<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:42271.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-1024
STATUS OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
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congress.senate
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri MAX BAUCUS, Montana
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island BARBARA BOXER, California
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Andrew Wheeler, Majority Staff Director
Ken Connolly, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
MARCH 1, 2006
OPENING STATEMENTS
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California... 9
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 11
DeMint, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina,
prepared statement............................................. 27
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 2
Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.. 4
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio,
prepared statement............................................. 44
WITNESSES
Ensign, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada......... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Fri, Robert, chairman, National Research Council, Committee on
Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 68
Senator Jeffords......................................... 69
Golan, Paul, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management, Department of Energy......................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 72
Senator Jeffords......................................... 73
Senator Voinovich........................................ 76
Loux, Robert, executive director, Nevada Agency for Nuclear
Projects, Office of the Governor............................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Response to an additional question from Senator Jeffords..... 100
Macfarlane, Allison, research associate, Program in Science,
Technology and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 60
Senator Jeffords......................................... 63
Moeller, Dade W., former president, Health Physics Society....... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 93
Senator Inhofe........................................... 85
Senator Jeffords......................................... 90
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada.......... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Wehrum, William, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Air
and Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 54
Senator Inhofe........................................... 51
Senator Jeffords......................................... 52
Senator Voinovich........................................ 54
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Natural Resources Defence Council, Thomas B. Cochran:
BEIR VIII Cancer Risks, Table ES-1........................... 41
Profiles..................................................... 39
STATUS OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room
628, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Inhofe (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Inhofe, Warner, DeMint, Jeffords, Boxer,
Carper, and Lautenberg.
Senator Inhofe. The committee will come to order. The
hearing will come to order.
I would like to make the announcement, with the concurrence
of Senator Jeffords that, when either Senator Harry Reid or
Senator John Ensign arrive for their brief statements, we are
going to interrupt what we are doing so they can be heard. OK?
I will go ahead and start, though, with an opening statement.
You guys, watch out for them, will you?
Staff. Senator Ensign just walked in.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Ensign just walked in. So we will
recognize Senator Ensign at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
NEVADA
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
allowing me to testify before your committee on the second
proposed rule concerning Yucca Mountain radiation standards.
This rule, on its face, I believe doesn't make sense, and
the closer one looks, the worse it appears. The EPA found
itself in a very difficult position. The original EPA Yucca
rule had been thrown out by a Federal Court, which found its
10,000-year compliance period was not consistent with the
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.
The EPA could have simply modified its rule by extending it
to cover the time of peak radiation exposure as required by the
Court. We know why the EPA did not do this. It didn't do this
because Yucca Mountain could not be engineered to meet the
standard. Yucca Mountain could not be built if that was the
case. So, instead of putting forth a common sense solution, the
EPA proposed the weakest peak dose standard in the world, a
proposal opposed by the National Council of Radiation
Protection. Again, when it comes to Yucca Mountain, sound
science has been rejected.
There are those who believe Congress should ignore
recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences and simply
lower the safety standards for the storage of the planet's most
deadly material. Senator Reid and I are committed to making
sure that that doesn't happen.
Mr. Chairman, Yucca Mountain continues to be plagued with
problems and delays. The Department of Energy no longer even
pretends to know when Yucca Mountain could open or how much it
will cost. DOE once again has stopped work at Yucca Mountain
after an NRC audit revealed that several years of data
collection was done with equipment that had not been
calibrated. This data is critical to health and safety because
it relates to how water could enter the repository and cause
corrosion of the nuclear waste storage casks.
We need to find another solution to our country's nuclear
waste problem. We need to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982 to require the DOE to take title of all spent nuclear
fuel. We need to invest in new technologies at our national
labs to recycle the waste without producing weapons grade
plutonium as a by-product. Transmutation technology, for
example, which transforms radioactive products into less
dangerous materials and produces electricity as a result is
quickly emerging as a viable alternative.
Mr. Chairman, this new proposed radiation standard, like so
much of the so-called science of Yucca Mountain is a farce. The
EPA was forced to create this ridiculous standard to make Yucca
Mountain look scientifically feasible on paper; it is not. I
believe this project is dangerous and misguided, fraught with
junk science and fraudulent data.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you for that excellent statement,
Senator Ensign. You may either be excused or stay, whichever
you would prefer.
Senator Ensign. I have other things pending, as all of us
Senators do. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. I am shocked.
Remind me if you see Senator Reid coming. Anyone out by the
door, do you see Senator Reid coming?
I will go ahead and start with my opening statement,
Senator Jeffords.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Today is our first oversight hearing on the status of Yucca
Mountain, the designated site for long-term storage of high
level nuclear waste. Before us today, we have the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as other
interested parties. We will be looking at a number of issues,
including the status of EPA's revised proposed standard.
The way the process is supposed to work is for DOE to
construct and operate the site in accordance with the radiation
standards that EPA sets and the NRC to regulate the facility.
There is a role for each one of them. This committee has the
sole jurisdiction over the EPA and the NRC, and it is our
responsibility to ensure that this site moves forward in
accordance with the law and that we can start shipping waste
there as soon as practical.
After personally visiting the site, I strongly support the
storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, and I encourage all
members of the committee to visit the site. It is amazing to
witness the amount of research that has been conducted on this
site. It is certainly the most well studied mountain in the
world. I do have a document here that is almost the title of
it, ``The Most Studied Real Estate on the Planet,'' if anyone
would like to get some of our documentation.
How can we not support this site which has gained both
national and international scientific peer approval over 20
years and $8 billion worth of scientific, environmental, and
engineering field work? How many more thousands of rock samples
do we need to further reconfirm what is already known about the
site's engineered and natural barriers' ability to contain
radioactive materials for thousands of years?
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 required DOE to
provide a Federal repository for used nuclear fuel no later
than January 31, 1998. Here we are, 8 years after that
deadline, and there is still no central repository for spent
nuclear fuel. In fact, according to current scheduling
projections, the placement of waste underground at the Yucca
site would not take place until 2015 at the earliest, and then
only if it receives full regulatory approval and the budget
requests are met. That leaves the United States at 17 years
behind schedule.
Meanwhile, millions of American families and businesses
have been paying twice for this delay in the storing of nuclear
fuel. They pay once to fund the Federal management of the used
nuclear fuel at a central repository and again when electric
utility companies have to build additional temporary storage
capacity at nuclear power plant sites because the Federal
Government did not meet its obligation to begin moving the used
fuel in 1998.
As a result, since 1983, the American consumers have paid
approximately $18 billion for this nuclear waste fund through
additions or add-ons to their utility bills with really nothing
to show for it. Still, the Federal Government continues to
collect nearly $700 million a year from electricity consumers.
Future generations of Americans--our children, our
grandchildren--will pay a high price for continued inaction. We
owe it to the American people to do better.
Nuclear energy makes up roughly 20 percent of our Nation's
energy mix. If we are going to continue to grow this economy,
we need to take the pressure off the natural gas, expand our
nuclear capacity, and increase our use of clean coal and clean
coal technology. In order to expand nuclear capacity, we have
to solve the waste issue which appears to be more of a
political issue than a scientific issue.
In addition to the Federal Agencies, we will hear from
several scientists, the State of Nevada, and of course, Senator
Reid, who we are expecting here in just a moment.
Finally, I would like to point out to my colleagues that we
decided against having the NRC testify today on the Federal
panel since they will be regulating DOE. We will have them next
week at the Nuclear Safety Subcommittee hearing, chaired by
Senator Voinovich, if members have specific questions for them
about Yucca Mountain.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the
State of Oklahoma
The hearing will come to order.
Today is our first oversight hearing on the status of Yucca
Mountain, the designated site for the long-term storage of high level
nuclear waste. We have before us today both the Department of Energy
and the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as other interested
parties. We will be looking at a number of issues including the status
of EPA's revised proposed standard.
The way the process is supposed to work is for DOE to construct and
operate the site, in accordance with the radiation standards that EPA
sets, and the NRC is to regulate the facility. This committee has the
sole jurisdiction over the EPA and the NRC, and it is our
responsibility to ensure that this site moves forward in accordance
with the law, and that we can start shipping waste there as soon as
practicable.
After personally visiting this site, I strongly support the storage
of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, and I encourage all members of the
committee to visit the location. It is amazing the amount of research
that has been conducted on this site. It is certainly the most well
studied mountain in the world.
How can we not support this site which has gained both national and
international scientific peer approval with over 20 years and $8
billion worth of scientific, environmental and engineering field work?
How many more thousands of rock samples do we need to further reconfirm
what is already known about this site's engineered and natural barriers
ability to safely contain radioactive materials for thousands of years?
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 required the Department of
Energy to provide a Federal repository for used nuclear fuel no later
than January 31, 1998. Here we are 8 years after that deadline and
there is still no central repository for spent nuclear fuel. In fact,
according to current scheduling projections, the placement of waste
underground at the Yucca site would not take place until 2015 at the
earliest, and then only if it receives full regulatory approval and the
budget requests are met. That leaves the United States at least 17
years behind schedule.
Meanwhile, millions of American families and businesses have been
paying twice for this delay in storing used nuclear fuel. They pay once
to fund the Federal management of used nuclear fuel at a central
repository and again when electric utility companies have to build
additional temporary storage capacity at nuclear power plant sites
because the Federal Government did not meet its obligation to begin
moving the used fuel in 1998.
As a result, since 1983, American consumers have paid approximately
$18 billion to this Nuclear Waste Fund through add-ons to their utility
bills with nothing to show for it. Still, the Federal Government
continues to collect nearly $700 million a year from electricity
consumers. Future generations of Americans, our children and
grandchildren, will pay a high price for continued inaction. We owe it
to the American people to do better.
Nuclear energy makes up roughly 20 percent of our Nation's energy
mix. If we are going to continue to grow this economy we need to take
the pressure off of natural gas, expand our nuclear capacity, and
increase our use of clean coal. In order to expand our nuclear capacity
we have to solve the waste issue, which appears to be more of a
political issue than a scientific issue.
In addition to the Federal agencies, we will hear from several
scientists, the State of Nevada, and Senator Reid, a former member and
briefly chairman of this committee, in addition to being the minority
leader. Finally I would like to point out to my colleagues that we
decided against having the NRC testify today on the Federal panel since
they will be regulating DOE. We will have them next week at a Nuclear
Safety Subcommittee hearing chaired by Senator Voinovich, if members
have specific questions for them about Yucca Mountain.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Jeffords.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we are conducting a very important hearing to
determine the status of the Federal project to develop Yucca
Mountain as a permanent disposal site for the Nation's nuclear
waste.
My State of Vermont, along with 39 other States, relies on
nuclear power for a large portion of its electricity
generation. It is an important part of the energy mix.
Nonetheless, we must be realistic in dealing with the downsides
associated with nuclear power.
Over 30 years ago, as Vermont's Attorney General, I was
concerned about the impact of nuclear waste on our environment
and the health care of Vermonters. As Attorney General, I
fought to improve the safety standards at Vermont Yankee by
calling for the use of new technology that dramatically reduced
airborne radiation.
When the industry resisted, I required Vermont Yankee to
enter into a contract with the State to use the best available
technology to control radiation and to accept State monitoring,
protecting the Connecticut River and the people of Vermont. The
Atomic Energy Commission later accepted these technologies as
their industry standard.
Throughout my time in Congress, I have continued to work
for a comprehensive solution to our nuclear waste problem. Back
in 1977, I introduced a bill in the House, calling for a
comprehensive Nuclear Waste Disposal Strategy. I maintained
then, as I do now, that finding an effective solution to the
waste problem is critical to the future of nuclear power in
this country. I supported the Yucca Mountain in the past in the
belief that it would resolve the problem and contain both our
past and future nuclear waste.
I have consistently supported a central storage solution
for nuclear waste. I continue to believe that it is essential
that we find a permanent geologic storage site if we are to
continue to produce nuclear energy.
However, the truth is that Yucca Mountain will not provide
the solution, and the project faces many challenges. It is now
clear that Yucca Mountain will only take part of the waste,
leaving some, if not most, of the waste that would be produced,
sitting along the banks of the rivers beside our small local
communities and our largest population centers. Yucca Mountain
will certainly not hold waste from any new nuclear plants that
the industry is planning to build. This is not adequate, and
this is not acceptable.
Moreover, we will examine today that we should not try to
beat a square peg into a round hole by trying to make the
science or regulations fit our efforts to build the Yucca site.
If the agencies working through the Yucca project cut corners,
we will undermine to develop a sound permanent and
comprehensive solution to the problem of nuclear waste
disposal. This will also lull us into a false sense of
security, believing that important issues related to disposal
are taken care of. They are not.
Americans need to know that, under a geological disposal
solution, high level waste will be stored safely and that we
have set the highest and the best standard to protect the
environment and the human health where we have to build future
disposal sites.
I urge my colleagues to be diligent today, to be focused in
their questions and push for the answers about whether we are
getting a real and comprehensive solution to the nuclear waste
disposal.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:]
Statement of Senator James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator from the
State of Vermont
Today we are conducting a very important hearing to determine the
status of the Federal project to develop Yucca Mountain as a permanent
disposal site for our Nation's nuclear waste. My State of Vermont,
along with 39 other States, relies on nuclear power for a large portion
of its electricity generation. It is an important part of our energy
mix. Nonetheless, we must be realistic in dealing with the downsides
associated with nuclear power.
Over 30 years ago, as Vermont's Attorney General, I was concerned
about the impact of nuclear waste on our environment and the health of
Vermonters. As Attorney General, I fought to improve the safety
standards at Vermont Yankee by calling for the use of new technology
that dramatically reduced airborne radiation. When the industry
resisted, I required Vermont Yankee to enter into a contract with the
State to use the best available technology to control radiation and to
accept State monitoring, protecting the Connecticut River and the
people of Vermont. The Atomic Energy Commission later accepted these
technologies as their industry standard.
Throughout my time in Congress, I have continued to work for a
comprehensive solution to our nuclear waste problem. Back in 1977, I
introduced a bill in the House calling for a comprehensive nuclear
waste disposal strategy. I maintained then, as I do now, that finding
an effective solution to the waste problem is critical to the future of
nuclear power in this country.
I supported the Yucca Mountain proposal in the past, in the belief
that it would resolve the problem, and contain both our past and future
nuclear waste. I have consistently supported a central storage solution
for nuclear waste. I continue to believe that it is essential that we
find a permanent, geologic storage site if we are to continue to
produce nuclear power.
However, the truth is that Yucca Mountain will not provide this
solution, and the project faces many challenges. It is now clear that
Yucca Mountain will only take part of the waste, leaving some, if not
most of the waste that will be produced sitting along the banks of
rivers, beside our small local communities and our largest population
centers.
Yucca Mountain will certainly not hold waste from any new nuclear
plants that the industry is planning to build. This is not adequate.
This is not acceptable.
Moreover, as we will examine today, we should not try to beat a
square peg into a round hole by trying to make the science or
regulations ``fit'' our efforts to build the Yucca site. If the
agencies working to site the Yucca project cut corners, we will
undermine our efforts to develop a sound, permanent and comprehensive
solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal. This will also lull
us into a false sense of security, believing that important issues
related to disposal are taken care of. They are not.
Americans need to know that under a geologic disposal ``solution,''
high-level waste will be stored safely, and that we've set the highest
and best standards to protect the environment and human health when we
have to build future disposal sites.
I urge my colleagues to be diligent today, to be focused in their
questions, and to push for answers about whether we are getting a real
and comprehensive solution to nuclear waste disposal. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses.
Senator Inhofe. Let me interrupt you just for a moment.
At this point, we had announced, Senator Reid, that when
you arrived, we would stop our proceedings, and we would look
forward to any statement you would like to make.
Senator Jeffords, we appreciate your doing that.
Senator John Ensign has already been here and made his
statement.
Senator Reid, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
NEVADA
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that very, very
much. I tried to get here. I try to be on time; sometimes you
can't be. I appreciate it. Also, Senator Jeffords, thank you
very much.
The proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, I don't
believe, Mr. Chairman, will ever be built. The project is mired
in scientific, safety, and technical problems.
In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act which
called for disposal of nuclear waste in a deep, geological
repository that would remain stable for thousands of years and
directed DOE to pick the most suitable site based on the
natural geologic features of the site. In 1987, Congress took
action based on political expediency and limited DOE's study to
Yucca Mountain, eliminating the State of Washington and the
State of Texas, despite the fact the criteria in the act would
disqualify the Yucca Mountain site.
DOE has been studying the site, as I have indicated, for
more than 20 years. The studies are even today incomplete and
don't provide a basis for evaluating whether Yucca Mountain is
a safe site for storing nuclear waste and whether it can be
transported safely across America's highways and railways, and
through our communities, past our schools and hospitals and
homes, and through major metropolitan areas.
Transportation of nuclear waste around the country and to
Yucca poses hazardous to public health, economic, natural
security, and environmental safety from accidents and terrorist
attacks which DOE has simply not addressed at all. Moving
almost 80,000 tons of waste to Yucca would involve about 53,000
truck shipments and 10,000 rail shipments over about 25 years
through cities and counties where nearly 250 million people:
Sacramento, CA; Buffalo, NY; Denver, CO; Chicago, IL; and the
District of Columbia; and, of course, Nevada.
Before he was elected the first time, President George W.
Bush wrote, ``I believe sound science, not politics, must
prevail in the designation of any high level nuclear waste
repository.'' He went on to write, ``As President, I would not
sign legislation that would send nuclear waste to any proposed
site unless it has been deemed scientifically safe.'' Now,
President Bush, I am sorry to say, hasn't followed what he said
he would do because now it is obvious that unsound science is
prevailing at Yucca Mountain.
A few of the scientific problems, and these are only a few
that we have seen in the last year or 18 months:
The Court threw out EPA's first Radiation Protection
Standards because they were not strong enough to protect the
public from radiation exposure, and they failed to follow
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.
EPA published its revised standards for the proposed Yucca
Mountain high level waste dump which are wholly inadequate, do
not meet the law's requirements, and do not protect the public
health and safety. In fact, EPA is proposing the least
protective public health radiation standard in the whole world.
Additionally, numerous scientific and quality assurance
problems, transportation problems, corrosion of casks,
effectiveness of materials, and many other things have caused
DOE to suspend work on the surface facilities and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to issue a stop order on the containers.
Additionally, DOE revealed the documents and models about
water infiltration at Yucca have been falsified, that is, there
has been cheating. They whitewashed this problem, or tried to,
but cannot whitewash the DOE Inspector General's report that
DOE continues to ignore falsification of technical and
scientific data on the project.
In numerous media reports, the Administration has confirmed
that it is preparing a legislative package that will remove
health, safety, and legal requirements--a clear admission that
the project is a complete public health, safety, and scientific
failure.
It should be clear to anyone that the proposed Yucca
Mountain project is not going anywhere. It will never open.
Yet, we must safely store spent nuclear fuel. So it is time to
look at other waste alternatives.
Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, the technology is there to
realize a viable, safe, and secure alternative. This can be
fully implemented within a decade or less if we now act. The
technology is onsite dry cask storage containment. Dry casks
are being safely used at 34 sites throughout the country. NEI
projects 83 of the 103 nuclear reactors will have dry storage
by the year 2050.
I and Senator Ensign have a bill that would safely store
nuclear waste while we look for a scientifically based
solution, The Spent Fuel Onsite Storage and Security Act. Our
bill requires commercial and nuclear utilities to secure waste
in licensed onsite dry cask storage facilities.
There is no justification, absolutely no justification for
endangering the public by ruling that there are no problems.
There is no reason to rush headlong toward a repository that is
fraught with scientific, technical, and geological problems
when it can be stored safely and securely in dry casks.
Our bill guarantees all Americans that our Nation's nuclear
waste will be stored in the safest way possible. It is time we
addressed the problem at hand, the safe storage of spent
nuclear fuel, and stop pouring taxpayers' money down the drain
on a project that could endanger all of our citizens. The Yucca
Mountain project is a failure, and I will continue to do what I
can to point that out to the public.
I would say, Mr. Chairman, one of the things I didn't want
to take the time for, because I know how rushed you all are, is
that there are members of Senate, some more than others, who
are tremendously concerned about costs, how much things cost.
Certainly, the presiding officer of this meeting, the chairman
of this full committee, has been concerned about dollars ever
since I have served with you. You must take a look at this
waste of money with this project. Right now, we have spent
upwards of $10 billion on nothing. We have nothing for this.
I would respectfully submit that this is not a game, saying
we are winners and losers. Let us do the right thing. Leave it
onsite in dry cask storage containers. It will be safe there
for at least 50 years, and thereafter, we will have some idea
of what to do with this.
The President of the United States is in India, trying to
work out something on the safe use of producing nuclear energy.
I have talked to him about this. I don't just, at hand, say
that what he is doing is wrong. I think it is something we need
to take a look at. We need to take a look at doing something
similar to that in the United States, but we have to solve the
waste problem. Until we solve the waste problem, and I think
the way to do it cheaply, not by spending $10 billion but a few
million dollars, is to store it onsite. It certainly would be
the right thing to do in my opinion.
I appreciate the committee's taking a look at this.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Reid, thank you for that excellent
opening statement. You certainly are invited to stay if your
schedule would permit or to leave if you are unable to do that.
Senator Jeffords, we did interrupt your statement. If you
would like to start over, that would be fine, or just pick up
where you dropped off.
Senator Jeffords. Where I left off, basically.
Senator Inhofe. Then that will be reflected in the record
as if not interrupted.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
[The complete statement of Senator Jeffords appears at a
prior point in the record.]
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jeffords.
Senator Boxer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Hello, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, protecting public health and safety should be
the primary test in assessing nuclear waste disposal options,
and with that measure in mind, Yucca Mountain continues to fail
the test in my view.
The focus of the hearing today is the status of the Yucca
Mountain project, including the establishment of radiation
standards that will ensure that public health and the
environment are protected. EPA's first effort to establish
radiation standards was largely struck down by the D.C. Circuit
for failing to comply with National Academy of Sciences
recommendations. EPA's current proposal for radiation standards
at Yucca Mountain has yet to be finalized but has drawn
criticism from an expert on nuclear issues for failing to
ensure that the public does not face unacceptable cancer risks.
Technical problems with the Yucca Mountain project continue
to raise red flags. A January 2006 order from the Department of
Energy has stopped all work on the repository because of
quality assurance problems. Whether the plan to address the
problems is successful remains to be seen.
On February 9, 2006, the National Academy of Sciences
called for DOE to further analyze and account for potential
terrorist acts on the transportation of nuclear waste before
large shipments take place. The National Academy of Sciences
also called for, among other things, additional analysis of
safety measures for high intensity fires.
Clearly, the potential risks associated with this project
remain very high. My longstanding concerns about this project
have not been addressed. My State of California is one of the
most affected by the Yucca Mountain project which is only 17
miles from the California border and Death Valley National
Park. Studies have shown that the groundwater under Yucca
Mountain flows into Death Valley, one of the hottest and driest
places on Earth. If radiation contaminates this groundwater, it
could be the demise of the National Park and the surrounding
communities.
The threat posed by nuclear waste transport in California
is also clear, and in the past I have laid that out. Mr.
Chairman, I won't do that today. I will spare you that, but I
will say that over 7.5 million people in California live within
1 mile of a possible nuclear transport route, 7.5 million
people. That is more people than we have in most of our States.
Yucca's geology also remains a concern. Two active faults
run through Yucca mountain, though they don't cross the
repository. Quakes of 5.6 and 4.4 on the Richter scale occurred
in 1992 and 2002, just 12 miles away from the site, just 12
miles away.
Strong science, good planning, and public confidence must
be part of any solution to the nuclear waste disposal problem.
We have not achieved that at Yucca Mountain in my view. A
nuclear waste repository poses dangers that have no parallel in
human history. We must not short-circuit the vital scientific
and public processes needed to address these dangers.
No nuclear waste disposal project should move forward until
the health and safety of the public are assured, and I will do
everything in my power to make sure that this does not move
forward unless I feel that the health and safety of the public
has been assured.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from the
State of California
Mr. Chairman, protecting public health and safety should be the
primary test in assessing nuclear waste disposal options. Yucca
Mountain continues to fail that test.
The focus of the hearing today is the status of the Yucca Mountain
project, including the establishment of radiation standards that will
ensure that public health and the environment are protected.
EPA's first effort to establish radiation standards was largely
struck down by the D.C. Circuit for failing to comply with National
Academy of Sciences recommendations.
EPA's current proposal for radiation standards at Yucca Mountain
has yet to be finalized, but has drawn criticism from an expert on
nuclear issues for failing to ensure that the public does not face
unacceptable cancer risks.
Technical problems with the Yucca Mountain project continue to
raise red flags. A January 2006 order from the Department of Energy
(DOE) has stopped all work on the repository because of quality
assurance problems. Whether the plan to address the problems is
successful remains to be seen.
On February 9, 2006, the National Academy of Sciences called for
DOE to further analyze and account for potential terrorist acts on the
transportation of nuclear waste before large shipments take place. The
National Academy of Sciences also called for among other things,
additional analysis of safety measures for high intensity fires.
Clearly the potential risks associated with this project remain
high. My longstanding concerns about this project have not been
addressed.
My State of California is one of the most affected by the Yucca
Mountain project, which is only 17 miles from the California border and
Death Valley National Park.
Studies have shown that the groundwater under Yucca Mountain flows
into Death Valley, one of the hottest and driest places on the earth.
If radiation contaminates this groundwater, it could be the demise of
the national park and the surrounding communities.
The threat posed by nuclear waste transport in California is also
clear. Over 7.5 million people live within 1 mile of a possible nuclear
transport route.
Yucca's geology also remains a concern. Two active faults run
through Yucca Mountain, though they do not cross the repository. Quakes
of 5.6 and 4.4 on the Richter scale occurred in 1992 and 2002 just 12
miles away.
Strong science, good planning and public confidence must be part of
any solution to the nuclear waste disposal problem. We have not
achieved this at Yucca Mountain.
A nuclear waste repository poses dangers that have no parallel in
human history. We must not short-circuit the vital scientific and
public processes needed to address these dangers. No nuclear waste
disposal project should move forward until health and safety of the
public are assured.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. I will be very brief. I am glad we are
having the hearing. I look forward to hearing from the next
panel of witnesses, and I was pleased to hear from at least one
of our colleagues a moment ago.
We all know we have a huge and growing reliance on foreign
oil. We have a huge trade deficit. It was about $750 billion
last year. Roughly a third of that was attributable to the oil
that we imported, in some cases from places around the world
where they don't like us very much, and I am convinced they use
our money to try to harm us.
We have had nuclear power plants now for less than 60
years. If we could figure out how to send a man to the moon
back in the 1960's and do it within less than 10 years, we
ought to be able to figure out how to safely dispose of nuclear
waste so that we can, frankly, increase our reliance on nuclear
energy and reduce our reliance on fuels from other places
around the world.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Carper.
We would ask now for our No. 2 Panel, William Wehrum and
Paul Golan to take the table. Paul Golan is the Acting Director
of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management for the
Department of Energy. William, is it pronounced Wehrum?
Mr. Wehrum. Wehrum.
Senator Inhofe. Wehrum, yes. We have visited before, but I
can never pronounce it properly. He is the Acting Assistant
Administrator of the Office of Air and Radiation, Environmental
Protection Agency, but has just been nominated by the President
to be the Assistant Administrator. We will look forward to
having a hearing very shortly to hear you.
So if the two of you would like to go ahead and be heard,
what we will do at this time is dispense with any more opening
statements from other members who may come, which is a
tradition of this committee. We would like to ask you to try to
hold your opening comments to maybe 6 minutes, but your entire
statement will be made a part of the record.
Mr. Wehrum.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM WEHRUM, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Mr. Wehrum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, Senator Jeffords, Senator Boxer. It is a privilege
to be here. I appreciate the opportunity.
My name is Bill Wehrum. I am the Principal Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. I am pleased to be here today
to provide you with an update on the status of EPA's public
health and safety standards for the proposed spent nuclear fuel
and high level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain,
NV.
I would like to begin by providing the committee with a
short history of the EPA's responsibilities and why we have
proposed revised standards.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 described the roles
and responsibilities of Federal agencies in the development of
disposal facilities for spent nuclear fuel and high level
waste. EPA was identified as the Agency responsible for
establishing standards to protect the general environment for
such facilities. In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress
delineated EPA's roles and responsibilities, specific to the
Federal Government's establishment of the potential repository
at Yucca Mountain.
EPA's role is to determine how the Yucca Mountain high
level waste facility must perform to protect public health and
the environment. Congress directed EPA to develop public health
and safety standards that would be incorporated into the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's licensing requirements for the
Yucca Mountain facility. The Department of Energy would apply
for the license to construct and operate the facility, and the
facility would open only if NRC determines that DOE can meet
EPA standards.
In establishing EPA's role, Congress also stated that the
EPA safety standards are to be based upon and consistent with
the expert advice of the National Academy of Sciences.
EPA established its Yucca Mountain standards in June 2001.
As required by the Energy Policy Act, these standards addressed
releases of radioactive material during storage at the site and
after final disposal. The storage standards had a dose limit of
15 millirem per year for the public outside the Yucca Mountain
site. The disposal standards consisted of three components: an
individual dose standard, a standard evaluating the impacts of
human intrusion into the repository, and a groundwater
protection standard.
The individual protection and human intrusion standard set
a limit of 15 millirem per year to the reasonably maximally
exposed individual who would be among the most highly exposed
members of the public. The groundwater protection standard is
consistent with EPA's drinking water standards which the Agency
applies in many situations as a pollution prevention measure.
The disposal standards were to apply for a period of 10,000
years after the facility is closed. Dose assessments were to
continue beyond 10,000 years and be placed in DOE's
environmental impact statement but were not subject to a
compliance standard.
The 10,000-year period for compliance assessment is
consistent with EPA's generally applicable standards developed
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It also reflects
international guidance regarding the level of confidence that
can be placed in numeric projections over very long periods of
time.
Shortly after the EPA first established these standards in
2001, the nuclear industry, several environmental and public
interest groups, and the State of Nevada challenged the
standards in Court. In July 2004, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit found in favor of the Agency on all counts except
one, the 10,000-year regulatory timeframe.
The Court did not rule on whether EPA standards were
protective but did find that the timeframe of the EPA standards
was not consistent with the National Academy of Sciences
recommendations. The National Academy of Sciences, in a report
to EPA, stated that EPA standards should cover at least the
time period when the highest releases of radiation are most
likely to occur within the limits imposed by the geologic
stability of the Yucca Mountain site. It judged this period of
geologic stability, for purposes of projecting releases from
the repository, to be on the order of a million years. EPA's
2001 standards required DOE to evaluate the performance of the
site for this period but did not establish a specific dose
limit beyond the first 10,000 years.
EPA proposed a revised rule in August 2005, to address the
issues raised by the Appeals Court. The new proposed rule
limits radiation doses from Yucca Mountain for up to 1 million
years after it closes. No other rules in the United States for
any risks have ever attempted to regulate for such a long
period of time.
Within that regulatory timeframe, we have proposed two dose
standards that would apply based on the number of years from
the time the facility is closed. For the first 10,000 years, we
would retain the 2001 final rule's dose limit of 15 millirem
per year. This is the protection at the level of the most
stringent radiation regulations in the United States today.
From 10,000 years to 1 million years, we propose a dose limit
of 350 millirem per year. This represents a total radiation
exposure for people near Yucca Mountain that is no higher than
natural levels people live with routinely in other parts of the
country.
One million years, which represents 25,000 generations,
includes the time at which the highest doses of radiation from
the facility are expected to occur.
Our proposal requires DOE to show that Yucca Mountain can
safely contain wastes, even considering the effects of
earthquakes, volcanic activity, climate change, and container
corrosion over 1 million years.
The public comment period for the proposed rule closed on
November 21. We are currently reviewing and considering the
comments as we develop our final rule. We held public hearings
in Las Vegas and Amargosa Valley, NV and in Washington, DC. We
are considering comments from these hearings, as well as all
the comments submitted to the Agency's rulemaking docket. A
document describing our responses to all comments will be
published along with the final rule.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the
committee and present an update on EPA's Yucca Mountain
standard. This concludes my prepared statement, and I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Wehrum.
Mr. Golan.
STATEMENT OF PAUL GOLAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Golan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. My name is Paul Golan. I am the Acting Director of
the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management. I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update
on the project today.
For more than 50 years, our Nation has benefited greatly
from the power of the atom and from nuclear energy, but we have
been left with a legacy marked by the generation of
accumulation of over 50,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel from
commercial power reactors and defense activities. There is a
strong global scientific consensus that the best and safest
option for dealing with this waste is geologic isolation,
including the National Academy of Sciences which has generally
endorsed the geologic disposal option from as far back as 1957.
Yucca Mountain possesses features that make it very
suitable as a geologic repository. With this in mind, in 2002,
Congress approved the President's recommendation for the
development of Yucca Mountain as the Nation's high level waste
repository. The President's recommendation was based on more
than 20 years of scientific research and recognizes that Yucca
Mountain will provide a safer and more secure location for the
Nation's nuclear waste than the current temporary storage
facilities offer.
Allow me to address three topics this afternoon: First, an
explanation of the clean-canistered approach to waste handling;
second, where the project is in developing a licensing
schedule; and last, a discussion of the proposed EPA Radiation
Protection Standards.
Though this program had intended to submit a license
application to the NRC in December 2004, a number of external
and internal issues arose that prevented that from happening.
In mid-2005, Secretary Bodman directed a thorough review of our
overall approach to the project to determine if there were ways
to run the repository better. His guidance to me was clear:
Make it simpler and safer.
Late last year, we announced a redirection to a
predominantly clean-canistered approach to fuel handling
operations. A single canister would be used to transport, age,
and dispose of the waste without ever needing to reopen the
waste package. We believe that the technical challenges can be
resolved which will result in a simpler, safer, and more
reliable operation.
The clean-canistered approach will significantly reduce
radiation risks and exposures of contamination from handling
spent fuel at the repository and eliminate the need to handle
spent fuel several times. It also eliminates the need for
construction of two large dry fuel handling facilities. With
this new approach, the spent fuel will be handled primarily by
the utilities. The Department would take advantage of
commercial reactor sites with existing capability and skills.
We are working with industry today to develop canister
specifications which should result in a path forward that is
easier to design, license, build, and operate. While this
approach will have significant financial and safety benefits,
it does require additional time to redevelop and revise
portions of our license application. Later this spring, the
Department expects to have a new design for the surface
facilities that support the canistered approach, and after
approval by the Secretary, we will incorporate that design into
our baseline.
We are committed to developing a realistic schedule that
will result in the submission of a strong license application
later this summer. Later this summer, we will publish our
schedule for submittal of the license application to the NRC.
As was mentioned before, in August 2005, the EPA proposed
revised standards for Yucca Mountain. Specifically, EPA
proposed a radiological exposure limit for the time of peak
dose to the general public during the 1-million-year period
following the disposal of waste at Yucca Mountain.
As the committee knows, there is limited temporary surface
storage of waste at 122 sites in 39 States across our Nation,
including many of the States this committee represents.
Let us be mindful that the 70,000 tons of fuel that will be
disposed of at Yucca Mountain will have produced over 2,000
gigawatt years of electricity. As a result of this, according
to a report issued by scientists from the University of
California-Berkeley, we are leaving the future generations 5
billion tons of coal that would otherwise have been consumed.
Additionally, we did not generate 700 million tons of
particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and other pollutants
including 650 tons of mercury that would have been released
into the environment. The report also will opine that there
were 300 coal mining deaths avoided as a result of using
nuclear power instead of coal. Nuclear energy will also allow
us to pass on to future generations a secure energy source that
is safe, reliable, and essentially emission-free.
The proposed EPA rule retains the existing 10,000-year
individual protection standard of 15 millirem per year and
supplements it with an additional standard of 350 millirem per
year at the time of peak dose. The Department supports this
approach. A rule with two compliance periods recognizes the
limitations of bounding analyses, the greater uncertainties at
the time of peak risk, as well as the lessened precision and
calculated results as time and uncertainties increase.
Retaining the 15 millirem per year for the initial 10,000
years ensures that the repository design will include all
prudent steps, including the use of engineered systems and
natural barriers to limit offsite doses. Through the 1-million-
year performance period, the natural and engineered barriers
will continue to keep exposure levels low, below what people
receive today based on where they live or where they work.
Importantly, this reflects a level of risk that society
normally lives with today and that the allowable dose for an
individual at Yucca Mountain, several hundred thousand years in
the future, would be no greater than the average dose of a
resident of Denver or similar high altitude location receives
today.
Studies show that areas with higher levels of natural
background radiation have no greater rate of cancer or other
radiation-linked illnesses than have been detected in areas
with lower levels of natural background radiation. I believe
our license will provide the necessary assurances that we can
operate Yucca Mountain in compliance with the performance
requirements of the EPA and NRC. We will demonstrate our better
approach to operate Yucca Mountain will be safe, carefully
planned, logical, and methodical.
Yucca Mountain is a good site, and there is a clear need
for Yucca Mountain, even if we could reduce the Nation's
electricity consumption by 20 percent and were able to shut
down every commercial reactor and nuclear power plant in the
country today. We could spend another 20 years and several more
millions of dollars and arrive at the conclusion that we need
to study Yucca Mountain more before we can proceed. Moving
forward into licensing will allow an open public debate on the
safety of Yucca Mountain.
