
command and control managers, and Dominican nationals, who
operated the 19 DEA's Fiscal Year 1998 appropriation included a
Caribbean initiative, which increased the number of staff in the
division (see ch. 4). Page 156
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
transportation networks. The traffickers transport cocaine,
heroin, and marijuana through the Caribbean corridor using private
planes and yachts; commercial airlines; cargo air; "motherships";
fishing vessels; small, motorized, high-performance "go-fast"
boats; cruise ships; and cargo container vessels. Once in Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the southernmost entry points of
the United States, drugs are more easily smuggled into the
continental United States, because no additional Customs
inspections are required. Cocaine According to DEA, cocaine, in
both powder and crack forms, continues to be the drug of choice of
both traffickers and users in the region. The Caribbean basin is a
major transshipment point for cocaine destined for the continental
United States and Europe. The primary routes are the Western
Caribbean (Jamaica-Bahamas), the Central Caribbean (Hispaniola),
and the Eastern Caribbean (Lesser Antilles-Puerto Rico). The El
Paso Intelligence Center has estimated that 140 tons of cocaine
flow through the Eastern Caribbean each year and, according to the
Interagency Flow Assessment Committee, approximately one-third of
the cocaine arriving in the continental United States comes
through Puerto Rico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. DEA also
reported the emergence of new local markets in Puerto Rico and the
Caribbean due to Colombian traffickers paying for services using
drugs, not currency. Cocaine traffickers use a variety of
smuggling methods-via air, land, and sea, according to DEA. For
example, cocaine destined for the United States may be dropped
from private planes to waiting maritime vessels or smuggled in
"go-fast" boats into the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. From Puerto Rico cocaine may be transported
into the continental United States in airfreight cargo. Couriers
on commercial airlines from Colombia and Panama are also used to
move cocaine through the Dominican Republic, from Haiti to Miami,
and from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland. DEA attributed the
dramatic rise in drug-related violence in Puerto Rico to the
increased influx of cocaine into the region. Competition for
control of the domestic Puerto Rican cocaine market, which makes
up an estimated 10 to 20 percent of the total cocaine smuggled
onto the island, accounted for some of the drug-related violence,
according to DEA. Citing statistics from the Puerto Rico Police
Department (PRPD), DEA officials reported that between 1995 and
1998, the percentage of homicides in Puerto Rico that were drug-
related had risen from 63 to 81 percent. Page 157
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA
sources indicated that Puerto Rico has become an arrival area and
a Heroin major transshipment point for high-
purity Colombian heroin entering the United States. The Eastern
Caribbean island nations are used as transshipment points for
heroin, which is then transshipped through Puerto Rico to the
continental United States. Heroin is also transshipped through
Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic, with Puerto Rico as a
second transshipment point, and on to the United States. According
to DEA, heroin from Colombia may be transported through Central
America into Haiti via couriers on commercial airlines. Moreover,
the availability of heroin in Puerto Rico itself has also
increased. Marijuana According to DEA,
marijuana continues to be cultivated throughout the Eastern
Caribbean islands (particularly on St. Vincent and the
Grenadines), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Puerto Rico.
Jamaica is one of the major marijuana producers in the world.
Marijuana grown in other parts of the Eastern Caribbean is
transshipped through Puerto Rico to external markets. In Puerto
Rico, marijuana is not only cultivated both indoors and outdoors
in its central mountains, but also smuggled onto the island from
the continental United States. Containerized cargo ships have been
the preferred concealment and transportation method for large-
scale, well-established marijuana traffickers. Express mail is
another method used to smuggle marijuana into Puerto Rico. At the
time of our review, both the domestic and foreign priority of the
Priorities, Programs, and Caribbean Division was to stem the
flow of drugs through the region into Initiatives
the United States. In 1998, the division's overall objective was
to reduce the capabilities of major drug trafficking organizations
by immobilizing their command and control centers and distribution
networks through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
incarceration of both leaders and members. Puerto Rico was
considered to be the "linchpin" of DEA's strategy in the Caribbean
because it is the outermost entry-point to the continental United
States. As noted above, the Caribbean Division included both
domestic and foreign offices. The Domestic Subdivision included
eight enforcement groups and the diversion program. The Foreign
Subdivision included six Country Offices and the Foreign
Operations Group. The division's response to the international and
transit character of the drug threat in the region was underscored
by its work-hour statistics. During fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
more than 50 percent of its investigative work hours, categorized
by geographic scope of the case, were expended on international
cases, which involve both foreign and U.S. domestic Page 158
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
components. Moreover, during those same fiscal years, 52.6 percent
and 39.9 percent, respectively, of the division's investigative
work hours, categorized by case target, were expended on
transportation-related cases. In order to stem the flow of drugs
into the region, the division's investigative priorities for
fiscal year 1998 included: (1) cocaine-related investigations
involving violent organizations, (2) the initiation of major
heroin investigations, and (3) marijuana-related investigations.
