Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: Afghanistan: A Plan to Turn the Tide?
January 31, 2008
BIDEN:
The meeting will come to order, please. I need to in advance apologize to my colleagues and the witnesses for my cold and my occasional coughing. It's irritating to me. It's probably going to be more irritating to you. But I thank you very much for being here.
We have two distinguished panels here today, and we're anxious to get going.
As I see it, here's the situation in Afghanistan. Security is probably at its lowest ebb since 2001. Much of the country is only nominally under the control of Kabul. The U.S. and coalition forces win every pitched battle, but the Taliban still grows stronger day by day.
Drug trafficking dominates the national economy, and narco barons operate with impunity. Reconstruction efforts have failed to bring substantial improvements to the lives of most Afghan citizens, and the slow pace is causing widespread resentment of both the Karzai government and the West.
And bin Laden and top Al Qaida leaders enjoy safe haven somewhere along the Afghan-Pakistani border. In fact, this summer the NIE, the national intelligence estimates on the terror threat, found that Al Qaida has, quote, "protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability," end of quote.
The administration firmly believes that we're about to turn the corner and that we just need to give our policy a chance to work. I am curious as to what that policy is, because, quite frankly, I tell you it's not clear to me.
But that's exactly as well what we've been hearing for the past five years -- the tide is about to turn. I sure hope so, I say to the witness from the administration, but I'm not prepared to bet on that under the present strategy. If we're not going to hold another hearing on Afghanistan next year and have another retelling of the same story, it seems to me we need a significant change in policy now.
Last month the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, testified to another congressional committee that the Taliban support has tripled over the past two years. In Iraq, he said, and I quote, "The United States does what it must, while in Afghanistan the United States does what it can," end of quote. I appreciate the admiral's honesty. His statement, it seems to me, makes abundantly clear why our efforts in Afghanistan seem to be too little, too late.
We're not succeeding in Afghanistan, quite simply, because we haven't made the kind of priority, I think, that needed to be made. We've not made success there our priority.
What would it take to achieve success in Afghanistan? At a minimum, it seems to me, from reading testimony, talking to other people, having briefings from the intelligence community, as well as discussions with my colleagues, it's going to take significantly greater investment, including troops and the type of troops, and including investment in rebuilding that country.
But it will still be a small fraction of what we have devoted to Iraq thus far. We've spent about as much on development aid in Afghanistan over the past five years as we spend on the war in Iraq every three weeks.
What could more development aid do? Can it do much without a reorganization of the way in which the aid is distributed and dealing with corruption?
As every military expert to testify before our committee has noted, the battle against the Taliban is not going to be won with bullets and bombs alone. It's going to be won with roads, clinics and schools. General Carl Eichenberry used to say, when he was in command of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and I quote, "Where the road ends, the Taliban begins."
What could we have done with a fraction of the military resources we've spent in Iraq? Earlier this month Secretary Gates announced the deployment of 3,200 additional Marines in Afghanistan. This is welcome news, at least in my view. But does anyone truly believe it's enough to turn the tide?
What do we need to do to achieve success in Afghanistan? In brief, the same thing we should have been doing all along -- first, establish security. If we should be surging forces anywhere, it's in Afghanistan, not Iraq. NATO troops and the new Marine deployment are necessary, but not sufficient.
We have to focus not just on sending more forces, but the kinds of forces and equipment we need, have sent. We need more helicopters, more airlift, more surveillance journals, and we've got to do a better job of training the Afghan police and army.
You know that old, bad expression "deja vu all over again?" As I read the reports that have been filed with regard to the police agencies, it is frighteningly reminiscent of the early reports about the police agencies in Iraq. They are corrupt, ineffectual, and in most places, based on what I'm told -- and the administration may have a different view -- they're viewed more as the problem than the solution by the population.
We need far more funds. We need to use them far better. The Afghans are patient, but they're not seeing reconstruction worthy of a superpower, worthy of the commitment we made and the president made, for a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.
After more than six years and more than $6 billion, the most we can claim is that life of ordinary Afghans isn't as bad as it was under the Taliban. We've got a much higher, I think, and we have to deliver much more.
The third thing we have to do is we have to counter the narcotics explosion. We should target multi-million dollar drug kingpins, not dollar-a-day opium farmers. Someday eradication may have its place, but in my view, not until we've got an alternative livelihood set up and a judicial system capable of taking down the drug barons. Until then, we should focus on the top of the food chain, not the bottom.
We have five witnesses today, who can explain these issues in detail, with authority and expertise. First is assistant secretaries Richard Boucher and David Johnson from the State Department. Then, three outside experts, well known to this committee and widely respected, will be here -- General James Jones, Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke.
