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[108 Senate Hearings]
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S. Hrg. 108-104
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:
OVERSIGHT OF 2003 PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR, CLIMATE CHANGE,
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 13, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
______
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WASHINGTON : 2003
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
first session
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri MAX BAUCUS, Montana
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio HARRY REID, Nevada
MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho BOB GRAHAM, Florida
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JOHN CORNYN, Texas BARBARA BOXER, California
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RON WYDEN, Oregon
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
Andrew Wheeler, Staff Director
Ken Connolly, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio, Chairman
MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HARRY REID, Nevada
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
FEBRUARY 13, 2003
OPENING STATEMENTS
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming... 9
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 20
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 7
Jeffords, James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont....... 10
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada.......... 47
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio... 1
WITNESSES
Bell, Hubert T., Inspector General, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, accompanied by: George A. Mulley, Senior Level
Assistant for Investigative Operations, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and Stephen D. Dingbaum, Assistant Inspector General
for Audits, Nuclear Regulatory Commission...................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 113
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Carper........................................... 120
Senator Clinton.......................................... 121
Senator Inhofe........................................... 118
Senator Voinovich........................................ 120
Meserve, Richard A., Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, accompanied by: Greta Joy Dicus, Commissioner; Nils
J. Diaz, Commissioner; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., Commissioner and
Jeffrey S. Merrifield, Commissioner............................ 11
Event Notification........................................... 87
Inspection Report............................................88-110
Letter from Glen W. Meyer, chief, Projects Branch 3, Division
of Reactor Projects, regarding Salem Nuclear Generating
Station--NRC Inspection Report No. 50-272/02-09, 50-311/02-
09.........................................................87-110
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Press Release No. 03-052, April 29, 2003...............55-57, 78-80
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Carper........................................... 86
Senator Inhofe........................................... 52
Senator Jeffords......................................... 55
Senator Lieberman........................................ 70
Senator Voinovich........................................ 59
Staff Response to OIG's October 16, 2002, Report, ``Review of
NRC's Handling and Marking of Sensitive Unclassified
Information''.............................................. 76
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Witt, Jere, prepared statement................................... 121
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:
OVERSIGHT OF 2003 PROGRAMS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change
and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9.30 a.m. in
room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. George V.
Voinovich (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Voinovich, Inhofe, Carper, Jeffords, and
Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order.
Today's hearing continues our ongoing oversight of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This oversight began by my
predecessor, the chairman of this committee, Senator Inhofe
back in 1998, and this is the fifth oversight hearing in 6
years. I believe that Chairman Inhofe deserves a lot of credit
for starting these hearings. It is my intention as chairman to
continue this strong oversight.
One of the main issues that I have had of what I would like
to discuss today is an incident involving a nuclear plant in my
State. While this may be the first time that I am discussing
this matter at a public hearing it is not my only involvement,
and I appreciate that the NRC has been open to my requests for
information. I am particularly thankful to Chairman Meserve for
his willingness to keep me apprised of the situation. I want to
thank all of the NRC commissioners and inspector general for
being here today with us.
Today's hearing is the first of these oversight hearings
since the tragic events of September 11th. As all of you are
undoubtedly aware concerns over terrorists attacks on America's
nuclear facilities are real and are warranted. Members of this
committee on both sides of the aisle, including myself, have
worked with the Administration on the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security and the protection of our
nuclear facilities. Senator Jeffords, while he was chairman of
this committee, worked very hard on this issue, as have Senator
Reid and Senator Clinton.
I was pleased that Senator Jeffords held one hearing on
nuclear security and then a second closed hearing that I
requested for national security reasons. Chairman Inhofe and I
intend to hold hearings later this year on the issue of nuclear
security and will likely mark up a nuclear security bill.
Because we intend to hold those hearings and markups later,
I would ask that we keep the focus of the hearings today on the
operations budget and oversight activities of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission rather than on the very valid issue
surrounding nuclear safety or security. The mission of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission is one of the most vital missions
carried out by the Federal Government--to regulate the Nation's
civilian use of the by-products source and special nuclear
materials, to ensure adequate protection of public health and
safety, to promote the common defense and security, and to
protect the environment.
I want to focus for just a minute on these three aspects of
this regulatory mission which is laid out in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The
first and most important of the NRC's critical missions is
regulation of nuclear materials in order to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety. I want to make myself
perfectly clear here: The No. 1 issue for the NRC is safety.
Period. There is no greater issue. I want the people I serve in
Ohio and my fellow Americans to be safe and it is the NRC's job
to guarantee it.
As you are well aware, there have been some serious
problems at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station since this
panel's last oversight hearing and the reactor at Davis-Besse
located at Oak Harbor and operated by First Energy. It has been
shut down for over a year. Investigations conducted by First
Energy and the NRC have revealed that boric acid corrosion had
eaten entirely through a 6.63 inch thick carbon steel RVP head,
and almost entirely through a thin internal liner of stainless
steel cladding. The stainless steel cladding, which is not
designed to act as a system pressure boundary, was the only
thing preventing a major loss of coolant, an accident that
could have released some 60,000 gallons of highly radioactive
liquid from the reactor into the containment area.
Following this discovery, I was assured that there were
safety measures in place that would have prevented a major
nuclear accident. I was told that the people of Ohio were safe
because of the design of the plant. To my dismay, I read in a
newspaper article on Tuesday in the Akron Beacon Journal
entitled ``Nuclear Plant's Cooling System Flawed.'' It seems
that the emergency cooling system at Davis-Besse that is
intended to prevent a nuclear disaster--from First Energy,
``would not have worked.'' This is from the First Energy
engineer--``would not have worked as it's designed to work.''
Although I was told immediately following this incident
there were adequate safety measures in place to prevent a
disaster, the fact of the matter is that the plant's safety
measures might have been sufficient really troubles me. And I
would like some answers to that and I want somebody to tell me
what's going on.
But it does not stop there. Subsequent investigations have
also revealed that both First Energy and the NRC missed several
opportunities to identify and correct the corrosion problem
before last February. In fact, the NRC has concluded that the
boric acid problems have been present and discoverable since
1996. This is particularly troubling to me. Simply put, I want
to get to the bottom of these events. I have expressed my
extreme concern to First Energy over what has happened. I have
asked the GAO to investigate what happened at Davis-Besse. Now
it is your turn to hear of my concern.
It is simply not good enough to know what happened at
Davis-Besse. I want to know what the NRC has done to correct
the problems. I want to know what the NRC is going to do to
prevent this from ever happening again at Davis-Besse or, for
that matter, any other nuclear facility in America. I want to
know what the NRC is doing to get Davis-Besse back on line in a
manner that will absolutely protect the people of my State. I
am pleased that the people most intimately affected by Davis-
Besse, the people of Ottawa County, are so actively involved in
the determination of when and if Davis-Besse will be on line.
I would like to read a portion of the statement from Jere
Witt, Ottawa County administrator, who has asked that I submit
his statement in our record of this hearing. ``A renewed
stringent regulation by the NRC must be part of this process.
This regulation must be based on knowledge and common sense,
not one influenced by political agendas. My personal thanks to
the NRC staff, especially Jim Dyer, Jack Grobe, Bill Dean, and
Christina Lippa for their open and candid discussion with the
residents of Ottawa County and myself. They have gone above and
beyond to ensure that we are informed. I would also like to
express my appreciation to First Energy, especially to Peter
Berg, Bob Saunders, and Lou Meyers, for allowing me to
participate on the Restart Overview Panel. They have provided
me free access to all facets of Davis-Besse.''
I would like unanimous consent to include the entire
statement that was submitted to me. There being none, it will
be in the record.
I appreciate the fact that the people most impacted by this
are intimately involved in this whole business--I hope that you
think that we provide you comfortable chairs because you are
going to be sitting in them for a long time until we are
absolutely assured that this kind of thing is never going to
happen again in our country.
The second purpose of the NRC is to promote the common
defense and security. Since the terrorists attack on September
11, 2001, this committee has conducted a comprehensive review
of the Nation's nuclear facilities, held hearings on their
safety and security, marked up nuclear safety security
legislation, and participated in the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security.
Although the NRC has not been moved under the Department of
Homeland Security, it is most important that the commission be
considered as a Homeland Security agency. President Bush's
fiscal year 2004 budget requests include $53.1 million for
homeland activities at the NRC, more than a 50 percent
increase. I would like to hear from the commission what it
intends to do with this money and how it intends to work with
the newly created Department of Homeland Security.
There are also some other questions that I think we all
have concerning your recent budget proposal that need an
explanation. Particularly, it is my understanding that the
Administration has proposed cutting spending on inspection
activities. I just don't understand that, especially when
according to what I have read the NRC did an inadequate job of
inspecting and monitoring what was going on at Davis-Besse.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management in the Federal Workforce, I am convinced that if the
NRC has the right people with the right knowledge and skills in
the right place at the right time--if they had--and if First
Energy had had the right people with the right knowledge and
skills at the right time and the right place, we wouldn't be
here today having this hearing.
Lastly, the third of the NRC's critical missions is to
protect the environment. Over the last 40 years, nuclear energy
has proven to be a safe, reliable, clean source of energy. It
currently produces 20 percent of our electricity and since
1973, the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity has
prevented 62 million tons of sulphur dioxide, over 32 million
tons of nitrogen, and over 2.6 billion tons of carbon being
released into the air.
The Energy Information Administration predicts that we will
need about a 30 percent increase in electrical generation by
the year 2050. We are dependent on fossil fuels, coal, oil, and
natural gas--and we will be for the foreseeable future,
although we are making some significant progress in the use of
renewables. Nuclear energy continues to be our next best
alternative. If we are going to be serious about protecting our
environment while providing safe, reliable, and affordable
electricity to all Americans, we need to increase our use of
renewables, improve how we burn fossil fuels, promote
efficiency, promote renewables, and increase the development of
nuclear energy. If we are to do this we must ensure to the
public that those facilities now in operation are safe.
I am anxious to hear from the witnesses today about how
they can guarantee that they are safe. Our witnesses today
include the chairman and commissioners of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission as well as the Inspector General of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I would like to thank Chairman
Meserve and the rest of the commission for coming down here to
discuss these issues. I look forward to their testimony and
working with my colleagues on this issue.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
Statement of Hon. George V. Voinovich, U.S. Senator from the
State of Ohio
The hearing will come to order. Good Morning.
Today's hearing continues our ongoing oversight of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. This oversight began by my predecessor, Chairman
Inhofe, when he was the chairman of this subcommittee in 1998, and is
the 5th oversight hearing in 6 years. I believe that Chairman Inhofe
deserves a lot of credit for starting these hearings. It is my
intention as chairman to continue this strong oversight.
One of the main issues that I would like to discuss today is an
incident involving a nuclear plant in my State of Ohio. While this may
be the first time that I am discussing the matter at a public hearing,
this is not my only involvement. I appreciate that the NRC has been
open and responsive to my requests for information. I am particularly
thankful to Chairman Meserve and his willingness to keep me apprised of
this situation. I want to thank all of the NRC commissioners and
Inspector General for being here today.
Today's hearing is the first of these oversight hearings since the
tragic events of September 11, 2001. As all of you are undoubtedly
aware, concerns over terrorist attacks on America's nuclear facilities
are real and are warranted.
Members of this committee on both sides of the aisle--including
myself--have worked with the Administration on the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security and the protection of our nuclear
facilities. Senator Jeffords while he was chairman of this committee
worked very hard on this issue, as have Senators Reid and Clinton.
I was pleased that Senator Jeffords held one hearing on nuclear
security and then a second closed hearing that I requested for national
security reasons. Chairman Inhofe and I intend to hold hearings later
this year on the issue of nuclear security and will likely mark up a
nuclear security bill.
Because we intend to hold those hearings and markups later, I would
ask that we keep the focus of this hearing on the operations, budget,
and oversight activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--rather
than on the very valid issues surrounding nuclear security.
The Mission of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is one of the most
vital missions carried out by the Federal Government--to regulate the
Nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear
materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, to
promote the common defense and security, and to protect the
environment.
I want to focus for just a minute on the three aspects of this
regulatory mission--which is laid out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
The first, and most important, of the NRC's critical missions is
regulation of nuclear materials in order to ensure adequate protection
of public health and safety.
I want to make myself perfectly clear here: The No. 1 issue for the
NRC is safety. Period. There is no greater issue. I want the people I
serve in Ohio and my fellow Americans to be safe, and it is the NRC's
job to guarantee it.
As you are well aware, there have been some serious problems at the
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station since this panel's last oversight
hearing and the reactor at Davis-Besse, located in Oak Harbor, OH, and
operated by First Energy, has been shut down for a year.
Investigations--conducted by FirstEnergy and the NRC--have revealed
that boric acid corrosion had eaten entirely through a 6.63 inch thick
carbon-steel RPV head, and almost entirely through a thin internal
liner of stainless steel cladding. This stainless steel cladding, which
is not designed to act as a system pressure boundary, was the only
thing preventing a major Loss-of-Coolant accident that could have
released some 60,000 gallons of highly radioactive liquid from the
reactor and into the containment area.
Following this discovery, I was assured that there were safety
measures in place that would have prevented a major nuclear accident. I
was told that the people of Ohio were safe because of the design of the
plant. To my dismay, I read a newspaper article on Tuesday in the Akron
Beacon Journal entitled ``Nuclear plant's cooling system flawed.'' It
seems that the emergency cooling system at Davis-Besse that is intended
to prevent a nuclear disaster, and I quote from a FirstEnergy engineer,
``would not have worked as it's designed to work.'' Although I was told
immediately following this incident that there were adequate safety
measures in place to prevent a disaster, the fact of the matter is that
this plant's safety measures might have been deficient. I was told one
thing but read in the newspaper another. I want some answers. I want
someone to tell me what is going on here.
But is does not stop there. Subsequent investigations have also
revealed that both FirstEnergy and the NRC missed several opportunities
to identify and correct the corrosion problem before last February. In
fact, the NRC has concluded that the boric acid problems had been
present and discoverable since 1996. This is particularly troubling to
me.
Simply put, I want to get to the bottom of these events. I have
expressed my extreme concern to FirstEnergy over what has happened. I
have asked the GAO to investigate what happened at Davis Besse, and now
it is your turn to hear my concern.
It is simply not good enough to know what happened at Davis Besse.
I want to know what the NRC has done to correct the problems. I want to
know what the NRC is doing to prevent this from ever happening again at
Davis-Besse or any other nuclear power plant in America. And I want to
know what the NRC is doing to get Davis-Besse back online in a manner
that will absolutely protect the people of Ohio.
I am pleased that the people most intimately affected by Davis-
Besse, the people of Ottawa County are so actively involved in the
determination of when and if Davis-Besse will be online.
I would like to read a portion of a statement by Jere Witt, Ottawa
County Administrator, who has asked that I submit his statement in our
record of this hearing:
``A renewed stringent regulation by the NRC must be part of this
process. This regulation must be based on knowledge and common sense,
not one influenced by political agenda's. My personal thanks to NRC
staff especially (Jim Dyer, Jack Grobe, Bill Dean, Christine Lipa) for
their open and candid discussion with the residents of Ottawa County
and myself. They have gone above and beyond to insure we are informed.
I would also like to express my appreciation to FirstEnergy especially
(Peter Berg, Bob Saunders, Lew Myers) for allowing me to participate on
the Restart Overview Panel. They have provided me free access to all
facets of Davis-Besse.''
I ask unanimous consent that the entire statement be submitted into
the record. No objection heard, it is so ordered.
With that being said, I hope that you think we provide comfortable
chairs for our witnesses, because you are going to be sitting in them
again and again until this committee is absolutely assured that you
have taken the necessary steps to prevent this kind of potential
disaster from ever happening again.
The second of the NRC's critical missions is to promote the common
defense and security.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, this committee has
conducted a comprehensive review of the nation's nuclear facilities,
held hearings on their safety and security, marked up nuclear security
legislation and participated in the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security. As I have already mentioned, we intend to hold more
hearings on this topic later.
Although the NRC was not moved into the Department of Homeland
Security, it is most important that the commission be considered as a
Homeland Security Agency. President Bush's fiscal year 2004 Budget
request includes $53.1 million for Homeland Security activities at the
NRC--more than a 50 percent increase. I would like to hear from the
commission what it intends to do with this money and how it intends to
work with the newly created Department of Homeland Security. There are
also some other questions that I think we all have concerning your
recent budget proposal that need an explanation. Particularly, it is my
understanding that the Administration has proposed cutting spending on
inspection activities. I just don't understand that, especially when
according to what I have read, the NRC did an inadequate job on
inspecting and monitoring what was going on at Davis-Besse.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management and the Federal Workforce, I am convinced that if the NRC
had the right people, with the right knowledge and skills in the right
place at the right time--and if FirstEnergy had the right people, with
the right knowledge and skills in the right place at the right time--we
would not be having this discussion today.
Lastly, the third of the NRC's critical missions is to protect the
environment.
Over the last 40 years, nuclear energy has proven to be a safe,
reliable, and clean source of energy. It currently produces 20 percent
of our electricity, and since 1973 the use of nuclear energy to
generate electricity has prevented 62 million tons of sulfur dioxide,
over 32 million tons of nitrogen, and over 2.6 billion tons of carbon
from being released into our air.
The Energy Information Administration predicts that we will need
about a 30 percent increase in electrical generation by the year 2015.
Today, we are dependent on fossil fuels--coal, oil, and natural gas--
and we will be for the foreseeable future. Nuclear energy continues to
be our next best alternative.
If we are going to be serious about protecting our environment
while providing safe, reliable and affordable electricity to all
Americans, we need to increase our use of renewable energy, improve how
we burn fossil fuels, promote efficiency, and increase the development
of nuclear energy.
If we are to do this we must ensure the public that those
facilities now in operation are safe. I am anxious to hear from our
witnesses today about how they can guarantee that they are safe.
Our witnesses today include the chairman and commissioners of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as the Inspector General of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I would like to thank Chairman Meserve
and the rest of the commission for coming down here to discuss these
issues, and I look forward to their testimony and to working with my
colleagues on these issues.
Senator Voinovich. I would now like to call on the ranking
member of this subcommittee, Chairman Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. I had asked the ranking member if he would
defer to me for probably less than 2 minutes.
Senator Carper. And I had refused.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Oh, well.
Senator Carper. I am happy to.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Senator Carper. I
appreciate it. We have Secretary Rumsfeld and General Meyers
before the Senate Armed Forces Committee at this very time and
I have to go back down there.
I would like to put my whole opening statement in the
record.
I would just mention a couple of things. In 1998, as you
mentioned Mr. Chairman, there had not been any oversight of NRC
for many years. We found--and it's true with any bureaucracy if
there's no oversight, things are happening that shouldn't be
happening. I just want to compliment this group before us. We
got in there. We looked at the problems that were there and
have made a lot of corrections.
Mr. Meserve, I understand that this may be your last time
you will be appearing before us. We certainly wish you the very
best. Mr. Diaz, I understand that your mother is having surgery
and you may have to leave early. Of course, we will say a
prayer for her, OK?
The last thing I want to do is just emphasize something the
chairman said. We have an energy crisis in this country. When
we consider an energy bill, we recognize that this Nation needs
all forms of energy. We need renewables; we need fossil fuels;
we need the natural gas; ane we need nuclear energy. Senator
Voinovich, you and I can remember people marching in the
streets against the nuclear plants--the same people during the
ambient air hearings who were concerned about air pollution. We
don't have air pollution with nuclear energy. In this country,
we are only 20 percent dependent upon nuclear energy. It really
should be more than that.
I am hoping that we are going to be able to do something
about using this nuclear energy to help us with the current
crisis. I am fearful of a lot of the legislation that I see
around that might be cutting back on some forms of energy
because right now we need it all.
So, Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member have an
awesome obligation to America to do what you can to keep the
progress going for nuclear energy to get more of it for America
and to run this great economic machine of ours.
The other day commented on a talk show, ``You can't run the
most highly industrialized nation in the history of the world
with windmills.'' There are a lot of people that believe we can
do that. However, until that great day comes, we need all forms
of energy, including nuclear energy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. Jim Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome to Chairman Meserve and all of the
commissioners. Commissioner Diaz--I understand your mother will be
having surgery tomorrow and you may have to leave this hearing early to
catch your flight. I wish my very best to you and her and I hope she
enjoys a speedy recovery.
I also want to take a moment to publicly thank Chairman Meserve as
this may be the last time we see him before this committee. I can think
of no higher compliment than to say you are leaving the NRC a more
effective and efficient Agency than when you first assumed your
position as chairman. Job well done and we all wish you well. I have
always been an advocate of nuclear power. Nuclear power has proven to
be a safe, reliable and clean source of energy. Over the next 15 years,
our energy demands will increase by nearly 30 percent. If we are to
meet the energy demands of the future, and we are serious about
reducing utility emissions, then we should get serious about the zero
emissions energy production that nuclear power provides. Nuclear
facilities are more efficient today than ever before and we are
exploring new, even better technologies. We should be excited about the
future of nuclear energy. I am pleased with NRC's commitment to both
license renewal and new reactor licensing as they are key to the
continued success of this clean, efficient energy. And this Commitee
must do its part, and we should start by reauthorizing Price-Anderson.
In 1998, as chairman of this subcommittee, I began a series of
oversight hearings of the NRC. The hearing I held in 1998 was the first
held by this committee in years. Fortunately, every year since that
time we have had the commission appear before us. I expect that
rigorous oversight of the NRC to continue.
In fact, the committee will hold another nuclear hearing in the
near future that will focus on the security of our nuclear energy
infrastructure. In this time of the constant threat posed by those who
wish to do harm to our Nation and freedom loving people, protecting our
Nation's commercial nuclear infrastructure, and more importantly, those
who live near these facilities, is paramount.
When I began conducting oversight of the NRC, I did so with the
goal of changing the bureaucratic atmosphere that had infected the NRC.
By 1998, the NRC had become an Agency of process, not results. It was
neither efficient nor effective. If the Agency was to improve it had to
employ a more results oriented approach--one that was risk-based and
science-based, not one mired in unnecessary process and paperwork. I am
pleased that in the last 5 years, we have seen tremendous strides and
those who work for the NRC should be proud. This approach has made the
NRC a lean and more effective regulatory Agency.
But while I am pleased with the progress, many challenges remain.
Today, this committee will be probing for answers, not only
regarding the day-to-day activities of the commission, but also more
pointed concerns that have recently come to light. Davis-Besse in Ohio
is one such situation where a number of questions have arisen. Those
questions need to be answered and public confidence restored. I applaud
Senator Voinovich for what he has already done. For some time now he
has been asking the tough questions and demanding answers of all
involved. He has used his leadership position both forcefully and
responsibly. The people of Ohio are fortunate to have such a good
person as their Senator.
As the chairman of the full committee, you can count on support and
my continued attention to the NRC and its mission. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
working with you in your new capacity as chairman of the
Environment and Public Works Committee.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Senator Voinovich. Now I would like call on the ranking
member of this subcommittee, Senator Carper. Governor Carper
and I have been friends for a long period of time. We are the
only two graduates of the Ohio State University here in the
U.S. Senate. Senator Carper and I worked very closely with each
other while we were both involved in leadership positions in
the National Governor's Association. I am really delighted that
Tom and I are going to be working together on this
subcommittee. I think because of that we made some fruitful
things happen there.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses today, we welcome you. We thank you for
your stewardship and for joining us. Governor Voinovich and I
have served together--we haven't really sat together like this
for about 10 years now. He was chairman of the National
Governor's Association when I was vice chairman and I was
privileged to succeed him there. He was chairman of the Jobs
for America's Graduates. I was his vice chairman. Here we are
here today. He is the chairman of this subcommittee and I am
still his sidekick. We have worked on a lot of things together.
My hope is that we will find plenty of common ground. I think
we will.
I am just delighted that Senator Lieberman is running for
President. That gives me an opportunity to serve as the ranking
member. I hope he stays in that campaign for as long as he can.
God bless him.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. I just want to say--and this is following
up on some of the comments of Chairman Voinovich. I am an old
Navy guy, and in the Navy we have aircraft carriers that are
essentially floating nuclear reactors. We have submarines that
are essentially a floating nuclear reactor. When you spend time
around vessels that rely on nuclear power largely, and you know
people who have lived on those for 3 years, you have a greater
degree of comfort with nuclear power than you otherwise would.
I am concerned, however, with the points that Senator
Voinovich raises about Davis-Besse. I think Senator Clinton is
going to be along later and she will raise some concerns about
a plant--I think it is called Indian Point--up in New York. I
will raise with you some concerns about releases of tritium, I
think in the groundwater, around the Salem One Nuclear Power
Plant just across the river from us in Delaware--right across
the Delaware River--in Salem, New Jersey, where some tritium
apparently last December leaked into the groundwater and was
just reported this past week.
I think that I--and certainly in Senator Inhofe, Senator
Voinovich--that you have people who believe that nuclear power
is important and part of our electric generation in this
country. It ought to be a more important aspect as we go
forward. One of the best ways to ensure that it is, is to
address the concerns that he is raising on Davis-Besse, and
that I will raise on Salem, and that Senator Clinton will raise
with respect to Indian Point.
Before I come back to the issue of nuclear power, let me
say, Mr. Chairman, that I am delighted to be on this
subcommittee particularly with you, but the subcommittee's
jurisdiction obviously not only includes nuclear issues but
also clean air issues. We live in a day where, gosh, 55 percent
of our oil today will come from foreign sources--55 percent.
And it is growing. We are on a verge of a war with Iraq. We
still actually import some oil from them directly or
indirectly.
Nuclear power can help us to alleviate the need for that
foreign oil. We had a trade deficit of about $400 billion last
year. A lot of that was oil--not all of it--but a lot of it was
oil. Nuclear power can help us to reduce that trade deficit,
too.
One of the reasons why I tend to be a proponent of nuclear
power, though, deals with not just the reductions in foreign
oil imports, but with the reduction in CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions. The President has proposed--and I think Senator
Inhofe will introduce later, maybe this month or next--the
President's Clear Skies initiative which addresses sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury releases from our power
plants. My hope is that at the end of the day we can add a
fourth ``P'' to that package and that would be carbon dioxide.
The ranking Democrat on this committee, Senator Jeffords, I
believe unveiled yesterday his ``Four P'' proposal--he is
walking in the room right now. That is pretty good timing,
Senator Jeffords. He introduced his ``Four P'' legislation
yesterday. The President's proposal does not include that. My
hope is that we can come to a consensus maybe around a proposal
that Senator Chafee, Senator Breaux, Senator Boxer, and I
introduced last year which will be reintroduced in here shortly
to address all four pollutants into our environment.
Having said that, we are delighted that you are here. We
thank you for coming, and, Mr. Chairman, to you for holding
this hearing. We very much look forward to working with you on
these issues, on the issues of clean air and particularly
carbon dioxide as we go forth. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. Senator Jeffords is the
ranking member of the full committee.
Senator Jeffords, we welcome you this morning. Would you
like to make an opening statement?
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Jeffords. Yes, I would.
Chairman Meserve, and Commissioners Dicus, Diaz,
McGaffigan, as well as Inspector General Bell, we appreciate
your appearing before the subcommittee and on this oversight.
First, allow me to take this opportunity to express my
thanks and appreciation to Commissioner Meserve as he leaves
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to become president of the
Carnegie Institute. Great. Going up. I congratulate you, Mr.
Chairman, on this prestigious assignment and wish you much
success. We are very sorry to lose you, though, at the NRC,
particularly in these difficult times as we work to ensure the
safety of the nuclear facilities against a variety of threats.
I commend you for the fine service you have given to the NRC
and to your government, and trust that you will continue to
lend your expertise and assistance--and I know that you will--
and wish you the very best of luck.
This hearing will provide us with the general overview of
matters before the NRC. I will not take the subcommittee's time
with a long statement, but I will have a few questions to ask
at the conclusion of the testimony. It is nice to have you all
here.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. I, too, would again
underscore how much we appreciate all of you being here with us
this morning. Mr. Meserve, I again appreciate the leadership
that you have provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the wonderful open relationship that I have had with you over
the last several years.
Mr. Meserve, I would like you to begin.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. MESERVE, CHAIRMAN, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION ACCOMPANIED BY: GRETA JOY DICUS,
COMMISSIONER; NILS J. DIAZ, COMMISSIONER; EDWARD McGAFFIGAN,
JR., COMMISSIONER AND JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, COMMISSIONER
Mr. Meserve. Chairman Voinovich, Senator Jeffords, Senator
Carper, it is a pleasure to appear before you today with my
fellow commissioners to discuss the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's program. We would like to thank you and the
committee for the past support and advice we have received over
the years. The commission looks forward to working with you and
the new Congress.
As has been indicated, I have announced my decision to
leave the NRC at the end of March, a little more than a year
before my term ends, to assume the presidency of the Carnegie
Institution of Washington. This decision did not come easily
since I have thoroughly enjoyed my tenure as chairman, and the
opportunity it has provided me to work on issues of importance
to the Nation. My colleagues and I have served during a period
of great tragedy and great challenges. I view my tenure as the
NRC chairman with great personal pride and accomplishment.
I believe that fiscal year 2002 and the first 4\1/2\ months
of this fiscal year have been marked by significant
achievements by our Agency. My full statement, which I have
submitted for the record, enumerates a few of these
achievements and challenges. The monthly reports we submit to
you and our other authorization and appropriations
subcommittees provide a more detailed description of our
activities.
Over the past 17 months, the commission has undertaken a
comprehensive review of our safeguards and security programs in
close consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and
the other Federal agencies, and with significant involvement by
State agencies.
Out of that review has come, No. 1, a series of interim
compensatory measures to strengthen security at our licensed
facilities and during transportation of spent fuel. No. 2, a
five-tier advisory system compatible with the Homeland Security
advisory system. No. 3, orders to strengthen our access
authorization programs at power reactors. No. 4, proposed
orders to strengthen guard training and address guard fatigue.
We have provided revised design basis threats for comment
to other Federal agencies, the States, and cleared industry
personnel. We have undertaken enhanced tabletop security
exercises at our reactor facilities and will, by the end of
this month, begin enhanced force-on-force exercises at these
facilities. We have defined actions to ensure better control of
high-risk radioactive sources of the most concern for potential
use in a radiological dispersal device.
In short, we have a comprehensive and aggressive program to
enhance security. Nuclear facilities had very significant
security before September 11th and that security has been
greatly strengthened in the aftermath of the attacks. The past
17 months have seen the maturing of our new reactor oversight
process. We, and most stakeholders, believe that this new
program is a significant improvement over our old inspection
process. The transition to the new process has gone remarkably
well, although it is still a work-in-progress on which we will
make further improvements.
The Davis-Besse plant has been our greatest recent
challenge. Mr. Chairman, you addressed this matter in great
detail, and we have had meetings about it. Our full statement
summarizes the issues and activities regarding Davis-Besse. The
NRC staff has devoted significant resources to the Davis-Besse
plant and to the broader issues raised by this incident.
The plant will return to operation only after the staff is
convinced, through intensive inspections, both that the plant
is physically ready to operate, and perhaps more importantly,
that the safety culture at the plant, which the licensee has
identified as the main root cause of the incident, is on the
path to recovery. We also recognize that there were failings by
the NRC in connection with this episode. We have undertaken an
aggressive lessons-learned exercise and are implementing the
resulting high-priority recommendations.
Our statement for the record also describes some
significant achievements in our reactor licensing program,
including license renewals, power uprates, and license
transfers. We are preparing for potential new reactor
construction. We expect to review three early site permits
starting this year and are undertaking the review of one
advanced reactor design, the Westinghouse AP-1000, and are in
the pre-application phase for several others.
In our materials program, the NRC, in partnership with the
agreement States, conducts a comprehensive program to ensure
the safe use of radiological materials in a variety of medical
and industrial settings. The commission has completed a complex
rulemaking on the medical use of byproduct material, and now
faces the challenge of implementing that rule.
The commission has also been implementing a major rule
change relating to large fuel cycle facilities and several
major licensing reviews are underway or soon will be submitted
that will test the application of that rule.
The staff has made progress on a wide array of programs
relating to the safe disposal of nuclear waste. A central focus
is the preparation for the Department of Energy's application
to construct a high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain,
NV. The application is expected in December 2004. Over the past
year, the staff has issued a draft Yucca Mountain review plan
for public comment and has conducted numerous public meetings
with DOE in anticipation of an application. The technical
issues involved will be substantial and the NRC decisions will
be closely scrutinized. We are preparing for that reality.
Our budget proposal for fiscal year 2004 will allow the NRC
to continue to protect public health and safety, promote the
common defense and security, and protect the environment, while
providing sufficient resources to address increasing personnel
costs and workloads. We are seeking an increase in our budget,
but the increased workload justifies it.
Mr. Chairman, the NRC has accomplished much over the past
year and has many important initiatives underway. This reflects
the reality that we are in a time of striking change.
Fortunately, the NRC is up to the challenges before it.
My colleagues and I would welcome the opportunity to
respond to your questions. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Meserve.
Do any of the other members of the commission want to share
with us some of your observations? Again, I appreciate your
being here. Mr. Merrifield? Mr. Diaz? Ms. Dicus? Mr.
McGaffigan?
Mr. McGaffigan. Waiting for your questions, sir.
Mr. Meserve. We want to make sure we spend the time
addressing the issues that you want to raise with us.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I'll begin. I think that in the
tradition of the committee we will have 5-minute rounds.
I will start off with one of the most disturbing pieces of
this whole Davis-Besse incident, which is as the investigation
moves along, continues to unravel surprises. The latest
development, as I mentioned in my statement, is that we were
all were told if the container had broken and gone through the
liner, that there wouldn't have been a problem.
I have been told that if the reactor lid had given way, a
major disaster would not have occurred. Now we find that that
may not be true. I am very upset about that because we relied
on the credibility of the information that was provided to us.
I would like to have some answers about that. The question
I have is: Are we going to have more surprises as we move
along? Mr. Meserve?
Mr. Meserve. We had spent an enormous amount of effort to
monitor the causes of the event at the Davis-Besse plant and
obviously are spending a great deal of effort to make sure that
the necessary corrective actions are in place. I visited you in
your office and I informed you that there were safety systems
in place that would have served to prevent a severe accident in
the event that there had been a rupture of the cladding on the
top of the reactor pressure vessel head.
Of course, we are dealing with a situation that didn't
happen, so we have to speculate and we have to rely on
analysis. Fortunately, a rupture didn't happen. In fact, the
preliminary work that the NRC has undertaken would suggest that
the cladding would have held for a considerable period of time
without rupturing. If it had, we would have had the following
circumstances unfold. The primary coolant in the reactor is at
high temperature and stays as a liquid because it is at very
high pressure.
If you were to have a rupture of the top of the head, there
would have been a depressurization of the reactor and that
liquid that is at high temperature--well above the boiling
point of water--would have flashed to steam. So you would have
had an ejection of the cooling water from the reactor.
All reactors are designed to be able to address an event of
that kind, which is called a loss of coolant accident. And so
there are safety systems that inject water into the core in
order to preserve cooling. Those systems would have operated
and, in fact, they are designed to be able to handle a break
that is 20 times larger than the one that would have occurred
in the event that there had been a rupture of the cavity at the
top of the Davis-Besse head.
The concern that has recently arisen is that there is a
large volume of water that is held in reserve that flows into
the reactor to cool the reactor, and that would fill the
reactor and would be flowing out. It would be collected for
recirculation--there is not an infinite supply of water that is
available.
Mr. Merrifield. It is 400,000 gallons.
Mr. Meserve. Mr. Merrifield has indicated that it would be
400,000 gallons of water that would be available in tanks. And
then the way the system works is that the water collects in a
sump at the base of the reactor building and then that is
recirculated back through the reactor. There are certain sprays
that occur in the containment to control temperature and
pressure and absent chemical processes.
The issue that has recently been raised--and this was
identified by the licensee--is a question as to whether there
would have been clogging of the sump as a result of debris that
might have accumulated in the sump and have covered the screens
and prevented the water from being able to flow to the
recirculation pumps.
There is another issue that has arisen recently. There was
a gap in the screening that might have allowed a large piece of
debris to get through and have damaged the impeller on the
pump, or conceivably could have constricted or been captured
in----
Senator Voinovich. The engineer said it would not have
worked as it is designed to work. It seems to me that if you
had some backup system in place, that somebody would anticipate
that debris would fall around, that screens could be cluttered,
and so on and so forth. Then the question really is: Is that
design adequate, or more than adequate, to get the job done?
Mr. Meserve. The analysis that we have undertaken is
preliminary. We are dealing with what-ifs here, that the screen
would have been--that that sump system would have been adequate
to handle the Davis-Besse style event. One could imagine
circumstances where the debris--because there was material that
was in the containment that shouldn't have been there--coatings
that were improper--that materials might have been released and
collected in the sump.
So we have an issue that was brought to us by the licensee
that we are analyzing and that is being addressed. The licensee
is on top of this issue, but it is unfortunate that it existed.
We don't think it would have created a problem if there had
been a rupture, but it is a problem that needs to be corrected.
It is being corrected. The screens have an area of about 50
square feet--that is the original design--that is, within the
tech specs for the original design. The licensee has changed
that to a screen system with 1,200 square feet of screen
surface area. So it gives you an enormously larger area within
which the water could flow so that you don't have the same
issues associated with debris possibly clogging the screen.
This unfortunate event obviously reflects the continuing
issues that we have had with the licensee in assuring that
there is an appropriate safety culture, to make sure that the
licensee is addressing problems such as this one. We are moving
in that direction.
Senator Voinovich. If you anticipated what might have
happened and the design as it was might not have worked, are
they going to be able to follow procedures so that it won't
again? Will debris be a problem, and more important than that,
are the containment facilities at other plants of the same
design being inspected?
Mr. Meserve. One of the steps that is being taken by Davis-
Besse has been to change this whole sump collection system to
one with a much larger screen area. This is part of the
collective measures that are being put in place before the
reactor will restart. We have been following the issue and
interacting with licensee on the general issue of making sure
that the sump systems is operable.
Senator Voinovich. My time is up.
Mr. Diaz, do you want to comment?
Mr. Diaz. I would just like to make an observation which
maybe doesn't reflect on my 6 years as commissioner. I worked
40 years as a nuclear engineer. Sometimes the way we talk and
the way that things are interpreted, are not exactly the way
that we see them.
Let me assure you that I do not see that at any one time
there was an impending disaster in Davis-Besse. I am firmly
convinced that the cladding could have withstood twice the
pressure in the reactor for quite a period of time. I am also
convinced that although it might not have worked well, the
circulation system in the containment--it would have cooled the
reactor quite adequately.
We are very demanding. We are almost perfectionists. And
maybe that is rightly so. Maybe that is the way we have to be.
But I think there was plenty of margin to assure the safety of
the people of Ohio. There is really significant evidence that
points out that this was not an impending disaster, that there
was not something that was about ready to burst and create a
cloud of radioactivity. All of the systems, including the
containment, were able to perform their functions. I think the
committee should know that. They were there. They might not
have been perfect, but they were there and they would have been
able to reduce this in whatever way it happens to a real small
accident. I would not have suspected in any way a release of
radioactivity to the environment. Thank you, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a localized question. I am reminded here of the
questions from Senator Voinovich and myself--and if Senator
Clinton joins us--and of the old adage from Tip O'Neill that
``politics is local.'' The chairman is interested in Davis-
Besse. I am interested in Salem, New Jersey, right across the
Delaware River from us. Senator Clinton is interested in Indian
Point.
I am also interested in the larger issues including the
next generation nuclear power, and threats from the security
side. I would hopefully have a chance to address those as well.
I look forward to hearing from some of the other commissioners
here. Sitting in your shoes you must want to just burst out and
say something to us. I hope you will feel comfortable in doing
that when the spirit moves you.
Let me just focus initially, though, on Salem, NJ. Right
across the Delaware River is a nuclear power plant. In fact,
there are a couple of reactors Salem One and Salem Two. Earlier
this week--I think it was on Tuesday--we learned that a small
amount of tritium was discovered in the groundwater next to one
of the spent fuel buildings there. I believe it was the Salem
One nuclear reactor.
As I mentioned earlier, I believe in nuclear power. I
believe it is an important part of meeting our power needs in
this country. Having said that, we obviously have an oversight
requirement to make sure that our citizens are protected. As
one who is a proponent of safe nuclear power, I believe if we
are going to have more of it, we have to be absolutely sure,
absolutely convincing, to the people in my State and your
States around the country, that we are going to do every single
thing that we can to ensure their safety.
I think it was Mr. Diaz who said, ``We are very demanding.
We are perfectionists.'' Good for you. That is exactly what we
want you to be and the kind of standards we want you to set.
But my question of the commissioners this morning is: How does
the NRC respond in a case such as the one in Salem, New Jersey,
where you have the owner of the reactor notifying--I think the
commission back in December--that there had been a discovery of
some tritium in the groundwater next to the spent fuel
building, and the information is made public in February?
I am not one who believes in that there is more to this
than needs to be the case. But I just want to know: Why the
delay? How do you normally proceed when you learn from the
owner of the plant that there has been a discovery of this?
What can we tell our citizens in Delaware? What can you tell
the folks over in New Jersey? What is the responsibility of the
plant owner in this case, PSC&G in cases like this? Again, if
tritium was discovered and reported as having gotten into the
groundwater in December, why does it become public in February?
Mr. Meserve. Well, let me say that we do have substantial
inspection resources that are present at every site. We have a
resident inspector at every reactor. That is where his duty
station is. It is to monitor situations at the plant. But the
reality is that these are complex machines. Licensees have
primary responsibility for assuring the safe operation of the
facilities. We have stringent requirements we place on the
licensees as to what expectations we have of them.
I will have to respond for the record on the details of
when we learned about the event at Salem and when the
information became public. It is my understanding with regard
to the situation that there has been the detection of tritium
in the groundwater in the immediate vicinity of the spent fuel
pool. That is, within 20 feet or so of the spent fuel pool. It
is at levels that are about three times the State groundwater
standards for tritium in groundwater. Nothing has been found in
the monitoring wells on the periphery of the plant. There seems
to be a very localized area of not very high concentrations of
tritium.
There are aggressive efforts that are being undertaken by
the licensee, with our supervision, to try to find the source
of the leak and to repair it. Let me say that the State is also
actively involved in pursuing this issue because of its
interest in assuring that groundwater resources are protected.
Senator Carper. Would one of you talk to us about tritium?
Is it something that we ought to be more concerned about? Less
concerned about? Talk to us a bit about tritium for those of us
who majored in economics.
Mr. Diaz. Very little concern, sir.
Ms. Dicus. Yes, very little concern.
Mr. Diaz. It is about the least harmful of all the
radiological substances that you can deal with. So it is a very
minor radioisotope as far as hazards to the biological systems.
It is just really--you know, it is radioactive but its
radioactivity is, in many ways, not harmless, but is really
quite tolerable and has a very large easy pathway through the
human body. It is excreted easily. It is not accumulated. There
are many, many things with tritium that although it is not
nice, makes it a ``nice'' radioisotope.
Ms. Dicus. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I want to echo what
Commissioner Diaz has said. It's a beta emitter which only has
any effect, if any, at the cellular level. But as he said, it
is easily eliminated. It is not one of the radioisotopes we
have great concern about. It is also a radioisotope that is
somewhat difficult to--it has the ability to go where it wants
to go when it wants to go there. It can be difficult to
contain. That is maybe one of the reasons we have seen it in
groundwater immediately near the spent fuel pools.
So, as a health physicist, I can reiterate what my fellow
commissioner has said. I am very comfortable with the
situation. Would we rather it not be there? Of course. But it's
not the issue that we would be highly concerned about.
Mr. McGaffigan. I would just add that tritium is heavy
hydrogen. It is the isotope of hydrogen that has two extra
neutrons in the nucleus. The EPA standard--and I believe the
State of New Jersey standard--is 20,000 picocuries per liter of
drinking water or groundwater. They treat them equivalently.
That equates to about 1/50th the dose that you get in a year.
If you got the limit, you would get about 1/50th of the dose
you would get working in the Capitol as a result of the
granite-emitting gamma rays at you because the radium is
decaying.
My son was a Senate page for Senator Warner a couple of
years ago. We did a physics project for the Page program. We
walked around the Capitol with a Micro-R meter. As I said, the
drinking water standard for tritium is about 1/50th of what you
get walking around the Capitol serving here.
Mr. Meserve. You have a much more dangerous job.
Mr. McGaffigan. You have a much more dangerous job.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Merrifield. Senator, you said you wanted to hear from
us so you get to hear all. I agree with what my fellow
commissioners have said. I look at it a little differently. I
worked, as you know, on the Environment Committee for some
years. I was one of the Superfund and RCRA counsels. So it is
very clear to me that the concerns that the public, the States,
the counties, and the others have about the protection of
groundwater. It is a vital resource that people really care
about.
I want to tell you--you have heard some explanation today
as to public hazards of that spill and that we don't believe
that this presents a significant public hazard at all, given
the proximity of the site and the fact that it is not spreading
significantly we can say with some assurance. But we also have
a concern about the environment.
We in our mandate have a requirement that a licensee have
sufficient funding available for decommissioning activities.
And so at the end of the day someday when this plant is shut
down, we will undertake those decommissioning activities. Part
of that is to make sure that the environment is protected as
well. So the licensees are on top of it. They are working hand-
in-hand with us. We are concerned about public health. We are
also very concerned about the environment.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Ms. Dicus.
Ms. Dicus. Thank you. I just want to add to the
explanations that you are hearing. We are not making light of
the issue. We don't like the fact that it is there. We are just
trying to reassure what the hazard is and we assure you what we
are concerned about, that we are not making light of the issue.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, again, some people in our
country are given to conspiracies and they worry about
conspiracies. I am not one of those people. I think the best
way to confront those who are skeptical of nuclear power is
with the facts much as you presented them. Not to hold things
back. Not to hold things back for a month or two, either, but
to be fully forthcoming and to share with us and with the
people of New Jersey and Delaware what we know. I think in the
end the truth can be the best antidote here as well.
Mr. Meserve. All of us are committed to having a completely
open Agency. I think we are viewed, quite frankly, as one of
the most open agencies in Government. We completely share your
view that we will never have the confidence of the public in
what we do unless our decisions and the bases for them are
accessible to the American people.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Senator Jeffords.
Senator Jeffords. The attacks of September 11, 2001 have
increased the need of agencies such as the NRC to keep secure
any information that might be used by terrorists. Yet it is
important that we not sacrifice too easily the public's
interest in accessing information concerning the safe operation
and security of facilities in their community. We all know, for
example, that it is often citizen complaints that result in
improvements that may have been overlooked by those closely
involved in the process.
As the NRC revises its policies and regulations in light of
the events of September 11, how do you intend to balance the
need for security against the public's interest in knowing what
the Government is doing in regard to nuclear power plants?
Mr. Meserve. Well, this is a very difficult issue, as I
just said to Senator Carper. We have long been leaning forward
in making information available to the American people about
our activities. One of things that we have had to recognize
after September 11th is that some of the information that we
had been routinely providing before that time might be of
substantial assistance to terrorists intent on a malevolent act
at one of our facilities.
So we have had a task force that has tried to develop
guidance which we are prepared to share with you that guides
those decisions. We have a very substantial widely used website
that we took down temporarily and screened the material. We
have now put that website back up after removing some of the
material that had been there previously.
It is hard to tell you in an overview exactly how the
process works but it is one where you try to look at the nature
of the information, try to balance the public's right to know
and the interest it might have for terrorists. We try to make
sensible decisions.
