Sen. Biden Chairs an SFRC Hearing on Long Term Security Agreements with Iraq
April 10, 2008
BIDEN:
The hearing will come to order.
I apologize for keeping my colleagues and the witnesses waiting.
Last November, the president of the United States and Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq signed a declaration of principals, what they refer to as a declaration of principals, which set out what is referred to these days in Washington jargon and international jargon as a framework.
It's interesting, I don't know. The good news for you all is you have to explain this to other diplomats. The bad news for us is we have to explain it to ordinary, very smart Americans who don't understand the jargon and it's confusing.
So part of what I hope we can do is demystify some of what is being discussed here. So the declaration of principals set out a framework for our countries, that is, Iraq and the United States, to negotiate, by the end of July of this year, agreements governing cooperation in political, economic and security spheres.
And among other things, the declaration contemplates, quote, "providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq," that's the end of the quote, and supporting Iraq, quote, "in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups, including Al Qaida, Saddamists, and all other outlaw groups, regardless of affiliation," which means all those folks fighting in Iraq and killing each other.
So to average Americans and to slow Senators like me, that sends up not one red flag, but 25 red flags, because I don't know any time we've ever had a status of forces agreement or an agreement not requiring congressional approval that says not only are we going to talk to you and consult with you when it comes to whether or not you're going to be attacked from outside, but we're going to consult with you, the government, on anything that may happen to you inside, when, in fact, we don't know what the hell the government is -- heck the government is inside.
We just witnessed the government, quote-unquote, Mr. Maliki, a Shia, the Da'wa party engaging in a -- I'm not making a judgment -- but engaging in using force against another Shia group that helped put him in office, the Sadr operation, along with SCIRI. So it gets pretty complicated for average Americans and average Senators.
So we're going to hear today about these two agreements that the administration is negotiating with Iraq, which were anticipated in the November declaration.
On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker told us that these agreements would set forth a vision, was his phrase, of our bilateral relationship with Iraq. One of the problems is you're about to set forth a vision of an administration that is not shared by many other people.
We're going to have a new president and there's an even shot. It may be, of the three people competing, the vision this administration shares for Iraq is clearly not one shared by two of the three, and the third may or may not share the vision. I suspect he might.
But one agreement is the strategic framework that will include the economic, political and security issues outlined in the declaration of principals and that document I think might be better titled "what the United States will do for Iraq," because it consists mostly of a series of promises that flow in one direction, promises by the United States to a sectarian government that thus far failed to reach any political compromises necessary to have a stable country.
Now, whether they're binding or not, if I look at this, and excuse me for speaking not in diplospeak or in foreign policy terms, but like I think normal people look at these things, here we are. The reason why we're not going to continue the U.N. umbrella that allows us to be where we are now and extend it is the Iraqis say, "Hey, look, we're not an occupied country. We're a sovereign country. We want to deal with ourselves."
The reason why we're not just doing a straight status of forces agreement is they said, "You want a status of forces agreement, we want some promises. We want something in return."
And when you all seem to be saying to us, and I'm just going to put this in the framework, I may be wrong, speaking of frameworks, "You all are coming to us saying 'Well, we're going to make commitments that are not binding to them.'"
But in Iraq, they think we mean it. It may not be binding. We're binding you to just have to come up and get a treaty.
But in Iraq, when we say we'll do the following things, the Iraqi people and the parliament we're going to try to sell them on is we're going to do them, because otherwise we wouldn't be having this discussion. We wouldn't be trying to have a strategic agreement with Iraq at this moment, were it not for the Iraqis demanding something more for our continued presence and an agreement relative to our force in Iraq.
I just want to put this in context, at least as I understand it.
The second agreement is what officials call "standard status of forces agreement," which will govern the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, including their entry into the country and the immunity to be granted to our forces under Iraqi law.
But unlike most SOFAs, as they're referred to, unlike most status of forces agreements, it would permit U.S. forces, for the purposes of Iraqi law, to engage in combat operations and detain insurgents -- put another way, detain people we conclude are bad guys.
Now, no other status of force agreements that I'm aware of allows us the ability -- and I think we should have -- if we're going to be there, we should have this authority, just speaking for myself.
But it is unusual. I can't think of any agreement of the 80 or 90 or so we have where we have an American military commander commanding forces under a status of forces agreement in another country, can say, "By the way, there's some bad guys over there, let's go get them."
I don't think we have that anywhere. I'll be happy, Mr. Secretary, to hear -- to be corrected if that's the case.
So unlike most other of these agreements, and there may be some, we're going to ask to be able to continue engaging in combat operations and detain people that the U.N. mandate allows us to do under our control.
In February, Secretaries Rice and Gates made clear that despite the unambiguous reference to security commitments, that's the phrase, security commitments in the declaration, these agreements would not include legally binding security commitments to defend Iraqis if attacked or -- or -- to defend the government against other militia groups within this country, and whether we call it a civil war or not, competing interests for control of Iraq.
And I welcome that clarification, but it obscures a critical point -- the likelihood that the United States will promise some response if Iraq is threatened or attacked.
