The Standing Rules of the Senate are drafted to encourage vigorous public debate on our nation’s most important issues. Indeed, the U.S. Senate is often referred to as “the world’s greatest deliberative body.” The Rules allow any Senator to seek recognition from the Chair at any time and, absent a temporary agreement to the contrary, to speak without interruption so long as he or she wishes. Debating important questions before the Senate is one way a Senator can highlight an issue, advocate for a change in policy, or voice his or her opinion on pending legislation.
Senate debate occurs in public, and is televised on CSPAN and transcribed in the Congressional Record. For your convenience, I post transcripts of my Senate floor speeches on this site for your review. I hope you find them informative and useful. My web site also makes available information on my voting record and legislation that I have sponsored in the Senate.
 print |  email |
|
Senator Sessions Speaks about the Iraq Hearings
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
IRAQ HEARINGS
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, we had a hearing yesterday in the Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, in which General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker made their reports back to the Congress, as they promised. They also testified yesterday afternoon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and today they are before the House committee. I think they had about a 30-minute break or less between the testimony here and their testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee. I thought General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker did a marvelous job and were asked a lot of tough questions, which is the Congress's responsibility, I don't dispute.
What I wish to share with my colleagues today relates to the testimony of General Jack Keane, who testified this morning before the Armed Services Committee.
General Keane was former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. He is a paratrooper, a combat veteran, a student of the military for 37 years, a four star general who has made four trips to Iraq in the last year, and he has made a number of suggestions and continues to be, in my opinion, one of the most respected observers of the Iraqi military situation we have in our country today.
In fact, I happened to be on ``The Charlie Rose Show'' with him and Senator JACK REED last night. Reference was made that he was an adviser to Presidential candidate and Senate Member HILLARY CLINTON. He said that, in fact, he had provided advice to her, but he had provided advice to all three of the leading candidates still in the race and three of those who dropped out. His advice is widely sought. His criticism was real over a year ago when he felt the policies we were executing in Iraq were not good policies and not effective. He believed a change in policy was called for. To a significant degree, the surge, and even more importantly, the tactical changes that took place with the surge were suggestions that he had made. Of course, General Petraeus also executed them, and it represented General Petraeus's view, but General Keane did make a valuable contribution in the new policy we have undertaken.
Now, the American people are concerned about Iraq. They are rightly worried that we have a long-term commitment, and they wonder whether there is a good and decent government at the end of that commitment, whether it will be worth the effort we are putting forth, and whether we have a realistic chance of success in Iraq.
I have asked General Petraeus each and every time he has testified before me: Do you believe we have a realistic chance of success? He said that when he first went over there, when things were going badly and he knew he had to make some changes, he said: Yes, Senator. If I didn't believe I could be successful, I wouldn't go, I wouldn't take the job. Since then, he has twice reported based on his time there that he thinks we have a realistic chance of success.
What did General Keane say to us today? This very fine, highly respected professional military officer said this:
The character of my visits to Iraq is to spend considerable time with the Iraqi people, their Sheik and Tribal leaders, as well as time with our U.S. military, Iraqi military, and civilian leaders, and our troops.
That is a direct quote. I will continue to quote General Keane:
First and foremost, we have the most talented and capable leadership team in Iraq represented by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Nothing in my 40 plus years in national security compares to this extraordinary team who provide the very best of leadership to their marvelous teammates and troops.
He talks about the dramatic turnaround:
The security turnaround in Iraq from the hell of 2006 and 3 years of failed strategy is one of the most stunning achievements in the annals of coun ter in sur gency practice. It was achieved in a matter of months versus the years it normally takes to turn around one of the most formidable insurgencies the West has ever faced. Fundamental to that success was the use of proven coun ter in sur gency practice to protect the people with sufficient amounts of Iraq and U.S. troops. This was a catalyst--
He says--
for the widespread Sunni awakening movement, which is truly underappreciated here in the U.S. What really happened is the Sheiks and Tribal leaders decided they could not achieve their political objectives with al-Qaida Iraq in fighting the United States and the government of Iraq. As such, the overwhelming majority of Sunni leaders made four strategic decisions to (1) stop the violence; (2) leverage the United States leaders to influence the government of Iraq; (3) reconcile with the government of Iraq; and (4) provide their ``sons'' to work with us and the Iraqis to help defeat the AQI--
al-Qaida Iraq--
and protect their own people.