Many of our activities in the security area in particular
are ones that we have had to hold confidential as a result of
the fact that we do not want to aid those who might be planning
to attack a nuclear facility. So those are areas that we have
withheld as Safeguards Information.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman, I just might add that this is
an issue we had a lot of discussion with your staff on last
year. There is a provision in the Atomic Energy Act, Section
147, that this committee passed in 1980 that provides us
something that no other agency of government has, namely, a
sensitive unclassified information category against which there
are civil penalties if the information is disclosed. I think
the committee did a very good job in 1980 in laying out a
definition of safeguards information. Indeed, it could be a
model for people thinking about the chemical industry or other
industries, how you might handle it. I won't read the
provision.
But we have to keep a lot of this information from the
public just as you do in defending the Capitol or defending the
White House or defending other critical elements. We can't talk
about the details of the security in public. We have a very
robust effort talking with other agencies of government,
talking with cleared individuals in State government, talking
to your staffs who are cleared. We are happy to have as much
input from cleared folks as we can get. But I know the details
of defending the Capitol are secret, and some top secret--and
appropriately so. Some of our information is secret. And we are
bringing licensees into--for the first time, really, we are
getting a large number of people within the nuclear power
industry with secret level security clearances.
That's an initiative that I think, again, we are ahead of
other agencies in doing. We are having some trouble, in all
honesty, with the foreign ownership, control, and influence
decisions that have to be made for each of these licensees that
sometimes have complex corporate situations. But we are getting
it done. We are having a dialog with as broad a group of people
as possible to get a broader prospective. We are getting a lot
of input from the guards on the front lines. Some of it is
through the media.
We would prefer to get it directly in a classified setting,
but we have a lot of debate about what the right training
requirements are, what the right design basis threat is, what
is the right place to draw the line between safeguards
information and unclassified information. We are happy to work
with the committee and with whoever we can. But there is some
degree of information--just as you here in the Capitol don't
want to have your security divulged, we have potentially very
dire consequences if some of our facilities were successfully
attacked. We have to protect that information.
Senator Voinovich. I would comment that as we moved into
this new life that we are living after September 11, we are
being more restrictive about the information that we provided
the public. It underscores how important it is that the public
have faith in the integrity and the credibility of the
organization that has that information. That is very important.
I think that your responsibility and of other agencies, that in
the past had given out such information, now are more
restrictive.
We welcome Senator Clinton this morning.
Senator Jeffords. Ms. Dicus.
Ms. Dicus. Just a quick comment with regards to the
safeguards information. We have identified a policy issue that
we need perhaps to take another look at the criteria that we
use to decide if something should be safeguards information or
official use only information. I think the commission is going
to take a look at that and be sure that our criteria are clear
and we know when to call something safeguards or no.
Senator Voinovich. Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I echo
your concerns that part of our challenge is obviously to keep
confidential information that would in the wrong hands be
troublesome and even dangerous, but to establish enough
confidence and trust so that people know that they are getting
information that they need in order to act.
As this panel and the committee knows, I have a lot of
concerns regarding the safety and security of our nuclear
plants, but in particular the plants at Indian Point because of
their proximity to a very highly densely populated area and
because of the topography of the area in which they are
located, which makes evacuation and emergency preparedness an
extraordinary challenge.
Yesterday, Chairman Meserve spent an hour with me and other
members of the New York congressional delegation as well as a
few local elected officials from West Chester County where the
plants are located. I am very grateful, and I thank the
chairman for his time.
As a result of the concerns that we are facing with respect
to Indian Point, the Governor of our State asked the former
head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, James Lee
Witt, to review the emergency preparedness. I was very grateful
that the Governor reached out to have such an independent
study, somebody from the outside with a history of knowing what
emergencies are.
As a result of that draft report, even more questions were
raised because the bottom line was that it seemed unlikely that
the kind of evacuation envisioned from either an accidental or
a terrorist attack that resulted in some kind of release would
be practical and able to be implemented.
Furthermore, Chairman Witt expressed his findings that it
may even be that the standards by which we are judging such
matters are not adequate to the times in which we currently
live. I did write to Chairman Meserve and ask for the NRC's
response to these very legitimate questions raised by Mr.
Witt's report. I was frankly concerned and I have talked to the
chairman about this, that the chairman characterized the Witt
report as placing ``undue weight on the impact of potential
acts of terrorism on emergency planning and preparedness.''
I have just come from a classified briefing with Secretary
Rich. We know the level of threat with which we are living. We
know that cities like New York and Washington continue to
remain at the top of the terrorists' potential targets. I don't
think we can place undue weight on the impact of potential acts
of terrorism.
I also believe that the difference between an accidental
release and a release caused by terrorism is not the same. Yes,
indeed, perhaps the same amount of radioactive material would
be released into the atmosphere. But the conditions under which
that release takes place, the circumstances governing how
responses are carried out, who is left at the plant to carry
out such responses, the level of panic that is communicated and
spread through the neighboring area, is not at all equivalent.
I have already told the chairman that from my perspective
we have to not only do everything we can possibly imagine,
putting ourselves unfortunately and as disgusting a practice as
this might be, into the minds of those who wish to destroy us.
And nothing, therefore, is unimaginable.
I know that the NRC under the very dedicated leadership of
these commissioners has always tried to do what it thought
needed to be done. I just believe we are not thinking hard
enough, strategically enough, and taking sufficient actions
either in fact, or communicating those to the public
sufficiently to reassure them that we are doing what we believe
needs to be done.
Now, in the Inspector General's testimony that has been
submitted, there are findings from a 2000 event inquiry at
Indian Point Two, including the finding that Indian Point Two
was a plant that struggled with various challenges in the area
of emergency preparedness. The OIG learned that recurring
weaknesses that had gone uncorrected appeared to play a role in
the poor emergency response performance, and that communication
between offsite emergency preparedness officials and the NRC
was nonexistent.
Similar findings have been replicated both by the GAO and
by the Witt report. So clearly, Mr. Chairman, we have a problem
when it comes to communications between offsite emergency
preparedness officials, but even more importantly, the people
who are expected to carry out the plans.
Just very bluntly, given the topography, the narrow winding
roads, the fact that this plant is smack up against the Hudson
River on one side and then winds through lots of beautiful
small towns on the other, suggests that we have problems
already in planning, and certainly suggests that a lot of
people in the event--particularly of a terrorist attack--are
going to be torn, as we all would, between trying to do what
Secretary Ridge and the Department of Homeland Security has
told us which is, set a place where you can meet your family,
you know, figure out how you are going to be taking care of
that primary responsibility, and fulfilling your official
duties. I mean, this is human nature. This is going to be an
enormous undertaking.
So as a result, the local county executives--Democrat and
Republican alike--have refused to certify the emergency plans
for their counties' participation. And the State emergency
management organization has refused to certify the emergency
plan. We are now in a kind of limbo between whether FEMA will
go forward and certify over the objections of local officials
and State officials, and what role the NRC will play in this.
So, Chairman Meserve, let me just ask that you give us an
update with respect to what the NRC and the plant operator have
done to ensure that the onsite emergency preparedness
weaknesses that have been identified at the plants have been
corrected, and whether there is going to be a continuing
problem, as the IG found, that the NRC decided to allow Indian
Point Two time to correct its deficiencies, and that that
decision outweighed the benefit of increasing NRC oversight,
which strikes some of us as a trend we are seeing at the NRC.
Could you comment on both my concerns and those specific
questions?
Mr. Meserve. I would be very pleased to respond, Senator.
Let me make a couple of comments in responding to your
questions.
First, let me assure you that we take the Witt report very
seriously. This was a very substantial effort by a
knowledgeable individual and we are not diminishing the
significance or the importance of that report. We will--and
are--reviewing that report and its recommendations very
carefully.
Second, I think it's important that I clarify what perhaps
was ambiguous in my letter. We were not intending to suggest--
and do not suggest--that we view terrorism as a subject that is
not a subject of great concern to us, to the licensee, to you,
and to the American people. In fact, we have spent an enormous
amount of time over the period since September 11 in assuring
ourselves that there are adequate security measures in place at
all of our nuclear power plants and other significant licensees
that might be the targets for a terrorist attack.
I will come back in a moment to the specifics with regard
to Indian Point.
The point that I was trying to make in the letter was
merely to say that as a normal part of our emergency planning
we do consider events that involve large releases of
radioactivity in very short periods of time. And the point we
were making is that one could imagine scenarios terrorists
could cause that might causes releases of large amounts of
radioactivity in a short period of time. But these events are
not unique.
We believe, based on our vulnerability studies, that we
have enveloped those events within the types of accidents that
we routinely consider. So the point in my letter was merely to
say that terrorism is not unique in its capacity to cause those
sorts of events and such events have been a traditional part of
our emergency planning.
With regard to Indian Point, I would say that there have
been very significant measures that have been taken by the
licensee as the result both of advisories that we have issued
and orders that we have issued to all of our reactor licensees.
We have significantly enhanced the manpower that exists as
guards at the facilities. The standoff distances for access to
the plants has been increased.
The coordination with local law enforcement has been
increased and, in fact, as I am sure you know at Indian Point,
there is a substantial complement of National Guard troops that
is available on the perimeter of that facility and remain
there, and have remained there since September 11.
So we have worked also in making sure that the licensees
are prepared to deal with various contingencies. In fact, there
are 30 or 40 different areas in which we have placed
requirements on all of our licensees. Of course, those apply at
Indian Point, and the licensee is meeting our orders. We have
had very significant inspection resources devoted to Indian
Point both in tabletop exercises and also having our security
experts, with assistance from expert contractors, visit that
facility. We have satisfied ourselves that the security there
is adequate.
That is not to say that everything is perfect. We have been
finding problems and they are being addressed. One of the
problems at Indian Point has had to do with the substantial
demands on the guard forces--the guards were working very long
hours. And so we had issues of fatigue of guards. It has been a
source of discontent that has appeared in the press as well.
We have been trying to address that issue in the short term
by way of an order that would impose limits on the hours of
guards and, over the longer term, by including guards within a
fitness for duty rulemaking that we would encompass those
matters.
There are issues as to training for which we are also
contemplating taking action in the near-term. That has been an
issue at Indian Point. We have spent a lot of time in talking
to the guards who have been raising concerns, to make sure that
we understand them. Where there are allegations of problems, we
run them to ground.
So we are making very major efforts at Indian Point, I can
assure you, to satisfy ourselves, that the security there is
adequate.
Mr. McGaffigan. Senator Clinton, might I add a few items?
The chairman makes the point that security is something that we
consider in emergency planning. Even before September 11th,
earlier in 2001, the chairman and I were involved in an
exercise at the Palo Verde nuclear station--an emergency
exercise that had a very large FBI contingent involved. More
recently, we have done a security-induced event at the Diablo
Canyon facility in California. We had done that previously in
Virginia at the BWXT Lynchburg Category I fuel cycle facility
where there is highly enriched uranium.
One of the things I think we can do at some point--and I
haven't even talked about this with my fellow commissioners--
but just to help bring alive the point that the chairman made,
perhaps the next exercise we do at Indian Point, either two or
three, we can have a security-induced--the hypothetical event
that causes the system to be exercised could well be a security
event, just as we have done at Diablo Canyon and as we have
done at Palo Verde.
I think then the issues that you raise, we may be able to
get greater public confidence. I try very hard. Matt Wald
called me the day that the spent fuel pool study came out. We
tried to communicate. I tried to assure him that the physical
security that the spent fuel pools at Indian Point--it is
almost impossible, barring the mother of all earthquakes in
which case we would have other problems--for that pool to
drain. It is in bedrock. It is below grade.
The report that Matt was asking me to comment on made the
point that if you can keep the pool at 40 percent full with
water, you will not get any zirc-clad ignition and you will not
get any offsite releases. It is physically impossible to get
those pools with any sort of terrorist event to drain below 50
percent deep. One of them is entirely below grade. The other
has a very small area above the fuel where you could poke a
hole in the pool if you could get through many feet of
concrete. That particular point is inaccessible to aircraft.
So there is no--we try to bat down these things, especially
in your State, when these issues arise. Those spent fuel
pools--there may be issues at other places, and we don't think
so. But in your pools it is physically impossible. So we try.
We try to bat these things.
In emergency planning, one of the points we made is that
the 10-mile emergency zones that were chosen in the late 1970s
are the basis for emergency planning. Those were chosen based
on the science we had at the time and the multi-agency process
involving FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
NRC. That was based on the science we knew then.
Since then, unfortunately we have had the Three Mile Island
event and the Chernobyl event, and we have discovered that we
were very, very conservative in choosing that 10-mile zone.
It's very hard to imagine events that fully exercise the 10-
mile zone, 314 square miles of people.
The events that we actually hypothesized in our exercises--
we typically are thinking about a quadrant in a 5-mile zone
where we can imagine somebody getting more than one rem, and we
in a disciplined way, talking to officials, it's the State's
call--I guess in New York's case, the local communities' call
to make these decisions as to: Do we evacuate this quadrant of
the 5-mile emergency planning zone where the wind is moving?
We need to communicate to the public that we understand
that these are very conservative zones that were chosen in the
late 1970s and if we were doing it today, based on today's
science, many in the industry would argue that the zones should
be brought in. We have not gone there. We have kept the
conservative larger zones.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, if I could just----
Senator Voinovich. I think we are running out of time on
this question. I would like to wrap it up so we can get on with
some other questions.
Senator Clinton. One quick follow up to Commissioner
McGaffigan.
What you just said, I would appreciate having the
commission commit to doing a force-on-force test at Indian
Point and sooner instead of later. It is something that I----
Mr. McGaffigan. I was talking about an emergency planning
test. The force-on-force is separate.
Senator Clinton. Well, it fits. There is a whole set of
concerns that we are addressing here. I think that we should do
it. It would be far better if there could be a clear conveyance
of the information that you tell us with such intensity and
sincerity, but which does not communicate. And even at the end
of it, when you get something like a report from James Lee
Witt, whom I have the highest regard for, which says that
everybody is honest. People are telling you what they believe.
But the standards are not adequate. So it doesn't really
matter.
So that is where the disconnect occurs. We just have a lot
of unanswered questions that are very troubling to people.
Mr. Merrifield. Senator Clinton, in fact we have been
working with Entergy. The chairman may correct me, but I think
we have plans underway to have a force-on-force exercise with
Entergy at that site. I believe it is in the June-July
timeframe. So I think we agree that that is clearly a plant
that has a priority.
I know the chairman wants to move on, but I do want to make
a couple of really quick observations. I agree with the
comments the other commissioners have made about emergency
exercises and terrorism. I was the commissioner that led our
joint exercise with the FBI at our BWXT facility. I also led
the exercise relative to Diablo Canyon, the first time we had a
security-initiated event since September 11, 2001.
I will tell you that we take those exercises as
commissioners very seriously. Each one of us leads one of those
exercises each year that includes hundreds of participants.
Many folks on our staff, probably 50 folks in our headquarters,
our regional staff, people onsite, FEMA, Federal agencies,
State and local governments, and utilities. It is an enormous
effort and one that I would certainly welcome and suggest that
you come view when we do one of those again to see what we do.
We are going to take James Lee Witt's recommendations very
seriously. We are going to look at them. I agree with the
chairman that we are not to belittle those. Where we work with
FEMA, where we can identify improvements, and where there are
those that need to be made, we certainly will.
The last thing I would say is this: You quoted the IG's
report from the 1990s. There is one significant thing that has
changed in that time period. At the time when they were looking
at those issues the plant was owned by ConEd. That was a
utility that had one site, Indian Point Two, and it arguably
did not have the commitment to keeping that facility where it
should be--from a material condition and from having the staff
treat that plant the way it should.
I remember when I first came to the commission in 1998, I
had a lot of discussions with our regional administrator
because we had those concerns about that plant. Entergy has
come in. The tone has changed. They have put a significant
investment into the site. They have certainly changed the way
that they do business around there. They have an expertise with
many, many plants.
So that is a component that we certainly look at. The
attitude that they have in terms of making sure that that plant
is operated appropriately is certainly--I would argue a lot
healthier than what we were dealing with when the IG was
looking at that report and ConEd back in the 1998-1999
timeframe.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. We did spend a lot of time on
that issue but it's instructive about what you are trying to do
at Indian Point. I think it's applicable to other sites around
the country. It should give some assurance that you are really
paying attention to the issue of security. I think that's
important to people's comfort level.
I think you have copies of pictures at your table of the
corrosion at the reactor heads at Davis-Besse. I have seen them
several times. You have them. It is my understanding that these
pictures were taken as part of an inspection of the facility in
April 2000.
I further understand that the photographs were included in
a report that First Energy filed with the NRC in 2000 and that
the NRC did not review that file and that the NRC regularly
fails to review these types of reports. I also understand that
the corrosion present in these pictures was present and visible
during multiple inspections as far back as 1996 and that it was
noted in multiple reports as far back as 1996.
If this is true, I think that this committee may have to
take a serious look at an overhaul of the NRC's day-to-day
oversight at these nuclear facilities. Is it true that these
pictures were contained in a report submitted to the NRC that
was not even looked at until the reactor was shut down?
Mr. Meserve. Senator, my understanding is that the licensee
had a condition report that it prepared in 2000 that included
this picture. This was not a picture that was, to our
knowledge, shared with the NRC. However, there is an allegation
that has been made that the picture was shown to an NRC
inspector who did not follow up on the picture. This is a
matter that is under investigation by the Inspector General.
Mr. McGaffigan. But that allegation was made only last
week, sir. So the allegation that an inspector saw this picture
was made at a hearing we had before the commission last week.
Senator Voinovich. So it's recent? And you're looking into
it?
Mr. Meserve. We are looking into it.
Mr. McGaffigan. We are looking into it.
Mr. Meserve. The Inspector General is looking into it. This
kind of thing we would refer to the Inspector General.
Senator Voinovich. The fundamental question is: Why didn't
you as a routine matter see this?
Does the NRC need to have a fundamental overhaul of the way
they do their inspections?
Mr. Meserve. Let me respond to it this way. We have sought
to undertake a major overhaul of our inspection program, to
focus our inspection resources on the most risk-significant
issues. And if there was a failing by the NRC in connection
with this episode, it was the failure to appreciate that the
kind of circumstances found at Davis-Besse could arise.
We had a conjunction of two phenomena that we had not
linked together--which is stress corrosion cracking and the
head corrosion. We had not seen that at another plant. One of
things that we have done as a result of this incident is to
have a very major lessons-learned effort to determine what was
wrong with our system that we did not catch this.
That has resulted on the order of 50 recommendations that
have been briefed to the commission. We have directed that
nearly all of those recommendations be pursued. There is an
action plan that we will be receiving an action plan and a
schedule for the implementation of the high priority
recommendations within the next few weeks.
We see this as a failure of our inspection system, as well.
And we are changing it to try to deal with it.
Senator Voinovich. Would any of the other commissioners
want to comment on this?
Mr. McGaffigan. I would just echo what the chairman said.
Obviously this head is not a clean head and the licensee had
other documents that suggested that their head was clean. Our
inspector--if this was presented to him--it would be a major
shortcoming not to have seen it.
Senator Voinovich. So what you are saying is that if it was
found that it wasn't reviewed. Then is it a major shortcoming
in the way these reports are reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission?
Mr. McGaffigan. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Also, in the NRC budget, there is a
reduction in the amount of money for inspection. At least, that
is what it appears to be. How can you get the job done if you
don't have the budget, to have the people, to get the job done?
Mr. McGaffigan. We all have the same answer but we will let
the chairman make it.
Mr. Meserve. We do have a very slight reduction in the
budget from fiscal year 2003 to 2004. It is about $400,000 out
of about $73 million for inspection activities.
That is not a decision that the inspection resources on the
ground at the plants should be reduced. In fact, what it
reflects is that we are into the fourth year of our
implementation of this inspection program, and we believe that
a lot of the overhead activities--the guidance, the training of
the people--can now appropriately ramp down because of
experience.
This budget was developed, however, before the lessons-
learned report came in. We certainly have the flexibility
within our budget to make adjustments to the allocation of
resources and if there is more that needs to be spent on
inspection capacities to be able to do the job, we have the
flexibility to do that and will do it. The budget you are
seeing does reflect something that was developed by us before
the full impact of the Davis-Besse episode was appreciated by
us.
Mr. Merrifield. Let me just underscore a couple of things
the chairman said. You showed us this photo. It is clear that
if our inspector had this photo and didn't act on it, then we
have to retrain our staff and make sure they have a higher
sensitivity about that. And if anybody looks at this photo--as
we would--it raises concerns. So we have to fix that.
Your question, though is: Does that bring a question about
the fundamental nature of the way in which we do inspections?
And I would ask the chairman not to overreact on that. As our
chairman has said, we had a task force that spent 7,000 hours
meeting with the local county you talked about--Ottawa County--
our own folks, folks outside the agencies, saying, ``Is there a
way in which we can fix and modify our process so that things
like this don't happen again?'' That resulted in the adoption
of the recommendations the chairman has spoken about.
But I want to underscore the issue of the inspections. We
are not taking any reduction in inspections next year. The
savings that the chairman has talked about was a reduction--
because we have this new oversight program that we have been
working on for years--there are some generic issues related to
that that we don't have to do anymore. So that's part of the
savings.
The other part of the savings that results in a reduction
is the fact that we are doing a better job of planning our
inspections before the inspections actually take place. This
committee and Congress have asked us to work efficiently and
effectively. We provided hand-held tools--electronic tools--to
our inspectors so that when they go out on their inspections
they don't have to spend 3, 4, or 5 hours in order to prepare
for their inspection. They can spend one-half hour doing it.
So we are getting the results of some of those efficiency
savings so that more that our inspectors' time is being spent
on inspections and less time during paperwork. That's the
result of what you see in that drop. We are not reducing
inspections this year.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Diaz.
Then Ms. Dicus.
Mr. Diaz. Mr. Chairman, just one simple comment. The bottom
line to me is that this issue was preventable. We need to do a
better job of making sure that the licensee and us have all the
processes that are needed so it is prevented. And it was
preventable. We don't like it any more than you do that we
might have had to rely for a potential rupture on a safety
system. That is not acceptable and we are taking the steps
necessary so this issue will not be repeated.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Dicus.
Ms. Dicus. Thank you. Clearly we, on this issue, have done,
as part of the issue, a ``mea culpa'' on it. Clearly we missed
something that it is only part of the issue and perhaps we
should have found.
When we had our commission hearing on Davis-Besse that
Commissioner McGaffigan referenced, one of the questions I
asked of our staff--we had three panels, our staff, the
licensee, and then stakeholder involvement, including Ottawa
County, as a matter of fact.
One of the questions I asked my staff was: How do I know I
don't have another smoking gun out there? I don't want this
commission to be back here next year with another licensee,
another plant, that we had something happen. In this case we
had a problem, a technical problem at the plant. We did not
have an incident which I think the chairman has made clear, as
well as, I think, Commissioner Diaz. The redundant systems we
had worked, but that is not what we are interested in having.
So our staff--the highly technical, very capable staff that we
have at the NRC--they know that this commission is looking at
the inspection program, looking at the oversight program that
we have because I don't want any more smoking guns. I made that
very clear in the briefing that we had.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I'd like to see what it was and
what the new plant is, the building of what Mr. Merrifield
said. I am also interested in two other areas. One of those is
the area of human capital. Another hat that I wear is as
chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management in the Federal Workforce. I would like to have a
report from you in terms of the capacity of the people that you
have on board, the potential for retirements, and your ability
to attract the people that you are going to need.
I always quote the statistic that you have more people over
60--6 times more over 60 than you do under 30. So often it
depends on the kind of people that you have that are working
that determines whether or not you can get the job done.
Also, have any sanctions been taken against individuals who
have worked for the NRC where it is obvious that they didn't do
the job that they were supposed to do?
Mr. Meserve. Let me just say just quickly on human capital
that we would be happy to provide you with a report. We
appreciate your leadership on that issue.
I can report to you that the 6-to-1 ratio that you
mentioned--and I appreciate the fact that you have used it
elsewhere--is no longer correct. I am afraid I now must say
that we have made great progress and it is now 2-to-1.
But unfortunately, I can't tell you that the problem is
solved. It was comparatively easy to change that ratio because
we hired a lot of younger people. With such a big leverage of
six-to-one, we were able to change the ratio quickly. But we
still have a serious situation. Thirty-six percent of our
employees, including fifty-two percent of our managers, can
retire within 5 years. We need to build capacity at this
Agency. We are uniquely dependent upon the skills of our staff.
I have sent you a letter with some suggestions as to things
that could be done. We very much appreciate your leadership in
that area.
With regard to sanctions against the NRC staff there is, of
course, the investigation that we mentioned a few minutes ago
about whether somebody had seen this. Some actions could arise
from that matter if it is substantiated. We have not taken any
other sanctions. We view the problem that arose at Davis-Besse
as an institutional failure and not a failure of the particular
individuals.
Among the lessons learned is to change our inspection
resources to make sure that people focus on issues associated
with this matter, to make sure that we have trained our people
so that they recognize this sort of situation and have the
capacity to deal with it, that we have the research in hand to
understand the underlying phenomena and have a better handle on
these types of issues.
Let me say there has been an enormous issue in the
industry, as well, to address the head issue. We have issued
orders, including an order earlier this week, to enhance the
inspection that is undertaken of the reactor vessel heads and
of the nozzles that are on them. So I think we have this
particular issue well in hand. The issues here are not ones
that are directed at individuals but rather, quite frankly, at
an institutional failure that we are aggressively addressing.
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman, my comment may go more to
your last question. One of the lessons learned from Davis-Besse
was we were assuming the place was better than it was. And not
only ``we,'' but the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations in
Atlanta, which is an industry group that evaluates the plants,
also thought the plant was better than it was. As a result, we
had a single resident inspector there when we should have had
two. And the resident was not fully trained for part of his
tenure, at a crucial time.
We had an engineer position back in Chicago that was also
vacant for part of the time. We had a project manager back in
Chicago who was focused on the Clinton plant, which was a plant
in trouble at the time. And then we had the project manager for
Davis-Besse back at headquarters. Instead of having our nominal
5-year tenure, we had 9 people in 10 years in that position.
So one of the things that I think the staff has learned as
a result of Davis-Besse is that we can't tolerate long periods
of time when we don't have the right number of inspectors at
the site--we can't tolerate these vacancies. And yet like all
Federal agencies, especially Federal agencies where there are
changes of station, like the military, people rotate, we have
to manage it.
There are a couple of us at this end of the table who have
been concerned. We went a few years ago from having three
inspectors at a typical two-unit site--Davis-Besse is a one-
unit site--but we had an N-Plus-One policy--at least one more
inspector than the number and no less than two. We have not
always been there. And then it becomes crucial that we backfill
with regional inspectors when we don't have the right number of
people at the site.
I think we are learning that lesson. But it is very
difficult. We can't assume somebody is a good guy. We have to
carry out the minimal inspection program and do that
aggressively at all of the sites. I think that is a lesson we
are learning. But there is some real problem at Davis-Besse, I
think, in our culture, in that we were assuming that the plant
was better than it was, and the industry institution with whom
we talk had a similar view, that this plant was better than it,
in fact, was.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman, I would say that I think one
of the significant lessons that we have learned from the Davis-
Besse episode is that we need to make sure we have the tools
and the people that we can deploy.
Senator Voinovich. What I would like to do is this. You
have Davis-Besse. Mr. McGaffigan, you have done a nice job of
describing it in terms of the personnel thing of ``Here is what
was there.'' Then you went on to describe what should have been
there.
I want to know what should have been there and what you are
doing to make sure that what should have been done is going to
be there because you are going to have the people there to do
it.
Mr. McGaffigan. The question today, sir, is not Davis-Besse
because we have more resources than you can imagine at Davis-
Besse. The question is. Are we doing it somewhere else?
Senator Voinovich. That is a good example. You can use this
as a case study that illustrates, ``We blew it. This is what we
should have had.'' Multiply that realization across all the
other facilities to determine the organizational needs and
personnel to ensure that you have the people at the right place
with the right skills and knowledge at the right time.
Senator Carper has to leave for a security briefing.
Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you. I apologize for having to leave
again. We appreciate your being here today and your service.
Mr. Meserve, we wish you well in your next post. Thank you for
your leadership.
I said earlier for those of us who are concerned about
reducing the threat of global warming, large amounts of carbon
dioxide into our air, nuclear energy can provide real help
there to alleviate those, I think, grave concerns. To the
extent that we are concerned as a Nation about the ever-growing
dependence on the importing of foreign oil and a burgeoning
trade deficit, a greater reliance on nuclear energy can help us
on that front as well.
Your stewardship and your diligence in making sure that
there is a commitment to perfection--in Mr. Diaz's words--a
commitment to perfection in the operation of these plants, or
something as close to that as we can humanely achieve is very
much needed, especially at this time.
I am going to ask a couple of questions for the record and
I will submit those in writing.
One of the questions that I will ask is going back to what
sounds like what was experienced at Davis-Besse and maybe at
this facility in New York State, a more modest incident. But
one of the questions I will be asking for the record is for you
to find out for us and to report back on the delay until the
time the information was actually released as public
information to the rest of us.
The final question I want to ask--and this focuses more on
a national issue. Mr. Meserve, in your comments earlier, you
began to touch on some of the new technology, the next
generation of plants that may be in the offing. Just take a
couple of minutes and give us a bit more information on what
might lie ahead in that regard.
Mr. Meserve. Of course, we do not make the decision as to
whether nuclear plants should be built. That decision is made
by others; our focus is making sure there is adequate
protection of public health and safety. We anticipate that
there may be such construction in the future.
We have revised our regulatory system and our licensees are
taking advantage of it in the preparation for new construction.
We expect this year, for example, that there will be three
early site permits. That's a way to get environmental issues
associated with a site examined early before there is an
investment, to make sure that the site is suitable for the
construction of a plant.
We also have an opportunity that our revised regulations
provide for design certification. We have certified three
designs. We have one that is in the process and a number that
are coming. These range from evolutions from current-types of
reactors with upgraded capabilities, to reactors that are
entirely different--gas-cooled reactors, for example, which use
helium as the working fluid rather than water.
All of these reactors reflect efforts to try to deal with
safety issues. Some of them use passive safety systems so that
rather than relying on pumps and mechanical devices in order to
assure that there is adequate cooling, they rely on gravity or
pressure to drive injection and thermally driven circulation as
the vehicle for cooling so you don't have the dependence on the
reliability of a mechanical device.
A number of vendors are brining these types of ideas for
possible construction to us or are talking about bringing them
to us for our review. If we certify them, that is a more
streamlined process for the eventual application of these
improved technologies in new construction.
Nobody has yet made the decision to come forward and say,
``We really want to do it. We are going to file an application
to proceed with construction and operation.'' There is
discussion in the industry about that possibility. It may be a
year or two before that happens, but as indicated by the early
site permits and the certified designs, people are laying the
groundwork for those decisions to be made.
Mr. Merrifield. I would also add. Teams are thinking about
the way we do business. In our country we no longer manufacture
the vessels. We talked about the vessel head at Davis-Besse. We
don't manufacture those components anymore in the United
States. We don't manufacture steam generators. Those are
manufactured in Japan, Korea, Spain, and Canada.
So we are going to have to change our way of doing business
if those reactor orders take place. We are going to put people
on planes and send them abroad and figure out how do we do
those inspections. We do some of that now because we do
inspections at foreign facilities.
So there are a lot of things that we have to plan on to
make sure that we are ready if, in fact, as the chairman has
mentioned, a utility were to decide to go ahead and build a
plant.
A second element to that, however, are the sites
themselves. As you may have heard--and the chairman touched
upon--there are three utilities--Entergy at its Grand Gulf site
in Mississippi, Dominion, with its North Anna site in Virginia,
and Exelon with its Clinton site in Illinois--have all
announced their decision this year to come in and seek pre-
licensing of the sites for the future.
So that is another step and sort of a toe in the water, so
to speak, of the utilities. We will be working to review those
sites to see if they are appropriate for the potential
placement of plants down the line.
Mr. McGaffigan. Senator Carper, I might just mention, given
your prior experience with the Navy, we do have somebody who
does build reactors. As you know, this year we completed the
review of the Virginia class submarine nuclear steam supply
system for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion program. It is a
classified effort, but we in public said that our judgment was
that this was an improvement on the already wonderful record of
the Navy in the previous reactor designs that the Navy had. So
the Navy does continue to advance technology for its particular
uses.
Senator Carper. Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Voinovich. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you. Can I rely on what I heard in
the previous round of questioning that we will confirm for the
record that there will be a force-on-force drill at Indian
Point in June or July?
Mr. Meserve. I can confirm that Entergy has agreed that it
will be an early exercise. The precise date has not been
established. June or July is a possibility. It is conceivable
even it might be earlier.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McGaffigan. Senator Clinton, may I also add that we are
probably not going to announce the date to the public. When a
plant actually has one of these security exercises, it is
potentially a little vulnerable. We have twice as many people
there because you have the shadow force and the force that is
actually still guarding the plant. We will probably not
announce that it occurred until after the fact, just so you
understand that.
Senator Clinton. Just so long as my neighbors don't think
they are being invaded, that's fine with me.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McGaffigan. That's actually something we have thought
about. We will not at Indian Point use the full sound system.
You will not hear a battle going on. In a more remote location
we have gear where it does sound like you have a full battle
going on.
Senator Clinton. That would be good.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Merrifield. I do want to allude to it, though. What
Commissioner McGaffigan is talking about is one of the
enhancements that we are making. We have decided to move ahead
and adopt a system that the military uses.
Senator Clinton. Good.
Mr. Merrifield. Laser indicators to target individuals who
may be invading the plant. Typically the military also uses
blanks as part of that program. The commission has
affirmatively said that we do not believe in using blanks in
highly populated areas where it might disturb local citizens.
It is something we are concerned about. So we certainly hear
you on that.
Senator Clinton. That's helpful. And following on that,
when is the NRC going to revise the design basis threat to
reflect the new threat environment in which we find ourselves?
Mr. McGaffigan. We have a design basis threat that is now
out for interagency review. We work on this issue with other
knowledgeable agencies including the FBI and the intelligence
community. We are receiving comments on that as we speak. The
commission has set a schedule for itself we are aiming to
complete that work--have scheduled to complete that work by the
end of March.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Mr. Merrifield. If we do achieve that, I think we will be
the first Agency in Government that will have revised its
design basis threat after September 11th.
Senator Clinton. That's good news.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Diaz. In reality, we do have a de facto new design
basis threat that we established a year ago. So although there
was an old DBT, the newer security requirements make for a much
larger DBT than the older one. So a de facto DBT has existed
for almost a year.
Senator Clinton. Good. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to
leave to go to the Armed Services Committee, but I have a
question that I would like to submit to Inspector General Bell.
I want to read it because it follows up on what we were talking
about previously.
As I understand it, the Inspector General's office is
currently working on a report concerning NRC's enforcement of
regulatory requirements and commitments at the Indian Point Two
nuclear power plant. I understand that the Inspector General
has been working on this report for quite some kind. My staff
has had several discussions with the Office of the IG about the
report. I have an extreme interest in receiving that report.
In fact, I wrote to the IG about it just last week in the
hope that it could be released before this hearing, or that at
least we could hear about its findings because it goes to the
point that the IG report that I previously referred to was
dated 2000. It was a retrospective report. We do need this
updated report. But the release keeps being pushed back. I
would like a date certain as to when this report will be
released. I would very much like to let the commission and the
IG know that this is a matter I will continue to raise in this
committee.
Then I will submit a second question for the IG with
respect to some of the issues that the chairman has addressed
concerning Davis-Besse and the workforce capacities and
training.
Before I leave, if any commissioners have any comment on my
questions concerning the IG report, I would be interested in
hearing them.
Mr. Meserve. Let me say that, as you know, the whole
function of the IG is to be a very independent operation. We
welcome and carefully consider the IG recommendations. I am
aware as well that the IG report with regard to Indian Point is
underway. I don't interfere and none of my colleagues interfere
with the IG's effort. So, the answer will have to come from the
IG as to what the schedule is for that report. We don't try to
control--it would defeat the purpose of the IG, quite frankly,
if we tried to exercise those sorts of controls on him.
We would be very happy to respond with regard to Davis-
Besse and the various issues that you have.
Senator Clinton. Thank you. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to express my appreciation to Chairman Meserve for his
service. I know this is probably the last time you will appear
before this committee, at least if the schedule is any
indication; perhaps not. But I personally want to thank you for
your service, as I thank the other commissioners.
We are all in uncharted terrain right now. I think it is
important that we ask the hard questions. We push each other
within Government, from outside of Government, as hard as we
can, to be creative, to think about all these issues perhaps in
a new and different way because I believe we have to be
hypervigilant and perhaps more committed to thinking outside
the traditional boxes that have served us well in the past but
are no longer adequate to what we are confronting today.
But I have enjoyed my working relationship with the
chairman. We have often disagreed and he continues to object to
the Nuclear Security Act which I am going to continue to press
forward on.
[Laughter.]
Senator Clinton. But I am very grateful that a person of
his commitment and caliber would be in public service. I regret
his loss to public service and this commission. Thank you.
Mr. Meserve. I very much appreciate your comments. I should
state for the record there are only aspects of the bill that I
object to.
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. We will be having another hearing on
that.
Senator Clinton. Well, maybe I will see you again.
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. The lessons-learned report cites
significant problems with the safety culture at Davis-Besse. A
report by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations--and I am
going to quote from it:
``A major contributor to this event was a shift in focus at all
levels of the organization from implementing high standards to
justifying minimum standards. This reduction of standards resulted from
excessive focusing on meeting short-term production goals, lack of
management oversight, base problem solving, justification of plant
problems, isolation, ineffective use of operating experience, and lack
of sensitivity to nuclear safety.
``A report by the NRC's Inspector General showed that only 53
percent of the NRC employees feel that is safe to speak up in the NRC
about safety issues. That report also states that almost 25 percent of
the NRC employees do not believe that the NRC's commitment to public
safety is apparent in what we do on a day-to-day basis.''
These are statistics that frankly are unacceptable. I would
like you, Chairman Meserve, to comment on it. Do we have a
culture there where we are not encouraging our people to speak
up about issues and be forthright?
Mr. Meserve. I am very pleased that you raised that issue,
Senator. What you are referring to is a survey of safety
culture that was conducted by the Inspector General. And
perhaps your questions could also be directed at him.
Let me say that in many respects this is a report which we
received with great enthusiasm. The report shows very
significant improvement in terms of the attitudes of the NRC
employees in most areas, significant improvement--often double-
digit improvement--in things like morale, commitment, respect
for the leadership and so forth, over a previous survey that
had been done in 1998. And it similarly showed that in nearly
all areas that the NRC staff stood up well in these various
metrics as compared with benchmarks that were drawn from other
R&D agencies or from the R&D world in general.
There were some issues, as all these reports obviously
raise some issues. And one of the issues that was raised was an
area called the ``Continuous Improvement Commitment,'' I
believe. It included attitudes toward safety, among other
elements, in which there were statistics where we fell short.
We take that very seriously.
What we have done is asked our executive director for
operations, who is the principal staff officer, to undertake an
examination of the underlying root causes for that problem and
how we should address it. So we took this report as indicating
that we had made enormous progress over the past time and stand
up well in general in comparison with our benchmarks. But we do
have some issues that we need to address, and we are addressing
them.
Senator Voinovich. And one of them is a comfort level on
the part of people to speak out?
Mr. Meserve. That is an issue. We demand that our licensees
provide a system in which people are comfortable to speak up.
We can ask no less of ourselves.
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman, I might just go ahead, sir.
We try to lead from the top on this issue, Mr. Chairman. At
every opportunity we, as commissioners, have to encourage staff
to raise issues. We have something in our system, a formal
process, for dissenting views within the staff, the differing
professional view and the differing professional opinion
process.
I can't tell you how often we encourage people to raise
issues at the very top. And we give them the opportunity to
address us when an issue is before us. Recently we had an issue
with regard to a new rule that we are going to be putting out
for risk informing our reactor regulations. And we had the
three people who had filed dissenting views from the consensus
position of the staff appear before the commission.
People raising dissenting views have, during my tenure on
numerous occasions, changed commission policy over the last 6
years. So we try to lead--and I think the senior staff is
trying to lead--by encouraging those views to come forward. We
are best when we have the full diversity of views of our staff.
I use this opportunity today, sort of through this question and
answer, to reiterate that from the commission on down we want
those opposing views. That is how you get the best public
policy, I believe.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman, I completely agree with the
characterization that Commissioner McGaffigan has made, and I
would add further that virtually all of us have a policy--the
commission having an open door policy, of saying to staff--and
we have said this repeatedly in public--if you have a concern,
come on in our door.
In the last few months I have had folks who have taken me
up on that, who have come in and raised concerns. You can ask
the Inspector General. I had one recently. A person brought an
issue up. And I referred it to him to take a look into it.
That's the way it should work. That's the position we have. Our
staff should be raising safety concerns and we should foster an
environment in which they are comfortable in doing so.
I would say that given what Commissioner McGaffigan has
spoken about, and what I have spoken about, we were somewhat
puzzled by that particular outcome. We kind of thought we had
an environment in which we were doing that. Obviously members
of our staff didn't feel that way, and I think there is a
commitment among the commission as a whole that we are going to
fix that problem.
Mr. Diaz. But it does seem that if you look at the
statistics from a group that actually is not in high positions
in the commission, and they might have felt--and we need to be
very responsive to it--that they couldn't really freely discuss
these issues. I think we now realize that that is an issue that
we need to look further. We have all of these discussions at
multiple levels with top management--that is not the problem.
We go to middle management--that is not the problem. It seems
like it is further down in the innards of our staff. That is an
issue that we really need to address.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to agree that the report
indicated that there has been improvement. But it also pointed
out that half the Agency's employees--53 percent--feel it is
safe to speak up. This is a significant 5 percent increase from
1998 that say they don't believe the NRC's commitment to public
safety is apparent in what we do on a day-to-day basis.
Obviously we can monitor this situation and perhaps have
another survey made in the near future to just compare it with
what the statistics were from the one that just was done and
see where you are. But I am very pleased to hear that you do
encourage people because I think that's the only way that you
can have a healthy organization is by encouraging people to
speak up and to disagree, and especially in the kind of work
that you are doing.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman, in the second point that you
were making, I think some of that goes to the issue of
communications. We have an Agency which is a result of our
organization back in 1975. The notion at that time was because
we were split from the Atomic Energy Commission, we should not
at all be promotional. And I think that feeling has trickled
down into the fact that sometimes the Agency isn't as
promotional of itself to explain to the public what we do and
how we do it and our commitment to safety.
I think if you ask any of us, if you ask any of our
management, and hopefully if you ask our staff, we are
committed to making sure that these plants and the other people
that we license are safe. Perhaps we can, and should, take as a
lesson from this survey that we can do a better job of
communicating that to the public.
I think if we do a better job of doing that, our staff will
have more engagement in terms of having confidence, and, in
fact, that the public perceives us that way. I think that is
part of what that second question was all about.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I have found from my experience
that you have your internal customers and you have your
external ones. Too often we pay attention to the external ones
instead of working with the internal ones.
How much participation do your people have? You are coming
back now. You are reviewing what you are doing, to do it
better, and so forth. How much input are you getting from the
people that are actually doing the job? Do you have quality
management at all in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Do you
have self-improvement teams or anything of that sort?
Mr. Meserve. We have, as a general philosophy, been trying
to flatten the organization, to take out layers of management,
to put the responsibility at lower levels so people who should
be doing the job are doing the job, strengthen the
communications at all levels with regard to how things are
going. We have constant efforts to monitor how we are doing in
this area. We very much welcome the input that the IG and
others provide to us.
So we are trying. We see this as an essential area for the
fulfillment of our mission. It's a way, quite frankly, for us
to deal with some of our human capital issues. We want to have
people who have pride in the work that they are doing, feel
responsible for the work, and have fulfillment from their work.
All of this is integrated, I believe, in our achievement of our
overall objective.
Senator Voinovich. I would be interested in your looking at
the way you are operating the organization. I would be
interested--and don't have to do it today--but I would like to
have it in writing of some specific examples where you are
doing things differently and the reason why you are, where the
people who are actually doing the job have come back and
recommended how they think they can do their job better.
Mr. Meserve. We would be pleased to do that.
Mr. Diaz. Mr. Chairman, there is a cultural issue that I
think you should be aware of that I think impacts on all of
this. The AUC has been trying to become more risk-informed and
performance-based through the years. That is a dramatic change
to many of our staff members. Many of them are still very
devoted--and maybe rightly so--to the way that we were doing
things.
So when you get these changes, actually you get diverse
opinions. And we welcome the diversity of opinions because in
many ways it gives us checks and balances. So I am saying that
there are many people in our staff that see some of our new
processes as advancing a little too fast, and the commission
needs to deal with the fact of how do we keep the staff in
there and at the same time go forth with changes.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Diaz, I understand that. We
instituted quality management in Ohio with some 58,000
employees.
Mr. Diaz. I see.
Senator Voinovich. The biggest problem I had were the
managers who had grown up in a command-and-control environment
that didn't want to change because they enjoyed telling
everybody what to do. But it is very important that the
management style change if you are going to have an efficient
organization that is going to have continuous improvement.
The last question I have of the panel is, as the
administrator of the Ottawa County Commission said, they are
interested in getting this facility back on line, but in a
manner that will absolutely protect the people of Ohio. I would
like you to comment on just where are we in this initiative.
Mr. Meserve. Well, we have a special process that we put in
place for situations like the Davis-Besse plant. That involves
a very substantial inspection effort by some of our most
qualified people to evaluate the circumstances at the plant, to
assure that the underlying issues that resulted in the problems
have been corrected. Only if we are satisfied that the
necessary improvements are in place, will we be in a position
to authorize the restart. This is a plant that cannot restart
without an authorization from the NRC.
This has been an ongoing effort. There are very substantial
modifications that the licensee is making. There is a very
important test that they need to undertake to bring the reactor
under pressure without a nuclear reaction occurring, to be able
to test the new head, and to test the possibility of events
that might occur on the bottom of the reactor.
So, there are a number of important steps that need to take
place, including this test and the completion of the various
upgrades, before the NRC would be in a position to authorize
this facility to restart.
Senator Voinovich. Do you have any kind of a timeline?
Mr. Meserve. I believe that First Energy has expressed
aspirations of late spring for completing that effort. I think
it is too early for us to be able to say that we are
sufficiently confident that that is a realistic date.
Mr. Merrifield. I would add, Mr. Chairman, that we are
going to use a disciplined approach. The chairman talked about
our 0-50 inspection process. It is disciplined. We want to make
sure that it is timely, but as much as we want to make sure it
is timely, we want to make sure it is done right, and that we
are confident that they are operating safely.
Senator Voinovich. I need both criteria. I want you to do
it right.
I do have a few more questions for you, but I will submit
them to you in writing so we can get on with our next witness.
I thank you very much for your being here today. Chairman
Meserve, thank you for your service to your country. I think
that too often we take for granted the fact that people like
yourselves are willing to step forward and take on positions on
commissions like this that could be partly controversial and
stressful, but I know that you do it because you want to
contribute to your country.
I would like to say one other thing to you. I am going to
be touching base with you maybe a little bit more often than
maybe some of the other chairmen because I do believe in
nuclear power. If we are going to go forward with nuclear power
in this country, however, we really have to allay the fears of
a lot of folks. And you know, there are some people who don't
like nuclear power, and any chance they have to find something
that they can pick at, they will do it. So that even puts a
much heavier burden on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to do
a superlative job.
I wish I could get some of my colleagues to understand
this--that we are now in a new world since September 11. It's
changed our lives. It's changed the responsibilities that we
all have. It's changed the public's interest in some of things
that maybe we took for granted before, but no longer.
So it is a heavy burden that you all have. Again, I
appreciate your willingness to serve. I am going to be spending
more time with you than perhaps those in the past because I
think it's necessary. Thank you very much.