The waste is here today. Let us not pass this burden on to
our children. This is our responsibility, and we need to deal
with it.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Golan.
Mr. Wehrum, when do you expect to finalize the proposed
rule?
Mr. Wehrum. We currently are in the process of reviewing
comments that were submitted during the public comment period
and the testimony provided during the public hearings. Once we
finish that assessment, we will move into focused work on
preparing the final rule, and we hope to get that done by the
end of this year.
Senator Inhofe. By the end of the year?
Mr. Wehrum. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. All right, sir. I would like to ask you:
How similar is the standard to comparable waste disposal
standards in Europe? It is my understanding that we protect the
90th percentile individual person which leads to an extremely
conservative standard, whereas Europe reaches 50, approximately
the 50th percentile. I would ask you the question: Is this too
conservative and how did we arrive at that?
Mr. Wehrum. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We believe our approach is
very consistent with the approach that is used internationally,
and certainly several countries in Europe have similar sorts of
standards in place. Our standard is based on an assessment of
exposure to what we call the reasonably maximally exposed
individual. We like our acronyms at EPA. That is the RMEI.
My understanding is that many of the international
standards and those in Europe apply a different methodology of
identifying the potentially affected population, and that would
be a critical group type approach. So when you compare and
contrast the relative differences between what we are doing and
what other countries in the world do, we believe that there is
actually a high level of consistency, and that we are, at least
with regard to the individual exposure, not being significantly
more stringent.
Senator Inhofe. I would ask the same thing about the
million-year standard, placing the high priority on
hypothetical long term hazards. It is my understand that, in
doing this, you are assuming that technology is going to be
static during this period of time, is that correct?
Mr. Wehrum. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Is that reasonable?
Mr. Wehrum. It----
Senator Inhofe. Can you think of any time in history that
would, well, scrub that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. In my opening statement, Mr. Golan, I
mentioned how the DOE, the EPA, and the NRC interact in this
process. I would ask you: When do you expect the DOE to submit
a license application to the NRC?
Mr. Golan. Sir, we are in the process of developing our
design for the surface facilities to handle primarily
canisterized waste. Once that has been reviewed and approved by
the Secretary of Energy, it is our intent to publish a license
schedule this summer. So we would like to get back to you after
we have a chance to look at the design, incorporate it into our
baseline, and have a basis to provide you a schedule.
Senator Inhofe. Is that assuming no litigation, that is not
foreseen at this time, would be there?
Mr. Golan. Our step in submitting the license application,
again, I think the litigation would come after that.
Senator Inhofe. I see, OK. You heard Senator Reid when he
was in here, and he was talking about the amount of money and
that we are all concerned about the amount of money that is
being spent.
I would ask you, on the other side of that: What are the
financial impacts on the Federal Government for not opening a
waste repository as scheduled right now? For example, I note
that you have already lost three lawsuits, one with TVA around
$35 million, and I believe one with the State of South
Carolina, and one with Exelon. What effect would this have,
financial effect?
Mr. Golan. Sure. The estimated liability that the
Government has for not accepting waste in 1998 through 2010, so
for a period of 12 years, is estimated somewhere between $2 and
$3 billion. After that, we estimate that the additional costs
for the incremental onsite storage costs would be in the order
of several hundred million dollars a year extra on top of that.
Senator Inhofe. The reason I am concerned about this is
that I know this panel has heard me say several times that
nuclear energy and the expansion of nuclear energy and opening
it up are absolutely necessary. There is no other way that we
are going to become independent. We need clean coal technology.
We need oil and gas. We need renewables. We need all of the
above, but certainly a very important thing is nuclear energy.
It seems to me some of us are old enough to remember back
in the sixties and seventies when there were a lot of protests
going on. There was a perceived danger that was there. Since we
have been getting into all the problems with clean coal, with
coal and the ambient air problems that we deal with on this
committee, it would seem to me, and it appears to be, that a
lot of the people who were opposed to the expansion of nuclear
energy back in those years are now recognizing that it is the
cleanest and the safest form that is out there.
I, certainly, as chairman of this committee, believe that
and believe that we need to get very aggressive in our
licensing system and encouraging expansion of nuclear energy in
this country. When you look at some of the European countries
that are 80 percent nuclear, you just wonder how we can do it
without that expansion. I don't think we can.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Jeffords.
Senator Jeffords. Excuse me. Mr. Wehrum, I would ask you
this about the groundwater protection standards at Yucca
Mountain. EPA proposes to stop the groundwater standard after
the first 10,000 years when the groundwater will become
increasingly contaminated. The EPA will protect the public
after 10,000 years by another part of the standard, but that
part of the standard is more than 23 times higher after 10,000
years than it is before that time. Why is the compliance period
for groundwater only 10,000 years?
Mr. Wehrum. Senator Jeffords, our strategy in proposing the
regulation is to take a two-pronged approach. The first prong
is to reiterate the standards that were adopted in 2001. We
believe those standards were fully protective of human health
and safety and have the added benefit that while 10,000 years
is a very long period of time, it is a period of time where we
believe we have greater confidence in the analytical tools that
are available and our ability to predict with greater precision
how the repository will behave. Beyond the 10,000-year period
of time and up to the million-year period of time, our ability
to analyze and predict with great precision is much less.
A million years is a very, very long period of time. It is
unprecedented given, certainly, our regulatory activity within
the Environmental Protection Agency. So it is our belief that
the proposed standard of 350 millirem per year over the
million-year period is appropriate, and is protective, and is
consistent with our ability to reasonably analyze and
reasonably predict the behavior of the repository and the
material stored in the repository.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you. Mr. Wehrum, the EPA is
currently revising its Yucca Mountain radiation regulations.
Some observers have suggested that the legislation will be
forthcoming from the Administration to set a radiation standard
at Yucca Mountain. Given that EPA is set to finalize its
revised regulation in the coming months, it does not seem wise
to proceed with that legislation, does it?
Mr. Wehrum. Senator Jeffords, our current obligation under
law is to complete the Radiation Protection Standard that has
been proposed, and we will continue to press forward and
attempt to complete that standard as soon as we reasonably can.
I would defer to my DOE colleague on questions about
legislation and the possible desire to draft or propose
legislation.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Golan, in July 2002, Congress
authorized DOE to submit a license application for the Yucca
Mountain project to the NRC. The law gave DOE 90 days to do so
after the vote. DOE promised to file by December 2004. After
repeated postponements, DOE no longer has a date for submitting
an application. Presumably, that original authorization has
lapsed. Doesn't DOE need to come back to Congress for
reauthorization?
Mr. Golan. I would have to get back to you on the
authorization question, Senator Jeffords. We are in the process
right now of putting together a license application schedule,
as I said, based on the clean canister design. That will meet
the EPA Radiation Protection Standard. Again, that is another
issue that arose after the 2002 date for Congress to submit a
license application. So there are things that happened after
that authorization that we are factoring into the development
of our license application.
Again, we expect to have a schedule that will have a
technical basis to submit a solid license application this
summer.
[The response to the referenced authorization question
follows:]
On July 23, 2002, the President signed into law Joint Resolution
No. 87 which was approved by both the House and Senate. Public Law 107-
200; 116 Stat. 735 (2002); 42 USC 1035 note. This statute affirmatively
approved the Yucca Mountain site, thus concluding the site-selection
process and obligating DOE to seek, as expeditiously as possible, a
license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build and operate a
repository at the site. Failure to file an application within 90 days
does not affect the validity of the Site Recommendation or DOE's
obligation under the NWPA to file an application once the President and
Congress approved the Site Recommendation decision.
Senator Jeffords. DOE is pursuing a new nuclear waste
reprocessing program called The Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership that could impact the role of the Yucca Mountain
project. This program relies on reprocessing technologies that
are currently under development. Existing reprocessing
technologies produce a by-product which is highly radioactive
sludgelike residue that must be solidified and sealed in a
stainless steel canister before it is shipped. How long will it
be before these new reprocessing technologies are viable?
Mr. Golan. Senator Jeffords, as you mentioned, the
Department did propose The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
starting in Fiscal Year 2007. In many ways, it is a
continuation of efforts the Department has been undergoing with
the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, and the Department has
requested $250 million in fiscal year 2007 to continue that and
to accelerate it.
Impacts on Yucca Mountain over the long term would be
tremendous and positive. If we could reduce the heat, if we
could reduce the half-life of the actinides, and of the fission
products, and of the nuclear waste at the site, and if we could
reduce the volume, those would be definite advantages of a
reprocessing capability that does not separate purified
plutonium.
As you mentioned, these technologies are under development,
and it is going to be several decades before we go through
engineering scale and then through actual commercial industrial
scale demonstrations here. You are right in terms of they will
produce a by-product under any fuel cycle scenario at Yucca
Mountain where a deep geologic repository would be needed. We
are proceeding along with developing the license application
for Yucca Mountain in parallel with the GNEP. Again, we would
need it, even if all the technologies of GNEP prove successful,
and again there is about 13,000 tons of waste, defense-
generated waste located at Savannah River, Hanford, West
Valley, and Idaho that is vitrified or going to be vitrified
that will ultimately end up at Yucca Mountain.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jeffords.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My chairman takes a large picture view of this which I
think is important, making the point that we want to become
energy independent, and therefore we need to do this because we
need to build more nuclear power plants. I would just be a
devil's advocate on this, much to the surprise of my chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. I even surprise Senator Jeffords.
I think if you are a proponent of nuclear power, the worst
thing you can do, it seems to me, is not deal correctly or
safely with the waste issue because I would posit if there is
just one accident, it could be so horrific that it would be the
end of nuclear power. For example, if you were moving the spent
fuel on trucks, and there was a horrific accident or a
terrorist incident, and something horrible happened, and it
never made its way to Yucca Mountain but it polluted
communities, killed people, gave people cancer, and maybe
terrorized a community, I would say very quickly that nuclear
power would not be what people turn to in this country.
So I think the way we deal with this is essential, and I
think that Senator Reid ought to be listened to.
Mr. Wehrum, I just have to say, your explanation of this
court suit I found very, shall we say, disingenuous. I don't
share the way you analyzed it. You said, we were upheld on
everything but one count. Well, there were three counts. The
three counts dealt with the safety standards. One standard was
individual protection or IP; the other was human intrusion into
the facility or HI; the third was groundwater protection. Guess
what? The Court threw this out on two out of the three. The
only one that they upheld was groundwater, and that was the one
that was challenged by industry.
The Court found that there wasn't individual protection
with the standard, and there was possibility of human
intrusion. So that was a disaster.
Now, you are going back. You are writing another rule. If
you think this thing is getting off dead center, I have to
agree with Senator Reid, this is a never ending situation
because what you are thinking of doing, I don't think responds
to the Court. We will see what the Court says because you know
there is going to be another lawsuit. But from what I hear you
saying, you are not really correcting the issues. This thing
has gone around in a circle.
Mr. Golan, you testified that President Bush has
recommended using Yucca Mountain as the Nation's nuclear waste
repository, ``based on more than 20 years of scientific
research,'' is that correct?
Mr. Golan. Yes, ma'am, I did.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, then I am very confused because on
February 19th, just 2 weeks ago, Ken Mehlman, the Chairman of
the Republican National Committee told a Nevada newspaper, and
I have the paper here, that President Bush doesn't favor or
oppose the site. So is it still your opinion that the
President, in fact, does favor the site?
Mr. Golan. The President did send his recommendation to
Congress, and Congress approved that recommendation in 2002. I
have no reason to doubt that the President has changed his
opinion on Yucca Mountain.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, I think we need to let Mr. Mehlman
know that when he is in Nevada, he can't say the President
doesn't support it, and then you come here and testify to us
that the President supports it. So at least let us find out
what the truth is, and I am going to say you are being
truthful. I just look at you, and I believe that.
Senator Inhofe. You never say that about me.
Senator Boxer. You are always truthful. I always think you
are truthful. I just don't agree with you, but you are
truthful.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. Now, Mr. Wehrum, I have an analysis from Dr.
Thomas Cochran, a respected nuclear physicist, which shows that
EPA's Proposed Radiation Standard for 10,000 to 1 million years
creates a one in five risk of increased fatal cancers for the
general population and a one in four risk for women. Do you
believe that is an acceptable risk of fatal cancers for the
public?
Mr. Wehrum. The proposed standard of 350 millirem was based
on an assessment of natural levels that people currently live
with safely in other parts of the country. What we attempted to
do is identify another part of the country that was comparable
to Amargosa Valley, and that area was Colorado. What we found
in the area of Colorado that we investigated is the average
natural exposure to radiation was on the order of 700----
Senator Boxer. So I take that as yes, you think then that a
one in five risk of increased fatal cancers for the general
population and a one in four risk for women to get cancer is
acceptable.
Mr. Wehrum [continuing]. Senator, my testimony is that I
believe that the standard we have proposed protects individuals
and protects the safety as we are instructed to do by the
standard.
Senator Boxer. First of all, it was kicked out of the
Court. So they don't agree with you. Second of all, Dr. Thomas
Cochran says that you are creating a one in five risk of
increased fatal cancers for the general public and a one in
four risk in women. Do you disagree with his assessment?
Mr. Wehrum. Senator, as I said, my belief is that the
proposed level of 350 millirem is protective of human health
and safety.
Senator Boxer. Well, the Court already threw that out. I am
asking you this question. Do you agree with Dr. Thomas Cochran?
Mr. Wehrum. Senator, the Court did not have before it the
proposed 350 millirem standard.
Senator Boxer. But what you are doing is now fooling with
the time period. I can guarantee, I believe if you want to
discuss that, they will throw it out because you are being a
little cute here in what you are doing, but that is beside the
point.
My question is: Do you agree with Dr. Thomas Cochran, a
respected nuclear physicist who says that there will be a one
in five risk of increased fatal cancers for the general
population and a one in four risk in women? Your answer is that
that is the same risk in a naturally occurring environment.
This is not a naturally occurring environment. You are doing
this to the people, and I am asking you: Is that an acceptable
risk, yes or no? Answer me, yes or no.
Mr. Wehrum. Senator, my answer is our proposed standard is
350 millirem per year.
Senator Boxer. Well, I am sorry, you are not answering. Yes
or no?
Mr. Wehrum. I understand that, Senator, but we have many
commenters who have offered a variety of opinions on the
standard that we have proposed, that being one of them.
Senator Boxer. But your answer is it brings it up to the
level of naturally occurring radiation, and we are doing this
to people. I am asking you if that is unacceptable, and you
won't answer it. You won't answer it, and I think that speaks
volume to the people of Nevada.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Boxer, we will have another round
in just a moment here.
Senator Boxer. I am fine.
Senator Inhofe. All right, we have been joined by Senator
Warner. Senator Warner, in addition to his seniority on this
committee is the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, which is, of course, very interested in the subject
at hand today.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just follow
these proceedings because it does relate overall to our defense
and our ability to look to this as a repository as planned over
these very, very many years. So at this time, I may have
questions to submit for the record, and I thank the Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Let me just follow up. First of all, I do agree with the
concern that Senator Boxer has in terms of an accident. I don't
think we deal with anything up here that you can't have some
kind of an extreme scenario by which there would be some tragic
accident. Nonetheless, we have been so cautious in approaching
this. I just would ask either one of you: Do you think that we
have been deliberate enough in pursuing this and taking as many
precautions as we can?
Mr. Wehrum. Mr. Chairman, I will take a first crack at
that. The Agency takes its responsibility very, very seriously.
We did in the first round of standard setting, and we continue
to take that responsibility very seriously in our effort to
respond to the remand of the Court. We have experts in the
field who are focused on these questions. We have made an
intensive effort.
Senator Inhofe. Pull your microphone up. Are you sure it is
on because I can hardly hear you up here?
Senator Jeffords. Many people in the audience are quite
anxious to have the benefit of your remarks.
Mr. Wehrum. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Yes, Senator, I will speak
more directly into the microphone.
My point is that we take our responsibility very seriously,
and we have devoted significant resources including experts in
the field, some of the greatest experts in the country we have
available. We have tried very hard to solicit a wide range of
input from everyone who has an interest in this issue. We know
there are those who have a different opinion, and it is
important to us to understand that different opinion.
Our goal is to establish a standard, consistent with the
law and consistent with our obligation to protect human health
and safety. I fully believe that we are doing that.
Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with him, proper precautions
having been taking place, Mr. Golan?
Mr. Golan. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I think we have been
deliberate, and I also believe that the prescribed process
through the licensing of Yucca Mountain will provide additional
opportunities for us being deliberate.
Senator Inhofe. I see. Mr. Golan, Senator Jeffords made the
comment that Yucca Mountain would only take part of the waste
and will leave some or most of the waste. It is my
understanding that Yucca Mountain is currently designed to hold
70,000 metric tons of waste. Could this be expanded? How would
you respond to Senator Jeffords' remark that it would just take
part of the waste?
Mr. Golan. According to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there
is statutory cap of 70,000 tons. That does not represent the
technical capability of Yucca Mountain. Our Environmental
Impact Statement analyzed for nearly 120,000 tons of waste into
Yucca Mountain. But again, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is the
limit on that, and it is based on an administrative control.
Senator Inhofe. We had an excellent briefing on that when I
was out at Yucca Mountain. I would certainly hope that many
members can go and take advantage of that.
Mr. Golan, Senator Jeffords talked about the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership program which is the reprocessing program. I
agree with the President; we need to have that. There are some
people who are saying, well, that is in lieu of the storage
program. Of course, I think that should be clarified for the
record, No. 1.
No. 2, the sum, $13 billion that would be over the next 10
years spent on that program, can you give us some assurance
that that money would not be taken out of the Yucca Mountain
program?
Mr. Golan. Sure. On your first point, Mr. Chairman, the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is not in lieu of Yucca
Mountain. Yucca Mountain is----
Senator Inhofe. I think that is very important to bring out
because I have had more people come up and say, well, this is a
change. It is not. We know that only about 10 or 15 percent is
actually used, and there is a lot left over, and a reprocessing
that needs to take place before final storage.
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir. Under any fuel cycle scenario, a deep
geologic repository would be needed. Additionally, the defense
waste Senator Warner was talking about that is at Savannah
River, Hanford and at Idaho, which has already been
reprocessed, would be going to Yucca Mountain. So it has
already been through that step.
The Administration has proposed a Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership. It is going to be requesting funding through the
budgetary process, not through the Nuclear Waste Fund to fund
those activities.
Senator Inhofe. So both of you would agree, I assume, that
the GNEP program should not deter the forward progress of Yucca
Mountain.
Mr. Wehrum. Absolutely not, sir.
Mr. Golan. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Jeffords.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Golan, the Yucca Mountain repository
is designed to house 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste. As of
2003, there were 49,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel
onsite at the country's nuclear reactors waiting for permanent
storage. By the year 2035, the United States is projected to
produce 105,000 metric tons of nuclear waste, and that is not
including waste from any new plants we build. Given this
projection, the Yucca Mountain repository would essentially be
full as soon as it opens, is that right?
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir. Your numbers are basically correct,
and we run into the statutory capacity limit sometime later
next decade.
Senator Jeffords. Is DOE considering a second disposal
location, and what is the timing of that decision?
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir, Senator Jeffords. In accordance with
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, between 2007 and 2010, the
Secretary is required to provide a report to Congress,
assessing the need of second repository. I think you will
recall there are a couple dozen States that were initially
considered for the first and second round of repositories. The
Department would certainly go back and look at those States as
it considered a second repository.
Senator Jeffords. What types of waste would be produced by
the new reprocessing technologies?
Mr. Golan. The new reprocessing technologies have to be
proved out in an engineering scale and on industrial scale, but
they would produce far less waste product that would need
ultimate disposal, the way the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership has envisioned. These would take out the actinides,
the plutoniums, and all the fissile materials and then reuse
those in fast flux reactors or fast spectrum reactors. That
waste that was generated as a result of the fast spectrum
reactors would be reprocessed or recycled again and reburned in
reactors.
So, depending on how this technology moves along, there
could be 80 percent or more of the volume reduced as a result
of the technologies envisioned by the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership.
Senator Jeffords. What changes would be needed in the Yucca
Mountain project to accommodate this new type of reprocessing
waste?
Mr. Golan. Senator Jeffords, under our current license
application, we contemplate disposal of the reprocessed waste
that is at Savannah River, Hanford, West Valley, and Idaho
today. That was reprocessed waste from the defense and, in the
case of West Valley, a pilot plant for commercial reprocessing.
We have vitrified waste form down in Savannah River and up in
West Valley, NY. We are working on vitrifying waste forms at
Hanford and at Idaho.
Those are already included in our license application, so
they are already included in the design. In my opinion, it is a
much better waste form because you don't have criticality
concerns. The heat load is significantly reduced. So we have
incorporated those waste forms in our design.
If we would look into the reprocessing or the recycling on
the commercial side of the reactors, we basically have
incorporated that waste form. What we would do is look at
changing the mix in terms of reprocessing waste or the defense
waste versus the spent fuel, and we would look at changing
those. As we would decrease the amount of spent fuel, we would
increase the amount of reprocessed waste that would go to Yucca
Mountain. But that waste form is already anticipated today.
Senator Jeffords. I asked, Mr. Golan, about the waste
produced by the Administration's proposed nuclear waste
processing program. Am I correct in my understanding that we do
not currently have environmental regulations that would govern
nuclear waste produced by a large scale reprocessing program?
Mr. Golan. No. We have environmental regulations that we
would, the Department would be obliged to meet.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Golan, DOE recently released a report
which investigated the scientific issues behind the e-mails
between USGS employees which implied that scientific data on
the Yucca Mountain project had been falsified. The accompanying
press release said that the report is ``confirming the
technical soundness of the infiltration modeling work performed
by the USGS employees.''
Sandia Laboratories, recently chosen to be the lead Federal
laboratory on the project, will now be conducting its own tests
to verify the results. How will Sandia Laboratories ensure that
similar mistakes will not occur as they did with USGS?
Mr. Golan. Senator Jeffords, that is an excellent question.
One of the reasons Sandia National Laboratory was chosen as the
lead laboratory for Yucca Mountain was its excellence in
science for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plan in Carlsbad, NM. We
are working with Sandia to ensure that the quality assurance
requirements for the project have been met. We have actively
engaged the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
After Sandia completes its work on redeveloping of the
computer model for infiltrations, much like we did with the
report that you are referring to, we had a group of independent
scientists--these are scientists independent of the Department
of Energy--evaluate and review the report. Before we replace
the work that is currently in our model with the Sandia work,
we are going to follow that same process. It is called Trust
But Verify Process. It is a process that is used in the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program and the Commercial Reactor Programs,
and it is a process that we are going to make a practice in
this program.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you. That is reassuring.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jeffords.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. I know you will be happy to know I want to
get back to the safety standard.
Senator Inhofe. Excuse me, Senator Boxer. I meant to go
back and forth here.
Senator Boxer. Yes, I will definitely yield. I will
definitely yield and let you wait a while.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is OK?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Senator DeMint. I apologize for being late and missing a
lot of the testimony, but this hearing is of great interest to
me. South Carolina has been the recipient of a lot of
radioactive low level/high level waste over the years with a
promise--Yucca is part of that promise--that one day this above
ground storage, which is not only in South Carolina but as you
know all around the country, thousands of tons of nuclear
waste.
There is some talk now that perhaps with the movement
toward reprocessing nuclear fuel that we no longer need Yucca
as most of the waste we are holding is not reprocessing
material; it is material that needs to be stored underground.
My concern is, in a lot of these hearings, we seem to now be
looking for a lot of reasons why we shouldn't do Yucca. The
potential health risk, and we see the EPA expanding its
standards to a million years. Incredible.
I would like to just ask maybe both witnesses: Instead of
talking about the problems with Yucca, could you talk about the
health risks of not doing Yucca? As we look at the above ground
storage around the country, the possible leaks, the groundwater
contamination that could occur everywhere, what do you see as
the risk of continuing this delay and leaving the status quo in
place, particularly as the United States has recognized its
need to develop more nuclear generation in the face of an
energy crisis?
We need to move ahead, yet we continue to be looking for
every reason in the world not to move ahead. We have already
studied Yucca Mountain more than any other piece of ground that
has ever been studied in the world. Could you, sir, just give
me, what are your assessments of the health risk of just
leaving this waste where it is?
Mr. Golan. Sure, Senator DeMint. In your State, not only do
you have the defense waste at Savannah River, but you have
3,500 metric tons, as your State gets 55 percent of its energy
from nuclear energy.
We assessed the option of doing nothing, and part of the
option of doing nothing was that we would have to repackage the
spent fuel at the reactor sites every hundred years.
Now for the near term, there is probably not an incremental
health risk because the storage casks have been licensed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for several decades. But again,
you bring up an interesting point, that is, if we did not have
Yucca Mountain and we would have to store in perpetuity this
waste at the surface next to the lakes and the rivers and the
waterways, it would present health risks several orders of
magnitude, in my opinion--again, we can point you back to our
Environmental Impact Statement--if we did not do the
repackaging of the waste very hundred years.
So we would be leaving a burden onto our children for the
radioactive exposure, the radiation exposure, for repackaging.
If we didn't do that, then the casks and the way the fuel is
packed over the course of time, over the course of the
centuries and millennia, would certainly pose an environmental
problem.
Senator DeMint. The site is a perfect dirty bomb site as
far as the ability of a terrorist to create a disaster by
exploding some of that material. So, in addition to what might
happen over natural aging over time, we have an exposed target,
not only in South Carolina but, as you know, in many places
around the country.
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
Senator DeMint. EPA, are you going to help us get this
done?
Mr. Wehrum. Yes, Senator, we will. I am not aware that the
EPA has done an analysis of the sort that you have just asked
about, of the risks associated with managing waste in the
current manner as opposed to Yucca. What I will say, just to
reiterate, our job at EPA is to set standards for the Yucca
Mountain repository that are fully protective of human health
and safety. I am convinced, it is my belief that we can do
that, and we will do that when we take final action later this
year.
Senator DeMint. But you will do an assessment of leaving it
in South Carolina for a million years as well?
Mr. Wehrum. If Congress directs us to do that assessment,
we would be more than happy to do so.
Senator DeMint. Because I think we do need to look at our
choices. I am afraid the way we are dealing with this now is we
assume that we can leave things the same and actually be safer
than if we moved ahead with what we have been trying to do for
a number of years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Senator DeMint follows:]
Statement of Hon. Jim DeMint, U.S. Senator from the
State of South Carolina
Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, for holding this hearing this
afternoon. Yucca Mountain is a vital component of America's energy
security, and I appreciate the close attention Yucca is finally
receiving.
I must admit I have a keen interest in the Yucca Mountain Project.
My State relies on nuclear energy for more than half of its electricity
and has played an integral role in building and maintaining our
Nation's nuclear deterrent during the cold war. As a result, South
Carolina has more than 6,100 metric tons of high-level radioactive
waste--almost 10 percent of all the waste currently planned for storage
at Yucca Mountain.
This waste has been sitting in tanks and above ground storage
facilities for decades. These methods of storage were meant to be
``temporary,'' but due to constant delays with Yucca Mountain the term
temporary no longer applies. Over the years, the people of my State
have demonstrated time and again that we can handle high-level
radioactive materials safely. However, it is time our Nation's nuclear
waste is disposed of permanently.
Now some have argued that the Administration's proposal to
reprocess nuclear waste eliminates the need for Yucca. However, this is
false. Reprocessing will reduce the amount of waste, but it does not
eliminate all the waste. In addition to the civilian waste left over
from reprocessing, the thousands of tons of cold war waste still need
to be disposed of permanently.
Instead of storing nuclear waste above ground at 131 sites in 39
States, it is infinitely safer to consolidate the waste into one
desolate place and bury it deep underground. Science and common sense
both dictate this solution and Yucca fits this description.
My staff has been to Yucca Mountain and spoken with the citizens of
Nye County, NV. In the process, they have not heard objections to
Yucca, just the opposite. The people of Nye County have said they want
the project to move forward. It is the political leaders opposed to
nuclear energy in America that constantly speak against Yucca Mountain.
Sadly, politics as usual has crept into the decisionmaking and is
starting to undermine the long-term security of America and our energy
independence. It is my sincere hope that today we can find some
consensus on moving forward with Yucca and opening this important
facility.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I think that is an excellent point to
bring up. I would encourage you to at least pursue doing such a
study because we have these questions, and we would like to be
able to have some kind of answer or maybe lead us to the
appropriate body to do something like this. It would be very
useful.
Thank you, Senator DeMint.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. This issue is complex because there is no
good answer. You leave it where it is, it is an issue. You
start moving it, talk about giving terrorists a chance at it.
That is what you would have to do. Put it on a train. Put it on
trucks. So it is a complicated matter. If we do look at it, I
think we need to look at both sides of it.
The thing about this issue that is so intriguing is that
when you are dealing with what God has created, namely this
world, and you take responsibility for it because we are the
stewards of this world that was created, in my view by God,
then you have to make sure that you do your best to protect
this world forever because that is our job. If we don't do the
right thing here, we could jeopardize all of it. So it is very,
very serious business here. That is why I pressed you on the
standard because there is a moral question.
You said, when I asked you if you felt it was acceptable
that one in four people, one in four women gets cancer from a
lifetime of exposure to the radiation there, which is what we
are being told by Dr. Thomas Cochran, a respected nuclear
physicist, and a man has a one in five risk, you won't answer
the question. But I will ask it a different way.
Right now, we regulate low level nuclear waste disposal
facilities at 25 millirem. Do you think Congress ought to look
at increasing that, that risk, in future years? Since you are
perfectly willing to do it for the high level waste, are you
proposing that we do it for the low level waste?
Mr. Wehrum. Senator, I will readdress the questions you
previously answered.
Senator Boxer. No. Can't you just answer the questions I
ask you, please? That would be so refreshing.
Mr. Wehrum. Yes, Senator. I will answer this question, but
I----
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Mr. Wehrum. My belief is it is an apples and oranges
situation.
Senator Boxer. Because?
Mr. Wehrum. We, as I explained a bit earlier, are proposing
a two-pronged strategy in our Yucca Mountain standard. The
first prong deals with the relative near future, and by that, I
mean between now and 10,000 years from now or at least 10,000
years from the time the storage facility is closed and disposal
occurs according to our regulations. The second prong
addressing the much longer period of time from 10,000 years to
1 million years. I believe, and we at the Agency believe, that
it is appropriate to have a value of 350 millirem per year for
the longer period of time that we are currently contemplating,
that within which the peak dose would occur, given the limits
of geologic stability of the Yucca Mountain site.
That 350 is based on a couple of things. One, as I
mentioned earlier, is it is based in part on our assessment of
naturally occurring radiation that people safely live with in
comparable areas in other parts of the country. It is also just
based on the reality that projecting with confidence over a
million-year period of time is a very difficult thing to do. We
should not suggest to ourselves, and should not suggest to the
public that we are responsible to, a false precision associated
with our ability to know what is going to happen in a million
years.
Senator Boxer. Sir, I really appreciate this, but I don't
have time. I asked you a simple question. You are not
recommending changing the level of exposure in low level
radioactive waste sites. To me, you can call it apples and
oranges, but it really makes the case. You are doing it this
way as a way to get around the Court decision. You are taking
two standards. One, as you say, the relatively near future and
one further up, but yet we have these other standards.
Let me ask you this: Are you going to go back and suggest
to EPA that they change their regulations? Do you know what the
acceptable risk is typically in most of our regulations at EPA
in terms of cancer risk?
Mr. Wehrum. It varies from standard to standard, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Well, I have the range. Do you not know it?
Do you want to tell us what it is?
Mr. Wehrum. I don't have the information that you have.
Senator Boxer. It is 1 in 10,000 to 1 in a million, not 1
in 5, not 1 in 4. So since you are so gung-ho about this deal,
why don't you go back and change the regulations as they apply
to the low level nuclear waste? Why don't you go back and
change the acceptable risk in all these other deals?
Let us face it. This is such a nightmare that we are
abandoning all of our traditions, all of our history in what we
consider to be an acceptable cancer risk. Look, that is it.
Maybe some people think it is fine; it has to be done. I happen
to not think that way.
But I also want to say, all this talk about naturally
occurring, as if there are no cancers. Do you know what happens
to people who live in areas that have naturally occurring
radiation? Do you think they are cancer-free? Do you know what
percent of cancers they get?
Mr. Wehrum. I am sure they are not cancer-free, Senator.
Senator Boxer. You are correct, 18,000 U.S. deaths
annually. So you talk about naturally occurring as if that is
some glorious nirvana, but it isn't.
Let me ask you, Mr. Golan. ``A January 9, 2006, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission audit of an earlier audit by Bechtel on
the corrosion rate of casks concludes that the Bechtel audit
was not effective in identifying, documenting, and alerting DOE
management to the significance of the issues which were in
noncompliance with quality assurance requirements.'' Has DOE
issued a stop work order on building the casks until these
problems are resolved?
Mr. Golan. Senator Boxer, the Department issued a stop work
order on the particular work activity for these humidity
gauges. So we did issue a stop work on the affected work which
you are referring to.
Senator Boxer. OK. What is the status now? If I could just
finish this, and then I'll stop.
Mr. Golan. Sure. We are conducting, my office, not Bechtel,
is conducting an independent investigation on what happened.
One of the things I will share with you, Senator Boxer, is
I have a stack of reports from the GAO, from the IG, from
various other people inside and outside the Department that
have looked at the quality of Yucca Mountain. I have read all
those reports, and they are missing one thing. They are missing
accountability. So I am going to hold the folks accountable.
Senator Boxer. Good, good. I knew I liked you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator DeMint, would you like a second round?
Senator DeMint. No, thank you.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Well, I thank both of the
witnesses for your fine testimony. You may be excused now.
We would ask our Panel No. 3 to come up, which would be
Robert Fri, chairman of the National Research Council for the
Committee on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards; Ms.
Allison Macfarlane, research associate, Program in Science,
Technology and Society, MIT; Mr. Robert Loux, executive
director of the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, the Office
of the Governor; Dr. Dade W. Moeller, former president of the
Health Physics Society.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Inhofe. Yes?
Senator Boxer. May I submit further questions for the
record?
Senator Inhofe. For this panel?
Senator Boxer. No, the previous panel.
Senator Inhofe. Of course.
What we will do here, we will only have one round of
questioning because of the time constraints, and we would like
to have your opening statement. The same will go for you as
went for the previous panel, that is, your entire statement
will be made part of the record, and we would like to have you
hold your opening statement down to close to 5 minutes, if you
could.
Mr. Fri.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT FRI, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS
Mr. Fri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Robert Fri. I
have the honor of having been the chair of the National
Research Council Committee that produced the report on the
Technical Bases for the Standards at Yucca Mountain, the
Academy report which has been referred to already a couple of
times in these hearings.
Let me summarize my statement by hitting on two major
points. First of all, the committee, which disbanded after it
issued its report in 1995, was very sensitive to the fact that
science can only take you so far to coming up with a standard.
At some point, policy has to step in and make the final
decisions.
That is particularly true in the level of risk that the
public is willing to accept from Yucca Mountain or any other
nuclear waste facility. Science can tell you a lot about the
nature of the effects and other matters, but the ultimate
decision is a policy decision, and the report did not, nor will
I, be in a position to talk to you about what the right answer
is to that policy decision because science doesn't get you that
far.
The second point I would like to summarize has to do with
this business of 10,000 years versus a million years because,
as you know, the most recent remand by the Courts, that
produced the most recent version of the standard that EPA
produced, really rested on that issue that was in the Academy's
report. If I may, I am going to use this cartoon next to me to
try to explain a little bit about what is going on.
What you have to do after you set a standard is to do an
analysis to see if the repository will comply with it. So, you
use computer models to model the migration of the radioactive
materials down to the water table and throughout the water
table to where human beings can come into contact with it.
There are two big things you have to decide how to do in
these so-called compliance analyses. One is to decide how long
to run the model, and the other is to decide on the exposure
scenario by which individuals come in contact with the
radioactive material.
The Academy report said there is no scientific basis for
stopping at 10,000 years, and that being the case, it is
appropriate to continue this analysis up to the point of peak
risk or until the point at which you don't think the models are
going to fairly represent what is going on geologically. The
panel, the committee said that is probably on the order of a
million years. We weren't trying to predict, and we weren't
suggesting that these models will predict what is going to
happen in a million years, much less what is going to happen in
10,000 years. We are simply saying that, in terms of doing the
analysis, the way the professionals do it, there is no
scientific basis for stopping at 10,000 years. Therefore, we
selected a much longer time period for analysis.
The second issue is the exposure scenario. How do people
come into contact with this radioactive material that gets
offsite as it migrates through the water table which they may
do by drilling a well into it and drinking the water, or eating
vegetables that were irrigated with the water, and the like?
The site at Yucca Mountain was picked because, among other
reasons, there aren't a lot of people there.
So, the committee said that we think the appropriate way to
approach this, just as a kind of statistical matter, is to have
what is called a probabilistic exposure scenario, to say that
it isn't absolutely necessary that somebody will come in
contact with this stuff, but there is a chance that they will
and it ought to be modeled on a statistical or probabilistic
basis.
Now, EPA said, no, let us stick with the short time period,
10,000 years, but as the gentleman from EPA pointed out, they
had this idea of Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual which
is a deterministic concept. It says that that individual will
become, will come into contact with the material that is
migrating offsite. So you have these two variables.