The division's investigative work-hour statistics for fiscal year
1998, categorized by the drug involved indicated that 71 percent
of investigative work hours were expended on cocaine-related
cases; 19 percent on heroin- related cases (about double the
previous year); and 10 percent on other drugs, including
marijuana. The increased investigative work hours expended on
heroin investigations corresponded to the changing drug threat-the
increased availability and use of heroin within, and transshipment
through, the region. According to DEA officials, although the
Caribbean Division used a variety of investigative methods to
accomplish its priorities, during the late 1990s the division
pursued a strategy that included the use of wire intercepts. For
example, in a 1995 DEA-led OCDETF case (See ch. 2 for discussion
of OCDETF), "Operation Omega," DEA used undercover buys, on-site
surveillance, liaison with local law enforcement, confidential
source information, and cooperating defendant testimony to
investigate the Ponce-based Angela Ayala-Martinez cocaine-
trafficking organization. However, the 1996 DEA-led OCDETF
investigation, "Operation Santa Isabel," used Title III
(electronic surveillance) telephonic intercept orders extensively
in Puerto Rico. As in DEA generally (see ch. 2) and as shown in
table I.2, the division increased its use of wire intercepts from
1995 through 1998. Table I.2: Caribbean Field Division's Use
Fiscal year
Wire intercepts of Wire Intercepts 1995
0 1996
6 1997
12 1998
30 Source: DEA. During 1998, the division worked domestically with
various task forces that included other federal and/or
commonwealth and local agencies. In Page 159
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Puerto
Rico, DEA carried out investigations with PRPD,20 Hacienda
(Treasury Department), and the Special Investigations Bureau21 of
the Attorney General's Office. One DEA-led enforcement group,
which included FBI agents and officers from PRPD, worked at the
airport. A task force group, comprising DEA agents and members of
PRPD, targeted lower level individuals in drug organizations with
the objective of working toward the upper echelons of the
organization. In addition, in San Juan and Ponce, DEA led task
forces, supported by HIDTA funds from ONDCP (see ch. 2 for
discussion of HIDTA). The San Juan task force, which included DEA
and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service among
other federal agencies as well as officers from the Puerto Rico
Police Department, focused on major drug organizations in San Juan
and along the northern coast of Puerto Rico. The Ponce task force,
which included agents from DEA, FBI, IRS, and the Customs Service,
among others; a Coast Guard investigator; an Assistant U.S.