I believe the war in Afghanistan is winnable, but I don't believe we're winning. I believe we need a new strategy for success, and I hope this hearing and this committee can help the administration produce one.
Before I recognize Senator Lugar, I'd like to welcome our guest, Michael Wilson, the ambassador of Canada.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for being here, and thank you for the really Herculean effort your country is making and the sacrifices you're enduring to deal with the situation in Afghanistan. You're one of our closest friends, and your nation is shouldering a heavy load for the common good in Afghanistan, and we thank you very much.
Today at least 78 Canadian troops have given their lives in this struggle. And of the dozens of nations participating in this struggle, only the United States and Britain have lost more troops. These represent the first combat deaths Canada has suffered since the Korean War, and I'm sure it has political repercussions at home.
It's not always appreciated. We don't always tell you, but our gratitude for our country is immense, and we thank you for being here.
Senator Lugar?
LUGAR:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our very distinguished panel. All of the witnesses are good friends of the committee, who have appeared before us many times. I'm especially grateful that they have come today to share their conclusions and insights on a subject of critical importance to United States national security.
The ongoing international effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan must succeed. There should be no doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO. The September 11th attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al Qaida still operates there. And the fate of the country remains both strategic and symbolic.
Afghanistan has experienced a 22 percent decrease in infant mortality, since the Taliban were in power. In 2001, only 8 percent of Afghans had ready access to health services. Today almost two- thirds of Afghans enjoy this benefit.
Since the fall of the Taliban, nearly 1,000 miles of main and secondary roads have been rehabilitated. This has contributed to a growing economy, which realized a 13 percent increase in GDP in 2007. School attendance has increased fivefold since 2002, with five million Afghan children attending schools and 60 million textbooks delivered.
Thus far, the United States has invested nearly $5 billion in the reconstruction effort. The rest of the international community has invested even more.
Yet, while these investments have yielded demonstrable gains, the overall situation in Afghanistan remains grave. Democratic institutions are fragile, and the government does not control significant regions of the country. A massive drug trade funds the Taliban, which, despite setbacks, seems to be able to regenerate its ranks.
These circumstances demand a resolute commitment by NATO countries and other coalition partners to help establish security and advance the causes of reconstruction, democracy and the rule of law in Afghanistan.
For its part, Afghanistan must be committed to building a sufficient army, raising an adequate budget, maintaining control of its own territory. NATO can only be a transitional force.
At the end of the Cold War, a debate ensued over the durability and purposes of the NATO alliance, and after much debate, the stability of Europe was greatly enhanced by the addition of new NATO members. This discussion flared again in the shadow of the Balkan conflicts. Each situation appears to have reinforced the value of the NATO alliance.
Yet the debate over the efficacy of the alliance continues, as the NATO-led ISAF has encountered the limits of coordinated action among its members. There is a troubling shortfall of political commitment that is hampering the ongoing operations in Afghanistan.
The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the Cold War, the gravest threats to Europe and North American originate from other regions of the world, and this requires Europeans and North Americans to be bolder in remaking our alliances, forging new structures and changing our thinking. To be fully relevant to the security and well being of the people of its member nations, NATO must think and act globally.
And I'm pleased to hear that the Bush administration is reviewing its current approach in Afghanistan. I look forward to hearing more about that today. The decision to send 3,000 additional Marines in Afghanistan should indicate to partners that the U.S. is committed and willing to dedicate the necessary forces to combat the insurgency. We also stand with the Canadians, the British and the Dutch forces, who are calling for more support from partners.
I believe strongly that NATO is capable of meeting the challenge in Afghanistan. NATO commanders have demonstrated that they understand the complexity of the mission. They know that success in Afghanistan depends on the attitudes of the people, the progress of reconstruction and the development of the economy, as much as it depends on battlefield successes.
But NATO commanders must have the resources to provide security, and they must have the flexibility to use troops to meet Afghanistan's most critical security needs.
I thank the chairman for holding this timely hearing and look forward to excellent discussion with our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BIDEN:
Thank you.
Ambassador, welcome.
BOUCHER:
Thank you, Senators.
Mr. Chairman, I'm very pleased to be here today. I think it's very timely that we have this discussion of the situation in Afghanistan and strategy on the way forward. And having received your letter about what you wanted to hear from us, I'll try to be brief. But I would like to discuss the situation, talk about the strategy and talk about how we're implementing it and what the next steps are, as far as we see it.
As Senator Lugar described, progress is being made. I have many of the same numbers that he does, but I think if you add together the achievements in roads, achievements in education, achievements in health care, we see a profoundly changed situation in Afghanistan. Economic growth is one sign of that, the extension of the government, having gone through the bond process and helping build up a national government.
I think last year we saw a lot of progress at the provincial level, and if I could say anything about this year, it's probably that progress to be made at the district level, and that's where a lot of the focus is.