This little chart is sort of designed to suggest that. The
vertical axis says Shorter Compliance Time at the bottom and
Longer Compliance Time at the top. Across the top, it says
Deterministic Exposure Scenario and Probabilistic.
Now you really don't need to get into technical details but
just to show you what happened. EPA said, down in the lower
left hand corner, let us have a shorter compliance time and the
deterministic scenario, and the Academy said, let us have a
longer compliance and a probabilistic scenario. So they were
kind of at opposite ends of the spectrum.
Now the Court said, you have to stick with the longer
compliance time, the million years. So EPA basically had three
options, it seems to me. One is to adopt a more probabilistic
exposure scenario the way the Academy did. They elected not to
do that because they want to stick with this RMEI, this
Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual, which is fine. They
could have tried to show that the two versions of the standard
are functionally equivalent, and they may be for all I know,
but that demonstration wasn't made.
So they are kind of stuck in the upper left hand corner,
and that is a place where the committee did not want to be. We
actually considered it. We thought that was too conservative a
place to be, given the circumstances at Yucca Mountain. So EPA
finds itself in some place where the committee probably
wouldn't have agreed that it should be.
EPA did not select the option of going with the million
years and the probabilistic exposure scenario. What they did
was, after 10,000 years, to change the standard. That does have
the effect of releasing----
Senator Inhofe. If you could draw to a conclusion here in a
moment, Mr. Fri?
Mr. Fri. That is it. I am done.
Senator Inhofe. That is it?
Mr. Fri. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Mr. Fri. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Ms. Macfarlane.
STATEMENT OF ALLISON MACFARLANE, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PROGRAM IN
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
Ms. Macfarlane. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
it is an honor to have the opportunity to address you on the
issue of the status of nuclear waste disposal at Yucca
Mountain. I am a research associate at MIT's Program in
Science, Technology and Society, and I have a Ph.D., in Geology
from MIT.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jeffords, let me begin by
emphasizing that, in my expert opinion, the best solution to
the problem of high level nuclear waste disposal remains a
geologic repository. On this issue, all countries with nuclear
energy programs are in agreement, though none has yet to
implement such a facility.
In light of the push for more nuclear power in the United
States, even taking into consideration the President's proposed
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, it is highly likely that
multiple Yucca Mountain type repositories will be necessary.
Therefore, it is imperative that we continue to work toward a
solution to the problem of high level nuclear waste.
Yucca Mountain is a relatively complex site geologically,
and this complexity increases the uncertainties associated with
predicting the performance of the repository in the future. The
DOE has attempted to predict the behavior of Yucca Mountain
over time, using a complex computer model called probabilistic
performance assessment, which is made up of numerous submodels.
The DOE has stated that it has validated these submodels.
From the perspective of an earth scientist, it is not possible
to validate or verify models of earth systems. This is because
earth systems are, by definition, open systems, accessible to
exchanges of matter and energy. As a result, it is not possible
to know all the processes that might affect the system.
Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld probably put it best
when he noted, ``There are known knowns; there are things we
know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to
say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are
also unknown unknowns--the ones we don't know we don't know.''
It is the unknown unknowns that I am concerned about here.
The DOE and the NRC will use the results of the performance
assessment to determine the suitability of Yucca Mountain. They
are forced to use this complex model in part because the EPA
standard requires these agencies to show that the site will
meet a specific dose limit over a specified time period. To do
so requires quantitative analysis, and thus the need for a
performance assessment model. Other countries have recognized
the limitations of quantitative performance assessments,
including France and Sweden.
So what policy would best respond to the complex geology at
Yucca Mountain and the inability of performance assessment
models to produce verifiable results? I have four suggestions.
No. 1, there is a natural opportunity to make changes to
our system of site evaluation right now while the EPA standard
is being reconsidered. Once the EPA standard is promulgated,
the NRC and DOE will have to adjust their regulations and can
take this opportunity to rethink them.
No. 2, in making changes to regulations, the DOE and NRC
should move away from sole reliance on probabilistic
performance assessment and opt for a broader and more
qualitative assessment scheme similar to that of France and
Sweden.
No. 3, work must continue on the Yucca Mountain site to
determine whether it will be suitable as a geological
repository. I suggest a comparative analysis, using data that
already exists for a number of investigated repository sites
around the world.
No. 4, if Yucca Mountain is found lacking in the
comparison, Congress would need to revisit repository siting.
In the United States, we are fortunate to have a large country
with many geologically appropriate locations for a nuclear
waste repository that have arguably simpler geology than Yucca
Mountain.
For a repository to succeed, the process must be fair and
perceived to be fair by all participants.
A large amount of high level nuclear waste already exists
in the United States and requires disposal. This problem
deserves rapid and focused attention for the betterment of our
environment. It is within our grasp to solve this problem.
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Dr. Macfarlane.
Is it Mr. Loux?
Mr. Loux. Loux.
Senator Inhofe. You are recognized, Mr. Loux.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT LOUX, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEVADA AGENCY FOR
NUCLEAR PROJECTS, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
Mr. Loux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am grateful for
your invitation on behalf of Governor Guinn. I am testifying
here on his behalf. I am Bob Loux, and I am the executive
director of the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects which is in
the Governor's Office itself. The Agency was established in
1985 to carry out the State's statutory oversight of the high
level waste program under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Since you have already indicated our written remarks will
be submitted for the record, I won't ask that.
As to the status of the Yucca Mountain project, the most
important and obvious fact is that there is no current schedule
or budget for DOE's submittal of a Yucca Mountain repository
license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As
you already noted, by law, DOE was to have submitted the
application 90 days after the site recommendation was confirmed
by Congress in mid-2002, and the last announced date for site
application was December 2004.
Even if a final EPA standard was in place today, DOE would
be unprepared to submit a license application because of its
recently announced shift to a single container approach for
transportation, storage, and disposal of radiated fuel. This
very same approach was rejected by DOE a decade ago for being
too costly and logistically too difficult to implement. So it
will be interesting to see how DOE is going to approach it this
time.
The current change involves design and certification of new
containers, fundamental redesign of the Yucca Mountain surface
handling facilities because of the change in concept of
operations, and shifting the complex waste packaging operations
to the reactor sites, some of which, maybe as much as 40
percent of the reactor sites, no longer have crane or rail
capacity access for the newly planned containers.
The probability of earthquakes damaging the operational
facilities and the renewed volcanism disrupting the repository
are sufficiently high, that radiological consequences of such
events must be considered in the repository safety assessments,
and work on these topics is ongoing.
DOE is unprepared to complete the license application
because scientific work critical to the NRC regulatory review
is in jeopardy. The model for how water penetrates the mountain
is being redone because of quality assurance failures and
allegations of falsification of information, which still are
being investigated by congressional committee along with others
including the Justice Department. Recently, the scientific work
to determine the rate at which disposal containers will corrode
and release waste into the environment has come into
significant question as a result of an audit of scientific
experiments and their quality assurance.
The planned repository surface facility, including storage
aging pads if you would, is located beneath a military training
and testing airspace that is dedicated to National security.
Aircraft crash hazards remain issues unresolved for the safety
analysis and the license application.
DOE has yet, also, to complete a draft Environmental Impact
Statement for the 319 mile long rail line to Yucca Mountain. It
is also the subject of litigation. The expected costs of the
line recently was raised from $1 to $2 billion. The corridor
selected crosses seven mountain ranges and traverses areas
known to flash flooding.
By 2010, there will be enough generated waste to fill the
statutory capacity of Yucca Mountain. Extremely costly
strategies recently announced to reduce the volume of waste
won't be available for decades, if ever, and I am speaking of
the GNEP which we have been talking about. Expanding Yucca
Mountain's statutory capacity without having defined and
studied the expansion area is irresponsible from a safety
perspective.
DOE is required by statute to maintain retrievability of
the waste for decades after en-placement. It is unlikely this
ability can be demonstrated due to the high heat, radiation
environment, and deterioration of tunnel conditions. In fact,
in its 2007 budget proposal, DOE is asking for funds to
maintain and upgrade existing tunnel facilities in just over 10
years after initial construction.
I have described to you the status of the Yucca Mountain
project and gave some insight why the schedule for the license
application is unknowable. If the past 23 years of the program
provides any message, it is that the schedule in reality is
largely unknowable.
Mr. Chairman, I agree with your statement early on that
really no more work is really necessary at Yucca Mountain,
although it is not for the same reasons. I agree with that
because most believe, independent scientists, that the Yucca
Mountain science is faulty. It has been recognized to be such
by most independent scientists nationally and internationally.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and
look forward to questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Loux.
Dr. Moeller.
STATEMENT OF DADE W. MOELLER, FORMER PRESIDENT, HEALTH PHYSICS
SOCIETY
Mr. Moeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Jeffords,
and Senator Boxer. I appreciate the opportunity to share with
you some of the views of the Health Physics Society.
As all of you are aware and as we have heard here
repeatedly this afternoon, progress on the proposed Yucca
Mountain repository is essentially at a standstill. At the same
time, high-level wastes are being stored at multiple locations
throughout the United States. These materials will remain there
until this log-jam is broken.
Rather than talk, though, about that past, I would like to
talk about the future, and I want to share with you what the
Health Physics Society would propose. The key element of our
proposal is that, rather than seeking to dispose of the waste
at this time, that the waste be stored in the proposed Yucca
Mountain for a time period of 100 years.
To ensure that the stored waste is not contaminating the
environment, the facility would have to be properly monitored,
and instrumented to provide, throughout the suggested 100-year
period, immediate warnings if anything has gone wrong. Any
packages showing signs of deterioration would need to be
promptly retrieved and stabilized.
Now at this point, I want to discuss the primary basis for
our policy, and in order to do so, Mr. Chairman, I have an
enlarged picture of the graph that is on the bottom of Page 4
of my testimony. I would be glad, if it is permissible, to have
all of you have copies.
Senator Inhofe. We have a policy that any graphs used have
to be submitted in advance, but yours was. So that will be all
right.
Mr. Moeller. It was in my written testimony.
Senator Inhofe. Please use it. Your clock is ticking.
Mr. Moeller. OK. Storing the waste for 100 years will
enable us and our Nation to take advantage of the many
significant technological advances that you have already heard
Mr. Golan describe. One of these is to begin reprocessing spent
fuel once again.
To demonstrate the benefits of reprocessing, I would like
to go through with you what is shown on the graph. Across the
bottom, it gives time in years. This is shown on a logarithmic
scale. Following this approach, the years are shown with each
division representing 10 times the number of years as the
previous one. For example, the first maker represents 1 year,
the second 10 years, the third, 1,000 years, etc.
Shown by the curve at the upper left-hand corner of the
graph is the toxicity of the radioactive waste that we are
going to assume has been chemically reprocessed and that about
95.5 percent of the plutonium has been removed.
Now Mr. Golan said their newer chemical techniques would be
applied. These would remove not only more of the plutonium, but
also most of the actinides and transuranics. If you look at the
graph, after a period of slightly more than a hundred years,
the waste would be equivalent in terms of toxicity to naturally
occurring uranium ore which has a concentration of 3 percent,
that is, ore in which 3 parts in every 100 are uranium. After
about 350 years, the waste will have decayed to the point where
it is comparable in its toxicity to uranium ore that contains
\2/10\ of 1 percent uranium.
Why do I emphasize this? I do so because that is the
concentration of uranium in the ore that has been mined at, for
example, Grand Junction, CO and has served as fuel for our
commercial nuclear power plant.
Now why has this decrease in toxicity occurred at such a
rapid rate? Well, in reprocessing the fuel, you remove the
cesium-137 and the strontium-90, two of the most important
fission products. These have half-lives of 30 years, and they
become important components of the waste.
Then why do I say 300 to 350 years as important milestones
in the toxicity of the waste? Well, 300 years is 10 times a
half-life of either strontium or cesium. If you take a half of
a half of a half of a half for 10 times, you don't have much
left. In essence, it is essentially a stable mass that is left
in terms of those two radionuclides.
Thereafter, the waste will continue to decay, and after a
period of about 2,000 years, its toxicity will have decreased
to about \1/10\ of ore containing a concentration of about 0.2
percent uranium. Subsequently, as the graph indicates, the
toxicity of the waste will slowly increase, finally leveling
off at about 1 million years being equal to that of ore
containing 0.2 percent uranium.
Why does toxicity increase? It does so because the uranium
is gradually decaying and producing its toxic decay products.
Nonetheless, as the graph indicates, the highest toxicity the
reprocessed waste can ever reach during this time-period will
be only slightly higher than that of the original 0.2 percent
uranium ore.
Have I had my 6 minutes yet?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, you have, if you could try to wind up,
please.
Mr. Moeller. All right, I will finish with this summary
statement. If the maximum toxicity of the reprocessed waste is
comparable to that of the original ore that was near or at the
surface of the Earth, as contrasted to the waste which will be
buried more than 600 feet beneath the ground, what do we have
to worry about?
Senator Inhofe. OK. Since you are still warmed up there,
Dr. Moeller, let me ask you a question.
Mr. Moeller. Certainly.
Senator Inhofe. During the last panel, Senator Boxer cited
some very high risk numbers based on EPA's proposed doses. From
a radiation standpoint, can you derive quantitative risk
numbers as high as Senator Boxer quoted, considering the EPA's
standard is 350 millirem?
Mr. Moeller. I am delighted that you asked me because I am
pleased to answer the question.
Senator Boxer, your estimate from Dr. Tom Cochran, whom I
know very well, sounds to me to be high. But to answer your
question, if indeed his calculations were correct and the dose
rate limit of 350 millirems a year creates a one in four risk
of women dying of cancer, that is totally unacceptable. No one
would approve that.
Now, on average, about 20 percent of the members of the
U.S. public die of fatal cancers. Some of those may be due to
radiation, but there are many other causes.
Before I could answer your question, I would need to review
the process Dr. Cochran used in making his estimate. As you
will note in my written testimony, I calculated the fatal
cancer risk for a lifetime dose rate of 350 millirems per year
and obtained an estimate of about a 1 percent increase in death
due to all types of cancer. When you take into account the
conservatism in that estimate, the true value is about half of
1 percent.
Senator Inhofe. I am sure that Senator Boxer will have some
responses to that.
Dr. Macfarlane, you were here when Senator DeMint was
asking his question, his concern--I wasn't even aware of what
is happening in South Carolina to the extent that it has been
happening--but his concern about the current policy of leaving
things above or storing wastes in existing sites until they can
apply future technologies.
Wouldn't it still be better, though, for the next 100 to
300 years, if that waste were put into Yucca Mountain in a
fully retrievable state rather than to leave it there as it is
now? Maybe I am misunderstanding what your testimony was.
Ms. Macfarlane. No. I guess what I am trying to say is, in
terms of interim storage, temporary storage, I think it is fine
for a hundred year timeframe. I think we have a responsibility
to deal with the issue of nuclear waste right now. It is an
ethical responsibility, seeing how we made this waste.
I don't agree with the proposals to sit around and wait
until we have better technology, and I think the best solution
to this material is a geologic repository, but I am not sure
that Yucca Mountain is the right location for a geologic
repository.
Senator Inhofe. First of all, I see a political problem in
your response because I would hate, if I were in Jim DeMint's
position, to have to go home and say, it is all right for a
hundred years; we will take care of this problem.
You mentioned, I think you said that there are other sites
that are better than Yucca. Did I misunderstand you? If so,
where are they?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think there are multiple sites all over
the country that are probably better than Yucca.
Senator Inhofe. Name one.
Ms. Macfarlane. I don't want to end up naming specific
sites and frightening certain State people, but I think these
locations exist. You could look at----
Senator Inhofe. You are not suggesting one might be in
Oklahoma, are you?
Ms. Macfarlane. Oh, I am sure there are, for instance.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Ms. Macfarlane. But the point is that Yucca Mountain
violates one of the main criteria of siting a nuclear waste
repository, which is that you find a geologically stable
location, and Yucca Mountain is neither seismically nor
volcanically stable.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fri, the National Academy of Sciences issued a study in
2001, reaffirming that the geologic repository is the best
method for permanent disposal of used fuel. Has anything
happened since that time that they would have changed their
position on that?
Mr. Fri. I haven't been a part of those studies since 1995,
but I think the general feeling is that the ultimate disposal
site as a geologic repository remains, as Dr. Macfarlane said
earlier, the best option.
Senator Inhofe. I see. I have a feeling you would have
heard about it if a change of position had taken place.
Senator Jeffords.
Senator Jeffords. I have no questions.
Senator Inhofe. All right, Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, what I want to do is put in
the record the study of Dr. Cochran, the nuclear physicist, and
I think that what I would like to do is put in his little
profile and then the one page of work he did which came out
with the cancer risks that I am glad to see Dr. Moeller said
was unacceptable because I certainly think it is as well. So we
will put that in the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection, that will be in the
record.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
[The referenced material follows.]
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Senator Boxer. First, I want to thank the panel very, very
much. As I said, it is complicated. We are dealing with issues
here that just pose tremendous risks, and any way you look at
it, it is risky: to leave it, to move it, to store it. But I
come down on the side of the greater risk is to go with Yucca
Mountain for lots of reasons, and a couple of you really have
underscored that for me.
Mr. Loux, I understand DOE still needs to build a rail line
to Yucca Mountain, and that cost estimates for this line have
increased from $800 million to more than $2 billion in the last
year, and I have a newspaper article that so states. If DOE
cannot finish the rail line prior to accepting waste at Yucca,
I understand DOE plans to temporarily use trucks to ship the
waste from the nearest railroad.
I would love to hear you give an opinion on how DOE's
failure to complete this rail line may impact Yucca Mountain
operations, including potential security or safety concerns.
Mr. Loux. Well, thank you, Senator. We have grave doubts
whether such a line ever can be built, especially given that
DOE is the one in charge. The costs have escalated. We think
they are going to go actually much higher.
Senator Boxer. Higher than $2 billion?
Mr. Loux. Yes. We think it is going to take a lot longer
than DOE says, perhaps maybe as long as a decade to complete.
Therefore,----
Senator Boxer. Who is going to pay for this rail line?
Mr. Loux. The ratepayers and the taxpayers.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Loux. Ultimately, we believe that if Yucca Mountain
should go forward, that in the final analysis, most if not all
the shipments will be by truck. As I mentioned in my testimony,
a full 40 percent of the reactor sites no longer have rail
access into them. So then you see a problem with having to move
that stuff to marshaling yards in Omaha, Chicago, other sorts
of places like that where you would have to accumulate enough
waste then to build a train to actually take it, assuming the
rail line was built.
Senator Boxer. Well, you have walked right into my next
question because I am very concerned about movement by truck. I
am concerned about movement of this material in any way, shape,
or form, but by truck in particular. California contains some
main routes proposed for transporting radioactive waste to
Yucca Mountain. A lot of other States' waste will go through my
State on the way there.
Last month, the National Academy for Sciences said that the
DOE should analyze their transportation plans to account for
terrorist acts and high intensity long duration fires. What is
your opinion on how well DOE current transportation plan
addresses these two vitally important issues, long duration
fires and the possibility of a terrorist attack?
Mr. Loux. Well, Senator, when you start out with the
assumption that all nuclear waste shipments are 100 percent
safe and nothing can go wrong, it biases your point of view
about what the actual risks are. That is sort of DOE's opinion,
that it all will be done safely, 100 percent safely without any
risk to anyone. We find that to be the contrary, and that is
what we found so refreshing about the actual National Academy
report because it was the first time that any of these
Government agencies have said something other than the fact
that this is 100 percent perfectly safe.
Senator Boxer. So when I ask you your opinion of how well
DOE's current transportation plan addresses the terrorism issue
and long duration fires, your answer is that they really don't
address them.
Mr. Loux. It does not.
Senator Boxer. They just kind of shove it under the rug and
say, we don't need to look at it because this is so safe. Is
that what you are basically telling me?
Mr. Loux. In general, yes.
Senator Boxer. OK. Can I have time for one more question?
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Ms. Macfarlane, in 1995, the National Academy report
included a reference to a prediction that the geologic
stability of the Yucca Mountain site was on the order of a
million years. You have done recent research on this project. I
know you gave us sort of the Don Rumsfeld answer, but I am
going to pin you down a little more here.
Please give me your expert opinion on these two questions:
Is the stability prediction based upon either current science
or science from a decade ago, and does it comport with our
current understanding of Yucca Mountain's geology, the fact
that it will be stable for a million years?
Ms. Macfarlane. That is a good point. I think it was based
on science from a decade ago. Science has progressed in a
number of ways. One of the things I would note about the
National Academy study is--I think it is page 68 of the study
itself--when they talk about their basis for that statement,
one of the things they don't mention is volcanism and the
potential for future volcanism. We now know that there is that
potential. It is not very well bounded. It is quite an
uncertain number, and it certainly becomes a lot more uncertain
as you go out toward a million years.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you
for the opportunity. As always, you were very generous to me.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Boxer. Let me just, I
saw Mr. Fri wiggling around a little bit during one of your
questions, Senator Boxer. So let me give him a chance to
perhaps answer.
Senator Boxer. Of course.
Senator Inhofe. It is true, I understand, that a recent
National Academy of Sciences study, studying the transportation
of this waste, came to the conclusion that there is ``no real
risk to public health and safety in transporting the fuel.''
Now, it is my understanding, Dr. Boxer--I said Dr. Boxer.
Senator Boxer. I will take it.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Boxer, this study is less than a
month old. So that would have taken into consideration the
point that you bring up about terrorists. Mr. Fri, am I
accurate in quoting from this study?
Mr. Fri. I am sure you are. I was not a party to that
study, so I don't know what is in it.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Senator Boxer. Well, I just think Mr. Loux----
Mr. Fri. The staffer at the Academy whispers in my ear,
however, that there may be a misstatement some place in there.
Senator Inhofe. I see. I certainly wouldn't want to be
guilty of that.
Well, thank you very much. We had a very distinguished
panel, and you have been very patient to wait through a rather
lengthy panel to get on, but I appreciate the sacrifices you
have made to be here. We will leave the record open. So there
will be questions for the record that will be submitted to you,
and we look forward to your answers at that time.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Senator George V. Voinvoich, U.S. Senator from the
State of Ohio
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the committee's first hearing
on this very important matter. The operation of Yucca Mountain as our
Nation's long-term high level nuclear waste repository is important to
meeting our environmental, energy, and economic needs.
I am pleased that this follows the hearing that I held in my
subcommittee on natural gas prices. Clearly, we have not harmonized our
policies. The energy challenges that we face today and into the future
threaten our global competitiveness. I am calling for a ``Second
Declaration of Independence'' to make us less dependent on foreign
sources of energy, and nuclear power plays an integral role.
Nuclear power provides about six percent of the electricity
consumed in my state and about 20 percent nationally. It is emission
free power, and by increasing its use, we could continue at a greater
rate our progress in cleaning up the air.
That is why I am pleased that this committee acted to include three
pieces of legislation that I authored with Chairman Inhofe in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to provide for the safe and secure growth of
nuclear power. These provisions--NRC reforms, security, liability
insurance, and human capital--combined with the Energy bill's sections
on risk insurance, production tax credits, and loan guarantees provide
the foundation for the construction of new nuclear plants. In fact, NRC
Chairman Nils Diaz recently told me in a meeting that the NRC expects
to receive applications for up to 11 new plants by 2009.
Other countries have also recognized the advantage of constructing
new nuclear plants. China, which continues to grow and threaten our
economic security, expects to construct 20 new nuclear reactors by
2010.
The challenge for nuclear energy is its waste. This problem was
recognized when the Nations' top scientists met in Princeton in 1955,
leading us to begin searching for the most optimum site for nuclear
waste disposal.
Frankly, I am extremely frustrated that more than 50 years later,
we have yet to solve this issue. We have spent $8 billion of ratepayer
funds with over $250 million contributed by Ohioans to the Nuclear
Waste Fund. Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requiring that
a final disposal facility be operational by 1998. The President,
Senate, and House in 2002 designated Yucca Mountain as the site.
So where are we today? Spent nuclear fuel is stored at sites across
the Nation including 790 metric tons in Ohio instead of one safe and
secure repository. Eight years after the law requires a storage
facility to be operational, the Department of Energy has yet to even
submit a license to the NRC.
The really exasperating part is that while we are providing
numerous regulatory incentives for the growth of nuclear power we are
providing a significant disincentive by leaving the waste question
unanswered.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a lot more questions than answers:
lack of a DOE license application to NRC, EPA's million year standard,
reprocessing, and many others.
I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses and hopefully
getting some answers to these questions.
Thank you.
Statement of Hon. John Ensign, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the second proposed
rule concerning Yucca Mountain radiation standards. This rule, on its
face, does not make sense. The closer one looks, the worse it appears.
I understand that the EPA was in a difficult position. The original
EPA Yucca rule and the subsequent NRC standard were thrown out by a
Federal appeals court. The Court found that the 10,000-year compliance
period was not ``based upon and consistent with'' the NAS
recommendations required by law. It failed to protect at the point when
the waste would be at its peak radiation. So what did the EPA do?
Well, EPA did not put forth a common-sense solution. That would
have been to extend the 15-millerem-per-year standard that it
originally proposed in order to cover the peak dose period as required
by the Court. We know why EPA did not do this. It didn't do it because
Yucca Mountain could not be engineered to meet that standard. Yucca
Mountain could not be built.
Instead, the EPA took the old standard that was rejected by the
Court, reproposed it in its entirety for the first 10,000 years, and
then proposed a standard for the 10,000 to 1 million-year period that
would be, by far, the weakest peak dose standard in the world. The
President of the National Council on Radiation Protection has publicly
opposed it. So, once again, sound science was sacrificed for
expediency.
The Agency for Nuclear Projects of the State of Nevada has done an
excellent, thorough analysis of this scientifically indefensible
approach. I know that you will be hearing today from the Executive
Director, Bob Loux, who will explore the weaknesses of the rule in
detail, so I will not do so here. I will, however, underscore that it
is important for this committee to look at several areas--the two-
tiered radiation exposure limits, the use of mean performance results
in the first 10,000 years and then median performance results later,
the groundwater protection standard that disappears before the period
of peak exposure, and the odd decision to set a health-based standard
that relies on comparing radiation doses in Amargosa Valley, NV, to
Colorado.
There are some who believe that Congress should ignore the
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences and simply lower
the safety standards for the permanent storage of this deadly material.
Senator Reid and I are committed to making sure that doesn't happen.
But in a broader sense, legislation won't make nuclear waste safe--and
burying it in Yucca Mountain definitely won't make the problem go away.
Even with a central repository, there will continue to be nuclear waste
stored at all operating reactor sites. Mr. Chairman, we produce 2,000
metric tons of nuclear waste a year. The DOE plans to transport 3,000
metric tons a year. Just do the math. Under the current plan, we won't
get rid of the nuclear waste backlog for nearly a century.
Mr. Chairman, Yucca Mountain continues to be plagued with problems
and delays. The Department of Energy no longer even pretends to know
when Yucca could open or how much it will cost. DOE once again has
stopped work at Yucca Mountain after an NRC audit revealed that several
years of data collection was done with equipment that had not been
calibrated. These data are critical to health and safety because they
relates to how water could enter the repository and cause corrosion of
the nuclear waste storage casks. We need to find another solution to
our nuclear waste problem. I think that we need to amend the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 to require the title to all spent nuclear
fuel, stored in dry casks, to be passed on to the DOE upon onsite
transfer from storage pools to casks. Senator Reid and I introduced
legislation to allow the DOE to assume liability of the waste onsite
before it is transferred to Yucca Mountain. Conveying the title means
the DOE will have full responsibility for the possession, stewardship,
maintenance, and monitoring of all spent nuclear fuel. Through the Act,
the DOE would also be made responsible for various maintenance and
oversight that would be associated with implementation.
Furthermore, we need to invest in new technologies at our national
labs to recycle the waste without producing weapons-grade plutonium as
a byproduct. A potentially viable option to ``recycle'' nuclear waste
is Accelerator-driven Transmutation of Waste (ATW). Simply put, ATW
transforms long-lived radioactive products into less hazardous
materials and generates electricity as a byproduct. After 300 years,
the residual activity and radiotoxicity of waste in the repository
following the ATW process would be less than that for a non-assisted
repository after 100,000 years. We know that we can store waste safely
for 300 years. It can't be certain that Yucca Mountain will prove safe
at the time of peak dose radiation as truly needed to protect the
health of our citizens.
Mr. Chairman, this new proposed radiation standard is a farce. EPA
was forced to create this ridiculous standard to make Yucca Mountain
``work'' on paper. But that's not EPA's job. No amount of data
manipulation is going to make Yucca Mountain work.
__________
Statement of Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada
I want to thank the Chair, the Ranking and other members of the
committee for the opportunity to testify today on this issue, which is
very important to me, my home State of Nevada and the rest of the
country.
I am convinced that the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump
will never be built because of the myriad scientific, safety and
technical problems in which it is mired. It simply is neither safe nor
secure, as illustrated by several significant scientific, legal and
budgetary setbacks this past year and a half.
Nuclear power plants and defense activities generate highly
radioactive waste materials that remain toxic for thousands of years.
Consequently, society must develop a secure way to store high-level
nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel rods that protects human health
and the environment.
In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to address
the difficult issue of storing such waste. The Act called for disposal
of nuclear waste in a deep geological repository that would remain
stable for thousands of years and directed the Department of Energy
(DOE) to study a number of sites in detail and pick the most suitable
site based on the natural features of the site. The Act instructed DOE
to develop a list of natural, geologic features that constitute a safe
repository, including factors pertaining to rock characteristics,
hydrology, proximity to water supplies and population, and seismic
activity. Some of these criteria specifically disqualified any site
that would require complex engineered measures to prevent groundwater
flow through the repository or damage from earthquake activity, both of
which are concerns at Yucca Mountain.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 directed DOE to evaluate three
sites in Washington, Texas and Nevada. Under the Act, the geologic
characteristics of a site were supposed to prevent radioactive waste
from escaping the storage facility. Using the original criteria for
site suitability in the Act, the characteristics described above should
have disqualified Yucca Mountain from consideration as a repository for
high-level nuclear waste.
DOE has proposed that 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste can
be stored in tunnels beneath the mountain, isolated from the
environment for hundreds of thousands of years. Yucca Mountain is a
volcanic ridge in southwest Nevada, about 90 miles from Las Vegas.
Yucca Mountain is located only about 90 miles southwest from Las Vegas
the fastest growing city in the United States.
As DOE research progressed, it became clear that geology alone
would not contain radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, and DOE began to
design engineered waste containers to compensate for geologic
weaknesses that would have disqualified the site under the 1982 Act.
Then, in 1987, Congress amended the Act to limit DOE's studies to
Yucca Mountain. This move was not based on science. In fact, DOE was
behind schedule on its characterizations of the three sites and had
reached no conclusion on the suitability of any of them. Rather,
Congress took action based on political expediency and cost
considerations. Since 1987, DOE's mission has shifted from objectively
evaluating whether a site was suitable to isolate radioactive waste to
justifying Yucca Mountain as a safe site for storing nuclear waste.
On February 15, 2002, President Bush approved a recommendation from
Secretary of Energy Abraham to build an underground storage facility
for high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Governor
Guinn of Nevada vetoed the site in April 2002. On June 9, 2002,
Congress overrode the veto.
Although DOE has been studying the site for 20 years, their studies
are incomplete and do not provide a basis for evaluating whether Yucca
Mountain is a safe site for storing high-level nuclear waste, nor that
it can be transported across America's highways and railways and
through our communities safely.
Before transporting nuclear waste across the country's highways,
rails, and waterways, adequate consideration must be given to the risks
of, and we must be prepared to deal with, accidents, terrorist threats
and containment breaches that may result. To date, we are not. Bad
science, bad law and bad policy are what characterize Yucca Mountain
and the decisions around transportation issues. The result is that
transportation of highly radioactive nuclear waste around the country
and to Yucca poses extraordinary hazards to the public health, economic
security and environmental safety.
Moving all the high-level nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain and a
second repository would take nearly 40 years and involve 105,000 truck
shipments, or nearly 20,000 rail shipments over more than 40 years.
Moving just the waste currently allowed by law to go to Yucca Mountain
would involve nearly 53,000 truck shipments or 10,000 rail shipments
over 24 years. As most of the waste is generated east of the
Mississippi, that means most waste will be traveling across the
country. Tens of thousands of shipments of deadly radioactive waste, an
average of approximately 2,800 each year, will be rolling through
neighborhoods in 43 States and hundreds of major metropolitan areas on
its way to Nevada for the next several decades. Approximately 125
million people live in the more than 700 counties on DOE's highway
routes, and approximately 110 million live on the train routes.
Communities through which nuclear waste could pass include:
Sacramento and San Bernardino, CA; Denver, CO; Boise, ID; the Chicago
metropolitan area; the Washington, DC, metropolitan area; Buffalo, NY;
and Las Vegas, NV. If you live within 1.5 miles of a highway or
railway, you live within 1.5 miles of a possible nuclear waste
delivery-route.
Because of the enormous number of individual loads involved, the
Government has acknowledged that there will be accidents no matter what
we do. The effects could be catastrophic. One accident, one nuclear
waste leakage or spillage, could be deadly. According to DOE, an
accident or fire involving a 25-ton payload of nuclear waste could kill
thousands immediately. The potential lasting effects are likely more
significant, from radiation-induced cancers to poisoned groundwater.
The cleanup costs could be in the billions. Other analyses show that
contamination could spread anywhere from 40 to 500 square miles and
latent cancer fatalities run into the tens of thousands, depending on
the type of accident, transportation and population patterns in the
area and the type of clean-up undertaken.
Shipping nuclear waste across the country also significantly
increases the risk of terrorist attack. Unfortunately, the last few
years have taught us that we are not immune from terrorist attack and
that terrorists are getting more sophisticated. In addition, this is a
large-scale, high profile Federal program--an attractive target for
terrorists. Each shipment has the potential for hijack.
Imagine literally hundreds of moving targets all across America
passing through towns just like this one. If waste is transported
through a combination of methods, the casks will have to be switched
out, parked on a siding, unloaded and reloaded from and into, barges,
trains and trucks. Waste would be vulnerable to attack during
packaging, shipment, temporary storage, repackaging, and in a national
repository where nuclear waste will be stored above-ground for several
years awaiting placement in the repository. Each shipment could be
sabotaged to crash in populated areas or blown up with black-market
high explosives or a missile in order to create what military
scientists refer to as a dirty bomb.
Terrorism experts have termed DOE's planned transportation effort
as a ``target rich environment where a terrorist could pick and chose
the time and place for an attack.''\1\ Unfortunately, DOE and the NRC
are not been willing to take the necessary steps to secure the safety
and security of nuclear waste shipments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Testimony of James David Ballard, Ph.D., Consultant, on behalf
of the State of Nevada on ``Transportation of Spent Fuel Rods to the
Proposed Yucca Mountain Storage Facility'' before the Subcommittees on
Highways and Transit and Railroads Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, April 25, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Governor of Texas, President Bush wrote, ``I believe sound
science, not politics, must prevail in the designation of any high-
level nuclear waste repository. As President, I would not sign
legislation that would send nuclear waste to any proposed site unless
it's been deemed scientifically safe.'' As President, Mr. Bush is
apparently willing to endanger the health and safety of millions of
Americans by letting politics and bad science prevail in the decision
to site a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. Clearly, the push
for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository waste has been
driven more by politics and bureaucratic bias than by science.
Some of the highlights of the scientific and technical problems
that have plagued the Yucca Mountain project the last year and a half
alone include:
<bullet> On July 9, 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals sided
with the people of Nevada in a lawsuit to stop the proposed Yucca
Mountain project. The court held that U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's radiation standard for the site was not stringent enough to
protect the public from the significant risks associated with nuclear
waste and failed to follow the recommendation by the National Academy
of Sciences.
<bullet> On August 31, 2004, the Nuclear Regulator Commission's
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rejected DOE's Yucca Mountain
document data base, saying it had failed to make public many of the
documents that it had in its possession. The Board said, ``Given the 15
years that DOE had to gather, review, and produce its documents and the
fact that the date of production, and the incompleteness of its
privilege review, it is clear to us that DOE did not meet its
obligation, in good faith, to make all reasonable efforts to make all
documentary materials available.''
<bullet> On October 4, 2004, the DOE Inspector General found that
DOE has given away more than $500,000 worth of Yucca Mountain
construction equipment in 2003. Half a million dollars is a tremendous
amount of the people's money to waste.
<bullet> On November 22, 2004, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board said DOE does not have a plan for safely transporting nuclear
waste to the proposed repository.
<bullet> On February 7, 2005, Dr. Margaret Chu, most recently the
Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, said
the project would be delayed until 2012 and that DOE's license
application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not be filed
until December 2005, delayed another year. To date, the license
application still has not been filed.
<bullet> On February 8, 2005, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board called for hearings to review concerns over the corrosion of the
titanium drip shields that are intended to keep water from leaking into
casks inside Yucca Mountain.
<bullet> On February 28, 2005, a DOE official said the proposed
Yucca Mountain repository may not open until 2015.
<bullet> On March 16, 2005, DOE revealed that documents and models
about water infiltration at Yucca Mountain, a key issue, had been
falsified.