Often called a security assurance or a security agreement, it will likely create the perception, at least in Iraq, that the United States and, I would argue, in the region, that the United States would come to Iraq's rescue if it's threatened to be attacked.
The next president may not want to do that. The next president may say, "I'm not buying into that deal. That's not my vision. I'm no piece of that vision."
It also ignores the further startling pledge in the declaration to support the Iraqi government in its battle with, quote, "all other outlaw groups."
So I assume that means any group that is at odds with the prime minister, quote, the government, is an outlaw group. And that's a potentially expansive commitment to take sides in an Iraqi civil war.
The key question before this committee, in my view, is whether either agreement should be approved by the Congress, either as a treaty approved by two-thirds of the Senate or as a congressional executive agreement approved by both houses.
It is a fact that security agreements with several countries have been made without explicit congressional or Senate approval, but not all security arrangements are created equal.
Our present military commitment in Iraq, in the context, you can't discuss this other than in the context in which it's in, the context in which this agreement would be made and concluded are important factors in evaluating, in my view, whether congressional approval is required.
Moreover, past practice is not a reason to bypass Congress nor can it answer the question of the president's authority, as the Supreme Court reminded us when it struck down dozens of statutes providing for a legislative veto in the landmark case of INS v. Chadha.
This committee has long been concerned with unilateral efforts of the executive branch to bind the nation. In 1967, the committee held a series of hearings that led to Senate approval of the national commitments resolution, which states that the national commitments by the United States can only result, quote, "from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branch of the United States by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution in both houses of Congress, specifically providing for such commitment," end of quote.
In its report on the resolution, the committee expressed concern that some foreign engagements, such as our base arrangements in Spain, form a kind of quasi-commitment, unspecified as to the exact import, but like buds in springtime, ready under the climactic conditions to burst into full bloom. I'm continuing to quote, "In practice, the very fact that our physical presence in Spain constitutes a quasi- commitment for the defense of the Franco regime, possibly even against internal disruptions," end of quote.
In 1970, a special subcommittee of this committee engaged in a study of security arrangements and commitments abroad. It described the practice of creeping commitments, that's the phrase, creeping commitments, and observed that, quote, "overseas bases, the presence of elements of U.S. armed forces, joint planning, joint exercise, or extensive military assistance program represent to host governments a more valid assurance of U.S. commitment than any treaty or executive agreement," end of quote.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to authorize the use of force, the power to raise and support the military, and the power of the purse, and it gives the Senate the power to approve treaties.
The president, as commander in chief and chief diplomat, can direct forces in war, once authorized, and negotiate and sign treaties. This division of power was intentional and, among other things, was designed to prevent one person from making national commitments that could result in taking the country to war.
I've often stated that no foreign policy could be sustained in the United States of America, no matter how enlightened, no matter how brilliant the vision, without the informed -- the informed -- consent of the American people ahead of time, basically, without them knowing what they're getting into.
That old expression of Vandenberg's, "You want me in on the landing, I've got to be in on the takeoff." I think it was Vandenberg.
Five years ago, President Bush went to war in Iraq without gaining that consent. He did so by overstating the intelligence and understating the difficulty, cost, duration and mission.
He had a legal basis, but he didn't get the informed consent of the American people, and we're seeing the consequences of that now.
With just nine months left in his term, the president is on a course to commit the nation to a new phase of a long war in Iraq and thereby bind, at least politically and internationally and perceptively, bind his successors to his what I consider to be a failed policy.
Once again, he appears poised to do so without the informed consent of the American people by rushing to conclude long-term agreements with the Iraqis without adequate public debate and without a voice of the people's representatives in Congress.
Instead of giving us a strategy to end the war without leaving chaos behind, this is purely me, I do not associate anyone else, I do not speak for my party in this regard, I'm not speaking for the presidential candidates on the Democratic side either, but from my perspective, instead of giving us a strategy to end the war without leaving chaos behind, the president has made it clear that he intends to pass on the parlance of his successor and, by this agreements, to make it harder -- harder, not easier -- for his successor to change course.
The president may have the power to initiate these talks, but I think it's a mistake for him to do so. The situation in Iraq can hardly be described as normal and the government in Baghdad is far from established and reliable, even in the eyes of the Iraqi people.
There is very shaky edifice for building a long-term relationship.
Instead, I believe the president should devote his energies, notwithstanding what he legally may be able to do, I think he should devote his energies to working with Iraq and its neighbors in a diplomatic surge, I think to help develop a lasting political settlement that will provide the foundation for a stable Iraq, and he should defer discussion of such long-term agreements to his successor.
But the president persists on this course and if he does, the Congress will insist on its role in approving or disapproving these agreements.
I'll conclude -- and before I yield to the chairman -- by saying I believe that the president would be well suited, the country would be better off, there would be clear and more precise understanding on the part of both the Iraqis as to what we're promising and on the part of the American people as to what they're committing to, for him to negotiate a status of forces agreement, period -- a status of forces agreement, period.