The Taliban are losing on the battlefield repeatedly, but they do remain a threat. But over the last year, they've been driven out of their strongholds in places like Panjwai near Qandahar, Sangin Valley in northern Helmand, and most recently, Musa Qala in Helmand.
Unfortunately, as they've lost on the battlefield, they've resorted more and more to tactics of pure terror, tactics of bombings, of IEDs, of kidnappings. So we've had many successes, though we have not yet enjoyed success. And that's what we have to focus on.
In the end we've found that if we provide good governance in places, we see development, we see security, we see, as my colleagues will say, decline in the poppy production. Good governance and the benefits of governance are what really make the difference in Afghanistan. Those are the things that will win the war.
It requires military force. It requires good leadership, both in the international and the Afghan side, and it requires a continuing flow of sufficient resources from the international community to help the Afghan government.
So the first conclusion about what we've seen in the last year and the years before is we know what works in Afghanistan. We just have to make sure that we're doing it and that we're doing it more and better.
The first element that we have to do is provide people with security. We're using the necessary force to fight the enemy. U.S. troops are at an all-time high -- NATO as well.
Afghan forces are increasing in number and are increasingly out in front. I think in some of the provinces I visited, most of the security is provided by Afghan forces now. And NATO forces, U.S. forces are there to support them and work with them.
The extra Marines will provide extra capability for us in a very key area and allow us to do some things, particularly with training and with putting more people out in the field with the Afghan forces and the Afghan police than we have before, since that's one of the keys to winning on the battlefield.
We have been accelerating police training at quite a rapid pace over the last year. The effort right now is focusing on what we call focus development districts.
General Cone at the Combined Command Alpha has a program that we call the focus development districts, where they take the police out, put in some good national policemen, more capable, and take the police from the district and go retrain them, reform them, reconstruct them, basically, and then put them back with mentors and supporters, so that they can do a better job of holding territory and providing the basic service that people want from their government, which is safety and security.
The narcotics problem my colleague, Ambassador Johnson, will talk about, but I think it's fundamentally a matter of watching the map at this point. We went last year from six provinces that were poppy-free to 13.
We see the narcotics problem exploding, but exploding in particular areas. And the insurgency and the narcotics trafficking are increasingly feeding off each other. And so as we address the narcotics problem, we have to look at it in that context, and as I said, that's what we're doing.
In terms of providing people with the services that they expect, they want safety, they want justice, they want economic opportunity, and they want health care and education from their government. A major push this year is in expanding the governance, the ability of government to provide services and safety to people at the local level.
If you add up the base request, but the supplemental that's still on request, we've got over $500 million devoted to governance this year. We've got more money going through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are spent locally to support the extension of the Afghan government and give people new opportunities.
The Afghans are doing their part. They provided a new office of local governance, working out of President Karzai's office, that started to appoint governors and district chiefs, who are vetted, who are their for their quality and not just for their connections. And these people have already shown, I think, great promise in terms of how they deliver governance at a local level.
Expanding justice at provincial levels is also a big part of the new budget. There's about $91 million appropriated or on request this year that will go into expanding justice at the provincial level.
The third big item is the one you referred to, quoting General Eichenberry that where the road ends, the insurgency begins. And that's the opportunity that's provided by infrastructure, by roads and electricity in particular.
We're now moving from the Ring Road, which is, but for one section, almost all completed, into last year a lot of money went into key provincial connections. That's still being done -- and more and more small roads built by Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They go up the valleys and the villages.
Roads are probably our largest funding item, if you look overall in Afghanistan. And it's something that works. I was up in Kunar province, which has been one of the most violent provinces in Afghanistan. I was there about a week ago. And our Provincial Reconstruction Team folks and the governor there are all talking.
They're not talking about how many insurgents there are in the Kunar Valley. They're talking about how many gas stations and Internet cafes there are along the road that we built down through the Kunar Valley that connects them to Jalalabad and markets for their produce.
We're also pushing very hard to expand the availability of electricity in Afghanistan. It's been a country with a very low supply of electricity. I think about 6 percent of the population get their electricity from the grid. We're trying to expand that very dramatically this year.
There are major projects that will bring more electricity to Kabul by the end of the year. At the Kajaki dam down in Helmand, generators there are being refurbished. That's already increased the electricity quite a bit in that area, and we're bringing electricity down from countries in the north, working with the neighbors to the north to get electricity for Afghanistan that they can buy.
So there's about $200 million in this year's budget that's devoted to bringing up electricity. Electricity, of course, not only lights for kids to do their homework, but the ability to do things like cold storage projects, so that farmers can grow something other than poppy and be able to market it at better prices year round.