<bullet> On July 18, 2005, DOE announced that it will use dedicated
train service for its rail transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-
level waste to Yucca Mountain, a shift from two decades of
administration policy that ignores the fact that about one-third of
reactor sites are not capable of shipping fuel by rail.
<bullet> On August 22, 2005, EPA published its revised radiation
standards for the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level waste dump. These
standards are wholly inadequate, do not meet the law's requirements and
do not protect public health and safety. In fact, EPA is proposing the
least protect public health radiation standard in the world, a standard
that is 40 times weaker than the public health standard for low level
radiation. This proposal is unacceptable and will needlessly expose
people to the risk of horrible adverse effect for generations. Please
see the comments that Senator Ensign and I submitted to the EPA and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NSC), which I have attached to this
statement.
<bullet> On October 6, 2005, the DOE Inspector General (IG) found
that DOE repeatedly gave business to Bechtel Corporation din spite of
poor work performance. According to the IG, DOE paid Bechtel $4 million
in ``incentive based fees'' even though ``Bechtel did not meet contract
specifications.''
<bullet> On October 13, 2005, DOE asked staff to develop a series
of actions to overhaul the Yucca Mountain project, going back to the
drawing board and revisiting proposals discarded decades ago as unsafe
or unworkable.
<bullet> On October 25, 2005, DOE announced that it would be
redesigning the spent fuel storage process, both the containers and
surface facilities admitting that their previous design was neither
clean nor uncontaminated. DOE has offered scant details on the
redesign.
<bullet> On November 16, 2005, the DOE Inspector General announced
that DOE has ignored numerous of admitted instances of falsification of
technical and scientific data on the project, showing that years of
quality assurance problems continue.
<bullet> On November 17, 2005, DOE sent a detailed letter to its
contractor regarding some of the desired changes in the site proposal,
but still has not provided details to Congress or the public.
<bullet> On November 19, 2005, the Energy and Water Appropriations
bill became law, cutting the Yucca Mountain budget to $577 million,
half of what DOE said it would need to keep the project on track.
At the December 7, 2005, at the NRC-DOE quarterly meeting on Yucca
Mountain, DOE announced that it expects to re-baseline the project mid-
2006, requiring many of the technical and scientific analyses to be
redone. There is still no timeline for when DOE will file its license
application.
<bullet> On December 14, 2005, DOE suspended work on the surface
facilities because of quality assurance concerns with the work of its
contractor, Bechtel. DOE has since extended Bechtel's contract for work
on Yucca Mountain.
<bullet> On January 30, 2006, concerns about the quality of the
scientific work that is supposed to ensure the safety of waste stored
at Yucca Mountain caused the NRC to issue a stop work order. The
concerns are about the container's corrosion rate studies; the
measurements are flawed.
<bullet> On February 9, 2006, the National Academies of Science
(NAS) found that in order to safely transport spent nuclear fuel
several things must occur, none of which DOE is currently undertaking,
including: it must be done with great care and all the existing
regulatory requirements and guidelines must be followed; transportation
must wait until it can be done almost entirely through dedicated train
transport; the possibility of fires is investigated in more depth
because of the unique safety concerns fires present; transportation
routes are carefully selected based on safety and social concerns; NAS
does a careful analysis of the security issues (terror risks, sabotage,
etc.); and full scale testing of casks.
<bullet> In addition, we expect that a Government Accountability
Office report on quality assurance issues that will released in March
to confirm the on-going quality assurance problems with the work by DOE
and its contractors.
<bullet> In numerous media reports, DOE has confirmed that it is
preparing a legislative package that addresses Yucca Mountain.
According to reports, this proposal will remove health, safety and
legal requirements, a clear admission that DOE cannot meet the current
public health, safety and technical requirements.
It should be clear to anyone that the proposed Yucca Mountain
project is a failure. It is based on unsound science and cannot meet
the requirements of law. It is not going anywhere. Delay after delay
costs the taxpayers billions and billions of dollars for a project that
the courts have ruled does not meet sufficient safety or public health
standards. I do not believe that Yucca Mountain will ever open, and
Nevada and the country will be safer for our successful efforts to stop
the project.
In addition, DOE has consistently underestimated the costs of the
Yucca Mountain Project, and total cost projections have grown more by
tens of billions since 1983. In several reports on total project costs,
DOE has cautioned that its cost estimates are a snapshot in time, based
on preliminary design, and should be expected to change as the
repository design develops. If history is any guide, the more DOE
learns about Yucca Mountain, the more it will cost to site a nuclear
waste repository there and the more taxpayer money we will waste on a
flawed proposal.
Yet, we must safely store spent nuclear fuel.
A 1979 study by the Sandia National Laboratory determined that, if
all the water were to drain from a spent fuel pool, dense-packed spent
fuel would likely heat up to the point where it would burst and then
catch fire, releasing massive quantities of volatile radioactive
fission products into the air. Both the short-term and the long-term
contamination impacts of such an event could be significantly worse
than those from Chernobyl. The consequences would be so severe and
would affect such a large area that all precautions must be taken to
preclude them. This is the type of serious, avoidable risk against
which all the Nation's nuclear sites can and should be protected to
counter terrorist threats.
It is time to look at other nuclear waste alternatives.
Fortunately, the technology to realize a viable, safe and secure
alternative is readily available and can be fully implemented within
the next decade if we act now. That technology is dry cask storage.
The technology for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry
storage casks has improved dramatically in the past 20 years. Seventeen
cask designs have been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
which says that spent nuclear fuel can be safely stored using dry cask
storage onsite at the nuclear power plants for at least 100 years.
Already, dry casks safely store spent nuclear fuel at 34 sites
throughout the country, many of them near communities, water ways and
transportation routes. The Nuclear Energy Institute has projected 83 of
the 103 active reactors will have dry storage by 2050.
Compared to water-filled pools, dry storage casks are significantly
less vulnerable to natural and human-induced disasters, including
floods, tornadoes, temperature extremes, sabotage, and missile attacks.
In addition, dry storage casks are not subject to drainage risks,
whether intentional or accidental.
On March 28, 2005, the Washington Post revealed that a classified
National Academy of Sciences report concluded that the Government does
not fully understand the risks a terrorist attack could pose to spent
nuclear fuel pools and that it ought to expedite the removal of the
fuel to dry storage casks that are more resilient to attack.
Senator Ensign and I have a bill that would do this The Spent Fuel
On-site Storage and Security Act of 2006, S. 2099. Our bill requires
commercial nuclear utilities to safely transfer spent nuclear fuel from
temporary storage in water-filled pools to secure storage in licensed,
onsite dry cask storage facilities. After transferal, the Secretary of
Energy would take title and full responsibility for the possession,
stewardship, maintenance, and monitoring of all spent fuel thus safely
stored. Finally, our bill establishes a grant program to compensate
utilities for expenses associated with transferring the waste. The
costs of transferring the waste and providing the grants will be offset
by withdrawals from the utility-funded Nuclear Waste Fund, stopping the
double payments taxpayers are making for the storage of nuclear waste.
No longer would they pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund when they pay
their utility bills, then pay again as taxpayers when the Government
pays the utilities for the cost of onsite storage. Taxpayers should not
have to pay twice.
Nuclear facilities currently provide 20 percent of our Nation's
electricity, but in light of the events of September 11, they also
present a security risk that we simply must address. There cannot be
any weak links in the chain of security of our Nation's nuclear power
infrastructure. There is absolutely no justification for endangering
the public by densely packing nuclear waste in vulnerable spent fuel
pools or in rushing headlong toward a repository that is fraught with
scientific, technical and geological problems when it can be stored
safely and securely in dry casks. Our bill guarantees all Americans
that our Nation's nuclear waste will be stored in the safest way
possible.
Instead of sticking to the commitment that Yucca Mountain, or any
storage of spent nuclear fuel, would be based on sound science, this
administration has cast sound science aside in favor of political
expediency in the myopic and dangerous pursuit of Yucca Mountain. It is
time we addressed to problem at hand the safe storage of spent nuclear
fuel and stopped pouring taxpayers' money down the drain on a project
that could endanger all of our citizens. Yucca Mountain is a failure.
__________
Statement of William Wehrum, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of
Air and Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency
Good afternoon. My name is Bill Wehrum and I am the Acting
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation at the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (``EPA''). I am pleased
to be here today to provide you with an update on the status of EPA's
public health and safety standards for the proposed spent nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV.
I would like to begin by providing the Committee with a short
history of EPA's responsibilities and why we have proposed revised
standards. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 described the roles and
responsibilities of Federal agencies in the development of disposal
facilities for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. EPA was
identified as the agency responsible for establishing standards to
protect the general environment for such facilities. In the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, Congress delineated EPA's roles and
responsibilities specific to the Federal Government's establishment of
the potential repository at Yucca Mountain. EPA's role is to determine
how the Yucca Mountain high-level waste facility must perform to
protect public health and the environment. Congress directed EPA to
develop public health and safety standards that would be incorporated
into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (``NRC'') licensing
requirements for the Yucca Mountain facility. The Department of Energy
(``DOE'') would apply for the license to construct and operate the
facility and the facility would open only if NRC determines that DOE
can meet EPA's standards. In establishing EPA's role, Congress also
stated that the EPA's safety standards are to be based upon and
consistent with the expert advice of the National Academy of Sciences.
EPA established its Yucca Mountain standards in June 2001. As
required by the Energy Policy Act, these standards addressed releases
of radioactive material during storage at the site and after final
disposal. The storage standard set a dose limit of 15 millirem per year
for the public outside the Yucca Mountain site. The disposal standards
consisted of three components: an individual dose standard, a standard
evaluating the impacts of human intrusion into the repository, and a
ground-water protection standard. The individual-protection and human-
intrusion standards set a limit of 15 millirem per year to a reasonably
maximally exposed individual, who would be among the most highly
exposed members of the public. The ground-water protection standard is
consistent with EPA's drinking water standards, which the Agency
applies in many situations as a pollution prevention measure. The
disposal standards were to apply for a period of 10,000 years after the
facility is closed. Dose assessments were to continue beyond 10,000
years and be placed in DOE's Environmental Impact Statement, but were
not subject to a compliance standard. The 10,000-year period for
compliance assessment is consistent with EPA's generally applicable
standards developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It also
reflects international guidance regarding the level of confidence that
can be placed in numerical projections over very long periods of time.
Shortly after the EPA first established these standards in 2001,
the nuclear industry, several environmental and public interest groups,
and the State of Nevada challenged the standards in court. In July
2004, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found
in favor of the Agency on all counts except one: the 10,000-year
regulatory timeframe. The court did not rule on whether EPA's standards
were protective, but did find that the timeframe of EPA's standards was
not consistent with the National Academy of Sciences' recommendations.
The National Academy of Sciences, in a report to EPA, stated that the
EPA's standards should cover at least the time period when the highest
releases of radiation are most likely to occur, within the limits
imposed by the geologic stability of the Yucca Mountain site. It judged
this period of geologic stability, for purposes of projecting releases
from the repository, to be on the order of 1 million years. EPA's 2001
standards required DOE to evaluate the performance of the site for this
period, but did not establish a specific dose limit beyond the first
10,000 years.
EPA proposed a revised rule in August 2005 to address the issues
raised by the appeals court. The new proposed rule limits radiation
doses from Yucca Mountain for up to 1 million years after it closes. No
other rules in the United States for any risks have ever attempted to
regulate for such a long period of time. Within that regulatory
timeframe, we have proposed two dose standards that would apply based
on the number of years from the time the facility is closed. For the
first 10,000 years, we would retain the 2001 final rule's dose limit of
15 millirem per year. This is protection at the level of the most
stringent radiation regulations in the United States today. From 10,000
to 1 million years, we propose a dose limit of 350 millirem per year.
This represents a total radiation exposure for people near Yucca
Mountain that is no higher than natural levels people live with
routinely in other parts of the country. One million years, which
represents 25,000 generations, includes the time at which the highest
doses of radiation from the facility are expected to occur. Our
proposal requires the Department of Energy to show that Yucca Mountain
can safely contain wastes, even considering the effects of earthquakes,
volcanic activity, climate change, and container corrosion over 1
million years.
The public comment period for the proposed rule closed on November
21, 2005. We are currently reviewing and considering the comments as we
develop our final rule. We held public hearings in Las Vegas and
Amargosa Valley, Nevada, and Washington, DC. We are considering
comments from these hearings, as well as all of the comments submitted
to the Agency's rulemaking docket. A document describing our responses
to all comments will be published along with the final rule.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee
and present this update on EPA's Yucca Mountain standards. This
concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to address any
questions.
______
Responses by William Wehrum to Additional Questions from Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Do you believe that a million-year standard places a
higher priority on hypothetical long term hazards over near term
concrete hazards?
Response. EPA believes that extending the application of the 15
millirems per year (mrem/yr) dose limit in the 2001 standards to 1
million years would inappropriately give ``long-term hypothetical
hazards'' precedence over ``near-term concrete hazards,'' EPA believes
that a regulatory standard applicable for extremely long times must
balance the level of protection offered by the standard, the ability to
make meaningful projections of complex system performance over such
periods, and the needs of the regulatory decision-making process in
which the standard will be used. EPA believes its proposal, and the
reasoning underlying it, provide an appropriate balance of these
factors. In developing its proposal, EPA considered international
guidance and practices regarding the use of long-term projections in
regulatory decision-making and the appropriateness of referring to
natural sources of radioactivity as a benchmark during extremely long
compliance periods.
We have established the 10,000-year standard as an indicator for
the time when uncertainties in projecting performance are more
manageable and for which comparisons can be made with other regulated
systems. While we believe there is some value in performing
calculations beyond the first 10,000 years, we also believe that over
the very long periods leading up to the time of the peak dose, the
uncertainties in projecting climatic and geologic conditions become
extremely difficult to reliably predict and a technical consensus about
their effects on projected performance in a licensing process would he
very difficult, or perhaps impossible, to achieve. This is one of the
major reasons that the 10,000-year time frame was originally selected
in the generic standard for land disposal of the types of waste
intended for the Yucca Mountain repository.
EPA also considered guidance from national and international
organizations regarding protection of future generations. The question
uses the same terminology used in the ``Chain of Obligation Principle''
as framed by the National Academy of Public Administration in its 1997
report ``Deciding for the Future: Balancing Risks, Costs, and Benefits
Fairly Across Generations,'' The principle reads: ``Each generation's
primary obligation is to provide for the needs of the living and
succeeding generations. Near-term concrete hazards have priority over
long-term hypothetical hazards.'' EPA believes that extending the
application of the 15 millirems per year (mrem/yr) dose limit in the
2001 standards to 1 million years would undermine the Chain of
Obligation Principle by giving ``long-term hypothetical hazards''
precedence over ``near-term concrete hazards.''
Question 2. Are there any other examples of regulating to 1 million
years?
Response. For time frames extending potentially to 1 million years,
there are no precedents in U.S. regulation. Other countries have only
considered such long time frames when dealing with disposal of long-
lived radioactive waste. For example, Switzerland states no time limit
for performance analyses. Sweden explicitly limits analyses to 1
million years. However, we believe that the United States has the only
example (these proposed standards) that would set. a numerical standard
for a compliance period of 1 million years.
Question 3. Could you further address Dr. Thomas Cochran's analysis
as used by Senator Boxer? Suggesting that EPA's Proposed Radiation
Protection Standard for 10,000 to 1 million year (350 millirems per
year) creates a one in five risk of increased fatal cancers for the
general population and a one in four risk for women'?
Response. EPA's current risk estimate for radiation-induced cancers
is an order of magnitude smaller than the values cited by Senator
Boxer. Using EPA's current cancer risk coefficients, we estimate that
members of a population receiving an extra 350 mrem/yr for their whole
life would have an additional cancer mortality risk of 1 to 2 in 100,
It is important to note that these estimates of cancer incidence relate
to the dose standards proposed to apply only to the hypothetical
Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual, who is among the most highly-
exposed members of the population. Therefore, these estimates do not
represent a prediction of increased cancer incidence for the population
as a whole. The current U.S. baseline cancer risk is about 22 percent,
or 1 in 5. In his testimony to the committee, Dr. Dade Moeller, former
president of the Health Physics Society, also cited a similar Value as
the overall fatal cancer rate.
Therefore, the increase in cancer mortality at 350 mrem/yr would be
relatively small compared with the current baseline cancer mortality
rate. The values cited by Senator Boxer during the hearing would
require one to assume that every fatal cancer in the country today is
attributable solely to background radiation. If this were true, no
other behavioral, environmental, or genetic influences, including
smoking, would cause a fatal cancer.
The estimate of the population-weighted risk of fatal cancers in
the recently released, and seventh, National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
report entitled Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII) is
consistent with EPA's current estimate, To address Senator Boxer's
question regarding higher risk levels for women, EPA's cumulative risk
estimates account for gender. However, if we calculate the lifetime
risk to men and women separately, using the BEIR VII gender-specific
risk estimates, the risk for each group still falls between 1 and 2
percent.
______
Responses by William Wehrum to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. If the revised standard EPA recently proposed were to
be the final standard, what is the risk to individuals exposed to the
radiation levels contained in that standard in 10,000 years and in 1
million years? How many additional cancers or other health effect to
exposed people should we expect to occur?
Response. EPA currently estimates that there is roughly an 8 in
10,000 chance of developing a cancer (fatal and nonfatal cancers
combined) for every 1,000 millirems of radiation exposure an individual
receives. Based on an assumption that the current cancer risk estimates
are valid in the distant future, it is projected that there would be
about one extra cancer in 1,000 exposed people over a period of 75
years at 15 mrem/yr (the dose limit over the first 10,000 years) and
about two extra cancers in 100 exposed people at 350 mrem/yr (the dose
limit for 10,000 up to 1,000,000 years). It is important to note that
these estimates of cancer incidence relate to the dose standards
proposed to apply only to the hypothetical Reasonably Maximally Exposed
Individual, who is among the most highly-exposed members of the
population. Therefore, these estimates do not represent a prediction of
increased cancer incidence for the population as a ' whole. DOE may
project peak exposures at levels less than 350 mrem/yr. In that case,
the projected number of additional cancers would be lower. Therefore,
the actual number of extra cancers will depend on the magnitude of
actual exposures as well as the size of the exposed population and the
duration of exposure.
Question 2. If the revised standard EPA recently proposed were to
be the final standard, do women, children, and the elderly exposed to
these radiation levels face the same risks of harmful health effects as
men?
Response. The calculated radiogenic cancer risk does vary with age
and, for some organs, there are gender differences in the risk of
cancer. EPA's risk estimates are age-, gender-, and organ-specific. EPA
takes into account the differences in cancer risk from radiation
exposure for men and women separately at each age from infancy through
adulthood. Therefore, while risks vary with age and gender, these
differences are accounted for in our cumulative risk estimates for the
exposed populations, as detailed in the preceding responses.
Question 3. Do the man-made nuclear waste disposal containers have
to remain intact for 10,000 years of more in order for Yucca Mountain
to meet a proposed 15 millirem standard?
Response. EPA has not developed its proposed Yucca Mountain
standards on the basis of whether the proposed disposal system will be
demonstrated to comply with such standards. Rather, as required by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, EPA has developed radioactive waste disposal
standards that we believe are protective of public health and safety.
It may be reasonable for DOE to consider that some waste packages may
fail during the first 10,000 years. Failure of the waste packages does
not necessarily mean that the standard cannot be met. it is the
responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to implement EPA's
standards and determine, during its licensing review process, whether a
repository design could meet the 15 mrem standard even if waste
disposal containers do not remain intact for 10,000 years.
Question 4. The primary contact that the public would have with the
radioactive waste stored in Yucca Mountain is via groundwater and the
peak radiation dose is expected to be after 10,000 years. We discussed
this some in the hearing, but why is the compliance period for
groundwater under the proposed EPA rule only 10,000 years? Shouldn't it
cover the peak dose to maximize public health protection? Why has the
EPA not allowed public comment on this portion of the rule?
Response. The NAS specifically declined to make recommendations on
separate ground-water standards because it did not consider such
``requirements necessary to limit risks to individuals,'' (NAS Report,
p. 121) NAS deferred to EPA's policy judgment, and these standards were
upheld under judicial review. Because of the uncertainties encountered
in making risk projections for up to 1 million years, we believe that
the individual protection (all-pathways) standard is reasonable and
protective (See the response to Senator Inhofe's first question). In
our original standards, EPA used its policy discretion and issued
separate ground-water standards for the 10,000-year compliance period
in order to be consistent with previous Agency uses of groundwater
protection standards for resource protection. In our current proposed
revision, we maintain the ground-water protection standard from the
original regulation. We have not sought comment on the ground-water
standards because our current rulemaking includes only those standards
specifically vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Question 5. EPA includes indoor radon exposure as part of its
estimates of natural background radiation. Radon is normally not
included as part of background dose, because indoor radon exposure is a
man-made public health risk. According to the EPA, radon exposure is
the second leading cause of lung cancer in the United States. How does
EPA justify including radon--an exposure that EPA urges the public to
mitigate by renovating their homes--as part of ``background
radiation?''
Response. The source of the radon is predominantly from soil and
rock underlying homes and is not classified as solely a man-made source
of radiation exposure, such as exposures from medical procedures.
Indoor radon was included in natural background because everyone in the
United States spends time indoors and will be exposed to some level of
radon in the course of their daily lives. Since at least 1975, the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements has discussed
indoor radon as a component of natural background radiation (NCRP
Report No. 45). For these reasons, indoor radon is an expected
component in the exposures people normally encounter over a given year.
Question 6. I asked Mr. Golan about the waste produced by the
Administration's proposed nuclear waste reprocessing program. Do we
currently have environmental regulations that would govern the type of
nuclear waste produced by a large scale reprocessing program?
Response. Wastes (i.e., high-level waste) from reprocessing
operations would be covered under EPA's generally applicable standards
for spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic radioactive
waste (40 CFR Part 191), However, these standards currently apply to
storage and disposal of these wastes only at Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC)-licensed facilities. High-level wastes stored at any
non-NRC licensed DOE facility are not covered unless it is also a
disposal facility.
As for reprocessing itself, it is covered under 40 CFR Part 190
insofar as the fuel being reprocessed is part of the uranium fuel cycle
and was used for the production of publicly used electrical power. No
other fuel cycles are included, nor is reprocessing if undertaken for
fuel other than that used for commercial electrical power production.
However, if the high-level waste from reprocessing was intended to
be disposed of at Yucca Mountain, EPA's Yucca Mountain standards would
apply as it covers storage as well as disposal of spent nuclear fuel
and high-level waste at the Yucca Mountain site (40 CFR Part 197).
______
Responses by William Wehrum to Additional Questions from
Senator Voinovich
Question 1. Is it true that the million-year standard assumes no
new technological advances over the next million years?
Response. Yes, that is true. In its report, Technical Bases for
Yucca Mountain Standards, upon which EPA was to base its Yucca Mountain
standards, the National Academy of Sciences stated: ``. . . we believe
that it is not possible to predict on the basis of scientific analyses
the societal factors that must be specified in a far-future exposure
scenario. (p. 96). Later, on p. 122, the Academy recommends: ``. . .
the use of assumptions that reflect current technologies and living
patterns.'' Therefore, the Agency followed that recommendation. It is
certainly reasonable to expect technological advances in the future,
but EPA has consistently applied a cautious regulatory approach.
Question 2. What is the range of background radiation around the
United States and within the State of Nevada, and how does it compare
to the radiation exposure expected at Yucca Mountain?
Response. Statewide-average background radiation dose rates
(defined here as exposures from cosmic, terrestrial sources and indoor
radon) can vary significantly. In its review of statewide background
radiation dose rates, EPA found that they range from a low of about
130-140 mrem/yr (Florida and Washington) to a high of about 960 mrem/yr
(South Dakota), with the national average being about 300 mrem/yr.
Variation within a single state can be greater than between
neighboring states. Across the State of Nevada, based upon countywide
averages the background dose rates vary from about 230-990 mrem/yr.
This significant localized variation. led EPA to locus on statewide
averages.
EPA's proposed standards are not dependent on any specific
projections of radiation exposure expected from the proposed
repository. Our proposed 350 mrem standard out to 1 million years is
consistent with the range of background radiation levels found across
the country.
______
Responses by William Wehrum to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. I understand that before EPA released its proposed
draft radiation protection standard for formal public comment, EPA held
behind-the-scenes, closed-door meetings with Department of Energy
(``DOE'') regarding the substance of the standard. Did DOE advocate a
standard or an approach to this rulemaking? What was their approach?
Response. EPA met with a wide range of stakeholders as we routinely
do when developing proposed rules. For example, we met with Federal
agencies, including NRC and DOE; industry and environmental groups; the
State of Nevada; and affected counties in Nevada and California to
share basic information about the development of the standards and
ensure we took into account the full range of views and technical
issues, Our final rule will include detailed information on what we
considered and how it affected our approach.
Meetings with Federal agencies were consistent with Administration
policies and the shared responsibilities for Yucca Mountain conveyed to
EPA, NRC, and DOE by statute. Decisions on the nature and form of the
proposed standards were made by EPA. Our reasoning and all data
supporting our proposed rule arc public information.
DOE preferred standards that are clear, reasonable, and
implementable. The views they provided are reflected in their written
comments. Those comments are publicly available in our docket.
Question 2. Mr. Wehrum, EPA's proposes a 350 millirem dose limit
for the period after 10,000 years, using the median calculated dose as
opposed to the mean, or average, calculated dose.
This median radiation dose equals an average radiation dose of
about 1,000 millirems per year, or over a lifetime of exposure, about
70,000 millirems. The National Academy of Sciences said that EPA should
use the ``mean'' when assessing compliance with standards.
Since using the ``mean'' is more protection of public health, would
you explain the rationale for departing from the NAS recommendation.
Response. There is no consistent correlation between the mean and
median for probabilistic distributions. Knowing the median of a
distribution does not indicate the mean. The median was proposed
because of the increasing uncertainty in projecting possible doses from
the repository over the 1 million-year geologic stability period. With
this increasing uncertainty, the confidence that can he placed in the
range of projected calculated doses diminishes significantly over time.
In the context of our ``reasonable expectation'' approach for
determining compliance, and the increasing uncertainty in the
reliability of dose projections, our preamble to the regulatory
proposal explained that high-end dose assessments for these exceedingly
long periods should not be weighed more heavily than lower-end dose
projections in making compliance decisions, and the median, as the mid-
point of the spread of dose projections is reflective of this even-
handed approach.
Question 3. Mr. Wehrum, governmental, scientific and public health
communities acknowledge that children suffer disproportionately from
environmental health risks. Specifically children, particularly female
children, are at significantly greater risk from radiation exposures
than adults.
Did the EPA calculate the health risk to the most vulnerable group,
namely children, in proposing its radiation exposure limit for the
Yucca Mountain?
Response. Yes. The Agency uses a cancer risk assessment method that
accounts for the risk to men and women separately at each age of
radiation exposure. Our risk estimates assume that at each age the
exposed population receives the maximum dose allowed by our proposed
standard. The dose standard must be set at a level that provides
protection over a lifetime, including radiation exposures that occur
during infancy, childhood, and adulthood. Therefore, while risks do
vary with age and gender, all these differences are accounted for in
our final risk estimate for the exposed population.
__________
Statement of Allison MacFarlane, Research Associate, Program in
Science, Technology and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is an honor to have
the opportunity to address you on the issue of the status of nuclear
waste disposal at the Yucca Mountain, NV, site.
I am a Research Associate at MIT's Program in Science, Technology,
and Society. I have a Ph.D. in geology from MIT and have been studying
and publishing on the issue of nuclear waste disposal since 1996. I am
editor of the forthcoming book, Uncertainty Underground: Yucca Mountain
and the Nation's High-Level Nuclear Waste. I have appended a longer
biographical sketch to the end of this testimony.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jeffords, I would like to use this
opportunity to discuss some of the problems with the U.S. nuclear waste
disposal program and make suggestions as to how to best address these
problems.
Let me begin by emphasizing that in my expert opinion, the best
solution to the problem of high-level nuclear waste remains a geologic
repository. On this issue all countries with nuclear energy programs
are in agreement, though none has yet to open such a facility. In light
of the push for more nuclear power in the United States, even taking
into consideration the President's proposed Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership, it is highly likely that multiple Yucca Mountain-type
repositories will be necessary. Therefore, it is imperative that we
continue to work toward a solution to the problem of high-level nuclear
waste.
Some policymakers have suggested that long-term above-ground
storage of spent fuel is a better solution to the current problem.
Their idea is to wait until a better alternative to geologic disposal
is discovered. Interim storage is just that an interim, temporary
solution. Interim storage is fine for 100 years, but longer than that
one cannot be assured the containers would prevent radioactivity from
entering the environment. In the unlikely case that societal control is
lost over the interim storage site or technological advance cannot
provide a better alternative to geologic disposal in the next 100
years, interim storage fails its task and exposes future generations to
radioactivity. Thus, I would argue for continued work on geologic
repository disposal of high-level nuclear waste.
The main focus of my remarks will be about the Yucca Mountain site,
its complex geology, the uncertainty associated with predicting future
performance of a geologic repository there, and the implications for
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards proposed for the
site. I will conclude with some suggestions for changes to the current
program.
yucca mountain: a complex geological site
Yucca Mountain is a relatively complex site geologically. The
mountain is a low topographic feature, has a low water table, and is an
arid region 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. In the following I
will provide some examples of the complexity of the site and the
uncertainties in the data that arise from this complexity.
Yucca Mountain is located in the Basin and Range extensional
province of the western United States, a tectonically active area. The
Yucca Mountain region is both seismically and volcanically active. For
example, in 1992, a magnitude 5.6 earthquake, centered at Little Skull
Mountain 12 miles southeast of Yucca Mountain shook the region,
including Jackass Flats, the proposed staging area for nuclear waste at
which buildings sustained damage. In 2002 the same fault system
produced a 4.4 magnitude earthquake.
The repository footprint itself is bounded by two faults, the Ghost
Dance fault on the east and the Sundance fault on the west, neither of
which appears to be active. Two other faults on Yucca Mountain are
suspected of being active: the Bow Ridge fault and the Solitario Canyon
fault, as are other faults in the region.\1\ Earthquakes could cause
rockfall on waste packages that might breach the packages. To assure
that this does not happen, the Department of Energy (DOE), tasked with
managing the repository, is intending to add titanium drip shields to
protect waste canisters. Earthquakes can also open new fractures in the
rock surrounding the repository, allowing for new water transport
pathways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management and
Operating Contractor (1999) Geology/Hydrology Environmental Baseline
File, Department of Energy, B00000000-01717-5700-00027 REV 01, DCN 1,
June 1999.
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Volcanism poses a greater problem for a repository at Yucca
Mountain than seismicity. Though the likelihood of an explosive volcano
erupting directly beneath the repository is remote, the outcome would
be devastating, spewing radioactive material directly into the
atmosphere. More likely would be a scenario in which magma intersects a
repository tunnel (not to be backfilled by design), and the associated
heat, corrosive gases, and water would affect the waste packages,
increasing corrosion rates and thereby releasing radioactivity into the
environment much sooner than expected.
The rocks that make up Yucca Mountain are volcanic in origin and
formed between 11.6 to 13.5 million years ago.\2\ These rocks are
composed of tuff, a fine-grained rock formed from cemented ash and rock
fragments. The region was affected by three episodes of volcanism since
4 million years ago: one at 3.7 million years ago, one at 1 million
years ago, and one at 80,000 years ago. These episodes have left
volcanic cones and lava flows adjacent to Yucca Mountain. Though the
80,000-year event suggests that volcanism may be continuing, it is
difficult to make precise predictions due to small number of volcanic
cones or lava flows on which to base evaluations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Carr, W.J., Buyers, F.M., and Orkild, P.P. (1986) Stratigraphic
and Volcano-Tectonic relations of the Crater Flat Tuff and Some Older
Volcanic Units, Nye County, Nevada. U.S. Geological Survey.
Professional Paper 1323, and Sawyer, D.A., Fleck, R. J., Lanphere,
M.A., Warren, R.G., and Broxton, D.E. (1994) Episodic Volcanism in the
Miocene Southwest Volcanic Field: Stratigraphic Revision, 40Ar/39Ar
Geochronologic Framework, and Implications for Magmatic Evolution.
Geological Society of America Bulletin 106, pp. 1403-1318.
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Partly as a result of the lack of evidence, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the DOE have not yet come to agreement about the
likelihood of future volcanism at Yucca Mountain over the 10,000-year
time of compliance set out in the old EPA standard.\3\ Extending the
standard out to 1 million years, as the EPA has proposed, will vastly
increase the uncertainties associated with our understanding of the
probability of future volcanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ They are one order of magnitude off from each other in their
probability estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Besides the potential for future volcanism, the ``dryness'' of the
Yucca Mountain site weighs heavily on the suitability of the site. The
repository at Yucca Mountain is to be located about 200-300 meters
below the ground surface and 200-300 meters above the water table. The
Yucca Mountain region is arid, receiving only 17 centimeters of
precipitation a year. The idea behind locating a repository in the
unsaturated zone, above the water table, was to take advantage of the
assumed slowly flowing water in the rocks. The DOE asserts that the
average infiltration rate of water in the unsaturated zone is about 5
millimeters per year.\4\ In such a location, the DOE assumed that
little water would come into contact with the waste packages and
corrode them over the millennia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management and
Operating Contractor (1999), op. cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the mid-1990's, the discovery of bomb-pulse tracer isotopes
affected the models of water transport in the unsaturated zone at Yucca
Mountain. Scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory found unusually
high values of chlorine-36 in the repository-level rocks at Yucca
Mountain. High values of chlorine-36 result from nuclear weapons tests
over the Pacific Ocean conducted in the 1950's. Because of these tests,
chlorine-36 was put into the atmospheric circulation and carried
eastward until it was precipitated out in places like Nevada. The
implications for the repository are that water traveled 200-300 meters
down in less than 50 years, at rates many times higher than the average
infiltration rate used by the DOE. These fast pathways appeared to be
associated with fault zones and fractures in the rocks.
The DOE continues to study water transport in the unsaturated zone
and has attempted to redo some of the studies done by Los Alamos, but
these analyses were problematic. Questions remain as to which fractures
may carry flowing water, what processes control fracture flow, and how
water is partitioned between fractures and rock. In addition, the DOE
has not included in its models of fracture flow events like thousand-
year storms that would dump huge amounts of water on the land. Thus the
DOE still has an incomplete picture of water transport in the
unsaturated zone at Yucca Mountain.
Why all the focus on water? The problem is that it is difficult in
the air-filled environment expected in the repository--an oxidizing
environment--to prevent corrosion of the waste package and the spent
nuclear fuel, the dominant waste form. All metals oxidize, just as iron
turns to rust, so selecting a metal alloy for the waste package
canister was challenging. The DOE has selected a material called Alloy-
22, a chromium, nickel, molybdenum alloy, to form the outside layer of
the waste canister. Alloy-22 is a corrosion-resistant alloy. The
particular composition selected by the DOE has been in existence since
1981. Data from DOE laboratory tests of 6 months to 5 years in length
have been extrapolated out to hundreds of thousands of years and
suggest that the waste packages will begin to fail at 50,000 years.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ A recently published document suggests that the DOE has changed
its analysis to find that waste package failure begins at 100,000 years
hence. See Stahl, D. (2006) Drip Shield and Backfill, In A. Macfarlane
and R. Ewing, editors, Uncertainty Underground: Yucca Mountain and the
Nation's High-Level Nuclear Waste. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once the waste canister fails, the spent fuel in its zirconium
alloy cladding will be exposed to any water present. Spent fuel is
basically uranium dioxide in addition to small amounts of fission
products and actinides.\6\ Uranium dioxide, as we know from natural
analogues, is not stable in an oxidizing environment in the presence of
water and it will alter, or rust, to form other minerals. It is not
known whether these new minerals will retain the radioactivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Fission products such as cesium-137 and strontium-90 form from
the splitting of uranium-235 atoms whereas actinides such as plutonium-
239 and neptunium-237 form from the absorption of neutrons by uranium-
238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the reasons that almost all other countries with repository
programs are planning to use a wet or reducing (as opposed to
oxidizing) repository environment is because spent fuel is stable in
such under such conditions. As a result, by carefully selecting the
repository conditions, these countries\7\ have reduced the
uncertainties associated with predicting future repository performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ These countries include Sweden and Finland, two of the
countries with the most advanced repository programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One final example of the complexity of the repository site is how
the geochemical environment in the repository will evolve over time,
especially the chemistry of the local waters. The DOE's strategy for
Yucca Mountain is to emplace a large amount of thermally hot
radioactive material into rock that contains water. Over time, there
will be interactions between the thermally hot waste and the water and
the rock, and the radioactively hot waste and water and rock. These
thermochemical, thermomechanical, thermohydrological, and radiation
interactions will produce processes and features that are impossible to
predict in advance. Thus, we cannot really know the chemistry of the
water over time or how it will interact with the waste package.
uncertainty and yucca mountain
There are many uncertainties associated with trying to understand
the behavior of a high-level nuclear waste repository thousands or
hundreds of thousands of years into the future. One question we need to
ask in siting a repository is whether the earth system is well enough
understood to make predictive models of a repository far into the
future? Is it possible to verify or validate these models? If not, then
can one site a repository?
