Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?
March 8, 2007
BIDEN:
The chairperson is never supposed to admit this, but I called this for 9:15. They usually start at 9:30. And I'm sitting in my office at 9:15, and my chief of staff said, "What are you doing here?"
I apologize, Mr. Secretary, getting you here at 9:15, and then starting five minutes late. And the train was actually on time, Mr. Chairman, I was actually here.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being here.
Today we face an issue at the very heart of our war on terror, the deteriorating -- my characterization -- deteriorating security situation and conditions in Afghanistan. If the current trend continues, we may soon find that our hard-won successes on the battlefield have melted away.
The last part of that statement -- and I'll repeat it again -- at the very heart of our war on terror, the deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan. If current trends continue, we may soon find that our hard-won success in the battlefield has melted away.
I didn't write those words in preparation for this morning's hearing. I spoke them nearly five years ago on the floor of the United States Senate, when two of my colleagues here, if I'm not mistaken -- I don't want to get them in trouble -- we all joined together to put more money and more troops and more effort into Afghanistan.
I'm not bringing up old quotes to say "I told you so" -- because there's a lot of things I've said that turned out not to be correct -- but to make a simple point. The situation in Afghanistan is not -- is not -- an unforeseen circumstance.
Plenty of military and civilian officials have been predicting exactly this outcome for years.
So, what's the state of play?
Osama bin Laden remains at large, right across the border in Pakistan, in all probability. There are reports that he has reconstituted his terrorist training camps, in Pakistan.
Given the chance to kill him in Tora Bora, the administration instead pulled most of our special forces out, our CIA teams and our Predators, and sent them to Iraq. The Taliban is back, keeping much of Afghanistan ungovernable. Suicide bombings, IEDs and other techniques imported from Iraq made their way last year into Afghanistan.
I remember a year ago we were saying, well, at least this isn't occurring in Afghanistan. I think everyone on this panel said, oh, it's coming. If it's in Iraq, it's coming.
And this has been -- the last year has been the bloodiest since the ouster of the Taliban.
The government in Pakistan turns a blind eye to the Taliban cross-border attacks and to the high command based in Quetta. Just last year, the government signed a separate peace with pro-Taliban militants in Waziristan. By "the government," I mean not our government.
Afghanistan reconstruction is stuck in first gear. President Bush promised a Marshall Plan, but he's delivered less development aid in the past five years than we spent on the war in Iraq in the last three weeks.
Total amount of aid spent in Afghanistan in the last five years is less than we spent in Iraq in the last three weeks.
Last year, Afghanistan produced 29 percent of the world's opium. The proceeds prop up the Taliban, warlords and corrupt officials. There's no serious counternarcotics program.
If the administration pursues a poorly conceived aerial poppy eradication plan, the results could be even worse. We have a lot of experience in this in Latin America.
Don't get me wrong. We've accomplished some great things. Because of our efforts, millions of Afghanistan children are in school today. We built roads and clinics. We've got American troops in provincial reconstruction teams showing that the U.S. military can be a wonderful friend as well as a fearsome enemy.
President Bush last month made two encouraging statements. First he announced the deployment of additional combat brigades to Afghanistan. This is obviously very important, because our NATO commanders desperately need not only several thousand battle-ready troops, but the helicopters, transport aircraft and other military hardware that go with them.
Second, the president pledged $11.8 billion in new funding over the next two years. These figures represent new funding in addition to current budget numbers. And I'm not sure of that. And if we focus on projects that bring real improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans, this may be a start of a more successful strategy. I certainly hope so.
Because in Afghanistan, success is still possible. Or put another way, failure is not thinkable.
The question is, how can we turn things around? Very briefly, in my view, we need to do three things.
First, establish security. We should be surging American -- if we surge American forces anywhere, it should be in Afghanistan, not Iraq. NATO troops are necessary, but not sufficient.
We also need to train the Afghan police and army, which means, for starters, paying them decent salaries.
I remember when I was in Afghanistan right after the Taliban fell, and I spent a lot of time with Karzai over a five-day period as he was just literally moving into an office. And I remember the discussion then about pay for police officers, pay for civilian personnel.
Second, we have to get moving on reconstruction. We need more funds, and we need to use them better. The Afghans are patient, but they're not seeing reconstruction worthy of a superpower. As General Eikenberry said, "Where the road ends, the Taliban begins."
Third, do counternarcotics right. We should target multimillion- dollar kingpins, not the dollar-a-day opium farmers. Someday aerial eradication may have it's place, but not until we've got an alternative for the livelihoods for the people who we're eradicating the poppy. And a judicial system capable of taking down the drug barons.
Until then, we should focus on the top of the food chain, not at the bottom. But unfortunately, as years as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I have an awful lot of experience watching us go through this same -- how could I say it -- reverse -- this same infatuation with thinking that, if we just eradicate for the campacias (ph) down in Latin America, somehow this is all going to go away. You've got to do it at the top.
