The Warner/Levin/Roberts amendment to the resolution of ratification on NATO Enlargement

Madam President, I rise in support of the Warner/Levin/Roberts amendment to the resolution of ratification on NATO Enlargement.

Before I talk about our amendment, I want to take a few moments to express my strong support for the enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

A significant aspect of any enlargement of the Alliance to the United States, of course, is that it would represent a commitment by the United States to treat an armed attack on any of these seven nations as an armed attack on the United States. In 1998, when the Senate was considering the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the attitude of Russia to the inclusion of former members of the Warsaw Pact was a factor which was part of the debate. Such enlargement was not intended to be threatening and, appropriately, it was not perceived as a threat by Russia, which wanted to establish a constructive relationship with the United States and the other members of NATO. As a matter of fact, Russia's decision on that matter was so clear that its position relative to NATO membership for former Soviet Republics Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is not even an issue today.

One issue that I have wrestled with in 1998 and before was my belief that NATO should have a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO member, if that member no longer complies with the Alliance's fundamental principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. In the Armed Services Committee hearings that preceded the 1998 Senate floor action, I put the issue to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who said in part that ``I think in situations in which a government emerges incompatible with the common purpose of the Alliance, there ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put forward.'' I also raised the issue with former Secretary of Defense William Perry who said in part that ``What you are describing is a problem--in fact, I would call it a flaw--in the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, this is a problem which should be addressed.''

I had a colloquy with the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden, who said in part that ``I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an important matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States and our allies. I believe that this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency situation exists.''

That careful and measured consideration, however, has not been undertaken within NATO councils in the interviewing years.
Just as I supported enlargement of the Alliance to a total of nineteen nations in 1998, so I support enlargement of the Alliance today to a total of 26. But I am mindful that the sheer number of nations that will soon make up the alliance increases the chance that one of them may some day depart from the alliance's fundamental principles. Having said that, I want to be perfectly clear--our amendment is not aimed at any of the seven nations whose accession is before us today--it is not aimed at the three most recent NATO member nations--it is not aimed at any of the long-term NATO member nations--and it is not aimed at any potential future NATO member nation--it is not aimed at any nation.

It is aimed at the possibility that a NATO member nation that, for example, was no longer democratic and was ruled by a dictator, would be in a position to veto a decision that all of the other NATO member nations wanted to take--perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were being ``ethnically cleansed'' on a scale that was approaching genocide such as happened in Kosovo. I believe that the United States should put the issue of whether a process should be established to suspend--suspend, not expel--such a member nation so that it would not endanger NATO's decision making when all but an undemocratic member nation wants to act.

The growth in the number of NATO member nations to 26 also increases, under the laws of mathematics, the potential that one NATO member nation, even a nation that conforms to the alliance's fundamental principles, could prevent the alliance from making a decision where all other countries want to act. The recent experience, wherein France prevented the North Atlantic Council from authorizing planning for the defense of Turkey to proceed and the Alliance had to go to the Defense Planning Council for that authorization, is a real-world example that demonstrates the need for the alliance to reconsider whether the consensus rule for NATO decisions should be changed.

I want to emphasize very strongly at this point that our amendment doesn't mandate a particular outcome to the discussion of these issues by the North Atlantic Council. It doesn't prejudge the result of the discussion and it doesn't require the U.S. representative to take a particular position in the discussion. It merely seeks to have the issues placed on the North Atlantic Council's agenda, discussed in the council, and the results of that discussion be reported back to the U.S. Senate.

Our amendment would require the President's report to discuss two other matters. The first would be methods to provide more flexibility to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who is presently U.S. General Jim Jones, to plan potential contingency operations before the formal approval of such operations by the North Atlantic Council. In the instance that I mentioned, wherein France blocked the planning for Turkey's defense, it would have been very useful if NATO's military planning staff could have been preparing contingency plans so that they would have been immediately available once the civilian decision-makers had approved the defense of Turkey.

A final discussion item would be methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns. This refers to the actual conduct of the operation--not to the approval to conduct it--and seeks to address the problems that were experienced in the conduct of the NATO operations in Kosovo where it is reported that General Wes Clark, the then-NATO Commander, was restricted in his actions as a number of NATO capitals insisted on reviewing and approving each day's bombing targets.

This amendment does not interfere with the passage of the resolution of ratification. It does not cause any delay in the accession of the seven new members into the NATO Alliance. It merely seeks to cause the Alliance to consider some issues that could pose serious problems in the future if not addressed in a calm, careful and measured way before a crisis occurs.

