

Offloading drinking water
Army National Guard photo



Logistics

Although some FEMA witnesses testified that FEMA had pre-positioned more commodities before Hurricane Katrina made landfall than before any other previous storm, it was not enough to sustain the tens of thousands of people left stranded by the hurricane. FEMA's logistics system became critical to providing additional food, water, ice, portable toilets, fuel, generators, and other necessary supplies to the impacted areas. However, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff testified: "FEMA's logistics systems simply were not up to the task."¹ Former FEMA Director Michael Brown agreed: "FEMA has a logistics problem."²

In some cases, state and local officials faced such overwhelming circumstances that they could not assess or communicate their needs accurately to FEMA. At other times, the system itself revealed flaws, as red tape prevented the prompt and complete acquisition and distribution of assets. To some degree, each level of government shares some of the responsibility for the failure of the FEMA commodities system after landfall.

Ordinary people forced to endure inhuman circumstances were the victims of these failures. Without generators, plumbing, or portable toilets, the Superdome became a stadium of human waste rotting in extreme heat. In Mississippi, victims who took refuge in public shelters found shortages of food and water, sanitation problems, and lack of electricity.

FEMA

The failed response to fulfill basic critical needs following Hurricane Katrina highlighted long-standing problems with FEMA logistics. With state and local authorities overwhelmed, the unprecedented demand for commodities fell – as the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted – on the federal government.

FEMA's logistics failure during the Katrina crisis was no surprise. FEMA already knew it lacked staff and systems needed to respond to a large disaster.³ William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in Louisiana, told Committee investigators that FEMA regularly fails to track supplies: "It has been a problem at every disaster I'm aware of."⁴

In 2004, Ken Burris, the FEMA Acting Director of Operations, initially requested \$60 million for modified logistical requirements that included logistical tracking systems.⁵ In January 2005, FEMA submitted an initiative to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve its logistics system.⁶ Documentation for the request reveals the burdens on FEMA's antiquated logistics systems. For example, warehouse-space requirements in some areas have grown as much as 10 times and the transportation mission had grown over 300 percent in three years, while staff support for these functions had been unchanged for seven years.⁷ The request concluded the logistics system was not functional, resulting in the "total inability to accomplish the FEMA mission in accordance with the performance goals."⁸ The status quo would also "negatively impact the ability to rapidly respond to both no-notice incidents and notice disasters and incidents."⁹

FEMA's poor planning for transportation was a key factor in the problems with commodities. Gary Moore, FEMA Director of Logistics, said FEMA had difficulty moving commodities during Katrina.¹⁰ For instance, on Saturday afternoon, FEMA realized it did not have enough truck drivers to deliver commodities and equipment and started reviewing résumés to hire additional drivers.¹¹ By Sunday afternoon, August 28, records show that FEMA was

short 68 of the 94 drivers who would be needed to move commodities for a short response effort and 162 drivers for a longer response.¹² To make matters worse, FEMA's transportation contractor, Landstar, does not own any vehicles. Instead, it locates independent drivers only after FEMA asks it to move commodities, which can also lead to delays.¹³ FEMA then had to compete against Landstar for drivers to hire.¹⁴ Drivers were also hard to come by because the commodities needed to be moved over a weekend.¹⁵

Staffing shortages hindered FEMA's logistics response to Katrina. In addition to the shortage of drivers, FEMA did not have enough people in Louisiana to staff a 24-hour operations center after the storm hit, which required many people to work more than 50 hours straight.¹⁶ FEMA's own evaluation of its response in Louisiana admitted that, "Lack of sufficient trained logistics staff significantly detracted from our response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and jeopardized the overall logistics mission."¹⁷

Unlike many large private shippers, FEMA could not track assets en route to destinations. As Moore explained: "I can tell you today when they leave someplace and I can tell you when they arrive someplace because they're manually counted when they got through the gate. In the middle of that, I don't know where they are."¹⁸

FEMA's decision to wait to determine whether pre-positioned assets were sufficient – instead of maintaining a constant stream of supplies – compounded the problem, as admitted by FEMA Director Brown: "We pre-positioned and then tried to see what was going to happen and then started it back up again. We should have just kept pushing."¹⁹

The logistics plan used in Katrina grew out of the Hurricane Pam catastrophic-storm exercise begun in 2004, and was still in development when Katrina struck. It envisioned a sequence of commodity deliveries from Federal Operational Staging Areas (FOSAs) to regional staging areas (RSAs), and then to local points of delivery (PODs). The plan assumed that as many as 160,000 people would require supplies.²⁰ Local officials viewed the commodities distribution plan as one of the most valuable products of the Hurricane Pam exercise,²¹ and FEMA officials scrambled to find, read, and use the Pam documents in the days before Katrina's landfall.²²

