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Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for asking me to testify. It is a unique pleasure to appear before you and Senator Lugar on this most important topic.

This Committee has had a longstanding interest in the role of the military in foreign policy. Most recently, in June 2006, when Senator Lugar was chair, the Committee heard from two executive branch witnesses in classified session on the topic of the DoD train and equip foreign assistance program. In unclassified answers to questions for the record, the two witnesses sought to reassure this Committee. The State Department was said to be comfortable with the new provisions giving DoD train and equip authority and funding. The Committee was also told that the Secretary of State was able to ensure that the new programs conformed to her overall priorities for U.S. foreign assistance.

To follow up, and to see whether views in the field matched those at headquarters, Senator Lugar tasked a number of us on the staff to travel to some 20 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East to examine the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department in our embassies. He asked us to focus on the agencies' cooperation on counterterrorism strategy, policies and activities, and give special attention to foreign assistance and the military's new Section 1206 funding.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, "1206" refers to a section in various defense authorization bills that has given the Department of Defense the authority to train and equip foreign militaries around the world directly from the Defense Department budget. Traditionally, such programs had been funded in the foreign affairs 150 account and implemented by the Department of Defense under the authority of the Secretary of State. But, having been granted the authority and funding to train and equip militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense requested the permanent extension of such authority to foreign militaries and police worldwide. Congress did not grant the full \$750 million requested, capping the amount at \$200 million and later raising that to \$300 million. Congress also required that any programs be "formulated jointly" by both departments and did not include foreign police. Also, the authority was granted on a temporary rather than permanent basis. It will expire at the end of this fiscal year unless the decision is made to extend or make it permanent.

Senator Lugar's staff report is widely available, appears on the Government Printing Office website, and has been distributed to every Senator. Moreover, it was sent from the Department of State to all embassies and we are told it is being used in the FSI course for future ambassadors.

Its findings include the following:

- 1) The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of

authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated. The leadership qualities of the ambassador are a determinative factor in striking a prudent U.S. military posture in our embassies.

- 2) While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the campaign against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long-term. It has traditionally been the military's mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies' mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.
- 3) The increase in funding streams, missions, and authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field. Currently, overlapping missions and inter-agency frictions are, for the most part, refereed by the U.S. ambassador and other State Department leadership in the embassy with intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance. But, as the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of State Department leadership and work for still more authority and funding.
- 4) There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America's profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold, it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary to win the campaign against terror.

The report goes on to attribute migration of traditionally foreign policy authorities and missions to the Department of Defense both to the urgency of the campaign against

terror and the disparity in the ratio between our country's investments in military versus civilian approaches. In a related staff study published last November, we found that during the Bush administration's tenure up until that time, the Congress had denied some \$7.6 billion that the President requested in his regular foreign aid budget. With this track record on the foreign affairs 150 budget account, it should not be a shockingly unexpected development when the executive branch turns to the defense 050 account as an alternative, a budget that is larger by a factor of at least twelve.

Congress has been slow in other ways to strengthen the civilian contributions to our national security effort. This Committee has passed multiple times the Lugar-Biden bill authorizing new capacity at the State Department to work as a full partner with the Department of Defense on post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. The bill is supported by both the Secretaries of State and Defense. In the last Congress, the bill passed the Senate unanimously but languished in the House. It has now passed the House in this Congress but is being held up from unanimous consent consideration by an objection from one Senator.

What can be done?

- 1) In our staff study, we found the programs undertaken under 1206 authority to be valuable, although not all uniformly targeted to counterterrorism. Strengthening the security sector of friendly, responsible governments, tightening border surveillance and improving intelligence gathering are important components of the anti-terrorism campaign. The ideal would be to allow the 1206 authorities to expire in October while continuing such programs and funding them in the right place, the foreign affairs 150 account. If this is impossible, capping the DoD funding and targeting it uniquely to military-to-military counterterrorism support is a second-best solution. Otherwise, DoD foreign aid will balloon to less manageable and even more worrisome levels.
- 2) It is clear that new mechanisms of cooperation between the two departments on counterterrorism aid have been found, with credit due in large measure to Congressional interest, probing and oversight. Congress should continue to push for regional meetings of ambassadors, assistant secretaries of state, and senior interagency personnel, including the combatant commands, as regional planning and intelligence sharing are needed to address borderless terrorism.
- 3) Those in Congress who support the foreign affairs budget should be vigilant and active in protecting robust funding levels throughout congressional deliberations, including the budget debate and authorization and appropriations processes.
- 4) The Lugar-Biden reconstruction and stabilization bill should be a top priority for the Senate and should be passed before this Congress adjourns.
- 5) This Committee should carry out vigorous oversight on the issue of the role of the military in foreign policy. It is as important to listen to our ambassadors to get a handle on this issue as to officials in headquarters. Studies, hearings such as this, and appropriate legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward keeping the right balance struck.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.