I ask unanimous consent that the discussion between myself and former Secretary of Defense Perry be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ISSUES RELATED TO NATO ENLARGEMENT--THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1998, WASHINGTON, DC

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Eisenhower, your sensitivity to the impact of this on our relationship with Russia, it seems to me, is correct, in terms of being aware of it. We should worry about it. We should consider it.

I reach a different conclusion than you do, but it is not politically incorrect to factor into the deliberation what the impact on that relationship is. I reach a different conclusion than you do for a number of reasons. And, by the way, I, too, have talked to dozens of parliamentarians in Russia, both here and in Moscow, as well as their leadership, their minister of Defense, their Foreign Minister, and so forth.

And I have heard their words. I have also seen their actions, including the following actions: They entered into a Founding Act with NATO after the decision to expand NATO was made. And they have remained a member of that relationship. And that Founding Act says--and this is between NATO, after the announced expansion, and Russia--that Founding Act reaffirms the determination of the parties, NATO and Russia, to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.

So one of the actions which they have taken is to both join a Founding Act with NATO after the announced expansion, and to remain a member of that Founding Act. Secondly, recently the Partnership for Peace was expanded. A more active participation was recently agreed to by Russia with NATO. So we have a more active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace recently, after the actual decision to have three additional countries join NATO.

Next, recently, their Prime Minister, Mr. Chernomyrdin, publicly pledged, after meeting with our Vice President, that the Russian Government will push hard for the Duma's ratification of START II. This came within the last few weeks.

We have heard--and I have heard from parliamentarians--that the expansion of NATO will hurt the chances for ratification. We understand that. But, nonetheless, the action taken by the Prime Minister is that he is going to push hard for that ratification. And that is despite his clear awareness that NATO is, with great likelihood, going to be expanded and that this Senate will ratify that expansion. So we have that action taken on the part of Mr. Chernomyrdin.

We also have a recent--interestingly enough, we talked about public opinion polls in here--we have a recent public opinion poll by the Gallup people in Moscow, released last Saturday, revealing that 57 percent of the people in Moscow support the Czech Republic's bit to joint NATO; 54 percent support Hungary's admission; 53 percent said Poland should allowed to join NATO. And a quarter of those polled had no views on the subject.

Now, I do not know what their sample was and so forth, but, nonetheless, I am not so sure public opinion in Russia is so wholly as one-sided as you indicate. And, again, I have also had similar meetings, as you have had, with their parliamentarians.

On the other hand, it is a very important factor to consider. And I think we should all weigh that. We should not give Russia a veto. That would be a very bad mistake, but we surely should consider the impact of any expansion on our relationship with Russia, and on the effort to bring Russia into the democratic world and to keep them there, and to keep them into the free market world. It is a very important issue.

You have raised another issue, however, which I find--and I join with you in finding troubling. And that is the inability of NATO to suspend a member, to remove a member who no longer comports with NATO's principles of democracy and free market orientation, and a dedication to freedom. This could happen in the future. It could happen. And there is no mechanism inside of NATO to suspend a member. Every member has a veto. And that could create a problem with your strategic vision. I think all of us hopefully view the world somewhat strategically. That could create a problem down the road.

And so I want to ask, Secretary Perry, about this issue. It is something which has troubled me. I do not want to try to condition the accession of these three new members on a suspension agreement, because that would raise a false implication that it has something to do with them--which it does not. It is a general issue that I think we have to face in NATO at some point, not related to these three particular countries, or any other particular country.

But what happens in the future if a member of NATO no longer comports to the principles of NATO in terms of commitment to democracy, freedom and free markets, and then has a veto on NATO operations? And my question, Mr. Perry, is this: Should we at some point raise within NATO, and satisfy ourselves, on the question of the suspension of a member at some point in the future and a mechanism to accomplish that end? That is my question.

Dr. Perry. That is a very good question, Senator Levin. What you are describing is a problem--in fact, I would call it a few--in the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, that is a problem which should be addressed. It has been a problem for many, many years. And therefore it is important, in addressing that problem, to separate it from the issue of NATO accession. I would not in any way want to tie that issue to the NATO accession issue.

We could have predicted several decades ago that that would cause a problem, that there would be some major issue come up on which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring NATO to a halt, or that some member would depart from the NATO values. Happily, that has not happened. But it is a potential problem, and I think we ought to address it.

Senator Levin. My time is up. I would appreciate, however, for the record, if you or any other member here--my time is up and the chairman here, I think, has got to stick to his 5-minute rule--but if you or any other panelist here would submit for the record your ideas on that subject, it would be very helpful to us.

I thank my friends, the managers of this resolution, for their tremendous work on NATO expansion and other issues.