Finally, I'd point out agriculture and irrigation. Agriculture and irrigation are major components of our work, because much of the population is agricultural, and a lot of the aid projects, as well as the alternate livelihoods projects, focus on repairing irrigation systems, building irrigation systems, and giving people other forms of agriculture and agricultural rural economics to go to, when they abandon the poppy production.
One of the things that everybody is very focused on in Afghanistan -- I found that in all my conversations last week -- was the need to concentrate all these efforts on key areas. General McNeill points out 40 districts produce 70 percent of the violence.
And so there is a real effort now to concentrate the military effects, the police training, local governance programs, some of the things that the Afghans are doing under their national solidarity program -- they do 35,000 small projects in 25,000 villages now -- as well as our aid efforts and the U.N. efforts, so that we can concentrate in particular districts and get not just the immediate military effect, but get the rebuilding and get the stability that we know that security and governance can provide, if they're done well together.
Musa Qala is the latest example where, after the troops went in and flushed out the Taliban, people are going in with better governance. They're going in with electric generators. They're going in with projects and consultations with the local population about what they need to stabilize and develop there.
So one area where I think you'll see a lot more this year is the concentration of these effects, the concentration of these resources at the district level.
The second is there will be a big push this year to expand funding and nail down funding for a longer term. Not only has the U.S. done that for the last two years, some of our allies have, too, and we'll probably have a major donor's conference this year, once the Afghan national plan is finished.
They look continuously to bring in other donors. I'd say many countries have been responsive, and I think the goal this year is to keep that up and to bring in some others -- effort focused on better coordination of international assistance. The Afghans have complained that they have 62 different kinds of forms to get projects and things like that. We're trying to put ourselves all under a better yoke in terms of working together to support the Afghan government.
And finally, I'd note several of the reports that we've seen recently talk about Pakistan and the situation in Pakistan. That is very important to us. We understand the militants have been able to hole up in the tribal areas and push out from there, push into Afghanistan, push into Pakistan.
There's a lot more coordination going on. For several years now we've had tripartite military efforts with U.S. commanders, NATO commanders, and the Pakistanis and Afghans getting together that we feel has been a very productive process.
But we've also seen, I think, with President Karzai's recent visit to Islamabad, a very positive set of changes in the Pakistan- Afghan relationship, recognition on both their parts that they face a common threat, and an opportunity to do more and go forward, both on a popular level with things like the jurgas that were held last August, but also the government-to-government and the military level. So we'll be pushing forward in terms of cooperation against the insurgents along that border.
So that's a basic overview of what we're doing, why we're doing it, and what we intend to do this year. So I'd be glad to take any questions you have after my colleague speaks about narcotics.
JOHNSON:
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, like Ambassador Boucher, I appreciate the opportunity you're providing us to discuss our efforts to assist in Afghanistan and, in my case, to curb the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics.
I'm going to focus my remarks on how we've adjusted our strategy in light of the current situation, as we enter the 2008 poppy-growing season. I've submitted a written statement for the record that I'll summarize.
Mr. Chairman, the scope of Afghanistan's drug problem is hard to overstate. In 2007, Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the world's opium poppy, a record high and the second year standing. Cultivation was particularly pronounced in the south, where the insurgency is strong and government authority weaker.
Afghanistan's narcotics industry fuels insecurity, undercuts reconstruction efforts and hinders the development of a legitimate economy. Notwithstanding these challenges, we did observe significant poppy reductions in the north of the country, including in the traditional poppy growing provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan.
As Ambassador Boucher mentioned, during 2007 the number of poppy- free provinces more than doubled from six to 13. To us these trends demonstrate that counter narcotics success can be achieved where there is security, political will and the ability to provide alternatives.
Early indications for the 2008 poppy growing season show a deepening of last year's trends. In the province-by-province map to my left, the provinces in the shade of red indicate where we suspect substantial or moderate cultivation. Those in blue are where we expect to have little cultivation or where we expect to see significant decreases in poppy cultivation, such as in Nangarhar.
As this demonstrates, the phenomenon of drug cultivation is not uniform across Afghanistan. In large sections in the north and east, including some areas bordering Pakistan, Afghanistan has made significant progress in reducing poppy cultivation. The problems become much more localized and concentrated in the south in provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar, where insecurity persists.
Our revised counter narcotics strategy released in August seeks to consolidate and expand upon gains throughout the north, while addressing expanding cultivation in a very challenging security environment in the south.
Our revised strategy aims dramatically to enhance incentives through the provision of additional development assistance, while simultaneously strengthening the disincentives through efforts such as interdiction, eradication and law enforcement.
We have, for instance, strengthened the good performers initiative, that aims to deliver rapid high impact development assistance directly to those communities that have been successful in reducing or eliminating opium poppy. The enhancements further support the U.S. Agency for International Development's well-established alternative development program.