Now, that is a remarkable development. It occurred in a matter of months, and I agree with him. I don't think even those of us in the Congress have fully understood the significance of what has happened. I don't say everything is perfect and is going to be perfect and there are not dangers and problems ahead, but we need to listen to the report from this objective, respected general very carefully.
He goes on to say:
These results are the very best one could expect in fighting an insurgency; your opponent not only surrenders, but comes to your side, to assist. The entire Arab Muslim world are aware of the Sunni rejection of AQI, the first major occurrence, ever, where the people have rejected the AQI and their barbaric hold on them. Additionally, in a recent poll over 90 percent of the Sunnis are expected to participate in the political process in the 2008 provisional elections and in the general election in 2009. What does that tell us about reconciliation? Clearly, the Sunnis are politically reconciling with the government of Iraq and the government of Iraq is assisting.
That is a good report.
People all over the Arab world know that al-Qaida has a Sunni heritage, and that al-Qaida fed on the Sunni unhappiness over being displaced from power as part of the Saddam Hussein regime. Many of the displaced Sunnis were military people with military training and capable in military conflicts and attacks. Now many Sunnis have partnered with the United States and the Government of Iraq and turned against al-Qaida and have basically driven them out of large portions of the country.
General Keane goes on to say this:
The implication of this is that the central region of Iraq is relatively secure and now the U.S. and Iraqi forces are focusing their efforts on the remaining presence of AQI in the north.
Now, I hope my colleagues will listen to this next sentence:
In my view, the AQI are already operationally defeated and the final campaign against AQI is underway as we speak. We will complete the defeat of AQI in the months ahead in 2008.
I say to my colleagues, without the slightest doubt, this is his professional military opinion. It is not a political document, and it is consistent with what we have been reading. If you read through what the media saying that the people in Al Anbar, the Sunni region that had been the haven of al-Qaida, have turned against al-Qaida, they have joined with the U.S. military and the government of Iraq and have made Fallujah and Ramadi now cities of relative safety. Just a few months ago they were exceedingly dangerous and violent cities. It is not perfect, but huge progress was made.
General Keane went on to say this:
Make no mistake, this is genuine progress and has led to a significant conclusion. We cannot lose militarily in Iraq, as we were on the verge of doing in 2006. The AQI and remaining hardliner Sunni insurgents cannot mount an offensive that they could sustain, which would threaten the regime. Are we finished? No, but we and the Iraqis have the momentum, we are on the offense, and we can finally see that winning in Iraq is now a likely outcome.
He talks about the problem with the Iranians. He doesn't minimize that in any way. He goes on to talk about Prime Minister Maliki. We have had people continually criticize Prime Minister Maliki, but it appears to me, based on the testimony I have heard, that he is growing in personal confidence and stature and is beginning to show some of the leadership we would like for him to show in the sovereign nation of Iraq.
He talked about Maliki's decision to quickly send troops to the south, to Basra, where a militia group and special groups associated with the Shia community were causing trouble to the central government. Maliki is a Shia, his government is dominated by Shia, and the majority of the country is Shia. A lot of the people who criticize the war at every possible turn have said that the Shia government in Iraq is doing nothing to crack down on the Shia militia. Then when Maliki does it, they promptly rise up and start saying he didn't do it wisely; he should have done it differently.
Let's see what General Jack Keane said:
As impulsive as he was, and while the planning and coordination [of this action to Basra] was inadequate, this is the right course of action. We should not be quick to judge the success of a campaign by the first few days of action when we know this is the beginning of a campaign which will last for months.
He is talking about a campaign against extremist Shia militia, particularly in the south.
My view is, the campaign in the south will not be as difficult as the fight against AQI and the Sunni insurgents. Indeed, Maliki's political position has been considerably enhanced because all the major political parties are supporting Maliki against the Sadirists, who are now isolated. In fact, this weekend Maliki announced that you cannot participate in the upcoming elections if your political party has a militia. This had thrown the Sadirists into disarray.