The Hurricane Pam plan guidelines for commodity distribution are internally inconsistent.²³ The power, water, and ice distribution section states that FEMA will direct the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to have "approximately one-day's supply of water and ice – 1,530,000 gallons of water [322 truckloads] and 5.5 million pounds of ice [137.5 truckloads] – at Camp Beauregard, a federal staging area, in Pineville, LA, before the hurricane makes landfall."²⁴ Camp Beauregard was chosen because it was far enough inland to be safe from hurricanes, yet close enough to quickly deliver supplies.²⁵ Later in the document, pre-landfall planning charts specify that one day's supply of ice and water would be 32 to 40 truckloads each. The same sections identify one day's supply of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and tarps to be 15 to 20 truckloads and 36 to 34 truckloads respectively.²⁶

FEMA had 30 truckloads of water, 17 truckloads of ice, 15 trailer loads of MREs, and 6 trailer loads of tarps at Camp Beauregard before the storm.²⁷ These commodities had been positioned at the beginning of the 2005 hurricane season as part of a new way to speed up the response to hurricanes, but FEMA did not get any additional commodities to Beauregard as Katrina moved through the Gulf of Mexico.²⁸

Despite some efforts to move some commodities into Mississippi, there were major deficiencies in commodities pre-staging there. FEMA's FCO for Mississippi, William Carwile, wrote several e-mails throughout Sunday to his superiors in which he expressed concern with commodities issues. Despite the fact that FEMA had ordered 400 trucks of ice, 400 trucks of water,

and 250 trucks of MREs for the Meridian Naval Air Station in Mississippi, by the evening of August 29 only 30 trucks of water, 15 of MREs, two of tarps, and 30 of ice were at the base.²⁹

FEMA's action of staging supplies early in the season throughout the Gulf Coast no doubt helped the response to Katrina.³⁰ But these supplies were not enough for a storm as strong as Katrina. The preparations for the hurricane should not have ended with the initial pre-positioning of supplies. Burriss confirmed that the initial pre-positioning was only a start, and the specifics of a storm would dictate whether FEMA should move more supplies to the area.³¹ While some supplies already staged in the Gulf region were moved to Mississippi or Alabama, records indicate that relatively few additional truckloads arrived in the primary FEMA staging areas in the days before landfall.³² The record is not clear whether additional supplies were moved into the region, bypassing the primary FEMA staging areas. In any event, the Committee believes that with Katrina bearing down on the Gulf Coast as a catastrophic storm, FEMA should have moved additional supplies to its primary staging areas in Mississippi and Louisiana.

Commodities such as water, ice, food, tarps, and generators were delivered inefficiently and ineffectively to Mississippi and Louisiana both before and after landfall. In Mississippi, Carwile expressed concerns in a September 1 e-mail to some senior FEMA officials, including Director Brown, that the "System appears broken. ... Will now attempt to get product in alternate ways."³³

A week after landfall, Carwile wrote that the food deliveries were "totally unacceptable."³⁴ Robert Latham, Director of Mississippi's Emergency Management Agency, testified that he received only 10 to 20 percent of the food and water he requested during the days he described as critical, and did not receive adequate supplies until September 9, 12 days after landfall.³⁵

FEMA's logistics also failed to meet demands in Louisiana. Colonel Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, told the Committee that he had difficulty getting food and water the week after the storm;³⁶ Lokey confirmed that requests were not being met.³⁷ In particular, FEMA was unable to fill the number of requests for MREs.³⁸ However, as noted by Colonel Al Jones, the Department of Defense (DOD) liaison officer who started working on logistics issues with Director Brown on September 2, local emergency managers had difficulty articulating an accurate level of demand for commodities given the catastrophic conditions and lack of communications.³⁹

FEMA recognized that it had failed.⁴⁰ Perceiving an overwhelmed logistics system, FEMA Director Brown "reached back to headquarters and had discussions about [how he] wanted all logistics turned over to DOD."⁴¹ On September 1, FEMA headquarters contacted the Department of Defense, requesting that DOD take over full logistics operations in Louisiana and Mississippi,⁴² thus proposing the transfer of one of its most important functions to another entity. (See Chapter 26 for additional information on this mission assignment and DOD's resulting actions).