But that's my view. We're going to get a chance -- and I genuinely, I mean it sincerely, I'm anxious to hear what the administration has to say on this, and they're going to be followed by a panel of witnesses who have varying degrees of difference, legal scholars, on what is required by the president, what is required by the Congress, and we're anxious to hear you.
With that, let me yield to Chairman Lugar.
LUGAR:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in thanking our witnesses for joining us today to discuss the legal framework for our presence in Iraq.
Although the issue may seem technical, it is highly consequential, both for United States policy and for the welfare of our soldiers and diplomats.
America's military and civilian personnel in Iraq and the other members of the multinational coalition have worked under a series of Chapter 7 United Nations Security Council resolutions, the latest being UNSCR 1790, adopted on December 18, 2007.
This Chapter 7 resolution authorizes the presence of a multinational force in Iraq until December 31, 2008. It notes the request made by Prime Minister Maliki, in his letter of December 10, 2007, which is part of the resolution.
Prime Minister Maliki declares that, and I quote, "The government of Iraq considers this to be its final request to the Security Council for the extension of the mandate and expects in the future that the Security Council will be able to deal with the situation in Iraq without the need for action under Chapter 7 of the charter of the United Nations," end of quote from Mr. Maliki.
Chapter 7 actions give a United Nations force internationally recognized authority to use deadly force, if necessary, without having to ask the permission of the host nation, as distinguished from Chapter 6 missions, such as those in Cyprus and Lebanon, that require the consent of the host government.
The multinational force in Iraq also operates under an order issued by the coalition provisional authority in 2003. CPA Order No, 1, as it's called, ensures that our personnel will not be subject to Iraqi legal proceedings.
This protective legal umbrella will expire when the mandate for the multinational force expires at the end of this calendar year.
I lay out these points because they make clear the technical reasons for our hearing today. Our presence in Iraq must be governed by international law or a bilateral agreement and our military and diplomatic personnel must have appropriate legal protections.
Transitioning to a bilateral agreement can deliver benefits with respect to our relationship with Iraq. Such an agreement would be a tangible expression of Iraqi sovereignty. It would provide a predictable legal framework for both sides.
Negotiations on such an agreement also have the potential to enhance United States leverage in our dealings with the Iraqi government.
Last summer, Senator Warner and I proposed an amendment to the defense authorization bill and among the elements of that amendment was an acknowledgment that the rationalization for the authorization to use force passed in 2002 is obsolete and in need of revision.
Many of the conditions and motives from six years ago no longer exist or are irrelevant to the current situation.
The amendment stated an expectation that the president would send to Congress a new rationale for the authorization. Our amendment also included a requirement that the administration, quote, "initiate negotiations with the government of Iraq on a status of forces agreement with a goal to complete work not later than 120 days after enactment of this act," end of quote.
The administration has told our committee that there are two agreements being negotiated in parallel. The first is a status of forces agreement, which prescribes how criminal jurisdiction over our troops and claims against activities by our military personnel will be handled.
The second agreement is a strategic framework agreement that addresses broader issues in the United States-Iraqi strategic relationship.
And, clearly, such agreements have the potential to be extremely consequential for the future of American activities in Iraq.
On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker testified that the agreements being negotiated, quote, "will not establish permanent bases in Iraq and we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels and it will not tie the hands of the next administration. Our aim is to ensure the next president arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress remains fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months," end of quote from Ambassador Crocker.
Although this is reassuring, Congress has legitimate concerns about commitments or understandings that might be made in these agreements, and the subjects covered in a strategic framework agreement may directly or indirectly affect how and when American forces would be used in Iraq in the future.
We know that Iraq presents an extraordinarily complex environment fro United States troops who might be drawn into future scenarios related to ethnic strive, competing militias, internal territorial disputes, terrorist attacks, foreign incursions or even coup attempts.
The complexity of these legal issues is not a reason to avoid talks with the Iraqis, but as these negotiations go forward, it is essential that the administration be fully transparent about their intentions and the progress of their deliberations.
We are seven months from a presidential election. Even before that, our mission in Iraq may well evolve based on conditions on the ground, Iraqi political developments and concerns about the strains on the American military.
Congress and the American people should be thoroughly apprised of the details of any agreement related to the future of American involvement in Iraq.
Therefore, I thank the administration for the briefings that our committee has received thus far. We will appreciate very much the testimony we hear today.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BIDEN:
Thank you.
And, again, I welcome our witnesses. Ambassador David Satterfield is the senior adviser to the secretary of state and coordinator for Iraqi policy, a career foreign policy officer, with significant credentials.
He spent most of his career dealing with the Middle East, serving as deputy chief of mission in Baghdad, principal deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of Near East Affairs, and ambassador to Lebanon, all cushy jobs he's had there.
And Mary Beth Long is the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. She's previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for counter-narcotics and for the Central Intelligence Agency, has briefed us before both in closed session and open. And it's a delight to have her here and I thank you for being here, Secretary.
And Joan Donoghue is a principal deputy legal adviser for the Department of State. She has previously served as deputy general counsel for the Department of Treasury. Probably happy to be with state, not treasury right now, in light of all that's going on. I'm joking.