Mr. Meserve. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Our next witness is Hubert Bell,
Inspector General for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
We welcome you to this hearing this morning, Mr. Bell, and
would appreciate your testimony. I apologize that we don't have
more members of this committee here today but there are lots of
things going on as you well know. You may proceed with your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HUBERT T. BELL, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION ACCOMPANIED BY: GEORGE A. MULLEY, SENIOR
LEVEL ASSISTANT FOR INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION AND STEPHEN D. DINGBAUM, ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Bell. Good morning. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today. I am
accompanied today by Mr. Stephen Dingbaum, Assistant Inspector
General for Audits, and Mr. George Mulley, Senior Level
Assistant for Investigative Operations.
As you know, the mission of the Office of the Inspector
General at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is to assist NRC
by ensuring integrity, efficiency, and accountability in the
Agency's programs that regulate the civilian use of byproduct,
source and special nuclear material in a manner that adequately
protects public health and safety and the environment while
promoting the Nation's common defense and security.
My office carries out this mission by independently and
objectively conducting and supervising audits and
investigations related to NRC's programs and operations;
preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; and promoting
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in NRC's programs and
operations.
To perform these activities, the OIG employs auditors,
management analysts, criminal investigators, investigative
analysts, legal counsel, and support personnel. The OIG also
uses private-sector contractors to audit NRC's financial
statements as mandated by the Chief Financial Officers Act, and
for other audit, investigative, and information technology
technical support services.
To fulfill our audit mission, we conduct performance,
financial, and contract audits. In addition, the audit staff
prepares special evaluation reports that present OIG's
perspectives or information on specific topics. OIG's
investigative program is carried out by performing
investigations relating to the integrity of NRC's programs and
operations.
Also, periodically the investigative staff conducts event
inquiries which yield investigative reports documenting the
examination of events or Agency regulatory actions that do not
specifically involve individual misconduct. Instead, these
reports identify staff actions that may have contributed to the
occurrence of an event.
Recent work performed by my audit and investigative staff
in furtherance of our mission include an event inquiry into the
NRC decision to allow Davis-Besse to continue to operate beyond
an NRC established deadline without performing vessel head
penetration nozzle inspections.
Additionally, we conducted an event inquiry to address
concerns resulting from an incident at Indian Point during
which the power plant experienced a steam generator tube
rupture in one of its four steam generators.
In the area of nuclear materials we investigated the
reported loss of two spent nuclear fuel rods at Millstone
Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. In addition, we addressed
unrelated allegations that the NRC and the Department of Energy
representatives conducted meetings that were contrary to
mandates regarding Government activities concerning the Yucca
Mountain nuclear waste repository site and made decisions
during these meetings from which Nevada representatives were
unlawfully excluded.
We also engaged an independent contractor to conduct a
survey of NRC's workforce to: (1) measure NRC safety culture
and climate; (2) compare the results against NRC's 1998 Safety
Culture and Climate Survey; and (3) to compare the results to
Government and national benchmarks.
Additionally, pursuant to the requirements of the
Government Information Security Reform Act, we completed a
review of NRC's implementation of its Information Security
Program, and in response to a congressional request, reviewed
the adequacy of NRC's programs for handling and releasing
sensitive documents.
A key goal of the OIG is to add value to NRC's regulatory
and administrative programs. The OIG is encouraged by the
Agency's actions to address OIG's findings, and to implement
many of the recommendations made by my office. There are many
examples of collaborative work between my staff and Agency
managers in an effort to refine the effectiveness and
efficiency of Agency programs.
While some challenges remain, the OIG supports the Agency's
commitment to ensure the effective regulation of the Nation's
civilian use of nuclear power and to the integrity of its
programs that ultimately protect the health and safety of the
public. OIG will remain steadfast in its resolve to assist the
NRC in fulfilling this important mission.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my report on the activities of my office during the
recent past. We would be pleased to answer any questions at
this time.
Senator Voinovich. We reviewed your investigation into the
events that took place at Davis-Besse and want you to know how
much we appreciate your efforts.
I've got a couple of questions about your investigation.
You have been staying in touch with what's been going on. Do
you believe that the NRC is doing everything it can to prevent
another incident like the one at Davis-Besse?
Mr. Bell. Senator Voinovich, I believe that NRC conducts
the various activities as a regulator of nuclear power in a
very competent manner. As shown, the events at Davis-Besse on
occasion and the actions taken or not by licensees and the
Agency can have a large cost consequence.
This is not new in the history of the nuclear industry or
NRC. What seems to be more prevalent today in both business and
regulatory environments without regard to the venue are
financial considerations. Typically a decision has an
associated cost and it is taken into consideration. In today's
regulatory environment, the NRC is readdressing what is meant
by an acceptable level of risk and its relationship to safety.
Are we to the point where we are placing the public at an
unacceptable risk? I don't believe so. The events at Davis-
Besse and possibly Indian Point, in my view, are instances
where it appears that both the industry and the NRC allowed
higher risks to be assumed. Should these risks be considered to
be unacceptable? I cannot say.
The licensee and the NRC staff must answer that question.
The NRC and its licensees must, however, eventually come to
terms as to the appropriate balance among risks, safety, and
any identified cost.
I believe that on balance, however, the incidents at Indian
Point and Davis-Besse indicate that we are moving close to the
undue risk line.
Senator Voinovich. Moving forward to the what?
Mr. Bell. The undue risk line. There's a line where we are
moving closer to becoming unsafe.
Senator Voinovich. Your opinion is that when you have a
balance, that you think that too often the considerations are
financial and not enough toward to the risk involved; is that
right?
Mr. Bell. No, I am saying that--we don't say that the cost
outweighs the risk. What we are saying is that any time the
risk changes, then there is a cost associated with the change
that is involved. And that is when the decision has to be made.
Whether you draw the line or you make them do the change,
without regard to the cost, or you simply accept the risk. To
me, there is a meeting point as to what is acceptable or not
acceptable.
Senator Voinovich. Well, obviously from your report it was
too much toward the financial and what you think needs to be
done is that we need to move more toward the risk and if there
is any opportunity for something to happen, that your opinion
would be that they would take the action immediately and lessen
the impact in terms of the financial impact that it would have;
is that what you are basically saying?
Mr. Bell. Well, our report didn't say that it was only
financially driven. What we said was that there was a decision
to be made about the technical and safety issues and also the
cost involved. We merely pointed out those two issues. I think
the inference from the press was that of the Agency was leaning
toward cost.
But our report did not conclude--in fact, that the Agency
erred on the side of finances over safety. What we said was
they looked at the financial burden that would result from an
early shutdown. We said that those are the two issues that we
pointed out. They made the decision; the Agency made the
decision, sir.
Senator Voinovich. The interesting thing to me is that they
based it on information that was not as good as it should be.
Had they been given the best information, do you think that
they would have made the same decision--to delay the shutdown
of that facility?
Mr. Bell. Could I have Mr. Mulley go over just what we did
in a capsulized form? Then I think that the question will
answer itself. I would ask that Mr. Mulley take 2 minutes and
explain the work that we did at Davis-Besse.
Senator Voinovich. Go ahead.
Mr. Mulley. Mr. Chairman, in direct answer to your
question----
Senator Voinovich. Give us your name again.
Mr. Mulley. My name is George Mulley. I am the Senior Level
Assistant for Investigative Operations at the OIG Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
As a direct answer to your question, I believe the answer
is: Had the staff known what they know now, there is no doubt
in our mind that they would not have allowed that plant to
continue to operate. I think the findings of that inquiry show
that the staff was weighing the financial impact of a plant
shutting down several months early versus the information they
had at the time.
I think this is a fact of life in the regulatory
environment we have now. We don't believe that the staff gave
undue consideration to the financial impact. There is some
language in our finding that says the staff's decision to allow
them to operate was driven by finances.
The point we're trying to make there is that on one side of
the equation you have the technical status of the plant, you
have some very serious questions being asked about the safety
of the plant. Absent the financial considerations, we believe,
FENOC would have shut down Davis-Besse right away. Financially
that had an adverse impact.
We also believe the staff considered the financial question
of how much it is going to cost to shut this plant down early.
And as a result of that they continued to have a dialog with
Davis-Besse to try to find a way to accommodate the situation
they were in. It was going to cost a lot of money and they
weren't prepared to conduct the inspection required by the
bulletin prior to the middle of February sometime.
Senator Voinovich. So, if they had had better information,
you believe that they would not have made the decision that
they made?
Mr. Mulley. I firmly believe that; yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. And you would say that whenever they
have such information and must make a decision like this, that
they should do a better job of documenting their analysis and
conclusions?
Mr. Mulley. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. If you are going to make a decision like
this, you really must consider all the details--why you did it,
etc. It's a very transparent process in the decisionmaking. The
question of arbitrariness, or influence, or something like that
can't be an issue in that equation.
Mr. Mulley. Yes, sir. Our investigation shows that the
decision made to allow the plant to continue to operate
apparently was made--for lack of a better word--at an ad hoc
meeting at the end of a day involving an unspecified number of
unnamed people. There was no record of the meeting made, and
there was no record until quite a bit later of the
justification that the staff used for making the decision to
accept the compensatory measures and to allow the plant to
continue to operate.
Senator Voinovich. That's interesting. What I read--and I
can't remember where--was that they had two meetings. They had
one meeting in which a vote was taken not to do it. Then they
came back and reconsidered it. So that would speak to more
deliberation than what you have just indicated.
Mr. Mulley. There was actually one meeting with two votes.
A vote was asked initially of the staff as to whether or not
the staff felt that the order should be issued. There was a
majority of the staff that felt that the order should not be
issued, that the compensatory measures were adequate.
But there were several people who disagreed. Then there was
a second question based on the results of the first, were there
any people who felt that there was an immediate safety concern
if we allowed Davis-Besse to continue to operate until February
16th. The result of that vote was unanimous. Nobody felt that
allowing the plant to operate an additional 6 weeks would
result in an immediate public safety issue.
Senator Voinovich. How long did that meeting last, by the
way?
Mr. Mulley. We don't know, sir.
Senator Voinovich. I think it points out that if you are
going to make that kind of decision, first of all, you have to
have the best information, and then it has to be very well
documented in all of its aspects.
Mr. Mulley. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. You were here for the first testimony?
Mr. Bell. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. There are photos that were taken as part
of the inspection of the facility in April and that they were
included in the report of First Energy and that that report
wasn't reviewed by the NRC. I found that you are just now
looking into that. So it was just about 10 days or a week ago?
Mr. Bell. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. I would be very interested in hearing
the results of your report. It underscores how important it is
that they overhaul the way they go about doing their job.
In addition, your report talked about the attitude--and I
think that is so important about the employees. Again, 53
percent of the employees feel that it is safe to speak up in
the NRC about safety issues. How does that compare with other
organizations of this type? Do you have any statistical
background on it? Is that 53 percent----
Mr. Bell. I can submit for the record the exact numbers,
Mr. Chairman.
But we think that this 53 percent is above or equal to the
national norm. As was noted, prior to 1998 when we did this
first safety culture and climate survey, my office had no way
of knowing or gauging what the safety culture and climate was.
So we did the initial survey in 1998 and then subsequently did
the follow up survey.
In all areas except two, there was significant improvement
in all areas. I think in all except two areas, they either
match or exceed the national norm benchmark that was set. So 53
percent in reality may be just a little over half, but compared
to the national norm, the survey indicated that they were at
norm or above the national norm in all categories except in the
area of continuous improvement commitment.
Senator Voinovich. Turning to your investigation into
improper contacts between the Department of Energy and the NRC
over the licensing of Yucca, I recall that you determined that
DOE and NRC have not had any improper discussions on that
matter? I want to clarify that because you brought that up
because you were looking into it.
Mr. Bell. Yes, sir. Those allegations were that they were
meeting illegally. As a matter of fact, those meetings were all
sanctioned. The meetings that involved the DOE and NRC
personnel in terms of the progress of applying for the
licenses--those meetings were aboveboard and there was nothing
improper about the meetings or the personnel involved in the
meetings.
Senator Voinovich. In your opinion, is the NRC prepared to
address the licensing request by the Department of Energy in an
independent and impartial manner?
Mr. Bell. The license application is not due to NRC until
really late 2004. We intend, next year, in our 2004 audit plan,
to look at some of the audit areas for the licensing
requirements. So I can't say today because we haven't done any
work in that area because the license applications haven't been
filed yet. So we really haven't done much work. We're really
not in a position to answer that question today, sir.
Senator Voinovich. We had an inspector general when I was
Governor of the State of Ohio. I talked to him a couple of
years ago, since I have been in the Senate. He is doing
something that I thought was very well taken; where they had
issues that could be very controversial, an agency said to the
inspector general, ``You know, what are some of the things that
we ought to be looking out for as we are going through this
process. We want to avoid the appearance of unprofessionalism
or impropriety when it's all over and done with. What are some
of the things that we should be looking at?'' This would be
without having to compromise the independence of it.
I don't know what the final outcome of that was but he
thought that was a healthy thing for him to be doing with some
of these agencies to help avoid them making mistakes and doing
things that are improper.
Mr. Bell. We have done a few things in terms of just being
on the forefront of it. For instance, in our last information
and planning conference that we do every year, we highlighted
the issues surrounding NRC's readiness to receive a potential
license application from DOE. We used NRC employee panels at
our information conference to discuss the information and
receive information on the things that were going to be
perceived as happening that we needed to get involved in. So
the dialog stages of it have begun to occur.
Senator Voinovich. So there is communication between you
and the NRC?
Mr. Bell. We are having dialog; yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. I have several other questions that I
will want to ask of you. I will put them to you in writing. We
would appreciate your responding to them.
Let me pose the same question that I asked the NRC: Do you
have a budget that's adequate for you to do the job that you
have been asked to do? Second, are you able to attract the
competent people that you need? You are overseeing an agency
that is pretty sophisticated in terms of what they are doing
and the quality of the people that are working there. In terms
of your operation, to start off with, are you able to attract
the competent people that you need to get the job done? What
does your budget look like?
Mr. Bell. In the budget for 2004, we have asked for $7.3
million and 47 FTEs, which for us would represent three new
positions. What we had envisioned--there's a short answer and a
long answer.
The short answer is that I feel we have very competent
people. We have been fortunate to attract some of the best and
the brightest. That's the good side. The down side sometimes is
in the IG community, for various and sundry reasons, they don't
like to travel. They come here and they don't like the work we
are doing. Then they move on to other law enforcement agencies,
or other IG agencies.
So sometimes, especially in the investigative side, there
has been a little more turnover than I would like. The audit
side for us has been a lot more stable. But the good part is
that as people leave, I have always been able to get competent
investigators to replace them.
The three new positions--and what we really intend to do,
is to create a technical unit which will do more of the
technical audits of the Agency. We are also in the process, and
in the final review process, of hiring for the first time in my
office an engineer, a person with an engineering background.
That is just to help us to better understand the work that we
are doing.
I mean, right now if we do an inquiry--and I think part of
it will be my response to Senator Clinton, that the report that
she has asked me for that I can't turn over to her yet is
because it is incomplete. And it is incomplete because we have
not finished the technical review end of it. It doesn't make
sense for us to issue reports if they are technically flawed
because we aren't the technical experts. So as we complete our
work, we do have an outside contractor that we look to for the
technical issues.
So hopefully when we bring on this field engineer position,
we will be in a better position to do more in real time in
terms of making sure what we farm out now is closer to what we
think it is and what we are doing is right.
Senator Voinovich. That is a problem that runs through a
lot of agencies is that too often they have to go out to third
parties to do the work for them. They don't have people inside
the Agency that can really fully comprehend what the private
outfit is doing for them, or for that matter, monitor the work
that the private outfit is doing.
So you are going to remedy that situation. That's good.
Mr. Bell. In the past when we have had investigations that
involve anything technical, we have gone to the Agency and they
have given us engineers on loan to actually help us with the
technical aspects of investigations. When you do any inquiry,
certainly to keep the independent aspect of it on the up-and-
up, we have to make sure that we do have a real independent
review of the work that we have done.
Senator Voinovich. Are there any other comments that you
would like to make here this morning? It's almost afternoon.
Mr. Bell. No, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I thank you for the good work that
you have done. I am going to continue to stay in touch with
your office in terms of Davis-Besse specifically.
Mr. Bell. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. It's the 25th year anniversary of the
inspector generals. The chairman of your group is over at the
Department of the Federal Highway Administration. He came in to
see me. I am going to be meeting with your group to talk about
inspector generals and your challenges, and to see if there is
something that through the other hat that I wear, I can be of
help to you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bell. We are planning a big celebration.
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. Thanks, everybody, for being here.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Senator Harry Reid, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this hearing today.
Under former Chairman Jeffords leadership, this committee succeeded
in passing important bipartisan legislation to improve the security of
our Nation's nuclear facilities.
I look forward to working with the new subcommittee and full
committee chairmen to move that legislation again quickly.
Today we are hearing from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
NRC Inspector General about general oversight issues at the NRC.
Until the last Congress it was rare to see the NRC here. Too often
this Agency has not had the careful watchful eye of the Congress. That
has led to some areas of real concern.
In the last few years, we have seen America's aging fleet of
nuclear reactors show their technological wrinkles. These wrinkles are
not just surface blemishes--they are signs of real problems ahead,
unless we take a new aggressive approach to regulating our Nation's
nuclear power plants.
To move in this direction, we need an agency that is committed to
protecting the public health and safety--not just preserving the profit
margins of the nuclear power industry.
These concerns are not only shared by the public, but even by NRC
staff.
A recent report by the Inspector General and I hope he will
elaborate on this in his own testimony paints a bleak picture of the
NRC's commitment to safety and security.
According to that report, a survey conducted by the Inspector
General found that a third of the Agency's employees question the
Agency's commitment to public safety and nearly half are not
comfortable raising concerns about safety issues within the Agency.
The survey also found that some NRC employees worry that safety
training requirements for nuclear facilities are outdated and ``leave
the security of the nuclear sites . . . vulnerable to sabotage.''
This is extremely troubling to me and I hope the commissioners will
tell us what they are doing to reform this climate at the NRC.
I am extremely concerned by this, because the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission now has the important responsibility of evaluating a license
for the proposed nuclear waste repository outside Las Vegas, NV.
I expect the NRC to reverse its recent attachment to the proponents
of repository and take a strong stand against the licensing of this
facility.
So far the Federal Government has been more concerned with moving
this process along than with making this process fair. The NRC is an
independent regulator and should live up to its responsibility by
taking the following concrete steps prior to the onset of a licensing
proceeding:
First, the NRC should revise its regulations to ensure that the NRC
staff acts as a party to the licensing proceeding. Although the NRC
staff typically plays this role, there has never been a case in which
the Federal Government has been the license applicant.
Second, the NRC should ensure that the members of the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Boards used for the Yucca Mountain license review are
selected from people outside the Agency with strict conflict of
interest protections.
Finally, the NRC should strongly reaffirm the importance of
maintaining the formal adjudicatory hearing process for the Yucca
Mountain license. In particular, there should be full rights to cross
examination and discovery.
Implementing these recommendations would go a long way to ensuring
that the NRC holds a fair and balanced Yucca Mountain license review.
In the next few years, the NRC will be faced with some of its
greatest challenges since the Three Mile Island accident.
There is a continuing need to upgrade security at nuclear power
plants.
There will potentially be a license review of the proposed nuclear
waste repository outside Las Vegas, NV.
There will be a need to reexamine the safety of our Nation's aging
fleet of nuclear reactors.
I hope the NRC officials here today will give us some understanding
of how they plan to meet these challenges in a way that puts the health
and safety of our citizens foremost.
I look forward to hearing from Chairman Meserve, the other
commissioners and the inspector general.
__________
Statement of Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today with my fellow Commissioners to discuss the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's programs. We appreciate the past
support that we have received from the subcommittee and the committee
as a whole, and we look forward to working with you in the new
Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that fiscal year 2002 and the first 4\1/2\
months of fiscal year 2003 have been marked by significant achievements
by our Agency in the face of great challenges. Let me enumerate a few
of our achievements and the challenges. I will not go into great detail
here because I submit a monthly report on our activities to you and our
other authorization and appropriations subcommittees.
SECURITY
Over the past 17 months, the Commission has undertaken a
comprehensive review of safeguards and security programs, in close
consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal
agencies and with significant involvement by State agencies. Out of
that review has come a series of interim compensatory measures (ICMs)
to strengthen nuclear security at power reactors, Category I fuel cycle
facilities, decommissioning reactors, research and test reactors,
independent spent fuel storage facilities, the two gaseous diffusion
plants, and the conversion facility, as well as in the transportation
of spent fuel. Last August we put in place a five-tier threat advisory
system compatible with the Homeland Security Advisory System, and we
have used that system twice, including just last week, to improve
security measures at our licensed facilities. We have issued Orders to
strengthen our access authorization programs at power reactors. We have
drafted proposed Orders to strengthen guard training and address guard
fatigue. We have provided revised design basis threats (DBTs) for
comment to other Federal agencies, the States and cleared industry
personnel. We have been conducting enhanced table-top security
exercises at our reactor facilities and will by the end of this month
begin enhanced force-on-force exercises at these facilities. We will
conduct force-on-force exercises on a 3-year cycle and have requested
the resources to do this in our fiscal year 2004 budget. We have
defined the actions that we need to take to ensure better control of
high risk radioactive sources containing radioactive isotopes of the
most concern for potential use in a radiological dispersal device.
In short, we have a comprehensive and aggressive program to enhance
security. Nuclear facilities had very significant security before
September 11th and that security has been greatly strengthened in the
aftermath of the attacks.
REACTOR SAFETY PROGRAMS
The past 17 months have seen the maturing of our new reactor
oversight process.
We and most stakeholders believe that this new program is a
significant improvement over our old inspection, enforcement and
assessment processes. One of its strongest factors is its transparency
and accessibility to members of the public. You will find on our web
page performance indicators and inspection findings for every power
reactor, as well as our current assessment of that reactor's overall
performance. The transition to the new process has gone remarkably
well, although it is still a work in progress on which we will make
further improvements.
Overall the industry has performed very well. As of the end of
2002, there was one plant designated for the highest level of scrutiny,
the Cooper plant in Nebraska, and one other plant, the Davis-Besse
plant in Ohio, which is effectively being treated similarly under our
Manual Chapter 0350 restart process. The Cooper plant has received
significant attention from both our Region IV and headquarters staffs,
and we are confident that it is on a path to resolving long-standing
problems.
The Davis-Besse plant has been our greatest recent challenge. Mr.
Chairman, you have followed this matter in detail and we have had
meetings about this. But let me try to summarize the issues for your
colleagues.
In February 2001, Duke Energy, the licensee at the Oconee Nuclear
Station, conducted a vessel head inspection at its Unit 3. The vessel
head is the very large steel structure that serves as the top of the
reactor pressure vessel. Duke found circumferential cracking in several
control rod drive mechanism penetration nozzles within the vessel head.
The NRC staff immediately recognized the significance of these
inspection findings--the possibility of the ejection of the control rod
drive mechanism--and initiated a series of actions to ensure that any
similar cracking would be promptly detected and repaired at other
pressurized water reactors.
The Davis-Besse plant was one which the staff and the industry
believed potentially had high susceptibility to such cracking. The
staff's August 2001 bulletin called for such plants to conduct vessel
head inspections by December 31, 2001, unless a later time could be
justified. Davis-Besse petitioned for additional time (until April
2002) to complete the inspection. The staff initially planned to issue
a shutdown Order, but decided in November 2001 to grant Davis-Besse a
46-day extension on the vessel head inspection requirement. When Davis-
Besse shut down and conducted the required inspection, they found no
through-wall circumferential cracking in the CRDM penetration welds,
but, as they began to repair the axial cracks, they unexpectedly found
a large cavity in the carbon steel of the reactor head. The cavity had
been caused by corrosion due to the presence of boric acid.
This degradation was preventable, and the licensee's actions
leading up to the discovery of the corrosion in March 2002 are
unacceptable. This discovery has led to investigations, which are
ongoing, of the licensee's actions. It has led us to focus large
inspection resources on the facility as it seeks to restart its reactor
with a new vessel head. It has also caused the Commission's staff to
focus on mistakes the NRC made in dealing with boric acid corrosion
issues in the 1990's. In this connection, an internal lessons-learned
task force has made a comprehensive set of recommendations related to
inspections, assessment of operating experience, NRC staff training and
experience, and the assessment of stress corrosion cracking, boric acid
corrosion, and barrier integrity requirements. The NRC staff is now
developing action plans to implement the highest priority
recommendations on an aggressive schedule. On Tuesday of this week NRC
issued orders to all 69 pressurized water reactor licensees outlining
much tougher vessel head inspection requirements than those previously
required by our regulations and by industry codes.
The Commission staff has devoted significant resources to the
Davis-Besse plant and to the broader issues raised by the Davis-Besse
incident. Davis-Besse will only return to operation after the staff is
convinced through intensive inspections both that the plant is
physically ready to operate, and, perhaps more importantly, that the
safety culture at the plant, which the licensee has identified as the
main root cause of this event, is on the path to recovery.
REACTOR LICENSING PROGRAMS
Let me now turn to significant achievements in our reactor
licensing programs. Four reactors--Hatch 1 and 2 in Georgia and Turkey
Point 3 and 4 in Florida--have had their licenses renewed to operate
for 20 additional years. That brings the total of renewed licenses to
ten. The staff currently has license renewal applications under review
for 20 additional units. In every instance, the staff has met its
timeliness goals in carrying out the safety and environmental reviews
required by our regulations. This is truly a remarkable achievement.
Today we expect almost all of the 104 reactors licensed to operate to
apply for renewal of their licenses. The staff will continue to face an
increasing workload in this area for the next several years as a bow
wave of license renewal applications are submitted (echoing the bow
wave of nuclear reactor construction in the 1970's).
The Commission also carefully reviews requests to raise the maximum
power level at which a plant may be operated. These so-called power
uprates range from requests for small increases based on better
flowmeter technology, to large requests in the 15 to 20 percent range
that require substantial hardware modifications at the plants. In all
instances, staff must be satisfied that safety margins are maintained.
In 2001 and 2002, the NRC approved 40 power uprates, which have added
approximately 1800 megawatts electric to the Nation's generating
capacity--the equivalent of two large power plants. We expect a similar
pace of uprates in the years ahead.
The staff has similarly processed a series of license transfer
applications that have allowed significant consolidation within the
nuclear power industry. Most of these transfers were processed within a
6-month target, and, with one exception, the NRC was not the last
regulatory agency to grant the necessary approval.
The NRC staff is preparing for potential new reactor and reactor
design applications. The staff is on target to conduct a timely review
of the Westinghouse AP-1000 design certification. It is preparing to
review three early site permit requests expected later this year. The
staff is also in the pre-application phase in dealing with potential
design certifications for several additional reactor designs. And the
staff is making infrastructure improvements to prepare for a potential
combined operating license request. These are resource-intensive
activities, and our fiscal year 2004 budget request provides for the
necessary significant growth to meet this challenge.
MATERIALS PROGRAM
Mr. Chairman, the NRC in partnership with 32 Agreement States also
conducts a comprehensive program to ensure the safe use of radiological
materials in a variety of medical and industrial settings.
In the last 17 months, the Commission has completed a complex
rulemaking on medical use of byproduct material--a rulemaking on which
there was significant interaction with the Congress. We now face the
challenge of implementing that rule and assuring that compatible
regulations are adopted in the 32 Agreement States.
The Commission has also been implementing a major rule change
relating to large fuel cycle facilities. This rule requires the
submission of an integrated safety assessment for all new licenses and
license renewals that applies risk insights to the regulation of these
facilities. Several major licensing reviews underway or soon to be
submitted will test the new rule. Substantial new construction of fuel
cycle facilities is planned in the near future, including a mixed oxide
(MOx) fuel fabrication facility in South Carolina as part of the
Department of Energy's program to dispose of excess weapons grade
plutonium, as well as two new gas centrifuge enrichment facilities, one
in Tennessee proposed by Louisiana Energy Services (LES) and one in
Ohio proposed by U.S. Enrichment Corporation. The staff is also
providing support to our Russian colleagues at Gosatomnadzor (GAN)
regarding the licensing of a Russian MOx facility, which will have an
identical design to the U.S. facility.
NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAMS
The Commission staff has made progress on a wide array of programs
relating to the safe disposal of nuclear waste.
A central focus of this program is the preparation for the
Department of Energy's (DOE's) application to construct a high-level
waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. That application is currently
expected in December 2004. Over the past year the staff has issued a
draft Yucca Mountain Review Plan for public comment and has conducted
numerous public meetings with DOE in anticipation of its application.
Preparations are now underway for the conduct of the licensing
proceeding, including the creation of an information technology system
to handle the large number of complex documents that will be involved.
This licensing proceeding will present the NRC with a formidable
challenge. The technical issues involved will be substantial. Moreover,
no single NRC decision or set of decisions since the response to Three
Mile Island accident is likely to be scrutinized as closely as those
concerning this one-of-a-kind facility.
Yucca Mountain is by no means the sole activity in our waste
program. The Commission staff has a substantial effort underway in the
area of dry cask storage of spent reactor fuel. Storage and transport
casks continue to be certified. Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installations (ISFSIs) continue to be licensed. The Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board panel will soon issue its final decisions on the
Private Fuel Storage (PFS) ISFSI in Utah. And the Surrey ISFSI in
Virginia is the lead facility for ISFSI license renewal. Indeed, our
workload related to ISFSIs and dry cask storage in general will
increase substantially in the years ahead based on licensees' plans to
adopt dry cask storage at their sites. We also have a major research
program underway, the Package Performance Study (PPS), which will
conduct full-scale integrity tests of both truck and rail casks under
stringent conditions. The PPS test protocols are being issued for
public comment.
The NRC staff is also continuing to make significant progress in
decommissioning contaminated sites. The staff has identified several
issues requiring Commission attention, particularly in the area of
making the restricted release and institutional control provisions in
our license termination rule work in practice.
HUMAN CAPITAL
The NRC is very dependent on a strong and capable work force for
the effective execution of its activities. The Commission's human
capital planning integrates strategies for finding and attracting new
staff, and for promoting employee development, succession planning, and
retention. In this connection, the Commission has developed and
implemented a strategic workforce planning system to identify and
monitor its human capital assets and needs. This includes the
development of an agency-wide online skills and competency system which
is used to identify gaps in needed skills and to address critical
skills shortages; the development of a restructuring initiative to more
closely align NRC's organizational structure with its human capital
goals; and the development of a web-based vacancy announcement system
that includes online application, rating, ranking, and referral
features. The Agency has also implemented two leadership competency
development programs to select high-performing individuals and train
them for future mid-level and senior-level leadership positions. In
addition, the Agency has continued to support its fellowship and
scholarship programs and identified a significant number of highly
qualified entry level candidates through participation in recruitment
events and career fairs.
NRC is utilizing a variety of incentives to remain competitive with
the private sector. So far we have been successful in attracting new
staff, particularly at entry-levels. Nonetheless, it is likely to
become more difficult for the Commission, as for many Federal agencies,
to hire and retain personnel with the knowledge, skills, and abilities
to conduct the safety reviews, licensing, research, and oversight
actions that are essential to our safety mission. Moreover, the number
of individuals with the technical skills critical to the achievement of
the Commission's safety mission is rapidly declining in the Nation, and
the educational system is not replacing them. The maintenance of
technically competent staff will continue to challenge governmental,
academic, and industry entities associated with nuclear technology for
some time to come.
BUDGET
The NRC has proposed a fiscal year 2004 budget of $626.1 million.
This represents approximately a 7 percent ($41.1 million) increase over
the fiscal year 2003 budget. This budget proposal will allow the NRC to
continue to protect the public health and safety, promote the common
defense and security, and protect the environment, while providing
sufficient resources to address increasing personnel costs and
increasing workloads. Approximately 25 percent of the budget growth is
for personnel costs, primarily the pay raise that the President has
authorized for Federal employees. The remaining increase serves several
other needs. First, the NRC's proposed fiscal year 2004 budget supports
enhanced security efforts to protect public safety and security. Toward
that end, the NRC is strengthening its safeguards and security programs
for nuclear reactors, other NRC-regulated facilities, and radioactive
materials. Second, the proposed budget addresses the growing interest
in building new nuclear power plants. It strengthens the capability of
the NRC to conduct reviews of new reactor designs and early site permit
applications. Third, the budget enables the Agency to process the
increasing flow of applications for license renewal. Finally, with
Presidential and congressional approval of the proposed Yucca Mountain
site for a HLW repository, the pace of the NRC's high-level waste
program is increasing, and the proposed budget enables the NRC to
continue its preparations for the license application that the U.S.
Department of Energy plans to submit in late 2004. In short, we have
important new work and there is strong justification for the budget
increase that we seek.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the NRC obviously has many important initiatives
underway. This reflects the reality that we are in a time of striking
change. Fortunately the NRC is up to the challenges before it.
I have had the privilege of leading the Commission for over 3
years. I can tell you that I am proud of the people with whom I work.
They are dedicated to ensuring the safe use of nuclear technology for
the benefit of the Nation. You will not find a more technically
competent and hard-working workforce in the Federal Government. Thanks
to them the NRC has accomplished many milestones during my tenure and
will accomplish many more after I step down.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. My
colleagues and I welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions.
______
Responses by Richard Meserve to Additional Questions from Senator
Inhofe
Question 1. What commitment has the NRC made to new reactor
licensing? What are the challenges faced by the NRC, and what is being
done to address those challenges in order to ensure a successful
program?
Response. The NRC has made a substantial commitment to new reactor
licensing. In response to increased industry interest in the possible
of deployment of new nuclear plants, the NRC assessed its technical,
licensing, and inspection capabilities, and identified enhancements to
support new reactor licensing. The results of this assessment are
contained in SECY-01-0188, ``Future Licensing and Inspection Readiness
Assessment (FLIRA),'' dated October 12, 2001. To implement
recommendations developed as a part of FLIRA, the NRC has provided
resources to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to perform
new reactor licensing work and has created the New Reactor Licensing
Project Office (NRLPO) in NRR to serve as the coordinating organization
for new reactor licensing issues. In addition, the Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (RES) has focused resources on the early
identification of potentially important safety issues, and associated
development of the technical basis for resolution of identified issues.
In addition to providing this support to the new reactor licensing
work, RES is leading NRC's effort for the pre-application review of
non-light-water reactor (non-LWR) designs, such as General Atomic's
high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor
(GT-MHR) design. Non-LWR HTGR designs present new technical issues and
challenges that are different from current generation commercial
reactors, and will require an infrastructure of expertise, analytical
tools and facilities to meet these new challenges. The NRC is also
examining its licensing processes for new reactor design in 10 CFR Part
52 to determine if changes can be made to increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of those processes.
The short-term challenge facing the NRC is resolving issues
associated with the review of design certification applications, early
site permit applications, and for making infrastructure improvements to
ensure that tools, information, and regulatory processes are in place
for the efficient, effective, and realistic review of new site and
reactor applications. Particularly challenging are design concepts that
are significantly different from current U.S. operating reactors. The
staff is currently reviewing Westinghouse's AP1000 design certification
application and has six other designs in various stages of pre-
application review. In addition, pre-application discussions are taking
place in preparation for three early site permit (ESP) applications
expected later this year. The NRC has also begun developing a
construction inspection program for advanced reactors. The status of
this work and its associated challenges are provided to the Commission
and the public in the form of semi-annual updates to the FLIRA report
mentioned above. The latest update, titled, ``Semiannual Update of the
Status of New Reactor Licensing Activities,'' dated January 8, 2003, is
publicly available at the following address: http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2003/secy2003-0005/2003-
0005scy.html.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request currently provides for the
resources to perform this work. However, it should be noted new reactor
licensing work has been very difficult to budget because of the high
uncertainty associated with some of the applications. Although the NRC
certified three advanced reactor designs in the 1990's, the industry's
interest in new plant deployment appeared to decline, and the NRC's
effort similarly decreased. About 2 years ago, industry activities
associated with design certifications and early site permits increased
and the NRC initiated the activities described above. If industry's
plans change drastically and more work is identified, the Commission
would have difficulty accommodating this new work without a
supplemental budget increase. This is because the requested budget for
fiscal year 2004 does not have enough resources to allow funds to be
redirected to support additional new reactor licensing work without
impacting other high priority work such as security, license renewal
and power uprates.
The longer-term challenge is ensuring that the staff has the
adequate skills to perform the reviews and inspections to support new
reactor licensing. To address this challenge, NRC's Office of Human
Resources has developed a plan of action for implementing a Strategic
Workforce Planning process designed to maintain the NRC's core capacity
and allow it to support new reactor licensing activities.
Question 2. Could you tell us what has been done in the past year,
and what is planned for the future, with regard to cask testing? There
was recently a tunnel fire in Baltimore--and that has raised some
concerns with the durability of spent fuel casks. What would have been
the impact of the Baltimore tunnel fire on a cask?
Response. Since 1999, the NRC has been conducting a Spent Fuel
Transportation Package Performance Study, which among other things is
planning full scale testing (both impact and fire tests), in order to
demonstrate the predictive capability of computer models and the
performance of currently licensed spent fuel cask designs. Physical
tests are currently planned in the 2004-2005 timeframe. The staff
recently issued NUREG-1768 ``United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Package Performance Study Test Protocols,'' which outlines
how the staff is proposing to test a selection of spent fuel
transportation casks. Much of the supporting analyses and development
of the protocols report occurred in the past year. The staff is seeking
public comments of the test protocols until May 30, 2003.
NRC certification requirements for transportation cask designs (10
CFR Part 71) include an evaluation of cask response to a hypothetical
fire accident. Separately, the NRC, working with the National
Transportation Safety Board and the National Institutes of Sciences and
Technology, has completed an extensive assessment of the fire that
occurred in the Howard Street tunnel (the Baltimore Tunnel Fire).
The fire conditions were analytically imposed on a currently
licensed spent fuel transportation cask. This assessment evaluated the
response of a transportation cask to that thermal environment inside
the tunnel. Staff provided their evaluation of a hypothetical event
involving a spent fuel transportation cask in SECY-03-0002, dated
January 6, 2003. The staff concluded that there would have been no
failure of the structural components of the transport cask, no failure
of the canister containing the spent fuel inside the transportation
cask, and no release of radioactive materials from this analyzed event.
Question 3. I know that much is being done to ensure that a Davis-
Besse type of situation doesn't occur again--i.e., reactor heads. But
what is the NRC doing to address other ``passive'' areas in order to
avoid, not necessarily a repeat of Davis-Besse, but a similar,
unacceptable situation from occurring? What sort of changes in
oversight is the NRC considering with regard to those ``passive''
areas?
Response. In March 2002, the NRC issued Bulletin 2002-01, ``Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
Integrity.'' With the then-newly discovered severe boric acid corrosion
of the Davis-Besse head, the purpose of this bulletin was to obtain
information related to the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure
boundary including the reactor pressure vessel head and the extent to
which inspection programs for boric acid corrosion satisfy applicable
regulatory requirements. The bulletin notes that ``this information
will also be used by the NRC staff to determine the need for, and to
guide the development of, additional regulatory actions to address
degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head and/or other portions
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Such regulatory actions could
include regulatory requirements for augmented inspection programs . .
.'' Based, in part, on the review of the information provided under
this bulletin, on February 11, 2003, the staff issued Orders to all
licensees of pressurized water reactors establishing interim inspection
requirements for reactor pressure vessel heads. The staff is continuing
to study the need for additional regulatory requirements for
inspections of other passive areas in the reactor coolant pressure
boundary.
Regarding changes in oversight being considered for other passive
areas, the staff is developing inspection guidance that will provide
for timely, periodic inspection of plant boric acid corrosion control
(BACC) programs. This task will take into account any new BACC
inspection requirements that the staff may develop and is scheduled to
be completed early in 2004.
In internalizing lessons learned from Davis-Besse, the staff will
pursue improvements to requirements pertaining to reactor coolant
system leakage such that licensees properly discriminate between
unidentified and identified leakage, and that better on-line enhanced
leakage detection systems may be installed to detect leakage rates
significantly less than one gpm. The staff will also develop inspection
guidance that includes action levels to trigger increasing levels of
NRC interaction with licensees to correspond to increasing levels of
RCS unidentified leakage.
Question 4. Chairman Meserve noted that the NRC has been working on
the design basis threat (DBT) in consultation with the Department of
Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal
entities. Could you please describe what is involved in that
consultation and what role these agencies are playing in the review of
the design basis threat?
Response. The NRC reviewed the DBTs in the context of the Agency's
comprehensive re-evaluation of its safeguards and security programs.
This review included significant input from the Intelligence Community,
the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, other Federal agencies, and State officials.
We rely upon the Intelligence Community and other Federal agencies to
provide information on the targets, tactics, training, and capabilities
of terrorists and other adversaries who may pose a threat to nuclear
facilities and activities. They also describe the domestic and
international threat environment. NRC then determines the subset of the
domestic threat against which NRC operating power reactor licensees and
Category I fuel cycle facility licensees should have primary
responsibility to defend. In making this determination, NRC assesses
the limits on the adversary characteristics against which a private
sector guard force can reasonably be expected to defend. In early
January 2003, NRC sent a staff draft of the DBT attributes to these
Federal agencies as well as authorized State officials, and met with
them to discuss their comments on the draft attributes. The Commission
issued Orders on April 29, 2003, revising the DBT both for nuclear
power plants and for Category I fuel cycle facilities.
Question 5(a). The President's Budget for fiscal year 2004 includes
a proposal to extend the NRC user fee at 90 percent of the NRC's
overall budget. As you may know, this committee considered and passed
the initial legislation that has led to a gradual reduction of the user
fee from 100 percent to 90 percent. At the time that legislation was
being considered, the NRC used data to show that approximately
licensees directly benefited from 90 percent of the NRC's budget which
was the basis for that legislation. Has the NRC conducted a similar
analysis this year to determine the cost of ``indirect'' services that
the NRC provides? Can the NRC provide such information to the
committee?
Response. Yes. This year, NRC has estimated the cost of
``indirect'' services that were included in the analysis based on the
90 percent recovery rate. Examples of activities included in the
estimate were international activities, Agreement State oversight, and
fee exemptions for nonprofit educational institutions. The estimate for
fiscal year 2003 is $55.1 million, which is approximately 10 percent of
the NRC's fiscal year 2003 total budget authority less funding from the
Nuclear Waste Fund.
The analysis supporting the 90 percent recovery rate was completed
prior to the events of September 11th, which ultimately resulted in the
NRC funding homeland security activities. As discussed in our answer to
the question concerning fee recovery for homeland security funding, we
believe there are activities associated with homeland security that may
be of ``indirect'' benefit to NRC licensees and, therefore, should be
funded off the fee base for fairness and equity reasons similar to
those identified in the previously referenced analysis.
Question 5(b). The President's Budget for fiscal year 2004 includes
a proposal to extend the NRC user fee at 90 percent of the NRC's
overall budget. As you may know, this committee considered and passed
the initial legislation that has led to a gradual reduction of the user
fee from 100 percent to 90 percent. At the time that legislation was
being considered, the NRC used data to show that approximately
licensees directly benefited from 90 percent of the NRC's budget which
was the basis for that legislation. Does the NRC believe that
additional security-related costs should be added to the fee base?
Response. The Commission does not support additional homeland
security-related costs being included in the fee base. Subsequent to
the events of September 11th, the NRC has received additional funding
for homeland security-related activities from two different sources.
For fiscal year 2002, the NRC homeland security activities were funded
from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. That is, the funds were not
added to the fee base. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget proposed
that NRC's additional security-related costs continue to be financed
from the General Fund, as they were in fiscal year 2002. The Congress
did not adopt this proposal in its fiscal year 2003 appropriations and
funded NRC's homeland security activities from the fee base. The
President's fiscal year 2004 budget includes the NRC costs for homeland
security in the fee base, consistent with the final fiscal year 2003
appropriations.
As you stated in your question, the President's Budget for fiscal
year 2004 includes a proposal to extend NRC user fee at 90 percent of
the NRC's overall budget. As indicated in my earlier response, the
resulting 10 percent of the fee base will only cover the costs of the
pre-September 11th activities that cause fairness and equity concerns.
We believe there are homeland security activities that cause fairness
and equity concerns similar to those that were addressed in the
previous 10 percent. Thus, these costs should not be added to the fee
base. To accomplish this, the NRC user fees need to be reduced beyond
the proposed 90 percent of NRC's overall budget.
An example of the homeland security activities that cause fairness
and equity concerns is our efforts to improve control and
accountability of radioactive sources. These activities are designed to
prevent the potential diversion and misuse of radioactive sources in
radiological dispersal devices (RDD) and, therefore, enhance national
security by safeguarding the entire citizenry of the United States.
NRC's safeguards and security activities for RDDs will also support
Agreement States and international efforts, similar to certain safety
activities that are already excluded from fees as a result of the
previous legislation.
______
Responses by Richard Meserve to Additional questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. Commissioner Merrifield testified that the Commission
has a design basis threat out for interagency review, and that the
Commission is currently receiving comments and expects to have
``completed that work by the end of March.'' Does this mean the
Commission expects to have comments back by the end of March, or that
the revision of the design basis threat will be completed by the end of
March?
Response. On April 29, 2003, the Commission issued Orders revising
the design basis threat (DBT) both for nuclear power plants and for
Category I fuel cycle facilities; the attached press releases describe
these actions.
______
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Press Release No. 03-052,
April 29, 2003
NRC News
NRC APPROVES CHANGES TO THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND ISSUES ORDER FOR
CATEGORY 1 FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after extensive deliberation and
interaction with stakeholders, has approved changes to the design basis
threat (DBT) for two category 1 fuel cycle facilities in Virginia and
Tennessee that possess enriched uranium used in nuclear reactors. The
changes will be issued by an Order amending the design basis threat for
theft or diversion of strategic quantities of special nuclear material.
The Order, which is being issued today, will be effective
immediately but allows a transition period for full implementation.
With this action completed, the Commission expects that there will be a
period of regulatory stability during which the two licensees can
consolidate this and previously ordered security enhancements.
The details of the design basis threat for theft or diversion are
confidential national security information and will not be released to
the public. Today's Order builds on the changes made by the
Commission's August 21, 2002 Order which made interim security
enhancements at these two facilities. The DBT was arrived at after
discussions with cleared stakeholders from other Federal agencies, the
two State governments and the two licensees.
Under NRC regulations, category 1 fuel cycle facility licensees
must ensure that the physical protection plan for each site is designed
and implemented to provide high assurance in defending against the DBT
to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and common
defense and security. Changes in those plans will now be made and
submitted to NRC for approval.
``With the completion of this Order,'' Chairman Nils J. Diaz said,
``the public should be reassured that the nation's category 1 fuel
facilities are well-secured against potential threats. The NRC intends
to continue working closely with the Department of Homeland Security
and other Federal agencies, as well as with State and local law
enforcement and emergency planning officials to ensure an overall
integrated approach to the security of these critical facilities.''
______
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Press Release No. 03-053,
April 29, 2003
NRC News
NRC APPROVES CHANGES TO THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND ISSUES ORDERS FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO FURTHER ENHANCE SECURITY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after extensive deliberation and
interaction with stakeholders, has approved changes to the design basis
threat (DBT). The Commission believes that the DBT represents the
largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard force
should be expected to defend under existing law. These changes will be
issued by Order.
In addition, the Commission has approved the issuance of two other
Orders to nuclear plants regarding work hours, training, and
qualification requirements for security personnel to further enhance
protection of public health and safety, as well as the common defense
and security. The three Orders will be issued to all 103 operating
commercial nuclear power plants.