Considerable attention has been paid to this attempt to turn over FEMA's troubled logistical efforts to the Department of Defense. After discussions among FEMA and DOD officials, on September 2 FEMA issued a \$1 billion mission assignment to DOD to plan and execute the procurement, transportation, and distribution of commodities in Louisiana and Mississippi. FEMA officials authorized spending up to \$1 billion on this mission, an estimate, as one FEMA official said, that was large enough to give DOD the authority to "cover the eventualities" that might arise in accomplishing this mission.⁴³

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale testified of this mission that DOD "got the largest request for assistance in the history of the United States. And it wasn't anything other

than ... ‘full logistics support throughout the entire area of responsibility.’” McHale continued that he felt that this was a “very broad, fairly loosely defined mission requirement” but since it was a “crisis circumstance, we felt that we should take that on, and we did.”⁴⁴

DOD’s performance under this mission assignment was ultimately considerably less than full logistical support. DOD appears to have identified certain areas of FEMA’s logistics system that required immediate attention – namely sourcing, tracking, and transportation – and restored the flow and distribution of commodities to both Louisiana and Mississippi. Hence, FEMA retained control over many of its traditional tasks.⁴⁵

Of the billion dollars authorized, DOD has sought reimbursement from FEMA for approximately \$100 million of work.⁴⁶ Billing records compiled by FEMA indicate DOD has sought reimbursement from FEMA partly for substantial costs for ship leases, fuel, airlift support, personnel travel, and some food.⁴⁷

The day before the mission assignment to DOD, despite FEMA leaders’ acknowledgement of the logistics problems, DHS Secretary Chertoff was publicly claiming otherwise:

The limiting factor here has not been that we don’t have enough supplies. ... We not only had a hurricane; we had a second catastrophe, which was a flood. That flood made parts of the city very difficult to get through. If you can’t get through the city you can’t deliver supplies. ... I’m telling you that we are getting food and water to areas where people are staging. ... The limitation here on getting food and water to people is the condition on the ground.⁴⁸

Other factors contributed to the logistics struggle. For example, communications between officials within Louisiana and with FEMA headquarters were almost nonexistent. As Scott Wells, the Deputy FCO in Louisiana said, “There was just a big communications void” in Baton Rouge.⁴⁹ FEMA had done little before landfall to ensure communications capabilities after landfall. (See Chapter 18, Communication Voids) The FEMA team leader at the Superdome had very limited communication capabilities with superiors in Baton Rouge and elsewhere, and estimated that this lowered his operational effectiveness by 90 percent.⁵⁰

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 25, both FEMA and state officials cited security issues as a principal reason for delayed delivery of commodities.⁵¹

Problems with Request for Assistance Systems

Louisiana’s Staff and E-Team Server Were Overwhelmed

The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), the agency in charge of the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC) under the Louisiana Emergency Plan, uses a computerized request system called E-Team to log requests from state or local emergency officials. Louisiana officials said that the number of incoming requests overwhelmed their E-Team server.⁵² LOHSEP ordered a replacement server for overnight delivery, but it was not installed until August 31.⁵³

Parishes that lacked Internet access transmitted their requests to LOHSEP by telephone, fax, and ham radio,⁵⁴ though the loss of key communications infrastructure between New Orleans and Baton Rouge undermined these efforts.⁵⁵ Although the E-Team system was at times interminably slow, it never completely stopped working.⁵⁶

When the state receives requests for assistance, the state is supposed to validate the requests before passing them to FEMA. A validation process eliminates frivolous or low-priority

requests or those requests best handled by other states through the EMAC system. In Louisiana, officials lacked understanding of what assistance FEMA could appropriately provide. That lack of understanding led to submission of requests that wasted FEMA's time and resources. As Wells put it:

When the state gets all these requests, they're supposed to consolidate them and see if they can meet those [requests] and they pass them to us. That mechanism of the state consolidating and screening requests was nonexistent [in Louisiana]. Everything was passed to us.

People wanting pens, paper – and this was back in October – an air-conditioner, a bus for the Mayor to go to Atlanta; all that stuff comes straight to us, ... there's no validation at the state level. We were just – we were getting actually thousands of requests.⁵⁷

At the Committee's December 8 hearing, Wells further elaborated that requests for ammunition, golf carts, bus rides for Mayor Nagin and his staff, and portable air conditioners were intermingled with legitimate, high-priority requests.⁵⁸ Wells told the Committee that the "hundreds and hundreds" of invalid requests "clogg[ed] down the system for the legitimate requests."⁵⁹ Wells' testimony is uncontroverted. Louisiana's failure to adequately prioritize its requests to FEMA wasted FEMA's time and limited resources..