The DOE has argued that it has characterized all the relevant
``features, events, and processes'' at Yucca Mountain. I will argue
that from my geologist's viewpoint that the DOE cannot know all the
features, events, and processes it needs to describe the repository
system because the repository is an evolving system whose basic
thermodynamic and kinetic features are still not known. One example as
just explained above is that of the evolution of the geochemical
environment of the repository.
Perhaps our current Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld put it best
by noting in a 2002 press briefing, ``There are known knowns; there are
things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is
to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also
unknown unknowns--the ones we don't know we don't know.'' What we don't
know we don't know could prove to be very important in the behavior of
a geologic repository.
The DOE has attempted to predict the behavior of the Yucca Mountain
repository over time using a complex computer modeling method called
probabilistic performance assessment. The performance assessment of the
Yucca Mountain repository\8\ is made up of numerous submodels of
systems that will affect repository behavior such as the climate, the
unsaturated zone, the waste package, etc. The DOE has stated that it
has validated these models by the use of laboratory tests, in situ
tests, and field tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The latest version of which is in the DOE's draft license
application, not available to the public.
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From the perspective of an earth scientist, it is not possible to
validate or verify models of earth systems.\9\ This is because earth
systems are by definition open systems, accessible to exchanges of
matter and energy. As a result, in open systems, it is not possible to
know all the potential processes or input parameters that might affect
the system. The Yucca Mountain repository is one of those open systems,
and therefore it is not possible to legitimately validate the
performance assessment model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ There is an excellent literature on this topic. Please see
Oreskes, N., Shrader-Frechette, K., and Belitz, K (1994) Verification,
Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences,
Science 263, pp. 641-646, and Oreskes, N., and Belitz, K. (2001)
Philosophical Issues in Model Assessment. In Model Validation:
Perspectives in Hydrological Science, M.G. Anderson and P.D. Bates,
editors, New York: J.Wiley and Sons, pp. 23-41.
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Models of earth systems cannot be validated or verified by
comparison to laboratory, in situ or field data for two reasons.\10\
First, the data may have errors in it that while small now, over time
may result in a large deviation from actual behavior. Second, though
model results may predict current behavior, over time the geologic
system will change in unpredictable ways, and therefore it is not
possible to predict future conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Please see Oreskes, N., Shrader-Frechette, K., and Belitz, K
(1994) op cit. for a longer discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The terms ``validate'' and ``verify'' powerfully signify the truth
of model results, suggesting that the model is an accurate
representation of future behavior of the system. These terms are used
to convince policymakers of the truth of the model results, though in
actuality, the models cannot be validated or verified.
More disturbing is a practice, perhaps an unconscious one, in which
experts present model results as if they were actual data. Secretary of
Energy Abraham was guilty of such practice when he stated, ``The amount
of water that eventually reaches the repository level at any point in
time is very small . . .'' We have not and cannot measure the amount of
water that will reach the repository at any time in the future, but the
DOE generated a model of the amount of water that might reach the
repository, which provided the results stated by the Secretary. These
are not facts, but instead unvalidatable model results.
Scientists and engineers from multiple disciplines have contributed
to the DOE's performance assessment model, making the results of
submodels difficult to compare and fold into a meaningful overarching
model. Given the different backgrounds of the scientists, engineers,
and managers involved, it is possible that another set of participants
might have produced a performance assessment model that gave divergent
results. In fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted a
study of performance assessments and reached this conclusion.\11\ In
their study, six groups of scientists developed separate performance
assessment models of contaminant transport in fruits. These models all
produced differing results. The IAEA attributed the differences to the
differing ways in which the modelers approached the problem, and the
differing ways in which they implemented the models and selected
parameters used in the models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Linkov, I., and Burmistov, D. (2003) Model Uncertainty and
Choices Made by Modelers: Lessons Learned from the International Atomic
Energy Agency Model Intercomparisons. Risk Analysis 23, pp. 1297-1308.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why all the emphasis on performance assessment? The results of
probabilistic performance assessment will be used by both the DOE and
the NRC to determine the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site. They
are forced to use these complex models for two reasons. First, there is
only one site to evaluate, so it cannot be evaluated in a relative
sense, as was the plan in the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA).\12\
The 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act changed this strategy by
allowing the characterization of only a single site, Yucca Mountain.
Thus, the DOE and NRC needed to develop a method to evaluate the site
in an absolute sense. They decided by the early 1990's that performance
assessment modeling was advanced enough to apply to a geologic
repository.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The 1982 NWPA had planned for three sites to be simultaneously
characterized in depth, including the sinking of exploratory shafts to
examine the subsurface.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the EPA standard calls for the DOE and the NRC to show that
the site will meet a specific dose limit over a specified time period.
To do this requires quantitative analysis, and thus the need for
performance assessment modeling. Other countries have recognized the
limitations of quantitative performance assessments, including France
and Sweden. France has set a dose limit in its site standard, but does
not make extensive use of performance assessment modeling and will
evaluate compliance with the standard by using both quantitative and
qualitative analyses.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Garrick, B.J. (2000) Letter to Chairman Meserve on ACNW Visits
to Nuclear Sites and Information Exhanges in the United Kingdom and
France, May 15-19, 2000. Letter dated August 18, 2000, http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acnw/letters/2000/1200158.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sweden has stated that it will depend on performance assessments
for time periods of up to 1,000 years, but for time periods beyond
10,000 years, ``Although such long-term calculations should be
performed, it is understood that with increasing time perspectives,
quantitative results, with associated uncertainties, should be regarded
as safety indicators. Using such indicators, it is recognized that the
final risk assessment will involve a substantial amount of qualitative
judgments [sic].''\14\ Moreover, in terms of compliance with standards,
the Swedes state that ``it appears obvious that a strict comparison of
calculation results with criteria is not meaningful. Calculation
results, e.g., doses, with associated uncertainty estimates should be
regarded as indicators of the level of safety and radiation protection
achieved rather than dose predictions. Thus, it appears that reasonable
assurance' is the only justifiable approach.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ From Nuclear Energy Agency, Radioactive Waste Management
Committee (2004) RWMC Regulators' Forum: The Regulatory Control of
Radioactive Waste Management Overview of 15 NEA Member Countries.
Report number NEA/RWM/RF(2004)1, February 13, 2004, p. 139.
\15\ Ibid. pp. 139-140.
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Both France and Sweden recognize the limitations of performance
assessments and the inability to determine compliance with standards by
direct comparison with performance assessment results. They are
comfortable with using a more qualitative approach. I would argue that
the current U.S. performance assessment methodology is actually a
qualitative approach masquerading as a quantitative one. In the current
situation, what should the United States do to bring more clarity to
its process to determine site suitability?
what should we do?
Given the strict limits placed by the EPA on the DOE and NRC's
ability to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site and their inability to
determine whether the numbers produced by the performance assessment
models are valid, how should the United States determine the
suitability of a repository site? I would like to make the following
suggestions.
<bullet> First, there is a natural opportunity to make changes to
our system of site evaluation right now while the EPA standard is being
reconsidered. Congressional legislation is not mandated to make the
necessary changes; it can be done within the necessary agencies.
Once the EPA standard is promulgated, the NRC will have to adjust
their regulations accordingly (currently 10 CFR 63), and the DOE will
have to adjust their guidelines (currently 10 CFR 963). At this point
in time, the NRC and the DOE can alter how they will determine site
suitability and licensability.
<bullet> Second, in making changes to the regulations and
guidelines, the NRC and DOE should move away from sole reliance on
probabilistic performance assessment as the method to determine
compliance with the EPA's standard and opt for a broader and more
qualitative assessment scheme, similar to that of France and Sweden.
One of the best ways to achieve assurance that the repository will
contain the radioactivity over the long term is to reduce the
uncertainties associated with waste disposal. For example, the DOE
intends to operate Yucca Mountain at relatively high temperatures to
maintain the tunnels above the boiling point of water for the first few
centuries. This plan increases uncertainties about waste canister
corrosion. Another example of reducing uncertainties is Sweden and
Finland's plans to dispose of their spent fuel in a reducing
environment, as opposed to U.S. plans to use an oxidizing environment.
<bullet> Third, the EPA may want to reconsider its standard in this
mode. Currently, the United States uses a dose-based standard to govern
nuclear waste disposal. Some countries, for example, do not use a dose-
based standard at all. For instance, the United Kingdom uses a risk-
based standard of one in 1 million per year fatal cancers from
radiation. The National Academy of Sciences, in its 1995 report,
suggested that the EPA adopt a risk-based standard, though the EPA
ignored this advice.
<bullet> Fourth, work must continue on the Yucca Mountain site to
determine whether it will be suitable as a geologic repository. To
supplement the performance assessment, which would be useful only for
short time periods (on the order of centuries), a comparative analysis
can be adopted similar to that proposed in the 1982 NWPA. As it is not
practical or pragmatic to select other U.S. sites and begin in-depth
characterization for the purposes of comparison with Yucca Mountain, I
suggest an alternative method. A large body of data exists for a number
of investigated repository sites around the world. I suggest that this
dataset be used for comparative purposes with Yucca Mountain. Included
in the list of sites for comparison should be the Waste Isolation Pilot
Project in Carlsbad, NM, which stores transuranic waste from the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex, the clay site at Bure in eastern France, the
crystalline rock site in Okiluoto, Finland, and the crystalline rock
sites at Forsmark and Oskarshamn in Sweden.
<bullet> Fifth, if Yucca Mountain is found lacking in comparison to
the above-listed sites, the DOE and the NRC may decide that it is not
appropriate for use as a geologic repository. In this case, Congress
would need to revisit repository siting and issue new legislation that
allows the DOE to search for and establish new sites. It is highly
likely that Congress will have to address this issue in the next 10
years even if Yucca Mountain is approved by the NRC because it will not
be able to contain all the waste produced in this country. In the
United States, we are fortunate to have a large country with many
geologically appropriate locations for a nuclear waste repository that
have arguably simpler geology than Yucca Mountain. For a repository to
succeed, the process must be fair and perceived to be fair by all
participants.
A large amount of high-level nuclear waste already exists in the
United States and requires disposal. This problem deserves rapid and
focused attention. It is resolvable, but requires a delicate balance of
technical prowess and fair and just policymaking. For the betterment of
our environment, it is within our grasp to solve this problem.
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views.
______
Responses by Allison Macfarlane to Additional Questions from
Senator Inhofe
Question 1. You seem to be taking a position that we should
continue to simply store waste at existing sites until we can apply
future technologies. But if we put the waste in Yucca Mountain for a
period of 100 to 300 years in a manner that is fully retrievable, as
DOE has proposed, isn't there some advantage to moving forward now with
Yucca Mountain given its dry nature?
Response. I am in no way advocating a position of ``wait and hope''
for new technologies. As I stated in my testimony, I believe that
geologic repositories provide the best solution to the problem of high-
level nuclear waste. The issue with Yucca Mountain is that it is a
geologically complex site, and therefore may not be a reasonable
location for a long-term repository.
Using Yucca Mountain as a retrievable storage site is one option,
but I do not endorse it for economic and policy reasons. A repository
or storage site at Yucca Mountain entails high transportation costs,
since the majority of reactors are located in the eastern or midwestern
portion of the country. If Yucca is found to be unsuitable as a
permanent repository, then billions of dollars will have been wasted
carting spent fuel to Yucca Mountain. It would have to be transported
elsewhere. Doesn't it make more sense to take the time to be
comfortable with the decision to dispose of waste there, instead of
simply rushing to a solution to appear to have solved the nuclear waste
problem? Furthermore, even if the site is found to be unsuitable, once
the waste is out there, it will be very difficult, politically, to move
it elsewhere.
Question 2. Considering the advantages of Yucca Mountain's
remoteness, do you see any scientific difficulties with using the site
for interim storage above or below ground?
Response. Yes. Above ground seismicity will pose a problem for
above-ground interim storage. The 1992 earthquake (magnitude 5.6)
centered on an unexposed fault on Little Skull Mountain resulted in
over 2000 aftershocks. One of the areas most affected was Jackass
Flats, the basin just east of Yucca Mountain that will the staging
ground for all waste disposal activities. During the 1992 earthquake,
some of the already-existing buildings on Jackass Flats were damaged.
Jackass Flats is a basin filled with unconsolidated sediments about
100-300 meters deep. In an earthquake such sediments basically act like
wobbly jello. This situation produced building damage experienced by
the Marina district in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in San
Francisco, even though it was far from the epicenter of the quake.
Thus, there is the potential for building/cask damage in the event of
an earthquake in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. Is an active seismic
zone a reasonable location to store waste? Do we really want to pay for
clean-up after each earthquake?
I think there are many other reasonable locations in the United
States for interim storage of spent fuel. Spent fuel can be stored in
dry casks (using exactly the same technology that would be employed at
an interim storage site) at reactor sites--almost all of which face
lower threats of earthquakes than does Yucca Mountain. Today, 25
reactor sites employ dry cask storage. This technology is over 20 years
old.
Question 3a. In your testimony you cited that almost all other
countries with a repository program is planning on using a wet or
reducing repository environment as opposed to a dry site. Two countries
specifically mentioned were Sweden and Finland. Couldn't the reason
that other countries are pursuing wet sites be that they simply don't
have any dry sites like Yucca Mountain?
Response. That is part of the reason. In Sweden, the siting process
was in part controlled by SKB's seeking out communities that were
willing to host the site. In exploring potential repository sites,
Finland made an effort to consider all the different rock types in the
country. Under the original 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the United
States had a similar provision, requiring the three sites that were
originally to be characterized in depth to represent three different
rock types. (All that was abandoned with the 1987 Amendments.)
Question 3b. Can you site specific examples where any country
considered and rejected a dry site in favor of a wet site?
Response. Not to my knowledge.
Question 3c. Can you site any specific international scientific
studies concluding that wet sites are preferable to dry sites?
Response. The criteria for selecting repository sites outlined by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2003 are the following
(quoted from Macfarlane, 2003):
<bullet> Long-term (millions of years) geologic stability in
terms of major earth movements and deformation, faulting,
seismicity and heat flow;
<bullet> Low groundwater content and flow at repository
depths, which can be shown to have been stable for periods of
at least tens of thousands of years;
<bullet> Stable geochemical or hydrochemical conditions at
depth, mainly described by a reducing environment and a
composition controlled by equilibrium between water and rock
forming minerals;
<bullet> Good engineering properties that readily allow
construction of a repository, as well as operation for periods
that may be measured in decades. [emphasis added]
Of the four criteria listed, the third emphasizes the need for a
reducing environment. Note that Yucca Mountain fails three of these
criteria. Yucca Mountain is not tectonically stable--it is both
seismically and volcanically active, violating the first criterion.
Yucca Mountain offers an oxidizing environment, not a reducing one, as
the third criterion requires. Also, one could argue that the second
criterion is violated with the discovery of fast water pathways along
fractures and faults in the mountain.
Question 3d. Isn't it true that there are also corrosion processes
at work in wet sites, just different processes?
Response. Yes, but they operate significantly more slowly. We know
this not only from laboratory tests, but, more importantly, from
natural analogues. Under saturated or wet conditions, corrosion
behavior is more predictable in part because the system is expected to
persist for a long time. Changes to boundary conditions, such as those
controlled by climate, will not affect the saturated system. In an
unsaturated system, like Yucca Mountain, climate changes, for example,
can affect the system.
The DOE has not adequately considered the effects of human-induced
climate change over the next few hundreds years on the system at Yucca
Mountain. If carbon in the atmosphere reaches levels approaching 1,000
ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100, conditions not experienced by earth for 50
million years, Yucca Mountain may indeed become much wetter than it is
now--with conditions similar to those 50 million years ago.
Question 3e. Is there any site in the world where waste containers
have been demonstrated to be capable of lasting 10,000 to 1 million
years with absolutely no degradation? If so, can you describe and site
specifics?
Response. Not that I know of.
Question 3f. Could it not be true that the reason there is so much
discussion about long-term corrosion processes at Yucca Mountain is
that these processes are just more highly studied and better understood
that those at other types of sites?
Response. No, that it incorrect. Corrosion processes have been
studied in as much detail at the Swedish and Finnish sites.
Question 3g. Doesn't the safety analysis of Yucca Mountain take
these corrosion processes into account in calculating a long-term
radiation doses?
Response. Yes, but many experts are not satisfied with the results.
The problem is that there are too many uncertainties. These
uncertainties arise from the fact that too many corrosion processes,
which occur over periods of geologic time under oxidizing conditions,
are not well understood. Basic information, such as thermodynamic and
kinetic data on the alteration products of uranium dioxide (the main
component of spent fuel) are not yet known.
Question 3h. Before DOE decided that the Yucca Mountain site was
the best suited site for waste disposal in 1986, eight other sites,
along with thousands of pages of scientific analysis, were reviewed.
Yucca Mountain's Environmental Assessment alone contained over 1,000
pages of scientific and technical information. All of this analysis was
rolled into the Multiattribute Utility Analysis published in 1986. To
what extent was Finland's scientific review before selecting a site?
Did Finland consider multiple sites as the United States has before
choosing the best site? Did Finland create an underground laboratory
for choosing their site as we did at Yucca Mountain?
Response. In 1984, the DOE first selected five sites (Davis,
Canyon, Richton Dome, Hanford, Yucca Mountain, and Deaf Smith County)
from nine previously identified sites. The DOE's basis for their
decision, which was not multi-attribute analysis, came under severe
criticism. They asked the National Academy of Sciences to review their
decision and the NAS handed down harsh criticism of their site
selection methodology. The DOE then employed multi-attribute analysis
(and came up with the same five sites). The NAS was more encouraged by
the use of multi-attribute analysis, but warned that multi-attribute
analysis alone was not adequate to make a site selection decision.
As I stated above, Finland did indeed consider five sites before
selecting the Okiluoto site in 2001. In 1987, Finland chose 5 sites
from a survey of the whole country. Each site represented a different
rock type. In 1992, they selected three sites for environmental
assessment. In 1997-99 they released the results of the environmental
assessments. Of the three sites studied, only the community near
Okiliouto favored developing a repository near them.
In Sweden's last iteration of site selection, they considered the
five sites already occupied by nuclear power facilities. Four of the
five communities were asked to participate in a feasibility study and
two accepted. So Sweden is studying two sites in depth at the moment.
Finland is just beginning to mine a repository--it did not yet
create an underground laboratory. Sweden, on the other hand, has
created an underground laboratory in Aspo, the Hard Rock Laboratory.
Question 3i. You mentioned that there were other sites more suited
for high level waste disposal than Yucca Mountain in the United States
please identify these sites and describe your bases for concluding that
these sites are better than Yucca Mountain?
Response. Suffice it to say that many states, especially those on
the east coast (where the majority of reactors are located) would have
reasonable geologies to host a repository for high-level nuclear waste.
Note, though, that the Nuclear Waste Amendments Act of 1987 prevents us
from considering most of those sites because they are crystalline rock,
the study of which for a geologic repository is prohibited by the Act.
The criteria for a good site are those listed above that the IAEA
developed. Germany has recently developed a similar list of criteria:
<bullet> A site must not have large vertical movements of >1
millimeter per year
<bullet> A site must have no active fault zones
<bullet> A site must have low seismicity
<bullet> A site must exhibit no Quaternary volcanism
<bullet> A site must not have young groundwater (the
groundwater should not contain tritium or carbon-14)
Following these criteria and those of the IAEA should result in
well-selected sites. The United States has many locations within its
borders that fit these qualifications.
______
Responses by Allison Macfarlane to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. In your written testimony, you recommend several
improvements for determining the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a
geological repository for nuclear waste such as making changes to our
system of site evaluation, reducing uncertainties associated with waste
disposal and using comparative analysis with data from other sites. Can
you provide some more detail to your recommendations, including
identifying priorities and suggest how long additional evaluation of
Yucca Mountain might take?
Response. First, let me quote from Chapter 24 of my forthcoming
book, Uncertainty Underground: Yucca Mountain and High-Level Nuclear
Waste (MIT Press, 2006):
How, then, should policy decisions on nuclear waste be made? Let's
revisit the advice of the person who first suggested the United States
consider the unsaturated zone in the Nevada desert: Ike Winograd.
Winograd (1990) suggested that the DOE use ``technical judgment'' to
evaluate the suitability of the site. Technical judgment includes the
use of multiple barriers in a repository, and encourages the use of
multiple techniques to analyze the site, with weighting as judged
reasonable by experience. This is simply a more honest way of
acknowledging our inability to specify the suite of correct conceptual
models for analysis.
Technical judgment can be supplemented by comparative analysis. In
the current situation that relies on performance assessment, Yucca
Mountain is being evaluated in isolation--that is, without comparison
to any other site. This makes it difficult for policymakers, the
public, and even scientists to grasp all the important issues that will
affect the safety of a repository over geologic time. For both
scientific and social reasons, comparing the site to others makes sense
(Flynn and Slovic, 1995). Thus, I suggest that Yucca Mountain be
evaluated via comparison to other existing or planned sites about which
a substantial set of information has been gathered. Potential sites for
comparison include the Swedish site, the Olkilouto site in Finland, the
clay site in France, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Project site in
Carlsbad, New Mexico. If Yucca Mountain comes up significantly short in
making such a comparison, then Congress will have to reconsider the
waste issue.
Fortunately, an opportunity has recently emerged to make changes in
the way Yucca Mountain is evaluated. Because of a July 2004 court
decision (see Introduction), the Environmental Protection Agency must
revisit the radiation protection standard for Yucca Mountain. This will
cause the NRC to promulgate new regulations and the DOE to issue new
guidelines. The NRC and DOE could de-emphasize performance assessment
in determining whether the Yucca Mountain site is suitable and add in
other measures such as those suggested above.
What else can be done to improve the current situation? Jasanoff
(1995) has shown that the legitimacy of scientific assessments,
especially those done by governmental bodies, can be improved by
negotiation and compromise instead of controversy. Conflict over
scientific assessments can be ameliorated by the use of the independent
scientific community. Jasanoff (1995) suggests that policy decisions
should be arranged so that there is continual and repeated consultation
among the scientists producing the analysis, independent scientific
experts, the public, and policymakers. The Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board, which oversees the DOE's nuclear waste programs, is an
oversight body, with its members appointed by the President from
candidates recommended by the National Academy of Sciences. This
appointment process can result in a sense of political dependence that
may mute the Board's message. Instead, Congress or the DOE could
provide funds to citizens' groups to consult with scientists not
affiliated with Yucca Mountain to develop a list of independent experts
to act as a review board. This was done very successfully for Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico where a federally funded, state
organization, the Environmental Evaluation Group, provided credible
technical oversight of WIPP. Such an oversight group or board would be
required to have meetings open to all who are interested during its
review sessions. Such a measure would provide both oversight and
legitimacy to the DOE's assessments. (quoted from Macfarlane, 2006)
In terms of priority, a few more studies must be concluded at Yucca
Mountain, especially those that bear on water transport in the
unsaturated zone (discussed below) and those that attempt to understand
spent fuel and waste canister corrosion. These studies will take on the
order of 5 years. Then it would be important to compare the Yucca
Mountain site to others, as suggested. Not only the DOE, but a number
of independent scientific groups, should perform their own analyses of
this comparison. Then, policymakers would have a good source of
information to make the choice of whether to proceed with Yucca
Mountain or to look elsewhere.
Question 2. Much has been made of our need for a geologic
repository. Your testimony suggests that DOE is now not really relying
on the geology of Yucca Mountain to protect the public from radiation
releases. Is there any way, based upon what we know at the site today,
to take advantage of the site's geology to protect against releases of
radiation?
Response. I think this issue deserves more study; the bottom line
is that we do not know yet. Yucca Mountain has many weaknesses (see
discussion on IAEA criteria). There are many unanswered questions, some
of which can be addressed in the next 10 years or so. These include
data on rapid water transport pathways from the surface to the
repository. The DOE needs to understand which faults and fractures flow
and what volume of water they might carry, in consideration of events
such as thousand-year storms.
Eventually, though, the problem is that Yucca Mountain may be left
with only engineering ``fixes.'' These are not really solutions for the
repository, which was supposed to operate using a ``multiple barrier''
approach that includes both geologic and engineered barriers. Right
now, Yucca Mountain appears to have only engineered barriers. The most
important decision in repository siting is site selection, and Congress
made this decision in 1987.
__________
Statement of Robert Fri, Chairman, National Research Council, Committee
on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is
Robert W. Fri. I am a Visiting Scholar at Resources for the Future, a
Washington-based nonprofit organization that aims to improve
environmental and natural resource policymaking through objective
social science research. I was also the chair of the National Research
Council's Committee on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards.
Our committee's report, Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards,
was issued in 1995. I have been asked to summarize for you the
recommendations in that report and to comment particularly on the
current status of the health standard for the radioactive waste
repository proposed for Yucca Mountain.
As background, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed EPA to
arrange for an analysis by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of
the scientific bases for radiation protection standards to be applied
at Yucca Mountain. The Act also directed EPA to develop radiation
protection standards that were ``based upon and consistent with'' the
National Academy of Sciences' recommendations:
. . . the Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with
the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public health and safety
standards for protection of the public from releases from
radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository
at the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards shall prescribe the
maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members
of the public from releases to the accessible environment from
radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository.
(P.L. 102-486, Title VIII, Section 801. 42 U.S.C. Section
10141) The NAS findings and recommendations to EPA on the
technical bases for Yucca Mountain standards were provided in
the National Research Council report entitled Technical Bases
for Yucca Mountain Standards, hereafter referred to as the
``TYMS report.'' This report was authored by a committee of
experts that was appointed by the Chairman of the National
Research Council. The TYMS committee was disbanded after its
report was completed in 1995. Accordingly, I am appearing here
today as past chairman of the TYMS committee, not as a
representative of Resources for the Future. I will provide you
with a summary of the TYMS report's recommendations relevant to
the topic of this hearing and will then discuss their relevance
to the EPA standard.
I will summarize the TYMS report's recommendations under three
headings:
<bullet> The elements of the standard itself
<bullet> Treatment of human intrusion
<bullet> Compliance assessment
Compliance assessment has proved to be the most difficult of these
issues and I will focus my comments on that topic.
the elements of the standard
The TYMS report made five recommendations regarding the elements of
the health standard for Yucca Mountain. They are:
1. The Form of the Standard. Although the Energy Policy Act
stipulated that EPA should develop a standard that prescribes dose
equivalents, the TYMS report recommended that EPA develop a standard
that sets a limit on the risk to individuals of adverse health effects
from releases from the repository.
2. Level of Protection. The TYMS report noted that the level of
protection was a policy decision to be established through the
rulemaking process. Science can provide some guidance in this matter,
but in the end the level of protection that the public wants is up to
them.
3. Protection of the General Public. The TYMS report concluded that
an individual-risk standard would protect the health of the general
public, provided that policymakers and the public were prepared to
accept that very low radiation doses pose a negligibly small risks.
4. Technology-Based Standards. The TYMS report recommended against
imposing repository subsystem performance requirements in the Yucca
Mountain standards.
5. Alara. The TYMS report noted that there is no scientific basis
for incorporating the ALARA principle into the standard.
With the exception of the committee's preference for a risk-based
standard, EPA appears to have generally concurred in these
recommendations regarding the elements of the standard. EPA has adopted
a dose-based standard, which is functionally equivalent to a risk-based
standard only so long as the arithmetic relationship between dose and
risk is fixed. Moreover, a dose-based standard is less easily
understood by the public than a standard stated in terms of the
incremental risk associated with future releases of radiation from the
repository.
treatment of human intrusion
The TYMS report recommended that the standards developed by EPA
should require active and passive institutional controls in the near
term, should be based on an explicitly assumed intrusion scenario in
the long term, and should set limits for the human intrusion scenario
that are no more stringent than the undisturbed case. EPA's standard is
broadly consistent with this recommendation.
Compliance Assessment The differences between the standard proposed
by EPA and the recommendations of the TYMS committee are greatest in
the area of how to assess whether the repository will comply with the
radiation standard that EPA sets. And it is on the issue of compliance
assessment that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the proposed
standard to EPA. I will first review the physical processes that the
standard is meant to govern, then compare how the TYMS committee
addressed the compliance issue, compare our approach to that of EPA,
and finally comment on the decision of the appeals court.
Conceptually, the physical processes involved are relatively
straightforward. Radioactive waste is placed in metal canisters and the
canisters are buried in Yucca Mountain in a system of tunnels. Over
thousands of years, these canisters will corrode and begin to release
their waste into the geological formations in which they were buried.
Infiltrating water from the surface of Yucca Mountain will carry this
waste downward through the rock formations, ultimately reaching the
water table. Once it reaches the water table, this radioactive waste
will be carried by groundwater away from the Yucca Mountain site.
During this whole transport process, the level of radioactivity in the
waste slowly declines, although some persists for hundreds of thousands
of years.
As the radioactive waste is moved by groundwater away from the
site, it can come into contact with human activity. The chief contact
is likely to be through the extraction of contaminated groundwater for
direct or indirect human consumption. If this occurs, humans could be
exposed to radioactivity by drinking this extracted water or eating
food irrigated with this water. The objective of compliance assessment
is to determine whether this exposure of humans to radioactivity would
result in a dose (or risk) that exceeds the EPA standard.
This brief summary of the physical processes by which the public
could be exposed to radiation escaping from the repository serves to
illustrate the importance of three recommendations made by the TYMS
committee regarding compliance assessment.
1. How Long. The TYMS report concluded that there is no scientific
basis for limiting the compliance assessment period to 10,000 years, as
proposed by EPA. That being the case, the committee recommended that
compliance assessment be conducted for the time up to which the
greatest risk of exposure to radiation from Yucca Mountain occurs,
within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the geologic
environment. The report concluded that the geological formations at
Yucca Mountain were sufficiently stable to permit modeling of physical
processes that control movement of radioactive waste from the
repository for periods on the order of 1 million years. It is important
to understand that this conclusion does not necessarily suggest that we
can predict what will happen 1 million years from now, or even 10,000
years from now. Rather, the TYMS committee concluded that modeling
physical processes for up to about a million years is not appreciably
more difficult that doing so for ten thousand years. The longer time
horizon provides more time for the radioactive waste released from the
repository to migrate to distant locations where it is more likely to
come into contact with humans.
2. Exposure Scenarios. An exposure scenario describes the means by
which humans are exposed to the radioactive waste from Yucca Mountain--
chiefly through extraction of groundwater. The TYMS report concluded
that there is no scientific basis for predicting the societal factors
required to establish exposure scenarios and, therefore, the report
recommended that such scenarios be established through the rulemaking
process. The practical consequence of this recommendation is to rely on
knowledge of current human activity around the site rather than to
speculate on what people might do in the future.
3. Who is Protected. The TYMS report recommended that EPA apply the
standards to a critical group representative of those individuals in
the population who, based on cautious, but reasonable, assumptions,
have the highest risk resulting from repository releases. The purpose
of this recommendation was to avoid the accumulation of overly
conservative assumptions. In particular, Yucca Mountain was selected
because of its isolation to reduce the likelihood that some individual
would extract groundwater that is contaminated with radioactive waste
from Yucca Mountain. The committee concluded that this isolation should
be taken into account in compliance assessment, and so recommended that
the probability of people being present be taken into account when
selecting the critical group.
The inconsistency, if there is one, between the TYMS committee
recommendations and the standard that EPA promulgated in 1999 lies in
the different treatment of the time horizon of the compliance
assessment and the definition of who is to be protected. The TYMS
committee elected to carry the time horizon out to the point of
greatest risk to the public, which is almost certainly more than ten
thousand years. EPA limited its compliance standard to ten thousand
years. On the question of who is protected, the committee recommended a
probabilistic identification of a critical group that would account for
the isolation of the Yucca Mountain site. EPA proposed to protect what
it defined as the Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual. This
individual was assumed to live above groundwater that contains the
highest concentration of radioactive contamination from Yucca Mountain,
and eats food and drinks water that contains this contamination. In
other words, the Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual is a
deterministic concept; there is no doubt that this person will
encounter the most contaminated water from the repository.
These differences can be illustrated in the chart at Figure 1. The
vertical axis represents the time horizon of the compliance assessment,
and the horizontal axis represents the degree to which the person to be
protected is selected on a probabilistic or deterministic basis. As you
can see, the TYMS committee and EPA are at diametrically opposite ends
of this representation. The TYMS report, in the upper right-hand
corner, uses a longer compliance period and a probabilistic exposure
scenario. The EPA standard is just the reverse--a short compliance
period and a deterministic exposure scenario.
I will conclude my presentation by offering some personal
observations on how the revised standard proposed by EPA in 2005
responds to the TYMS report recommendations. The DC appeals court
concluded that EPA had not set a standard that was based upon and
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National
Academy of Sciences, because EPA did not follow the committee's advice
on the compliance period. However, in proposing a new standard in
response to the court's direction EPA had to deal with the problem that
the specification of the time horizon and the selection of the person
to be protected are intimately connected.
So, in revising the standard, EPA could have looked at what
combination of time horizon and selection of the person to be protected
creates a reasonable case that is consistent with the court's opinion.
For example, it could have shown that the protection afforded to the
public by its remanded standard is functionally equivalent to the
recommendations of the TYMS committee, and that there are good policy
reasons for using the EPA approach. Or it could have accepted the
longer time horizon but selected the individual at risk in a less
deterministic way, thus avoiding an overly conservative approach.
It appears, however, that EPA had policy reasons for retaining the
Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual as the definition of the
individual at risk. This decision would place the standard in the upper
left-hand corner of Figure 1. But that is a place that the TYMS
committee specifically did not want to be. We know this because one
member of the committee did want to combine a long time horizon with a
deterministic selection, a position that he outlined in some detail in
the report.
But this position runs the risk of excessive conservatism. As I
wrote in response to this committee member's proposal:
``. . . the standard should avoid . . . an extreme case defined by
unreasonable assumptions regarding factors affecting dose and risk'. .
. . some members of the committee believe that the approach advocated
by [the dissenting member] could become just such an extreme case.''
(TYMS report, page 188) What EPA did to avoid becoming overly
conservative, as I interpret the new proposal, is to retain the 10,000-
year standard and the Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual as the
person at risk, and to add a post-10,000 year all-pathways standard
that applies to the time of peak dose at a period of up to 1 million
years. The numerical value of that added standard is 350 millirem,
which is higher than dose allowed for the 10,000-year standard. It is
difficult to say whether EPA's proposed standard is consistent with the
TYMS report, which only provided risk ranges as starting points for
EPA's analysis. I would note, however, that the committee recognized
that EPA properly had considerable discretion in applying policy
considerations outside the scope of our study to the development of the
health standard for Yucca Mountain.
Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Responses by Robert Fri to Additional Questions from Senator Inhofe
Question 1. NAS issued a study in 2001 reaffirming that a geologic
repository is the best method for permanent disposal of used fuel--has
anything occurred since then to change that conclusion?
Response. The NAS report referred to in this question, Disposition
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal and
Technical Challenges (NRC, 2001), notes (p. 1) that ``There has been,
for decades, a worldwide consensus in the nuclear technical community
for disposal through geological isolation of high-level waste (HLW),
including spent nuclear fuel (SNF).'' The report also notes (p. 3) that
``After four decades of study, geological disposal remains the only
scientifically and technically credible long-term solution available to
meet the need for safety without reliance on active management.'' There
have been no developments since this report was issued that would
change these conclusions.
Question 2. What did the NAS mean when it stated that ``selection
of a time scale also involves policy considerations''?
Response. The 1995 NAS report on Yucca Mountain standards (NRC,
1995) focused on the technical bases for how long a risk-based standard
should be applied. The report concluded (p. 55) that ``there is no
scientific basis for limiting the time period of the individual risk
standard to 10,000 years or any other value.'' However, the report
notes that there might be policy reasons for setting such a time limit:
``One [reason] would be to set a policy that beyond a set interval of
time, it would not be necessary to protect public health.'' The report
also notes (p. 56) that ``EPA might choose to establish consistent
policies for managing risks from disposal of both long-lived hazardous
nonradioactive materials and radioactive materials.'' The report also
recommended (p. 56) that ``In drafting standards, EPA should as a
matter of policy address whether future generations should have less,
greater, or equivalent protection.''
It is important to recognize that when mandating this study,
Congress directed the NAS to examine only the technical bases for the
Yucca Mountain standards. The NAS refrained from addressing the policy
bases, leaving that task to EPA. The NAS judged that it was EPA's
responsibility to determine and clearly explain the important policy
issues to be addressed in setting these standards.
Question 3. Could EPA have proposed a standard based on a peak dose
incorporating policy considerations based on risk which only reached to
10,000 years and stay within the NAS recommendations?
Response. This is a hypothetical question that can only be answered
by Congress or the courts. However, it is worth noting that the 1999
letter report by the NAS Board on Radioactive Waste Management (NRC,
1999) recommended that EPA acknowledge that its proposed 10,000-year
standard was a policy choice. EPA declined to pursue this line of
argument when it promulgated its final standards.
Question 4. Do you think that a million-year standard places a
higher priority on hypothetical long term hazards over near term
concrete hazards?
A properly designed standard can achieve both near-term and long-
term protection. The recommendation in the 1995 NAS report (NRC, 1995)
for a probabilistic critical group combined with a standard based on
the time of peak risk was explicitly designed to achieve such a
balance.