Attorney on site; local officials from PRPD and Hacienda; and a
special local prosecutor, focused on major drug organizations in
the Ponce area. Investigative work-hour statistics for the
division, when analyzed according to source of cases, highlight
the significance of its cooperative efforts. State and local task
force efforts accounted for 36.4 percent and 28.8 percent of the
division's investigative work hours expended in fiscal years 1997
and 1998, respectively. Joint state and local cases accounted for
another 5.5 and 12.9 percent of its investigative work hours
expended during those years, respectively. In addition,
investigative work hours dedicated to OCDETF cases by the division
almost doubled, from 7.9 to 15.1 percent, between fiscal years
1997 and 1998. Internationally, the division's six country offices
in the islands worked with their foreign counterparts in those
countries to respond to the drug threat in the region. Cooperative
law enforcement efforts varied from country to country. For
example, in Haiti, DEA was engaged in vetting (see ch. 2 for
discussion of vetting) local law enforcement personnel. The
division was involved in a number of special operations. For
example, Operation Buccaneer, an ongoing campaign to eradicate
marijuana, was 20 In Puerto Rico, the police are primarily
commonwealth police, and law enforcement matters are handled
through them. 21 According to its director, the Special
Investigations Bureau was formed 20 years ago and focuses on
organized crime and public corruption in Puerto Rico. At the time
of our review, it had 250 agents, of whom 40 were assigned to
federal task forces. The bureau has a drug section, which develops
cases. Some of these cases are worked with DEA. Page 160
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices carried
out by the Jamaicans and supported by DEA, DOD, and the State
Department. In Operation Summer Storm, the division and DEA's
Belize Country Office worked with the 26 Caribbean nations,
Belize, Suriname, and Guyana to conduct a combined, coordinated
air, land, and maritime counternarcotics operation within each
nation's territorial borders to interdict, disrupt, and dismantle
the flow of drugs. In the Dominican Republic, the DEA country
office provided wire intercept assistance. During fiscal years
1997 and 1998, joint federal foreign efforts accounted for 35.3
percent and 24.2 percent, respectively, of investigative work
hours categorized by source of cases. The Caribbean Division
provided enforcement statistics for fiscal years Enforcement
Statistics and 1997 and 1998. These data indicated
the division's involvement in 654 Case Examples
arrests in 1997 and 1,147 arrests in 1998. DEA also provided
arrest data reported by type of case-international, national, and
foreign. Domestic arrests were categorized as international or
national and included arrests related to OCDETF cases. Table I.3
below shows the distribution of the division's arrests by type of
case. Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean Division, by
Case Type, for
Number of arrests Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998
Type of cases Fiscal year International a
National a Foreigna Total 1997
403 182 69
654 1998 483 556
108 1147 aAn international case includes targets
involved in U.S. domestic and foreign criminal activities; a
foreign case includes targets operating principally outside the
jurisdiction of the United States. Source: DEA. The division
reported seizures of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in both
domestic and foreign cases. For fiscal year 1997, the division
reported total seizures of 7,780.2 kilograms of cocaine, 25.3
kilograms of heroin, and 18,835.8 kilograms of marijuana. For
fiscal year 1998, the division reported cocaine seizures of
5,442.2 kilograms, heroin seizures of 40.2 kilograms, and
marijuana seizures of 5,910.8 kilograms. DEA also provided
information on the results of specific cases mentioned above.
Operation Omega, which targeted the Ponce-based Angela Ayala-
Martinez cocaine-trafficking organization, resulted in 77 arrests
and the seizure of more than $1 million in drug-related assets.
Indictments against another 20 defendants were expected in late
1998. In Operation Santa Isabel, the Ponce Resident Office used
information gathered through traditional investigative techniques
to apply for Title III wiretap orders for 12 telephones associated
with the Rivera-Rosa cocaine importation and Page 161
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices cocaine
and heroin distribution organization. These intercepts produced
more than 60 calls related to drug trafficking and resulted in a
seizure of 1,300 kilograms of cocaine in November 1996. With
information on Rivera- Rosa's activities in the Dominican Republic
gathered from these intercepts, DEA's Santo Domingo Country Office
worked with Dominican officials to arrest 25 members of the
organization, including Rivera-Rosa, and to seize cocaine, heroin,
marijuana, and drug-related assets. As of August 1998, DEA
reported 81 arrests and the complete dismantling of this drug
organization. Page 162 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the
Drug Enforcement Administration Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. See
comment 1. Now on pp. 6. Page 163 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug Enforcement
Administration See comment 2. See comment 3. Now on p. 7. See
comment 4. Page 164 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug
Enforcement Administration We did not reproduce the enclosure.