The three Orders, which are being issued today, will be effective
immediately, but allow transition periods for full implementation. With
these actions, the Commission expects that there will be a period of
regulatory stability during which operating commercial plant licensees
will be able to consolidate these and previously ordered security
enhancements.
These Orders, in combination with the recently issued Order in the
area of access authorization, enhance the already strong defense
capability at these sites using three interdependent elements directed
to best protect the public, with the appropriate resources placed at
the right places. These elements are:
the revised Design Basis Threat and associated defensive
capabilities derived from previous measures that the Commission
directed; tighter work hour control and more robust training
requirements for security personnel, to increase their capability to
respond to threats; and enhanced access authorization controls to
ensure all plant personnel with access to critical areas have had the
most rigorous background checks permitted by law.
The Order that imposes revisions to the Design Basis Threat
requires power plants to implement additional protective actions to
protect against sabotage by terrorists and other adversaries. The
details of the design basis threat are safeguards information pursuant
to Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act and will not be released to the
public. This Order builds on the changes made by the Commission's
February 25, 2002 Order. The Commission believes that this DBT
represents the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated
private security force should be expected to defend under existing law.
It was arrived at after extensive deliberation and interaction with
cleared stakeholders from other Federal agencies, State governments and
industry.
Under NRC regulations, power reactor licensees must ensure that the
physical protection plan for each site is designed and implemented to
provide high assurance in defending against the DBT to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.
Extensive changes in those physical protection plans will now be made
and submitted to NRC for approval.
The second Order describes additional measures related to security
force personnel fitness for duty and security force work hours. It is
to ensure that excessive work hours do not challenge the ability of
nuclear power plant security forces to remain vigilant and effectively
perform their duties in protecting the plants. However, the Order does
include provisions to allow increases in work hours under certain
conditions, once specific requirements are met. The NRC developed this
unclassified Order through a public process. The NRC carefully
considered comments from power reactor licensees, security force
personnel, public citizen groups and other agencies in reaching its
final decision. The Order will be publicly available on NRC's website
at: http://www.nrc.gov.
The third Order describes additional requirements related to the
development and application of an enhanced training and qualification
program for armed security personnel at power reactor facilities. These
additional measures include security drills and exercises appropriate
for the protective strategies and capabilities required to protect the
nuclear power plants against sabotage by an assaulting force. This
Order requires more frequent firearms training and qualification under
a broader range of conditions consistent with site-specific protective
strategies. The details of the enhanced training requirements are
safeguards information, and will not be released to the public. As with
the DBT Order, the Commission solicited comments on a draft training
Order from cleared stakeholders, including security personnel and took
those comments under consideration in reaching its final decision.
``With the completion of these complementary Orders,'' Chairman
Nils J. Diaz said, ``the public should be reassured that the nation's
nuclear power plants are well-secured against potential threats. The
NRC intends to continue working closely with the Department of Homeland
Security and other Federal agencies, as well as with State and local
law enforcement and emergency planning officials to ensure an overall
integrated approach to the security of these critical facilities.''
______
Question 2. Commissioner Merrifield testified that the Commission
has a design basis threat out for interagency review, and that the
Commission is currently receiving comments and expects to have
``completed that work by the end of March.'' What is the nature of the
document NRC has out for agency review? Is it an advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking? Is it a draft proposed rule?
Response. Although the DBTs are generally described in 10 CFR 73.1,
the specifics of the DBTs which are most important in the review
process are not described in the regulations due to the classified or
sensitive unclassified information involved. The specific information
regarding adversary characteristics of the DBT for radiological
sabotage--such as the size, capability, and weaponry of the attacking
force--is classified as Safeguards Information under Section 147 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The specific information
regarding adversary characteristics of the DBT for theft or diversion
of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material is
confidential national security information. The NRC staff sent a draft
set of these adversary attributes to authorized stakeholders on January
2, 2003, in the form of a letter. The NRC focused its effort on the
specific adversary attributes and would not put those in the regulation
because of their sensitive nature. The Commission issued Orders
revising the DBT both for nuclear power plants and for Category I fuel
cycle facilities on April 29, 2003, to ensure that necessary additional
measures are implemented in the near future. In the longer term, the
Commission intends to proceed with rulemaking, as appropriate.
Question 3. Commissioner Merrifield testified that the Commission
has a design basis threat out for interagency review, and that the
Commission is currently receiving comments and expects to have
``completed that work by the end of March.'' Please identify all
agencies and persons to whom the Commission has provided this document
that is currently out for agency review?
Response. The staff transmitted the January 2 , 2003 letters to the
Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of
Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Departments
of Energy, Defense, and State and the U.S. Coast Guard, to licensees
that operate nuclear power reactors and Category I fuel cycle
facilities, and to officials in States where these nuclear facilities
are located. We have also provided or discussed the attributes with
staff from congressional oversight committees, Homeland Security
Council, Duke Cogema Stone and Webster (applicants for Mixed Oxide fuel
fabrication facility) and Westinghouse (vendor for new reactor design
review). On April 29, 2003, the Commission issued separate Orders
revising the DBT for both nuclear power reactors and for Category I
fuel cycle facilities.
Question 4. Does the NRC intend to revise its design basis threat
regulations, and if so, when does it anticipate completing that
revision?
Response. Yes. The Commission issued Orders revising the DBT both
for nuclear power plants and for Category I fuel cycle facilities on
April 29, 2003. Rulemakings to modify unclassified DBT descriptions in
10 CFR Part 73.1 will follow, as appropriate, but would not discuss any
of the detailed adversary characteristics contained in the DBTs.
Question 5. Commissioner Diaz testified as follows: ``In reality,
we do have a de facto new design basis threat that we established a
year ago. So although it was a DBT, the security requirements are for a
much larger DBT than the older one. So a de facto DBT has existed for
almost a year.'' Please explain the nature of this new design basis
threat. Is it consistent with the Commission's existing design basis
threat regulations? If not, please explain what the ``new design basis
threat'' is. Please also explain how its implementation is consistent
with the NRC rules and the requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act.
Response. The Commission issued Orders on April 29, 2003, revising
the design basis threats (DBT) both for nuclear power plants and for
Category I fuel cycle facilities. Chairman Diaz' comment referred to
the fact that the NRC issued Orders on February 25, 2002, to implement
interim compensatory measures (ICMs) to provide protection against an
adversary force and characteristics exceeding the DBT in place prior to
September 11. The ICMs identified protective measures to be implemented
prior to the Agency formally redefining the DBT because we had not
established the entire set of parameters needed for long term
decisionmaking and there was an urgent need for heightened security,
with uniform and enforceable requirements. The details and attributes
of a postulated threat were not provided, yet the security requirements
established significantly enhanced defensive capabilities to match new
threat conditions.
Although the approximate size and attributes of the threat were not
formally described in our Orders, the licensee actions that we required
were based on our preliminary assessment of the new threat ``licensees
must defend their facilities against.'' The DBT in existence before
April 29 combined with the ``size and attributes of the threat''
implied by the new compensatory measures could be considered to have
established a defacto-DBT. The defacto interim DBT for power reactors
was used since last July in the enhanced adversary characteristics used
in the table-top security exercises which resumed in July 2002 and in
the force-on-force security exercises which resumed in February 2003.
The Commission established revised DBTs with its Orders of April
29, 2003, requiring licensees to revise their physical security and
safeguards contingency plans to comply with the revised DBT defined in
the Order. The issuance of Orders is authorized by the Commission's
broad authority in the Atomic Energy Act for the protection of the
public health and safety and the common defense and security, as well
as by the Commission's implementing regulations. These Orders comply
with all applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,
including providing the opportunity to request a hearing. However, the
specific details of the design basis threat for radiological sabotage
are Safeguards Information and will not be released to the public.
Question 6. Chairman Meserve testified that the NRC has a task
force that is developing guidance on how to decide whether material
should be withheld from public disclosure. Please provide information
as to any guidelines or criteria this task force has developed.
Response. Two days after the terrorist attacks, the Defense
Department requested that NRC shut down its web site because they
believed it contained sensitive information that could be helpful to
terrorists. For several days, our web site only made limited, basic
information available on employment, public meetings, news releases and
links to our electronic document system. We recognized our web site had
to be restored quickly, or public confidence in our Agency could be
negatively impacted. However, we also needed to strike a balance
between the public's right to know and the need to protect sensitive
information. We convened a Task Force made up of representatives from
our program offices to develop criteria and guidance for the staff so
that they could make informed decisions about the specific types of
information that could be released to the public. Coincidentally, at
the time of the terrorist attacks, we were undertaking a major re-
design of our web site. The new site was designed to improve the
public's access to information, make navigation easier, and give
greater visibility to frequently accessed information. General
information that was not considered sensitive was incrementally
restored to our web site under the new design. After several months of
deliberation, the Task Force recommended to the Commission that certain
criteria should be applied when making a determination about the
availability of certain documents. Guidance was issued to the staff in
June 2002, to assist them in making decisions on when to withhold
certain documents from the public, including posting them to the web
site or entering them into our ADAMS public library. The general thrust
of the criteria was that information should be withheld only if its
release could provide a clear and significant benefit to an adversary
in a potential attack. The scope of the criteria was limited to
documents that will be generated in the future, and not on existing
documents that could not be retrieved because they were housed in
locations beyond our control. The guidance suggested withholding plant-
specific information such as site-specific security measures, access
controls, construction details, or information useful to breach key
barriers. The Task Force remains available for specific issues that may
arise from the guidance issued to the staff.
Question 7. Will these general criteria or guidance be made
available to the public? If so, will NRC issue a regulation? If not a
regulation, what other form will this public release take? If this
general guidance will not be provided to the public, please explain why
not.
Response. The criteria have been made available to the public
through the voting record on COMSECY-02-0015. We are not planning to
issue regulations to our licensees regarding these criteria. However,
we are preparing a Regulatory Issues Summary, which is a guidance
document for licensees, so they can protect certain information when
transmitted to the NRC. Further, Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act
provides the statutory basis for Safeguards Information, a category of
sensitive unclassified information that is protected from public
disclosure.
Question 8. Is the NRC also ensuring that potentially affected
private citizens, or non-governmental groups whose mission it is to
address safety or security issues at commercial nuclear power plants,
will, if they obtain appropriate clearances, have input into NRC
decisionmaking, including changes to the design basis threat? If so,
how is NRC accomplishing this? If not, why is NRC not doing this?
Response. The NRC is very interested in the views of all its
stakeholders. This was true before September 11, 2001, as evidenced by
the long history of public meetings and extensive information available
to the public, and it remains true today. Since September 11, 2001,
however, control of sensitive information has been particularly
important and protecting sensitive information has been a major concern
for all government agencies.
Prior to gaining access to sensitive information, NRC needs to
determine that an individual has a ``need to know'' the information and
the necessary background check or clearance. Even if a person has the
appropriate clearance, they may not have a ``need to know''. NRC
determines ``need to know'' in 10CFR Part 25 as a ``determination made
by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective
recipient requires access to a specific classified information to
perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function
under cognizance of the Commission.''
This new sensitivity to access to information has reduced the
opportunity for the public to access as much information as in the
past. However, for adjudicatory proceedings, the Commission's rules of
practice specify how interested parties may obtain access to restricted
data and national security information. There have been limited
situations in specific hearings where appropriately cleared individuals
representing private citizens or non-governmental organizations have
been granted access, with restrictions, to specific sensitive
information. In an ongoing proceeding concerning the application to
construct a Mixed Oxide (MOx) Facility at Savannah River, the NRC's
Licensing Board found recently that the intervener had made a
sufficient showing for its expert witness and counsel of record to make
specific applications for security clearances.
The NRC has sought other means of maintaining a dialog with the
non-industry stakeholders. One way this is done is to invite
representatives of State and local government agencies, including local
law enforcement officials, to attend meetings on security issues and
provide their perspective.
__________
Responses by Richard A. Meserve to Additional Questions from
Senator Voinovich
Question 1. One of the most disturbing pieces of this whole Davis-
Besse incident is that as the investigation progresses it continues to
unravel surprises. This latest development that I read about in the
newspaper on the emergency cooling system is most troubling. Now--have
you found out everything that happened at Davis-Besse? Can you assure
me that there will be no more surprises here?
Response. While the majority of problem discovery activities are
complete at Davis-Besse, design review activities are ongoing which may
reveal additional deficiencies requiring correction.
In response to the discovery of the reactor head degradation at
Davis-Besse in March 2002, the NRC established a special Oversight
Panel to guide the NRC's response to the situation and provide
oversight for Davis-Besse's recovery efforts. The Panel, led by senior
managers from the Region III and Headquarters offices, is ensuring that
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company identifies all causal factors
contributing to the head degradation, bounds the scope of the impact of
those causal factors, and implements lasting corrective action before
any restart and future operation of the reactor.
In August 2002, the Oversight Panel issued its first Checklist of
required actions to be accomplished prior to restart based on the
inspection findings and root cause analysis issues identified at that
time. Since then, we have revised the Checklist to include new areas of
concern such as the radiological protection program and containment
sump modifications. The Restart Checklist is used to provide a concise
summary of the status of major activities necessary for closeout before
the Panel could consider a request for restart of the facility. The
checklist is updated as significant new issues emerge.
In May 2002, the licensee submitted its first Return-to-Service
Plan, which identified key improvements necessary for restart. This
plan considered NRC-identified input as well as issues that FirstEnergy
determined were necessary in order for the plant to run reliably in the
future. Actions included replacement of the reactor vessel head,
correcting degraded conditions within the containment due to boric acid
corrosion, verifying the design of key safety systems, improving safety
programs and improving the management and human performance of the site
workforce. This area, which involves safety culture aspects of the
organization, will require long term continued emphasis to ensure
lasting corrective action. The NRC Restart Checklist and FirstEnergy
Return-to-Service Plan are aligned though the Oversight Panel
activities.
The NRC is also addressing the issue of potential wrongdoing on the
part of FirstEnergy managers and staff. The NRC Office of
Investigations has an ongoing investigation into matters at Davis-
Besse. The Oversight Panel is closely monitoring the investigative
activities and will ensure appropriate actions are completed before
restart is considered.
Question 2. I believe that you have copies of several pictures that
were distributed during the hearing of the corrosion on the reactor
heads at Davis-Besse. It is my understanding that these pictures were
taken as part of an inspection of the facility in April 2000. I further
understand that these photographs were included in a report that
FirstEnergy filed with NRC in 2000, that the NRC did not review that
file, and that the NRC regularly fails to review these types of
reports. I also understand that the corrosion present in these pictures
was present and visible during multiple inspections as far back as 1996
and that it was noted in multiple reports as far back as 1996. If this
is true, then I think that this Committee may have to take a very, very
serious look at some fundamental overhaul of the NRC's day-to-day
oversight at these nuclear facilities. Is it true that these pictures
were contained in a report submitted to the NRC that was not even
looked at until after the reactor was shut down?
Response. The photograph of the reactor vessel head and service
structure depicting corrosion trails on the reactor head streaming from
openings in the base of the service structure was not submitted to the
NRC.
A power reactor licensee normally generates several thousand
internal ``condition reports'' each year. A condition report describes
a deficiency in plant equipment or programs and is used to track
corrective actions and ensure adequate resolution of the problem. One
condition report generated in April 2000 contained as an attachment the
referenced photograph. The routine NRC inspection program examines a
sample of onsite activities including condition reports. That specific
condition report existed in the files at Davis-Besse, but was not
selected as part of a routine baseline inspection sample.
An allegation has been made that the picture was shown to an NRC
inspector in 2000. This is a matter that is under investigation by the
Office of the Inspector General.
Question 3. What have you done to sanction the people involved in
the day-to-day oversight of Davis-Besse as a result of this (vessel
head corrosion) discovery?
Response. The NRC views the problem that arose at Davis-Besse as an
institutional failure and not a failure of the particular individuals.
There has been no sanction of any NRC individual as a result of the
reactor pressure vessel head degradation at Davis-Besse. We are taking
action to correct this institutional failure.
Question 4. What changes are you making or contemplating to the
overall day-to-day oversight at nuclear power plants (as a result of
Davis-Besse)?
Response. The Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force identified a
number of program and implementation issues that may have contributed
to the inability of the Agency to detect the issues at Davis-Besse in a
more timely manner. The Commission approved proceeding with the
recommendations identified for action by senior NRC management. The
Task Force's recommendations are currently being evaluated and
implemented; changes to the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) will be
made as appropriate. For example, the NRC plans to evaluate how to
improve the use of industry operating experience in the ROP, and will
evaluate the need for additional or improved barrier integrity
performance indicators. An evaluation will also be performed to
determine whether a more direct method is needed to assess and react to
performance weaknesses in the cross-cutting areas of human performance,
problem identification and resolution, and safety conscious work
environment. The results of this evaluation will be communicated to the
Commission in the staff's semi-annual status reports on the Davis-Besse
Lessons Learned Action Plans, as well as annual ROP self-assessment
report for Calendar Year 2003.
Question 5. The Lessons Learned Report cites significant problems
with the safety culture at Davis-Besse. A report written by the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations states--and I am going to quote
from the report here--``A major contributor to this event was shift in
the focus at all levels of the organization from implementing high
standards to justifying minimum standards. This reduction in standards
resulted from excessive focus on meeting short-term production goals, a
lack of management oversight, symptom-based problem-solving,
justification of plant problems, isolationism, ineffective use of
operating experience, and a lack of sensitivity to nuclear safety. The
lessons learned at Davis-Besse are universal in nature and should be
used by all nuclear stations.'' A report by the NRC's Inspector General
showed that only 53 percent of NRC employees feel that it is ``safe to
speak up in the NRC'' about safety issues. That report also states that
almost one-fourth of NRC employees do not believe that ``the NRC's
commitment to public safety is apparent in what we do on a day-to-day
basis.'' These statistics are frankly unacceptable. As I mentioned in
my opening remarks, the No. 1 priority for the NRC needs to be the
safety of the public. What is the Commission doing to change things and
instill a more appropriate level of safety culture in both the NRC's
operations and in the facilities that you regulate?
Response. Regarding safety culture in the NRC's operations, the NRC
Executive Director for Operations established a Task Group to review
the Inspector General's 2002 Safety Culture and Climate survey results,
identify the key areas for improvement, and identify potential options
for improvement. The Task Group is working to develop a better
understanding of the survey results including the factors that
influenced them. This will allow the Agency to identify and implement
improvements in an effective and efficient manner, while continuing to
build on those improvements already underway. We are committed to
assuring a culture at the NRC where employees feel free to speak about
a variety of topics, and where differing opinions are not only welcome,
but are encouraged.
The current policy of reviewing safety culture is specified in the
staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-98-059, ``Proposed Options
for Assessing the Performance and Competency of Licensee Management.''
The SRM approved current staff practice of inferring licensee
management performance from performance based inspections, routine
assessments, and event follow-up. In addition, the SRM to SECY-98-176,
``Proposed Options for Assessing a Licensee's Safety Conscious Work
Environment,'' approved the staff's assessment of the safety conscious
work environment, part of safety culture, on a case-by-case basis while
encouraging licensees to use third parties to survey their own safety
conscious work environment. The SRM also allowed the staff to develop
and implement additional guidance and training of inspectors in support
of more complete and consistent program implementation. More recently,
in the SRM to SECY-02-0166, the Commission unanimously reiterated its
opposition to pursing rulemaking for oversight of a safety conscious
work environment. The Commission believed that such a rule would be
subjective in nature, difficult to inspect and enforce, would likely
intrude on management prerogatives and might well cause a chilling
effect on the most effective safety culture element--the commitment of
management to a safety conscious work environment. In light of efforts
by foreign regulators to measure and regulate safety culture, at the
Commission's direction the staff is monitoring developments abroad so
as to ensure that the Commission remains informed about these efforts
and their effectiveness. In particular, because subjectivity is a
principal concern of the Commission regarding the direct regulation of
safety culture, the staff will monitor efforts to develop more
objective measures that can serve as indicators of possible problems
with safety culture.
Finally, the Commission is supportive of the efforts of the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to address issues relating
to safety culture through its monitoring of licensees.
Question 6. The Lessons Learned Report--produced by an NRC Task
Force--states that staffing and resources problems existed at Davis-
Besse. That report states that ``Regional staffing and resource issues
challenged the NRC's ability to provide effective regulatory oversight
of (Davis-Besse).'' The report goes on to list recommendations to
address what looks like to me to be a human capital problem. How much
of a role did NRC's human capital problems play in this incident, and
what can be done to address it? Do you have enough people with the
right skills to accomplish your mission?
Response. Human capital problems were not a significant contributor
to the failures of the NRC to discover the reactor head degradation
earlier at Davis-Besse. Throughout this period, both resident inspector
positions at Davis-Besse were staffed with the exception of 11 months
(December 1998 to October 1999), when there was only one resident
inspector assigned to the site. The inspection program consists of a
baseline level of inspection effort plus a range of additional
inspection effort to be expended based on the assessment of licensee
performance. While the NRC accomplished all required inspections at
Davis-Besse throughout this time period, the level of effort was lower
than the average facility due to the Agency's perception of good
licensee performance.
As presented in the Lessons Learned Task Force report, there were
four major areas requiring NRC improvement:
<bullet> Assessment of Stress Corrosion Cracking of Reactor
Materials
<bullet> Assessment of Operating Experience, Integration of
Operating Experience into Training and Review of Program Effectiveness
Reviews
<bullet> Evaluation of Inspection, Assessment and Project
Management Guidance
<bullet> Assessment of Barrier Integrity Requirements.
In accordance with Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendation
3.3.5(3), the NRC will monitor resident inspector staffing levels and
develop human resource strategies to be more effective during inspector
turnovers; specifically, the time between a resident inspector leaving
a plant site and the arrival of the new inspector.
All inspections to ensure the health and safety of the public at
the U.S. nuclear power facilities continue to be accomplished. The NRC
has undertaken aggressive action to maintain the high quality and
capability of its workforce, including hiring experienced professionals
and highly qualified entry level staff.
Question 7. I am extremely concerned that in light of the situation
at Davis-Besse and the Task Force's report, that the NRC's budget for
fiscal year 2004 proposes to cut funding for inspections. This
basically means that there will be less people our there doing what we
need them to do--inspecting. Could you please comment on the rational
behind this request?
Response. The NRC budget for the entire Reactor Inspection and
Performance Assessment program in fiscal year 2003 is $73,610,000, with
$73,172,000 requested for fiscal year 2004, for a net decrease of
$438,000. Although there was a net decrease in this budget area for
fiscal year 2004, resources for the specific activities involved in the
inspection and assessment of licensee performance were increased from
fiscal year 2003. These increases were made to reflect several lessons
learned and inspection program enhancements that were deemed to be
appropriate based on the first couple of years of Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) implementation. However, in addition to providing the
resources for the conduct of inspections, this budget area encompasses
the many different work activities necessary to develop and maintain
the inspection program. This includes, for example, program development
and oversight by Headquarters staff and the time necessary for regional
inspection staff to prepare for inspections and then document the
results. With the ROP reaching its fourth year of implementation,
program development costs have decreased as would be expected and
certain efficiencies have been realized in many of these areas,
resulting in less resources being required to support the inspection
program. Overall, these reductions in the program support areas offset
the increases in resources for conducting actual inspection and
assessment, and resulted in the overall net decrease for this budget
area. The result is that there will not be a negative impact on the
number of inspectors performing the important mission of inspecting the
nation's nuclear facilities.
In addition, the fiscal year 2004 budget was prepared before the
full extent of Davis-Besse lessons learned were known to the staff and
could be reflected in the budget for inspection and assessment. The
fiscal year 2004 budget has recently been reviewed by the staff with
Davis-Besse lessons learned and inspection follow-up activities
factored in. The staff expects that this will result in an increase in
budgeted resources above what was initially requested for the Reactor
Inspection and Performance Assessment program in fiscal year 2004.
Question 8. As I stated in my opening statement at the hearing,
this facility (Davis-Besse) needs to get back online, but in a manner
that will absolutely protect the people of Ohio. Please comment on what
the NRC has specifically done and will do to meet that objective.
Response. The NRC clearly defined those actions necessary to be
taken to ensure safe restart and operation of the Davis-Besse facility.
Shortly after discovery of the reactor head degradation, the NRC
issued a Confirmatory Action Letter documenting specific commitments
including the commitment of FirstEnergy to obtain NRC approval prior to
restart of Davis-Besse. On April 29, 2002, the NRC established a
special Oversight Panel, led by senior managers from Region III and
Headquarters, to coordinate and oversee NRC activities necessary to
address repairs and performance deficiencies at the plant in order to
assure that it can operate safely. The Oversight Panel established a
Restart Checklist that contains those actions necessary to be resolved
before restart of Davis-Besse would be considered. The Oversight Panel
has been directing NRC activities to provide effective assessment of
Davis-Besse recovery actions and regularly reports its progress
publicly.
The Oversight Panel will remain in place as long as necessary,
typically 6-12 months following restart, to ensure that corrective
actions are and continue to be effective. At the point in time that the
Oversight Panel is satisfied that the corrective actions at Davis-Besse
are lasting and that the routine reactor oversight program is
sufficient to provide effective oversight, the Panel will recommend to
NRC senior management that Panel activities be terminated.
Question 9. The NRC asked for a significant increase in fiscal year
2004 budget for homeland security. What does the NRC plan to do with
this proposed funding increase?
Response. NRC's homeland security resources increased by
approximately $17.5 million in fiscal year 2004. This results from an
increase of $27 million in expanded efforts for controlling high-risk
radioactive sources, conducting more frequent force-on-force exercises,
reviewing revised nuclear power plant security plans, conducting
research on mitigation strategies for potential vulnerabilities, and
developing and completing regulatory improvements associated with
homeland security initiatives. These increases are offset by a
reduction of approximately $9.5 million resulting from the completion
of vulnerability assessments for storage and transportation activities,
and completion of NRC security enhancements for the NRC buildings.
The $27 million increase includes $11.6 million for enhancing the
tracking and regulatory control of high-risk radioactive materials.
This effort involves accountability of radioactive sources within the
Nation's borders and the export and import of high-risk sources. The
objectives are to prevent the potential use of high-risk radioactive
sources in a radiological dispersal device and to increase safety and
security by reducing the number of incidents involving inadequate
control of high-risk sources both domestically and internationally.
This will reduce the potential malevolent use of radiological material,
which could result in significant public health and safety or
environmental impacts. Resources for force-on-force exercises at NRC
licensed facilities increased approximately $7.0 million. The NRC staff
has started conducting force-on-force exercises, using enhanced threat
capabilities, and plans to conduct these exercises at each nuclear
power plant on a 3-year cycle compared to the previous 8-year cycle.
Resources for conducting research on mitigation strategies for
potential vulnerabilities increased approximately $6.0 million due
primarily to risk-informed vulnerability assessments and mitigation
analyses at nuclear power plants to various modes of potential attack,
spent fuel pool analyses, and support for radiological dispersal device
research. An increase of $2.4 million will be used to support necessary
regulatory improvements related to homeland security initiatives,
including rulemaking and guidance development. The staff will also
require significant additional resources to review the revised security
plans at all operating commercial reactor and Category I fuel cycle
licensees, which will be submitted in fiscal year 2004 pursuant to
Orders issued by the Commission on April 29, 2003.
Question 10. As you know, the NRC was not moved into the Department
of Homeland Security. How does the Commission intend to work with the
newly created Department of Homeland Security? What steps are you
currently taking in this regard?
Response. The NRC has already established a cooperative working
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We
continue to make progress in enhancing coordination and collaboration
with DHS and other agencies on matters of homeland security. The Office
of Nuclear Security and Incident Response was formed in April 2002 to
unite the Agency's safeguards and security functions with the incident
response program. NRC has established a full-time liaison with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as strengthened existing
coordination with other agencies and organizations, such as the
Homeland Security Council, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. We provide Situation Reports (SITREPS) to
DHS twice a day, promptly exchange sensitive event information with DHS
as incidents occur, coordinate changes in threat levels, and hold
frequent meetings with DHS to discuss policy issues and status of
activities of mutual interest. In addition, NRC currently participates
in numerous interagency working groups, that are hosted by or involve
participation by DHS, such as the working group that conducted the
operational plan for Operation Liberty Shield.
Question 11. I have read in the newspapers over the last month that
two nuclear plants, one in Tennessee and other in Texas, have also
discovered coolant leaks that were causing corrosion. This seems to be
an industry-wide problem. Can you tell me about the situation at these
plants and what the NRC is doing to prevent anything like what happened
as Davis-Besse from occurring anywhere else?
Response. Both of the nuclear power facilities in Texas, Comanche
Peak Unit 1, and the South Texas Project Units 1 and 2, have conducted
visual inspections of their reactor vessel heads during their
respective maintenance outages in Fall 2002 and early Spring 2003.
Inspections revealed small reactor coolant leaks from the canopy seal
welds associated with the control rod drive mechanisms. While not
considered reactor pressure boundary leakage, these leaks sometimes
result in the accumulation of boric acid on the reactor vessel heads.
The licensees repaired the leaks and cleaned the boric acid deposits on
the reactor vessel heads. Contrary to media reports of corrosion to the
Comanche Peak Unit 1 vessel head, these leaks did not cause corrosion
of either of the reactor vessel heads.
The NRC resident inspection staffs at these facilities and others
nationwide have increased their oversight of licensee inspections and
have implemented NRC inspections pursuant to an Order that was issued
to all pressurized water reactors that required more comprehensive and
frequent vessel head inspections to better assure that the situation
that occurred at Davis-Besse does not occur at these plants.
In January 2003, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the licensee
for Sequoyah Unit 2, identified an accumulation of boric acid deposits
on insulation covering the reactor pressure vessel head (RPVH). These
deposits were the result of a leaking pipe fitting connecting two
sections of a reactor vessel instrument line that was disconnected and
then later reconnected during the plant's May 2002 outage. Leakage from
the fitting seeped through a seam in the insulation onto the RPVH.
While cleaning the area of the leakage, the licensee observed minor
corrosion on the RPVH and determined that the affected area was small.
The measurements taken indicated that the corroded area was in the
shape of a groove less than half an inch wide, about five inches long,
and at most about one-eighth of an inch deep. The RPV head is at least
six inches thick in this area.
The NRC performed an onsite review of the corroded area and the
piping fitting that had leaked, and reviewed the licensee's technical
information and initial evaluations. Based on the cleaning of the
corroded area, removal of the boric acid from the area, repair of the
leaking pipe fitting, verification of no other leaking components onto
the RPVH, and review of the technical information and initial
evaluations, the NRC staff identified no immediate safety concerns.
Subsequently, the NRC issued Information Notice 2003-02, ``Recent
Experience with Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Boric Acid
Corrosion,'' on January 16, 2003, to notify the nuclear operating plant
industry of the potential of leakage from fittings disconnected and
reconnected during reactor vessel head assembly and disassembly.
In March 2003, during inspections required by an NRC Order issued
to the industry on February 11, 2003, TVA identified boric acid
deposits on the Sequoyah Unit 1 RPVH. The licensee conducted
examinations to determine if RPVH nozzle cracks could have been the
cause of this leakage. To date, the licensee has not confirmed any
nozzle cracking and believes the source of the boric acid deposits was
from leakage of control rod drive canopy seals, which was corrected
years ago. After cleaning up the deposits, no corrosion of the RPV head
was identified. Currently, the NRC staff is independently assessing the
adequacy of the Sequoyah licensee's inspections and analysis.
As mentioned previously, the NRC issued an Order amending the
licenses of all pressurized water reactor facilities in February 2003.
This Order requires inspections that are more reliable than the
previously required visual inspections in determining the presence of
reactor pressure vessel head cracking or leakage. As utilities look
harder as a result of this Order, there may be more reported
occurrences of discovered cracks or even minor leakage. Supplemental
inspections performed in response to NRC Bulletins issued in 2002
identified no significant findings of RPVH leakage. The intent of the
increased vigilance in this area is to identify minor problems now so
that they may be corrected. Longer-term rulemaking is currently planned
to incorporate improved vessel head inspection requirements into the
NRC's regulations.
Question 12. The NRC has stated that it did not consider corrosion
of the reactor head a threat prior to the discovery in March 2002
because officials at the Davis-Besse facility informed them that the
heads were regularly cleaned and inspected during the refueling
shutdowns prior to the discovery. Obviously, this was not the case.
What changes are the NRC making to ensure this never happens again?
Response. To address the immediate concerns raised by the
increasing discovery of problems with reactor pressure vessel heads
(RPVHs) at pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the NRC issued a series
of bulletins and other communications. The long-term resolution of this
issue is expected to involve changes to the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) and
will involve changes to the NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.55a, ``Codes
and Standards.'' Although licensees' actions to date have provided
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
for the near-term operating cycles, the NRC deemed it appropriate to
establish a clear regulatory framework pending the revision of 10 CFR
50.55a. Therefore, the NRC issued order EA-03-009 on February 11, 2003,
that imposes requirements for PWR licensees to inspect RPVHs and
related penetration nozzles pending the revision of 10 CFR 50.55a. The
NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/150 for inspectors to assess the
adequacy of licensees' RPVH and vessel head penetration inspection
activities.
The NRC inspection program guidance will be revised to ensure more
effective review and evaluation of licensee's programs for boric acid
corrosion control (BACC). Staff will collect information available
worldwide on boric acid corrosion of pressure boundary materials and
operating experience feedback to date for developing the inspection
guidance. The revised inspection guidance will provide guidance to
determine the adequacy of BACC programs (timely and periodic inspection
of PWR plant BACC programs, implementation effectiveness, ability to
identify leakage, and adequacy of evaluation of leaks).
Question 13. I understand that several contract workers at Davis-
Besse tested positive for radiation exposure when they reported to work
at their next assigned nuclear plant last February (some contract
employees travel from facility to facility to fulfill their contracts).
I also understand that these employees did not test positive for
radiation exposure when they left Davis-Besse. Has the NRC determined
how these workers were exposed and how that exposure was not detected
at Davis-Besse when they left the facility?
Response. On February 20, 2002, several contract workers were both
internally and externally contaminated with radioactive material while
installing equipment inside the steam generators at Davis-Besse. The
licensee specified radiological controls for the work which were based
on historical data for the radiological conditions inside the steam
generators. However, the radiological conditions were significantly
different during February 2002. There were several indications that
radiological conditions were more severe warranting additional
precautions for worker safety. However, the licensee failed to
adequately evaluate those indications prior to worker entries into the
steam generators.
NRC review of the circumstances surrounding the steam generator
work revealed that Davis-Besse staff failed to adequately assess the
radiological conditions in the workers' environment, failed to provide
appropriate protection for those workers, failed to adequately monitor
worker exposure to radiation and failed to prevent the release of
minute radiological particles that the workers carried offsite. The
workers were not overexposed and the offsite release of materials did
not pose a health risk to the public.
Question 14. This situation at Davis-Besse has provided plenty of
ammunition to those who oppose nuclear energy. I agree with them that
this is a serious matter, but I still believe that nuclear power is an
important and necessary part of our energy future. What does the NRC
plan to do to increase public confidence in the safety of nuclear
energy following this event?
Response. The NRC actively seeks, includes and values stakeholder
input in key activities. Enhancing public confidence in the NRC as a
strong and credible regulator is one of our four Performance Goals.
Following the Davis-Besse event, the NRC responded to the vessel head
degradation with a series of actions, including evaluating the event,
forming a special oversight panel, and commissioning an independent
Lessons Learned Task Force to assess its regulatory processes. Each of
these actions was implemented with significant stakeholder input and
communication.
The Oversight Panel has established a Communications Plan and a
Communications Team to ensure that the activities of the NRC and those
of Davis-Besse are made known to interested members of the public.
Examples of public access to information regarding Davis-Besse include
a monthly newsletter and an extensive web site. The Panel has conducted
over 40 public meetings. Typically there are more than one hundred
individuals attending the meetings. Outside call-in telephone lines are
arranged for some meetings and most meetings are transcribed, with the
transcripts posted on the NRC web page. Extensive information about the
Davis-Besse reactor vessel head damage and the ensuing activities is
also available on the NRC web site. In addition, State of Ohio
personnel regularly accompany NRC inspectors and the Ottawa County
Administrator is a member of FirstEnergy's Restart Oversight Panel. The
Commission met publically with FirstEnergy and the NRC staff to discuss
the facility status, followed by a public forum with key interested
stakeholders.
The NRC's Lessons Learned Task Force conducted an independent
evaluation of the NRC staff's regulatory processes related to assuring
reactor vessel head integrity in order to identify and recommend areas
of improvement applicable to the NRC and/or the industry. The scope of
the task force effort included: reactor oversight process issues,
regulatory process issues, research activities, applicable practices
used in the international community, and the NRC's generic issue
process. The Task Force invited input at public meetings on its charter
and publicly presented its results. The Commission received the results
of the Task Force efforts at a public meeting, followed by a public
forum on the issues with key interested stakeholders, and directed the
staff to proceed with implementing the recommendations identified for
action by senior NRC management.
The NRC has also initiated multiple activities at reactors similar
in design to Davis-Besse to ensure that the issues that caused the
problems at Davis-Besse were not occurring at other facilities. The
development of these actions included public dialog and input from all
concerned stakeholders. The NRC's public web site includes direct links
to extensive information regarding the NRCs safety initiatives with
these other reactors.
The NRC has received positive comments regarding the amount of
information provided to the public and the openness with which the NRC
conducts its activities. Our redesigned web site is easier to navigate,
provides more information, and is more user-friendly than before--
making it easy to access information regarding this and other safety
issues.
The NRC intends to continue placing a high priority on public
involvement and will ensure that Davis-Besse can operate safely before
the plant is permitted to restart.
Question 15. Senator Voinovich would like information provided
regarding the new reactor oversight process.
Response. The current reactor oversight process for power reactors
uses a variety of tools to monitor and evaluate the performance of
commercial nuclear power plants. The process is designed to focus on
those plant activities most important to safety.
The NRC uses inspection findings together with objective
performance indicators to assess plant performance. An ``action
matrix'' provides consistent agency action based on licensee
performance in seven cornerstones of safety: (1) initiating events, (2)
mitigating systems, (3) integrity of barriers to release of
radioactivity, (4) emergency preparedness, (5) occupational radiation
safety, (6) public radiation safety, and (7) physical protection.
The Performance Indicators and the assessment of inspection
findings are posted to the NRC web site, using the color notation of
their significance-green, white, yellow, or red. Green indicates that
performance is acceptable while red represents unacceptable
performance. The NRC addresses any significant performance issues, as
necessary, and follows up any other performance issues until they are
corrected.
The results of reactor oversight are documented in inspection
reports and performance indicators. Inspection reports, correspondence,
and other information about the performance of reactor facilities are
available to the public in the Agency's document management system
(ADAMS). Inspection reports, issued on each inspection, are also
available on the reactor oversight process web page.
The NRC's Office of Public Affairs has issued NUREG-1649, ``Reactor
Oversight Process,'' dated July 2000, to provide a plain English
description of the ROP to our internal and external stakeholders. To
view this publication go to: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1649/r3/index.html.
In addition, general information about the ROP can be found at
NRC's public web page (www.NRC.gov). From the NRC home page, click on
the task-bar tab for ``Nuclear Reactors.'' That will bring up a page
with a light-blue ``Quick Links'' box on the right. Follow the
``Reactor Oversight Process'' links to obtain specific information
about the program.
There are three primary pages that will provide you with different
types of information that can be accessed by typing in addresses as
follows:
(1) For plant performance information and a high-level summary of
the ROP, go to:
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html
(2) The ROP Program Documents page provides a consolidated listing
and access to specific program guidance for the key areas of the ROP,
including performance indicators, inspection, and assessment. This page
also provides links to the policy documents for the ROP, including the
annual ROP self-assessment Commission papers.
To access this page, go to:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/program-
documents.html
(3) For a more detailed look at documents pertaining to the
inspection of NRC-licensed activities, including the inspection
procedures used by our inspectors in the field, go to the Inspection
Manual at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/
To download a copy of the attached NUREG-1649, go to:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1649/
r3/sr1649r3.pdf
Question 16. Senator Voinovich would like human capital
information: what is the NRC's capacity to keep staff on board and
ability to hire the people the Agency needs?
Response. Over the last 2\1/2\ years, NRC has implemented a
strategic workforce planning process that provides for the systematic
and ongoing identification of critical skills gaps and the application
of a variety of human capital strategies to close them. With an active
partnership between program managers throughout the Agency and human
resources staff, NRC is currently enjoying success in hiring and
retaining the staff it needs to carry out its vital mission. However,
the Agency also recognizes that it must continue to understand and
address its strategic human capital management challenges, and it would
welcome any assistance Congress could provide to train, hire, and
retain individuals with critical skills needed by NRC.
To aid retention, NRC provides a high quality work environment and
a variety of incentives and flexibilities. With a focus on continual
learning, the Agency supports training and development programs in
technical, non-technical, and leadership skills. The human capital
budget also funds graduate and senior fellowships, retention
allowances, relocation bonuses, and quality of work life programs.
Attrition, including losses due to retirement, remains relatively low.
Since fiscal year 2000, attrition has ranged between 5 and 6 percent;
while in the late 1990's, it jumped to 7.5 percent. Clearly, the
economy and the opportunities in the labor market affect employees'
decisions about continued government employment.
Through an aggressive, targeted recruitment program for diverse
entry-level and experienced candidates, NRC is currently competing
successfully to acquire the skills it needs. The Agency is benefiting
from the condition of the economy and from NRC's varied recruiting,
staffing, and compensation tools. By reinvigorating the cooperative
education program and strategically using recruitment bonuses,
undergraduate scholarships, and the summer hire program, the Agency has
been able to attract and hire entry-level staff. By using a flexible
compensation system and recruiting tools such as Monster.com, NRC has
had recent success in attracting and hiring experienced staff with
specialized technical skills. Over the last year, the Agency hired 261
new permanent employees. Of these new employees, 67 highly qualified
engineers and scientists joined the Agency's Nuclear Safety Intern
Program.
NRC actively monitors the relevant labor market and the results it
is achieving in the strategic management of human capital. The Agency
recognizes that external factors, including the economy, impact the
strategies it must use to hire and retain the critical technical talent
it needs. Through an ongoing planning, implementation, and assessment
process, NRC is working to assure that it will continue to maintain the
technical competence of it's workforce. To help maintain and continue
these recent successes, NRC would welcome and strongly support human
capital provisions of the type reflected in S. 1591, which was
introduced by Senator Voinovich in the last session of Congress.
Question 17a. Senator Voinovich asked: What resources should have
been in place at Davis-Besse?
Response. Davis-Besse is a single unit pressurized water reactor
facility. NRC policy dictates that inspection for this type of facility
be performed by both onsite resident inspectors and region-based
specialist inspectors. The complement of onsite resident inspectors
includes two full time positions--a qualified senior resident inspector
and a qualified resident inspector. Specialist inspections are
conducted by drawing upon various regional staff inspection resources;
these inspections are managed by a Projects Branch in the regional
office. Staffing for a typical projects branch includes a Branch Chief
and a Project Engineer. Ordinarily a projects branch is responsible for
two to three reactor sites.
Question 17b. What was in place?
Response. Since at least 1996, at least one fully qualified NRC
inspector has always been assigned to the Davis-Besse site. For most of
that time, both of the resident inspector positions were staffed with
qualified inspectors. One exception involved a 20-month period
(November 1998 to July 2000) when only one fully qualified resident
inspector was assigned. For an 11-month period (November 1998 to
October 1999), there was one resident inspector assigned to the site.
When the second resident reported to the site in October 1999, he was
partially qualified until July 2000, when he achieved full
qualification. Periodic specialist inspections were also conducted at
Davis-Besse.
The regional Branch Chief position has always been filled, but the
Project Engineer position was not permanently staffed from June 1997
through June 1998, and then again from September 1999 through May 2000.
This latter position is not required. In the NRC's independent
``Lessons Learned Task Force'' report, it was noted that the cognizant
Branch Chief for Davis-Besse focused a large amount of his time on the
Clinton nuclear facility, a plant in the same branch as Davis-Besse
that was under the NRC's intensive ``Manual Chapter 0350'' Oversight
Process. The same report indicated that senior regional management
determined that the assigned Branch Chief provided effective oversight
of all of his assigned plants.
Question 17c. What is the NRC doing to ensure that a similar
problem isn't occurring elsewhere?
Response. NRC policies specify that two resident inspectors be
assigned to Davis-Besse. As noted above, there was a 20-month period of
time when only one fully qualified inspector was assigned to the
facility. In response to an NRC ``Lessons Learned Task Force
recommendation, the NRC will now more closely monitor resident
inspector staffing levels and develop human resource strategies to
better manage inspector turnovers. Specifically, NRC policy will be
revised and effort will be focused on minimizing the time between when
a resident inspector leaves a plant site and when a fully qualified
replacement inspector arrives. In addition, the NRC Executive Director
for Operations recently issued guidance that permits the assignment of
additional inspectors to a site beyond the planned staffing in
anticipation of staff turnover. Additional long-term improvements are
also being reviewed and evaluated as part of the ongoing, continuing
improvement process.
Prior to implementation of a revised Reactor Oversight Process in
2000, the NRC inspection program permitted significant variability in
the application of inspection resources, largely based on assessed
facility performance. The total inspection hours at Davis-Besse for the
3 years of 1998, 1999, and 2000 were lower than most other single unit
sites, although the hours were consistent with the facility performance
documented through the previous reactor oversight program. The new
program mandates that a minimum baseline inspection effort be completed
at every nuclear facility.
All inspections at U.S. nuclear power facilities to ensure the
health and safety of the public continue to be accomplished. The NRC
has undertaken aggressive action to maintain the high quality and
capability of its workforce, including hiring experienced professionals
and highly qualified entry level staff.
Question 18. Provide specific examples of how the NRC is doing
things differently as a result of employees coming forward with
recommendations on how to do the job better.
Response. This is an important subject that we continue to work on
to achieve further improvements. There are a variety of forums and
processes, both formal and informal, available to NRC employees who
wish to make recommendations on improvements and efficiencies with
regards to policy and safety issues or administrative matters. We have
encouraged the staff to engage managers in informal, personal feedback
in the course of their daily business. Two of the more formal processes
for providing feedback are the NRC's suggestion program and the filing
of differing professional views. NRC's review and concurrence process
for work products also provides staff, supervisors, and managers
opportunities to offer changes in approach and direction. In addition,
periodic staff meetings, management retreats, focus groups, task or
work groups, self assessments, and a feedback form process (where
suggestions or recommendations are brought forward and considered)
provide platforms for direct employee involvement in determining
policies, processes, and procedures. The Agency has an ``open door
policy that encourages staff at all levels to interact with managers
anywhere in the Agency.
The attached pages provide some specific examples of changes to
NRC's business practices that have occurred as a result of employee
recommendations.
EXAMPLES
<bullet> Two recent employee recommendations brought forward
through the Agency's Differing Professional View/Differing Professional
Opinion (DPV/DPO) process resulted in several enhancements to an
ongoing review of NRC's Significance Determination Process. Another
employee raised a DPV regarding the appropriateness of the resolution
of an allegation raised by a licensee employee which resulted in a re-
review of the allegation by the inspection staff and a change in
position on the disposition of the allegation.
<bullet> NRC employees from all four NRC regional offices and the
Technical Training Center, working with the inspection program staff in
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, completely revised the
process for training and qualifying NRC power reactor, research and
test reactor, decommissioning, vendor, and construction inspectors and
operator license examiners to increase efficiency in the program.
<bullet> Managers in the regions generally meet two times a year
with all reactor inspectors, and two additional times with senior
resident inspectors, to solicit feedback and recommendations from the
staff on how the Reactor Oversight Program (ROP) can be improved. The
best practices are compiled and placed on the regional internal web
sites for viewing by all staff, and have resulted in changes to
inspection procedures.