Incentives such as these must be balanced with strong disincentives, such as interdiction, eradication, and most of all, an effective criminal justice system. Assisting the government of Afghanistan in improving interdiction capabilities is among our highest priorities.
The Drug Enforcement Administration provides training, mentoring and investigative assistance to the counter narcotics police of Afghanistan, and it supports three specially vetted units that investigate and pursue key high value targets.
According to the Afghan government's statistics in 2007, the counter narcotics police of Afghanistan seized 39 metric tons of opium, four metric tons of heroin, arrested 760 individuals for trafficking, and destroyed 50 drug labs.
Eradication is another critical component of counter narcotics strategy. Based on its experience in other countries, the U.N. estimates that 25 percent of Afghanistan's poppy crop must be eradicated in order to effectively deter the population from growing poppy. To promote eradication that is effective and equitable, the U.S. strongly supported non-negotiated force protected eradication.
The U.N. has reported that poppy cultivation is no longer associated with poverty in Afghanistan. The poppy fields in the south are largely owned by wealthy drug lords, and in some instances, corrupt officials. The benefits of this policy of reducing financial benefit to insurgents and corrupt officials that enable a climate of corruption far outweigh the potential loss of support for a small percentage of the population.
To develop the ability of the nascent Afghan criminal justice sector, the Departments of State and Justice are training a specially vetted task force of Afghan judges, prosecutors and investigators to try mid and high-value narcotics traffickers before the counter narcotics tribunal of Afghanistan.
Since that Afghan led task force became operational in May 2005, it's prosecuted over 1,200 cases, arrested over 1,600 defendants, and seized more than 38 metric tons of opium.
Mr. Chairman, again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues. I welcome your feedback and look forward to the discussion. Thank you.
BIDEN:
Thank you, gentlemen.
Seven minute rounds -- is that OK?
Well, to listen to you two guys, we're doing really well. Things are going really well in Afghanistan. And that's encouraging. But let me ask you. Thirty-eight metric tons seized -- how many produced?
JOHNSON:
It's a fraction of the amount produced.
BIDEN:
Like what? One percent?
JOHNSON:
No, I think it's substantially more than that, but not...
BIDEN:
Well, what do you think? Give me an estimate.
JOHNSON:
I believe about 400. So I would say in the range of maybe 10 percent.
BIDEN:
And the criminal justice system -- is it functional?
JOHNSON:
It is beginning to function, but it is not functioning in the way that we would expect in a...
BIDEN:
It's not even remotely functional at this point, is it?
JOHNSON:
Remotely I would not describe it. It's more than remotely functioning, but it is in the process of being established.
BIDEN:
Yes. It isn't functioning. That would be a fair statement. Isn't it true? I mean, there are some places where it may be functioning, but essentially it's not a functioning criminal justice system.
JOHNSON:
Well, I did mention that there had been over 1,200 convictions for this special court, so there is a system that is producing some results, but it is embryonic.
BIDEN:
Ambassador Boucher, you indicated that we're making progress against the Taliban. How does that square with the fact they control a lot more of the country?
BOUCHER:
I don't think they actually control a lot more of the country. They operate in a lot of the country, but we've seen areas where they've tried to settle down and establish control.
We've seen several of those major areas taken away -- Panjwai, near Kandahar, a Canadian and Afghan operation late 2006, early this year. That was one of their heartland places, and they're out of there now, and there are services being brought into that area, and a lot of ordinary people moving back...
BIDEN:
Are we better off relative to the Taliban today than we were two years ago?
BOUCHER:
We're better off in terms of our ability to bring in the government and help them provide services throughout the country. We're better off in terms of their not controlling places and not having so many concentrations where they can operate from.
But we're not better off in terms of bombs, because as they've been losing on the battlefield -- they failed to achieve any of their objectives last year, except they've turned more and more terror, and they're able to go blow themselves up.
BIDEN:
So we're losing more, right, this year than last year?
BOUCHER:
We've been out there fighting a lot more, and yes, we've had more casualties this year.
BIDEN:
The police -- how would you rate their effectiveness?
BOUCHER:
Very variable.
BIDEN:
Any place? Tell me where it's real good.
BOUCHER:
I think some places in the north. Some districts in the south, where we started this focused development, show a lot of promise. Police training has lagged behind all the other sectors.
We've made a major push last year in budget and in effort. Now we've got a lot more good policemen coming out. We've got a lot more trained policemen. We've got a lot more focus on what needs to be done with the police.
BIDEN:
The reports I've read...
BOUCHER:
We've seen some of the reform in ministry of interior that's needed, but more of that is yet to come.