But thank you all for being here. As I understand it, both Assistant Secretary Long and Ambassador Satterfield are going to testify. We'll begin with you, Mr. Ambassador.
SATTERFIELD:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would ask for concurrence that my prepared remarks be entered into the record.
BIDEN:
They will be.
SATTERFIELD:
Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the U.S. government's intent, purpose, as well as progress towards developing a basic framework for normalized relations with the Iraqi government, which would include a status of forces agreement.
Our overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people establish their country as a stable, democratic nation, with an effective sovereign government that can meet its people's needs and play a positive role in the region and in the international community.
There is healthy debate about the future presence, composition and role of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, it is clear that U.S. forces will need to operate in Iraq beyond the end of this year.
The government of Iraq has expressed its intent that the U.N. Chapter 7 mandate expire at the end of this year and not be renewed. The United States and the U.N. Security Council support this goal.
It's, therefore, imperative that the United States negotiate with the Iraqi government an agreement that would provide a post-Chapter 7 framework applicable to U.S. forces, including Iraqi consent to the presence and operation of those forces and the protections necessary for our troops to continue to operate in Iraq.
Such an agreement is similar to many SOFAs we have across the world. This SOFA is indeed unique in that it also takes into account the special circumstances and requirements for our forces in Iraq, in particular, in providing for consent by the government of Iraq to the conduct of military operations and associated detainee operations.
In addition to a status of forces agreement, we intend to establish the strategic framework for a strong forward-looking relationship with Iraq, a relationship that reflects our shared political, economic, cultural and security interests.
Such a strategic framework would broadly address the topics outlined in the declaration of principals signed by the president and Prime Minister Maliki in November of 2007.
Both the status of forces agreement and the strategic framework come at the urging of and with explicit support from the Iraqi government and moderate political forces from across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, religious and political communities and parties.
Together, they seen an accord that both affirms Iraqi sovereignty and continues to permit U.S. and coalition forces to assist in addressing the threat posed by extremists and outside actors, who seek power through violence and terror.
On the United States side, Ambassador Crocker will be in the lead and he is assisted by an interagency team of experts charged with negotiating the details of the status of forces agreement.
The Iraqis have also set up a broadly representative and technically capable team, a team that represents, if you will, a national decision on their part and, together, we are in the initial stages now of engaging in clarifying positions on the issues.
The status of forces agreement will set the basic parameters for the U.S. military presence in Iraq, including the appropriate and necessary consent for the government of Iraq and pretensions necessary for our troops to operate effectively.
These provisions are vital for our military. We owe it to our forces in Iraq to obtain for them protections they enjoy elsewhere in the world.
The strategic framework and the status of forces agreements will not tie the hands of the next president. They will ensure that every policy option remains on the table. As for the size of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the nature of our operations in Iraq, the status of forces agreement and the strategic framework will do nothing to commit or limit the discretion of this president or the next president to make those important decisions.
Neither the framework nor the status of forces agreement will include a binding commitment to defend Iraq or any other security commitments that would warrant Senate advice and consent.
I want to be clear. They will not establish permanent bases in Iraq. Indeed, the agreements will be explicit on this point, nor will they specify the number of forces or the role of forces to be stationed in that country.
In keeping with past practice, our intent is to conclude the status of forces agreement as an executive agreement rather than a treaty. We intend to consult, as the secretaries of defense and state and we have pledged, with the Congress throughout this entire process.
We are committed to a fully transparent process and we understand the importance of such engagement.
Background briefings by senior administration officials, including this panel, have already begun. Ambassador Crocker, our lead negotiator, testified before both the House and the Senate this week, as you know, and, as with other negotiations, I must make clear we will not be publicly discussing our negotiating positions, but we will ensure members of the Congress are kept fully informed.
Mr. Chairman, members, the United States has enduring national security interests in Iraq. 2008 is a year of critical transition both for the United States and for Iraq. Our primary objective is to build a sustainable foundation for success in promoting U.S. interests.
We are committed to doing everything we can to ensure that the situation in Iraq continues to stabilize and that the next administration has maximum flexibility to consider and to adopt its own policies to conditions and circumstances on the ground.
This is precisely what the agreements we seek with Iraq must and will achieve.
Thank you.
BIDEN:
(OFF-MIKE)
LONG:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to start out by thanking this body and its members for your continued support of our men and women in uniform and to the Department of Defense. Thank you, again, for everything that you do for us.
The Department of Defense, of course, has a strong interest in not only achieving the strategic framework that Ambassador Satterfield will speak to you about, but, as well, the status of forces agreement that we're here to talk about today.
This latter document, of course, provides the protections and the authorities for the U.S. military, it's civilian personnel and the contractor supporting for them to operate and continue to operate in Iraq.
It is, as a matter of course, an essential document in transitioning the institutional relationship between our countries in a military way.
As all of you are aware, on January 1, 2009, the day following the expiration of the current United Nations UNSCR resolution, our men and women in uniform, as well as our coalition partners, will need an international authority under which to maintain their continued operations in Iraq.
The U.S. is very interested, in addition to the SOFA, in arranging this for our troops and providing a robust coalition presence in Iraq well into 2009 and beyond.