<bullet> Senior resident inspectors met to discuss the lessons
learned from the Davis-Besse event, and developed a list of
recommendations for internal process changes. One recommendation
resulted in the sharing of a list of special areas to emphasize when
inspecting licensee performance during refueling outages and reactor
containment or drywell walk downs.
<bullet> In addition, the staff has made recommendations which have
improved focus on safety and skills in conducting inspections, such as:
<bullet> Inspectors have been actively involved in the
implementation of, and improvement to, the ROP since its inception.
<bullet> Unique inspection techniques, best practices and notable
findings are shared among inspectors for use as a reference tool. Some
best practices were in heat sink, permanent modifications, and
maintenance rule inspections. Typically, the information is provided
electronically for inspectors to view.
<bullet> An inspector newsletter, initiated in January 2003 and
published bimonthly, shares information on a variety of findings and
solicits feedback.
Other suggestions from the NRC staff have been acted upon and used
to improve how they do their job:
<bullet> The use of docking stations, laptop computers, and other
technologies to reduce paperwork and speed up completion of inspection
reports.
<bullet> The use of global positioning devices and cellular
telephones to aid in real time communications with licensees and
location of mobile or fixed radiation monitoring equipment around
nuclear power plants.
<bullet> Improved use of electronic printing allows inspection
teams to receive inspection reference material and drawings
electronically instead of having licensee's mail large volumes of
drawings.
<bullet> During resident inspector seminars, individual inspectors
regularly share insights or lessons learned with other inspectors. In
addition, inspectors regularly interact with Headquarters counterparts
on several working groups to improve specific inspection areas. One
example is a focus group looking into the inspection of corrective
action program effectiveness.
<bullet> A recent example of a recommendation raised through the
Employee Suggestion program involved implementation of a quicker and
more cost-effective way of transmitting final letters to persons that
had raised safety concerns using the contract overnight service instead
of certified mail.
<bullet> Staff have made recommendations to add, expand, or re-
locate certain training for efficiency and cost savings.
In the materials area, initiatives in tracking, oversight and
follow-up reviews of materials Agreement State Programs have been
undertaken as the result of suggestions by staff. In addition:
<bullet> Staff has suggested and management has supported
implementation of several enhancements to the Integrated Materials
Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP). This program is used to
evaluate both NRC Regions and Agreement State radioactive material
programs. These enhancements include establishment of both a list
server for team members and an IMPEP website for resource information,
resulting in more efficient and effective completion of IMPEP reviews.
<bullet> At the staff's suggestion, management agreed that
responsibility for issuing and signing draft IMPEP reports should be
delegated to the IMPEP Team Leader. This change has streamlined the
concurrence process and has resulted in efficiencies in the timeliness
of issuance of these draft IMPEP reports.
<bullet> Staff conceptualized and management supported
implementation of a new allegation web site for Agreement State
allegations and concerns. The new web site allows members of the public
to go directly to the State with concerns regarding areas of their
regulatory responsibility. Staff also suggested enhancements in the
review of Agreement State regulations and increased use of electronic
communications with Agreement States.
A revision to the byproduct materials inspection program focusing
inspection on risk significant activities was initiated based on staff
review and recommendation.
__________
Responses by Richard Meserve to Additional Questions from
Senator Lieberman
Question 1. What concrete steps has the NRC taken to ensure better
accounting of special nuclear materials and to achieve a higher level
of confidence in its regulation of special nuclear material? Has the
NRC considered resuming periodic Material Control and Accounting
inspections at nuclear power reactors?
Response. The NRC is examining material control and accounting
(MC&A) programs as part of its comprehensive review of the Agency's
safeguards and security program that is being undertaken in response to
the terrorist activities of September 11, 2001. While this review
proceeds, the NRC continues to conduct MC&A inspections at fuel cycle
facilities. The MC&A inspection activities for nuclear power plants are
being considered as part of this review.
In the interim, the NRC has developed a Temporary Instruction (TI)
to use for conducting audits of MC&A programs at nuclear power plants.
This TI will help NRC ascertain the breadth and scope of the MC&A
issues which were identified as a result of the evaluation of missing
fuel rods at Millstone. The NRC will begin implementing the TI at
several sites this year and will complete the audits at all sites in
2004. The NRC will also conduct detailed inspections of MC&A at six
nuclear power plants in 2004. Using the results from the MC&A program
review, the implementation of the TI, and the inspections at six
plants, the NRC will determine what, if any, changes to the MC&A
program, including the scope and frequency of MC&A inspections at
nuclear power plants, are needed in the context of the overall
safeguards program review.
Question 2. Because previous NRC inspections at Millstone did not
report the fuel rods missing and the NRC no longer performs routine
Material Control and Accounting inspections at nuclear power reactors,
how confident can the Agency be that this problem is not more
widespread?
Response. As noted in Question 1, staff plans to examine MC&A
programs as part of the comprehensive review of the Agency's safeguards
and security program that is being undertaken in response to the
terrorist activities of September 11, 2001. The staff has developed a
Temporary Instruction (TI) to ascertain the breadth and scope of the
MC&A issues which were identified at Millstone. The staff will begin
implementing the TI at several sites this year by conducting an audit
of the plants' MC&A process. The NRC will complete the audit at all
sites in 2004. In addition, the NRC will conduct full-scale inspections
at six nuclear power plants. Changes, if any, to the MC&A program will
be evaluated based on the results from these efforts, and as a whole in
the context of the overall safeguards program.
Question 3. I understand that on March 19, 1999, Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut filed an application for a license amendment to increase
the storage capacity of its Millstone Unit 3 spent fuel pool from 756
assemblies to 1860 assemblies. The pool currently has 21 high-density
fuel racks; the license amendment would allow an additional 15. What is
the status of NRC action on this application? Has it been approved?
Response. The NRC approved the license amendment by letter dated
November 28, 2000 (Accession No. ML003744387).
Question 4. In reviewing this application, what alternatives for
storage of nuclear waste did/will the NRC consider? I understand that
on March 19, 1999, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut filed an application
for a license amendment to increase the storage capacity of its
Millstone Unit 3 spent fuel pool from 756 assemblies to 1860
assemblies. The pool currently has 21 high-density fuel racks; the
license amendment would allow an additional 15. What is the status of
NRC action on this application? Has it been approved?
Response. The NRC reviews the application as submitted by the
licensee and either approves or denies the application based on
technical considerations. The licensee's application was judged to be
acceptable. NRC review of alternatives for storage of nuclear waste is
not required as part of this application.
Question 5. In reviewing an application to increase the capacity of
a spent fuel pool, does the NRC take into account the extent to which
this action may increase security risks to the plant and possible
consequences of pool failure in the event of an accident or security
breach at the plant. Were these considerations taken into account in
the review of the Millstone Unit 3 expansion request?
Response. In accordance with 10 CFR 73, ``Physical Protection of
Plants and Materials,'' each operator of a nuclear power plant is
required to provide substantial physical protection against
radiological sabotage, including the use of detection devices,
barriers, access controls, and armed guards. Spent fuel pools are
located within protected areas of the plant, which require physical
security. A change to the capacity of the spent fuel pool does not
directly impact the security measures that protect it. Since September
11, 2001, several orders and numerous advisories have been issued by
the NRC to all commercial nuclear plants which improved the physical
security at the nuclear plants, including their spent fuel pools.
Additional enhancements are under consideration.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of Amendment,'' license
amendments issued to increase spent fuel pool capacity are normally
found to involve no significant hazards consideration. This means that
the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety. Because of the robust design and
construction of spent fuel pools, the major failure of a spent fuel
pool is considered very unlikely and is beyond the design basis of the
plant. Nonetheless, the NRC is doing analyses of spent fuel pool
vulnerability to a terrorist event. The National Research Council in
its 2002 report, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism, found: ``The threat of terrorist
attacks on spent fuel storage facilities, like reactors, is highly
dependent on design characteristics. Moreover, spent fuel generates
orders of magnitude less heat than an operating reactor, so that
emergency cooling of the fuel in the case of an attack could probably
be accomplished using `low tech' measures that could be implemented
without significant exposure of workers to radiation.'' The Commission
agrees with this statement. One of the design characteristics of the
Millstone 3 spent fuel pool is that the pool is partially below grade,
which means that in even a worst case terrorist attack, continuing to
cool the fuel and preventing any offsite consequences is eased
considerably. The NRC reviews the technical aspects of the application,
as specified in the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, section 9.1.2,
``Spent Fuel Storage.'' This includes verifying conformance with 10 CFR
50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 61, 62, and 63. For
example, the effect of the increased number of fuel assemblies on
subcriticality criteria, heat load, and seismic qualification are
reviewed. For the Millstone Unit 3 expansion request, the NRC reviewed
the technical aspects of the application as described above.
Question 6. Please describe the current NRC procedures to prevent
loss of water from spent rod pools from various causes, including acts
of malice. Please describe current NRC procedures to avoid a fire in
the fuel pool resulting from a loss of water and to extinguish a fire
in the fuel pool should one occur.
Response. By NRC regulation, spent fuel pools are designed to
prevent a substantial loss of coolant inventory under accident
conditions, which include credible random equipment failures and severe
natural phenomena, such as earthquakes and hurricanes. This criterion
ensures the structure of the pool is robust. In addition, each plant
has redundant sources of spent fuel pool makeup, each with at least the
capacity to maintain water level following a loss of forced cooling or
a failure of the pool's stainless steel liner. Plant emergency
procedures include directions for aligning these makeup water sources
to the spent fuel pool. In response to the events of September 2001,
the NRC issued the Safeguards Advisories for Power Reactors which
included guidance for licensees to consider alternate sources and
methods for spent fuel pool makeup. Also, as part of the February 25,
2002, Orders and Interim Compensatory Measures, the NRC directed
licensees to develop guidance and strategies to maintain or restore
spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily
available resources. It is expected that these strategies would result
in plant operators developing alternate means of using the
aforementioned systems for a broader range of plant damage conditions,
including the loss of large areas of the plant.
Question 7. What steps has the NRC taken to make spent rod pools
more secure at plants like Millstone since the events of September
2001? What additional steps/studies does the NRC plan to undertake? If
additional study of this subject is planned, what is the timeframe for
NRC completion of the work (please indicate month and year)? Is the NRC
evaluating alternatives for hardening these and other types of nuclear
waste storage facilities?
Response. Spent fuel pools are robust structures constructed of
thick concrete walls with stainless steel liners, and are designed to
withstand earthquakes and other severe events. NRC's ongoing
comprehensive safeguards and security program re-evaluation includes
the consideration of potential threats, consequences and risks of
terrorist attacks using various explosives or other techniques on spent
fuel pools and spent nuclear fuel dry storage casks. An assessment plan
is being developed to comprehensively review potential vulnerabilities
at spent fuel pools, including both internal and external threats.
Completion of the majority of these studies is scheduled for late-2003.
The results of the studies will determine whether additional security
measures beyond those already taken at these sites are necessary.
Orders were issued by the Commission on February 25, 2002, to
operating reactors, on May 23, 2002, to decommissioning reactors and to
independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) using wet
storage, and on October 16, 2002, to ISFSIs using dry storage, to
enhance the security measures for spent fuel. The specific security
measures are Safeguards Information under Section 147 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, but generally include requirements for
increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities,
additional security posts, vehicle stand-off distances, and enhanced
coordination with law enforcement authorities. In addition, as
mentioned in response to the previous question, the February 25, 2002,
Order also directed licensees to develop guidance and strategies to
maintain or restore spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing
or available resources. At pools, such as the Millstone 2 and 3 pools,
which are partially below grade, this task, as noted above, is eased
considerably by that design characteristic.
Question 8. What concrete steps has the NRC taken to ensure that
NRC staff with appropriate technical expertise evaluate inspection
reports like the 1997 inspection report on Indian Point Unit 2?
Response. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviewed its
previous process for treatment of the Steam Generator Inspection
Summary Reports as part of the Steam Generator Action Plan. The action
plan was intended to direct and monitor the NRC's effort to ensure
issues such as the evaluation of Steam Generator Inspection Reports are
appropriately tracked and dispositioned.
In April 2001, a formal process for performing a technical review
of licensees' Steam Generator Inspection Summary Reports against newly
developed formal written review guidance was implemented. NRC project
managers were instructed to send the Inspection Summary Reports
required by the plant's technical specifications to the technical staff
for review as soon as the reports were received. The technical staff is
cognizant of the timing of the industry's maintenance outages that
include steam generator inspections, so the technical staff checks that
they have received all of the Steam Generator Inspection Summary
Reports that are due to the NRC. The Inspection Summary Reports are put
into the formal work planning process at the NRC, which tracks the work
until completion. A safety evaluation is written as a result of the
review, and is provided to the licensee.
To ensure a consistent review of the summary reports by the
technical staff, the staff uses formal review guidance that provides a
discussion of the technical elements of the inspection summaries that
need to be reviewed by the staff, with a discussion of how to evaluate
the elements. In addition, the review guidance instructs reviewers
(e.g., junior reviewers) to explore and discuss findings and issues
with more senior reviewers, as needed. Issues or questions that are
raised by any of the reviewers are handled through the normal NRC
review process, i.e., discussing the issues with the licensee through
formal written requests for additional information, phone calls, and
public meetings.
Question 9. What concrete steps has the NRC taken to ensure that
NRC staff conduct an adequate review of license amendment requests such
as the 1999 request to amend the license to extend the steam generator
inspection interval? In particular, has the NRC instituted adequate
controls to demonstrate that all steps of its process for responding to
license amendment requests are completed and supported by sufficient
documentation?
Response. Shortly after the February 2000 tube failure, the Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) initiated a self-critical review of
its activities and processes used in the prior evaluation of the IP2
steam generator license amendment. In addition to a peer review by the
Office of Research, NRR also commissioned a lessons-learned review, the
objective of which was to evaluate the NRC staff's technical and
regulatory processes related to assuring SG tube integrity in order to
identify and recommend areas for improvements applicable to the NRC
and/or the industry. On August 29, 2000, the OIG issued its event
inquiry, ``NRC's Response to the February 15, 2000, Steam Generator
Tube Rupture at Indian Point Unit 2 Power Plant.'' The OIG had
initiated this inquiry because of concerns from Congress and the public
about the IP2 event. In particular, the OIG had concluded that ``the
process does not provide adequate controls to demonstrate that all
process steps are completed and supported by adequate documentation.''
The OIG made several recommendations to enhance the process. The
comments and recommendations raised by OIG were factored into the
lessons-learned charter.
Based on the results of its lessons-learned review, NRR prepared
improved guidance detailing the processes and expectations for reviews
of license amendments. NRR Office Instruction LIC-101, ``License
Amendment Review Procedures,'' provides guidance to the staff, in
particular, about (1) better planning and tracking of the work involved
in processing a license amendment, (2) improved control of documents
used in the review process and which form the basis of its conclusions,
(3) ensuring adequate definition of the regulatory and technical basis
for its review and conclusions, and (4) explicitly identifying the
basis for its conclusions. In addition, NRR provided training to its
staff on the process and management expectations.
In a memorandum dated June 4, 2002, the OIG concluded that adequate
corrective actions had been implemented to correct the deficiencies
noted in the report and that no further action was necessary.
Question 10. What steps has the NRC taken to improve communications
between offsite emergency preparedness officials and the NRC to improve
emergency preparedness response during the incidents such as the
February 15, 2000 incident at Unit 2?
Response. The NRC staff, at the suggestion of the GAO report on
Indian Point Emergency Preparedness, has assessed the Agency's policies
for non-emergency communication with State and local officials. This
activity had previously been initiated in response to findings
documented in an NRC Office of the Inspector General report. Our
assessment of NRC communication practices has concluded that existing
practices are generally adequate and the level of interaction and
communication needed between the NRC and local officials remains a
site-specific variable. At some sites, regular interaction with NRC
representatives is appropriate. However, at other sites, less frequent
interaction with NRC representatives has been adequate absent unusual
site activities. However, to further enhance the availability of NRC
staff to local officials and members of the public, the NRC has revised
inspection guidance for regional management to consider the site
specific needs for contacts with the members of the public and offsite
officials and inspection resources.
In the case of Indian Point, over the past several years the NRC
has had extensive interactions with local government and elected
officials regarding developments at that site. The NRC has briefed
local officials on important plant events and NRC actions on a
continuing basis. The NRC routinely holds meetings in the local area
which are open to public observation and provide opportunities for
comments and questions from the local public. Local officials or their
staffs attend these meetings. On a number of occasions the NRC
conducted pre-meeting briefings for local officials to facilitate
information exchange. The NRC also consistently provides early
notifications to congressional, State and local officials of any
significant site activity or significant correspondence with the
licensee. As a matter of management philosophy, the NRC encourages an
``open door'' policy with regard to access by the public, State and
local officials to the NRC staff.
Question 11. Do the NRC and/or FEMA plan to take any interim
measures to address the significant concerns identified in the draft
Witt report?
Response. Yes. The matters addressed in the draft report in large
measure relate to offsite planning and preparedness, which falls
primarily under FEMA's authority. While the NRC reserves the right to
any judgment as to the overall state of emergency planning and
preparedness, in keeping with the longstanding understanding between
FEMA and the NRC, we look initially to FEMA for its views on the draft
report relating to offsite preparedness. On February 21, 2003, FEMA
issued its report on the September 2002 emergency preparedness exercise
at Indian Point. We are continuing our review of this FEMA report which
addresses a variety of planning issues including FEMA's conclusions
regarding concerns raised by Witt and Associates.
One important issue identified by the Witt report relates to plant
security and the effect of potential terrorism. Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC has taken a number of steps to
enhance the already high level of security at the nation's nuclear
power plants. These steps have resulted in, among other things, more
guards being trained and placed on duty at the plants, providing an
even higher level of security at what were already the best protected
commercial facilities prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks. The
NRC's actions have included issuing Orders in February 2002 formalizing
certain security enhancements as requirements, issuing more than 40
advisories to licensees to describe threat conditions or recommend
protective measures, issuing an NRC Threat Advisory and Protective
Measures System, consistent with the Homeland Security Advisory System,
to rapidly respond to national changes in the threat environment, and
other actions. Additionally, NRC's February 2002 security Orders
specifically required licensees to enhance their emergency response
plans as appropriate in light of the current threat environment.
Licensees were required to ensure that emergency response plans were
compatible with enhanced security measures. During 2003, the NRC
resumed force-on-force exercises in a pilot program. In addition, the
NRC has embarked on a number of studies to assess and address the
vulnerability of nuclear plants from the new threats confronting the
United States.
Emergency preparedness programs are designed to cope with a
spectrum of accidents including those involving rapid, large releases
of radioactivity. Emergency response plans are tested during frequent
(e.g., quarterly or more often) small-scale drills and periodic full-
scale emergency exercises that simulate serious reactor accidents,
which have invariably included postulating large releases of
radioactivity that occur shortly after the initiation of events The
plans and their implementation are periodically reviewed to confirm
that they are being adequately maintained and address changing
circumstances appropriate to any given site.
Question 12. Please describe the types of actions available to the
NRC and/or FEMA to assess the adequacy of an approved emergency
response plan if there is an allegation that the plan is insufficient
to protect the public health and safety of citizens living within the
emergency plan zones for the nuclear power facilities included in the
submission by providing reasonable assurance that State and local
governments can and intend to effect appropriate protective measure
offsite in the event of a radiological emergency. Please describe the
range of actions available to the NRC and/or FEMA if they find that an
emergency response plan is no longer adequate. Has the NRC and/or FEMA
made such a finding in the past? If so, please describe the specific
NRC and/or FEMA response in each instance. Has the NRC and/or FEMA
action included suspension of the plant's license or temporary shutdown
of the plant?
Response. When offsite emergency preparedness (EP) issues are
raised to the NRC, either by allegation, 2.206 petitions, general
correspondence or other communications, the NRC will request the
assistance of FEMA. Offsite EP issues raised in inquiries to the NRC
regions will be referred to NRC Headquarters (HQ) for resolution. If at
any time during the review FEMA determines that the issues involved
could potentially affect its reasonable assurance finding for the site
in question, FEMA will immediately bring this preliminary assessment to
the attention of the NRC. At that time, FEMA and NRC will determine
what additional steps need to be taken to resolve the issue.
If FEMA determines under 44 CFR 350.13 of its regulations that
offsite emergency plans or preparedness are not adequate to provide
reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken
in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and
safety of the public, FEMA shall, as described in its rule, advise the
Governor of the affected State, and the NRC of that initial
determination.
If after 4 months from the date of the initial notification the
deficiency is not corrected, or an acceptable plan for correcting the
deficiency has not been submitted, then FEMA shall withdraw approval of
the plans and immediately inform the NRC and the Governor of the
affected State and shall publish in the Federal Register and local
newspaper notice of its withdrawal of approval. Upon receiving
notification of such action from FEMA, the NRC will promptly review
FEMA's findings and determinations and formally document the NRC's
position. When, as described, in 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and 50.54(s)(3)
of its regulations, the NRC finds the state of emergency preparedness
does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures
can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency and if
after 4 months the deficiencies are not corrected, the Commission will
determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such
deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is
appropriate. In determining whether a shutdown or other enforcement
action is appropriate (including taking such actions before the 4-month
period has expired), the Commission shall take into account, among
other factors, whether the licensee can demonstrate to the Commission's
satisfaction that the deficiencies in the plan are not significant for
the plant in question, or that adequate interim compensating actions
have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling
reasons for continued operation.
10 CFR 50.54 (3) states that ``Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed as limiting the authority of the Commission to take action
under any other regulation or authority of the Commission or at any
time other than that specified in this paragraph.'' Accordingly, the
NRC's February 2002 security Orders specifically required licensees to
enhance their emergency response plans as appropriate in light of the
current threat environment. The NRC has embarked on a number of studies
to assess the vulnerability of nuclear plants to terrorist attacks.
Should any of the vulnerability studies indicate a need we would not
hesitate to issue additional Orders as necessary.
The NRC has not suspended a plant's license or ordered a temporary
shutdown of the plant based on emergency preparedness issues. However,
after Hurricane Andrew, for example, the Turkey Point Nuclear power
plant delayed restart due to offsite emergency preparedness concerns.
The following are examples of NRC actions relative to offsite planning
deficiencies:
As a result of the first full-scale exercise in 1982 for Indian
Point 3, FEMA identified five deficiencies in the exercise report and
the NRC issued a 120-day letter on August 3, 1982. The March 1983
exercise showed progress but two deficiencies remained. On May 5, 1983,
the Commission voted 5 to 0 to close the plant by June 9, 1983 unless
FEMA indicated sufficient progress to resolve the remaining two
deficiencies. A State compensating plan was developed for counties
unable or refusing to participate. On June 8, 1983, FEMA reported
progress was made and on June 9 the Commission voted 3 to 2 to allow
continued operation. Following the November 1984 full-scale exercise,
FEMA reported that the Deficiencies had been fully corrected and there
was reasonable assurance. In the June 1986 exercise 6 deficiencies were
identified. These deficiencies were remediated through exercises by
November 1986.
For Shoreham, utility compensating plans were developed and
implemented at the licensing stage when Suffolk County and New York
State (NYS) both refused to participate in the planning process. The
utility provided and trained employees in all functions of plan
implementation and passed a full-scale demonstration of the utility
plan prior to a full-power license being issued. Shortly after this the
plant was sold to NYS and then decommissioned.
For the Seabrook case, prior to licensing, Massachusetts and its
towns as well as several New Hampshire towns refused to participate in
the emergency preparedness activities for Seabrook including not
permitting the erection of siren poles in Massachusetts. As in the
Shoreham case compensating plans were developed and staffed by the
utility for Massachusetts under the `realism rule' in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(1). The State of New Hampshire developed compensating plans
for the towns that refused to participate. The qualifying exercise
prior to the full-power license was successfully conducted for both
States. After Seabrook became operational and a change in Massachusetts
leadership occurred, Massachusetts rejoined the planning process for
Seabrook. The New Hampshire towns also began participating with the
State in the planning effort.
Question 13. I understand that the State of New York and several of
the counties surrounding the Indian Point Plant have declined to
provide annual certification of continued adequacy of the emergency
preparedness for fiscal year 2003. Is this accurate? Please describe
the annual State and local government certification requirement. What
is the effect of the failure of a State and/or local government to
provide the annual certification?
Response. Yes, it is true that the State of New York and the
counties surrounding the Indian Point nuclear plant did not submit
their annual letters of certification (ALCs). However, the State of New
York did submit their ALCs for the upstate risk counties: Oswego (for
the Nine Mile Point and Fitzpatrick plants); and Monroe and Wayne
(Ginna plant). It is important to remember that the ALC is not a
certification of the adequacy of emergency plans and preparedness, but
rather, a list of emergency preparedness activities that the State and
local jurisdictions need to perform or address during the year.
The ALC is a method that State and local governments with
radiological emergency planning and preparedness responsibilities use
to inform FEMA that the requisite preparedness activities have been
completed for the previous calendar year. These activities include:
distribution of public education and information materials to the
residents; testing of radiological instruments; exercises; practice
drills of various types, such as for emergency communications;
training; updating of plans and Letters of Agreement; and completion of
alert and notification tests.
The requisite information concerning local preparedness activities
is provided by those local governments to the State. The State then
submits the information to FEMA along with the information on
completion of the State's own annual preparedness activities. The
initiation of the ALC can be found in FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1,
Section C. If a State fails to submit this information for a specific
site, FEMA regional staff may make staff assistance visits to the
various jurisdictions for the purpose of verifying local efforts to
update and maintain plans, training and readiness. For Indian Point,
this would have to be done with the assistance of the State of New
York, which provides the multi-jurisdiction oversight that ensures a
consistent planning foundation. This is true throughout the Nation with
all planning for nuclear sites as well as planning for any major event.
FEMA has given the State and counties involved with emergency
preparedness for the Indian Point site until May 2, 2003, to submit the
necessary plans and documents including critical evacuation planning
elements. FEMA expects this submittal to also contain documents
normally submitted as part of the ALC, such as Letters of Agreement and
updated school plans.
Question 14. What concrete steps does the NRC plan in response to
the findings of the fiscal year 2002 Evaluation of the NRC's
Information Security Program that (1) the NRC security program is not
well integrated and not consistently implemented across the Agency; and
(2) NRC officials have not clearly defined the responsibility and
accountability for all aspects of the information security program
within its organizational structure?
Response. In response to the independent evaluation of the NRC
Information Security Program, the NRC developed a plan of action and
milestones (POA&M) that has been formally submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). NRC is also required to file a quarterly
report, providing updated status information for all of the actions
listed in the POA&M. The POA&M includes specific action items to
address the finding noted in the evaluation. The NRC security program
is currently governed by a number of policy directives (management
directives) that provide guidance for the security disciplines of
physical security, personnel security, telecommunications security,
classified information security, sensitive unclassified information
security, and automated information systems security. In response to
the September 11th terrorist event, the NRC made a number of
organizational adjustments and re-aligned a number of the security
functions. The management directives that clarified the details of the
NRC security program are all being updated, with a completion date of
December 2003. The management directive that defined the
responsibilities and accountability for the NRC information systems
security program will be the first policy directive that will be
updated, and it is scheduled to be finalized by July 1, 2003. In
updating all of the security policy directives, the NRC will ensure
that all elements of the NRC security program are well integrated and
consistently implemented across the Agency.
Question 15. How does the NRC plan to respond to recent Office of
Inspector General findings (detailed in the written statement for this
hearing) that (1) NRC program guidance does not adequately protect
``Official Use Only'' documents from inadvertent public disclosure; (2)
training on handling, marking, and protecting sensitive unclassified
information is not provided to all NRC employees and contractors on a
regular basis; and (3) NRC employees are not consistently implementing
the requirement to report incidents of inadequate release of sensitive
unclassified information to the Office of the Executive Director for
Operations?
Response. On December 19, 2002, the NRC staff responded to the
OIG's October 16, 2002, report, ``Review of NRC's Handling and Marking
of Sensitive Unclassified Information''; the staff response is
enclosed. The staff's memorandum to the OIG agreed with the OIG
findings and included a response for each specific recommendation. With
respect to the protection of Official Use Only (OUO) documents, the
staff will issue more prescriptive guidance in a revision to Management
Directive 12.6. Training regarding the handling of OUO information and
reporting of incidents regarding its handling is included in a more
comprehensive program on the handling of all types of sensitive
information.
______
Staff Response to OIG's October 16, 2002, Report, ``Review of NRC's
Handling and Marking of Sensitive Unclassified Information''
December 19, 2002
Memorandum to: Stephen D. Dingbaum, Assistant Inspector General for
Audits
From: William D. Travers /RA/, Executive Director for Operations
Subject: NRC's Handling and Marking of Sensitive Unclassified
Information (OIG-03-A-01)
This memorandum provides the staff's response to the findings and
recommendations discussed in OIG-03-A-01, Review of NRC's Handling and
Marking of Sensitive Unclassified Information, dated October 16, 2002.
Recommendation 1. Update the guidance for OUO documents to require
clear identification of sensitive unclassified information to prevent
its inadvertent disclosure.
Response. Agree. More prescriptive guidance for OUO will reduce the
likelihood of inadvertent releases of sensitive unclassified
information. The staff will conduct a total review of MD 12.6, NRC
Sensitive Unclassified Information Security Program, and make
appropriate changes concerning the marking and use of OUO cover sheets.
We expect this action to be completed not later than July 31, 2003.
Recommendation 2. Mandate consistent use of defined markings on
documents containing Official Use Only information and clarify the
markings that should be used on sensitive unclassified information.
Response. Agree. Consistent use of OUO markings would enhance the
identifiability of sensitive documents and contribute to the reduction
of inadvertent disclosures. Additional guidance for OUO marking, where
appropriate, will be prescriptive and will be part of the revision of
MD 12.6 expected by July 31, 2003.
Recommendation 3. Conduct annual mandatory training for all NRC
employees and contractors on the procedures for marking and handling
sensitive unclassified information.
Response. Agree. Training would heighten employee awareness and
knowledge as well as improve employee handling of sensitive
unclassified information. However, it may be ineffective to develop a
specialized training program dedicated solely to sensitive unclassified
information. An agency-wide comprehensive security education program
for handling both classified and sensitive unclassified information
would place increased emphasis on sensitive unclassified information.
Therefore, the staff is exploring the creation of computer-based
training to include handling and marking of both classified and
sensitive unclassified information.
Recommendation 4. Train NRC employees and contractors on the
requirement to report incidents of inadvertent releases of sensitive
unclassified information to the OEDO in accordance with MD 3.4.
Response. Agree. The staff will emphasize the requirement to report
inadvertent releases of sensitive unclassified information to OEDO in
any future security presentations for employees and contractors.
Question 16. In the Performance and Accountability Report for 2002,
the NRC indicates that it has been conducting a comprehensive review of
its programs and security of the nuclear facilities and activities it
regulates, and has made significant changes to its regulatory programs
and has enhanced the already robust security of sensitive facilities
and activities, including a new homeland security threat advisory
system. Please describe the additional concrete steps the NRC has taken
to improve security at all nuclear power plants and at the Indian Point
and Millstone Nuclear Power Plants, in particular.
Response. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the NRC issued a series of safeguards and threat advisories
to the major licensed facilities, including Indian Point and Millstone,
placing them on the highest security level. Many of the strengthened
security measures became requirements as a result of NRC Orders issued
to all licensed operating nuclear power plants on February 25, 2002,
and to other sensitive nuclear facilities in the following months. The
specific details of the new requirements are Safeguards Information,
under Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and cannot be
disclosed in a public document; however, generally the new requirements
include increased security patrols, augmented security forces,
additional security posts, increased vehicle standoff distances,
tightened facility access controls, and enhanced coordination with the
law enforcement and intelligence communities. The NRC worked with the
FBI, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and our licensees to review access
lists of employees working at nuclear power plants to identify any
individual whose name matched the FBI Watch List. We determined that
there were no positive matches. Subsequently, on January 7, 2003, the
NRC issued immediately effective Orders to all 103 operating commercial
nuclear power plants requiring that licensees enhance their programs
that control access to the facility. Some of the requirements formalize
a series of security measures that NRC licensees had taken in response
to advisories issued by the NRC in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks. Additional security enhancements, developed
during our ongoing security review, are also provided in the Orders.
The specific security measures addressed by the Orders, which
supplement existing regulatory requirements, are classified as
Safeguards Information under Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
amended, and 10 CFR 73.21. The measures generally include restricting
temporary unescorted access to a facility and with the February 25,
2002 Orders, the January 7 Orders will remain in effect until the
Commission determines otherwise.
The Commission has completed an initial assessment of power reactor
facility vulnerabilities to intentional malevolent use of commercial
aircraft in suicidal attacks and has initiated a broad-ranging research
program to understand the vulnerabilities of various classes of
facilities to a wide spectrum of attacks. Although our work in this
area is ongoing, the Commission has directed nuclear power plant
licensees to develop specific plans and strategies to respond to an
event that could result in damage to large areas of their plants from
impacts, explosions or fire. In addition, licensees must provide
assurance that their emergency planning resources are sufficient to
respond to such an event.
The Commission worked closely with other Federal agencies to revise
the design basis threats that provide the foundation for the security
programs of nuclear power plant and Category I fuel cycle facility
licensees; Orders revising the DBT were issued on April 29, 2003; the
enclosed press releases provide details on this action. The
Commission's Orders to these licensees in February and August 2002
effectively enhanced security in the interim while this work was
underway. Full security performance reviews, including force-on-force
exercises, have resumed at these facilities and will be conducted on a
3-year cycle instead of the 8-year cycle that had been used for nuclear
power reactors prior to September 11, 2001. These reviews initially
commenced last summer with seven table top exercises that for the first
time involved a wide array of Federal, State and local law enforcement
and emergency planning officials.
The NRC has developed a new Threat Advisory and Protective Measures
System in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 and as
revised by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. When a new
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat condition is declared,
the NRC promptly notifies affected licensees of the condition and
advises them to the appropriate predefined protective measures that
have been developed for each threat level. The new system for NRC
licensees has been formally communicated to licensees, Governors, State
Homeland Security Advisors, Federal agency administrators and other
appropriate officials. The new system replaces the NRC's 1998 threat
advisory system and covers additional classes of licensees not included
in the 1998 system.
As for site-specific actions, each licensee was required to respond
to the NRC Orders they received by describing the actions the licensee
planned to take to implement the required actions in accordance with
the terms of the Orders. All licensees, including licensees for Indian
Point and Millstone, responded and implemented the required actions in
accordance with the terms of the Orders. The implementation of the
Orders and associated interim compensatory measures have been reviewed
by resident inspectors and region-based security inspectors.
______
NRC NEWS
NRC APPROVES CHANGES TO THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND ISSUES ORDER FOR
CATEGORY 1 FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after extensive deliberation and
interaction with stakeholders, has approved changes to the design basis
threat (DBT) for two category 1 fuel cycle facilities in Virginia and
Tennessee that possess enriched uranium used in nuclear reactors. The
changes will be issued by an Order amending the design basis threat for
theft or diversion of strategic quantities of special nuclear material.
The Order, which is being issued today, will be effective
immediately but allows a transition period for full implementation.
With this action completed, the Commission expects that there will be a
period of regulatory stability during which the two licensees can
consolidate this and previously ordered security enhancements.
The details of the design basis threat for theft or diversion are
confidential national security information and will not be released to
the public. Today's Order builds on the changes made by the
Commission's August 21, 2002 Order which made interim security
enhancements at these two facilities. The DBT was arrived at after
discussions with cleared stakeholders from other Federal agencies, the
two State governments and the two licensees.
Under NRC regulations, category 1 fuel cycle facility licensees
must ensure that the physical protection plan for each site is designed
and implemented to provide high assurance in defending against the DBT
to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and common
defense and security. Changes in those plans will now be made and
submitted to NRC for approval.
``With the completion of this Order,'' Chairman Nils J. Diaz said,
``the public should be reassured that the nation's category 1 fuel
facilities are well-secured against potential threats. The NRC intends
to continue working closely with the Department of Homeland Security
and other Federal agencies, as well as with State and local law
enforcement and emergency planning officials to ensure an overall
integrated approach to the security of these critical facilities.
______
NRC NEWS
NRC APPROVES CHANGES TO THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND ISSUES ORDERS FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO FURTHER ENHANCE SECURITY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after extensive deliberation and
interaction with stakeholders, has approved changes to the design basis
threat (DBT). The Commission believes that the DBT represents the
largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard force
should be expected to defend under existing law. These changes will be
issued by Order.
In addition, the Commission has approved the issuance of two other
Orders to nuclear plants regarding work hours, training, and
qualification requirements for security personnel to further enhance
protection of public health and safety, as well as the common defense
and security. The three Orders will be issued to all 103 operating
commercial nuclear power plants.
The three Orders, which are being issued today, will be effective
immediately, but allow transition periods for full implementation. With
these actions, the Commission expects that there will be a period of
regulatory stability during which operating commercial plant licensees
will be able to consolidate these and previously ordered security
enhancements.
These Orders, in combination with the recently issued Order in the
area of access authorization, enhance the already strong defense
capability at these sites using three interdependent elements directed
to best protect the public, with the appropriate resources placed at
the right places. These elements are:
<bullet> the revised Design Basis Threat and associated defensive
capabilities derived from previous measures that the Commission
directed;
<bullet> tighter work hour control and more robust training
requirements for security personnel, to increase their capability to
respond to threats; and
<bullet> enhanced access authorization controls to ensure all plant
personnel with access to critical areas have had the most rigorous
background checks permitted by law.
The Order that imposes revisions to the Design Basis Threat
requires power plants to implement additional protective actions to
protect against sabotage by terrorists and other adversaries. The
details of the design basis threat are safeguards information pursuant
to Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act and will not be released to the
public. This Order builds on the changes made by the Commission's
February 25, 2002 Order. The Commission believes that this DBT
represents the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated
private security force should be expected to defend under existing law.
It was arrived at after extensive deliberation and interaction with
cleared stakeholders from other Federal agencies, State governments and
industry.
Under NRC regulations, power reactor licensees must ensure that the
physical protection plan for each site is designed and implemented to
provide high assurance in defending against the DBT to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.
Extensive changes in those physical protection plans will now be made
and submitted to NRC for approval.
The second Order describes additional measures related to security
force personnel fitness for duty and security force work hours. It is
to ensure that excessive work hours do not challenge the ability of
nuclear power plant security forces to remain vigilant and effectively
perform their duties in protecting the plants. However, the Order does
include provisions to allow increases in work hours under certain
conditions, once specific requirements are met. The NRC developed this
unclassified Order through a public process. The NRC carefully
considered comments from power reactor licensees, security force
personnel, public citizen groups and other agencies in reaching its
final decision. The Order will be publicly available on NRC's website
at: http://www.nrc.gov.
The third Order describes additional requirements related to the
development and application of an enhanced training and qualification
program for armed security personnel at power reactor facilities. These
additional measures include security drills and exercises appropriate
for the protective strategies and capabilities required to protect the
nuclear power plants against sabotage by an assaulting force. This
Order requires more frequent firearms training and qualification under
a broader range of conditions consistent with site-specific protective
strategies. The details of the enhanced training requirements are
safeguards information, and will not be released to the public. As with
the DBT Order, the Commission solicited comments on a draft training
Order from cleared stakeholders, including security personnel and took
those comments under consideration in reaching its final decision.
``With the completion of these complementary Orders,'' Chairman
Nils J. Diaz said, ``the public should be reassured that the nation's
nuclear power plants are well-secured against potential threats. The
NRC intends to continue working closely with the Department of Homeland
Security and other Federal agencies, as well as with State and local
law enforcement and emergency planning officials to ensure an overall
integrated approach to the security of these critical facilities.''
______
Question 17. In the Performance and Accountability Report for 2002,
the NRC indicates that it is studying the potential vulnerability of
nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities, and nuclear fuel and
materials storage and transportation containers, including deliberate
aircraft crashes on power reactor facilities and storage and
transportation casks. When does the NRC anticipate this study to be
completed (please indicate month and year)?
Response. In January 2002, the NRC completed an initial assessment
of the scope of vulnerabilities to aircraft attack. It provided
insights that were factored into the interim compensatory measures
developed (in February 2002) for nuclear power plants, and influenced
NRC's interactions with other Federal agencies. More detailed analyses
for nuclear power plants are expected to be completed by September 2003
with a final report due in December of this year. More detailed
analyses for storage and transportation casks are expected to be
completed by December 2003. The vulnerability assessments for cyber
terrorism are anticipated in August 2003 and results from the
irradiator vulnerability studies are scheduled for June 2003.
Question 18. As part of these reviews, is the NRC considering
whether it requires/would benefit from changes to its existing legal
authority? In the Performance and Accountability Report for 2002, the
NRC indicates that it has been conducting a comprehensive review of its
programs and security of the nuclear facilities and activities it
regulates, and has made significant changes to its regulatory programs
and has enhanced the already robust security of sensitive facilities
and activities, including a new homeland security threat advisory
system.
Response. Yes. The NRC for more than a decade has submitted
proposed legislation to the Congress that would enhance security at
NRC-regulated facilities. Last year, the Commission identified
additional measures, particularly relating to access authorization, and
communicated those to the Congress. Unfortunately, Congress has not
enacted these proposals. The Commission has been consulting with
Congress on appropriate security legislation.
Question 19. Has the NRC consulted with interested stakeholders
(Federal, State, and local government; interest groups; and the public)
in conducting these reviews? In the Performance and Accountability
Report for 2002, the NRC indicates that it has been conducting a
comprehensive review of its programs and security of the nuclear
facilities and activities it regulates, and has made significant
changes to its regulatory programs and has enhanced the already robust
security of sensitive facilities and activities, including a new
homeland security threat advisory system.
Response. The NRC has coordinated its review of this issue with
appropriate Federal agencies and licensees and industry representatives
authorized to receive Safeguards Information. We have involved the
States in our review of the design basis threats, in our preparation of
Regulatory Issue Summaries to put in place a five-tier threat advisory
system, consistent with HSPD-3, and in our review of potential
additional measures for materials licensees. We have shared all Orders
and Homeland Security Advisory System documents with the affected
States.
When possible, such as in developing our Fatigue Order, we have
followed an open process, with drafts being shared on our web page and
open meetings to discuss the drafts.
However, direct public involvement on sensitive or classified
papers is not possible. We do, however, take into account input
received from interested stakeholder groups to the extent possible.
Question 20. The NRC completed a new round of tabletop exercises
using the expanded threat scenarios for power reactor facilities and
selected fuel cycle facilities in November 2002. Does the NRC plan to
[write] a report on these exercises? If so, when will the report be
released (please indicate month and year)? Does the NRC plan to make
the report available to the public?
Response. The staff submitted SECY-02-0223, ``Expanded Table-Top
Drill Lessons Learned and Proposed Force-on-Force Testing Pilot
Program'' on December 16, 2002, and the Commission approved this
planned approach on January 23, 2003. Because the staff paper and
Commission decision contain Safeguards Information under Section 147 of
the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and other sensitive information,
there are no plans to release these documents to the public.
Question 21. In fiscal year 2003, the NRC plans to complete its
review and revision of the design basis threat that provides the
foundation for the security programs of nuclear power plant and
Category I fuel cycle facility licensees. Please indicate the month in
which this review will be completed. What criteria has the NRC
established for this review? Will it account for security threats due
to terrorist activities?
Response. On April 29, 2003, the Commission issued Orders revising
the DBT both for nuclear power plants and for Category I fuel cycle
facilities. The DBTs are based on criminal and terrorist activities and
capabilities worldwide that pose a threat to licensed nuclear
facilities and activities. This review of the DBT included significant
input from the intelligence community, the Department of Defense,
Energy and Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
other Federal agencies and State officials. We rely upon the
intelligence community and other Federal agencies to provide
information on the targets, tactics, training and capabilities of
terrorists and other adversaries who may pose a threat to nuclear
facilities and activities. They also describe the domestic and
international threat environment. NRC then determines the subset of the
domestic threat against which NRC operating power reactor licensees and
Category I fuel cycle licensees should have primary responsibility to
defend. In making this determination, NRC assesses the limits on the
adversary characteristics against which private sector guard force can
reasonably be expected to defend.
Question 22. In the Performance and Accountability Report for 2002,
the NRC described plans to conduct full security performance reviews,
including force-on-force exercises at each nuclear power plant on a 3-
year cycle instead of the 8-year cycle that has been used prior to
September 11. Does the NRC plan to begin the first force-on-force
exercises in fiscal year 2003? How many such reviews will be conducted
in fiscal year 2003? How does the NRC plan to prioritize the review of
plants? Please confirm my understanding that Chairman Meserve committed
to a force-on-force exercise at the Indian Point plant during this
calendar year.
Response. In February 2003, the NRC resumed force-on-force
exercises using expanded adversary characteristics in a pilot program.
We will conduct the pilot program force-on-force exercises at a rate of
about two exercises per month, until the revised DBT is effective, at
which time the NRC will transition to the revised force-on-force
performance evaluation program. There will be a force-on-force exercise
at Indian Point during CY2003. The method for prioritization of plants
selected for force-on-force performance assessments will be determined
as part of the pilot program.
Question 23. Does the NRC plan to review the adequacy of the
existing 10-mile emergency planning zone around nuclear power plants?
How does NRC protect public health and safety of citizens living 20-,
50-, 100-miles downwind of nuclear power plants?
Response. Since September 11, 2001, NRC has been studying the
potential vulnerability of nuclear power plants. Nothing in our studies
thus far would indicate a problem with the adequacy of the existing 10-
mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around
nuclear power plants, or the existing 50-mile ingestion exposure
pathway EPZ.
An NRC/EPA task force provided the planning basis for offsite
emergency preparedness efforts considered necessary and prudent for
large power reactors in 1978 in NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016,
``Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government
Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear
Power Plants'' (``Planning Basis for Radiological Emergency
Preparedness (REP) Plans''). This planning basis was later incorporated
into NRC and FEMA regulations.
Since 1978, NRC's understanding of possible source terms resulting
from severe accidents has improved considerably. NUREG-1465 outlines
that improved understanding. NUREG-1465 would indicate that the 1978
NRC/EPA task force report was even more conservative in the spectrum of
accident scenarios encompassed by the 10- and 50-mile EPZs than
originally envisioned.
At present, commercial nuclear power plants in the United States
have two concentric emergency planning zones (EPZs). EPZs are defined
as the areas for which planning is needed to assure that prompt and
effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an
accident. The choice of the size of the EPZs represents a judgment on
the extent of detailed planning which must be performed to assure an
adequate response. In a particular emergency, protective actions might
well be restricted to a small part of the planning zones. On the other
hand, for the worst conceivable accidents, protective actions might
need to be taken outside the planning zones. The current EPZ distances
are considered large enough to provide a response base that would
support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed.
The first zone, called the plume exposure pathway EPZ, is an area
of about 10 miles in radius from the center of the plant. The major
protective actions planned for this EPZ, evacuation and sheltering,
supplemented by the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), where
States have chosen to add that measure, would be employed to reduce
fatalities and injuries from exposure to the radioactive plume from the
most severe of the core-melt accidents, and to limit unnecessary
radiation exposures to the public from less severe accidents. The
second zone, called the ingestion pathway EPZ, is an area of about 50
miles in radius from the center of the plant. The major protective
actions planned for this zone, putting livestock on stored feed and
controlling food and water, would be employed to reduce exposure to the
public from ingestion of contaminated food and water. The ingestion
exposure pathway EPZ of 50 miles was selected because Federal
protective action guidelines would generally not be exceeded beyond 50
miles for a wide spectrum of hypothetical accidents. It is not likely
that protective actions would need to be taken for the entire 10- or
50-mile emergency planning zones, respectively, even for a significant
release. However, these response measures can and will be expanded if
the conditions of a particular accident so warrant.