We have three witnesses today who can explain these issues in detail, with authority, with expertise.
The first is Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia. We all know and respect him, and he's a straight shooter. We're happy he's here.
And then we have two exceptional witnesses. General James Jones recently retired from the United States Marine Corps, who I probably caused him to retire, because I think he's the single most qualified person in the United States military.
He was the commander -- and I've said that before he retired, I hope I didn't hurt you, general -- who was the commander of NATO until earlier this year. He supervised the alliance expansion to include responsibility for all of Afghanistan.
And then Ambassador James Dobbins, currently at the Rand Corporation. He has served as special envoy for Afghanistan, and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 he served as liaison to the Afghan forces fighting alongside our troops, bringing down the Taliban. An extremely talented man.
Gentlemen, welcome, and I will now, before we turn to our first witness, turn it over to my colleague, Senator Lugar.
LUGAR:
Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join your welcome to Secretary Boucher and General Jones and Jim Dobbins, who have been very good friends of this committee for many years.
And I appreciate the extraordinary expertise that our witnesses bring to our deliberations on Afghanistan.
Almost six months ago, the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Afghanistan that featured General Jones. At that time, we observed the Taliban insurgents were challenging NATO forces in greater numbers, sowing dissent among Afghans, cooperating with the narcotics trade and complicating security efforts in ways that inhibit the rule of law and reconstruction.
Many analysts believe that fighting in Afghanistan soon will intensify, as the Taliban attempt a spring offensive to demonstrate their strength.
Although the Taliban do not possess the capability to defeat NATO and the coalition, and Afghan forces arrayed against them on the battlefield, the insecurity the Afghan people feel because of the Taliban attacks has caused some to lose confidence in their government.
Others are leaning more heavily on tribal leaders and warlords who offer security. This undercuts the authority of the Afghan government, increases the risk of civil conflict between tribal factions.
The United States and our alliance partners must be prepared to respond to any increase in insurgent violence. There should be no doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO.
The September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda still operates there. And the fate of the country remains both strategic and symbolic.
As in Iraq, the success of our strategy depends not just on battlefield victories. It also depends on providing the populace with reasons to support the central government and coalition forces.
Battlefield successes will not bring security, if the economic dislocation and political resentment within Afghanistan provide the Taliban with a steady supply of recruits to replace their losses.
We need to underscore that the United States, NATO and the international community are committed to stability and the reconstruction in Afghanistan. We must focus efforts now on economic development that makes a difference in the lives of Afghans and gives young people more employment options.
We've established an infrastructure to support development in Afghanistan, including provincial reconstruction teams. But if this infrastructure lacks resources to make discernible progress on electricity, water, health care, agriculture and other measures, it will be irrelevant to the security situation.
It isn't clear what portion of Taliban insurgents are true believers, and what portion are so-called "day-fighters" -- local mercenaries who are being paid to fight by the Taliban, often with funds generated from the narcotics trade.
But to the extent that alternatives to a mercenary livelihood can be expanded, the Taliban will find it more difficult to regenerate their ranks.
President Bush has made a significant request, as the chairman mentioned, for new funds for Afghanistan in the 2007 supplemental, including $2 billion for economic reconstruction. It is vital that this funding be used to maximum effect, and that our allies, similarly, meet their commitments.
The Afghanistan Compact adopted by the international community last year called for a significant increase in reconstruction and development efforts. Likewise, when NATO assumed command of the international security assistance force in Afghanistan, it called for a renewed emphasis on reconstruction and development.
Our partners in NATO and beyond must support these calls with an increase in resources.
I thank the chairman for holding this hearing. I would mention as a point of personal privilege that the chairman and Senator Hagel, the three of us, visited with President Karzai in '03 when we visited Iraq, and before that at the conference on the Dead Sea, and saw his plans then.
We were impressed with his economic ministers and the things that they wanted to do. And we still have confidence in them.
And it's significant that the three of us are here this morning to hear you, and our distinguished witnesses, and to try again.
I thank the chair.
BIDEN:
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Welcome. The floor is yours.
BOUCHER:
Thank you, senator.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Hagel, Senator Nelson, it's a pleasure to be here today. I have a longer statement that I'd like to have entered into the record. And then I'll...
(CROSSTALK)
BIDEN:
Without objection, your whole statement will be placed in the record.
BOUCHER:
... (inaudible) remarks. Thank you, sir.
Senator, I'm going to sketch out briefly, if I can, somewhat of a different picture than the one that you opened up with.
BIDEN:
I expected you might.
BOUCHER:
But I want to say from the start, I think you got all the right pieces. All the right factors are there.