As we move ahead in our negotiations with Iraq, I would like to join Ambassador Satterfield in guaranteeing and assuring you, committing to a transparent and cooperative process with the members of this body, as well as our sister legislative body.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I stand ready for your questions.
Thank you.
BIDEN:
(OFF-MIKE)
I don't think there's been many times when I've taken issue with the position taken by Chairman Lugar, but he points to the need for U.S. leverage in his opening statement.
I would think we're at the maximum point of U.S. leverage we'll ever be at this moment. If we don't have leverage now over this government, then we're in real trouble, with the decision having to make about we have 140,000 troops there, more than that now.
If that doesn't constitute leverage, I don't know what does. But anyway.
And, again, I'm going to try to pursue this so that I think that my constituency can understand what we're talking about here.
Let me begin with the last statement, your concluding point, Mr. Ambassador. You say, "We have enduring national interests in Iraq."
What are they?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, we believe strongly that both in and through Iraq, the future of U.S. interests in a stable, secure Middle East, in an Iraq and a broader region which is full prepared and able to confront the challenge posed by extremism, whether Al Qaida's terror or Iran's expansionists, hegemonistic ambitions, is facilitated and supported through what happens in Iraq.
This is not solely about Iraq or the future of that country, although that is an important issue.
It is more broadly about the price and the advantages of failure and success in making of Iraq a stable state, a state that is able to assist in our and in regional efforts to confront the extremism, the terror, and Iranian ambitions of which I spoke.
Those are our fundamental interests.
BIDEN:
Now, would you acknowledge that it's possible that two of the three presidential candidates don't share that vision?
There are those -- I'm not speaking for either candidate, but it may very well be the next president does not believe that Iran is seeking hegemony in the region and that Iran may very well be worse off with an Iraq in disarray.
You would acknowledge that's a possibility, wouldn't you?
SATTERFIELD:
Mr. Chairman, I speak on behalf of this administration.
BIDEN:
Right. That's the point I want to make. You speak on behalf of this administration, whose views are not shared by two of the three potential next presidents, and we're about to codify, we're about to lay out for the whole world to see this president's vision of our rationale to be in Iraq.
I think that, as they say, over-makes my point. You are speaking, as you should, for this president. You have laid out two premises that there is significant disagreement on with the competing party's candidates.
One, that the fight against terrorism resides in Iraq, that is not a view shared by -- they acknowledge terrorism exists, but it's not a view shared by a lot of the witnesses that have appeared before us in the past.
Witnesses appeared before us, very competent women and men of very respected backgrounds, and said that if we leave Iraq, there's no rationale for Al Qaida to stay, that the real war against terrorism is on the Pakistan-Afghan border.
I'm not making the case who's right or who's wrong, but I'm making the case, at the front end of this, you have a vision, representing the president, that is not a vision at least wholly shared by two of the candidates why may very well, at least based on polling data, have an even chance of being the next president.
So what in the heck are we doing? Forget the legalities of this. Just think of the practicalities. Just like big nations can't bluff, big nations can't make implied promises that you have a pretty good idea the next guy coming along may not -- or woman coming along -- may not be committed to.
This is folly. This is a serious, serious mistake in terms of the interest of the United States of America. Forget the constitutional requirements, forget the precedent.
But let me ask another question, if I may. As you point out, you're not going to tie the hands of the next president of the United States of America.
Yet, the security arrangement envisions, at a minimum, we will consider protecting the government, because that's who we're talking about now, dealing with the government in Iraq, the government against threats both internal and external.
What would happen if, tomorrow, the Maliki government decided that the awakening was the threat -- I predict to my colleagues that may cross his mind -- and decides that he is going to move with Iraqi forces, primarily Shia, against an element of the awakening, the Sunnis, in a remote part of Anbar Province, gets tied down, just like he did in Basra, what is the expectation, do you think, of the government of Iraq that we would use, as we did in Basra, helicopters, we would use intelligence data, we would use communications, we would coordinate with them?
I would suspect that would be the expectation. And then what happens when the United States doesn't? What happens to those forces of ours that are sitting on the ground?
This is a bad idea. What do you think is the notion here that is contemplated by -- let me back up.
Have we had discussions, to the best of your knowledge, with the Maliki government about extending the U.N. mandate for three months?
SATTERFIELD:
Mr. Chairman, I led the negotiations in Baghdad last December that produced the extension for one additional year to December 31 of this year.
BIDEN:
That's why I asked the question.
SATTERFIELD:
Of the Security Council resolutions. I participated in the prior two years' negotiations, as well.
I can assure you that in the course of those three years of discussions on negotiations, particularly this last one, it became quite clear that the government of Iraq, and this is beyond Prime Minister Maliki, but that the political structure of Iraq wished to bring to an end, by December 31st of this year and no later, that Chapter 7 mandate based on reasons -- sovereignty assertion, as well as a national will and a sense of national preparedness.
In the previous two years, in '05 and '06, we secured an additional extension based upon our judgment, in consultation with the government of Iraq and its political leadership, that that was both a possible goal and a desirable goal.