Question 24. I understand that on December 18, 2002, in five
separate licensing proceedings for power plants, the NRC issued orders
rejecting NEPA claims related to security risks because security risks
are incalculable due to the undetermined probability of an attack.
Please explain these NRC rulings in detail. How does/will the NRC
address these security vulnerabilities in its licensing procedures for
specific plants? Does the NRC's commitment to ``probabilistic risk-
informed management prevent the Agency from addressing security
vulnerabilities?
Response. In Private Fuel Storage (a dry cask independent spent
fuel storage installation), Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (a mixed oxide
fuel fabrication facility), Millstone (expansion of the spent fuel
storage pool capacity at a commercial reactor site), and McGuire/
Catawba (license renewal for four commercial reactors), the Commission
considered whether the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
requires the NRC, in rendering licensing decisions, to consider the
impacts of terrorism.
At the outset of its decision, the Commission stressed that it had
already strengthened its security requirements for licensees in
multiple areas, acting under its AEA-rooted duty to protect ``public
health and safety'' and the ``common defense and security.'' The
Commission also explained that further changes to address terrorist
threats though the security and safeguards requirements for NRC-
regulated facilities could result from an ongoing examination of
security regulations and programs.
On the legal question concerning NEPA, the Commission held that
NEPA does not require a terrorism review, and that an environmental
impact statement is not the appropriate format in which to address the
challenges of terrorism. The Commission's December 18 adjudicatory
decision rested, essentially, on four grounds. First, the link between
an agency licensing decision and terrorism is too speculative and
remote from the licensing decision. Second, the risk of a terrorist
attack at a nuclear facility cannot be adequately determined. The NRC's
policy with respect to use of risk information is that this technology
should be used to the maximum extent possible in all agency regulatory
decisionmaking, to the extent practical, given the state of technology
of risk methods and data [Ref: the Commission's PRA Policy Statement of
1995]. In the case of assessing risk from terrorist acts, a major
limitation in the state of technology is the inability to estimate the
frequency of the initiating act. Since September 11, the NRC staff has
been investigating means by which risk information can be used in
security-related regulatory decisionmaking, even in recognition of this
important limitation. Third, NEPA does not require a ``worst case
analysis,'' which ``creates a distorted picture of a project's impacts
and wastes agency resources.'' Lastly, NEPA's public process is not an
appropriate forum for considering sensitive security issues. Moreover,
given the Commission's existing efforts under the Atomic Energy Act, it
was not obvious what additional information or insights a formal NEPA
review of such issues would yield.
Question 25. The citizens of Connecticut and across the United
States are increasingly concerned about the safety and security of
nuclear power plants near their homes, particularly during our
heightened state of terrorism alert. What steps has the NRC taken to
provide regular updates to the public about its ongoing work to address
security concerns? What steps has the NRC taken to provide regular
information to residents of areas surrounding individual plants about
specific measures at those plants?
Response. In the past, the NRC has striven to ensure public
confidence by being one of the most open agencies in the U.S.
Government. We recognize the reality that suspicions are nurtured if
our activities are not fully accessible to the concerned public.
However, we also recognize the counterbalancing consideration that open
discussions of security issues could be exploited by terrorists.
Therefore, the level of our communication with the general public on
details of security issues has significantly decreased. We believe that
extensive interaction with appropriately cleared stakeholders and
local, State and Federal agency representatives, including the
Department of Homeland Security and the individual State Homeland
Security Advisors, is necessary to understand fully the potential
ramifications of security-related decisions, to ensure reasonable and
consistent application of security measures across national critical
infrastructure, and to increase public confidence in the NRC's actions
and the industry's preparedness to deal with terrorist attacks.
In this light, the Agency has been meeting often with members of
the industry, representatives of Federal agencies, including the
Intelligence Community, and State and local law enforcement
authorities, and the public when the information is not sensitive, and
the public when the information is not sensitive, to resolve the issues
and to ensure a range of perspectives are brought to bear in NRC
decisionmaking. Although the sensitive nature of the information
discussed prevents the NRC from opening all these meetings to the
public, it is expected that the active involvement of Federal, State
and local government agencies in these discussions will appropriately
represent the public citizens' interests.
The NRC also makes available an extensive public website that
contains a wealth of information on our activities including
nonsensitive security information. The Office of Public Affairs
responds to media requests for information and writes press releases to
announce significant activities. These resources and activities are
designed to inform the public regularly of pertinent information on
each plant in as much detail as allowed by requirements for protection
of Safeguards Information.
Question 26. I understand that NRC Atomic Safety Licensing Boards
are currently adjudicating the ``Private Fuel Storage proposal, which
would involve transporting 44,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste from
reactors across the country to Utah. In the future, the NRC is also
expected to consider a DOE license application for shipping 77,000 tons
of waste to Yucca Mountain. Leaked results of an explosive test on a
German CASTOR nuclear waste cask demonstrated its vulnerability to
attack. Apparently, no explosive tests on currently licensed US
transport casks have been performed. I also understand that the NRC has
contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to perform limited
physical tests on nuclear waste transportation casks (the Package
Performance Study), but this study will not include explosive tests.
Does the NRC plan to include explosive tests in the Package Performance
Study test protocol, given the current security context?
Response. The NRC has a comprehensive program examining security
issues under the current threat environment. The Package Performance
Study focuses on the safety of casks in severe transportation
accidents, not deliberate criminal acts, so explosive threats are not
part of the Package Performance Study.
Question 27. What is the NRC currently doing to evaluate and
address security vulnerabilities of nuclear waste shipments?
Response. NRC's existing regulations currently contain significant
safety and security requirements for the transport of radioactive
material. After the September 11, 2001 event, we also issued advisories
to increase security in transportation of specific types of radioactive
material, including spent fuel shipments and shipments referred to as
Highway Route Controlled Quantities of radioactive material. On October
3, 2002, the Commission issued Orders to licensees transporting spent
nuclear fuel and will be considering expedited rulemaking in this area
as well. In consultation with the Departments of Transportation and
Homeland Security, we are also reviewing transportation requirements as
part of our comprehensive review of the safeguards and security
programs. In addition, NRC is conducting vulnerability analyses to
assess the risk and consequences of attacks on nuclear waste shipments.
The results of these analyses will be used to decide on the need for
any revisions to NRC requirements or regulatory oversight of nuclear
waste shipments.
Question 28. What concrete steps is the NRC taking to improve the
safety culture within the Agency and clearly demonstrate to its staff
and the public a commitment (to) effective regulation and protecting
health and safety?
Response. The results of the Office of the Inspector General's 2002
Safety Climate and Culture Survey concluded that the NRC has made
substantial progress in improving its safety culture and climate since
the last survey was conducted in 1998. The OIG found that NRC has
improved significantly across nearly every topical area, and in many
categories the Agency's scores exceeded established national
benchmarks. However, there were some areas where more information is
needed to determine underlying causes of employee attitudes that are
reflected in the areas for improvement and to develop strategies to
systematically address the underlying causes. In particular, we need to
further examine the reasons why only slightly more than half of NRC
employees feel that it is ``safe to speak up in the NRC and how we can
address that issue. We established a task group representing the major
program offices to review the survey results, identify the key areas
for improvement, identify potential options for improvement, and
develop a schedule for implementing these actions. The task force
report is due to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). As
discussed in the report, there are a number of strengths which should
be maintained as well as areas for improvement. The Task Group will
work with the contractor that conducted the survey to gain a better
understanding of the survey results including the factors that
influenced the results. This will allow us to identify and implement
improvements in an efficient manner, while continuing to build on those
improvements already underway.
Question 29. What enforcement action will NRC take in response to
the Davis-Besse incident?
Response. The NRC staff has not yet arrived at final enforcement
decisions, thus it is premature to speculate on what enforcement
outcome is appropriate and when it will be taken. In accordance with
the NRC Enforcement Policy, the staff will evaluate each identified
violation and, considering the significance of the violations and the
surrounding circumstances, will arrive at appropriate sanctions. Within
this process, on February 25, 2003, the NRC issued a preliminary
``Red'' significance determination for the apparent violations leading
to the reactor vessel head incident. A ``Red'' classification signifies
``high safety significance.'' Completing the significance determination
for this performance deficiency is one input into the NRC's final
decision on enforcement action.
Another critical input will be the results of the ongoing
investigation by the NRC's Office of Investigations to determine if
willful violations occurred at Davis Besse. The NRC will also refer any
Office of Investigation findings to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
prosecutive determination if there appear to be criminal violations
within the NRC's jurisdiction. If DOJ declines to prosecute, the NRC
would expect to take its enforcement action(s), including any civil
penalties, within a few months of the completion of the Office of
Investigations report. If DOJ pursues the case, we normally would not
take enforcement action until the DOJ proceedings are complete.
At the outset of its decision, the Commission stressed that it had
already strengthened its security requirements for licensees in
multiple areas, acting under its AEA-rooted duty to protect ``public
health and safety'' and the ``common defense and security.'' The
Commission also explained that further changes to address terrorist
threats though the security and safeguards requirements for NRC-
regulated facilities could result from an ongoing examination of
security regulations and programs.
On the legal question concerning NEPA, the Commission held that
NEPA does not require a terrorism review, and that an environmental
impact statement is not the appropriate format in which to address the
challenges of terrorism. The Commission's December 18 adjudicatory
decision rested, essentially, on four grounds. First, the link between
an agency licensing decision and terrorism is too speculative and
remote from the licensing decision. Second, the risk of a terrorist
attack at a nuclear facility cannot be adequately determined. The NRC's
policy with respect to use of risk information is that this technology
should be used to the maximum extent possible in all agency regulatory
decisionmaking, to the extent practical, given the state of technology
of risk methods and data [Ref: the Commission's PRA Policy Statement of
1995]. In the case of assessing risk from terrorist acts, a major
limitation in the state of technology is the inability to estimate the
frequency of the initiating act. Since September 11, the NRC staff has
been investigating means by which risk information can be used in
security-related regulatory decisionmaking, even in recognition of this
important limitation. Third, NEPA does not require a ``worst case
analysis, which ``creates a distorted picture of a project's impacts
and wastes agency resources.'' Lastly, NEPA's public process is not an
appropriate forum for considering sensitive security issues. Moreover,
given the Commission's existing efforts under the Atomic Energy Act, it
was not obvious what additional information or insights a formal NEPA
review of such issues would yield.
Question 30. To what extent is the emphasis on production over
safety, reported on at Davis-Besse, characteristic of operations at
FirstEnergy's other nuclear power plants and reactors across the
country?''
Response. NRC is closely monitoring activities at other FirstEnergy
plants, Beaver Valley and Perry, for indications of improper focus or
emphasis. Based on the current NRC onsite inspection and integrated
assessment activities, there have been no examples identified which
would indicate an emphasis on production over safety as being
characteristic of operation at either the Beaver Valley or Perry
plants. To the contrary, there have been specific recent instances
where FirstEnergy either shut down plant operations or maintained the
plant shut down and sacrificed production in order to ensure that
issues were fully understood and that safety was not impacted.
In the case of the Beaver Valley Power Station, FirstEnergy has
made efforts to improve performance since purchasing the facility from
Duquesne Light Company in December 1999. For example, in April 2001,
Beaver Valley Unit 1 was voluntarily shut down to replace degrading
reactor coolant pump seals. The licensee did not attempt to defer this
repair until a later scheduled outage, which might have been possible
since the seals were performing adequately at the time. Additionally,
in May 2002, Beaver Valley Unit 2 was voluntarily shut down to repair a
Nitrogen line leak on the main transformer. Similarly, this repair
might have been successfully deferred until a regularly scheduled
outage. Several major voluntary projects have also been initiated over
the last 2 years to improve overall safety performance. These projects
include the Latent Issue Review Project, intended to identify and
resolve latent deficiencies in risk significant and generation
significant systems, and the Major Equipment Reliability Program,
intended to replace major equipment with newer, more reliable equipment
at the plant.
In the case of FirstEnergy's Perry Station, in September 2002, the
plant scrammed during performance of routine turbine testing. While
attempting to reset the scram following the event, the operator
identified that a scram discharge volume drain valve failed to function
properly. FirstEnergy established a problem solving team which
evaluated the component failure and recommended a design change which
was implemented prior to unit restart. Additionally, this outage was
used as an opportunity to replace a recirculation pump seal package
which had been exhibiting degraded performance. Perry station
management chose to extend the forced outage caused by the scram beyond
the time needed to fix the specific problems which led to the shutdown
in order to resolve these issues.
With respect to the other operating reactors across the country,
the NRC routinely observes licensees' performance in this area during
its performance of baseline inspection activities across the country.
Specific inspections include the monitoring of the plant operators'
management of ``on-line risk,'' or the safety risk associated with
taking important equipment out of service for maintenance while the
plant is operating, rather than performing a plant shutdown to
facilitate the maintenance activities. This ``maintenance
effectiveness'' inspection procedure allows inspectors to determine
whether licensees are improperly deferring equipment maintenance from
shutdown conditions to power operations by evaluating this on-line risk
component. The inspection is performed at every operating plant in the
country. No significant adverse trends have been detected in this area
that would suggest other utilities are improperly placing emphasis on
production over safety by deferring maintenance to periods of power
operation or to future scheduled outages.
Question 31. Why did the NRC take such a weak approach to
regulation at Davis-Besse, giving undue consideration to the financial
outcomes of decisions critical to public health and safety?
Response. The decisionmaking process used for addressing the issue
of Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) cracking at Davis-Besse
constituted an appropriate use of risk-informed decisionmaking. The
information presented by the licensee and the staff analysis showed
that the likelihood of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) during the
proposed period of time (from December 31, 2001 to February 16, 2002)
was small. The staff performed independent calculations to verify that
a LOCA resulting from a CRDM failure would be effectively mitigated by
the Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Based on this information, the
staff concluded that the increased risk of core damage was acceptably
small and the risk of a Large Early Release (of radioactivity from
within the containment structure) was very small. This analysis placed
the results within our guidelines of small changes that were considered
``acceptable with [continued] management attention.
Management and staff, given the information available at the time
the decision was made, concluded that the additional operating time did
not pose an undue risk.
The NRC's primary obligation is to ensure adequate protection of
the public health and safety. Maintaining safety is the primary
performance goal on which we base the most important of our decisions.
Only if and when this performance goal is satisfied is there
consideration of other goals, such as the goal to avoid undue
regulatory burden. The Commission unanimously concluded that the staff
did not give undue consideration to the financial outcomes of decisions
critical to the public health and safety, but rather the staff ensured
that safety was maintained as its primary obligation.
Question 32. What steps is the NRC taking to prevent incidents
similar to Davis-Besse at other nuclear facilities?
Response. Immediately after discovery of the reactor pressure
vessel head degradation at Davis-Besse, the NRC issued Bulletin 2002-
01, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant
Pressure Boundary Integrity,'' on March 18, 2002, requesting
information from licensees concerning the structural integrity of the
reactor coolant pressure boundary at pressurized-water reactors (PWR)
and to assure that no other pressurized water reactors had a degraded
reactor vessel head. On August 9, 2002, the NRC issued Bulletin 2002-
02, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle
Inspection Programs,'' requesting information about licensees' plans
for future inspections and programs for their reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) heads and penetration nozzles, and providing a more rigorous
vessel head inspection program that the NRC staff would find
acceptable.
The NRC staff issued Orders to PWR licensees in February 2003 to
ensure that future inspections of RPV heads and penetration nozzles
will supplement visual examination with non-visual non-destructive
examination methods, further assuring that the conditions that led to
the Davis-Besse head degradation will not occur at other plants.
The NRC formed a Lessons Learned Task Force (LLTF) to review the
Davis-Besse incident and make recommendations for improvement in the
NRC's activities. The LLTF has completed its evaluation and made its
recommendations. The NRC formed a Senior Management Review Team (SRT)
to review the recommendations and the SRT has recommended approval of
49 of the 51 recommendations from the LLTF. The NRC staff developed and
forwarded to the Commission detailed action plans, which will
facilitate the implementation of the higher priority recommendations.
These action plans cover areas such as internal review of operating
experience at nuclear facilities and boric acid corrosion control
program inspections. The Commission directed the staff to proceed with
the action plan.
Responses by Richard Meserve to Additional Questions from
Senator Carper
Question 1. At today's hearing, you were kind enough to provide
some background on the events related to release of small amounts of
tritium at Salem 1 reactor. While I appreciated your response and that
of the other commissioners regarding the effect of tritium, I remain
concerned about the timeline regarding the effect of tritium, I remain
concerned about the timeline regarding the notification of the public
in cases such as this. Specifically, I would like to know on what date
the NRC onsite inspector was aware of the situation at Salem? What date
was the situation reported to the NRC by the plant owner, PSEG? And
finally, on what date was a public notice of this event issued by the
NRC?
Response. On September 18, 2002, Public Service Electric and Gas
(PSEG) identified contaminated water leakage into the Unit 1 Auxiliary
Building and initiated an investigation. On November 20, 2002, PSEG
informed the Salem NRC resident inspectors that the identified water
leakage into the Unit 1 auxiliary building appeared, based on chemical
and radiological analyses, to be similar to Unit 1 spent fuel pool
water. Earlier, on October 1, PSEG had mentioned leakage evaluations to
the Headquarters Project Manager as part of discussions on outage
activities, and that the September 18 problem identification document
was within the PSEG corrective action system.
When notified, the NRC resident inspectors initiated a review of
PSEG's actions and evaluations regarding the characterization of the
leak. Senior regional specialists were sent to the site in early
December 2002, to provide additional expertise in evaluating PSEG's
actions relative to characterization of this leakage and its potential
impact on workers, the public, and the environment. NRC resident and
regional specialist oversight continued over the next several months
through direct inspection by resident staff, as well as periodic visits
and discussions by the regional specialists with PSEG and State of New
Jersey representatives. No immediate health or safety concerns were
identified for workers, the public, or the environment.
On February 6, 2003, the initial inspection activities were
documented on pages 25-26 of the enclosed quarterly resident inspection
report (50-272/02-09) for the period ending December 28, 2002. Also, on
February 6, 2003, PSEG formally reported to the State of New Jersey its
identification of tritium in two onsite wells near the facility. This
identification was the first discovery of tritium, external to plant
structures, above the State's reporting requirement of 1000 pCi/l.
Consistent with NRC regulations outlined in 10 CFR 50.72, on that same
day, PSEG reported to the NRC, in an Event Notification (39566)
(enclosed) that it had formally notified the State of New Jersey
regarding ``a spill of radioactive material, specifically, tritium.''
______
Event Notification
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES REGARDING TRITIUM
SPILL
Notification was made to the State of New Jersey to report a spill
of radioactive material, specifically, tritium at a concentration of
6.92 E-5 microcuries/ml. The material is presently contained on the
property of Salem Generating Station and was discovered at 0945 on
February 6, 2003.
Soil samples obtained at a depth of 20 feet from 2 monitoring wells
indicates the presence of tritium. The monitoring wells are adjacent to
Salem Unit 1 and within the protected area. We recently sampled all
domestic water supplies and the results were negative. There is no
indication of any offsite release, there is no threat to the public or
company employees. We cannot determine at this time if this is an
existing or historic condition. We are continuing with additional
analysis to determine the source and extent of the condition.
The licensee informed State agencies and the NRC resident inspector
and will inform the local agency of LAC.
______
February 6, 2003.
Mr. Harold W. Keiser, Chief Nuclear Officer and President,
PSEG Nuclear LLC-N09,
P.O. Box 236,
Hancocks Bridge, NJ.
Subject: Salem Nuclear Generating Station--NRC Inspection Report 50-
272/02-09, 50-311/02-09
Dear Mr. Keiser: On December 28, 2002, the NRC completed an
inspection of Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor facilities. The enclosed
report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on
January 16, 2003 with Mr. Lon Waldinger and other members of your
staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as
they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and
regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors
reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection involved 3 months
of resident inspection and region-based inspections by radiation
protection, emergency preparedness, security and in-service inspection
specialists.
Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified
four issues of very low safety significance (Green). All of these
issues were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements.
However, because of their very low safety significance and because they
have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is
treating these issues as non-cited violations in accordance with
Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
Additionally, an unresolved item discussed in Inspection Report 02-
07 involving the failure to maintain the automatic fire suppression
systems in six electrical areas was fully evaluated using the
significance determination process during this period and found to be
of very low significance (Green).
If you deny the non-cited violations noted in this report, you
should provide a response with the basis for your denial within 30 days
of the date of this inspection report to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of
Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem facility. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear
power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC has
issued two Orders (dated February 25, 2002 and January 7, 2003) and
several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to
strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and
enhance access authorization. The NRC also issued Temporary Instruction
2515/148 on August 28, 2002 that provided guidance to inspectors to
audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory
measures (ICMs) required by the February 25th Order. Phase 1 of TI
2515/148 was completed at all commercial nuclear power plants during
calendar year (CY) 2002, and the remaining inspections are scheduled
for completion in CY 2003. Additionally, table-top security drills were
conducted at several licensees to evaluate the impact of expanded
adversary characteristics and the ICMs on licensee protection and
mitigative strategies. Information gained and discrepancies identified
during the audits and drills were reviewed and dispositioned by the
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. For CY 2003, the NRC
will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls,
conduct inspections, and resume force-on-force exercises at selected
power plants. Should threat conditions change, the NRC may issue
additional Orders, advisories, and temporary instructions to ensure
adequate safety is being maintained at all commercial power reactors.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's ``Rules of Practice,''
a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or
from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
Glenn W. Meyer
Chief, Projects Branch 3,
Division of Reactor Projects.
______
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Docket Nos: 50-272, 50-311
License Nos: DPR-70, DPR-75
Report No: 50-272/2002-09, 50-311/2002-09
Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)
Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 and 2
Location: P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038
Dates: October 1-December 28, 2002
Inspectors: Raymond K. Lorson, Senior Resident Inspector; Fred L.
Bower, Resident Inspector; Michael C. Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector;
Dave Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector; Jason Jang, Senior
Radiation Specialist; Joseph T. Furia, Senior Health Physicist;
Frederick Jaxheimer, Reactor Inspector; Suresh Chaudhary, Reactor
Inspector; Roy L. Fuhrmeister, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By: Glen W. Meyer, Chief, Projects Branch 3, Division of
Reactor Projects
INSPECTION REPORT
Summary of Findings--IR 05000272-02-09, IR 05000311-02-09
Public Service Electric Gas Nuclear LLC, Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 on
10/1-12/28/02, Heat Sink Performance, Fire Protection, Emergent Work,
Refueling and Outage, and Temporary Modifications.
The report covered 3 months of inspection by resident inspectors
and also included inspection by regional specialists in radiation
protection, fire protection, security, emergency preparedness and in-
service inspection. This inspection identified five green issues which
were non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process
(SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be ``Green'' or be
assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power
reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. INSPECTOR IDENTIFIED FINDINGS
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
<bullet> Green. The inspectors identified that the thermal
performance testing of heat exchangers in the component cooling water
(CCW) system was inadequate, in that readily apparent CCW flow rate
errors existed.
This NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, ``Test Controls,''
is greater than minor, because it affected the Mitigating System
Cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that inadequate test
controls could allow a degraded heat exchanger to go undetected. This
finding was of very low significance, because the CCW heat exchangers
remained operable when the flow measurement errors were corrected in
subsequent evaluations. Also, this finding had an aspect of problem
identification and resolution, in that an apparent error was not
identified. (Section R07)
<bullet> Green. The inspectors identified that the records of
troubleshooting and repair activities on the 1PR2 valve and on the 22
containment fan cooling unit were incorrect and incomplete.
This NCV of TS 6.10.1.b (records) was greater than minor, because
it impacted the inspectors' ability to independently assess the
condition of these components following maintenance activities and it
affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone equipment reliability
objective. This finding was of very low significance, because the
components performed acceptably during the post-maintenance testing.
Also, this finding had an aspect of problem identification and
resolution, in that it indicated that corrective actions for a
previous, similar violation (IR 2001-12) had not been effective.
(Section R13).
<bullet> Green. A required decay heat removal support system (11
CCW room cooler) was removed from service at conditions not permitted
by Technical Specifications (TS) (refueling cavity level less than 23
feet.)
An NCV of TS 6.8.1 was identified for failure to establish and
implement adequate procedures to control the removal of the 11 CCW room
cooler from service for maintenance. This finding was greater than
minor, because it affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective
of equipment availability, in that it resulted in a condition where two
residual heat removal systems were not operable when required by TS.
The finding was determined to be of very low significance, since the 11
CCW pump remained functional when the fan was out of service without
the necessary compensatory measures. (Section R20)
<bullet> Green. The inspectors identified that a temporary
modification (hose connection and pump) to an operable service water
header was not properly evaluated.
This NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Controls
was greater than minor, because it affected the Mitigating System
Cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that it could have
affected the operability of the only service water header while reactor
de-fueling operations were in-progress. This finding was determined to
be of very low significance, as the service water header remained
functional while the hose was attached. (Section R23)
<bullet> Green. PSEG did not properly maintain room isolation
barriers and improperly implemented a modification to the switchgear
penetration area ventilation system, both of which caused an existing
fire protection concern on carbon dioxide (CO<INF>2</INF>)
concentration to be exacerbated. This finding represents the completion
of an unresolved item identified in Inspection Report 2002-07 regarding
the automatic fire suppression system in six safety-related electrical
areas addressed by the fire protection program.
When fully evaluated, this finding was determined to be an NCV for
failure to maintain the fire protection program as required by License
Conditions 2.C.5 (Unit 1) and 2.C.10 (Unit 2). The finding was greater
than minor, because it adversely affected the Mitigating System
Cornerstone objective regarding fire suppression equipment capability.
The finding was determined to be of very low significance due to the
multiple trains of mitigating systems which would have survived
postulated fire events. Also, this finding had an aspect of problem
identification and resolution, in that ineffective problem evaluation
existed regarding the preventive maintenance and modifications on the
affected equipment. (Section OA5.3)
______
Report Details
SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the period at full power. On October 10, 2002, the
unit was shutdown to begin refueling outage 1R15 (Section R20). On
November 5 the unit was taken critical and power ascension continued
until November 12 when the unit was returned to full power. On November
12, the unit was manually tripped in response to a lowering steam
generator water level condition. The event was investigated and the
unit was returned to a critical mode on November 12 (Section R14). The
unit operated at approximately full power for the remainder of the
period with the exception of power reductions performed at the request
of the offsite load dispatcher.
Unit 2 operated throughout the period at approximately full power
with the exception of power reductions performed at the request of the
offsite load dispatcher.
1. Reactor Safety
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier
Integrity [Reactor--R]
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope.--On December 10 the inspectors performed a
walkdown of the Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water (SW) system,
refueling water storage tanks, auxiliary feedwater storage tanks, and
related heat trace systems to review whether preparations for cold
weather conditions were appropriate and consistent with operations
procedure, SC.OP-PT.ZZ-0002(Q), ``Station Preparations for Winter
Conditions.'' The inspectors also reviewed S1.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q),
``Adverse Environmental Conditions,'' to determine whether PSEG had
defined responsibilities for tornados, hurricanes and high wind
conditions.
b. Findings.--No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors performed two partial system
walkdowns during the Unit 1 refueling outage (1R15). On multiple days
the inspectors walked down the 1 SW bay while the 3 SW bay was removed
from service for maintenance. The inspectors also walked down the
redundant emergency diesel generators (EDGs) while the EDG associated
with the out-of-service SW bay was removed from service. Each Unit 1
EDG was removed from service for maintenance during 1R15. To evaluate
the operability of the selected train or system when the redundant
train was out of service, the inspector checked for correct valve and
power alignments by comparing the positions of valves, switches and
electrical power breakers to system diagrams. The inspector also
verified that key standby and support system process parameters were
acceptable to support operation of the redundant equipment.
b. Findings.--No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Fire Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope.--During the weeks beginning on December 15 and
December 22, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of six
areas described below to assess PSEG's control of transient combustible
material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression
capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. As
part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed fire protection
procedure, NC.NA-AP-0025, ``Operational Fire Protection Program,'' and
engineering document, DE.PS.ZZ-0001-A2-FHA, revision 5, ``Salem Fire
Protection Report--Fire Hazards Analysis,'' to ascertain the
requirements for required fire protection design features, fire area
boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for these areas. The
following areas were reviewed:
<bullet> 11 and 12 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Rooms (fire areas
1FA-DG-84H and 1FA-DG-84G)
<bullet> Unit 1 and Unit 2 Carbon Dioxide Equipment Rooms (fire
areas 1FA-DG-84F and 2FA-DG-84F)
<bullet> 21 and 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Rooms (fire areas
2FA-DG-84H and 2FA-DG-84G)
The inspectors reviewed the following notifications to determine
whether PSEG appropriately addressed these issues in accordance with
their corrective action program:
<bullet> Notification 20125638 which identified the failure to
close fire impairment permits when repairs to fire barriers were
completed.
<bullet> Notification 20127260 which documented an inspector
identified issue involving two potentially degraded fire barrier seals
(Unit 1).
<bullet> Notification 20125301 which involved excessive cycling of
the carbon dioxide tank compressor (Unit 1).
b. Findings.--No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Unannounced Fire Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors observed an unannounced, off-
hours fire drill on December 4, 2002. The drill involved having the
fire brigade respond to a simulated electrical breaker fire in the
safety-related 84 foot elevation electrical switchgear room at Salem
Unit 2. The inspectors verified that the fire brigade responded to the
hazard area with appropriate breathing apparatus, protective clothing,
and fire fighting equipment. Additionally, the inspectors verified that
the fire brigade leader adequately directed the actions of the fire
brigade, referred to the fire fighting response procedures and
communicated the fire status to the plant operators. The inspectors
also verified that the fire brigade established a monitor to ensure
that the fire did not re-flash and searched the area for potential fire
victims, and also observed the post-drill critique.
The inspectors reviewed notification 20125652 which identified a
deficiency in the development of the fire drill scenario and
notification 20125656 which identified that a notification was not
promptly developed for the scenario deficiency to assess whether PSEG
was appropriately entering items into the corrective action program for
resolution.
b. Findings.--No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed flood protection
measures for external sources as described in the Individual Plant
Examination for External Events. The inspectors reviewed procedure
SC.MD-PM.ZZ-0036, ``Watertight Door Inspection and Repair,'' and
selected completed watertight door inspection records. The inspectors
also reviewed procedure SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, ``Flood and Fire Barrier
Penetration Seal Inspection,'' and selected 2002 completed flood seal
inspection records. The inspectors observed that seal discrepancies
were documented in notification 20102951. This inspection also included
tours of various plant areas including 64 feet and 84 feet electrical
switchgear rooms for Units 1 and 2 that were identified as risk
significant. The inspector located and toured an underground service
water pipe and cable tunnel with PSEG engineering personnel. The
inspectors noted what appeared to be groundwater dripping from several
conduit seals. Sump pumps in this area had discrepancies which appeared
to prevent automatic operation.
The inspectors also attempted to locate and inspect additional
underground bunkers/manholes subject to flooding that contained risk-
significant cables. At the conclusion of the inspection period, PSEG
had not identified and provided access to all underground cable vaults
with safety-related cables. PSEG initiated notification 20127365 to
inspect the safety-related cable vaults at Salem. PSEG was also
evaluating their underground cables to determine whether the cables
were qualified for wetted or submerged service. PSEG initiated
notification 20105022 to capture these issues in the corrective action
program. At the completion of this inspection period, the engineering
evaluation (order 80048125) for these issues had not been completed.
Therefore, the inspectors were unable to determine whether PSEG
implemented appropriate corrective actions for industry operating
experience related to submerged safety-related electrical cables. This
issue remains unresolved pending further review of PSEG's actions for
submerged safety-related electrical cables. (URI 50-272 and 311/02-09-
01).
b. Findings.--No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed 12A and 12B CC system
heat exchanger performance test data collected on October 11, 2002, to
verify that the heat exchangers met the performance requirements and
assumptions specified in engineering calculation, S-C-CC-MDC-1798,
revision 3, ``Component Cooling System Heat Exchangers.'' Additionally,
the inspectors examined service water and component cooling system
drawings, reviewed operations procedure, S1.OP-PT.SW-0017, ``12
Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Heat Transfer Performance Data
Collection,'' and interviewed a design engineer to verify that the test
methodology accounted for instrument inaccuracies and differences
between test and design basis conditions.
The inspectors also reviewed notification 20125915 which documented
inspector identified performance test deficiencies to ensure that PSEG
appropriately entered these issues into the corrective action program
for resolution. One of the deficiencies involved the failure to
maintain the data acquisition system test data as required by procedure
S1.OP-PT.SW-0017. The failure to maintain this quality record affected
the inspectors' ability to confirm that the average test data values
were representative of the individual test data samples and was similar
to the findings discussed Section R13.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified that the thermal
performance testing of heat exchangers in the component cooling water
(CCW) system was inadequate, in that readily apparent CCW flow rate
errors existed. This finding was determined to be of very low
significance and was considered a non-cited violation of Appendix B,
Criterion XI, ``Test Control.''
Description. The thermal performance testing of the 12A and 12B CC
heat exchangers was performed in accordance with operations procedure
S1.OP-PT.SW-0017. The test was designed to compute the fouling factor
for each heat exchanger based on measured SW and CC system process
parameters.
The inspectors identified that the flow values recorded for the CC
heat exchangers (CC side) were less than the values recorded for the
same flow stream through the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger
(i.e. 2636 gpm for the 12B CC heat exchanger vs 3000 gpm for the RHR
heat exchanger). This was a readily apparent discrepancy since the
flowrate through the CC heat exchanger, which supplied both the RHR
heat exchanger in addition to other loads, should have been larger than
the CC flowrate through the RHR heat exchanger.
This flow discrepancy introduced a non-conservative error into the
determination of the 12A and 12B CC heat exchanger fouling factors. A
PSEG engineer re-computed the fouling factors assuming the higher flow
values and determined that the heat exchangers remained operable.
Analysis. The inspectors determined that this finding was
associated with the procedural quality attribute that affected the
reliability objective of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to properly
monitor the CC heat exchanger thermal performance, and is therefore
greater than minor. If left uncorrected, this finding could result in a
more significant safety concern (i.e. the failure to identify
unacceptable CC heat exchanger performance through testing). This
finding was evaluated using the Phase I worksheet of the significance
determination process (SDP) and determined to be of very low risk
significance (Green), since the CC heat exchangers remained operable
when the flow measurement error was corrected. Also, this finding had
an aspect of problem identification and resolution, in that an apparent
error was not identified.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, ``Test Control,''
requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure
that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and
components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and
performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to the
above, PSEG failed to develop adequate procedural controls for
measuring the flow through the CC heat exchanger during thermal
performance testing. Because the failure to adequately measure the flow
through the CC heat exchanger during thermal performance testing was
determined to be of very low significance and has been entered into the
corrective action program (notification 20129515), this violation is
being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section
VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272/02-09-02, Failure to
Properly Test the 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities
.1 Inservice Inspection
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspector reviewed the repair of the
refueling water storage tank (RWST) to assure it was in compliance with
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Code). The inspector also reviewed whether PSEG addressed
the pre-repair condition of the RWST in accordance with ASME Code
requirements as discussed in Inspection Report 50-272/01-07 (unresolved
item (URI) 50-272/01-07-01).
The inspector reviewed the work order implementing the visual
examination of the reactor head of Unit 1, which included photographic
examples of penetration leaks from Surry, Oconee, Davis Besse, and
Crystal River 3, in order to evaluate the scope of the visual
inspections undertaken by PSEG in response to NRC Bulletin 2002-002.
The inspector reviewed the visual examination procedure and the
qualifications of the individuals implementing the visual inspection.
The inspector reviewed the disposition of the visual examination of the
head, which indicated there was no evidence of leakage of any kind,
either from the head penetration or the canopy seal. With the
inspection personnel who performed the inspection of the reactor head,
the inspector discussed the visual evaluation of developer residue
remaining on some of the canopy seal welds. Additionally the inspector
reviewed the supporting documents for a number of nondestructive
examinations that had been completed to determine their compliance with
the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements.
The inspector reviewed the Salem Unit 1 Steam Generator Program,
Steam Generator Aging Management Program, and Steam Generator
Operational Assessment. The inspector observed the location
verification for the acquisition of automated eddy current data taken
from steam generator 14, Column 11, Row 62 taken simultaneously with
data from a tube located at Column 11, Row 63, using the Framatome
ROGER manipulator, to verify the data set was controlled and
opportunities were introduced in the data collection process to capture
location errors that might cause data offsets. The inspector reviewed,
with the independent Level III eddy current data analyst, the anomalous
eddy current drift data of steam generator 14 in the tube located at
column 10, row 83, the tube located at column 4, row 75, and the tube
located at column 2, row 85.
The inspector reviewed the data to determine if PSEG was taking
into account the lessons-learned at Seabrook Unit 1 steam generators
because the Salem Unit 1 generators were purchased from Seabrook Unit 2
as replacement generators and are identical in critical areas to
Seabrook Unit 1. The inspector discussed the increase in the number of
anti-vibration bar wear indications between refueling outage 13 and 14
in order to ascertain what evaluations had been performed. The
inspector reviewed the disposition of loose parts in steam generator 11
at tube location Row 1 Column 3 and in steam generator 14 at location
row 2, column 23. In addition, the inspector discussed, with the
independent eddy current analyst and PSEG steam generator principal
engineer, the current evaluation of the previously discovered loose
parts at row 42, column 62 and column 63 in steam generator 14 in order
to determine if a previous commitment to monitor and evaluate these
unplugged tubes had been implemented during the current outage.
The inspector reviewed randomly selected corrective actions in the
Steam Generator and Inservice Inspection Programs to determine if
actions related to the programs were being addressed.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
The inspector determined that PSEG addressed the pre-repair RWST
condition in accordance with the ASME Code and concluded that no
violation of NRC requirements had occurred. Therefore, URI 50-272/01-
07-01 is closed.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope.--On November 14, 2002, the inspectors observed
a licensed operator simulator training scenario to assess operators'
performance and evaluators' critiques. The scenario observed involved
operator response to a reduction in main transformer cooling and the
implementation of abnormal procedure S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001(Q), ``Rapid
Load Reduction.'' The scenario also involved operator response to a
leak in the charging system and the implementation of abnormal
procedures S2.OP-AB.RC-0001(Q), ``Reactor Coolant System Leak'' and
S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001, ``Abnormal Radiation.'' The inspectors observed the
in-process critiques conducted by the evaluators in the simulator, and
reviewed the areas for improvement that were entered into the operator
training department critique data base.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed recent operating
problems, notifications, system health reports, and maintenance rule
(MR) performance criteria to determine whether PSEG had effectively
monitored the performance of the Unit 1 CC water system and the Unit 1
pressurizer safety relief valves (included with the reactor coolant
system MR data). The inspector reviewed the planned and completed
corrective actions for recent system problems involving elevated CC
pump vibrations and also for a pressurizer ``as found'' set pressure
test failure (notification 20116997) to ensure that these problems were
appropriately addressed. The inspector also reviewed PSEG's assessment
of these issues to evaluate the adequacy of the functional failure
determinations.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
.1 12 Service Water Header Piping Inspection and WEKO Seal Repair
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed selected maintenance
activities associated with the inspection and permanent sealing of the
12 SW header. On November 30, 2001, a leak was discovered on the 12 SW
header that was repaired with a temporary rubber WEKO seal. NRC review
of the operability determination associated with this temporary repair
was documented in Section 1R15.2 of Inspection Report 2002-07. The
inspectors reviewed the maintenance records and inspection results of
the maintenance activities (order 60024893) to inspect this concrete
piping in accordance with engineering change authorization (ECA)
80044126, ``No. 12 Service Water Header Piping WEKO Seal
Installation.'' The review also verified that plant risk was properly
managed during the installation activities.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Power Operated Relief Valve 1PR2 Repair
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed selected emergent
maintenance activities associated with the troubleshooting and repair
of Unit 1 power operated relief valve (PORV), 1PR2 and its air operated
actuator. The 1PR2 valve lifted, caused a brief depressurization during
plant heat-up, and caused the plant to be cooled down for
troubleshooting and repairs. The outage control center (OCC) initiated
a TARP Team (notification 20119917) that implemented the technical
issues process. PSEG attributed the unexpected lifting of 1PR2 to a
maintenance technician's failure to install a required spacer during
the completion of order 60023070. PSEG's root cause analysis of this
event was performed under notification 20120466 and order 70028106. The
root cause analysis report had not been issued by the end of the
inspection period.
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance records and the results of
the maintenance activities to repair 1PR2 under orders 60032780 and
60032911. The inspectors reviewed the completed maintenance procedure,
SC.IC-PM.RC-0001(Q), ``Pressurizer PORV Valve Actuator Maintenance.''
The inspectors also interviewed selected engineering and work planning
personnel. The inspectors also verified that NRC identified
discrepancies associated with the calculations of the valve internal
measurements were documented in notification 20122636.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified that the records of
troubleshooting and repair activities on the 1PR2 valve were incorrect
and incomplete. This finding was evaluated and determined to be of very
low risk significance (Green), because it did not directly affect the
operation of a mitigating system. This finding was a recurrence of a
violation (NCV 2001-12-02) that was previously identified in NRC
Inspection Report (IR) 2001-12 and indicated that previous attempts to
correct this problem were ineffective.
Description. During the review of orders 60032780 and 60032911, the
inspectors noted discrepancies between the electronic records of the
work orders and the paper records of the work orders. The discrepancies
were related to procedures specified to be used versus the procedures
actually used. The actual work and troubleshooting records were
incomplete and did not document the principal maintenance activities.
The inspectors also noted that the 1PR2 air actuator test record was
retained by the valve engineering in lieu of being retained as a
quality record. PSEG initiated notifications 20125602 and 20125560 to
capture these issues in the corrective action program.
Analysis. This finding adversely impacted the inspectors' ability
to perform their regulatory oversight function to independently assess
the operability of equipment important to safety. The finding affected
the Mitigating System Cornerstone reliability objective and was
therefore greater than minor. The finding was determined to be very low
safety significance (Green) since the 1PR2 has been functioning
satisfactorily since the completion of the maintenance and post-
maintenance testing. Also, this finding had an aspect of problem
identification and resolution, in that it indicated that corrective
actions for a previous, similar violation (IR 2002-12) had not been
effective.
Enforcement. Technical Specification (TS) 6.10.1.b requires that
records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections,
repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to
nuclear safety be retained for at least 5 years. Contrary to the above,
PSEG failed to maintain complete and adequate records of inspection and
maintenance activities performed on the 1PR2. This very low risk
violation has been entered in the corrective action program
(notification 20091973) and is being treated as the first example of a
non-cited violation consistent with the Section VI.A of the NRC's
Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272 and 50-311/02-09-03.
.3 22 Containment Fan Cooling Unit (CFCU)
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed selected emergent
maintenance activities associated with the troubleshooting and repair
of 22 CFCU and its associated flow control valves. These activities
were selected for inspection, because following scheduled maintenance,
the 22 CFCU began oscillating from 0-2000 gpm when returned to service.
Additional aspects of this issue were documented in Sections R15 and
R19. Engineering personnel were assembled to implement the technical
issues process. The inspectors reviewed the following corrective action
and work order documents associated with this issue:
<bullet> Notifications 20122677 and 20122736 and order 60033111
<bullet> Notifications 20122710 and order 60033240
<bullet> Order 60032382
The inspectors reviewed all the maintenance records and results of
the maintenance activities provided by PSEG for repairs to the flow
controls for the 22 CFCU under orders 60033240, 60033111 and 60032382.
The inspectors reviewed the records of the completed procedure used,
SH.MD-AP.ZZ-0002(Q), ``Maintenance Department Troubleshooting and
Repair'' for troubleshooting in accordance with order 60033240.
The inspectors verified that an inspector-identified discrepancy
associated with PSEG's failure to include the unavailability of the 22
CFCU in the weekly risk assessment (week 99), when the work was carried
over from work week 98, was entered into the corrective action process
and documented by notification 201220123088.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified that the records of
troubleshooting and repair activities on the the 22 containment fan
cooling unit were incorrect and incomplete. This was the second example
of this finding. This finding was evaluated and determined to be of
very low risk significance (Green), because it did not directly affect
the operation of a mitigating system.
Description. During the review of notifications 20122677, 20122736
and 20122710, and orders 60033111, 60033240 and 60032382, the
inspectors noted discrepancies between the electronic records of the
work orders and the paper records of the work orders related to
procedures used. The inspectors also noted that the records of the
actual work performed were incomplete. Some examples of this
observation included: records were not found for troubleshooting under
order 60033111; records were not found for Temporary Modification (TM)
02-036 that was installed and removed under order 60033240; and records
were not found for testing under order 60032382. Neither the electronic
nor the paper records provided the documentation of these principal
maintenance activities. PSEG documented these issues in the corrective
action program.
Analysis. This finding adversely impacted the inspectors' ability
to perform their regulatory oversight function to independently assess
the operability of equipment important to safety. This finding affected
the Mitigating System Cornerstone reliability objective and was
therefore greater than minor. The finding was of very low safety
significance, since the 22 CFCU had been tested and found operable
during post maintenance testing and in service. Also, this finding had
an aspect of problem identification and resolution, in that it
indicated that corrective actions for a previous, similar violation (IR
2002-12) had not been effective.
Enforcement. Technical Specification 6.10.1.b requires that records
and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair and
replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety
be retained for at least 5 years. Contrary to the above, PSEG failed to
maintain complete and adequate records of inspection and maintenance
activities performed on the 22 CFCU. This very low risk violation has
been entered in the corrective action program and is being treated as
the second example of a non-cited violation consistent with Section
VI.A of the NRC's Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272 and 50-311/02-09-03.
.4 Other Emergent Maintenance Activities
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed additional selected
maintenance activities through direct observation, document review
(risk assessment reviews, operating logs, industry operating experience
and notifications), and personnel interviews. This review was performed
to determine whether PSEG properly assessed and managed the risk, and
performed these activities in accordance with applicable TS and work
control requirements, including the administrative procedures for
managing risk associated with conducting maintenance activities during
both on-line and outage conditions. The following activities were
reviewed:
<bullet> 1A, 1B and 1C EDG maintenance outages during 1R15.
<bullet> Unit 1 forced outage activities on November 12, 2002.
<bullet> Installation of a bus link on the 2C battery on November
12, 2002.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions
.1 Synchronizing Main Generator to the Grid
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors observed selected portions of
the preparations and synchronization of the main generator to the grid
on November 6, following the Unit 1 refueling outage and return to Mode
1. The inspectors verified that the activities were performed in
accordance with S1.OP-SO.TRB-0001(Q), ``Turbine Generator Startup
Operations.'' The inspectors noted that management oversight was
provided by an assistant operations manager and also that identified
procedural problems were placed into the corrective actions program
(notifications 20120646 and 20120831).