BIDEN:
This discussion reminds me so much of the discussion about police in Iraq that Senator Hagel and I have had over the years. I've not found one independent report that suggests they're anything other than a problem. Can you cite one for me?
BOUCHER:
I'll tell you one thing. There was a survey done last year that I think was reported by the BBC in December, and one of the things that really struck me was people said they'd rather have bad policemen than no policemen at all. Now, that's certainly not our goal, but the fact that...
BIDEN:
Well, that's what you've achieved.
BOUCHER:
... people do have policemen...
BIDEN:
We've achieved that, though. It may not be the goal, but we've achieved it.
BOUCHER:
That was the case beforehand, sir. There were 70- some...
BIDEN:
It's the case right now. Look, look. You know, it's interesting, I thought -- this report by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit that's called "Cops or Robbers." The report ends with the following, and I'm not saying this is the only source. We're going to hear from two witnesses about this as well. It says that "It's time to clarify today's blurred vision on the role of police in Afghanistan and to achieve a consensus on a common vision and a strategy for development of a police force who will operate as cops rather than as robbers."
This is so much an echo of four years ago, five years ago in Afghanistan. The emphasis has been on numbers, not quality. The emphasis has been to rapidly ramp up the numbers of police.
Let me move on in the minute or so I have left.
With regard, Mr. Johnson, to the move against poppy production, how many of the drug lords have been arrested and tried and put out of business?
JOHNSON:
I mentioned in the statement I made the number of arrests that have been made by and the number of convictions. "Drug lord" is an indefinite term.
BIDEN:
No, it's not. No, it's not an indefinite term. There are at least a dozen identifiable people you know, who are running these operations. If you don't know, we really have a problem. We have a gigantic problem if you don't know. You know. Have any of them been arrested?
JOHNSON:
Well, I think if we were going to be using the term "kingpin," which is frequently used in this term, I don't think we have been yet successful in that, and arrested and convicted, the exception to that being that there have been some extraditions to the United States for trial here. I think all of those individuals are people that we would describe as significant players in the Afghan drug trade.
BIDEN:
One last question on this, and there's a lot more I want to come back to. In speaking with the intelligence community, the military, almost every segment of our government involved with having an input on dealing with eradication, nobody seems to think, including our NATO allies, that aerial spraying is a good idea.
And you pointed out that you have six fewer areas in which poppy is now being produced. How did you succeed there? Was it aerial spraying?
JOHNSON:
The way we made progress there was multifold, but it was through a forced eradication program in which we provided assistance. It was significantly...
BIDEN:
You say forced eradication. What kind of forced eradication? What was the...
JOHNSON:
On the ground. On the ground mechanical.
BIDEN:
Right.
JOHNSON:
It was significantly, and even largely, through local governing officials and particular governors who had the political will and had the security environment in which they could destroy poppy themselves.
BIDEN:
There's probably a lesson in that, isn't there?
JOHNSON:
Well, I think the lesson is that security and counter narcotics go hand in hand, that you can't have one without the other, and you can't do them sequentially. You have to do them together.
BIDEN:
All right.
Military tells me that if in fact aerial eradication is adopted as the favored method of eradication, which our ambassador wants very much, that that would require a heck of a lot more military resources than we have now.
You're essentially flying crop dusters. This is something I've been involved in with 30 years on this issue, as you have, from the Judiciary Committee. And we're essentially flying crop dusters, what most people would think would be that, eradicating, this defoliant that takes out the...
And in order for that to occur successfully, you need helicopter gunships. You need protection for those aircraft, because they can be shot down. They can be shot down, some of them, just with small arms fire.
So have you calculated what additional military resources beyond the actual planes that would spray the defoliant are needed in order to make -- even if the decision is made -- an aerial eradication should be the major thrust of eradication? Is there a study or a calculation or a report that you've put together on what other assets you'd need?
JOHNSON:
Well, based on the consideration of this issue earlier, when we were considering whether or not it would be the right way to go, we have developed plans for this.
In addition to the spray aircraft, which are lightly armored, as you mentioned, we have the helicopters that are already on the ground that provide security for the ground forced eradication program. So they're there, and they're capable of providing this service, if it were needed. But if I could...
BIDEN:
That's interesting. If you could submit that for the record, that would be great, even if it's in a classified form, because you're the first person who's told me that. That's a fascinating thing.
JOHNSON:
Well, could I continue?
BIDEN:
Sure, please.
JOHNSON:
We have these aircraft there, because we need them -- the helicopters -- for the ground program. They're also used for mobility, for the police training program, for assisting in the development of judicial systems. So those aircraft are on the ground already.
BIDEN:
Pretty well spoken for.
JOHNSON:
But not any spray aircraft. We don't have the capability to do any spraying, and we don't plan to, because we've consulted with the government of Afghanistan, and they do not wish for us to do so.