That is not our conclusion, was not our conclusion last year. We do not believe...
BIDEN:
You haven't answered my question, with all due respect. Has there been a direct request in the last month or so of the Iraqi government to consider a binding status of forces agreement and an extension -- an extension -- of the U.N. mandate for three months?
They are not unaware -- I speak with these same principals you speak with. I may have spoken to them as many times as you have in my close to dozen trips to or 10 or 12, whatever it is, to Iraq, whether it's Maliki or whether or not it's the vice presidents representing each of those constituencies there.
And all of us have, not just me, we've all spoken with them. Has anyone said to them -- they know there's an election coming up. They know the debate that's going on. They're watching this, as well as -- I mean, the TVs are turned on for this hearing, not because we're important, because they're wondering what's going on.
Has anyone said to them, in the last several months, "consider extending the mandate for three months to allow the next administration to work out its relationship?"
You say the following. You say that we want a normalized relationship with the Iraqi government. There is no Iraqi government that we know is likely to be in place a year from now.
They haven't even worked out, under their constitution, the two provisions they're required to work out, a regions law, which is written in their constitution, which goes into effect the middle of this month, because they postponed it, kicked it down the road 16 months. That expired -- I ask my staff for help -- I think mid-April.
So come a couple days from now, any of the 18 governates, they may not, will have the legal authority to vote within their governate to establish a region, defining its own security arrangements, not in contravention to the constitution, the national constitution, and defining a number of other things.
They are able to write a constitution, any one of those governates. Just like the constitution of the state of Indiana, the constitution of the state of Minnesota, they're able to do that.
Just like Minnesota has their own state police, they can decide to have their own state police.
Not been done yet. We don't know what the shape of this government is going to look like. We're having provincial elections that are coming up, which most of the witnesses before us said are probably not going to take place on time. Hope they do.
So the idea we're normalizing relationships with a government that is far from normal or normalized. Half the cabinet has walked away. There's not a normal government in Iraq.
My time is up. I've gone three minutes beyond it, almost four. I apologize. But if you want to respond, you can. I understand if you don't want to. But just understand my frustration here.
The premise is there's a normalized government, we're going to normalize relations with a government that really doesn't thoroughly exist. It is sovereign, but it does not -- who are we normalizing it with? What is the shape of that government?
And you point out that the enduring national interests that we want to essentially codify, not bindingly, codify with the Iraqis is one that is not necessarily shared by the next president.
I think you're making a big mistake for our national interests in pushing this without telling the Iraqis, and if we don't have leverage now, what are they going to say, "Go home?" Good. Have us go home. Tell us they don't want us there.
You've got a lot of Americans who are going to say, "Oh, no, no, no, no, let's stay when you don't want us."
We just heard for two days from two incredibly competent government servants, one military, one civilian, Petraeus and Crocker, that the Iraqis really want us to stay.
This sure as heck would be a good test.
I yield to my colleague.
LUGAR:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The chairman has laid out in some detail these parts of the political analysis in the United States, as well as analysis of developments of the government in Iraq.
Let me just pursue for a moment that proposition, and both are, if not in flux, at least subject to changes. Now, given that predicament, why have you chosen the current path for the presentation of these two agreements?
For example, the chairman has mentioned, if I gathered his argument correctly, extending the U.N. Security Council resolution for another three months. But wouldn't one alternative might have been to approach the Security Council for an extension of the next year, that is, 2009, on the basis, literally, of these very substantial prospective changes in Iraq, quite apart from changes in the United States?
From the standpoint that you described, Ambassador Satterfield, as having negotiated the last go-round of this, the Iraqis with whom you dealt would find that very unsatisfying. As a matter of fact, they've said this is it, 2008, that year extension, that's it.
And I understand the point of view of those leaders whom you visit or maybe even some more substantial group of people, but on the other hand, the situation is one in which the political changes have to be recognized by Iraqis, surely, in their own country and perhaps they also recognize political changes when they occur in the United States of America, in our debate, regardless of which party wins.
Now, under those circumstances, it would appear that we have at least some leverage, speaking of leverage, to indicate that although it may be the preference of the Iraqis, at least those in leadership, to see the Security Council mandate come to an end in 2008.
In our judgment, it really won't work out that way and I mention that, very candidly, in view of the opposition to this proposition of the two agreements, that you must sense, that was at least manifest in some comments in the hearings with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and certainly have been in the chairman's opening statement and questioning of you this morning.
This is, in essence, not likely to be a lay down hand. You do not anticipate it would be, but simply knowing that, perhaps in advance, that you had a political argument in this country, why did you proceed as you have to present these two agreements in the form you have presented them?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, as you note, the Iraqi government, beyond Prime Minister Maliki, the entire structure of the Iraqi political establishment has made quite clear, in growing fashion, but explicitly so in the concluding part of last year, they wished this to be the end of the Chapter 7 mandate.
We believe they certainly believe that that reflects the broadest view of their constituents, because, indeed, they have constituents in Iraq.
We believe it's an appropriate moment given that Iraqi demand, and that is exactly what it is, a demand that the mandate come to a close, it is their request which is the requirement, not a U.S. request, for extension of the Security Council mandate.