______
Responses by Robert Fri to Additional Questions from Senator Jeffords
Question 1. A reason to use a risk-based standard is so that you
can compare the risks between different kinds of regulated activities,
that is to say the public can know the risks of the Yucca Mountain
repository compared to a chemical plant. Do you believe that doses
stated in radiation measurements allow the public to compare the risks
they face from this facility versus other facilities?
Response. The 1995 NAS report (NRC, 1995) recommended that the
Yucca Mountain standards be based on risk rather than dose precisely
because the authoring committee judged that nonexperts would more
easily be able to make such comparisons. This was reiterated in the
1999 letter report from the NAS Board on Radioactive Waste Management
(NRC, 1999). There are two issues involved with such comparisons.
First, it is difficult for nonexperts to convert from dose to risk.
Second, the dose-risk relationship is subject to change with advances
in scientific knowledge of radiation health effects. In the latter
case, EPA would have to adjust its dose-based standards to maintain a
constant level of risk.
Question 2. In 1995, the panel predicted geologic stability was on
the order of 1 million years. How was that prediction made? I am
interested in better understanding this prediction because there has
been some seismic activity at the Yucca Mountain project site in 2002.
Response. The 1 million-year time estimate for the stability of
hydrological and geological conditions in the vicinity of Yucca
Mountain was based on quantitative assessments of the rates of three
geological processes: erosion, deposition of sediment, and faulting.
The operation of these processes over time will change the land surface
and subsurface geology in the vicinity of the proposed repository.
These changes, in turn, will affect the groundwater system, which is
the main pathway for projected radionuclide releases from the proposed
repository. If future changes in the groundwater system are large, it
will be very difficult to use quantitative models to estimate the long-
term performance of the repository system. The committee examined the
estimated rates of these three geological processes and concluded that
geological and hydrological stability could be expected for periods on
the order of 1 million years.
Question 3. Will you describe the type of individuals that comprise
the ``critical group'' that the NAS recommended that EPA regulate to
protect from radiation at the Yucca Mountain project. Can you describe,
in greater detail, how the NAS recommendation and EPA's new regulation
differ in their approach to risk regulation?
Response. The critical group is described in the 1995 NAS report
(NRC, 1995, p. 53) as ``representative of those individuals in the
population who, based on cautious, but reasonable, assumptions, have
the highest risk resulting from repository releases. The group should
be small enough to be relatively homogeneous with respect to diet and
other aspects of behavior that affect risks.'' The report also notes
that it is necessary to define who these hypothetical persons will be
in the future by making assumptions about lifestyle, location, and
eating habits, among other factors. Based on knowledge of current
lifestyles around the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, the
individuals most likely to be at highest risk at long times into the
future are those who use water that has become contaminated with
material from the repository. Those individuals are likely to live near
the repository and draw their water from the ground or from surface
sources fed by groundwater. Both EPA and the NAS committee agree on
which individuals are likely to be at highest risk. However, as
explained the written testimony, the 1995 NAS report recommended that
the critical group be based on probabilistic exposure scenarios,
whereas EPA has chosen to use deterministic exposure scenarios.
Question 4. Your written testimony seems to suggest that EPA is
being overly conservative when it seeks to regulate to protect people
that will encounter the most contaminated groundwater from the Yucca
Mountain project. Are you suggesting the National Academy panel you
chaired did not think we should protect people we know will be exposed
to the highest levels of radiation?
Response. The committee recommended that the analysis of compliance
with the standard be extended to the time of greatest risk, which is
well beyond the 10,000-year limit originally proposed by EPA. At the
same time, the committee cautioned against making overly conservative
assumptions when conducting the analysis. The design of the NAS
recommended critical group was based on these two principles. See the
answer to question No. 3 for additional details on protection of the
critical group.
Question 5. Does the National Academy's 1995 report address the
technical basis for changing the standard, namely moving from 15
millirem to 350 millirem, after 10,000 years, as EPA is currently
proposing?
Table 2-4 on page 50 in the 1995 NAS report (NRC, 1995) provides
some suggested starting points for EPA's consideration of risk-based
standards. EPA's recommended 350 millirem standard is well above the
numerical values in that table. The 1995 NAS report recommended that
the health standard apply to the time of peak risk and did not
explicitly recommend a two-part standard as EPA is currently proposing.
references cited
NRC [National Research Council]. 1995. Technical Bases for Yucca
Mountain Standards. Washington, DC.: National Academy Press.
NRC. 1999. Comments on Proposed Radiation Protection Standards for
Yucca Mountain, Nevada by the Board on Radioactive Waste Management.
Washington, DC.: National Research Council--Board on Radioactive Waste
Management.
NRC. 2001. Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel:
The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges. Washington, DC.:
National Academy Press.
__________
Statement of Paul M. Golan, Acting Director for the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Paul Golan
and I am the Acting Director of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. I appreciate the opportunity
to provide the committee with an update on the Yucca Mountain Project.
introduction
Over the last 50 years, our Nation has benefited greatly from
nuclear energy and the power of the atom, but we have been left with a
legacy marked by the generation and accumulation of more than 50,000
metric tons of commercially generated spent nuclear fuel, 2,500 metric
tons of DOE spent fuel, and an estimated 20,000 or more canisters of
DOE high-level radioactive waste. There is a global consensus that the
best, safest, long-term option for dealing with this waste is geologic
isolation.
The National Academy of Sciences has generally endorsed the
geologic disposal option for high-level waste since 1957. In
particular, the National Research Council has stated:
``High-level waste should be put specifically into designed
and engineered facilities underground, where the local geology
and groundwater conditions have been chosen to ensure isolation
of the waste for tens of thousands of years or longer, and
where the waste materials will migrate very slowly if they come
into contact with the rock.''
As the committee knows, there is limited temporary surface storage
of waste at 122 sites in 39 States across our Nation. Additionally,
2,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel will be generated
this year and in every succeeding year by the current fleet of
commercial electrical power generating reactors as they supply 20
percent of our Nation's electricity. As a result, failure to address
the issues of permanent disposal is not an option.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, defined the Federal
Government's responsibility to provide permanent geologic disposal in a
repository for all spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
In 2002, Congress approved President Bush's recommendation for
development of Yucca Mountain as the Nation's high-level radioactive
waste repository. The President's recommendation of Yucca Mountain was
based on more than 20 years of scientific research, and recognizes that
Yucca Mountain will provide a safer and more secure location for the
Nation's nuclear waste than the current temporary surface storage
facilities, many of which are located near lakes, rivers, and
waterways.
Within the Federal Government, the Department of Energy has the
responsibility to construct and operate the Yucca Mountain repository.
I will address the following topics today in my opening statement:
<bullet> First, a review of actions initiated by the Secretary over
the last year and an explanation of the clean-canistered approach and
why we believe that path is compelling;
<bullet> Second, a discussion of the Proposed Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Radiation Protection Standard; and
<bullet> Third, where the Project is in terms of developing a
baseline and schedule.
the clean-canistered approach
In mid-2005 Secretary Bodman directed a thorough review of the
Department's overall approach to design, licensing, and operation of
the Project to determine if there were better ways to run the
repository. His guidance to me was clear: ``. . . make it safer and
simpler.'' Late last year we announced a redirection to a predominantly
clean-canistered approach to spent fuel operations. A single canister
would be used to transport, age, and dispose of the waste without ever
needing to re-open the spent fuel package. While some have been
critical of this approach, we believe that the technical challenges can
be resolved; and the result will be a simpler, safer, and more reliable
operation.
The clean-canistered approach will significantly reduce the risks
of radiation exposure and contamination from spent fuel handling
operations at the repository. It does this by eliminating the need for
at least two massive fuel-handling facilities that are intended to
handle individual spent nuclear fuel assemblies several times prior to
packaging the waste for disposal. With this plan, the spent nuclear
fuel primarily will be packaged for disposal by the utilities that
generated the waste. This approach offers the advantage of having those
who know most about the waste--the generators--be responsible for
placement in canisters and packaging. We would thus take advantage of
commercial reactor sites with existing capability and skills. We will
not need to build new equipment and train operators for a capability
that already exists in the private sector. We are working with industry
to develop the specifications for a canister that can contain
commercial spent nuclear fuel after it is discharged from the reactors
and cooled. In addition to requiring fewer, cleaner, and simpler
surface facilities, the new facility approach should be easier to
design, license, build, and operate.
While this approach will have significant short-term and long-term
fiscal and safety benefits, it will require additional time to
redevelop and revise portions of the license application. Later this
summer the Department expects to have a new conceptual design for the
surface facilities at Yucca Mountain that support this approach.
proposed epa radiation protection standard
On August 22, 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency proposed a
revised ``Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standard
for Yucca Mountain'' in response to a decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which vacated portions of
the existing EPA standard. Specifically, EPA proposed a radiological
exposure limit for the time of peak dose to the general public during 1
million years following the disposal of radiological material at the
Yucca Mountain site.
The proposed rule retains the existing 10,000-year individual
protection standard of 15 mRem/year to the reasonably maximally exposed
individual, and supplements it with an additional standard applicable
at the time of peak dose. The Department supports this approach. A rule
with two compliance periods recognizes the limitations of bounding
analyses, the greater uncertainties at the time of peak risk, and the
increased uncertainty in calculated results as time and uncertainties
increase. Retaining the existing 15 mRem/year standard for the initial
10,000-year period ensures that the repository design will include all
prudent steps, including the use of engineered and natural barriers, to
minimize offsite doses during the first 10,000 years after disposal.
These natural barriers, and to some extent the engineered barriers,
will continue to operate throughout the million-year period, keeping
exposure levels low, below what people receive today based on where
they work or where they live. Importantly, this reflects a level of
risk that society normally lives with today, in that the maximum peak
dose at Yucca Mountain would be no greater than the average dose a
current resident of Denver or similar high altitude location receives
in an average year.
development of a baseline and schedule
Although the Yucca Mountain Program had intended to submit a
license application to the NRC in December 2004, a number of issues
arose that prevented this, including development of the amended draft
EPA radiation protection standard as discussed earlier, redesign of the
surface facilities to handle primarily canistered waste, and other
matters that need to be addressed before we are ready to submit a
license application. We believe that submission of our license
application should not be driven by artificial dates. We are committed
to developing a realistic schedule that will result in the submission
of a strong license application to the NRC. We expect to receive and
review our new design this spring and, after its approval by the
Secretary, incorporate it into our baseline. Later this summer, we
anticipate we will publish our schedule for submittal of the license
application to the NRC.
conclusion
There is a clear national need for Yucca Mountain, even if we could
reduce our National electricity consumption by 20 percent and were able
to shut down every commercial reactor and nuclear project in the
country today. We are taking steps to ensure that we develop and
construct the safest, simplest repository that we possibly can, based
on sound science and quality work. I believe that our license
application will provide the necessary assurances that we can operate
Yucca Mountain in compliance with the performance requirements of the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
We will also demonstrate that our approach to operations will be
carefully planned, logical, and methodical.
This completes my prepared statement.
______
Responses by Paul M. Golan to Additional Questions from Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Given the scope of the work identified and re-planned
in the proposed budget, what is the Department's plan to update cost
estimates of the TSLCC reflecting the Department's best estimates and
assumptions?
Response. The program is planning to develop new cost estimates
once the Department selects new designs for surface facilities that
incorporate a clean-canistered approach and that are approved by the
Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board. Decisions on the designs are
expected this summer.
Question 2. The Department is shifting important scientific and
data quality work to Sandia as part of a restructuring of the program,
and there has been a dramatic reduction of funding over the last 2
years in this area. Given the heightened concern over the fidelity and
quality of data supporting the scientific mission and performance of
the mountain, which must be relied upon in an NRC proceeding, what is
the Department doing to ensure the personnel, quality controls, and
checks and balances needed to preserve the fidelity and quality of the
data that represents the underpinning of the scientific bases of the
license application?
Response. While the quality assurance program has operated pursuant
to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved parameters, this
project has not achieved the ``nuclear culture'' required of an NRC
licensee when it undertakes the construction and operation of a nuclear
facility.
We are implementing mandatory training on identifying conditions
adverse to quality and the actions required to be taken if any such
condition is identified.
Question 3. In addition to preparing the application for Yucca
Mountain, I understand your office has been making progress on other
related issues such as designing standardized canisters for the
shipment of waste. How will this enhance the licensing process?
Response. We believe that the clean-canistered approach to
receiving commercial spent fuel will allow us to greatly simplify the
design and licensing of the facilities at Yucca Mountain. With a clean-
canistered approach personnel will be handling primarily canistered
waste, not individual fuel assemblies as previously planned. These
canisters will provide another contamination barrier between the worker
and the waste. For example, when routine maintenance is required in the
canistered operating facilities, workers will not have to deal with
radiological contamination as they would with individual fuel assembly
handling operations.
Question 4. Why do you need the full fiscal year 2007 budget
request for Yucca Mountain if the Department is not planning on
submitting a license application this year?
Response. The fiscal year 2007 budget request does not assume a
license application will be submitted to the NRC this year. The request
includes funds for the development of the license application and
repository surface design to support the cleancanistered approach.
Additional funds are requested for ongoing science programs, data
collection efforts, quality assurance, program management and
activities for systems analysis. The Department is also requesting $70
million to develop the transportation infrastructure in 2007. This
includes rail cars, rolling stock, casks and completing the
environmental impact statement for rail access to the site. Last, we
are requesting $40 million to make safety-required improvements to the
infrastructure at Yucca Mountain.
______
Responses by Paul M. Golan to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. DOE.--I understand that the cost estimates for building
a rail line to Yucca Mountain have increased from around $800 million
to over $2 billion in the last year. If costs continue to escalate and
DOE is not able to develop rail access to Yucca Mountain, what are the
contingency plans for shipping waste to the facility from around the
country?
Response. Previous cost estimates for the Nevada rail line were
prepared prior to the designation of the Caliente rail corridor and
were based on an average of all the rail lines being analyzed. The
current estimate is specific to the Caliente rail corridor and includes
the cost of facilities related to rail operations. These facilities
include sidings and basic maintenance capability where the Nevada Rail
Line connects to existing mainline track, track maintenance-of-way
facilities along the track and an end-of-line facility proximate to the
repository. The Department of Energy (DOE) believes the cost of
constructing rail access to the repository along the Caliente corridor
is still viable based on these considerations. If funding to construct
and operate rail access to the repository is not provided, DOE would
have to reconsider its decision to use the mostly rail mode of
transport within the State of Nevada. Other transport modes available
for consideration in Nevada are the mostly legal/overweight truck
option, and the heavy haul truck option. Both the legal weight and the
heavy haul truck options could be combined with the mostly rail option
as the national transportation mode with interrnodal facilities used at
the juncture of existing rail lines and major highways within the
State.
Question 2. What is the latest Yucca Mountain cost estimate?
Response. The Department has not prepared a formal cost estimate
since the 2001 Total Life Cycle Cost Estimate of $57.5 billion. The
Department is planning to develop an updated cost estimate after the
surface facility designs and clean-canister approach is approved later
this year.
Question 3. A few months ago, DOE announced it was redesigning the
Yucca Mountain project so as to transform it into a ``clean facility.''
The centerpiece of this restructuring is the Transportation, Aging, and
Disposal canister (TAD). An almost identical concept (the Multiple
Purpose Canister or MPC) was put forth by DOE in the early 1990's and
eventually abandoned as too costly and too logistically difficult.
Since that time, more and more utility companies have moved to dry cask
storage, almost all of which require the fuel to be put in welded
storage canisters, making retrieval and repackaging in TADs extremely
costly and difficult for the utilities. If the use of the Multiply
Purpose Canister was so logistically difficult, how will DOE ensure a
multi-purpose canister like the TAD can be implemented when onsite dry
storage is proliferating and existing storage canisters are not
compatible with DOE's plans for using TAD canisters?
Response. The multi-purpose canister (MPC) approach was not
rejected for being too costly and too logistically difficult to
implement. The MPC approach was abandoned in the mid-1990's as a result
of budget reductions and congressional guidance suggesting that the
Department not spend additional resources on the development of storage
and transportation technology.
The Department is aware that many utilities are utilizing dry-cask
storage to meet their onsite spent fuel storage needs. The Department
believes that transport, aging and disposal (TAD) based canister
systems, which incorporate features required for long-term
disposability, can be successfully developed, licensed and commercially
deployed within five to 6 years. The Department is currently developing
options for incentivizing both the utility industry and the cask vendor
community to incorporate TAD-based systems into their waste management
plans as early as possible.
Question 4. What is the status of design and licensing of the new
TAD canister? How long will it take?
Response. The Department expects to have a performance-based
specification for the TAD-based systems available later this summer.
The Department believes that the TAD-based canister systems can be
successfully developed, licensed and commercially deployed within 5 to
6 years.
Question 5. Without taking credit for man-made waste disposal
containers that would have to remain intact for 10,000 years or more,
can Yucca Mountain meet a proposed 15 millirem standard?
Response. The Department has stated previously that it believes it
can demonstrate compliance with a 15 millirem standard during the
initial 10,000 years after closure of the repository. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) developed this standard to reflect the use of
both geological and engineered barriers. For the period beyond 10,000
years, EPA has proposed a 350 millirem standard. Based on past
experience, DOE expects the Total System Performance Assessment model
would take declining credit for engineered barriers as the number of
years after closure increased.
Question 6. During the hearing, EPA Acting Assistant Administer
Wehrum recommended I direct a question to you regarding legislation to
set the EPA's radiation standards. EPA is currently revising its Yucca
Mountain radiation release regulations, as mandated by the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2004, in order to make them ``based
upon and consistent with'' NAS recommendations. Is DOE seeking
legislation to set radiation standards at Yucca Mountain?
Response. The Administration is currently considering draft
legislation regarding Yucca Mountain. Since the draft legislation is
still under development and review, I cannot discuss specific
provisions at this time.
Question 7. Global Nuclear Energy Paretnership.--The Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP) budget submission includes discussion of
interim storage sites. Is Yucca Mountain or the Nevada Test Site
currently being considered as a possible interim storage site, and is
the Administration proposing or supporting efforts to change current
law to allow interim storage at Yucca Mountain or anywhere else in
Nevada? How much scientific, technical, or engineering work will need
to be done to accommodate an interim storage facility, and what is the
estimated cost?
Response. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act constrains the extent to
which the Department can undertake interim storage of commercial spent
fuel to be disposed of at the Yucca Mountain repository. The
Administration's recently proposed amendment to the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act did not include any provisions related to the interim
storage of commercial nuclear spent fuel.
The Department is currently pursuing engineering scale
demonstrations of an integrated fuel cycle that would: (1) separate
spent nuclear fuel into its constituent elements; (2) fabricate the
actinide-based elements contained in spent fuel into a new advanced
fuel form; and (3) consume transuranics in a facility such as an
advanced burner test reactor. The Department has published an Advance
Notice of Intent to initiate an Environmental Impact Statement this
year to examine these advanced technologies and the locations for
conducting engineering scale demonstrations of the technologies.
Question 8. Is Yucca Mountain or the Nevada Test Site being
considered as a possible site for a reprocessing plant envisioned under
GNEP? What sites are being considered?
Response. No decisions have been made relative to siting the spent
fuel recycling demonstration facilities. DOE will initiate the
appropriate analyses and reviews required under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) this year to inform a decision by 2008
as to where the engineering scale demonstration facilities would be
located. In March 2006, DOE issued a request for Expressions of
Interest from the public and private sectors for hosting advanced
recycling facility demonstrations. The Department anticipates issuing a
Request for Proposals this spring and awarding contracts in summer 2006
for site evaluation studies. The results of these studies should
provide additional information for the NEPA analyses.
Question 9. How would reprocessing and fast neutron reactors, if
developed to commercialization, affect the licensing of Yucca Mountain?
Does DOE plan to submit a license application for spent fuel storage at
Yucca Mountain before reprocessing and fast neutron reactors are
technically viable and economic?
Response. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) technologies, if
demonstrated, could have a positive impact on the future operation of
the Yucca Mountain repository because of the reduction in volume of
waste that needs geological disposal, the homogeneous waste form, the
lower heat load, and the shorter half life of the radioactive
constituents.
Successful deployment of GNEP technologies, however, is many years
in the future. DOE does not intend to delay fulfilling its obligation
to begin consolidating and disposing of the approximately 50,000 metric
tons of commercial spent fuel already generated, as well as the
approximately 2,000 metric tons being generated each year. DOE plans to
proceed with licensing, constructing and operating the Yucca Mountain
repository as planned. When GNEP technologies are deployed, DOE will
take the necessary steps to make the repository accommodate the changes
in the waste stream.
Question 10. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.--The GNEP program
is proposing an international fuel cycle program that would include
providing fresh fuel to countries and taking back the spent fuel. Would
any of that spent fuel or reprocessing waste end up in Yucca Mountain?
Would the GNEP program subsidize the fuel supply and return program, so
that the U.S. Government--and U.S. taxpayers--would pay to transport or
store foreign nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain?
Response. We do not envision accepting spent fuel pursuant to GNEP
until there is sufficient advanced recycling capability available in
the United States. At that time, we would have to consider the
conditions under which the United States would reprocess another
country's spent fuel.
Question 11. Quality assurance (QA) is extremely important,
especially for a project spanning several decades with thousands of
people working on it. QA procedures are established to ensure that the
data are generated, documented, and reported correctly. At Yucca
Mountain, QA is integral to the accuracy of the water infiltration
models, which have been used to predict how rapidly water can travel
through the mountain, how waste containers will corrode, and when the
containers will release material into the environment. The Government
Accountability Office has issued 7 reports since 1988 repeatedly
criticizing DOE's and USGS' quality assurance and model validation
programs. Over the years, DOE has stopped its contractors' work on the
project again and again in order to address these problems. In January
2006, the DOE instructed Bechtel SAIC LLC, its main contractor, to
cease work on key areas of the site, including assurance practices,
which were revealed by a whistleblower. In February 2006, NRC stopped
work at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on research related to
corrosion rates of the metals to be used to construct the waste package
and drip shield, because researchers failed to calibrate equipment,
referenced canceled documents, and incorrectly measured the corrosion
rate. Does DOE intend to address the quality assurance problems that
have been repeatedly found in research related to the site? If so, what
is DOE specifically doing to stop these egregious acts of scientific
fraud?
Response. Over the years, the Yucca Mountain QA program has been
reviewed by many independent organizations including the Government
Accountability Office, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
Office of the Inspector General. These organizations have raised
concerns about the effectiveness of the Yucca Mountain QA Program. The
Department has generally concurred with the findings and instituted
corrective action plans to address the deficiencies. These
deficiencies, however, do not undermine the overall soundness of the
science performed in connection with the Yucca Mountain Project.
Improving the quality and culture of this organization is essential
to moving this project forward. The Department intends to demonstrate
good quality, science, and processes in its license application and
across the entire organization. The Department is working aggressively
to improve the quality and culture of this organization, as
demonstrated by its standards, its actions, its behaviors, and its
performance. The Department has reviewed and revised its procedures and
has taken measures to ensure that all Project employees are cognizant
of the QA Program requirements. Individuals are being trained and
managers will aggressively enforce these requirements. Holding people
accountable is what society has a right to expect.
Question 12. Is it true that both DOE and NRC believe the risk of
an airplane crash at the Yucca site is a significant safety issue that
could prevent storage of waste onsite? Has the Air Force agreed to
restrict its flights so Yucca can be licensed?
Response. It would be premature and inappropriate for DOE to state
what it believes to be the safety significance of an airplane crash at
the repository site. Instead, DOE is assessing all hazards to the safe
operation of a repository (of which, aircraft crashes are one) in
accordance with 10 CFR 63.111. DOE is assessing the hazards associated
with aircraft crashes at the repository site and is evaluating design
and operational approaches to mitigate the risks, as necessary, to meet
the standards set forth in 10 CFR 63.111. DOE is continuing discussions
with U.S. Air Force regarding appropriate flight restrictions over the
repository site and land withdrawal area.
Question 13. When will DOE release additional details about
intended rail shipment routes across the country to Yucca Mountain?
What are the DOE's plans for implementing a dedicated train program for
rail shipment for the roughly one-third of reactors in the United
States that do not have rail access?
Response. The Department of Energy is working with stakeholders
through the Transportation External Coordinating Working Group to
establish the criteria and methodology for selecting transportation
routes. A set of recommendations for routes in the Midwest has been
provided by the Midwestern Office of the Council of State Governments.
Further recommendations are expected from the Eastern Regional
Conference of the Council of State Governments. These recommendations
along with other stakeholder input and the Department's own analyses
will be used to select the routes for shipments to Yucca Mountain.
Final decisions will be made in time to provide funding for emergency
preparedness training along the transportation corridors. The
Department has consistently committed to providing these funds three to
5 years before the first shipments are made.
Part of the Department's transportation planning has included
provisions for either heavy haul or barge shipments to a rail
connection for those reactors that do not have direct rail access. The
Department is working with State regional groups to identify where
barge would be feasible. Two regional groups, the Southern States
Energy Board and the Northeastern Regional Conference of the Council of
State Governments, are working on studies for the use of barge in their
respective regions. The Department will evaluate the tradeoffs of using
barge, heavy haul truck or other truck options, with the input of the
States and tribes as part of its transportation planning.
______
Responses by Paul M. Golan to Additional Questions from
Senator Voinovich
Question 1. DOE.--What is DOE currently doing to restore confidence
in the data that was compromised by USGS employees?
Response. The USGS emails, while not directly involving data
collection and technical work, have caused the Department to review the
work contained in two reports, Simulation of Net Infiltration for
Present-Day and Potential Future Climates and Analysis of Infiltration
Uncertainty, which currently support the Total System Performance
Assessment for the license application. The Department has conducted an
evaluation of the potential technical impacts resulting from questions
raised by the emails.
The evaluation concluded that, while the emails in and of
themselves do not suggest a misrepresentation of the underlying
science, they do appear to imply circumvention and/or misrepresentation
of compliance with Yucca Mountain Project quality assurance
requirements. Consequently, we have implemented remedial actions to
address both potential technical and quality assurance issues
associated with the supporting data, implementing software, and process
models called into question.
The Department has tasked Sandia National Laboratories to review
the existing infiltration model and to prepare a new model. After
Sandia completes these tasks, its work will be independently checked by
experts outside the Department. We have been very clear that it is
vital to properly carryout this work, and we will take the time
necessary to do so.
Question 2. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.--How does the
Department expect to fund the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
program at its current estimated cost of $13 billion over the next 10
years?
Response. The Department will seek Federal appropriations for the
integrated advanced recycling technology demonstration program that is
central to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Over the next 10
years, the majority of the anticipated costs pertain to designing,
building and bringing the three integrated advanced recycling
facilities to initial operation. The Department has initiated
discussions with countries on the technology demonstration effort and
we are hopeful that the costs will be shared among the partners.
Question 3. University Reactor Infrastructure and Education
Program.--To support the resurgence of nuclear power in the United
States we will have to continue to fund the nuclear programs at
universities, why did DOE cut this critical funding in the FY-07 budget
proposal?
Response. Over the last decade, university nuclear engineering
schools leveraged funding provided by DOE and industry partners to
strengthen the nuclear engineering education infrastructure and attract
students to careers in nuclear engineering. With enrollments at their
highest levels in over a decade and four new university nuclear
engineering programs launched over the last 5 years, the Department
believes that the objectives of the Government's support to nuclear
engineering programs have been achieved and funding has not been
requested in fiscal year 2007.
However, DOE will continue funding university participation in
DOE's nuclear energy research initiatives, through the Generation IV
nuclear systems initiative, the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative, and the
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). Over the last 4 years, the
Department has also sponsored AFCI fellowships for 25 students seeking
post-graduate degrees in study related to advanced fuel cycles,
including fuels, recycling and transmutation engineering. DOE will
continue to support the AFCI fellowship program in fiscal year 2007 and
would propose to begin a fellowship program as part of the Generation
IV initiative for study in disciplines related to advanced reactor
systems.
__________
Statement of Dade W. Moeller, Former President, Health Physics Society
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jeffords, and distinguished members of
the Committee, my name is Dade W. Moeller. I am Chairman of the Board
of Dade Moeller & Associates and am appearing today as a representative
of the Health Physics Society (HPS), an independent nonprofit
scientific organization of professionals who specialize in radiation
safety. Thank you for providing this opportunity for the Society and me
to serve as a resource as you examine the status of the Yucca Mountain
project. I received a Masters in Environmental Engineering from the
Georgia Institute of Technology in 1948, and a Doctorate in Nuclear
Engineering from North Carolina State University in 1957. I served in
the U.S. Navy for 2 years during World War II and as a commissioned
officer in the U.S. Public Health Service from 1948 to 1966.
Subsequently, I was appointed to the Faculty of the School of Public
Health, Harvard University and remained there from 1966 to 1993.
Initially, I served as Chairman of the Department of Environmental
Health Sciences, and later as Associate Dean for Continuing Education.
I am a past-President of the Health Physics Society, and the recipient
of the Meritorious Achievement Award from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. I was elected to the National Academy of Engineering in
1978 and to the Georgia Tech Engineering Hall of Fame in 1999. I
received the Distinguished Engineering Alumnus Award from N.C. State
University in 2001, the Robley D. Evans Commemorative Medal from the
Health Physics Society in 2003, and the William McAdams Outstanding
Service Award from the American Academy of Health Physics in 2005.
I am the author of more than 200 papers published on various
aspects of environmental health, with emphasis on radiation protection,
waste management, and environmental monitoring. The bulk of these
during the last 5 to 10 years have related to independent assessments
of potential radionuclide releases from the proposed Yucca Mountain
high-level radioactive waste repository. I am the author of a widely
used textbook on Environmental Health, the third edition of which was
published in 2005.
the health physics society
The HPS includes approximately 6,000 members in over 40 countries
who are currently engaged in the practice, science, and/or technology
of radiation safety. Its mission is to assure excellence in radiation
safety. Society activities include encouraging research in radiation
science, developing standards, and disseminating radiation-safety
information. As a nonprofit scientific organization, it is not
affiliated with any governmental, industrial, or private entity. The
Society is affiliated with the International Radiation Protection
Association, the American Academy of Health Physics, the American Board
of Health Physics, the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements, and other scientific and professional societies and
institutions.
In my testimony I will try to be clear as to whether statements are
those of the Health Physics Society or are my own professional opinion.
background
At present, progress on the development of the proposed Yucca
Mountain high-level radioactive waste repository is at a standstill. So
long as controversies over the dose rate limit and the health effects
of low doses of radiation exist, there will continue to be delays in
completing this project. In the meantime, spent fuel and high level
radioactive waste is being stored at more than 100 commercial nuclear
power plants, and at multiple facilities of the U.S. Department of
Energy. It will remain at these sites until this log-jam is broken.
Although I will make some comments on the Environmental Protection
Agency's environmental performance standards that are at the heart of
the controversy contributing to this log-jam, my central message is to
make a proposal for a path forward.
proposal
The key elements of the approach I propose are as follows:
1. Rather than seeking to ``dispose'' of the waste at this time,
the suggested policy would be that, as an interim step, the waste be
``stored'' in the proposed facility for perhaps 100 years, during which
time it would be subject to retrieval, if necessary.
2. One of the immediate benefits in adopting this approach would be
to enable the U.S. Congress to meet the obligation it assumed in
passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, that is, for the Federal
Government to accept responsibility for the management of high-level
radioactive waste, an obligation that it has not been able, to date, to
fulfill.
3. To ensure that the waste is not contaminating the environment,
the Yucca Mountain facility would need to be equipped with monitoring
devices that would provide, throughout the proposed 100-year period,
immediate warnings of the deterioration of any waste packages and
ensuing potential leakage. In anticipation of the potential occurrence
of such events, provisions should be developed, and implemented if
necessary, to retrieve and stabilize the affected waste packages. The
monitoring program should include the status of engineered systems and
components (such as borehole and shaft seals, backfill, and drip
shields), as well as the thermal interaction effects of the waste
packages, backfill, drip shields, rock, and unsaturated zone and
saturated zone water. The program should also provide continuous online
information on the condition of the waste packages, supported by
laboratory experiments that focus on their internal condition (USNRC,
2001).
4. Another step that could be taken to enhance the comfort of the
population groups that could be affected by radionuclide releases would
be to limit, through regulations, the development of other nuclear
related facilities within the region during the proposed 100-year
period. Under these conditions, the applicable dose rate limit, based
on the long-term dose rate limits recommended by the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1991, paragraph 191), the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP, 1993,
Section 15, page 46), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC,
1991, 10 CFR Part 20.1301), and the Health Physics Society (HPS, 2003,
recommendation 4), would be 1 mSv per year. The HPS recommendation also
supports the ICRP ``special circumstances'' provision that states, ``in
special circumstances, a higher value . . . could be allowed in a
single year, provided the average (dose rate) over 5 years does not
exceed 1 mSv per year.'' (ICRP, 1991, paragraph 192). This means that,
in case of an inadvertent release, the public dose rate limit for the
year in which it occurred could be as high as 5 mSv.
5. Even though intruders who might seek to remove some of the waste
would receive very high radiation doses (and obtaining the equipment
required to remove any of the waste would be far beyond their
capabilities), the facility would nonetheless need to be equipped with
adequate security devices to provide surveillance 24 hours per day.
6. During the proposed 100-year storage period, many significant
technological developments will occur, some of which could completely
change current concepts on the best approach for the final disposition
of high-level radioactive waste. Based on the information in the figure
below (Boulton, 1978), one of the most promising changes would be to
resume the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. As the graphs indicate,
after about 200 to 350 years, the toxicity of the remaining waste
(assuming 99.5 percent effectiveness in removing the plutonium) would
be comparable to that of the original uranium ore that was mined to
fuel the reactor from which the spent fuel was removed. This would, in
essence remove the need for a dose rate limit in terms of periods of
time on the order of thousands of years. Congress has recently shown an
interest in moving toward a reprocessing capability as demonstrated,
for example, in the Integrated spent fuel recycling provisions of the
fiscal year 2006 appropriations to the Department of Energy (House of
Representatives, 2005, pages 156-157).
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
7. Another technological advance that leading cancer specialists
predict will be developed within the next 50 years, at most, is a
method for the prevention, or cure, of many of the cancers that are
common today. Adding support to this optimism is a recent item
published in Science (von Eschenbach, 2005) in which the then current
Director of the National Cancer Institute stated that NCI ``could meet
its target of eliminating suffering and death from cancer by 2010 if
its nearly $5 billion annual budget were increased by $4.2 billion over
5 years.'' In this regard, the NCRP (1995) has offered the following
comments:
``One of the most important factors likely to affect the
significance of radiation dose in the centuries and millennia to come
is the effect of progress in medical technology. Medical progress
achieved during the past several decades has reduced the risk of
premature death and increased the average age of the population,
leading to a relative increase in diseases prevalent in the elderly,
e.g., cancer.'' . . . ``At some future time, it is possible that a
greater proportion of somatic diseases (diseases such as cancer) caused
by radiation will be treated successfully. If, in fact, an increased
proportion of the adverse health effects of radiation prove to be
either preventable or curable by advances in medical science, the
estimate of long-term detriments may need to be revised as the
consequences (risks) to future populations could be very different.''
(NCRP, 1995, Report No. 121, Section 4.2.2.3).
8. The temporary storage of the spent fuel for the suggested 100-
year period would provide time for the United States to take advantage
of these and similar developments. Since the hereditary effects of
radiation have been shown to be minimal, absent the fear of cancer, the
potential health problems associated with the disposal of the waste
would be significantly reduced.
benefits of the proposed policy
The proposed approach offers multiple benefits. These include:
1. Centralized storage of waste is provided for security and
controllability in a manner that is reversible, allowing for new
technologies to be applied to the waste before being interned for
perpetuity.
2. If reprocessing the spent fuel from nuclear reactors is judged
to be warranted, the toxicity of the waste will be of concern for only
250 to 300 years (as noted above) such that the designation of an
appropriate long-term dose rate limit would no longer be needed.
Similar considerations will apply to the time-period for which it must
be documented that the disposal facility, including the waste
containers, etc., has been designed to maintain their integrity.
3. A benefit to reprocessing, if initiated, is that the extracted
plutonium can be used as nuclear fuel, thus enhancing our capacity to
generate electricity through a process that generates no airborne
releases that will contribute to global warming.
4. Another benefit to reprocessing is that it will reduce the
amount of waste requiring disposal in Yucca Mountain.
5. Also of note is that the proposed policy is based on sound
science as illustrated by citations to the recommendations of the NCRP
and the ICRP. The roles of these two organizations are important as
sources of radiation protection standards since, in chartering the NCRP
in 1964, Congress stipulated that it was to:
``collect, analyze, develop and disseminate in the public
interest information and recommendations about (a) protection
against radiation and (b) radiation measurements, quantities
and units, particularly those concerned with radiation
protection.''
Concurrently, Congress stipulated that the NCRP was to ``cooperate
with the International Commission on Radiological Protection.'' In
accord with this directive, members of the NCRP are active participants
in developing the documents that are published by the ICRP.
6. The proposed policy would also remove the implication that any
human being, or government body, has the insight or knowledge to make
recommendations beyond a few hundred years into the future. On
reflection, most people would agree that the establishment of dose rate
limits 10,000 to 1 million years into the future is ludicrous.
Archeological discoveries have documented the presence of humans on
earth only slightly more than 10,000 years ago, and written records
documenting the presence of humans date only some 5,500 years ago
(Whitehouse, 1999).