BIDEN:
Oh, OK. Good. All right. Thank you very much.
I yield to the chairman.
LUGAR:
Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to explore a thought which you mentioned, I think, Secretary Boucher, that there will be a donor's conference after the Afghan national plan is completed.
And that sounds like a very good idea, but it just spurs once again my thinking, because I'm not sure that we have a plan for Afghanistan. I'm not certain we really have comprehension on this committee, and I suppose I want more of the assurance that the administration knows more.
Specifically, if we used the model in business of a business plan of what works, how much capital is required? What kinds of activities are going to be required? What marketing strategy, and so forth?
Sometimes business plans work, and businesses thrive. But in this particular case, it appears to me that of necessity we reacted to 9/11, and we have been in Afghanistan ever since. We have worked with NATO allies in Afghanistan. A great number of good things have happened in particular provinces.
But at the end of the day, despite assurances that the government has some degree of control over the country, most observers going province by province don't find that. Central government control is very limited.
There is control by tribal leaders or those who had some leadership in the past in various places. Certainly, control is contested in many areas in the south and east, and it's not just simply the problem of the drug lords and so forth -- the Taliban, or on occasion even Al Qaida, supplementing their activities.
So day-by-day we combat this. We have successes. We can report a number of good things that happen. But I'm hopeful the administration may come forward, working with the international community, and just to try to get some idea.
What sort of capital resources does this country need -- a poverty-stricken place -- to at least advance to a different level of potential economic activity and education? How much money to build the roads and the infrastructure so in fact the central government might have some possibility of actually reaching constituent populations?
How much is going to be required for the training of an adequate army and police force -- in other words, a cadre of civil servants, who are involved? It's likely to be a very, very large sum. And in addition to the money, how many personnel, whether they're military people of our country and others, NGOs, volunteers, are going to be required?
Otherwise, what I suspect we are looking at is a situation of transition here in which we will have hearings like this. There'll be reports that there were some ups and downs last year, and so forth, but at some point the patience of our NATO allies, maybe even the American people, our constituents, will say, "We've done enough. These folks are on their own and will have to do their best."
Now, some will counsel we've been through this before. Withdrawal after the last occasion led to what some would say was a theater in which the Taliban made it possible for Al Qaida to have the camps, and people attacked us. So they would say, "Here we go again, all the way back around."
But nevertheless, unless there is some plan as to why Afghanistan will ever be a different country, what physically is going to bring integrity to this situation -- the model that has often been cast of democracy, with the gains for women, for students, for everybody?
Unless there is some goal out there, some overall plan, this situation is going to be a victim, at some point, of the politics of this country or others, and then we may lament this, but we will indicate that we gave it our best shot. We spent a good bit of money and troops and so forth.
What kind of overall planning, comprehensive planning, even if at the end of the day, people say, "Well, this is impossible. We just can't raise the cash. We can't get the people there," and therefore, we have a more limited goal, which will not be as satisfying in terms of the integrity of the state, and so forth?
But at this point I don't see any parameters of this, and that's disturbing, and this is why I want some reassurance.
BOUCHER:
Let me reassure you, sir. You've raised a lot of very important and substantial questions there, and I think the framework that you're coming from is the right one. We have to remember this was one of the poorest countries in the world in the '50s, '60s and '70s. It was on a par with sub-Sahara in Africa, and then went downhill for 25 years.
When I first went there in January of 2002, the Afghan government was 20 people sitting around a table. The Afghan treasury was an empty safe. There were 50 kilometers of roads. There were a few telephones that didn't work.
It's now one of the fastest growing cell phone markets in the world. It's got a road system that unifies the nation. It's got a government that works fairly well, better in some ministries than others, but it's capable of providing education and wells and projects for people around the country.
It's got an army that's credible and out in the field and fighting. It's got a police force that is reforming -- and it's not just quantity, it's quality as well. A lot of what's being done with the police training is to reform it as we stand it.
So I see all these efforts. Nobody can tell me it's not going in a positive direction. What I see when I go to Kabul -- you know, I saw four or five years ago, people were building houses, then they were furnishing houses. The shops that used to be in containers are now in buildings. You see school kids out going to school. You see more lights on at night than you ever did before. There is progress. It's going in the right direction.
The question that you asked, though, is how much does it take to finish the job all over the country to really succeed? Last year at the London conference, the London compact and the Afghan strategy were laid out with the goals that had to be achieved in a timeframe between then and 2014, I think. Most of them were.
That is being turned increasingly into an implementation plan, a development strategy that will go the World Bank for vetting about March of this year, and it will be based on that that we expect to hold a donors' conference, probably in the summertime, or beginning or end of the summer, to try to put money into the specific implementation steps needed to achieve those goals that have been laid out.