If the situation -- if the current trends continued last year's trends, we would be in a horrible situation. But I really do think that we have set it up. We're in a better position this year. We have -- I'll explain -- we have more resources, more capability, and we're looking for additional resources.
The areas that you outlined -- security, reconstruction, narcotics, and I would add governance, extending the government of Afghanistan, extending good government in Afghanistan -- those four things, as you noted, need to be done more, more generally throughout the country, and better, in better coordination. And that's the program that we've laid out for this year.
This year we recognize we have to step up efforts and carry out a comprehensive security, political and economic strategy to make the country safe for all, especially for the people of Afghanistan.
In the five years since Bonn, we have made impressive progress -- kids in school, thousands of kilometers of roads, extending government, institutions of government -- but we recognize we have many challenges still to overcome.
We have to check the Taliban insurgency to ensure that the population SEES the benefits of good government, and do a better job getting the message out in Afghanistan and abroad.
The administration has requested an additional $11.8 billion in assistance for the remainder of 2007, and for fiscal year 2008 in Afghanistan. This is a significant increase in resources compared to previous years.
The funding request reflects a strategy of extending government and the benefits of government to people throughout the country, especially in the south and east. It'll go into training and equipping police and military, constructing district roads, increasing electricity generation and distribution, extending government, training government employees, providing services to citizens, fighting narcotics and bringing about rural development.
We're all increasingly alarmed by the rapid growth of opium poppy cultivation in the country. Poppy production in Afghanistan fuels corruption and finances criminal and insurgent groups.
Less than two years ago, we launched a multifaceted campaign that we're intensifying this year. With the support of Afghan authorities, we've created and expanded a strategy of public information, rural development, law enforcement, interdiction and eradication.
Last year we saw six poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan. We have an opportunity this year to double the number of poppy-free provinces to 12, maybe 14, perhaps more.
Once again this year, we anticipate intensified attempts by the Taliban to disrupt government authority and sway the population in their favor. They failed last year to take and hold cities, towns and territory. This year they're more likely to -- they are likely to turn increasingly to suicide bombings, assassination and intimidation tactics, often targeting innocent civilians.
The United States, the government of Afghanistan and our allies are approaching the expected spring violence with some confidence. NATO, U.S. and Afghan forces are more capable this year, better positioned and poised to follow up effectively after military operations.
We are succeeding in extending the writ of government to more districts. We're putting more Afghan police, Afghan soldiers on the ground, more military, more NATO, more capable district officials, more reconstruction, more roads, more effective Afghan government than ever before in Afghanistan.
As you noted, Pakistan continues to be a key partner, and I would say a vital partner, in the fight against Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is clear to us that the Taliban are under pressure from all sides, including from Pakistan.
Recently, Pakistan has launched attacks on training facilities and armed infiltrators, and has arrested Taliban leadership figures, including, as you seen in press reports, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the former Taliban minister of defense.
Pakistani leaders are committed to combating extremism and continuing to move the country towards a moderate course.
Pakistan's success is absolutely key to the success of U.S. strategic goals in the region. We have supported Pakistani authorities and will continue to support them.
At the NATO summit in Riga in November, as well as the foreign and defense ministerials in January and February, NATO allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Afghanistan mission.
We have continued to press our allies to fulfill the force shortfalls for the NATO requirements. And since last fall, allies have pledged approximately 7,000 new troops to the mission; 3,200 of those are American, but the majority are contributions from other allies.
While some caveats restricting operations remain a concern, allies have also expressed a willingness to come to each other's aid should the need arise. We're also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion over the last six months in new, multi- year assistance.
We and our allies recognize that success in Afghanistan can be achieved and must be achieved. The people of Afghanistan badly want our assistance and understand all too well the consequences of failure.
At the Department of State, we appreciate the committee members' interest and support, and particularly the kind of travel that you've made their in the past.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear and discuss these issues with you today, and I look forward to responding to any questions you and the members may have.
BIDEN:
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We'll stick to seven-minute rounds, if that's OK, if we agree.
Let me get right to it, Mr. Secretary. Do you agree that the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremists are now operating in more areas of Afghanistan than they were a year ago?
BOUCHER:
I don't think so. I think, first of all, they have been very dominant in the south and largely in the south. There have been -- they have the capability of carrying out bombings, of sending suicide bombers to other parts of the country, and we've seen some of that.
But I would say, by and large, it's the same or less, because parts of the south, where they had operated pretty freely, have been taken away from them. So, like some of the areas around Kandahar, the Panjshir Valley.
BIDEN:
So you think it's actually less territory.
BOUCHER:
I think it's probably less. I would say, more or less, we're facing a similar situation. We'll see suicide bombers more throughout the country, though.
BIDEN:
What is the size of the Afghanistan army? And to what extent can they operate independently?