Given their demand that it come to an end, we determined that a course which laid out both a framework that presented the status of forces agreement in context, that is a specific agreement in which the Iraqis offer to us authorities, offer to us permissions, offer to us protections for our personnel in country, that this would be presented by the Iraqis to their people, as we will present it here, in the context of a broad and overarching strategic partnership and relationship with Iraq and with its people for the time to come.
With respect to the political environment here, this administration, as is this case, Senator, with any administration, must pursue what it determines to be U.S. national interests, as well as the best means of pursuing those interests until the last day, the last hour that it remains in office.
And we believe these undertakings, the strategic framework and the status of forces agreement, provide a stable platform for the next administration, indeed, for this administration in the next months, to look at the situation in Iraq, to make judgments about how best to carry forward U.S. interests, with the greatest ability to make appropriate and thoughtful decisions possible.
It does not tie the hands of the next president.
LUGAR:
Well, let me just follow a little bit further on that. This is not meant to demean for a moment the argument that you presented, but the context of the argument I presented was that this administration surely recognizes the argument that we're having here today and have had a little bit before.
And as a result, this agreement or these two agreements, if they did happen, perhaps combined with the testimony we heard from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker that there would be a pause of 45 days after the drawdown currently, and then further consultation, this provides at least a fairly stable understanding, at least as the administration looks at it, for the end of this administration and the end of the year as far as the Iraqis.
What I suppose the committee is trying to at in a bipartisan way, and this is difficult in the middle of a political campaign, is where does this leave the next administration.
Now, your assertion would be, well, it leaves it with a stable situation, a few agreements, the Iraqis have made proposals for security. Whoever the incoming president is or secretary of state or defense or so forth ought to be happy to have that sort of lay of the land.
Maybe so, maybe not. Maybe the incoming folks are not at all happy with that situation. Matter of fact, did not really like the particular agreement that was fostered, but at least proceeded to make things stable for this administration through the rest of the year.
In simply common sense terms, this is why we're having, it seems to me, if not an argument, at least a debate about an issue that otherwise, as you say, would seem very stable, that we finally get the U.N. out of it, talk about Iraqis and the United States.
But as the chairman has pointed out, and I don't necessarily want to get into the detail of how stable I believe the Iraqi government is, how comprehensive and so forth, but we've had not endless hearings, a good number trying to describe bottoms-up, the possibility that stability in the provinces might somehow ever get to the green zone.
Discussing the Iraqi government as it if it is an entity that is definable, that is strong, and so forth seems to me to be a stretch, although diplomatically, I understand. As you're dealing with them, who else do you deal with?
Go to the green zone, not out into one of the 18 provinces, and try to find and define the future.
Let me just sort of get back to the thought that it may very well be that the administration's point of view is simply to try to ride this one through with the two agreements as is and hope for up or down votes on the situation.
I would hope, in the course of these hearings and in other consultations that you promised as we get into details that will not be public today, that there is some degree of give within our own conversations, quite apart from that which we might ask of the Iraqis, because I think the chairman's points are well raised.
Ultimately, although we haven't promised Mr. Maliki what we would do if this force or that force came at him, or somehow the parliament can't move on anything, or if, in fact, corruption, or lack of service, or the breakdown of the power system, or all these things occur, and you can't really cover all those contingencies.
And yet, all of them are very real in testimony we've already heard about the country. So although the Iraqis may insist that we are sovereign, and we want the U.N. out of there, the U.N. Security Council passed a -- we have some leverage with them, I would contend -- in fact, quite a bit -- in terms of their security and their future.
And I think probably we ought to utilize that in the coming weeks as we discuss these agreements.
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, if I could respond to the points that you've made and a point -- a very good point which the chairman made as well, we have very deliberately chosen to negotiate these documents not with a given figure or office, or even with a given party or faction.
These have to reflect a national decision on the part of the Iraqis. It has to reflect national will, which is why we have very deliberately structured these negotiations -- insisted upon it, in fact, and have had that reciprocated by the Iraqi side -- in seeing a broad collective reflecting, frankly, the majority of all of the forces in Iraq, except those on the extreme margins, which, of course, are a different story.
The vast majority of Iraqis and their political representatives are part of this process because of the concerns over what might be the course of different governments, different parties taking office through the constitutional provisions of Iraq.
With respect to the issue of wouldn't it be better to simply continue with the Security Council resolution, putting aside the point that the Iraqis themselves have made clear to the council and to us they don't wish that to be the course, we believe that acknowledging formally Iraqi sovereign status is itself a major contributing element to stability in the time ahead in Iraq.
It has its own intrinsic value and merit in terms of that country's future and in terms of how we see that country's future impacting on the region.
And finally, a point which the chairman and you both raise, about what would the consequences of a decision, a request, on the part of this or any other Iraqi government for particular engagement of U.S. forces, the case would be under the status of forces agreement, as is the case today at this moment.
Any such request would be subject to consultation, reflection, analysis on the part of our leaders, diplomatic and military, in Iraq as well as here in Washington, and a decision would be taken on that basis, based on our assessment of national interest.