Undoubtedly, other approaches will be proposed. All should be given
careful consideration, including detailed reviews and evaluations,
prior to making a final selection.
epa performance standards
The adoption of my proposed policy for monitored retrievable
storage in the near future (i.e., 100 years) negates the need to
evaluate the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) performance
standards for Yucca Mountain as a permanent high-level waste repository
until a decision on the final disposition of spent fuel and other high-
level waste is made after incorporating the development of improved
technology and scientific knowledge. However, it seems appropriate to
make some comments on these standards since they are the currently
proposed standards, and are of interest for this hearing.
These comments are offered with the understanding that my central
message calling for a re-design of the purpose for the Yucca Mountain
project will make these issues moot.
scientific basis for the epa standards for yucca mountain--beginning
operation to 10,000 years
The EPA standards for the period from when Yucca Mountain begins
operation as a permanent waste repository to 10,000 years have been a
long time in development and have gone through an extensive review
during the rulemaking process. However, the HPS wants to take this
opportunity to point out that the existence of a groundwater protection
standard that is separate from an individual protection standard is not
founded in science. The HPS understands the courts have upheld the
EPA's right to establish a groundwater standard separate from an ``all
pathways'' individual protection standard. However, the HPS believes it
is appropriate to continue to reaffirm its position that ``[Public
radiation-safety standards] should be expressed as an effective dose
resulting from all exposure pathways'' (HPS, June 2003). Since the
EPA's right to establish a separate groundwater protection standard is
founded in their legislative authority and enabling legislation,
alteration of this EPA approach, which is not consistent with current
scientific knowledge, would require congressional action.
scientific basis for epa standards for yucca mountain--10,000 to 1
million years after beginning operation
Basis for Proposed Standard
It should be noted that the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1991) has for some time stated that one
of the approaches for judging the acceptability of dose rate limits for
members of the public ``is to base the judgment on the variations in
the existing level of dose from natural sources. This natural
background may not be harmless, but it makes only a small contribution
to the health detriment which society experiences. It may not be
welcome but the variations from place to place (excluding the large
variations in the dose from radon in dwellings) can hardly be called
unacceptable.''
Also to be noted is that there are large uncertainties in the dose
rates from each of the components of natural background. In terms of
radon, alone, there are large uncertainties in the measured value of
the radon concentration (the presence of thoron; the status of the
equilibrium of the radon decay products; the fraction that is
unattached versus attached; etc.).
For these and other reasons, any such dose rate limit should be
accompanied by an expression of the range of uncertainty it
encompasses. The HPS has taken the position that ``Estimation of health
risk associated with radiation doses that are of similar magnitude as
those received from natural sources should be strictly qualitative and
encompass a range of hypothetical health outcomes, including the
possibility of no adverse health effects at such low levels'' (emphasis
added) (HPS, 2004).
The EPA proposed rule has a detailed discussion about the ``Effects
of Uncertainty'' (USEPA, 2005, pages 49025 to 49027). However, the
uncertainty addressed by the EPA relates to uncertainty of projecting
geological and human activity into the future. It does not discuss the
uncertainty of today's knowledge of hypothetical health outcomes from
low doses of radiation, which forms the basis for the dose rate limit
in the proposed standards, including the possibility of no adverse
health effects at these low levels.
Validity of the USEPA Analyses
Although the variation in the dose rates from natural background
radiation can be a valid basis for making judgments for radiation
protection purposes, a series of extensive studies that my colleagues
and I have performed have shown that the variations estimated by the
EPA (USEPA, 2005) could be improved through the incorporation of the
following adjustments.
<bullet> One would be to base the dose estimates to the maximum
extent onsite-specific values;
<bullet> Another would be to apply the latest estimated value of
the coefficient for converting radon exposures into dose;
<bullet> A third would be to estimate the doses from both outdoor
and indoor exposures;
<bullet> The last would be to discuss the uncertainties that
accompany the dose rate estimates.
With respect to the last comment, our review and evaluation showed
that the primary sources of the uncertainties, associated with the dose
rate estimates for radon, are the measured values of the radon
concentration, and the previously cited dose coefficient. For these and
other reasons, any such dose rate limit should be accompanied by an
expression of the range of uncertainty it encompasses. The significance
of our assessments is that the estimated magnitude of the overall
uncertainty in the current estimates of the combined (total) dose rate
from all sources of natural background is about 150 percent. As a
result, the differences in the estimated dose rates in one area of the
country, compared to another, can only be realistically evaluated in
light of these uncertainties. This leads to the realization that, even
though the procedures used by the USEPA (2005) in developing their
recommended dose rate of 3.5 mSv per year could have been improved,
their estimate was nonetheless well within the range of the associated
uncertainties and is therefore acceptable.
The peer reviewed studies that support the above statements and
other analyses of the EPA standards are contained in five scientific
articles, two of which have been published and three of which are in
publication. The first two articles, Sensitivity Analyses Of The
Standards For The Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository--A Review,
Evaluation, And Commentary (HPJ, May 2005), and Impacts Of Stable
Element Intake On <SUP>14</SUP>C And <SUP>129</SUP>I Dose Estimates
(HPJ, October 2005) are attached. The remaining three articles will be
forwarded to the Committee when they are published in the next several
months.
perspective on 3.5 msv/year
The discussions that follow are designed to provide perspective on
the impacts of a dose rate of 3.5 mSv per year. One way of gaining
perspective on this impact involves calculating an estimate risk of
cancer from the exposure and comparing it to other risks, such as the
``natural'' risk of cancer. I must note that the HPS position is that
``Estimation of health risk associated with radiation doses that are of
similar magnitude as those received from natural source should be
strictly qualitative and encompass a range of hypothetical health
outcomes, including the possibility of no adverse health effects at
such low levels.''
However, the HPS does recognize that
`` . . . risk assessment at low doses . . . can be used to inform
decisionmaking with respect to clean up of sites contaminated with
radioactive material, disposition of slightly radioactive material,
transport of radioactive material, etc.''
In the following discussions I am using quantitative risk
calculations to inform decisionmaking but I am not stating that it is
known for a fact that there will be actual cancer induction or death
from radiation exposure at these levels. Also, the 3.5 mSv per year
results in a lifetime dose that is greater than the lifetime dose of
100 mSv below which the HPS recommends not doing quantitative
assessments.
Estimated Risk of a Cancer Fatality per Unit of Dose
According to the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP, 1991, Table 4, page 24), the risk of death due to the
exposure of a member of the public to ionizing radiation is
5 10<SUP>-2</SUP>/Sv (5 10<SUP>-5</SUP>/mSv) of effective dose.
Expressed in another manner, the coefficient (5 10<SUP>-5</SUP>/mSv)
means that the chances of dying from a cancer caused by exposure to
radiation are 5 in 100,000 per mSv of effective dose. At the same time,
however, it is important to recognize that this coefficient
incorporates the linear-no-threshold hypothesis (LNT), a concept that
the ICRP has repeatedly stated leads to risk estimates that are
conservative, that is, too high (ICRP, 1966, page 60; ICRP, 1977,
paragraph 30). More importantly, keep in mind this is for a population
with today's medical treatment and care, which does not account for the
likely medical advances that will exist in 10,000 years when this dose
rate limit will be applicable. Keeping this caveat in mind, if it is
assumed that a population group receives an average dose rate of 3.5
mSv per year, they will receive a total dose during a lifetime of 70
years of:
(3.5 mSv per year) (70 years) = 245 mSv.
Applying the ICRP risk coefficient, the estimated percentage of the
people who would die of fatal cancer due to being exposed to a lifetime
dose of this magnitude would be:
(5 10<SUP>-5</SUP> per mSv) (245 mSv) = (1225 10<SUP>-5</SUP>) =
1.225 10<SUP>-2 </SUP>= 1.2 percent.
Prior to applying this risk estimate in evaluating the impacts of
potential radionuclide releases from the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository, it is important to recognize that the exposed people are
assumed (a) to be adults, as required by the USNRC regulations (2001),
and (b) to take in a sufficient amount of radioactive material each
year that, during the 50 years that follow, they will ultimately
receive a committed dose of no more than 245 mSv. This latter
assumption leads to additional conservatism in the dose rate estimates,
the reason being that many of the exposed people will not live long
enough to receive the full 50-year dose commitment. In fact, the NCRP
has estimated that the average adult, who is exposed under these
conditions, will receive less than half of the estimated committed dose
(NCRP, 1993, Section 6.1, page 25).
This is in contrast to the case on which the ICRP risk coefficient
was based, namely, that the estimated doses are received in full by the
exposed population group. Accounting for these considerations, and the
fact that a relatively large fraction of the radionuclides that will
potentially be released from the proposed Yucca Mountain repository
have long effective half-lives, the actual increase in the cancer
fatality rate could readily be half of that estimated above, namely,
about 0.6 percent.
On this basis, the relative increase in cancer fatalities within
the exposed Amargosa Valley population can be estimated as follows. The
spontaneous rate of cancer deaths in the United States currently is
about 1800 per 10,000 persons, that is to say, 18 percent of our
population die from cancer due to other causes (NRC, 1995, page 72).
Based on an added radiation dose rate of 3.5 mSv per year, the chances
of dying from cancer, for the average resident of the Amargosa Valley,
would have been increased from 18 percent to about 18.6 percent. On a
relative basis, this represents an increase of:
(0.6%) (18.6%) = 3%.
Estimated Risk of Cancer Incidence per Unit of Dose
According to the NRC (2005, BEIR VII Report), ``. . . approximately
one individual in 100 persons would be expected to develop cancer from
a lifetime (70 year) exposure to low-LET natural `background' radiation
(excludes radon and other high LET radiations).'' According to the NCRP
(1987, Table 9.6, page 148),and the ICRP (1991, paragraph 191), the
total dose rate from natural background, excluding exposures to radon
and its decay products, namely, (a) cosmic radiation, (b) terrestrial
radiation, and (c) ingested naturally radioactive materials, is ``about
1 mSv per year.''
Since a dose rate of 1 mSv per year, over a lifetime of 70 years,
will yield a total of 70 mSv, the probability of developing cancer
would be 1 chance in 100 (1%) per 70 mSv of effective dose. The
probability, based on a dose rate of 3.5 mSv per year would be 3.5
times as high, namely, about 3.5 percent. Once again, this estimate of
the increase in the cancer incidence rate was based on the assumption
that the estimated doses are received in full by the exposed population
group. Accounting for this and other considerations, the actual
increase in the cancer fatality rate could readily be half of that
estimated above, namely, about 1.8 percent.
On this basis, the relative increase in cancer fatalities, within
the exposed Amargosa Valley population, can be estimated as follows.
The spontaneous rate of cancer incidence in the United States is about
42 persons per 100, that is, about 42 percent of our population, at
some point in their lives, will develop cancer due to other causes
(NRC, BEIR VII Report, 2005). Based on an added radiation dose rate of
3.5 mSv per year, the chances of suffering cancer, for the average
person in the Amargosa Valley, would have been increased from 42
percent to about 43.8 percent.
This accompanying relative increase in cancer incidence would be:
(1.8%) (43.8%) = 4%.
Although based on two different sources of information and risk
estimation methodologies, this shows good agreement with the estimate
for the increase in average risk of cancer fatalities (about 3 percent)
presented above. Also to be kept in mind is that the estimated
percentage increases in the number of cancer fatalities among residents
of the Amargosa Valley would be 0.6 percent. and the comparable
estimate of the increase in cancer incidence would be 1.8 percent.
Confirming the Cancer Risks due to a Dose Rate of 3.5 mSv per Year
The estimated risks of cancer incidence and death, due to exposures
to ionizing radiation, are based on epidemiological studies, the most
notable being the extensive studies of the survivors of the World War
II atomic bombings in Japan. Just how difficult it is to quantify the
health impacts of a dose rate of 3.5 mSv per year is illustrated by the
fact that the National Research Council (NRC, 1995, Table 7-2, page 73)
estimates that it would require careful data collection and study
throughout the lifetime (i.e., 70 years) of a population group of at
least 3,000 people to detect an increase in the total cancer mortality
due to an annual exposure of 3.5 mSv for a total of 70 years. One of
the reasons for this is that ``. . . even at a continued exposure of 5
mSv per year, the change in the age specific mortality rate is very
small.'' (ICRP, 1991, paragraph 191).
ICRP Recommended Dose Rate Limit for Members of the Public
The long-term annual dose rate limit for members of the public, as
recommended by the ICRP (1991, paragraph 192), and the NCRP (1993, page
46) is 1 mSv per year. Compliance with this recommendation is to be
based on what is called the ``Critical Group,'' which was introduced by
the ICRP in 1977, and defined as follows:
``It is often possible to identify population groups with
characteristics causing them to be exposed at a higher level than the
rest of the exposed population from a given practice . . . These groups
. . . (are) known as critical groups . . .'' (ICRP, 1977, paragraph
216).
In elaborating on the Critical Group, the ICRP stated:
``The actual doses received by individuals (within the
Critical Group) will vary depending on factors such as
differences in their age, size, metabolism and customs, as well
as variations in their environment. . . . With exposure of
members of the public it is usually feasible to take account of
these sources of variability by the selection of appropriate
critical groups within the population provided the critical
group is small enough to be relatively homogeneous with respect
to age, diet and those aspects of behaviour that affect the
doses received. Such a group should be representative of those
individuals in the population expected to receive the highest
dose equivalent, and the Commission believes that it will be
reasonable to apply the appropriate dose-equivalent limit for
individual members of the public to the weighted mean dose
equivalent to this group. Because of the innate variability
within an apparently homogeneous group some members of the
critical group will in fact receive dose equivalents somewhat
higher than the mean. However, because of the maximizing
assumptions used, the dose equivalent actually received will
usually be lower than the estimated dose equivalent.'' (ICRP,
1977, paragraph 85).
In a later report, the ICRP (1985a, paragraph 69) offered the
following commentary on additional characteristics of the Critical
Group:
``It is obvious from the definition that some individuals will
receive dose equivalents in excess of the calculated mean dose
equivalent. Decisions on the acceptability of the exposure of the
critical group will depend not only on the proximity of the calculated
mean dose equivalent to the dose-equivalent limit but also the expected
spread of the distribution of actual dose equivalents. It is also
necessary to consider that other sources may contribute to the exposure
of any one critical group. It is suggested that, in general, to satisfy
the homogeneity requirement the ratio of maximum to minimum values
should not exceed an order of magnitude. For many distributions,
therefore, the mean will be a factor of two to three lower than the
maximum postulated. The necessary degree of homogeneity in the critical
group depends on the magnitude of the mean dose equivalent in the group
as a fraction of the relevant source upper bound. If that fraction is
less than about one tenth, a critical group should be regarded as
homogeneous if the distribution of individual dose equivalents lies
substantially within a total range of a factor of 10, i.e., a factor of
about 3 on either side of the mean. At higher fractions, the total
range should be less, preferably no more than a factor of 3.''
The important fact to note is that, based on the criteria described
above, some members of the Critical Group (as applied in determining
the regulatory compliance of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository)
would receive dose rates three times the limit. If the applicable long-
term dose rate limit for members of the public were 1 mSv per year (as
recommended by the ICRP and the NCRP), these individuals would be
expected to receive dose rates up to 3 mSv per year.
additional perspective
On the basis of epidemiological studies, it is estimated that 30
percent of the cancer deaths in the United States are due to the use of
tobacco products, and an additional 35 percent are due to improper
diets, obesity, and the lack of exercise (Moeller, 2005, Table 1.2,
page 5). In short, 65 percent of the fatal cancers that occur in the
U.S. population are due to deficiencies in our personal habits, factors
that are under our control. In contrast, only 2 percent of the cancer
deaths in this country are estimated to be due to environmental
pollution. In the overall scheme of life, the risk of fatal cancer due
to an annual dose of 3.5 mSv throughout one's lifetime is certainly
acceptable. As the ICRP has so eloquently stated:
``The Commission . . . wishes to emphasize its view that ionising
radiation needs to be treated with care rather than fear and that its
risks should be kept in perspective with other risks.'' (ICRP, 1991,
paragraph 14).
conclusion
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for the
opportunity to testify before you today as you oversee the status of
the Yucca Mountain project. I would be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
references
Boulton, J., ``Management of Radioactive Fuel Wastes: The Canadian
Disposal Program,'' Report AECL-6314 (1978).
House of Representatives, ``Making Appropriations For Energy and
Water Development For The Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, and
For Other Purposes, Conference Report,'' Government Printing Office,
House of Representatives Report 109-275, November 7, 2005.
HPJ, ``Sensitivity Analyses Of The Standards For The Proposed Yucca
Mountain Repository--A Review, Evaluation, And Commentary,'' Health
Physics Journal, Vol. 85, No. 5, pages 459-468, May 2005.
HPJ, ``Impacts Of Stable Element Intake On 14C And 1291 Dose
Estimates,'' Health Physics Journal, Vol. 89, No. 4, pages 249-354,
October 2005.
HPS, ``Ionizing Radiation-Safety Standards for the General Public,
Position Statement of the Health Physics Society,'' Available at http:/
/hps.org/documents/publicdose03.pdf, (June 2003).
HPS, ``Radiation Risk In Perspective,'' Available at http://
hps.org/documents/radiationrisk.pdf, (August 2004).
ICRP, ``The Evaluation of Risks from Radiation,'' Publication 8,
International Commission on Radiological Protection, Pergamon Press,
New York, NY (1966).
ICRP, ``Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection,'' Publication 26, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 1,
No. 3 (1977).
ICRP, ``Principles for Monitoring for the Radiation Protection of
the Population,'' Publication 43, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 15, No. 1
(1985a)
ICRP, ``1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection,'' International Commission on Radiological
Protection, Oxford, Pergamon Press; ICRP Publication 60, Ann ICRP 21(1-
3) (1991).
Moeller, D.W., Environmental Health, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA (2005).
NCRP, ``Exposure of the Population in the United States and Canada
from Natural Background Radiation,'' National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements, Report No. 94, Bethesda, MD, (1987).
NCRP, ``Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,'' Report No.
116, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,
Bethesda, MD (1993).
NRC, ``Radiation Dose Reconstruction for Epidemiologic Uses,''
National Research Council, Washington, DC, National Academy Press
(1995).
NRC, ``Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation--Phase 2,'' BEIR VII Report, Pre-publication Copy, National
Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC (2005).
USEPA, ``Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Proposed Rule,'' U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, DC: Federal Register;
Title 40 CFR, Part 197; pages 49014-49065 (2005).
USNRC, ``Standards for Protection Against Radiation,'' U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC: Title 10, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 20.1301 (1991).
USNRC, ``Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geological
Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada: Final Rule.'' U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC: Federal Register, 10 CFR Part
63; 2001: pages 55732-55816 (2001).
von Eschenbach, Andrew, ``Buying Time,'' Science, Vol. 309, no.
5735, page 697 (29 July, 2005).
Whitehouse, D. `Earliest writing' found; 1999, BBC News. Available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/334517.stm. Accessed on 16
January 2006.
______
Responses by Dade W. Moeller to Additional Questions from
Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Is it possible to quantify radiation risk at 350
millirem per year, which is the EPA proposal?
Response. It is not possible to quantify the radiation risk at any
level of radiation exposure for a population 10,000 to 1 million years
from now, which is the time period for which the EPA proposal is
applicable. This is due to the fact that there is no technical basis
for forecasting the causes of death among, and the life spans that will
be experienced by, the affected groups. Without this, and related
information, the risk estimates cannot be quantified and any proposed
dose rate limit is meaningless. This point is so important to the
evaluation of the EPA proposal for Yucca Mountain that I have covered
this is a separate enclosure to this submittal titled ``Implications of
Risk Quantification on the Ruling of the Court of Appeals.''
Risk coefficients exist for quantifying the health effects (i.e.,
fatal cancers) that may occur in a large existing population exposed to
350 millirem (mrem) per year. The resulting estimates, however,
incorporate so many assumptions that they are highly uncertainty and,
as noted above, they are applicable only to populations with today's
(i.e., known) cancer rate experience and human life spans. As for the
range of the uncertainties, the Health Physics Society (HPS, 2004)
cautions that the ``Estimation of health risk associated with radiation
doses that are of similar magnitude as those received from natural
sources should be strictly qualitative and encompass a range of
hypothetical health outcomes, including the possibility of no adverse
health effects.''
There are multiple factors that must be considered in estimating
the risks of radiation exposures. The more important of these are
discussed below.
Quantifying Risk.--Lifetime risk estimates are developed through
the science of epidemiology. Fundamental to this process is the
comparison of the health outcomes of a group of people, exposed to
higher doses, to the health outcomes of a similar group (i.e., similar
age, gender, nationality, cancer rates, etc), exposed to lower doses.
After accounting for all potentially confounding factors, increases in
the number of cases of illness and death that occur in the exposed
group, as compared to the non-exposed, or less exposed (control) group,
are attributed to the radiation exposure. It is important to recognize,
however, that this is the observed increase in the risk for the exposed
group at the time the comparison was made. To obtain the lifetime risk
estimate, the observed difference must be projected to a time when
everyone in both the exposed and control groups has died. This is
particularly significant in terms of the survivors of the atomic
bombings in Japan. In that case, only slightly more than half of the
original atomic bomb survivors had died by 2005, 55 years after they
were exposed (NRC, 2006, page viii). In order to project the health
effects to the end of their lives, assumptions must be made about the
relationship between radiation induced, and ``naturally occurring''
cancers, and the projected life spans of the people remaining in the
study. Since the risk estimates currently available are applicable only
to populations with known cancer rates and life spans, it is not
appropriate to apply these estimates to populations who will be living
10,000 to 1 million years from now, the reason being that it is not
scientifically possible to project the baseline cancer rates, or the
extent of the life spans that populations will be experiencing, three
or four decades from now, much less 10,000 to 1,000,000 years from now.
The problem of transferring risk coefficients derived from the
Japanese atomic bomb survivor data to a population far into the future
is more completely examined in the enclosure to this submittal, titled
``Implications of Risk Quantification on the Ruling of the Court of
Appeals.''
Perspective on 350 millirem per year.--Although the current risk
estimates cannot be responsibly used to predict risks to populations at
the time the EPA proposed dose rate limit of 350 mrem (0.350 rem) per
year would apply, they can be used to provide perspective on the health
impacts on current populations that might be affected by radionuclide
releases from the proposed repository. Assuming that the Amargosa
Valley population was exposed at this rate throughout an average
lifetime of 70 years, their total dose would be:
(0.350 rem/year) (70 years) = 24.5 rem = 0.245 Sv.
In this regard, it is important to note that this is higher than
0.1 Sv (10 rem), the minimum dose for which the BEIR VII committee
states that fatal cancer risks can be estimated without unacceptable
statistical limitations (NRC, 2006, page 7). Assuming a population
consisting of 50 percent men and 50 percent women, the applicable fatal
cancer risk coefficient would be 570 10<SUP>-</SUP><SUP>4</SUP> per
Sv. (NRC, 2006, Table ES-1, page 15). On this basis, the estimated
percentage of the Amargosa Valley population that might incur excess
fatal cancers would be:
(570 10<SUP>-</SUP><SUP>4</SUP> per Sv) (0.245 Sv) = 0.014
= 1.4 percent.
For a population the size of that residing in the Amargosa Valley
(about 1200 people; Rautenstrauch et al., 2003), this would mean that
the estimated number of excess deaths due to radiation-induced cancer
could be:
(1200) (0.014) = 17.
Because the exposed population is so small, this estimate should
probably be expressed as representing something in the range of perhaps
10 to 20 deaths. Since these would be expected to occur, if at all,
over the 70-year lifetime of this population group, the average number
of excess deaths would range from perhaps 1 every 7, to 1 every 3.5
years. The implications of this are discussed in the response to
question No. 2 below. Concurrently, this same population group would be
expected to suffer a total of 245 fatal cancers, or about 3 to 4 deaths
per year, in the absence of the postulated doses due to radionuclide
releases from the proposed repository (NRC, 2006, Table ES-1, page 15).
Question 2. Is it fair to extrapolate the effects of instantaneous
high levels of radiation doses to low level exposure over an
individual's lifetime?
Response. No, it is not, the key words being ``over an individual's
lifetime.'' Although risk models for fatal cancer have been developed
for extrapolating the health effects of radiation exposures involving
high doses received at high dose rates to those involving low doses
received at low dose rates, the estimated health effects (for example,
the number of fatal cancers that might result) can be expressed only
for the affected population as a whole. They cannot be expressed in
terms of the impacts on individual members of that group. At the same
time, it must be recognized that estimates based on these processes are
reasonably accurate only if the population group, being evaluated, is
large, i.e., numbering in the tens of thousands. Compounding the
situation is that assessments of health effects that involve either
small population groups, or small doses will, in general, not be
meaningful due to the lack of statistical rigor.
Even when the potentially affected population group is relatively
large, the interpretation of the risks is not easy. This is well
demonstrated by the information provided in the BEIR VII report (NRC,
2006). Within a group of 100,000 members of the U.S. population, for
example, even in the absence of additional exposure from the proposed
repository, there will be, on average, about 20,420 cancer deaths due
to natural causes. If each member of this population group is exposed
to an average dose of 1 rem over his/her lifetime, one can
statistically estimate that an additional 57 of them may die from
cancer. No method is available, however, to differentiate which members
of this population will be among the 20,420 who will die from cancer
due to ``natural causes,'' or will be among the 57 additional members
who may die due to the added average dose of 1 rem. Also of note is
that, in this example, the increase in the estimated cancer deaths, due
to the radiation exposure, is less than 0.3 percent of what otherwise
would have occurred.
Question 3. What are your views on EPA's proposed rule and does it
protect public health and safety? Is it overly conservative, not
protective, or just right?
Response. On the basis of my review and analysis, I conclude that,
considering the significant sources of conservatisms in the dose
estimates, the calculated risks, and their associated uncertainties,
the proposed EPA dose rate limit would be fully protective of public
health and safety. Please note, however, the caveats in the separate
set of comments on the ``Implications of Risk Quantification on the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals.''
Technical Basis.--The approach adopted by EPA, in establishing the
350 mrem per year dose rate limit, was in accord with the guidance
provided by the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP), an organization in which members of the Health Physics Society
continue to be active participants. One of the guidelines recommended
by this organization for judging the acceptability of dose rate limits
for members of the public ``is to base the judgment on the variations
in the existing level of dose from natural sources. This natural
background may not be harmless, but it makes only a small contribution
to the health detriment which society experiences. It may not be
welcome but the variations from place to place (excluding the large
variations in the dose from radon in dwellings) can hardly be called
unacceptable.'' (ICRP, 1991, paragraph 190, pages 44-45).
Nonetheless, the ICRP certainly did not have in mind that this
guidance would be used to establish a dose rate limit for a time-period
10,000 to 1 million years from now. Although, on the basis of my review
and analysis, I concluded that the proposed EPA dose limit would be
fully protective of public health and safety, that conclusion was made
in the context of the conditions that exist today. Since it is
impossible to predict the characteristics (particularly the lifestyles
and fatal cancer rates) of populations who will live so far into the
future, I also concluded that any dose rate limit that would be
developed and recommended on the basis of today's society is
essentially meaningless. Other aspects related to this subject are
discussed in the response to question No. 4 below.
Discussion of Uncertainties.--While, in view of the conclusions
stated above, comments on other aspects of this question would appear
to be superfluous, it should be noted that there are considerable
uncertainties in the dose rates from each of the components of natural
background. In terms of radon, alone, these include relatively large
uncertainties in the measured values of the radon concentrations, due
to the presence of thoron (which interferes with the radon
measurements); the status of the equilibrium of the radon decay
products; the fraction of the decay products that are unattached; and
the assumed residence time indoors. In fact, it is estimated that the
combined uncertainty accompanying the radon dose estimates can be as
high as 150 percent (Moeller and Sun, 2006). Two questionable
procedures applied by EPA in the assessments, on which their
recommended dose rate (350 mrem y<SUP>-</SUP><SUP>1</SUP>) was based,
were (1) the use of generic, rather than site-specific data, for
estimating the dose rate in both Nevada and Colorado; and, (2) basing
the difference in the dose rate in the region with a ``high'' natural
background rate, versus that with in the Amargosa Valley, on the
average for the State of Colorado versus the average for the State of
Nevada, extrapolated to be representative of the Amargosa Valley. Both
Colorado and Nevada obviously have regions with natural background dose
rates that are higher than the state-wide average.
To provide an independent review and evaluation of the EPA
estimate, an associate and I compared the average natural background
dose rate in the Amargosa Valley to that for Leadville, CO. These two
communities were selected since they are in the same general region of
the United States; they are of comparable size; and in both cases site-
specific data were available for the conducting the evaluations.
Interestingly, the estimated difference in the natural background dose
rates in the two communities was almost 400 mrem (4.00 mSv) per year,
almost 15 percent higher than the EPA estimate. One of the primary
reasons for the higher estimate is that the EPA contractor overlooked
the fact that more than 90 percent of the population of the Amargosa
Valley live in mobile homes which, due to their construction and
placement a foot or more above the ground, have indoor radon
concentrations that are less than those outdoors (Moeller and Sun,
2006).
Discussion of Conservatism.--Also to be considered in answering a
question of this nature are the significant conservatisms that are
incorporated into the methodologies used in documenting compliance with
the dose rate limit. According to the regulations of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (USNRC, 2001), the person on whom compliance with
the regulations will be based is an adult. Under these conditions, the
dose assigned to an intake of a radionuclide is that which will be
imparted to the exposed person during the 50-year time-period following
ingestion. Due to their nature, a majority of the more important
radionuclides in high-level radioactive waste, that have the potential
for release from the proposed repository, have long radioactive half-
lives combined with long biological retention times in the body. For
these reasons, the NCRP has estimated that many of the exposed people
will not live long enough to receive their full 50-year dose
commitment. In fact, the NCRP estimates that the average adult, who is
exposed under these conditions, will receive less than half of the
estimated committed dose (NCRP, 1993, Section 6.1, page 25). For these
radionuclides, which include 226Ra, 237Np, 239Pu, and 241Am, this means
that the calculated dose will be less than half of that which will
occur.
It has been a long-standing policy of the ICRP and NCRP that
radiation exposures from naturally occurring sources (other than those
that are technically enhanced) are not to be included in assessments
for compliance with regulations. In contrast, EPA requires that any
naturally occurring radium in the groundwater being consumed by the
residents of the Amargosa Valley must be included as a source of dose
in the determination of compliance. EPA also requires that the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), for purposes of determining compliance,
must assume that the ``reasonably maximally exposed individual'' (RMEI)
resides 18 km south of the border of the proposed repository, an area
that is currently not inhabited. The Amargosa Valley, which is the most
probable location of the primary population group that could
potentially be exposed through releases from the proposed repository,
is located some 35 km south of the proposed repository.
Another source of conservatism is the assumption by DOE that an
aquaculture farm, shut down some 5 years ago but a significant
potential source of increased intake of <SUP>14</SUP>C, is still
operating. Still another conservatism is the failure to account for the
fact that, although the primary radiation exposures due to the
operation of the proposed repository will be through the ingestion of
radionuclides, studies show that the health effects per unit dose, due
to radionuclides non-uniformly distributed within the body, are
significantly less than those for comparable doses from external
sources of exposure (Bair, 1997). These, and other assumptions, lead to
an estimated overall factor of conservatism of 10 in the dose rate
estimates (Moeller and Ryan, 2006).
Question 4. Is regulating to 1 million years necessary to protect
public health and the environment?
Response. No. Regulating to 1 million years becomes unnecessary if
the technological and policy changes suggested in my testimony are
adopted. In fact, if the proposed changes are implemented, the nature
and toxicity of the waste requiring disposal will be such that it will
only need to be monitored for a period of 300 to 500 years, at most.
Our goal has been to present a plan that will provide a mechanism for
ending the ongoing legislative wrangling. It will accomplish this by
producing a waste that is far less toxic than that which otherwise will
need to be disposed. Also not to be ignored is that the proposed
technological changes will eliminate any need for establishing a dose
rate limit from 10,000 to 1 million years.
In any discussion of this nature, it is important to keep in mind
the genesis of the controversy. It occurred as a result of the ruling
of the U.S. Court of Appeals (issued on July 9, 2004) that the
``10,000-year compliance period selected by EPA violates section 801 of
the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) because it is not, as EnPA requires,
`based upon and consistent with' the findings and recommendations of
the National Academy of Sciences.'' In essence, the court ruled that
the EPA's standard as of that time was ``arbitrary and capricious''
under the Administrative Procedure Act, and it was incumbent upon EPA
to establish a dose rate limit extending beyond 10,000 to 1 million
years. That ruling had nothing to do with science.
Technical Benefits of the Proposed Approach.--The fundamental
change in the suggested approach is that the Nation's high-level
radioactive waste be placed in interim storage at the existing Yucca
Mountain facility for a period of 100 years. This will provide a
``window'' for DOE to reconsider its present approach not only in the
management and treatment of its high-level waste, but also to
dramatically change the conditions under which it will need to be
disposed. The primary technical benefits can be summarized as follows:
1. This ``window'' would enable DOE to take advantage of new and
ongoing technological developments in the physical and chemical
processing of spent nuclear fuel. One example, already demonstrated at
the laboratory level, has been shown to yield an increased
effectiveness in the separation of the transuranic radionuclides (for
example, 237NP, 239PU, and 241Am) from the fission products. This would
produce a waste with a significantly reduced toxicity. In fact, after a
decay period of about 350 years, its toxicity would be no higher than
the original ore that was strip-mined to obtain the uranium that, after
being used as a source of power for the reactors, produced the spent
nuclear fuel that, after being processed, yielded the waste. This
comparison is based on the assumption that the original ore contained a
uranium concentration of 0.2 percent, that is, it was what is called a
relatively low grade of ore. If the ore was of a higher grade, the
difference in toxicity would be even more dramatic. After 1,000 years
decay, the waste would have decayed to where the toxicity would be no
higher than about 10 percent of that of 0.2 percent ore. Particularly
noteworthy is that, while the uranium ore, when mined, was at or near
the surface of the earth, the waste resulting from reprocessing would
have been vitrified and buried in thick metal containers more than 600
feet beneath the surface of the earth.
2. The resumption of fuel processing would reduce the thermal heat
load of the waste being placed in the proposed repository, thus
yielding benefits in terms of reduced impacts on the surrounding
geological structures. Equally important, it would eliminate the
concerns related to criticality.
3. While the above discussion involves primarily technical issues,
the suggested approach would have a significant bearing on the
environmental health issues related to the disposal of high-level
radioactive waste. The basis for this statement is that the recommended
actions, if adopted, would essentially remove the need to consider a
regulatory dose rate limit for more than perhaps 400 or 500 years after
the waste were placed in the proposed repository. From a technical
standpoint, it would enable DOE not only to remove the more toxic long-
lived materials from the waste, prior to placing it in the proposed
repository, but it would enable the un-used uranium and newly produced
plutonium to be reclaimed and used as fuel in generating additional
electricity in nuclear power plants. This suggested approach would also
conserve our uranium resources and significantly reduce, as noted
earlier, the toxicity of the waste.
4. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that implementation of
this proposal would require a full-scale safety review of all of its
associated ramifications. A common error, in the adoption of what
appear to be promising new approaches, is the failure of those
implementing the suggestions to review and evaluate their full range of
implications. These would include the impacts of the suggested changes
on the challenges that must be solved in handling and vitrifying the
waste, similar challenges in converting the transuranic radionuclides
into fuel for use in commercial nuclear power plants, and safety
considerations associated with transporting the waste to the storage
facility. Also to be considered is the fact that, while the newer
chemical technologies (a primary example being the UREX + Process
developed at the Argonne National Laboratory East), has been proven at
the laboratory scale, the upgrading of this process into an industrial
scale operating facility would require considerable effort and time,
the latter being perhaps as much as 10 to 30 years.
Policy Implications of the Proposed Approach.--From a policy
standpoint, the proposed approach has far-reaching implications, many
of which would be extremely beneficial to the United States' energy
program and associated industries. For example:
1. Achieving a satisfactory solution for waste disposal problem
would reduce our dependence on foreign oil, because it would enable us
to move forward in generating copious supplies of electricity through
the application of nuclear energy.
2. A satisfactory solution to the waste disposal problem would
reduce our discharges into the atmosphere of the gases that cause
global warming.
3. The resumption of spent fuel reprocessing would significantly
reduce the amount of waste requiring transportation and disposal. At
the same time, however, this could present challenges in terms of
handling and transporting the waste. This and other potential
ramifications would need to be given careful consideration.
4. The 100-year storage/monitoring period would enable the DOE
staff to document more fully the adequacy of the capabilities of that
facility for the ``disposal'' of high level waste. This would, in turn,
provide additional assurance that the proposed facility would operate
as anticipated, as well as an opportunity to incorporate beneficial
changes in its design.
5. Finally, the proposed policy would enable the Federal Government
to accept responsibility for high-level waste as mandated in the 1992
Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
references
Bair, William J., ``Radionuclides in the Body: Meeting the
Challenge, Lauriston S. Taylor Lecture,'' Health Physics, Vol. 73, No.
3, pages 423-432 (September 1997).
EPA, ``Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Proposed Rule,'' Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, DC: Federal Register; Title 40 CFR, Part
197; pages 49014-49065 (2005).