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Power Operated Relief Valve 1PR2 Lift During Plant
Pressurization
a. Inspection Scope.--During plant heatup on November 1, 2002, the
1PR2 PORV lost closed indication and reactor coolant system pressure
began to lower. Attempts to close the valve manually were unsuccessful
and the pressure reduction was terminated by closing the PORV block
valve, 1PR7. A transient assessment response plan (TARP) team was
assembled. Subsequently, the plant was cooled down and the valve
internals were inspected. PSEG determined that a spacer from the
internal trim package had not been reinstalled when the 1PR2 was worked
on during the outage. The inspectors verified that this issue was
entered into the corrective action program (notification 20119917) and
a level 1 root cause analysis and a review of the human performance
aspects were planned. The inspectors observed and monitored selected
portions of the TARP team activities.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Manual Reactor Trip of Salem Unit 1 Due to Low S/G Water Level
Caused by Feed Pump Runback
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the response to a
Unit 1 reactor trip that occurred on November 12, 2002 following the
unexpected loss of the 11 main feedwater pump. The 11 main feedwater
pump trip was caused by the momentary shorting of an electrical probe
to ground during a troubleshooting activity. The inspectors reviewed
this event to ensure that the operator response was appropriate and in
accordance with operating procedures, mitigating equipment operated
properly, and to confirm that PSEG's post-trip review and corrective
actions were thorough. The inspectors interviewed operators and
operations management, reviewed applicable documentation including
operator logs, the TARP report, the post-trip data package, the 4-hour
non-emergency event report, applicable notifications and attended the
post-trip SORC review meeting to ensure that the cause(s) of the event
were understood and addressed. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
notification 20122632 to resolve inspector-identified problems
associated with the maintenance and implementation of the Trip Hazards
Area program.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Containment Isolation Valve Control Cable Cut
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the operability
determination (CROD)-02-009 (notification 20114253) for a control cable
for a reactor coolant pump cooling water containment isolation valve
(1CC118). Design change activities to replace cable fire wrap resulted
in a six-inch longitudinal cut through the outer jacket, copper
shielding material, an insulating sheath, an inner protective layer and
through one conductor's insulation layer. PSEG's visual inspection of
the cut did not find any damage to any conductors. No alarms were
received and valve indication was not lost in the control room. PSEG
tested and verified circuit continuity of the conductors with a
critical safety function. The inspectors verified that compensatory
measures were implemented and corrective actions were specified. The
inspectors also reviewed order 70027181 that documented the follow-up
operability assessment (CRFA) performed in accordance with procedure
SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0108, ``Operability Assessment and Equipment Control
Program.''
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor 1R1B
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the operability
determination (CROD)-02-008 (Notification 20113713) for the control
room ventilation radiation monitor spiking into alarm and realigning
the control area ventilation (CAV) system. PSEG believed that a faulty
radiation detector temperature alarm module was producing noise that
resulted in the spurious radiation alarms and CAV system realignment.
PSEG performed troubleshooting and determined that the radiation
detector and the radiation detector heater (required for environmental
qualification) were working properly. The inspectors verified that
compensatory measures were implemented and corrective actions were
specified. The inspectors also reviewed Order 70027081 that documented
the follow-up operability assessment (CRFA) performed in accordance
with procedure SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0108, ``Operability Assessment and Equipment
Control Program.''
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Unit 1 AMSAC
a. Inspection Scope.--During a control room tour on November 14,
2002, the inspectors noted that the AMSAC trouble alarm was
illuminated. Based on discussions with control room operators, the
inspectors noted that the system was inoperable, the condition had been
logged and had been entered into the corrective action system
(notification 20121636). The inspectors discussed the condition further
with operations and engineering personnel to determine whether the
AMSAC system had been inoperable when the plant was restarted from the
Unit 1 forced outage in November. The inspectors reviewed control room
alarms and determined that the AMSAC system was operable during the
plant startup. PSEG initiated notifications 20122925, 20122627 and
20122624 to document that an issue associated with operator awareness
of the AMSAC system status during the startup and also to identify
enhancements to the AMSAC alarm response and maintenance procedures.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.4 22 Containment Fan Coil Unit
a. Inspection Scope.--On November 20 PSEG maintenance personnel
performed calibration and testing of the 22 CFCU flow instruments
(Section R19). On November 23 while attempting to perform procedure
SC.IC-LC.SW-0001(Q), ``Containment Fan Coil Unit Service Water Flow
Instruments Loop Calibration,'' in accordance with Order 30069819,
control room and maintenance personnel observed 0-2000 g.p.m. flow
oscillations with the 22 CFCU in service. The 22 CFCU was removed from
service. Unit 2 was in a previously entered (November 19) limiting
condition for operation (LCO) for scheduled maintenance on the 22 CFCU.
PSEG performed troubleshooting and found that the SW flow could be
stabilized with the flow controller in manual control and the flow
control valve (22SW223) full open. The oscillations returned when the
controller was returned to automatic control. To resolve the inability
to control SW flow at the accident flow setpoint, PSEG configured the
22 CFCU in the manual control mode with the 22SW223 valve full open
(greater than normal accident flow). The 22 CFCU fans were also
configured to only operate at the accident (low) speed. PSEG planned to
limit run time on the 22 CFCU to that required for surveillance
testing.
PSEG considered the 22 CFCU degraded, but operable with the flow
controls in manual in lieu of its normal automatic control mode. The
inspectors reviewed the operability determination (CROD)-02-011
(Notification 20122803 and Order 70028270), the regulatory change
process determination and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening performed for the
degraded condition. The inspectors also observed the SORC meeting that
reviewed these documents for safety concerns. The inspector also
verified that PSEG implemented administrative controls to declare the
22 CFCU inoperable if the river temperature were to exceed 60 F. The
inspectors also reviewed the follow-up operability assessment (CRFA)
documented in order 70028270 that was performed in accordance with
procedure SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0108, ``Operability Assessment and Equipment
Control Program.''
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.5 14 Containment Fan Cooling Unit
a. Inspection Scope.--On December 22 PSEG personnel attempted to
place the 14 CFCU in the high-speed, low-flow mode of operation for
valve stroke time testing. The 14 CFCU outlet flow control (accident
mode) valve (14SW223) slowly stroked closed and one of the normal flow
control valves (14SW57) indicated open (accident position) with no
measurable stroke time. Unit 1 was in a previously entered (December
17) LCO for scheduled maintenance on the 14 CFCU. PSEG formed a TARP
team to investigate (Notification 20125678). Based on troubleshooting
PSEG concluded that the most likely cause of this problem was that a
second normal flow control valve (14SW65) was throttled open. To
resolve this problem PSEG racked out and removed the control power to
the high speed fan breaker and performed testing, which demonstrated
that the 14 CFCU was operable but degraded in this configuration. The
inspectors reviewed PSEG activities to confirm that the 14 CFCU was
operable in the ``as left'' configuration.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds
a. Inspection Scope.--On December 9-13 the inspectors reviewed the
outstanding Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator burdens as described by
operations procedure, SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0030(Q), ``Operator Burden Program.''
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the open operator workarounds,
operator concerns, overhead annunciators, control room instrumentation
and computer point deficiencies. These items were reviewed to ensure
that identified system deficiencies would not prevent operators from
properly responding to plant events.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
.1 12 Service Water Header Piping WEKO Seal Installation
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed selected portions of
a design change (order 80044126) that had modified the 12 SW header
piping and installed a WEKO seal to restore the degraded header to its
design qualification. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59
screening done for this design change. The inspectors also reviewed
Vendor Technical Document (VTD) 325626 (MPR Associates Calculation
2449, ``Evaluation of Salem Generating Station Concrete Service Water
Pipe Specials'') that provided analysis and established bounding
criteria to demonstrate that the repair of the 12 SW header with a
double wide WEKO seal and segmented stainless steel cylinder would
restore the header piping to its original design criteria. The bounding
criteria included: (1) minimum remaining average wall thickness of the
unflawed metal; (2) length of the through-wall flaw; (3) limited damage
to the concrete coating on the steel pipe; (4) mortar coated steel
piping without pre-stressed concrete; and (5) limited deterioration of
the longitudinal tie rods. The inspectors verified that the design
bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant
systems and components were not degraded by the design change.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors observed the performance of
post-maintenance testing (PMT) and/or reviewed documentation for
selected risk-significant systems to assess whether the systems met
TSs, UFSAR and PSEG procedural requirements. The inspectors assessed
whether the testing appropriately demonstrated that the systems were
operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety
functions. The following test activities were reviewed:
<bullet> Selected maintenance activities associated with the
troubleshooting and repair of Unit 1 PORV 1PR2 under order 60032911.
<bullet> Selected maintenance activities associated with the
troubleshooting and repair of the 1PR2 air operated actuator under
order 60032780.
<bullet> Calibration of the 22 CFCU loop flow control devices on
November 20, 2002, in accordance with Order 30069819 and procedure
SC.IC-LC.SW-0001(Q), ``Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) Service Water
Flow Instruments Loop Calibration.'' The inspectors also reviewed the
pre and post calibration testing that was completed in accordance with
procedure S2.IC-SC.SW-0001(Q), ``Containment Fan Coil Unit Service
Water Inlet/Outlet Flow.''
<bullet> Scheduled maintenance outages on the 12 chilled water pump
and the 12 component cooling water pump during the week of December 15,
2002, and EDG maintenance activities performed during 1R15, following
their completion.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
.1 Routine Observations
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the key activities
planned and scheduled for the Unit 1 refueling outage (1R15), the 1R15
risk assessment report, and the contingency plans developed for the two
reactor coolant system (RCS) mid-loop operating periods and for the
removal of the 12 service water header from service. This review was
performed to determine whether PSEG appropriately assessed and had
planned actions to manage the risk associated with the 1R15 activities.
Some of the specific activities reviewed included:
<bullet> Plant cooldown data to determine whether the plant
cooldown was performed in accordance with TS limits.
<bullet> Plant configuration to periodically verify its consistency
with the plant Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM) plan,
including availability of decay heat removal systems as required.
<bullet> Reduced inventory and mid-loop conditions. Reviewed
contingency plans for inventory control for RCS at mid-loop with fuel
in the reactor vessel. Verified that a temporary level column was
installed and that it was periodically monitored to determine the water
level in the RCS hot leg and the reactor pressure vessel. Reviewed
preparations for steam generator nozzle dam removal including mock-up
training. Verified that the containment equipment hatch was secured
during reduced inventory operations and that the personnel equipment
hatch could be promptly secured.
<bullet> Fuel handling operations, including removal and insertion
of the fuel bundles and fuel movement within the spent fuel pool.
Verified that fuel handling was performed in accordance with plant
procedures and that the location of fuel assemblies, including new fuel
assemblies, and control elements were tracked from core offload through
core reload.
<bullet> Selected maintenance activities, including RWST discharge
nozzle weld inspection and restoration, 12 SW header outage and
internal pipe inspections, and EDG maintenance outages.
<bullet> Bare metal visual inspection of the Reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) head with PSEG personnel. Conducted a visual inspection of
the under-RPV area at normal operating temperature and pressure
conditions.
<bullet> Walkdown of selected areas of the containment and
pressurizer cubicle during closeout activities and prior to reactor
startup to identify debris that could affect the performance of the
containment emergency sump. Identified some minor deficiencies to PSEG
outage management personnel for resolution following this walkdown.
<bullet> Plant restoration, including control of mode changes,
startup and power ascension activities.
b. Findings.--A finding (discussed in Section R23) was identified
involving the failure to properly evaluate a temporary modification to
the 11 service water header while the 12 service water header was
removed from service. No other findings of significance were
identified.
.2 One Shutdown Cooling Loop Inoperable and less than 23 Feet of
Water Above the Fuel
a. Inspection Scope.--On October 25 the inspectors noted a late log
entry documenting entry into TS Action Statement (TSAS) 3.9.8.2. Entry
into this TSAS was required when less than two RHR loops are operable
with the reactor cavity water level less than 23 feet above the top of
the fuel in the reactor vessel. The inspectors reviewed selected
procedures, risk and contingency planning documents, control room logs,
notification 20118564, order 70027847 and discussed the event with PSEG
operations, outage management, risk assessment and licensing personnel
to evaluate the adequacy of PSEG's review of this event.
b. Findings
Introduction. PSEG removed the 11 component cooling water (CCW)
pump room cooler fan from service at conditions not permitted by TS
(i.e., with refueling cavity level less than 23 feet). This finding was
determined to be of very low risk significance (Green), because during
the event the 11 CCW pump remained available and functional, and
therefore did not directly affect the operation of a mitigating system.
Description. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.9.8.2
requires that two operable RHR loops be maintained when the reactor
cavity water level is less than 23 feet above the top of the active
fuel. At 2:23 a.m. on October 25, 2002, the 1C vital bus was de-
energized with the refueling cavity drained down below a level of 23
feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel. This de-energized
the fan motor of the 11 CCW pump room cooler that was required to
support operability of the 11 CCW pump (one of two CCW pumps required
to maintain two RHR loops operable). This oversight was identified a
few hours later by an oncoming operating crew.
Also, PSEG had not implemented the required compensatory measures
prior to de-energizing the fan room cooler. These actions would have
included, running the available (12) room cooler, propping open the 11
CCW pump room door, tagging the auxiliary feedwater pumps out of
service, stopping the safety injection and containment spray pumps,
ensuring service water temperature is below 90 F, and monitoring
atmospheric temperature. PSEG evaluated this issue and identified human
performance, procedure and administrative controls, supervisory
oversight and human performance as contributing factors to this event.
Additionally, the operating procedures did not cover the 11 CCW pump
and room cooler within 1C vital bus de-energizing guidance. Inadequate
scheduling and coordination of major outage events and the failure to
identify required compensatory measures were also identified as
contributors to this event.
Analysis. This finding affected the configuration control attribute
of the availability objective of the Mitigating System Cornerstone
since it involved the failure to adequately control outage activities
and affected the operability of required decay removal systems while
shutdown and was therefore more than minor. The finding was reviewed by
NRC Senior Reactor Analysts from Region I and NRR and determined to be
of very low safety significance since the 11 CCW pump was able to
function for the period of time that the room cooling fan was removed
from service without the necessary compensatory measures. Therefore,
the 11 CCW pump remained available and functional.
Enforcement. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written
procedures shall be established and implemented for activities in
Appendix ``A'' of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33
requires that procedures be developed to perform maintenance on safety
related systems. PSEG failed to establish and implement adequate
procedures prior to conducting maintenance that removed the 11 CCW pump
room cooler from service. This very low risk violation has been entered
in the corrective action program (notification 20118564) and is being
treated as a non-cited violation consistent with the Section VI.A of
the NRC's Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272 and 50-311/02-09-04.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
.1 Routine Testing
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the test results for
selected risk significant components systems to assess whether the
components met TS, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and PSEG
procedural requirements. The inspectors assessed whether the testing
appropriately demonstrated that the components were operationally ready
and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The
following tests and activities were reviewed:
<bullet> S1.OP-ST.CH-0002(Q), ``Inservice Testing--12 Chilled Water
Pump''
<bullet> S1.OP-ST.CC-0002(Q), ``Inservice Testing--12 Component
Cooling Pump''
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Containment Air Temperature Surveillance Measurement
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors interviewed design engineers
and reviewed vendor documentation to determine whether the containment
integrity design basis accident analysis considered the initial
temperature of the containment passive heat sinks. This review was
conducted to determine whether PSEG's method for determining the
containment average air temperature per TS 4.6.1.5 was consistent with
the design basis accident analysis assumptions for initial containment
temperature as discussed in Inspection Report 50-272 & 50-311/01-09
(URI 50-272 & 50-311/01-09-01).
b. Findings.--PSEG demonstrated that the initial containment
temperature assumed in the containment integrity design basis analysis
considered the initial (i.e. pre-accident) temperature of the
containment passive heat sinks. The inspectors concluded that PSEG's
method for measuring containment temperature as described in Inspection
Report 50-272 & 50-311/01-09 would satisfy design basis accident
assumptions. Therefore, no violations of NRC requirements were
identified and URI 50-272 & 50-311/01-09-01 is closed.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the following
temporary modifications (TMs) to assess: (1) the adequacy of the 10 CFR
50.59 screen or evaluation; (2) the installation and removal conditions
and instructions; (3) the updating of drawings and procedures; and (4)
the expected removal date. The following TMs were inspected:
<bullet> 02-037, ``Bypass Detector Low Temperature Alarm for
Radiation Monitor 2R1B, Channel 1''
<bullet> Installation of a Temporary Hose to the 11SW527 Valve
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified that a temporary
modification (hose connection and pump) to the service water system was
not properly evaluated. A Green NCV was identified for failure to
adequately evaluate a rubber hose that was temporarily attached to the
only operable service water header as prescribed by 10 CFR 50, Appendix
B, Criterion III, ``Design Control.''
Description. The inspectors identified that on October 18, 2002, a
temporary rubber hose and air-operated pump were connected to the
11SW527 valve to facilitate draining of leakage from the 12 SW header.
The hose was approximately 3 inches in diameter, and manually operated
11SW527 valve was left in the open position. In this configuration the
temporary hose and air-operated pump formed an extension of the 11 SW
header pressure boundary and failure of this temporary assembly would
have adversely affected the capability of the SW system to supply
required safety-related loads. The 12 SW header was out of service for
maintenance and reactor core defueling operations were in progress
while the temporary assembly was connected.
The inspectors informed operations personnel regarding this concern
and reviewed operations procedure, S1.OP-SO.SW-0005, ``Service Water
System Operation,'' and the temporary modification log to determine
whether this configuration had been previously analyzed. The inspectors
determined that this configuration had been established without
performing an adequate engineering evaluation of the potential impact
of this temporary assembly on the SW system. Operations personnel
implemented interim corrective measures to shut the 11SW527 valve when
not actually using the connection to drain the leakage from the 12 SW
header and initiated notification 20117389 to enhance the procedural
guidance for control and use of temporary assemblies.
Analysis. The inspectors determined that this finding was
associated with the evaluation and use of temporary equipment that
affected the design control attribute of the capability objective of
the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to maintain an operable service
water system, and is therefore greater than minor. If left uncorrected,
this finding could have resulted in a more significant safety concern
(i.e. the failure of the temporary hose assembly could have challenged
the capability of the only operable service water header while reactor
core defueling operations were in progress). This finding was evaluated
using the Phase I worksheet of the SDP and determined to be of very low
risk significance (Green) since the temporary hose assembly remained
intact, was installed for a short period of time, and was typically
attended by a nuclear equipment operator.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, ``Design
Control,'' requires that applicable regulations for structures,
systems, and components are properly translated into specifications,
procedures and drawings. Contrary to the above, PSEG failed to develop
adequate specifications and procedures prior to connection of a
temporary hose assembly to the 11 SW header. Because the failure to
develop adequate controls for this configuration was determined to be
of very low significance and has been entered into the corrective
action program (notification 20117389), this violation is being treated
as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC
Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272/02-09-05, Failure to Properly Evaluate a
Temporary Installation to the 11 Service Water Header.
2. Radiation Safety
Occupation Radiation Safety [OS]
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas
a. Inspection Scope.--During the period October 21-25, 2002, the
inspector reviewed exposure significant work areas, high radiation
areas, and airborne radioactivity areas in the plant and evaluated
associated controls and surveys of these areas to determine if the
controls (i.e., surveys, postings, barricades) were acceptable. The
primary focus of this inspection was observing and reviewing work
activities associated with the Unit 1 refueling outage (1R15). For
these areas the inspector reviewed radiological job requirements and
attended job briefings to determine if radiological conditions in the
work area were adequately communicated to workers through briefings and
postings. The inspector also verified radiological controls,
radiological job coverage, and contamination controls to ensure the
accuracy of surveys and applicable posting and barricade requirements.
The inspector obtained this information via: interviews with PSEG
personnel; walkdown of systems, structures, and components; and
examination of records, procedures, or other pertinent documents. The
inspector determined if prescribed radiation work permits (RWPs), and
procedure and engineering controls were in place; whether PSEG surveys
and postings were complete and accurate; and if air samplers were
properly located. The inspector reviewed RWPs used to access these and
other high radiation areas to identify the acceptability of work
control instructions or control barriers specified. The inspector
reviewed electronic pocket dosimeter alarm set points (both integrated
dose and dose rate) for conformity with survey indications and plant
policy. The controls implemented by PSEG were compared to those
required under plant technical specifications (TS 6.12) and 10 CFR 20,
Subpart G for control of access to high and locked high radiation
areas.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and
Controls
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspector reviewed ALARA job evaluations,
exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements and compared
ALARA plans with the results achieved. A review was performed of the
integration of ALARA requirements into work procedures and RWP
documents, the accuracy of person-hour estimates and person-hour
tracking, and generated shielding requests and their effectiveness in
dose rate reduction. The inspector obtained this information via:
interviews with PSEG personnel; walkdown of systems, structures, and
components; and, examination of records, procedures, or other pertinent
documents.
The inspector also reviewed exposure goals established for the Unit
1 refueling outage (1R15). An outage goal of 110 person-rem had been
established by PSEG, including the following work activities and their
outage exposure goal: reactor maintenance (18.500 rem); primary steam
generator work [including eddy current testing] (20.335 rem); reactor
coolant pump and motor work (3.460 rem); and, in-service inspection
(7.700 rem). By day 14 of the outage, outage exposures exceeded 116
person-rem. The primary reason for exceeding the outage goal identified
by PSEG was higher than anticipated area dose rates as the result of a
shutdown crud burst and the subsequent inability to remove the
radioactive material from the primary coolant in sufficient quantity
prior to the start of outage work.
Since the 1999 Unit 1 refueling outage (1R13), this is the third
time greater than anticipated area dose rates have been created
following a shutdown crud burst and subsequent primary coolant clean-
up. Similar issues also arose during the 2000 Unit 2 refueling outage
(2R11). Corrective actions taken after both of these previous outages
proved insufficient to prevent a recurrence during 1R15.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspector reviewed field instrumentation
utilized by radiation protection technicians and plant workers to
measure radioactivity, including portable field survey instruments,
friskers, portal monitors and small article monitors. The inspector
reviewed selected radiation protection instruments observed in the
radiologically controlled area (RCA), specifically verification of
proper function and certification of appropriate source checks for
these instruments which were utilized to ensure that occupational
exposures are maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1201. The
inspector obtained this information via: interviews with PSEG
personnel; walkdown of systems, structures, and components; and
examination of records, procedures, or other pertinent documents.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
3. Safeguards
Physical Protection [PP]
3PP3 Response to Contingency Events
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the status of
security operations and assessed implementation of the protective
measures in place as a result of the current, elevated threat
environment.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
4. Other Activities [OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspector reviewed a listing of licensee
event reports for the period January 1, 2002 through October 21, 2002
for issues related to the public radiation safety performance
indicator, which measures radiological effluent release occurrences per
site that exceed 1.5 milli-rem per quarter (mrem/qtr) whole body or 5
mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; or 5 mrads/qtr gamma air
dose, 10 mrads/qtr beta air dose; or 7.5 mrems/qtr organ doses from I-
131, I-133, H-3 and particulates for gaseous effluents.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspector reviewed PSEG's procedure for
developing the data for the emergency preparedness PIs which are: (1)
Drill and Exercise Performance, (2) Emergency Response Organization
Drill Participation and (3) Alert Notification System (ANS)
Reliability. The inspector also reviewed PSEG's drill/exercise reports,
training records and ANS testing data from the fourth quarter of 2001
to the end of the third quarter of 2002 to verify the accuracy of the
reported data. The review was performed in accordance with NRC
Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance criteria are 10 CFR 50.9 and
NEI 99-02, Revision 2, Regulation Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Reactor Scram and Unplanned Power Reductions
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed the performance
indicator (PI) data submitted by PSEG for ``Unplanned Scrams per 7000
Critical Hours,'' ``Scrams with a Loss of Normal Heat Removal,'' and
``Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours'' to ensure that the
data was consistent with the plant operating histories and with the
guidance contained in NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Indicator
Guideline.'' The inspectors reviewed the data submitted from the third
quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2002.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Cross Reference to P&IR Findings Documented Elsewhere
Section 40A5 describes a finding for failure to be able to achieve
and maintain a 50 percent concentration of carbon dioxide for 30
minutes by the fire suppression systems for six safety-related areas.
The failure of PSEG to identify that modifications to the ventilation
system to trip the exhaust fans aggravated this previously identified
condition and to implement timely and effective action for the
conditions are indicative of potential deficiencies in the licensee's
corrective action reviews.
.2 Reactor Safety Cornerstone--Salem Unit 1 Inservice Inspection
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspector reviewed a sample of corrective
action reports shown in Attachment 1, which identified problems related
to ISI issues. The inspector verified that problems were being
identified, evaluated, appropriately dispositioned, and entered into
the corrective action program.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone--Salem Unit 1 Auxiliary
Building Water Leak
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed PSEG activities
regarding problem identification and resolution of contaminated water
leaks into the Auxiliary Building. The review noted the applicable
information as discussed below.
On September 18, 2002, PSEG documented (notification 20114071) the
discovery of water leakage through the Unit 1--78-foot mechanical
penetration room wall. PSEG also noted that workers' shoes coming from
the room were contaminated. PSEG took smear and water samples. The
measurement results indicated that the source of water was from a
radioactive system. There has been a history of non-contaminated water
leakage in this area (e.g., notification 20001837 in 1999 and MMIS
971217047 in 1977).
On September 25, 2002, PSEG initiated an evaluation (notification
20114152) to resolve the water leakage. Subsequently, PSEG engineering
personnel identified a second leak at a spent fuel pool cooling piping
penetration (between the Unit 1 spent fuel building and the auxiliary
building) located within the Unit 1 78-foot mechanical penetration
room.
On November 20, 2002, PSEG informed the resident inspectors of the
leak. PSEG personnel reported that chemical analysis of water from the
leak was indicative of the Unit 1 spent fuel pool. On November 29, PSEG
began installation of a collection device to capture the leakage from
under the spent fuel pool cooling line and direct this water to the
contaminated drain and liquid radwaste systems.
On December 9-10, 2002, the resident inspectors and a regional
specialist toured the Unit 1 78-foot mechanical penetration room and
verified the leak catch device under the spent fuel pool cooling water
return pipe. The inspectors also toured Unit 1 64-foot switchgear room
and noted that there was evidence of five (5) water leaks along the
wall in the room. The leaks appeared to be long established with the
exception of one (Sample 7). PSEG took five samples and measured for
boron, tritium, and gamma analyses. The analytical results of the
Sample No. 7 indicated that the source of water was from a radioactive
system. Analytical results of the other four (4) samples suggested that
these were the results of uncontaminated groundwater intrusion. On
December 9 PSEG assigned a full-time team and developed an action plan
to address the leaks. Two additional notifications (20123998 and
20120815) were drafted to document the corrective actions.
On January 2 and 3, 2003, the inspectors reviewed analytical data,
including water samples from seven (7) onsite environmental test
locations. The analytical results for tritium, fission, and activated
gamma emitters were well below the required lower limits of detection
(LLDs) listed in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The
inspectors attended PSEG's meetings to observe their discussions of (1)
soil and water sampling, (2) drilling of permanent deep sampling wells,
(3) spent fuel pool water make-up rate, (4) integrity of the fuel
transfer canal, (5) sampling the water at the bottom of spent fuel pool
to track iodine-131, and (6) monitoring for spent fuel pool water
leaks.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified at the
time of this inspection. At the conclusion of the period the inspectors
were unable to determine whether PSEG met all ODCM and 10 CFR 20
effluent release requirements since the environmental sampling
activities had not been completed. This issue will remain unresolved
pending completion and assessment of the planned environmental
monitoring activities (URI 50-272/02-09-06).
.4 Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System Water-Hammer
a. Inspection Scope.--An inspection of problem identification and
resolution for a selected issue was performed to review the
effectiveness of actions in identifying the problem and the
implementation of the follow-up corrective actions. The item selected
for this review was related to notifications 20099566, 20104986, and
20110575 that documented a water-hammer event during the start of RHR
pumps 21 and 22 for testing, and the troubleshooting efforts to
determine the cause. The inspection included the review of the
troubleshooting efforts, engineering analyses and evaluations, the root
cause determination, the corrective action plan, and design
modification and post-modification testing following the installation
of additional RHR system vents in May 2002. Also, the inspector
performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the RHR system, and
reviewed RHR system fill and vent procedure, and reviewed the design
and licensing basis for the RHR system.
The inspector did not identify an operability concern with the
water hammer events but noted that PSEG's initial efforts to understand
and resolve this problem did not appear timely. The initial water-
hammer event was identified before the startup from the Unit 2
refueling outage in May 2002, and the cause was attributed to a check
valve slamming noise. Based on the document review and interviews, the
inspector concluded that PSEG troubleshooting activities for this
problem were delayed until August 2002 (notification 20110575). The
inspector noted that the eventual investigation of this problem
appeared to be better focused and thorough.
b. Findings. No significant findings were identified.
.5 Human Performance Improvement
a. Inspection Scope.--During the June 2001 assessment meeting
between the NRC and PSEG, PSEG senior management indicated that a group
had been formed to initiate a human performance improvement program.
Due to continuing human performance issues at Salem, the inspectors
selected this improvement program for review of measurable performance
changes regarding the identification and resolution of problems.
The inspectors found that the improvement program described during
the 2001 meeting had not been maintained. Also, in the summer of 2002,
an industry peer review identified that an integrated and visible
approach to improving human performance was not evident at the site. In
October 2002 PSEG assigned a new human performance manager and began
development of a new human performance program initiative. The
inspectors discussed this initiative with the human performance manager
and reviewed draft action plans for program implementation. The initial
implementation has commenced through the communication and training of
senior and mid-level managers on the initiative and tools for
implementation. Performance indicators to measure human performance
improvement are being developed and populated with data. PSEG indicated
that these performance indicators would provide a meaningful measure of
performance by the end of 2003. The inspectors determined that it was
premature to determine the effectiveness of this program.
b. Findings. No significant findings were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) LER 50-311/02-002-00: Containment Internal Pressure Not
Maintained Within Technical Specification Limits
On April 20, 2002, PSEG discovered that the instrumentation used to
monitor the containment internal pressure was reading one-half of the
actual containment pressure. This lower indicated pressure resulted in
operation where the actual containment internal pressure exceeded the
0.3 psig TS 3.6.1.4 limit. The problem resulted from the installation
of an incorrect part as an equivalent replacement for an
instrumentation module. PSEG's planned and completed corrective actions
included repair of the instrument, review of the release calculation
used in the Annual Radioactive Effluents Report, review for a similar
problem at Unit 1 and entry of this problem into the corrective action
program to evaluate the programmatic problems that led to this event.
No new findings were identified in the inspector's review. This finding
constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to
enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's
Enforcement Policy. PSEG documented the problem in notification
20097451. This LER is closed.
.2 (Closed) LER 50-272/02-005-00: Unexpected Auto-Start of Turbine
Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump at Start of Refueling Outage
On October 10, 2002, during the scheduled manual trip to start the
1R15 refueling outage, an unexpected automatic start of the 13
auxiliary feedwater pump occurred. Operators responded properly to the
event. This event resulted from the previous adjustment of the steam
generator low-low setpoint that was performed in response to a generic
concern (discussed in Inspection Report 50-272 & 50-311/02-03). PSEG's
planned and completed corrective actions included evaluation of whether
further setpoint changes could be implemented to preclude this type of
event and a review to determine whether this type of event can be
defined as expected. The LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no
findings of significance were identified. PSEG documented this event in
notification 20116128. This LER is closed.
.3 (Closed) LER 50-272/02-007: Core Alterations Performed Without
Direct Communications
On October 16, 2002, while lifting the upper internals from reactor
vessel, PSEG failed to establish direct communications between the
control room and the refueling station as required by TS 3.9.5. PSEG's
planned and completed corrective actions included development of a
temporary standing order to clarify roles and responsibilities for the
refueling and operating crews, and procedural enhancements. No new
findings were identified in the inspector's review. This finding
constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to
enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's
Enforcement Policy. PSEG documented the problem in notification
20116936. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 TI 2515/150--Reactor Pressure Vessel Head (RPV) and Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2002-02)
a. Inspection Scope.--The inspectors reviewed PSEG's activities to
detect circumferential cracking of RPV head penetration nozzles in
response to NRC Bulletin 2002-02, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and
Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs,'' as specified by
Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/150. The activities included interviews
with analyst personnel and other technical staff, reviews of
qualification records, procedures, and observations of selected video
tape and pictures of the reactor vessel closure head visual
examination. The inspectors also reviewed the susceptibility
calculation to verify that appropriate plant-specific information was
used as input. In accordance with TI 2515/150, inspectors verified that
deficiencies and discrepancies associated with the RCS pressure
boundary or the examination process was identified and that they were
placed in PSEG's corrective action process.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified and the
specific reporting requirements of TI 2515/150 are documented in
Attachment 1.
.2 TI 2515/148, Revision 1, Appendix A--Inspection of Nuclear
Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope.--An audit of PSEG's performance of the interim
compensatory measures imposed by the NRC's Order Modifying License,
issued February 25, 2002 was completed in accordance with the
specifications of NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction (TI)
2515/148, Revision 1, Appendix A, dated September 13, 2002.
b. Findings. No findings of significance were identified.
.3 (Closed) URI 50-272; 50-311/02-07-01: Failure to maintain the
Fire Protection Program as described in the FSAR and approved in the
SERs.
Introduction. PSEG did not properly maintain room isolation
barriers and improperly implemented a modification to the switchgear
penetration area ventilation system, both of which caused an existing
fire protection concern on carbon dioxide (CO<INF>2</INF>)
concentration to be exacerbated. This finding (Green NCV) represents
the completion of an unresolved item identified in Inspection Report
2002-07 regarding the automatic fire suppression system in six safety-
related electrical areas addressed by the fire protection program.
Description. During the 1999 triennial fire protection inspection
(NRC Inspection Report 50-272&311/99-10), the inspectors identified a
White finding involving the initial testing of the 4160V switchgear
room and lower electrical penetration area CO<INF>2</INF> fire
suppression systems. When initially tested in 1974 (Unit 1) and 1979
(Unit 2), the systems failed to achieve the design concentration of 50
percent CO<INF>2</INF>. The inspectors determined that the plant
condition did not meet the requirements of License Conditions 2.C.5
(Unit 1) and 2.C.10 (Unit 2), i.e., the fire protection program. The
CO<INF>2</INF> systems as described by PSEG in the FSAR and approved by
NRC specify a 50 percent CO<INF>2</INF> concentration to be maintained
for 30 minutes.
Following this finding, PSEG initially attempted to replace the
CO<INF>2</INF> system with a water-based automatic sprinkler system.
This plan was abandoned due to floor drain system limitations. In April
2002 PSEG determined that returning the CO<INF>2</INF> system to fully
operable status would be a better alternative.
PSEG performed tracer gas testing in May 2002 to support re-
analysis of the CO<INF>2</INF> systems and to resolve issues associated
with commitments for CO<INF>2</INF> retention in fire areas at Salem.
The test results predicted achievement of approximately 45 percent
initial concentrations, which would dissipate to 18 to 28 per cent
within 20 minutes.
PSEG identified that the majority of the leakage from the rooms was
through the CO<INF>2</INF> isolation dampers and the fire door seals.
PSEG subsequently determined that the dampers used were backdraft
dampers, and therefore improperly utilized for isolation in the
switchgear and penetration area ventilation system. PSEG also
determined that the 5 year damper seal replacements recommended by the
damper manufacturer had never been done.
The CO<INF>2</INF> system design called for the ventilation system
fans to trip on a CO<INF>2</INF> discharge. The initial ventilation
system design had the supply fans continuing to operate after a
CO<INF>2</INF> discharge, but the exhaust fans tripped. Between 1994
and 1996 PSEG installed engineering changes 1-EC-3377 and 2-EG-3298
that permitted the exhaust fans to continue to operate after a
CO<INF>2</INF> discharge, thereby further degrading the ability of the
CO<INF>2</INF> system to achieve and maintain a 50 percent
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration for 30 minutes.
Analysis. The inspector determined that this finding adversely
impacted fire suppression equipment capability, affecting the design
control attribute of the capability objective of the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone, and therefore is greater than minor.
The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
0609, Appendix F. The finding passed the Phase I screening criteria,
since it affected either manual or automatic suppression, depending
upon the room.
For the phase 2 evaluation, the inspector developed fire scenarios
based on the switchgear units in the areas of concern. The IPEEE fire
scenarios were used as the starting point. Since the areas had been the
subject of impairments and had fire watch patrols, the transient
combustible scenario was not imposed. In addition, the non-propagation
fire scenarios for the switchgear fires were assumed to become
propagation scenarios, due to the degraded gaseous suppression systems.
The most limiting fire scenarios were those which led to a transient
with loss of power conversion system, and disabled an auxiliary
feedwater pump and a power operated relief valve. The ignition
frequencies for these scenarios were summed, and the fire mitigation
factors applied. The factors gave full credit for the fire brigade.
Existing electrical raceway fire wrap was credited during scenario
development by not imposing fire damage to cables which were wrapped.
The resulting fire mitigation frequency corresponds to Row D of the
risk estimation matrix (Table 5.6 in Appendix F of IMC 0609). The
mitigating system capability rating for the remaining auxiliary
feedwater trains (3) resulted in an overall risk characterization of
Green.
Also, this finding had an aspect of problem identification and
resolution, in that ineffective problem evaluation existed regarding
the preventive maintenance and modifications on the affected equipment.
Enforcement. License Conditions 2.C.5 (Unit 1) and 2.C.10 (Unit 2)
require PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the
fire protection program as approved in the SERs. Contrary to the above,
PSEG failed to properly maintain room isolation dampers and improperly
implemented a modification to the switchgear and penetration area
ventilation system that resulted in the inability of the carbon dioxide
fire suppression systems for six safety-related areas to maintain the
design concentration for the specified time period. This self-revealing
violation of very low safety significance is not being cited since it
meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-
1600, for being dispositioned as NCV.
4OA6 Management Meetings
a. Exit Meeting Summary.--On January 16, 2003, the inspectors
presented their overall findings to members of PSEG management led by
Mr. Lon Waldinger. PSEG management stated that none of the information
reviewed by the inspectors was considered proprietary.
b. PSEG/NRC Management Meeting.--On December 17 and 18, 2002, the
NRC Region I Deputy Regional Administrator and the Region I DRP
Division Director toured Salem Station and met with PSEG management to
discuss current plant performance issues.
______
Attachment 1--Supplemental Information
A. KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
C. Banner, EP Supervisor; D. Burgin, EP Manager; H. Berrick,
Licensing Engineer; T. Cellmer, Radiation Protection Manager; C.
Conner, NDE Engineer; P. Fabian, Steam Generator Engineer; V.
Fregonese, Manager Design Engineering; M. Hassler, Radiation Protection
Operations Superintendent--Salem; H. Malikowski, Materials Engineering;
J. Nagle, Supervisor Licensing; T. Neufang, ALARA Supervisor--Salem; T.
Oliveri, NDE/ISI Inspector; R. Schmidt, Materials Engineering; B.
Sebastian, ALARA and Support Superintendent; W. Treston, Supervisor
ISI; V. Zabielski, Steam Generator Group Manager.
B. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-272&311/02-09-01; URI; Submerged safety-related electrical
cables appropriate corrective actions. (Section R06).
50-272/02-09-06; URI; Salem Unit 1 spent fuel pool water leak.
(Section 4OA2.3).
Opened/Closed
50-272/02-09-02; NCV; Failure to properly test the 12 component
cooling heat exchanger. (Section R07).
50-272&311/02-09-03; NCV; PSEG failed to maintain complete and
adequate maintenance records. (Section R13).
50-272&311/02-09-04; NCV; Shutdown cooling loop inoperable and less
than 3 feet of water above the fuel. (Section R20).
50-272/02-09-05; NCV; Failure to properly evaluate a temporary
installation to the 11 service water header. (Section R23).
Closed
50-272/01-07-01; URI; Inservice Inspection Activities. (Section
R08).
50-272&311/01-09-01; URI; Containment air temperature surveillance
measurement. (Section R22).
50-272&311/02-07-01; URI; Failure to maintain the fire protection
program as described in the FSAR and approved in the SERS. (Section
OA5.3).
50-311/02-02-00; LER; Containment internal pressure not maintained
within technical specification limits. (Section OA3.1).
50-272/02-05-00; LER; Unexpected auto-start of the turbine driven
auxiliary feedwater pump at start of refueling outage. (Section OA3.2).
50-272/02-07-00; LER; Core alterations performed without direct
communications. (Section OA3.3).
C. LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report,
the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records:
Calculation #S-C-RC-MDC-1928, Rev 0, Determination of Effective
Degradation Years (EDY) at RFO 1R15 (Salem Unit 1) and 2R13 (Salem Unit
2).
SH.RA-IS.ZZ-0005(Q), Rev 1, VT-2 Visual Examination of Nuclear
Class 1, 2 and 3 Systems
SC.RA-IS.RC-0001(Q), Rev 0, Vessel Head Penetration Examination
Drawing E 233-048, Closure Head Assembly for 173'' ID Reactor.
Video tape and still photographs of Bare metal inspection and
selected RV head nozzles.
NC.NM-AP.22-0004(Q) NDE Inspector vision tests
SH.MD-AS. 22-0001(Q) NDE Certificates of Qualification
Reactor power, RCS Flow and RCS temperature data collected by
engineering
LR-N02-0297, Response to NRC Bulletin 2002-02, Reactor Pressure
Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs
Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2. September 06, 2002.
PSEG Technical Specification 6.9.1.5 Annual Reports Salem and Hope
Creek Generating Stations Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311, and 50-354 dated
February 26, 2002.
Engineering Evaluation No. S-1-RC-MEE-1509 Rev 0--1R14 Steam
Generator Tubing Operational Assessment for Cycle 15.
Engineering Evaluation No. S-1-RC-MEE-1507 Rev 0--Salem 1R14 Steam
Generator Tubing Condition Monitoring Assessment.
Engineering Evaluation No. S-1-RC-MEE-1691 Rev 0--1R15 Steam
Generator Degradation Assessment.
Engineering Evaluation No. S-1-RC-MEE-1508 Rev 0--1R14 Steam
Generator Tubing Degradation Assessment.
S1.SG-ST.RCE-0001(Q)-Rev 4 Steam Generator Eddy Current
Examination.
54-ISI-400-11 Revision August 27, 2000--Framatome Technologies
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Examination of Tubing.
Examination Technique Specification Sheet #1 Rev 3--Bobbin Probe
Examination.
Examination Technique Specification Sheet #2 Rev 0--Rotating Probe
Examination (115/+Point/080HF).
Examination Technique Specification Sheet #3 Rev 0--Dual Coil
Rotating Probe Examination (+Point MR/HF) U-bend.
Examination Technique Specification Sheet #4 Rev 1--Single Coil
Rotating Probe Examination (+Point) U-bend.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016623
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016624
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016625
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016626
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016627
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016628
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016629
B-0.
6875 by 040 EPRI, ASME, Wear Cal Standard as built drawing--6016630
B-0.
Radiographic Examination Record Order 600032565.
02RF Examination Summary Record 191000--Integrally welded supports
to reactor coolant pump 11 11-PMP-1LG.
02RF Examination Summary Record 191100--Integrally welded supports
to reactor coolant pump 11 11-PMP-2LG.
02RF Examination Summary Record 221400--Main Steam System Component
34-MS-2141-1PL-1.
02RF Examination Summary Record 221500--Main Steam System Component
34-MS-2141-1PL-2.
02RF Examination Summary Record 221600--Main Steam System Component
34-MS-2141-1LP-3 thru 6.
02RF Examination Summary Record 222000--Main Steam System Component
34-MS-2141-1PL-7 thru 10.
02RF Examination Summary Record 222210--Main Steam System Component
34-MS-2141-1PL-11.
02RF Examination Summary Record 222215--Main Steam System Component
34-MS-2141-1PL-12.
02RF Examination Summary Record 148200--Safety Injection System
Component 2-SJ-1137-13.
02RF Examination Summary Record 148300--Safety Injection System
Component 2-SJ-1137-14.
02RF Examination Summary Record 148400--Safety Injection System
Component 2-SJ-1137-15.
02RF Examination Summary Record 148500--Safety Injection System
Component 2-SJ-1137-16.
02RF Examination Summary Record 148900--Safety Injection System
Component 2-SJ-1137-20.
02RF Examination Summary Record 005310--Reactor Pressure Vessel
Closure Head Component 1-RPV-NUTS 1-54.
Corrective Actions: 20102540, 20097621, 20098121, 20099595,
20096101, 20096437.
Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicator (PI)
Data (NC.EP-DG.ZZ-0001(Z)--Rev 03).
Notifications and Orders related to the Water-hammer event:
20099566, 20099608, 20102647, 20104986, 20108933, 20110575,
20111010, 20111212, 20113051, 20113361, 20115277, 20114030, and
20113054.
Procedures
Filling and Venting Procedure for RHR: S1.OP-SO.RHR-0003(Q), Rev.
12. Water-hammer Action Plan, Attachment 5 to Procedure NC.PF-AP.ZZ-
0082(Z).
Engineering Evaluations and Related Documents
RHR Water-hammer Issue Update, dated September 6, 2002.
Level 2 Evaluation RHR Water-hammer.
Event Time Line 04/05/02 through 11/05/02.
Drawings:
205350-SIMP, Rev. 02, ECCS-Simplified P&ID, 205332-SIMP, Rev. 01,
RH R--Simplified P&ID; RH--2-2, Rev. 11, Aux Bld RHR & Safety
Injection; P&ID for Elv. 45', 55', and 64' RH--2-3, Rev. 10, Reactor
Containment RHR & SI P&ID for Elv. 78' 0''.
D. LIST OF ACRONYMS
ALARA--As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable
ANS--Alert and Notification System
ASME--American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAV--Control Area Ventilation
CC--Component Cooling
CCW--Component Cooling Water
CFCU--Containment Fan Cooling Unit
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
CO<INF>2</INF>--Carbon Dioxide
CY--Calendar Year
ECA--Engineering Change Authorization
EDGs--Emergency Diesel Generators
EDY--Effective Degradation Years
EFPY--Effective Full Power Years
EPRI--Electric Power Research Institute
ICMs--Interim Compensatory Measures
IR--Inspection Report
ISI--Inservice Inspection
LCO--Limiting Condition for Operation
LLDs--Lower Limits of Detection
MR--Maintenance Rule
NCV--Non-Cited Violation
NDE--Non-Destructive Examination
NRC--Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OCC--Outage Control Center
ODCM--Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
ORAM--Outage Risk Assessment and Management
PARS--Publicly Available Records
PI--Performance Indicator
PMT--Post-Maintenance Testing
PORV--Power Operated Relief Valve
PSEG--Public Service Electric Gas
PWSCC--Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking
RCA--Radiologically Controlled Area
RCS--Reactor Coolant System
RG--Regulatory Guide
RHR--Residual Heat Removal
RPV--Reactor Pressure Vessel
RV--Reactor Vessel
RWP--Radiation Work Permit
RWST--Refueling Water Storage Tank
SDP--Significance Determination Process
SW--Service Water
TARP--Transient Assessment Response Plan
TI--Temporary Instruction
TM--Temporary Modification
TS--Technical Specifications
TSAS--Technical Specification Action Statement
URI--Unresolved Item
VTD--Vendor Technical Document
e. ti 2515/150--reactor pressure vessel head and vessel head
penetration nozzles reporting requirements
a.1. Was the examination performed by qualified and knowledgeable
personnel?
The examination was performed by qualified and knowledgeable
personnel. The inspectors found the use of VT-2 certifications
including required visual examination for utilized personnel. The
inspection technique utilized for bare metal visual examination was as
described in the licensee's Bulletin 2002-02 response, dated 6
September 2002.
a.2. Was the examination performed in accordance with approved
procedures?
The visual examination was in accordance with approved and adequate
procedures.
a.3. Was the examination able to identify, disposition, and resolve
deficiencies?
The examination was adequate to identify, disposition and resolve
deficiencies.
a.4. Was the examination capable of identifying the PWSCC
phenomenon described in the bulletin?
The examination performed was capable of identifying the PWSCC
phenomenon described in the Bulletin 2001-01.
b. What was the condition of the reactor vessel head?
The general condition of the Reactor Vessel (RV) head was clean
bare metal with some localized grit or fibrous debris on the uphill
side of several nozzles. This debris appeared to be a mixture of inert
foreign material/dirt and did not contain any evidence of boric acid.