So I think it is a noteworthy event that Maliki took the central army of Iraq, supported as best we could, and sent them off to the south--almost a division--to confront these Shia militia and, as General Keane noted, they can be successful in the long run. It has thrown the Sadirists into disarray and it has been very popular with the Iraqi people, who would like to see him standing up to these groups, many of whom are associated with Iran. There is a nationalistic mood in the country of Iraq. They do not want to be dominated by Iran.
So General Keane goes on to say this:
All that said, it is critical to succeed. It is in the U.S. national interests to defeat Iran in Iraq. To do so, we need a U.S. national and regional strategy. . . .
Many of our colleagues and commentators continue to say, well, yes, we have had some military progress, thank you, General Petraeus and people like you. We congratulate you on your work, but still the Government of Iraq has shown no political progress. Without political progress, ultimately, we cannot have peace and a progressive Iraq, so it is all doomed to failure. You have heard those arguments on television all the time, and they are on the floor of the Senate, and they were raised in committee. This is what General Keane said:
The surge or counter-offensive was always intended to buy time so that the Iraqis could make political and economic progress. This is happening and while there is much to be done, the progress is definable. How can anyone conclude there is no political progress when (1) the Sunnis are reconciling with a Shia dominated government, stopped the violence, and are providing 91,000 of their sons [Sons of Iraq] to assist us? This, after all, was the intent of the much-discussed national legislative benchmarks. (2) As to the benchmarks, we, the United States Government [he was somewhat critical of our Government] ``brow-beated'' the government of Iraq into submitting to a legislative agenda. After we achieved some basic security, the government of Iraq has made impressive political progress--passing 12 of 18 benchmarks and making progress on 5 others. Significantly, 4 out of 6 legislative benchmarks, including deBaathification, amnesty, semi-autonomous regions and provincial powers are passed. Why is it so difficult to acknowledge that both these points, Sunni reconciliation and major national legislation, represent significant political progress?
I ask my colleagues, why are we in this body not willing to acknowledge this is progress? Is it because we are so invested in predicting a defeat of our own military that we refuse to acknowledge that
progress of unexpected depth and breadth has occurred? It is not over yet, I submit. This is a difficult, dangerous situation still. The violence is still about in Iraq; I don't deny that. But it is a 60-percent, or more, reduction in less than a year. And huge sections of the country have begun to reconcile, as we hoped and prayed would occur.
We had this talk through the last election. It was a good way to articulate it politically. Opponents of the war argued that the only thing they understand in the Iraqi Government and the only way they will reconcile and work out their political differences is for us to tell them to do so, and if they don't do so, we threaten to pull out our troops, regardless of the consequences on the ground, and this will make them more likely to reconcile and be nice to one another. We basically rejected that and we signed on to a new strategy, a counter insurgency strategy, which we called a surge. What did General Keane say about that?
It is a myth to suggest by withdrawing rapidly, somehow, that will force the Iraqis to make progress they would not make by our presence. Anyone who truly knows the situation in Iraq, and the Iraqi leaders, realizes that it is the American presence that has aided the Iraqis to make the progress they have made and will continue to make. Our encouragement, tough-mindedness, and genuine assistance are major factors in that success. To leave and abandon them forces them into isolation, not reconciliation. It brings out their worst fears, driven by their paranoia about the past, that the Shias are on their own and their enemies are all around. What is needed is our continued, but not open-ended, presence to further our mutual objectives.
He talked about our force, our military. This is important. This man has given his life to the service of his country. He said this:
One final point, about our ground forces; not only are they magnificent but are performing to a standard not seen in any previous conflict. They are not a broken force, or near broken. Their discipline, morale, competence, behavior, and courage is extraordinary, and it is so with the knowledge that many of the American people do not support the war, but do support them. Are they stressed, and their loved ones as well, by the repeated deployments? Of course they are. But this is a proud, resilient force that has no quit in it; they have a dogged determination to succeed. We are fighting two wars that are in our national interest [Iraq and Afghanistan] and I have known since Ð9/11, our force, which I was a part of it, was committed to protect the American people by staying on the offense against our enemies. They want to win, and they will; they do not want to be a party to choosing defeat, or to be part of an Army or Marine Corps that suffers a humiliating defeat. That stark reality will break the force. Fighting protracted wars in our history has always stressed our forces. Doing what we can to reduce the impact is critical, but choosing victory is, hands-down, the best answer.