HPS, ``Radiation Risk In Perspective, Position Statement of the
Health Physics Society,'' Health Physics Society, McLean, Virginia
(August 2004)
ICRP, ``1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection,'' International Commission on Radiological
Protection, Publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 21, No. 1-4
(1991).
Moeller, Dade W., and Ryan, Michael T., ``Review and Evaluation of
Factors Affecting Dose Estimates for Long-Term Performance Assessments
Using the Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository as an Example,'' Health
Physics (in press).
Moeller, Dade W., and Sun, Lin-Shen C., ``Comparison of Natural
Background Dose Rates for Residents of the Amargosa Valley, NV, to
Those in Leadville, CO, and the States of Colorado and Nevada,'' Health
Physics (in press, 2006).
NCI, ``Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program, 2005,''
National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, MD (2005). Available at SEER--
http://www.seer.cancer.gov.
NCRP, ``Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,'' Report No.
116, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,
Bethesda, MD (1993).
NRC, ``Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, BEIR VII Phase 2,'' National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, DC (2006).
Rautenstrauch, Kurt R., Smith, Anthony J., and Andrews, Robert,
``Technical Basis Document No. 12: Biosphere Transport, Revision 1,''
Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC, Las Vegas, NV (September 2003).
USNRC, ``10 CFR Parts 2, 19, 20, 21, etc., Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada; Final Rule,'' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC, Federal Register, 10 CFR Part 63; pages 55732-55816 (November 2,
2001).
______
Responses by Dade W. Moeller to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. In your written testimony, I was interested to see that
you endorse temporarily storing spent nuclear fuel at the Yucca
Mountain site for approximately 100 years. Congress has tried in the
past to approve interim storage but has failed because of fears that
the storage would become permanent and that the financial and political
investment at the site would prevent an independent evaluation of the
project as a long term repository. As a radiation health specialist,
what do you see as the health benefits of interim waste storage at
Yucca Mountain?
Response. This question involves multiple considerations. As noted
in the written testimony that we prepared, approval of the proposal for
storing the high-level waste for 100 years in the Yucca Mountain
facility would need to be accompanied by a number of safeguards. First,
the waste would need to be stored in a manner so that it could be
monitored continuously to warn of any failures in the waste canisters
or any other components of the system. To ensure that corrective
measures could readily be implemented, if necessary, the waste would
also need to be stored so that it can be retrieved, and the defects or
sources of the failures remedied. At the same time, all the data on the
performance of the system would need to be made available. In fact,
arrangements should be considered for having a team of independent,
technically qualified, members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (USNRC, 2000) staff (referred to, in the case of commercial
nuclear power plants as onsite ``resident inspectors'') be stationed at
the Yucca Mountain facility to observe operations on a full time basis.
Benefits of 100-Year Storage Period.--In terms of the factors on
which responses are requested, the benefits of the 100-year storage
period would relate to potential developments in two specific areas.
One would be methods for the cure and/or prevention of diseases that
are directly related to the effects of radiation exposures. Obviously,
the most important such disease would be cancer. The second benefit
would be improvements in the development of chemical technologies for
separating the transuranic radionuclides from the spent nuclear fuel.
Since it appears more appropriate, the latter topic will be discussed
in the response to question No. 2.
In terms of medical technologies, it should be noted that progress
in developing methods for the cure and/or prevention of a variety of
cancers is moving ahead at a rapid pace. For example, a recent article
in U.S. News & World Report, describes a new vaccine that ``may rid the
world of cervical cancer.'' (Fischman, 2006). Similar progress is being
made in developing vaccines for other types of cancer. Should these and
related developments be successful, they would completely change the
degree of protection required for the disposal of high-level
radioactive wastes.
Supporting the importance of such developments, in terms of how the
detrimental effects of cancer are viewed, is the following statement of
the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP,
1995):
``One of the most important factors likely to affect the
significance of radiation dose in the centuries and millennia
to come is the effect of progress in medical technology.
Medical progress achieved during the past several decades has
reduced the risk of premature death and increased the average
age of the population, leading to a relative increase in
diseases prevalent in the elderly, e.g., cancer.'' . . . ``At
some future time, it is possible that a greater proportion of
somatic diseases (diseases such as cancer) caused by radiation
will be treated successfully. If, in fact, an increased
proportion of the adverse health effects of radiation prove to
be either preventable or curable by advances in medical
science, the estimate of long-term detriments may need to be
revised as the consequences (risks) to future populations could
be very different.'' (NCRP, 1995, Report No. 121, Section
4.2.2.3).
Cautionary Notes.--In this regard, however, it is important to note
that, even if a method for curing or preventing cancer is developed,
this will not eliminate the health concerns of radiation. One of the
remaining concerns will be the potential for hereditary effects. In
this case, however, the concern appears to be even less. After a
detailed review and evaluation of the latest information on human
genetic disease and the mechanisms of radiation-induced genetic
mutation, the BEIR VII committee concluded that the application of a
new approach to genetic risk estimation leads the committee to conclude
that:
``At low or chronic doses of low-LET irradiation, the genetic
risks are very small when compared to the baseline frequencies
of genetic disease in the population.'' (NRC, 2006, page 12).
Another potential concern would be mental retardation. This effect,
which is of concern in terms of exposures to the children of mothers
during pregnancy, has been shown to be primarily of importance for
exposures that occur during the period from 8 weeks to 15 weeks after
conception. A similar but smaller effect has also been detected
following exposures that occur during the period from 16 weeks to 25
weeks (ICRP, 1991, paragraph 92, page 23). In terms of the proposed
Yucca Mountain repository, however, the concern should be small. As
noted in the BEIR VII report, these effects occur only ``at high
doses.'' (NRC, 2006, page 1). Any effects that might be anticipated,
due to operations in the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, would be
extremely small.
Other Potential Health Benefits of Interim Storage.--Another
benefit is that the suggested 100-year storage period would enable the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to incorporate new technological
developments into the repository design while, at the same time, gather
additional data to enhance their documentation that the proposed
facility will perform as they anticipate, and to identify design and
procedural changes that would further improve the retention of the
waste.
Another advantage, which certainly has a strong relation to public
health and safety, is that the storage of the spent nuclear fuel and
high level waste in a single centralized and geologically safe
facility, rather than at about 100 interim nuclear waste disposal
facilities (about 70 of which are at commercial nuclear power plant
sites) throughout the country, would vastly increase the level of
protection against potential human intrusion, terrorist attacks, as
well as against the impacts of large aircraft crashes, whether
deliberate or accidental. Another advantage is that the capabilities
for security protection, as well as the ability to correct any failures
in the waste canisters, would be vastly superior to those that could be
provided at each of the 100 existing storage sites.
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO, 2005), created by
the Canadian Government in 2002 under the Federal Waste Act, is
following a similar approach. Their timeframe for completion of a
repository, however, is significantly longer (300 years) as compared to
the 100-year timeframe suggested for the United States. So as to avoid
storage of the waste at multiple individual reactor sites, Canadian
authorities are also moving forward with plans for the development of a
centralized facility for interim storage of the waste.
Question 2. In your proposal, you also state that during the
proposed 100-year storage period, many significant technological
developments will occur which could change the best approach for the
final disposal of radioactive waste. Given that these new reprocessing
technologies are unproven and, if viable at all, are still potentially
20 to 60 years away, can we say anything today about the health effects
of the radiation these technologies will produce?
Response. While newly developed reprocessing technologies should
not be applied without careful review and evaluation, there appear to
be multiple benefits in the resumption of the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel. Several of these are discussed below:
1. Although proven only at the laboratory scale, the UREX + Process
(developed at the Argonne National Laboratory East) for removing the
transuranic radionuclides (237Np, 239PU, and 241Am) from spent fuel,
appears especially promising. Because the degree of separation is more
efficient than was available with previous technologies, the toxicity
of the waste thus produced would be orders of magnitude less than that
of spent nuclear fuel.
2. Once removed, the highly toxic transuranic radionuclides could
be used as fuel in commercial nuclear power plants and, through this
process, converted into shorter lived fission products that would, in
general, be far less toxic.
3. Another potential public health benefit would be that the
application of these new techniques would reduce the volume of the
waste that would need to be handled, transported, and disposed. While
this would also involve other considerations, the potential benefits
are promising.
4. The high-level radioactive waste, produced through the
application of the improved separation techniques, would yield a much
reduced heat load. This would significantly improve the performance of
the proposed repository. Although these changes would not necessarily
yield an immediate health benefit, they would certainly do so in terms
of the long-term performance of the proposed repository and its
projected health impacts on future generations.
Other Considerations.--As question No. 2 reminds us, it will be
necessary to expand the capabilities of the UREX + Process so that is
can be applied on an industrial scale. Nonetheless, its effectiveness
in separating the transuranic radionuclides from the fission products
has such promising benefits that I believe that DOE would be remiss not
to undertake this effort. Although this could require as much as 10 to
30 or more years to accomplish, the suggested 100-year storage period
should provide the time necessary to accomplish this goal. When
considered in conjunction with the potential reductions in health
effects (described in the response to question No. 1), this technology
would certainly appear worthy of exploration.
At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that the
resumption of chemical processing and the implementation of the
suggested new approach is not a one-way street. While it is anticipated
to have multiple benefits, a change in any component of the waste
disposal system will have impacts on other components. For this reason,
the suggested changes will need to be implemented in a prudent and
cautious manner. While there will undoubtedly be some surprises, the
long-term benefits are considered to be well worth the effort.
references
Fischman, Josh, ``Sticking It To Cancer,'' U.S. News & World
Report, Vol. 140, No. 12, pages 56-63 (April 3, 2006).
ICRP, ``1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection,'' International Commission on Radiological
Protection, Publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 21, No. 1-4
(1991).
NCRP, ``Principles and Application of Collective Dose in Radiation
Protection,'' Report No. 121, National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, Bethesda, MD (1995).
NRC, ``Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, BEIR VII Phase 2,'' National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, DC (2006).
NWMO, ``Choosing the Way Forward--Draft Final Report,'' Nuclear
Waste Management Organization, (2005). http://www.web.net/ robbins/
index.html
USNRC, ``Staff Requirements--SECY-99-227--N+1 Resident Inspector
Staffing Policy,'' Memorandum from the Secretary to the Executive
Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC (January 11, 2000).
______
Response by Dade W. Moeller to an Additional Question from
Senator Boxer
Question. Is a ``one in four risk'' of fatal cancer for a woman
exposed to 350 millirems per year of cancer acceptable?
Response. Senator Boxer, your estimate from Dr. Tom Cochran, whom I
know very well, sounds to me to be high. But to answer your question,
if indeed his calculations were correct and a dose rate limit of 350
millirems a year would create a one chance in four of a woman dying of
cancer during her lifetime, ``that would be totally unacceptable. No
one would approve that.''
Subsequent to the hearings, the following review and evaluation of
the risk of such a lifetime dose rate for women has been estimated. The
results are as follows.
According to the BEIR VII committee, which, under the auspices of
the National Research Council, has just completed a detailed review and
evaluation of the latest information on the health effects of ionizing
radiation, the risk to women of fatal cancer due to exposure to
ionizing radiation is 660 10<SUP>-4</SUP> Sv<SUP>-1</SUP> (NRC, 2006,
Table ES-1, page 15). Assuming a woman were to receive a lifetime (70
years) radiation dose at a rate of 350 mrem per year, her total dose
would be:
350 mrem/year) (1 rem/1000 mrem) (70 years) = 24.5 rem.
Since 24.5 rem is equal to 0.245 Sv, the estimated increase in
fatal cancer risk that a group of women so exposed would incur would
be:
(660 10<SUP>-4</SUP> Sv<SUP>-1</SUP> (0.245 Sv) = 0.016 =
1.6 percent.
That is to say, under the stipulated conditions, 1.6 percent of the
women so exposed could die of cancer.
The risk estimated by Dr. Cochran (one chance in four) is
equivalent of 25 percent. This is a factor of:
(25 percent) (1.6 percent) = 15.6.
times the estimate based on the latest guidance provided by the
BEIR VII committee.
conclusion
On the basis of these analyses, one can conclude that the risk
estimated by Dr. Cochran, due to a total dose of 0.245 Sv, vastly
exceeds the amount that such a dose would be expected to create. For
purposes of perspective, it might be noted that the ``natural'' risk of
fatal cancer among women residing in the United States is 19.78 percent
(NCI, 2005). Rounding this off to 19.8 percent, the total risk of fatal
cancer to a group of women, under the presumed circumstances, would be:
(19.8 percent) + (1.6 percent) = 21.4 percent.
On this basis, even the estimated risk of fatal cancer due to a
postulated dose of 0.245 Sv, combined with that due to the ``natural''
background risk, would be less than the ``one chance in four'' risk
ascribed by Dr. Cochran to the postulated dose alone.
references
NCI, ``Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program, 2005,''
National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, MD (2005). Available at SEER--
http://www.seer.cancer.gov.
NRC, ``Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, BEIR VII Phase 2,'' National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, DC (2006).
______
Implications of Risk Quantification on the Ruling of the Court of
Appeals
introduction
On July 9, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals ruled that the
``10,000-year compliance period selected by EPA violates section 801 of
the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) (U.S. Congress, 1992) because it is not,
as EnPA requires, `based upon and consistent with' the findings and
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.'' (U.S. Court of
Appeals, 2004) This being the case, the Court ruled that it was
incumbent upon EPA to establish a dose rate limit extending from 10,000
to 1 million years. In contrast, close examination reveals that the
recommendation of the National Research Council Committee on Technical
Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards (NRC, 1995, pages 6-7) stipulated
that the ``assessment be conducted for the time when the greatest risk
occurs . . .'' Compliance with the ruling of the Court would,
therefore, require that the EPA proposed dose rate limit be converted
into an equivalent limit in terms of risk. This can be accomplished
only if data on the health effects (cancer risks) per unit of radiation
exposure to a future U.S. population, anticipated to exist 10,000 or
more years from now, can be estimated. The ramifications of such a task
are discussed in the sections that follow with the conclusion that the
risk cannot be estimated. The implications of how the scientific issues
discussed below impact the implementation of the ruling of the Court of
Appeals is strictly that of Dade W. Moeller.
sources of information on radiation risks
Radiation health-effects experts worldwide agree that the primary
sources of data on the cancer related risks of ionizing radiation are
those generated through the epidemiological studies of the survivors of
the World War II atomic bombings in Japan.
transfer of risk estimates to the u.s. population
Although the Japanese data are comprehensive, they are directly
applicable only to the population group that was exposed at the time of
the bombings. They cannot be applied, without modification, to the
United States, or any other population, particularly for interpreting
the health effects from potential radionuclide releases from the
proposed Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste repository. Even
more importantly, they cannot be applied under any conditions for
assessing the risks of exposures that occur 10,000 to 1 million years
into the future. This is due to a host of reasons, the most prominent
of which can be described as follows:
<bullet> The exposures in Japan involved relatively high doses
received at high dose rates. In contrast, potential radionuclide
releases from the proposed repository will involve low doses received
at low dose rates. This is important because the health effects, per
unit dose, received at low rates are less than those received at high
dose rates. This difference is taken into account through the
application of what is called a Dose and Dose Rate Effectiveness Factor
(DDREF).
<bullet> The baseline risks for specific cancers within a
population play a dominant role in terms of the magnitude of the excess
cancer risks due to radiation exposures. Since the baseline risks for
specific cancers within the U.S. population are not the same as those
for the Japanese population, there are country-to-country, or spatial,
differences in the risks of cancer in different body organs.
<bullet> The characteristics of the U.S. population in the future
will be different than they are today. This means that there will be
temporal differences in the risks of cancer in different body organs,
per unit of dose--now as contrasted to the future.
Challenge No. 1: Converting Health Effects of High Dose and Dose Rates
to Low Dose and Dose Rates
Based on extensive reviews and evaluations, the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1991, paragraph B62, pages
111-112), and the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP, 1993, Section 7, page 29), have recommended that,
for the evaluation of the health effects (per unit dose) of low dose
and dose rate exposures, the estimated risks (increased cancers)
observed among the Japanese a-bomb survivors be divided by a factor of
2.0. As noted above, this is known as the dose and dose rate
effectiveness factor (DDREF). Although the BEIR VII committee
recommended a value of 1.5 for DDREF (NRC, 2006, page 274), the value
being almost universally applied today is 2.0.
Challenge No. 2: Transfer of Risk Estimates to the U.S. Population
Once the health risks have been modified, taking into account the
dose and dose rates, the next step is to interpret (or translate) the
risks from the radiation exposures that were observed among the
Japanese population, to those that would be anticipated for people
currently living in the United States. To accomplish this task, it is
necessary to account for critical differences in the characteristics of
the populations in the two countries.
Epidemiologists use the term, ``risk,'' for describing the excess
health effects (e.g., cancer incidence and mortality) observed in
populations who have been exposed to radiation. One methodology that
has been developed for this purpose is the Excess Relative Risk (ERR)
model. The basis for this model is that the excess risk of developing a
specific cancer, due to radiation exposure, is assumed to be
proportional to the baseline risk, and that the proportionality
(percentage increase) due to a unit dose of radiation will be the same
for the U.S. population as for the Japanese population.
Data show that the baseline risks for cancers of the colon, lung,
female breast, and male prostate are higher in the U.S. population than
in Japan. In contrast, the baseline rates for cancers of the stomach
and liver are higher in Japan (NRC, 2006, pages 269 and 275). In
applying the concept of proportionality, it is assumed that if a given
radiation exposure increases the baseline risk of a specific cancer in
the Japanese population by 10 percent, it will do likewise in the
United States population. In a sense, this implies that the higher
rates of colon, lung, female breast, and male prostate cancers in the
United States mean that the U.S. population is more susceptible to
these cancers. That being the case, they will similarly be assumed to
be more susceptible to these same cancers, if exposed to radiation.
Extending this concept, if vaccines (similar to that for cervical
cancer) are developed for preventing additional types of cancers, and
their baseline rates are reduced, then the probability of those cancers
being caused as a result of being exposed to radiation will be
similarly reduced. That is, if a vaccine reduces the baseline rate for
a specific cancer, it will be assumed to reduce the probability that
radiation will cause that same cancer.
Further complicating the transfer of data from one population to
another is that the lifestyles and baseline cancer rates in populations
do not remain constant with time. This was exemplified by the changes
that occurred in the rates for cancers of the stomach, colon, lung, and
female breast, among the Japanese population during the period from
1950 to 1988. This was attributed to the fact they were becoming more
``westernized.'' (NRC, 2006, page 268).
Challenge No. 3: Transfer of Risk Estimates to Future U.S. Populations
In contrast to the discussion above, the ruling by the Court of
Appeals stipulated that a dose rate limit be established for the time-
period from 10,000 to 1 million years after closure of the proposed
repository. Again, it is important to note that, while the National
Research Council Yucca Mountain Committee (NRC, 1995) recommended that
compliance be assessed on the basis of the time of ``greatest risk,''
the Court stipulated that EPA promulgate a dose rate limit for purposes
of determining compliance. The only way that a dose rate limit,
regardless of its magnitude, has any relevance is if the risk of
cancer, associated with that dose rate limit, can be quantified. As
noted above, this depends on a host of characteristics of the presumed
future population. Only after those characteristics have been defined,
can such a transformation be made. That this will be a daunting task is
exemplified by the example, discussed immediately above, of the impacts
of ``westernization'' on the Japanese population. This occurred during
a period of less than 4 decades. Currently, there is no scientific
basis for projecting the changes that will occur during time-periods
ranging from 10,000 to 1 million years.
Since there are multiple characteristics that determine the risks
of cancer among exposed members of a population, and many of these are
organ specific, this means that a host of characteristics, lifestyles,
medical practices, and other factors, within the postulated future
population must be specified. The examples that follow illustrate the
magnitude and challenges of this task.
<bullet> Cancer screening approaches, such as colonoscopies,
during which pre-cancerous lesions cannot only be detected, but also
removed, thus reducing the incidence of colon cancer. Note: Such a
statement presumes that colonoscopies will still be the common among
populations living 10,000 to a million years from now! The same general
concept applies to the other examples that follow.
<bullet> Procedures for vaccinating children for chronic hepatitis
B, since such a practice reduced the incidence of liver cancer. In
contrast, the increasing rate for Hepatitis C, for which a vaccine does
not exist today, may lead to an increase in liver cancer.
<bullet> The age at which women have their first child--the
younger the age the less risk they have of developing breast cancer in
the future.
<bullet> The racial composition of the population. African-
American men, for example, have higher rates of prostate cancer. In a
similar manner, genetic susceptibility to cancer is different for
various races.
Since, as noted, the National Research Council Committee (NRC,
1995, pages 6-7) recommended that ``compliance assessment be conducted
for the time when the greatest risk occurs . . .,'' it will be
necessary to convert the EPA 3.5 mSv (350 mrem) per year dose rate
limit (EPA, 2005) into an equivalent risk rate limit. If this is to be
accomplished in any reasonably accurate manner, it will be necessary to
know the baseline rates for all types of cancer at that time. This, in
turn, will require having accurate information not only on the
information listed above, but also on:
<bullet> How long members of the exposed population are
anticipated to live--the risk of cancer increases with longevity, as
well as the distribution of the population by age, since the
susceptibility to cancer varies with age.
<bullet> Projections of future developments of cancer preventive
therapies--most especially vaccines for cancers in specific body
organs.
<bullet> The anticipated exposure of the population group to other
carcinogens, such as tobacco.
In short, data will be needed on their age distribution, life
spans, baseline cancer rates, exposures to other carcinogens, and
dietary habits. In addition, it would require an accurate projection of
the status of medical care, medical technology (including the
availability of artificial lungs, stomachs, livers, etc.), and multiple
other items of information relative to the postulated future
population.
conclusions and commentary
The recommendation of a dose rate limit, without the ability to
estimate the risk that it would represent, would provide essentially no
benefit in terms of protecting future population groups. Unless the
items of information enumerated above can be made available, it will
not be possible to provide a useful dose rate limit. Since the data are
not available (and cannot be projected), one can only conclude that it
is not scientifically possible for EPA to respond to the ruling of the
Court in any meaningful manner.
What the Circuit Court failed to recognize is that the time of
``greatest risk'' will not necessarily coincide with the time of ``peak
dose.'' The relationship between dose and risk is not linear with time,
especially when dealing with tens of thousands to a million years. The
time of peak does could, in reality, occur at a time of minimum risk.
references
ICRP, ``1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection,'' International Commission on Radiological
Protection, Publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 21, No. 1-3
(1991).
NCRP, ``Limitation of Exposures to loizing Radiation,'' National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Report 116, Bethesda,
MD (1993)
NRC, ``Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards,'' Committee on
Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards,'' National Academy Press,
Washington, DC (1995).
NRC, ``Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, BEIR VII Phase 2,'' National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, DC (2006).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Public Health and
Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, Proposed Rule,'' Washington, DC: Federal Register; Title 40
CFR, Part 197, pages 49014--49065 (August 22, 2005).
United States Court of Appeals, For the District of Columbia
Circuit, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc., Petitioner v. Environmental
Protection Agency, Respondent (Argued January 14, 2004; Decided July 9,
2004).
U.S. Congress, ``Energy Policy Act of 1992,'' H.R. 776, Washington,
DC (1992).
__________
Statement of Robert Loux, Executive Director, Nevada Agency for
Nuclear Projects
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
Robert Loux, Executive Director of the Nevada Agency for Nuclear
Projects, which is a branch of the Office of the Governor of the State
of Nevada. The Agency was created by the Nevada Legislature in 1985 to
carry out the States oversight duties under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. I have served as the Agency director since it was established. Our
Agency also serves as staff for the Nevada Commission on Nuclear
Projects.
Our State, being the home of the Nevada Test Site, has a long
history of Federal nuclear programs, and our citizens are well informed
about the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level nuclear waste repository
located on and adjacent to the southwest portion of the Nevada Test
Site, about 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The U.S. Department of
Energy has occupied the Yucca Mountain site since 1978, and in 1983,
after passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the site was
named one of nine Potentially Acceptable Sites, located in six States.
In 1986, after screening of the nine sites as required by the Act,
Yucca Mountain was named as one of three Candidate Repository Sites
slated for detailed site characterization. The two other sites were
located in Deaf Smith County, TX, and on the DOE's Hanford Reservation,
in Washington. According to the Act, after completion of site
characterization, one of the three Candidate Sites would be recommended
to the President by the Secretary of Energy for development of a
repository.
As you know, in late 1987, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act that terminated the site screening process under which
the three candidate sites were being characterized, and singled out the
Yucca Mountain site as the only site to be studied for a potential
repository. The Amendments Act also terminated the required screening
process for a second repository that involved potential sites in States
in the northern mid-west and along the eastern seaboard in order to
meet the geographic equity provision of the 1982 Act. The Amendments
Act directs Congress to consider the need for a second repository
between 2007 and 2010.
In order to assure the safety of a repository, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 required the Environmental Protection Agency to
``promulgate generally applicable standards for protection of the
general environment from offsite releases from radioactive material in
repositories.'' Sec 121(a). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also was
instructed to promulgate ``technical requirements and criteria'' for
its use in approving or disapproving a repository license application
that ``shall not be inconsistent with any comparable standards
promulgated by [EPA]'' Sec. 121(b). The histories of the original EPA
standard and NRC licensing rule are a matter of record, and others in
this hearing likely will make reference to them.
At the time of passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act,
in 1987, it was clear that there was no scientific basis for selection
of the Yucca Mountain site as the single site to be studied for
potential development of a repository, notwithstanding assurances to
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee by the then DOE Yucca
Mountain Project Manager that it was ``inconceivable'' to him that the
site could not meet the EPA standard by a margin of multiple orders of
magnitude. By 1992 it was equally clear that the Project Manager had
been wrong.
Studies of Yucca Mountain directed at air flow through the
unsaturated zone above the water table, where the waste potentially
would be emplaced, resulted in calculations indicating that airborne
release of radioactive carbon-14 would exceed the EPA standard's
radionuclide release limit by a factor of 6 to 8. DOE's attempts to
have EPA revise the standard to allow for the expected carbon-14
release did not succeed after scientific scrutiny by a special panel of
experts convened by EPA. DOE's efforts to have the National Academy of
Sciences National Research Council Board on Radioactive Waste
Management endorse a relaxation of the EPA standard also were
unsuccessful after the Board examined the technical issues.
Congress then set a course to try to save Yucca Mountain from later
disqualification by including Section 801 in the Energy Policy Act of
1992 which mandated a new Yucca Mountain site-specific EPA standard,
and subsequent revision of the NRC licensing rule to be consistent with
the new EPA standard.
``the [EPA] Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences,
promulgate, by rule, public health and safety standards for protection
of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or
disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site. Such
standards shall prescribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent
to individual members of the public from releases to the accessible
environment from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the
repository.'' Section 801(a).
As instructed, EPA contracted with the NAS for a report of findings
and recommendations to be titled ``Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain
Standards'' which was published in 1995. Of interest in today's hearing
is the report's finding that there is no scientific basis to limit the
repository compliance period to 10,000 years as had been done in the
original EPA standard; and, its recommendation: ``We recommend
calculation of the maximum risks of radiation releases whenever they
occur as long as the geologic characteristics of the repository
environment do not change significantly. The time scale for long-term
geologic processes at Yucca Mountain is on the order of approximately 1
million years.''
Page 71-72. The 1 million-year period is referred to in the report
as the period of geologic stability, during which, the report
concluded, it is feasible to make a compliance assessment. The report
also noted that, ``In the case of Yucca Mountain, at least, some
potentially important exposures might not occur until after several
hundred thousand years.'' Page 55.
In June 2001, EPA promulgated its rule, Public Health and
Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada
(40 CFR Part 197). The rule set a regulatory period of 10,000 years for
compliance with EPA's maximum individual dose standard, which was set
at 15 millirems per year. A separate groundwater protection standard
was also set for the 10,000-year regulatory period, with dose and
radionuclide concentration limits consistent with Safe Drinking Water
Act standards that apply to all the Nation's public drinking water
supplies. The rule did acknowledge that peak expected doses could occur
after the 10,000-year regulatory period and required DOE to calculate
the peak individual dose during the period of geologic stability after
10,000 years and include the results in the Yucca Mountain
Environmental Impact Statement ``as an indicator of long-term disposal
system performance.'' But the rule further states that ``No regulatory
standard applies to the results of this analysis.'' Sec. 197.35.
Nevada and others (Nuclear Energy Institute, Natural Resources
Defense Council, and several other environmental public interest
organizations) challenged the EPA standard in lawsuits filed in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in July
2001. Among Nevada's and others' issues was that the setting of a
10,000-year regulatory period was not ``based upon and consistent
with'' with the findings and recommendations of the NAS, as required by
the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The Court upheld this challenge and
vacated that portion of the EPA standard that applied a 10,000-year
regulatory period, as well as the portions of the NRC licensing rule
(10 CFR Part 63) that adopted EPA's 10,000-year regulatory period.
Nuclear Energy Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 373 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
On August 22, 2005, EPA published in the Federal Register a
Proposed Rule modifying 40 CFR 197 with respect to the Court's ruling.
30 FR 70, No. 161, pp.49015-49063. Nevada provided extensive comments
on EPA's proposal before the close of the comment period in November
2005 (comments are included with this statement). Since the close of
the comment period, new information relevant to two aspects of the
Proposed Rule has emerged, and Nevada has provided two Supplemental
Comments to EPA, on December 21, 2005 and January 11, 2006 (also
included with this statement).
EPA's proposed Yucca Mountain Standard is unprecedented in its
adoption of a two-tiered standard, bifurcating radiation exposure
limits to the period up to 10,000 years after disposal, and the period
from 10,000 to 1 million years. It is further unprecedented in its
application of a dose limit up to 10,000 years that is based on
conventional risk apportionment, while applying, for the first time
ever in U.S. or international regulation, a contrived and arbitrary
background-based dose limit for the remaining time period. The proposed
350 millirem per year individual dose limit after 10,000 years is 23
time higher than the 15 millirem per year mean (or average) dose
standard applied up to 10,000 years, and 87.5 times higher than the
groundwater protection standard which EPA improperly proposes to
truncate at 10,000 years.
The 15 millirem per year standard, as EPA has applied it to the
initial 10,000-year period, is consistent with current and accepted
radiation risk protection levels in other U.S. and international
regulation. It also represents an apportionment for waste disposal of
the generally accepted limit of 100 millirems per year from the entire
uranium fuel cycle, which includes operation of nuclear power reactors.
EPA's 350 millirems per year median dose limit is based on the
differential between EPA's current estimated (but not verified)
background radiation dose in Amargosa Valley, below Yucca Mountain, and
the estimated average background dose in the State of Colorado. EPA
cites the average Colorado background dose to be about 700 millirems
per year (which is about double the national average), and estimates
the Amargosa Valley background to be about 350 millirems per year. In
essence, EPA's conclusion is that if 700 millirems per year background
is acceptable to people in Colorado, it must be acceptable also for
people in Amargosa Valley. Therefore, in EPA's view it is reasonable to
impose an additional dose from the repository of 350 millirems per year
in order to achieve an individual dose of 700 millirems per year. EPA
rationalizes its approach by saying that such exposures that are
expected to occur several hundred thousand years into the future should
not be considered to ``pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or
catastrophic consequences.'' 70 FR 161, August 22, 2005, at 49039.
The numerous scientific and ethical flaws in EPA's approach are
elaborated in our comments, and a supplemental comment, to EPA on its
proposed standard. Foremost is that the Colorado average background
dose includes 87 percent indoor radon exposure (over 600 millirems per
year) which can be mitigated primarily by home ventilation, and is the
focus of a major EPA radon abatement program nationwide, executed by
the same EPA division that has proposed this standard. There is also
U.S. policy, adopted by Congress, to bring indoor radon levels down to
the very low level included in natural outdoor radiation exposure. It
appears EPA believes its own indoor radon program and national policy
on abatement will fail, and are of no regard in its setting of
standards for Yucca Mountain.
EPA's choice to use a median dose limit for compliance
determination is also disingenuous and scientifically unsupportable.
The median dose is the dose level for which half of the scenarios
calculated are larger, and half are smaller, and it does not reflect
the range of dose levels. In DOE's performance calculations, at peak
dose, a 350 millirem per year median dose is the equivalent of a 1050
millirem per year average dose.
We have concluded that EPA's proposal is not only unlawful, in that
it is not consistent with the findings and recommendations of the NAS
and therefore in violation of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, but has no
justifiable scientific or ethical basis in its cavalier flaunting of
all human radiation protection regulation worldwide.
The premise of the NAS Technical Bases report is simple and
straight forward--humans must be protected from the maximum radiation
risk from a nuclear waste repository, whenever that risk is projected
to occur. If this protection cannot be reasonably assured at the
outset, the problem is with the selected repository site and design,
not with the premise. EPA's selection of a 1 million-year regulatory
period is a reflection of the NAS finding that compliance assessment is
feasible through that time period for most physical and geologic
aspects of a repository at Yucca Mountain, given our knowledge and
understanding of the natural characteristics and features and processes
at Yucca Mountain and in the surrounding area. The wide range of
possible assumptions about the longevity of the metal waste containers
coupled with our current understanding of the physical and hydrologic
characteristics of Yucca Mountain indicate it is very likely that the
calculated peak individual dose will occur sometime during the million-
year period of geologic stability. If there were no metal containers
and shields protecting the waste from infiltrating water, DOE's
calculations for time of peak dose (in the Site Recommendation
performance assessment) put the average peak at about 2,000 years after
repository closure. Using DOE's optimistic projections of the rate of
container failure, the performance calculation shows the time of peak
dose at between 200,000 and 300,000 years after closure. The magnitude
of the calculated peak dose, in both cases is approximately the same,
and both far exceed 15 millirems per year. In the case with no metal
waste containers or shields, a 15 millirem per year standard would be
exceeded within 500 years after closure of the repository.
The compliance test for a repository is whether there is reasonable
expectation that the statistical maximum dose (or risk) to humans from
releases from the repository fall within a pre-established regulatory
dose limit. It is of great importance that the complex performance
calculation is scientifically credible because the compliance decision
is to be made prior to waste emplacement. After the waste is disposed
and the repository is sealed, the performance calculation has no
relevance as to how the repository will actually perform, and when the
maximum dose to individuals will occur. It could appear in as little as
a few thousand years. The wide range of uncertainty in performance is
dominated by the great uncertainty surrounding not the geology and
hydrology, but the failure rate of the metal waste containers. Once the
waste containers begin failing by corrosion, the contamination of the
groundwater will be relatively rapid, far reaching, and irreversible.
Radionuclides from waste disposed at Yucca Mountain will eventually
reach the land surface both through groundwater pumping and through
natural playas and springs where groundwater that has traveled beneath
Yucca Mountain reaches the land surface today.
We have concluded that EPA must withdraw its proposed Yucca
Mountain standard and reissue a new draft that:
<bullet> does not promote arbitrary and scientifically unjustified
bifurcated radiation exposure limits,
<bullet> continues strict groundwater protection requirements
through the time of maximum radiation exposure from a Yucca Mountain
repository,
<bullet> eliminates statistical gerrymandering through the use of
median versus mean calculations, and that adheres to EPA's traditional
health and risk based approach to radiation and environmental
protection in accord with national policy.
EPA has indicated that it would like to have its final Yucca
Mountain standard in place sometime this calendar year, and as soon as
possible so as not to hinder DOE's ability to submit a license
application to NRC in the near future.
Under current circumstances in the DOE repository program, EPA's
withdrawal of its proposed standard, and issuance of a legally,
scientifically, and morally sustainable proposal will not impede the
DOE's plans for license application.
DOE has officially informed the NRC that it has no schedule for
when it will submit a license application to the NRC, and that it does
not know when it will have such a schedule. This announcement is a
consequence of multiple ongoing changes, events and circumstances in
the program, all remaining unresolved to the extent that a license
application is unlikely within the period of time that a diligent EPA
would take to reissue a proposed Yucca Mountain standard, and finally
promulgate a defensible standard.
______
Response by Robert Loux to an Additional Question from Senator Jeffords
Question. The State of Nevada believes that EPA has failed to
produce a revised standard that is fair to future generations of Nevada
residents. What form should the standard take if it were to be fair,
would it be the same standard, such as 15 millirem, imposed for a
million or more years?
Response. The State of Nevada has provided extensive comments to
the EPA on the proposed standard, which were attached to my written
statement provided to the Committee prior to the hearing. In direct
response to your question, Nevada proposed to EPA that, . . . the
process of complying with the Court's ruling and the Academy's
Technical Basis report is quite simple. All EPA needs to do is insert
``extend the 15 millirem standard through the period when peak doses
are available to the public''.
This period could be as long as several hundred thousand years, if
you believe DOE's story about how long the disposal containers will
last (since DOE's performance assessments show no contribution to waste
isolation from any aspect of the geologic setting) or as short as 500
to 1,000 years if the containers fail very quickly, as Nevada's
research demonstrates convincingly. What the Nevada and DOE agree about
is that once radioactive material leaves the containers inside Yucca
Mountain this radiation shows up in existing drinking water wells in
Amargosa Valley in 100 years or less.
This leads to the other part of the proposed standard that is of
concern to Nevada. Protection of Nevada's groundwater is of paramount
concern to Nevada and its citizens, and therefore we believe that the
groundwater protection requirements in the proposed standard be
extended thought the period of peak doses to the public, whenever that
occurs and not arbitrarily cut off after 10,000 years.
<all>