BOUCHER:
They are -- I think they have about 35,000 troops now. They are operating closely with our forces, with NATO forces. I don't -- I think you'd have to get a military person to describe their capabilities to operate independently. But they operate very effectively, and very effectively with us.
Their problem right now is that they're pretty strung out. They've been in the fight and fighting well, but they're constantly, constantly working.
BIDEN:
How about the police?
BOUCHER:
The police have lagged behind a little bit. I don't have a number right off the top of my head for the police, but I guess, I'd just have to say, there's more and more every day, and they're starting to get more capabilities.
BIDEN:
What percentage of Afghanistan does the central government control, would you say?
BOUCHER:
It controls the north, the east, the west, the center. It has control of all the provincial capitals, many of the district areas in the south.
At the same, "control" means they have effective government, they have government officials, they have police, they have military.
BIDEN:
But are the government officials...
BOUCHER:
That doesn't mean it stops everything that might go on there.
BIDEN:
No, I'm not -- I understand that.
Are you telling me, in the west -- in Herat and other places -- that Kabul is in control? Or are the warlords in those areas in control?
BOUCHER:
I think there is basic national authority throughout the country. And obviously, in some places, local authorities have a strong role. But previously dominant warlords in some of these areas have been moved out, and there is more effective national government authority.
BIDEN:
When -- you know, there's a routine by which -- I recall when, over the first couple of years after the Taliban fell, I met fairly regularly, and for a six- or eight- or 10-month period -- I can't remember how long -- but I met weekly with the then-national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice.
And I remember going into her office at one point and making the comment that I thought that we were undercutting Karzai in Kabul on public works projects, because we were going directly to the warlords and giving them the money for sewer projects, water projects, highway projects.
And the comment she made at the time was, well, that's always been the way it is. The warlords are there. That's just reality.
Has there been a change in that philosophy? Do we actually -- are we actually -- for example, we're about to, hopefully, appropriate a considerable portion of money for Afghanistan.
Much of that, some of that, will go to public works projects. The PRTs will do some of it, but there will also be, I assume, direct appropriations.
Need the mayor of a city somewhere in Afghanistan go through the central government to get the allocation, or does the allocation come directly from either AID or the Department of State or the United States government?
In other words, are we funneling all the aid for local projects through the national government, Karzai's government?
BOUCHER:
A lot of it does go directly to the central government for the central government to spend. But particularly with the huge amounts that we're spending, a lot of it we spend directly, we contract directly.
But we do it in conjunction with the national authorities, with the authorities.
I was up in the Panjshir Valley, a very calm area. The PRT there work with the governor. They work on the roads that he identifies and the local authorities identify. You know, he's the one that brings the project, cuts the ribbon.
It's done -- PRTs act in support of the local, of the national government. They act to extend the authority and the benefits of the national government.
BIDEN:
My observation -- my time is almost up -- my observation is that there is a direct correlation between who you have to go to to get the money and the degree to which the person you have to go to is viewed as having authority in the region.
And I've been perplexed as to why, in order to try to build up the central government and Karzai's authority, why we have not increased his ability to have leverage on the political scene by allowing it to be known that that highway that's being built is not because of the local mayor.
It's a little bit like today, if you go into our states and highway funding, you don't have to go through the state, you can go directly to the local mayor or councilman, I promise you the governor's authority is going to be a whole lot less in the state.
And it seems to me -- that seems to me to be a missing piece. Maybe I am -- maybe I have misunderstood how you've changed allocations.
But to be precise, if the PRT gets a request to extend a road two miles into a village, or to reconstruct a water project that's been damaged or build one from the start, or dig wells, does that come directly from the local tribal leader or warlord? I know we don't like using that phrase anymore, but they're still warlords.
Or do those requests get rationalized through the allocation of resources by the central government, saying, no, no, it's better for us to put more emphasis here than there?
How do the PRTs interface with Karzai's ministers and Karzai's government?
BOUCHER:
When I was in Panjshir Valley, sir, I saw this working. When people come to the PRT, a local village, and says we need a school, we need a clinic, a road, the PRT's answer is, you know, great, we'll try to help you.
Talk to the governor. He's the one that's got to sort out the priorities, because everybody wants a school and everybody wants a road. He's got to decide where it's going to go.
And as the representative of Karzai, of the national government, the governor is the one that sorts it out and decides where these things...
BIDEN:
I have 33 seconds.
BOUCHER:
... which ones to do.
BIDEN:
For the record, explain the relationship between the governor and that governor's allegiance to the central government.
BOUCHER:
The governor is an appointee of the central government, can be hired, fired, sent off. He works for Karzai. He works for the central government.
BIDEN:
OK. My time is up. I have a few more questions later about -- if they're not asked -- about the pledges we've received from other countries, how they've been forthcoming, if they're been forthcoming, and the like.