It was a remarkable bit of testimony, I think, and it came from a man whose credentials are undisputed--a general who was prepared to criticize our tactics when he believes they were in error. He invested time by going there four times to visit this country. He has gone throughout the entire country, and he is in a position to evaluate and analyze whether our new tactics--the surge and coun ter in sur gency tactics General Petraeus has applied--were successful. He said it is one of the most dramatic turnarounds in the history of warfare, certainly in fighting against an insurgency.
We can all disagree about the war and whether we should have gone there, and how we should draw down our troops. But let's not deny that with the courage and fidelity of our military men and women in uniform, they have made dramatic progress in recent months. That progress places us in a much better position to secure a very successful outcome in this effort.
As to those who have opinions about what we should do in Iraq, and they think perhaps the President's ideas or others are not worthy of respect, let me just say it this way: January, a year ago, General Petraeus went over to Iraq. Last summer, we funded by an overwhelming vote the surge giving General Petraeus additional troops and additional authorities to lead in Iraq. We basically gave General Petraeus a chance because things had not been going well and people were very worried, and I was one of them.
General Petraeus was No. 1 in his class at Command and General Staff College, received a Ph.D. from Princeton University, commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul when the war began, and spent a year there. I visited with him there. He came home for a period of time, I think less than a year. He was asked to go back and train the Iraqi military. I visited him in Baghdad when he was doing that. Following that tour, he came home and he wrote the Defense Department manual on how to confront and defeat an insurgency, and before the ink was dry on that manual we asked him to go back and lead that effort.
I would say we have never had a better prepared general for the complex military and political situation such as we face in Iraq. There has been a dramatic improvement under his leadership. That is indisputable.
General Petraeus testified yesterday, and this is basically what he said: I have drawn down the surge numbers. We will have those numbers completely drawn down by this summer. So our troop levels will be back to where they were before the surge occurred. I think, it is my best military judgment--my best military judgment--that we ought to pause for a while, and not immediately continue to draw down--and not for a year, just for a matter of months--and make sure we don't go so fast in our withdrawal that we destabilize the progress we have made because much of the progress is fragile. It could fall back if we don't conduct ourselves properly. That is what he asked us to do.
We have political generals, we have commentators on television who like to talk, and on the radio, but I will tell you who has earned my respect. General Petraeus. If he says, after all this effort and all the commitment of this Nation, that he needs a few months of pause before we begin to draw down again, then I think we ought to give it to him. Who is prepared to dispute that? If we don't support that, what we are saying is we think we know better than General Petraeus. General Keane says it is the finest military team he has ever seen assembled in his 40 years in the military.
I made the mistake of saying that General Petraeus--because I visited him over there, I knew this was his third tour in Iraq--that he had served 3 years in the war on terror. A little later it came up again. He said: Since 2001, I have been deployed 4 1/2 years.
I remember when he went this time. He was asked to go. He believed he could make a difference. He believed he owed it to his country to give it his best shot. I am sure he felt a burden--people said he was the best person we had to lead our troops--to try to fulfill the request of his country. He left his family again to place his life at risk and to serve our country in Iraq.
I think his advice has been proven correct repeatedly, and I believe we ought to give him this chance to succeed. I agree with General Keane that nothing would be more corrosive of a fabulous military than to have all their sacrifice, all their efforts, the loss of life, the injuries sustained among the brotherhood of the military, to have all that thrown away by a precipitous political pullback. What will the military think the next time we ask them to go somewhere?
I have to tell you, Mr. President, I think we were far too optimistic about creating a government in a country that has never had a legitimate government, that has no experience, and no history with it. We thought it was far easier than it turned out to be. We thought and did not fully comprehend, as General Keane indicated, the depth of the opposition that rose up after the initial successful invasion. Our military was smaller than we needed. Now we know, and perhaps we should have known earlier.
We have made some mistakes. It has not been a perfect operation, that is for sure. I respect people who disagree with what I have said. Good people can disagree. I am not questioning their patriotism. However, logic, common sense, and a commitment to the men and women who have gone out and served us so well, to me, makes it pretty easy to say we should support General Petraeus's reasonable request that the continued drawdown pause for a while before resuming, and we should support it.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
|
|
||||