On the military side, there have been targets set for military and police, requirements set in terms of who needs to be trained, the kinds of forces they need, the kind of air mobility the army needs, and really set those things.
Now, those may not be the final numbers. There are plans to get to certain levels, and there's already a look at whether those are going to in the end be the right levels. But I think there are very specific plans about what we're trying to accomplish with training, both in terms of quantity and in quality.
And these plans dovetail. They dovetail, because they're brought together in Washington by the planners who are making and in Kabul by the people who are making and implementing these plans.
And the overall strategy is to win on the battlefield and win the war, really, by providing this governance at the local level. And that's being done more and more every day. I think there are places where you can see it definitely working. I saw it last week in Kunar. I saw it last week in Jalalabad. I've seen it in Panjir in the north. You see it someplace at the district level, someplace at the provincial level.
But where we have succeeded in Afghanistan is where we've been able to provide a combination of military force, good governance and economic opportunity. And we've done that successfully in many places. We have to do it in all the places, if we're going to succeed fully.
LUGAR:
Just two quick comments. I hope that as these plans are developed, or if they actually are on paper, that you will share them with us...
BOUCHER:
Absolutely.
LUGAR:
... because this has been a consistent focus of the committee for several years.
And let me finally say -- this is not a precise analogy -- but if, for example, in a political campaign you were to report to your supporters, "I'm making progress. I've been to Clinton County. I've touched base, and we're doing well over here in Pocomo," but the final result is that you get 25 percent of the vote and lose three to one, this is bad news.
(LAUGHTER)
All I'm saying is that we need to have some overall parameters of in fact how this is going to be a nation that holds together, as opposed to the fact, as you point out, you've found some progress, and we acknowledge process, but at the end of the day, Afghanistan has been a very difficult state historically, as you know better than many in your scholarship.
And it will be extremely difficult again, if we really don't get it right, and we do have this opportunity with our NATO allies now, and the focus of the world. This is not the moment we get it right. I pity the Afghans, because their situation is not going to improve after the world withdraws.
I thank you very much for your testimony and your answers.
BOUCHER:
Thank you, sir.
BIDEN:
Let me explain, if I may, the absence of the Democrats. There is a Democratic caucus going on right now, relating to the combination of what the Democrats are going to do in the Senate relative to the stimulus package, as well as what they're going to do relative to our debate relating to continuation of the president's program on eavesdropping. So that's under way now. That's the reason why they're not here. It was called at 10 o'clock. And I'd rather be here.
Senator Hagel?
HAGEL:
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And gentlemen, thank you for your time this morning.
Mr. Boucher, how long have we been in Afghanistan?
BOUCHER:
Since late 2001.
HAGEL:
So we're in our seventh year.
BOUCHER:
Yes.
HAGEL:
How much money have we invested in Afghanistan total -- drug eradication efforts, military operations, economic assistance? Do you have any general number?
BOUCHER:
I want to make sure I've got this right. It's about $25 billion.
HAGEL:
That sounds a little light to me on the numbers that I have, but we'll come back to that, and I would appreciate if you could provide this committee for the record the best numbers that you can provide over the last six years, as we are in our seventh year, in total expenditures in Afghanistan.
Mr. Boucher, I believe this was your quote here over the last few minutes. You said, "No one can tell me Afghanistan is not going in the right direction." Now, the panel after you will have an opportunity to express themselves rather directly, but some of what I think we will hear in the next panel has taken some issue with your comment.
And since you, I suspect, will not be here to respond to this panel -- who you know the individuals who will appear after you, Mr. Johnson; you know they are highly regarded, highly experienced, highly respected former public officials who know something about Afghanistan and the world -- and I might draw your attention, especially in light of your comment that no one can tell you we're not going in the right direction, to the Washington Post story this morning.
It was based on a press conference yesterday held by the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, incidentally, General Jones, who will follow you. And this was a release of two studies -- according to the Post's words -- strongly worded assessments of the war in Afghanistan.
And General Jones said this, according to the story, "Make no mistake. NATO is not winning in Afghanistan, said the report by the Atlantic Council of the United States." Further, the quote goes, "Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become a failed state," according to the port.
And of course, both reports produce some recommendations, which I would like to get your response to in a moment. You and Mr. Johnson, as the chairman has noted, have expressed yourselves in, I understand, a way that would be expected from you. But there are an astounding number of contradictions about how much progress we're making.
And you have both alluded to the fact that the Taliban is losing on the battlefield. We're making good progress on the poppy production decline front. But yet the facts just don't bear that out.
And if we're making so much progress, then why are we putting in 3,200 more Marines? Why are we to a breaking point in NATO over this issue? Consequently, the Canadian ambassador is sitting in the front row, listening to this.