The insulation configuration provides relatively easy access for visual
examination. No significant visual obstructions were encountered during
the bare metal inspection.
c. Could small boron deposits, as described in the Bulletin 2001-
01, ``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles,'' be identified and characterized?
Small boron deposits, as described in Bulletin 2001-01, could be
identified and characterized by the visual examination technique used.
None were found during this visual inspection.
d. What material deficiencies were identified that required repair?
No material deficiencies associated with concerns described in
Bulletin 2001-01 or 2002-02 were found.
e. What if any, significant items that could impede effective
examination?
No significant items were identified that could impede effective
examination.
TI 2515/150, Section 04.05 d, requires that inspectors report
lower-level issues concerning data collection and analysis, and issues
deemed to be significant to the phenomenon described in Bulletin. The
inspector found the licensee calculation method was identical to what
is provided in Appendix C of TI 2515/150. However, several observations
were made regarding the potential for variations in the inputs for a
specific plant calculation of effective degradation years (EDY). These
insights identified by the inspector are provided for information
below.
<bullet> The licensee's calculation for EDY for the Salem units
does not include uncertainty for the unit Effective Full Power Years
(EFPY) or RV head temperatures. The licensee and inspectors found no
evidence that other plants have utilized input parameter uncertainty
for the relative ranking determination.
<bullet> The Salem calculation for EDY utilized reactor thermal
power data from PSEG fuels which was demonstrated to be more accurate
and provides a more conservative result for the Salem units than the
generator electric output data used by MRP-44.
<bullet> The Salem Reactor Vessel head closure temperatures were
calculated by Westinghouse under the WOG program ``Technical Support of
Generic Letter 97-01, Response for RV Head Penetration Alloy 600
PWSCC.'' The licensee verified the plant specific inputs utilized
remained current before using the vendor calculated head temperatures
in the susceptibility ranking calculation. The inspector found that the
licensee does not have the information to perform a technical
comparison of the method utilized by the WOG to determine RV head
temperatures with the method utilized to obtain the reference plant RV
head temperature of 600 Deg F in the industry susceptibility model.
______
Question 2. At today's hearing, you were kind enough to provide
some background on the events related to release of small amounts of
tritium at Salem 1 reactor. While I appreciated your response and that
of the other commissioners regarding the effect of tritium, I remain
concerned about the timeline regarding the effect of tritium, I remain
concerned about the timeline regarding the notification of the public
in cases such as this. Also, I would like to know specifically what is
the responsibility of the plant's owner, PSEG in cases like this?
Response. The licensee has the responsibility to identify and
correct problems at its facilities. Licensees are required to have a
problem identification and resolution program that provides for: (1)
identification of problems; (2) reporting of problems in accordance
with established criteria (e.g., NRC, State, and/or internal); (3)
implementation of mitigating actions as necessary; (4) evaluation of
any consequences of the problem (e.g., effect on workers, public, or
the environment); (5) evaluation and determination of causes; (6)
determination of risk significance; and (7) implementation of
corrective actions commensurate with that risk significance. The basic
requirements for these activities are outlined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix
B. Specifically in this case, when the problem was identified, the
licensee documented it in its corrective action program, initiated a
review of the issue consistent with its understanding of the safety
significance of the problem, implemented various mitigation activities
to reduce or eliminate potential effects, and reported the issue to the
State and the NRC when reporting criteria were met.
PSEG has taken actions to identify the source and extent of the
leakage, including the drilling of a number of sample wells and
evaluating sample data. PSEG has also taken action to collect any
further leakage and is directing it into plant waste systems. The
licensee is closely monitoring the issue consistent with its corrective
action program, and is also undertaking a number of activities
associated with identifying permanent repair options to the spent fuel
pool. The NRC will continue to evaluate PSEG's activities regarding the
root cause for the leak and corrective actions. Further, the NRC has
maintained close coordination with the State of New Jersey and will
continue to interact frequently with appropriate State officials.
Question 3. Question about new technologies related to nuclear
power: As I mentioned, I am a Senator who is interested in learning
more about nuclear power. In particular, could you elaborate on what
new power technologies are expected to be deployed in the coming
decade?
Response. The NRC's responsibilities are to license and oversee the
operation of nuclear power plants, and does not promote the use of
nuclear power associated technologies, or work on the development of
those technologies. Those activities are conducted by the Department of
Energy (DOE). DOE has looked at this question recently and organized a
near-term deployment group to examine prospects for the deployment of
new nuclear plants in the United States during this decade, and to
identify obstacles to deployment and actions for resolution. The result
of DOE's effort is documented in a report titled, ``A Roadmap to Deploy
New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010,'' dated October
31, 2001. This report is available on DOE's website at: http://gen-
iv.ne.doe.gov/MAP-organization.html. The NRC does communicate with DOE
regarding these activities, to ensure that our activities related to
advanced reactor design are consistent with DOE's plans. The NRC also
stays informed of the industry's activities related to advanced reactor
development and deployment.
The Nuclear Energy Institute has indicated to the NRC staff that
its candidate for near term deployment will most likely be from one of
10 designs. The designs have or will be reviewed in accordance with a
standard design certification process in accordance with regulations
contained in 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart B. Through this process the NRC can
certify a reactor design for 15 years independent of a specific site.
Three of the ten designs that the nuclear industry is considering have
already been certified by the NRC, a fourth application for design
certification is currently under review, and six other designs are
subjects of pre-application discussions between the NRC and the
developers of those designs. The following is a synopsis of the various
designs and their NRC review status:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Design Supplier Size and Type NRC Review Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System 80+........................... Westinghouse........... 1354 Megawatt-electric Certified
(MWe) pressurized
water reactor.
Advanced light water
reactor; spherical
containment.
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor....... General Electric....... 1350 MWe boiling water Certified
reactor. Advanced
evolutionary design
built and operating in
Japan.
AP600................................ Westinghouse........... 610 MWe pressurized Certified
water reactor. Uses
passive safety
features for core
cooling.
AP1000............................... Westinghouse........... 1117 MWe pressurized Application review in
water reactor. Higher progress
capacity version of
the AP600.
ESBWR................................ General Electric....... 1390 MWe boiling water Pre-application review
reactor with passive in progress
safety features. Based
on earlier passive
simplified boiling
water reactor, but
higher in capacity.
Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR-700)..... Atomic Energy of Canada 731 MWe CANDU. Heavy Pre-application review
Limited (AECL). water moderator with in progress
light water coolant;
on-line refueling;
based on Canadian
CANDU technology.
Gas Turbine Modular Helium reactor... General Atomics........ 288 MWe per module Pre-application review
prismatic graphite in progress
moderated gas-cooled
reactor. Modular
direct cycle helium-
cooled reactor being
considered for power
production and
disposition of excess
weapons-grade
plutonium in Russia.
SWR-1000............................. ANP Framatome.......... 1253 MWe boiling water Pre-application review
reactor. Based on a in progress
Siemens design;
incorporates passive
safety features.
International Reactor Innovative and Westinghouse........... 300 MWe pressurized Pre-application review
Secure (IRIS). water reactor. in progress
Integral primary
system plant design;
eliminates classic
loss-of-coolant-
accidents; spherical
containment.
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR).... PBMR Pty............... 165 MWe per module gas Some discussions with
cooled reactor. the staff. PBMR Pty.
Modular direct cycle plans to request a pre-
helium-cooled pebble application review
bed design, currently
planned for
construction in South
Africa.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4. You mentioned that three companies are planning to
submit pre-license applications to the Commission. If those were to be
approved, what would the likely schedule then be with regard to
possible construction of a new reactor at one of those sites.
Response. The staff does not currently have a schedule from
industry regarding possible construction activities. Currently, the NRC
is involved in several different reviews to prepare for possible new
construction. The regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 52 describe a
standard plant design certification process, an early site permit
process, and a combined licensing process. (The standard plant design
certification process is discussed in the previous question). An
application for a combined license may incorporate by reference a
standard design certification, an early site permit, both or neither.
This approach allows early resolution of safety and environmental
issues. The issues resolved by the design certification process and
during the early site permit process are not reconsidered during the
combined license review.
The three early site permit (ESP) prospective applicants have not
committed to a timeframe for possible construction at the sites they
plan to reference. An ESP addresses site safety issues, environmental
protection issues, and plans for coping with emergencies, independent
of the review of a specific nuclear plant design. An ESP, if approved,
is good for 10 to 20 years and can be renewed for an additional 10 to
20 years. Therefore, there is a long window of opportunity for an
applicant to reference an ESP in a combined license (COL) application.
A COL authorizes construction and conditional operation of a
nuclear power plant. After a COL application is approved, onsite
construction activities could take place. In a recent meeting with the
NRC staff, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) indicated that it was
targeting a potential COL application for calendar year 2005. While the
ESP process is scheduled to be tested later this year and the staff has
already certified 3 standard plant designs, a COL application has not
yet been reviewed by the NRC. NEI did not commit to referencing one of
the three ESP applications expected in calendar year 2003. Therefore,
it is possible that industry may use a different site for a COL.
Regardless, if a COL application were received in calendar year
2005 and it referenced both an early site permit and standard certified
design, the staff estimates it would take approximately 27 months for
the review to be completed. This would place the actual start of
construction, at the earliest, in the 2007 to 2008 timeframe. Typical
construction schedules for new reactors based on the heavy reliance on
modular construction techniques are 5 years. This would result in
commercial operation of a new nuclear plant, at the earliest, in the
2012 to 2013 timeframe.
Question 5. Mr. Chairman, in your written testimony, you made the
following comment: ``Moreover, the number of individuals with the
technical skills critical to the achievement of the Commission's safety
mission is rapidly declining in the Nation, and the educational system
is not replacing them. The maintenance of technically competent staff
will challenge governmental, academic, and industry entities associated
with nuclear technology for some time to come.'' I have heard similar
assessments from other agencies, but not from any more critical to
public safety than the NRC. My question is what should we, the
Congress, do to reverse this trend? And second, what will happen if we
do not?
Response. Congress has already taken some steps that help the NRC
combat the shortage of technical skills needed by the Agency. Recent
proactive policies and legislation that maximizes human capital
flexibilities have helped the NRC with its aging staff issue. While
various recruitment, retention and training flexibilities allow the
Agency to compete more effectively for existing talent, the pool for
that talent is drying up. A report published by the U.S. Nuclear
Engineering Department Heads Organization (NEDHO) in 1999 included
survey results that indicated school enrollment reductions in nuclear
engineering of 72 percent for courses at bachelor's level and 46
percent for courses at master's level, when compared to 1992 levels. At
the same time that academic enrollments are decreasing, retirements of
current industry professionals are increasing dramatically. Actions to
help reverse these trends might include: 1) increased Federal
Government assistance to colleges and universities; 2) increased
national recruitment efforts and incentives for hard-to-fill Federal
positions deemed inherently governmental; and 3) opportunities for
Federal/academic/private sector employment sabbatical exchanges.
If some type of action is not taken to reverse trends, then the
United States may eventually have a more difficult time ensuring the
safety of current and emergent nuclear technologies. Severe competency
shortages could eventually force reductions in current regulatory work
levels, which could adversely affect licensee operations. Even if
competency shortages of this extreme were avoided, delay in addressing
the problems will add to the overall cost of solutions.
Question 6. Mr. Chairman, during the debate last year over the
Senate approval of Yucca Mountain, one of the key issues was that full-
scale testing of the containers that would be used to transport the
waste has not been conducted. In your testimony you mentioned something
about the Package Performance Study to study rail and truck casks at
full scale. What is involved in these tests, what schedule do you have
for them, and what is your system for double checking the results?
Response. The NRC is conducting a Package Performance Study to
investigate the response of spent nuclear fuel transportation casks to
transportation accident conditions. In February 2003, the NRC staff
published for comment a report that contains the NRC's draft plans for
impact and fire testing proposed to be conducted under this study. This
report is NUREG-1768 ``United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Package Performance Study Test Protocols.'' The NRC proposes to use an
actual full scale rail cask and an actual full scale truck cask. The
impact test that the staff proposed for comment involves a drop from a
tower onto a very hard target at a speed in excess of current
regulatory criteria, and the thermal test involves testing the cask in
a fully engulfing fire that will burn for more than a half hour. The
public comment period closes May 30, 2003. Following review and
analysis of the comments, the staff will develop the detailed test
plans and procedures and initiate procurement of the test specimens and
testing equipment. Prior to the tests, the computer predictions for the
expected results will be published. One of the objectives of the study
is to improve public confidence both in the ability to model the cask's
performance using computers and in the rigor of the certified cask
designs. The tests will be conducted under a rigorous quality assurance
program. The tests will likely be performed in 2004 and 2005.
Question 7. Has there been progress in selecting or designating
transportation routes for the high level waste? What is the schedule
for those designations and who is involved?
Response. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
Department of Transportation, specifies the routing requirements for
shipment of high level waste and spent nuclear fuel in Title 49, Code
of Federal Regulations. State agencies can also designate preferred
routes within their States. In general, the shipper of the high-level
waste will designate transportation routes on a case-by-case basis,
which meet the requirements of Title 49 and any applicable State
requirements. After these routes are determined, the NRC (for NRC
licensed material) considers the physical security issues associated
with the route and may require the shipper to consider additional
precautions in timing, stops, or other protections if warranted by the
route. For the proposed high level waste repository, it is our
understanding that the Department of Energy is developing strategies
for the transportation of spent fuel which would include routing
considerations.
Question 8. The NRC submitted a report last November entitled
``Inspector General's Assessment of the Most Serious Management
Challenges Facing the NRC.'' The report identifies nine important
management challenges, ranging from:
(a) Protection of nuclear material and facilities used for civilian
purposes; (b) Proper administration of all aspects of financial
management; to (c) Protection of data bases and other important NRC
information.
What has the Commission done to address the concerns raised in that
report? Do you believe the IG has accurately characterized the
challenges facing the NRC?
Response. The NRC has initiated a number of activities which
address the management challenges discussed in the IG's report. These
activities are discussed in the NRC's Budget Estimates and Performance
Plan, Fiscal Year 2004, NUREG-1000, Volume 19, dated February 2003. The
approach begins with an assessment of what, if any changes, should be
made to the NRC's Strategic Plan, including a determination of whether
our goals, strategies, and measures adequately address the actions that
are considered necessary to address the challenges. Volume 19 lists the
nine most serious challenges discussed in the IG's November report and
describes the actions/milestones being taken by the NRC to address
these challenges. The management challenge described as ``Protection of
Information'' was the latest challenge added to the list. We are
currently analyzing this challenge and will identify actions/milestones
and schedules in the fiscal year 2005 Performance Plan.
In response to the second part of the question, the challenges
discussed in the OIG's report accurately describe the key challenges
facing the NRC. Key challenges such as those related to human capital,
described by the IG as maintenance of a highly competent staff to carry
out NRC's public and safety mission, are similar to those being faced
by other Federal agencies.
__________
Statement of Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today. I am accompanied today by Mr. Stephen
Dingbaum, Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Mr. George Mulley,
Senior Level Assistant for Investigative Operations.
As you know, the mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is to assist NRC by ensuring
integrity, efficiency, and accountability in the Agency's programs that
regulate the civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear
material in a manner that adequately protects public health and safety
and the environment, while promoting the Nation's common defense and
security. Specifically, NRC's OIG supports the Agency by carrying out
its mandate to (1) independently and objectively conduct and supervise
audits and investigations related to NRC's programs and operations; (2)
prevent and detect fraud, waste and abuse; and (3) promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in NRC's programs and operations. The OIG
also keeps the NRC Chairman and Members of Congress fully and currently
informed about problems, recommends corrective actions, and monitors
NRC's progress in implementing those actions.
BACKGROUND
To perform these activities, the OIG employs auditors, management
analysts, criminal investigators, investigative analysts, legal counsel
and support personnel. The OIG also uses private-sector contractors to
audit NRC's financial statements as mandated by the Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) Act and for other audit, investigative and information
technology technical support services.
To fulfill our audit mission, the OIG conducts performance,
financial, and contract audits. Performance audits focus on NRC
administrative and program operations and evaluate the effectiveness
and efficiency with which managerial responsibilities are carried out
and whether the programs achieve intended results. Financial audits
attest to the reasonableness of NRC's financial statements. Contract
audits evaluate the cost of goods and services procured by NRC from
commercial enterprises. In addition, the audit staff prepares special
evaluation reports that present OIG perspectives or information on
specific topics.
The OIG's investigative program carries out its mission by
performing investigations relating to the integrity of NRC's programs
and operations. Most OIG investigations focus on allegations of fraud,
waste, and abuse and violations of law or misconduct by NRC employees
and contractors. Additionally, allegations of irregularities or abuses
in NRC programs and operations with special emphasis on those
activities that could adversely impact public health and safety are
investigated. Also, periodically the investigative staff conducts event
inquiries, which yield investigative reports documenting the
examination of events or agency regulatory actions that do not
specifically involve individual misconduct. Instead, these reports
identify staff actions that contributed to the occurrence of an event.
Following are examples of work performed by my audit and
investigative staffs in furtherance of our mission to ensure integrity,
efficiency and accountability in NRC's programs.
INVESTIGATIONS
Nuclear Reactors
NRC Regulation of Davis-Besse Regarding Damage to the Reactor
Vessel Head. The OIG completed an inquiry into concerns raised by the
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) regarding a perceived lack of NRC
oversight of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). NRC
Bulletin 2001-01 sought to have licensees perform inspections, which
could only be performed when the plant was shut down, by December 31,
2001, on plants identified as highly susceptible to vessel head
penetration nozzle cracking. UCS alleged that the NRC allowed DBNPS to
continue operating past December 31, 2001, despite indications of
significant cracking to the reactor vessel head.
As a result of this inquiry, the OIG found, among other things,
that NRC's decision to allow DBNPS to continue operating beyond
December 31, 2001, without performing vessel head penetration nozzle
inspections was driven in large part by a desire to lessen the
financial impact on the licensee that would result from an early
shutdown. In addition, the OIG found that NRC staff was reluctant to
take regulatory action against a licensee absent absolute proof of a
violation, despite strong indications that DBNPS was not in compliance
with NRC regulation and plant technical specifications and may have
operated with reduced safety margins.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture at Indian Point Unit 2 Power Plant.
The OIG conducted an event inquiry to address concerns raised by the
public and Congress as a result of an incident at the Indian Point Unit
2 Power Plant (IP2), which occurred on February 15, 2000. In that
incident, IP2, a pressurized water nuclear reactor plant, experienced a
steam generator tube rupture in one of its four steam generators. The
OIG's inquiry primarily addressed the adequacy of the NRC staff's
handling of issues associated with the IP2 steam generator tube
rupture, as well as the NRC's handling of shortcomings identified in
the IP2 Emergency Preparedness Plan.
The OIG found that the last steam generator inspection conducted by
IP2 took place in 1997, and the results were provided to the NRC staff.
However, the OIG learned that the NRC staff did not conduct a technical
review of that steam generator inspection report when IP2 submitted it
in 1997. The OIG concluded that, had the NRC staff or contractors with
technical expertise evaluated the IP2 1997 inspection report, the NRC
could have identified the flaw in steam generator number 24 that was
indicated in the inspection report. This flaw was the cause of the IP2
steam generator tube rupture on February 15, 2000.
Also, the OIG found that, in 1999, the NRC granted a license
amendment to IP2 to extend their steam generator inspection interval,
but that the NRC staff conducted an inadequate review of the license
amendment request.
During the conduct of this event inquiry, the OIG also found that
IP2 was a plant that struggled with various challenges in the area of
emergency preparedness. The OIG learned that recurring weaknesses, that
had gone uncorrected, appeared to play a role in the poor emergency
response performance of IP2 during the incident on February 15, 2000.
The OIG also found that communications between offsite emergency
preparedness officials and the NRC was non-existent.
Nuclear Materials
NRC's Regulatory Oversight Over the Control of Special Nuclear
Material at Millstone Unit 1. The OIG investigated the reported loss of
two spent nuclear fuel rods at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
In November 2000, the NRC license holder for Millstone discovered they
could not locate two spent fuel rods which were last accounted for in
1978. The OIG investigation reviewed NRC oversight of the licensee's
special nuclear material accountability program from the late 1970s to
the present.
As a result of this investigation, the OIG found that the missing
fuel rods were last accounted for during a 1978 Nuclear Material
Control and Accountability (MC&A) inspection at Millstone Unit 1
conducted by the NRC. In a 1982 MC&A inspection conducted by the NRC,
the fuel rods were no longer present on the inventory. The OIG
determined that the NRC inspector did not identify the loss of these
fuel rods in the 1982 inspection because he relied on an inaccurate
current inventory amount instead of beginning the inspection with the
ending inventory amount reflected on the 1978 inspection. The OIG also
determined that the last MC&A inspection conducted at Millstone was
1982, and that the NRC ended this inspection program for all nuclear
power plants in 1985.
Unlawful Interaction Between NRC and DOE Staffs Regarding Yucca
Mountain. The OIG conducted an investigation upon receipt of
allegations by the Attorney General of the State of Nevada that NRC and
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) representatives conducted meetings that
were contrary to mandates regarding Government activities concerning
the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository site. It was alleged that
NRC and DOE representatives made decisions during these meetings from
which the State of Nevada representatives were unlawfully excluded.
As a result of this investigation, the OIG determined that the NRC
staff did not initiate or coordinate contacts with representatives of
DOE to develop policies on issues related to Yucca Mountain. OIG also
learned that NRC and DOE representatives did not meet in violation of
ex parte provisions. The OIG learned that pre-licensing communications
between NRC and DOE representatives occurred during informal meetings
which were held in accordance with the pre-licensing phase of the
application process and were consistent with NRC regulatory
requirements and policy mandates.
Review of NRC's Staff Approval of the Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)
Request for Expansion of High-Level Radioactive Waste Storage. The OIG
completed an investigation into concerns raised by members of the
public and elected State officials that (1) the NRC staff and the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) did not adhere to
procedures during their review of the Carolina Power and Light's (CP&L)
request to amend its operating license and increase its spent fuel
storage capacity at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; (2) the NRC
staff pressured the ASLBP to expedite the approval of the license
amendment and staff did not sufficiently review all relevant
contentions; and (3) the NRC was biased toward CP&L and stifled the
public's participation in the license amendment review process.
As a result of this investigation, the OIG did not validate claims
of misconduct by the NRC staff during its review of the CP&L license
amendment requests. The NRC license amendment process was followed.
However, the OIG identified several staff actions that gave the
appearance that during the license amendment review process the NRC was
not an impartial arbiter. This perception of staff bias toward the
licensee may have negatively affected the public's confidence in its
ruling.
AUDITS
Nuclear Reactors
Review of NRC's License Amendment/Safety Evaluation Process.
Commercial nuclear power plant licensees submit approximately 1,500
applications each year to request that the NRC amend their operating
licenses. Safety evaluations provide the regulatory bases for the
staff's decisions regarding licensing actions and the technical,
safety, and legal basis for the Agency's disposition of a license
amendment request.
In June 1999, the NRC approved an Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power
Plant license amendment request to extend the previously established
steam generator inspection interval. In February 2000, a steam
generator tube failed. Congressional interest in this event caused the
OIG to initiate an audit of the safety evaluation process to (1)
evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness and (2) determine whether
refinements are needed.
The OIG audit revealed that the Agency has a detailed process for
responding to license amendment requests that is well thought out and
thorough. The process includes the development of safety evaluations
and all the necessary steps when followed would ensure that the staff
performs the technical reviews that are required for the Agency to
approve or disapprove license amendment requests. However, the OIG did
find that the process did not provide adequate controls to demonstrate
that all steps are completed and supported by sufficient documentation.
The NRC has taken steps to strengthen the license amendment/safety
evaluation process.
Review of NRC's Significant Determination Process (SDP). The NRC
regulates the Nation's 104 operating commercial nuclear plants through
its reactor oversight program. The SDP is a series of analytical steps
that the NRC staff use to evaluate inspection findings. The process
uses four colors C Green, White, Yellow, and Red C to indicate the
significance of inspection findings. While SDP is viewed by the NRC
staff, licensees, and stakeholders as an improved method for
establishing the significance of inspection findings, the process still
needs significant improvement. Specifically, the OIG found that NRC
should correct phase 2 analysis weaknesses because it provides
conservative results that are subsequently changed, is used
infrequently, and adds cost and time to the process. In addition, the
NRC should take steps to improve SDP timeliness.
NRC Safety Culture and Climate
2002 Survey of NRC's Safety Culture and Climate. The OIG engaged an
independent contractor to conduct a survey of NRC's workforce to: (1)
measure NRC's safety culture and climate, (2) compare the results
against NRC's 1998 Safety Culture and Climate Survey, and (3) compare
the results to government and national benchmarks.
The survey generally concluded that the NRC safety culture and
climate appears to be improving. Specifically, the workforce views
itself as effective and dedicated to the NRC safety mission. Comparison
with the 1998 survey results also indicates improvement in virtually
every category or topical area. Further, the survey found that most
scores exceed established national benchmarks for government research
and technical composites.
However, the survey did reflect that two program support offices
will require substantial effort to improve organizational culture and
climate.
In addition, the survey also found that Continuous Improvement
Commitment, that is employees' views on commitment to public safety,
and whether employees are encouraged to communicate ideas to improve
safety, regulations and operations, is below norm and a matter of
concern. Empowerment, Communication, Quality Focus, Management
Leadership, and Organizational Commitment were determined to be areas
requiring additional management focus.
As a counterpoint, dramatic improvement was demonstrated in the
category, Future of the NRC, that focuses on items that evaluate
employee's views on how the NRC's regulation of its licensees have
changed in the past year and will change in the future. That is the way
people are managed day to day, communication, the quality of work
produced, productivity, the public image of the Agency, and the NRC as
a whole. The survey concluded that improvement in these topics can
positively impact issues gauged in the category Continuous Improvement
Commitment.
Security Audits
Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA). The OIG used an
independent contractor to perform the second annual evaluation of NRC's
Information Security Program. The fiscal year 2002 evaluation found
that NRC made substantial progress in improving its information
security program to include implementing the recommendations from the
fiscal year 2001 GISRA assessment. However, the NRC security program is
not well integrated and not consistently implemented across the Agency.
In addition, NRC officials have not clearly defined the responsibility
and accountability for all aspects of the information security program
within its organizational structure.
NRC senior managers recently increased attention to the information
security area. NRC management plans to continue this needed focus to
enhance program effectiveness and to ensure its consistent
implementation throughout the Agency.
Sensitive Unclassified Information. The OIG received a
congressional request to review the adequacy of the NRC programs for
handling and releasing sensitive documents after a preliminary draft of
the Yucca Mountain Review Plan was inadvertently released to the public
in September 2000. The plan, a predecisional document, was an Official
Use Only document and should have been treated as sensitive
unclassified information protected from public disclosure until
Commission approval was granted.
The OIG found that the NRC has program guidance to prevent the
release of sensitive unclassified information. However, the guidance
does not adequately protect Official Use Only documents from
inadvertent public disclosure. Additionally, training on handling,
marking and protecting sensitive unclassified information is not
provided to all NRC employees and contractors on a regular basis.
Consequently, many of the staff are not knowledgeable about NRC's
requirements and guidance in this area. NRC employees are not
consistently implementing the requirement to report incidents of
inadvertent release of sensitive unclassified information to the Office
of the Executive Director for Operations.
NRC Headquarters Security. The OIG conducted an audit, Review of
Security at NRC Headquarters, that revealed after security reviews in
1995 and 1999, the NRC increased its protection of Headquarters
buildings against unauthorized access. Following the September 11, 2001
attacks, the NRC further tightened its Headquarters security and
identified a remaining vulnerability. The Agency is working with the
General Services Administration regarding a solution for this
vulnerability. Additionally, OIG auditors found that NRC has
increasingly hardened its controls to protect against unauthorized
access to its Headquarters complex, but still needs to do more.
Financial Management
Audit of NRC's Financial Statements. Since 1994 to the present, the
NRC has received an unqualified opinion on their financial statements.
During this timeframe, the annual audits identified a number of
internal control issues, which did not affect the opinion, the majority
of which were resolved. However, one internal control issue has
lingered since the fiscal year 1998 audit: implementation of managerial
cost accounting in accordance with Federal standards. Although the
Agency implemented its cost accounting system in fiscal year 2002, the
system failed to meet Federal accounting standards and systems
requirements. Cost accounting is a vital component of the Agency's
ability to correlate its programs with its costs as mandated by the
Government Performance and Results Act and Federal accounting
standards. The Agency continues to work on resolving this issue during
fiscal year 2003.
Accountability and Control Over NRC's Noncapitalized IT Equipment.
OIG conducted an audit of the Agency's accountability and control over
noncapitalized (initial cost of less than $50,000 per item) information
technology (IT) equipment. The audit found that the Agency's property
and supply system (PASS), the official data base for agency property
transactions, is responsible for tracking more than 27,000 pieces of
noncapitalized equipment valued at approximately $75 million. Of these
totals, IT equipment comprises approximately 16,000 pieces, with an
acquisition cost of approximately $51 million.
This OIG audit revealed that the NRC's property management policies
for this equipment adhere to applicable laws and regulations, such as
the Federal Property Management Regulations. However, the management
controls to implement these policies are inadequate or lacking. Also,
PASS contains inaccurate information; in fact, OIG statistical
projections indicated that the system did not accurately reflect the
locations of as many as 3,571 of the Agency's 16,000 pieces of
noncapitalized IT equipment costing approximately $8.38 million. The
Agency has taken steps to reconcile its property inventory and increase
property controls.
Software Accountability. The OIG audited NRC's compliance with
Executive Order 13103, Computer Software Piracy, which requires all
executive agencies to adopt policies and procedures to promote legal
software use and proper software management. The review determined that
the NRC is not in compliance with the Executive Order because its
policies (management directives) and its procedures (management
controls) do not address the full scope of the Executive Order's
requirements. The NRC has not conducted an initial assessment of its
software, established a baseline for its software inventory, or
determined whether all software on agency computers is authorized. As a
result, the NRC needs to incorporate Executive Order requirements into
its Management Directives System and implement measures to carry out
the Executive Order. The Agency generally agreed with the report's
findings and recommendations and is in the process of taking corrective
action.
SUMMARY
A key goal of the OIG is to add value to NRC's regulatory and
administrative programs by identifying opportunities for improvement in
agency operations and by conducting activities to prevent and detect
fraud, waste and abuse. The OIG is encouraged by the Agency's actions
to address OIG findings and to implement many of the recommendations
made by my office. There are many examples of collaborative work
between my staff and agency managers in an effort to refine the
effectiveness and efficiency of agency programs.
While some challenges remain, the OIG supports the Agency's
commitment to ensure the effective regulation of the Nation's civilian
use of nuclear power and to the integrity of its programs that
ultimately protect the health and safety of the public. OIG will
continue to remain steadfast in its resolve to assist the NRC in
fulfilling this important mission.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
report to you on the activities of my office during the recent past. I
would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
__________
Responses by Hubert T. Bell to Additional Questions from
Senator Inhofe
Question 1. In your opinion, is the NRC doing everything that it
can and should be doing to prevent another incident like the events at
Davis-Besse from happening again? If not, what needs to be done?
Response. The events at Davis-Besse caused the NRC to undertake an
introspective analysis of the technical and programmatic issues that
contributed to the event. During this process, the Commission has
pressed the staff to carefully evaluate the event so that the
circumstances that gave cause to it are not repeated. The Commission
has accepted the findings of the agencies Lessons-Learned Task Force
and has adopted essentially all senior management's associated
recommendations for corrective action.
If the recommendations are followed up on, the NRC will be in a
better position to prevent a recurrence.
Question 2. Can you assure me that the NRC has found out everything
that happened at Davis-Besse and that there will be no more surprises
in this matter?
Response. Based on the work completed by this office with respect
to the NRC's regulatory oversight of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Plant, we believe the NRC staff has demonstrated a willingness to
identify and address existing problems at the plant. However, this
office is not in the position to provide assurance that the NRC staff
or First Energy, the Davis-Besse licensee, have uncovered all the
safety issues at the plant.
Question 3. I believe that you have copies of several pictures that
were distributed during the hearing of the corrosion on the reactor
heads at Davis-Besse. It is my understanding that these pictures were
taken as part of an inspection of the facility in April 2000, that
these photographs were included in a report that First Energy filed
with the NRC in 2000, and that this report was never even reviewed by
the NRC. Are you looking into this? What-if any-preliminary thought or
conclusions do you have?
Response. The Office of Inspector General has an ongoing
investigation into the claim that pictures taken by the licensee of the
corrosion of the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head were provided to NRC
inspectors during the refueling outage in 2000. As part of this
investigation, OIG is looking into if, and when, NRC inspectors first
obtained a copy of Davis-Besse Condition Report 2000-0782 with the
subject photographs attached. Additionally, OIG is examining whether
Region III managers appropriately communicated related plant issues to
inspectors to allow them to appropriately recognize and follow-up on
indicators of these problems when discovered during inspections.
Question 4. I understand that a Report that you wrote found that
only 53 percent of NRC employees feel that it is ``safe to speak up in
the NRC'' about safety issues. That report also states that almost one-
fourth of NRC employees do not believe that ``the NRC's commitment to
public safety is apparent in what we do on a day-to-day basis.'' What
recommendations would you make to improve the safety culture at the
NRC?
Response. The OIG's Safety Culture and Climate Survey was
undertaken to solicit the views and opinions of NRC employees on a wide
range of subjects, of which Continuous Improvement Commitment is one.
Continuous Improvement Commitment assesses employee views on NRC's
commitment to public safety, and whether employees are encouraged to
communicate ideas to improve safety, regulations, and operations. In
comparison to the results of the prior 1998 survey that score improved
by 3 percent to 67 percent, but the results were 4 percent below
similar governmental norms.
To improve the safety culture at NRC, OIG's report recommended that
the Agency focus on seven areas: continuous improvement commitment,
empowerment, communication, NRC image, quality focus, management
leadership and organizational commitment.
The Commission is already taking action to address the issues
stated in the report. In a memorandum dated January 13, 2003, the
Chairman advised NRC's Executive Director for Operations that he was
concerned that more needed to be done to determine the underlying
causes of the employee attitudes reflected in the identified areas for
improvement and to develop strategies to address these underlying
causes systematically. He directed the Executive Director for
Operations to take the following actions and develop an action plan for
addressing these matters: (1) develop and conduct a systematic
assessment of the areas for improvement identified in the report and
establish appropriate priorities for agency attention; and (2) identify
the underlying causes for the employee attitudes reflected in each
area.
On January 30, 2003, NRC's Executive Director for Operations
advised the Commission that he created a task group to respond to the
Chairman's Commission's request.
We are following the progress of the task group in its addressing
the Chairman's concerns.
Question 5. Turning to your investigation into possible improper
contacts between the Department of Energy and the NRC over the
potential licensing of Yucca Mountain, I recall that you determined
that DOE ad NRC have not had any improper discussions on the matter. In
your opinion, is the NRC prepared to address the licensing request by
the Department of Energy in an independent and impartial manner when--
and if--it is filed?
Response. Based on the work conducted to date by this office
regarding Yucca Mountain, we have no reason to believe that the NRC
staff will not address any licensee application from the Department of
Energy in an independent and impartial manner.
Question 6. Does the fiscal year 2004 Budget Proposal adequately
fund you and your office to carry out your mission?
Response. For fiscal year 2004, we requested $7.3 million and 47
FTE to carry out the mission of my office. This represents a total
increase of $0.5 million over last year's budget. Included within this
increase is $0.3 million to support the addition of 3 FTE to our
technical audit staff, and $.02 million to cover the increased
personnel costs associated with existing staff.
If these additional audit resources are provided by Congress, it
will enhance our capability to focus on NRC programs related to the
handling and disposal of nuclear waste, nuclear fuel fabrication, and
nuclear material control and accountability issues. It will also enable
my office to provide better oversight of the NRC's safety-related
programs and emerging responsibility at certain DOE laboratories, as
well as the role of NRC's Enforcement Program. Further, the expanded
capability will enable OIG to assist the Agency in the early
identification of problems, thereby giving the NRC an opportunity to
address the problems at an early stage.
In assessing the basis for the requested OIG budget, it is
important to note that three-fourths of the NRC's resources are
dedicated to program activities related to nuclear reactors, materials,
and waste, while only one-third of OIG auditors work in these program
areas. Because of the mandatory nature of audit work in the financial
and information management areas, we cannot divert our existing
auditing resources into nuclear program activities. To accommodate this
disparity, we requested these additional audit resources to accomplish
a more balanced audit program that is better aligned with NRC
activities and current events.
Responses by Hubert T. Bell to Additional Questions from
Senator Voinovich
Question 1. Fifty-three percent of the employees feel that it is
safe to speak up in the NRC about safety issues. How does that compare
with other organizations of this type?
Response. NRC is below the composite scores of other organizations
in the Government research and technology composite. This composite
includes the scores of various Department of Defense research,
development, and technology centers (e.g., Naval Undersea Warfare
Center) and Department of Energy national laboratories (e.g., Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory). The contractor did not have a basis to
compare NRC to other regulatory agencies; as a result there is no
direct comparison. NRC is 5 percentage points below the composite for
the Government research and technology sector.
Question 2. Do you have any statistical background on it?
Response. NRC was 53 percent in the 2002 Safety Culture and Climate
Survey (an 8 percent increase from the 1998 survey, which was 45
percent).
U.S. Government research and technology composite was 58 percent.
U.S. research and development norm (includes Merck, Phillips
Electronics, and Shell Oil Company) was 59 percent.
The U.S. National Norm (includes organizations such as American
Airlines, Citibank, Kerr-McGee, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers) was 56
percent.
______
Responses by Hubert T. Bell to Additional Questions from
Senator Carper
Question 1. Do you believe the Commission has reviewed the report
and taken steps to address the concerns you raised?
Response. Yes. In the NRC's Performance and Accountability Report
Fiscal Year 2002, the Agency addresses each of the management
challenges identified by this office. The Agency's response
demonstrates its commitment to address the challenges presented and the
Agency provides examples of progress made during fiscal year 2002. As
an illustration, during the March 11, 2003, Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program conference, the Deputy Director of the Office of
Personnel Management praised the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for its
efforts in the area of workforce planning.
Question 2. Do you believe that the Commission has sufficient
resources to adequately address all of the challenges identified in
your report?
Response. In addressing each of the challenges, the Agency does not
question the adequacy of its resources to make continued progress in
the challenge areas. OIG is not aware of resource limitations that
could adversely effect sustained progress for each challenge.
Question 3. Given what has occurred at Davis-Besse in Ohio, and at
Indian Point in New York, do you see any connection between the low
score in this category [Continuous Improvement Category] and these
events?
Response. The OIG's Safety Culture and Climate Survey was
undertaken to solicit the views and opinions of NRC employees on a wide
range of subjects, of which Continuous Improvement Commitment is one.
Continuous Improvement Commitment assesses employee views on NRC's
commitment to public safety, and whether employees are encouraged to
communicate ideas to improve safety, regulations, and operations.
In comparison to the results of the prior 1998 survey, that score
improved by 3 percent to 67 percent, but the results were 4 percent
below similar governmental norms. We do not see a direct correlation
between that score and the event that occurred at Indian Point and
Davis Besse. Our reports concerning the events at Indian Point and
Davis Besse did not directly address employee attitudes in this area.
During the investigation, we did observe indications that some
employees were discouraged from raising different points of view.
Question 4. What should the Commission, and this committee, be
doing to raise that score?
Response. The Commission is already taking action to address the
issues stated in the report. In a memorandum dated January 13, 2003,
the Chairman advised NRC's Executive Director for Operations that he
was concerned that more needed to be done to determine the underlying
causes of the employee attitudes reflected in the identified areas for
improvement and to develop strategies to address these underlying
causes systematically. He directed the Executive Director for
Operations to take the following actions and develop an action plan for
addressing these matters: (1) develop and conduct a systematic
assessment of the areas for improvement identified in the report and
establish appropriate priorities for agency attention; and (2) identify
the underlying causes for the employee attitudes reflected in each
area. We are following the progress of these issues.
______
Responses by Hubert T. Bell to Additional Questions from
Senator Clinton
Question 1. Mr. Inspector General, is your office currently working
on a report concerning NRC's enforcement of regulatory requirements and
commitments at the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant? If so, how long
have you been working on that particular report?
Response. The Office of the Inspection General (OIG) is completing
its investigation into the effectiveness of NRC's regulation of Indian
Point Unit 2. A section of this report deals with our review of NRC's
enforcement of regulatory requirements and commitments at that
facility. Our investigation was initiated in the spring of 2001. During
the conduct of the field work, the events of September 11, 2001,
required a large investigative commitment from this office. In the
spring of 2002, following on the heels of September 11, the Davis-Besse
matter developed. Once again, OIG's efforts in response to this event
took investigative resources from the Indian Point 2 investigation.
Question 2. My staff has had several discussions with your office
about this report, and you know of my extreme interest in the report. I
wrote to you about the report just last week in fact, in the hope that
you would be able to release the report before the February 13, 2003,
hearing, or tell us about its findings at the hearing. The release of
this report seems to keep getting pushed back. Can you please give me a
date certain that this report will be release?
Response. The OIG Event Inquiry into the effectiveness of NRC's
regulation of Indian Point Unit 2 will be released by April 25, 2003.
Question 3. Concerning your testimony, and your findings regarding
Davis-Besse, Indian Point, and perhaps other plants around the country,
would you say that there is any sort of trend in the NRC's behavior, in
that the Commission appears to give ``undue weight'' to what the
Commission and the industry consider to be the ``costs'' of regulatory
oversight? That they in essence give greater consideration to these so-
called ``costs'' and perhaps not as much consideration to the adequate
protection of human health and safety?
Response. The NRC has adopted as a Performance Goal: reducing
unnecessary regulatory burden on stakeholders. As the Agency has
explained, its purpose is to make agency and licensee resources
available to more effectively focus on safety issues. The costs
associated with NRC activities can impact a variety of NRC licensees.
Considering the associated cost in the decisionmaking process is not
new for the nuclear industry or the NRC.
The events at Indian Point and Davis Besse showed that on occasion
actions taken or not taken have financial consequences. Currently, the
NRC as part of the exercise of its responsibilities is readdressing
what is meant by an acceptable level of risk, its relationship to
safety, and associated costs. The work of my office to date does not
lead me to believe that the NRC in its reappraisal is placing the
public at an unacceptable risk.
The events at Indian Point and Davis Besse are, from my
perspective, occasions where it appears that both the licensee and the
NRC allowed higher risks to be assumed. I cannot say that these higher
risks are unacceptable, but the NRC in its reappraisal deliberations
must, along with its licensees, gauge what is the appropriate balance
among risk, public health and safety, and any identified associated
costs.
__________
Statement of Jere Witt, Ottawa County Administrator and Member of the
Davis-Besse Restart Overview Panel
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to
present to you a summary of Ottawa County views on the recent events,
involving the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Davis-Besse.
I am Jere Witt, Ottawa County Administrator for the past 25 years,
and a member of the Davis-Besse Restart Overview Panel.
Ottawa County is the biggest stakeholder in this process. The
residents of Ottawa County are the most affected by the plant.
Safe operation of the plant has and always will be my first
priority.
It should also be noted that the Ottawa County Emergency Management
Agency has demonstrated itself to be one of the best in the country.
This has been done involving drills with FEMA, the NRC, and more
importantly real life scenarios of tornadoes, floods, collapsed
buildings, etc. The protection of the residents is their only goal.
My role on the Restart Overview Panel is to represent Ottawa County
to insure the plant is ready to restart and operate safely.
I have observed the restart activities since day one, attending
over 60 meetings, many all day long.
These meetings include:
a. Restart Overview Panel monthly meetings
b. Two tours of containment
c. NRC public meetings
d. Updates from NRC staff
e. Three full day meetings with groups of employees on safety
conscious work environment
f. Meeting with employees individually
g. Two meetings with First Energy Board of Directors--Nuclear
Committee
h. Observing many plant activities including the Restart Readiness
Review Board
We must evaluate the value of the continued operation of Davis-
Besse in terms of safety and impact to the community. Davis-Besse is
the largest employer and the largest taxpayer in Ottawa County.
Obviously Davis-Besse and the NRC made mistakes and we must insure
it never happens again.
I have personally been involved in the development of the plan
putting together the actions required to safely and effectively operate
Davis-Besse in the future.
There is a new commitment to safety development and it will
continue to grow.
This commitment started with the new management team and
demonstrated through their actions and involvement with the staff.
The Leadership in the Action program is making sure it permeates
through all staff from the top to the bottom.
Employees are using the new systems, as evidenced by the many
safety improvements being brought to light and instituted, including
major ones (Emergency Sump/Decay Heat Valve Pit/Leak Detection Systems,
etc.).
This will only help the safety culture continue to grow.
There is a new system in place for the resolution of open issues.
Employees are trained on it and see the results.
Management is out in the plant observing the work and being
directly involved with the staff.
The CEO and Board of Directors are very involved as evidence by
time spent at Davis-Besse and meeting with the Restart Overview Panel.
The NRC 0350 process has been a good one to get to where we are
today--We now need a better process to insure it does not happen again.
My recommendations are as follows:
a. The NRC should meet at least semi-annually with Ottawa County to
update the status of the plant and any significant risk issues. We
should be a player in any discussion of potential safety risks.
b. The Restart Overview Panel should continue in some format to
continually review the plant operations and the NRC's review of these
operations. This panel gives an expert independent review of the plant.
I am sure many plants have expert consultants that review their
operations, but my experience on this panel has made me keenly aware of
how much better this review is done, if they meet as a group. They have
asked the toughest questions throughout the Davis-Besse. incident and
continuously challenged each other and the staff. I also believe the
NRC should be involved at least as an observer. I truly believe that
independent experts such as this acting as a group could have possibly
prevented this incident.
c. The NRC must be fully funded to make the necessary inspections.
d. NRC employees should not be allowed to become employees of a
utility for a significant time period.
I also have some questions:
a. How will the NRC change its programs to guarantee the proper
inspections at Davis-Besse, to insure safe operations? What methods
will you use to assess the effectiveness of these changes and will
there be independent oversight of these changes?
b. The company has shown how it is changing the safety culture at
Davis-Besse and how it will measure its effectiveness. I have not seen
the plan on how the NRC will change its own safety culture and measure
its effectiveness. The NRC as the regulator must demonstrate to the
residents of Ottawa County how they will make necessary changes as
recommended in the ``Lessons Learned Report''.
c. I know that First Energy has dealt with the personnel issues of
those involved in this incident. Ottawa County requests that the NRC
deals with its own appropriately, if they have not already. This is
vital to public confidence.
SUMMARY
I will assure that Ottawa County will continue a more active role
as a partner in future operations of Davis-Besse. We will challenge and
demand answers from both First Energy and the NRC.
The systems and programs are in place to safely operate Davis-Besse
and I am confident that with the proper changes made at Davis-Besse,
FENOC, First Energy, and the NRC we will all continually monitor all
facets into the future to protect the residents of Ottawa County.
A renewed stringent regulation by the NRC must be part of this
process. This regulation must be based on knowledge and common sense,
not one influenced by political agenda's.
My personal thanks to NRC staff especially (Jim Dyer, Jack Grobe,
Bill Dean, Christine Lipa) for their open and candid discussion with
the residents of Ottawa County and myself. They have gone above and
beyond to insure we are informed.
I would also like to express my appreciation to First Energy
especially (Peter Berg, Bob Saunders, Lew Myers) for allowing me to
participate on the Restart Overview Panel. They have provided me free
access to all facets of Davis-Besse.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this information.