And we have been extremely clear and fully transparent with the Iraqi government on this issue of what consultations mean. It's reflected in sort of the web and woof of everything we do in Iraq today. It will not change with these agreements.
(UNKNOWN)
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BIDEN:
Taking advantage of being chairman for 30 seconds here, the difference is there is no formalized agreement guaranteeing the present government's security internally. That's the big difference -- or at least implying we would do that.
And I want to make it clear to the witnesses, I don't doubt for a minute the veracity of everything you say about these not being binding.
So understand, I'm not in any way questioning your assertions about the intentions of the administration relative to not formally binding the next administration. I just want to make that clear.
I yield to the senator from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold.
FEINGOLD:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. In his appearance before the Senate Arms Services Committee this week, Ambassador Crocker was asked about the agreement being negotiated with the Iraqi government and whether, quote, "you envision this after we succeed in this conflict," unquote.
Ambassador Crocker responded that he, quote, "would actually envision it as helping us to succeed in the conflict."
I'd like to confirm that we are, in fact, seeking to establish a long-term relationship with Iraq even as the fighting continues. Is that correct? Is that what we're trying to do?
And are there any conditions the government of Iraq must meet before the United States agrees to anything such as achieving national reconciliation?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, we do, indeed, believe, as Ambassador Crocker stated, as I have stated, that conclusion of these arrangements, we believe, will contribute to stability in Iraq, security in Iraq and, indeed, to our common success, ours and Iraq's.
And in terms of conditionality, obviously we continue to work with the government of Iraq as it continues to work on advancing the goal of national reconciliation along with greater assumption of its responsibilities on the security side, on the economic side.
FEINGOLD:
But are we trying to establish this long-term relationship as the fighting continues?
SATTERFIELD:
We are obviously negotiating these arrangements now while the fight for a stable and secure Iraq continues, yes, sir.
FEINGOLD:
OK. Given the fact that the Maliki government with which you are negotiating does not represent a true coalition of the main Iraqi political parties, won't this agreement have the effect of exacerbating the perception that we are taking sides in a civil war, especially since the majority of the Iraqi parliament has called for a time table for the withdrawal of American troops?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, in fact, we believe the government of Iraq -- the presidency council, Prime Minister Maliki as the head of the executive branch -- do, indeed, reflect the broad range of centrist parties in Iraq.
Those parties that have excluded themselves from participation in the government in whole -- the Sadrist movement, although they do continue to participate in the council representatives -- represent a rather extreme position.
Prime Minister Maliki does have the participation in his government and is in active dialogue with principal Sunni interlocutor, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. He is very much part of this process.
As I said to the chairman and Senator Lugar, we have structured this negotiation -- the Iraqis have structured their negotiating team -- to reflect all, and I will underscore "all," of the major political parties in Iraq, ethnic, sectarian parties. They are all part, formally, of this process.
FEINGOLD:
OK, but this is a duly elected parliament. Are you not concerned at all that the majority of the Iraqi parliament has called for a time table for the withdrawal of U.S. troops? Is that not relevant?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, I do not believe that the majority of the members of the Iraqi parliament do not support the conclusion of these arrangements and would not offer their support for these arrangements.
We believe quite to the contrary, that indeed, they will enjoy broad popular and broad legislative support in Iraq.
FEINGOLD:
Historically, security commitments to other countries have only been made in treaties that were ratified by the Senate. Now, I understand that you are saying that this agreement will not provide any commitments or bind future presidents.
I would note that the agreement will not bind the Congress either. If the Congress were to enact legislation prohibiting enforcement of the agreement, would you agree that this statute would be binding and would override the executive agreement?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, we do intend to negotiate the status of forces agreement as an executive agreement, as is the course with virtually all such arrangements that don't contain reciprocal or other binding commitments.
With respect to the speculative question on possible legislation, we would have to assess that legislation in its context.
FEINGOLD:
If Congress passes a clear law overriding the executive agreement, would the law override that agreement, in your view, as a matter of law?
LONG:
Senator, as Ambassador Satterfield indicated, we would obviously have to look carefully at it at the time. It would certainly present difficult questions for us if we were at that sort of loggerheads.
And we would hope that through additional briefings and discussions with you about the content of the agreement and the extent to which it provides protections for our troops, we wouldn't reach that point.
FEINGOLD:
I would suggest your difficult is in the nature of our Constitution. But if we pass a law overriding it, that's the law.
What would, in your view, have to be -- in these negotiated documents to cause them to rise to the level of needing congressional approval?
LONG:
Senator, we haven't done a laundry list of the things that could create a problem, because we simply aren't contemplating those things. We've tried to identify some of the topics that have arisen in discussions of these agreements to try to make clear what we don't intend to cover.
So for example, there certainly has been a practice that a binding security commitment has been submitted to the Senate. We don't intend one of those. And we haven't done a thorough analysis about whether there's any possible way that we can make an argument that we wouldn't have to submit that to the Senate.
FEINGOLD:
OK.
Ambassador Satterfield, you note in your testimony that, quote, "our overarching goal in Iraq is