Page 165 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug
Enforcement Administration The following are GAO's comments on the
Drug Enforcement Administration's letter of June 23, 1999. 1. We
inserted the word "measurable" to cover any measurable level of
GAO Comments performance, whether numerical or percentage,
against which actual achievement can be compared. 2. We added the
phrase "against the base year list" and a statement to indicate
that neither the domestic nor the international target lists of
drug trafficking organizations called for by the National Strategy
have yet to be developed. 3. We did not add DEA's suggested
statement. However, in our evaluation of DEA's comment at the end
of chapter 3, we noted DEA's inference that it cannot finalize
performance targets and measures until a designated targeted list
of drug trafficking organizations, as called for in the National
Strategy, is completed. 4. We revised the statement that little
can be said about DEA's effectiveness without performance targets
to clarify our intent that it is difficult to quantitatively
assess DEA's overall effectiveness without such targets. Page 166
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix III GAO
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Norman J. Rabkin, (202) 512-
8777 GAO Contacts Daniel C. Harris, (202) 512-8777 In
addition to those named above, Ronald G. Viereck, Samuel
A.Caldrone, Acknowledgments Lemuel N. Jackson, Barbara A.
Stolz, Michael H. Little, Barry J. Seltser, Ann H. Finley,
Katherine M. Raheb, and Donna M. Leiss made major contributions to
this report. Page 167 GAO/GGD-99-108
DEA Operations in the 1990s Glossary This glossary contains
definitions of performance measurement terms Performance
used in this report. Because limited standard definitions exist,
we used Measurement Terms definitions from a variety of
sources, including OMB's circular A-11, DOJ's guidance to
components on the preparation of fiscal year 2000 budget estimates
and related annual performance plans, and ONDCP's 1998 performance
measure of effectiveness plan. Essentially, OMB and DOJ
definitions relate to measuring agency performance as provided for
in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results
Act). ONDCP definitions relate to assessing the performance of the
National Drug Control Strategy (the National Strategy). A
performance goal, as defined by OMB for purposes of the Results
Act, Performance Goal means a target level of performance
expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which
actual achievement can be compared. As used in this report, the
terms performance goal and performance target (defined below) are
largely interchangeable. DEA uses the term performance goal, and
ONDCP uses performance target. A performance indicator, as defined
by OMB for purposes of the Results Performance Indicator Act,
means a particular value or characteristic used to measure output
or outcome (defined below). Performance indicators are associated
with performance goals in annual performance plans. As defined by
DOJ, performance indicators are signs that point to success or
failure in performance and answer the question, "How will we know
when we have been successful?" They refer to what specifically is
to be measured. As used in this report, the terms performance
indicator and performance measure (defined below) are largely
interchangeable. DEA uses the term performance indicator, and
ONDCP uses performance measure. A performance measure, as defined
by ONDCP for purposes of the Performance Measure National
Strategy, means data and variables and events used to track
progress toward performance targets. Measures show how progress
toward performance targets will be tracked. As used in this
report, the terms performance measure and performance indicator
are largely interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance
measure, and DEA uses performance indicator. A performance target,
as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National Performance
Target Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved.
It is a measurable level of performance against which actual
achievement can be compared. As used in this report, the terms
performance target and performance goal are largely
interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance target, and DEA
uses performance goal. Page 168
GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Glossary Outcomes, as
defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on the Results Act,
Outcomes means an event, occurrence, or condition that
indicates progress toward achievement of the mission of the
program. Outcomes can be measured in terms of the extent to which
they are achieved, or they can reflect the quality of service
delivery or customer satisfaction. Intermediate outcomes are
expected to lead to the desired ends but are not in themselves
ends. In many programs, a progression or sequence of outcomes
usually occurs. End outcomes are the desired end or ultimate
results that the agency hopes to achieve through its program
activities. These results are directly related to the agency's
mission. Outputs, as defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on
the Results Act, Outputs means the products and
services produced by a program or process and delivered to
customers, whether internal or external. Outputs result from
internal activity or effort. Outputs are important for measuring
internal work performance, but they do not in themselves indicate
the extent to which progress has occurred toward the program's
mission or what impact a program has had on a particular goal or
objective. A reporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of
the National Reporting Agency Strategy, means the agency
designated to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving established
performance targets. The reporting agency is not necessarily the
only agency responsible for achieving performance targets. A
supporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for the purposes of the
Supporting Agency National Strategy, means the agency that is
designated to assist the reporting agency with data collection and
assessment or that has programs that contribute to achieving the
performance target. Page 169 GAO/GGD-
99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 170 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
Operations in the 1990s Page 171 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
in the 1990s Page 172 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the
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