The Systems That FEMA and the States Used to Process Requests for Aid Were Incompatible, Delaying Fulfillment

Requests to FEMA, on the other hand, must be submitted on an Action Request Form (ARF). The ARFs and the state's E-Team system are not compatible, so state officials had to fill out both E-Team requests and FEMA ARFs. While Lokey did not think the incompatibility slowed the response to requests, it certainly complicated the tracking of requests, as will be discussed below.⁶⁰

After a standard hurricane, FEMA has 72 hours to establish a Joint Field Office (JFO), which uses Mission Assignments – broad orders based on the ARFs – to task various government agencies to provide needed assets. After Katrina, however, the JFO in Louisiana did not become fully operational for 12 days after landfall, forcing state and FEMA officials to send important functions over to the FEMA Regional Operations Center in Denton, Texas.⁶¹ Instead of coordinating with an on-site JFO, state and FEMA officials had to spend time reaching regional officials⁶² who were often unacquainted with the situation in Louisiana.⁶³

FEMA also didn't have enough staff.⁶⁴ The FEMA team in Louisiana had a single individual who worked 18 to 20-hour shifts to fill out and submit ARFs. Despite repeated requests for additional staff, Wells was still trying to get more staff as late as September 9. Wells called the shortage of people to process assistance requests "our biggest problem."⁶⁵

FEMA Could Not Track Requests

Once FEMA submitted requests for assistance to the agencies expected to complete them, it had no efficient way to track progress by those agencies. FEMA's review of the Katrina response in Louisiana found that tracking difficulties led to duplication of requests, orders, and efforts.⁶⁶ The inability to track left some orders "unfilled, unchecked, or misdirected."⁶⁷

Sometimes, state officials had a hard time following up on state E-Team requests they had transferred to FEMA's ARFs, as FEMA often failed to record on the ARFs their corresponding E-Team request. LOHSEP designated staffers to manually match up E-Team requests with ARFs, but that cumbersome process proved inadequate for the magnitude of

the task.⁶⁸ Eventually FEMA started logging the state numbers, which made tracking request easier, though the system was still far from perfect.⁶⁹

Judgment Errors Within the System Also Hampered the Response

The Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), which represents 80 percent of the nursing homes in the State of Louisiana, had a desk at the state EOC in Baton Rouge⁷⁰ because it had primary responsibility for helping nursing homes coordinate evacuations. LNHA submitted E-Team requests during the first days of the crisis, but then LOHSEP revoked its privilege⁷¹ because LNHA was not a government agency.⁷² Meanwhile, hundreds of nursing-home patients were stranded by rising water. LNHA was forced to set up and privately coordinate nursing-home rescue efforts.⁷³ As a result, rescues were delayed.

FEMA personnel admitted that there was a chance that an approved request would be denied at FEMA's Regional or National Headquarters. For example, FEMA denied a state request for 1,000 small rubber rafts because the boats would not be useful for rescues in debris-filled water. A state official disagreed and testified that the boats would have been valuable for towing behind motorboats and picking up victims in shallow water.⁷⁴ LOHSEP's Colonel Jeff Smith felt that reasonable requests were being "filtered," probably because not all levels of authority recognized the severity of the situation.⁷⁵

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts

As noted elsewhere, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an inter-state agreement⁷⁶ to provide mutual aid when disaster strikes.⁷⁷ Forty-nine states, along with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have all enacted legislation to become part of the Compact,⁷⁸ and Congress has given its consent.⁷⁹ Upon declaration of an emergency, states can pre-position assets and wait for a request for assistance from the affected state.⁸⁰

Both Louisiana and Mississippi asked for assistance through the EMAC system during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Every member state as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico responded, providing a wide range of equipment, medical aid and supplies.⁸¹ Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest EMAC response in U.S. history.⁸²

The EMAC system demonstrated both its value and limitations during Katrina. Carwile testified that the resources made available through EMAC – almost 25,000 personnel who performed close to 900 missions, were crucial.⁸³ Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour agreed, singling out Florida's search-and-rescue teams and law-enforcement officials.⁸⁴ The Louisiana National Guard described EMAC as "the most successful feature of our response."⁸⁵

Louisiana Commodities

The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan designates LOHSEP as the lead state agency for coordinating the distribution of commodities. In Katrina's aftermath, emergency managers in Louisiana faced two distinct logistical challenges after landfall: (1) providing massive quantities of commodities to the enormous numbers of victims in the Superdome and Convention Center, and (2) disbursing relatively smaller amounts to the thousands of victims scattered across southeast Louisiana and the greater New Orleans metropolitan area – chiefly, the collection sites for rescuees along highway overpasses. Not surprisingly, they performed best in delivering to locations where the need was rapidly identified and supply lines could be established. But LOHSEP failed to coordinate and establish supply lines to the ad-hoc, unplanned distribution points.

Katrina revealed what the Hurricane Pam exercise and resulting plans assumed: the catastrophic storm would severely limit the capabilities of local authorities,⁸⁶ thereby requiring FEMA and the state to lead the distribution of commodities to the affected areas after landfall. Wells said that FEMA's responsibility was to get commodities to the federal staging areas, and then, according to the planning done during the Hurricane Pam exercise, the state and FEMA would decide how they would deliver the commodities the "last mile" to the public distribution points.⁸⁷

Before landfall, FEMA and the state pre-positioned more commodities at FEMA's Operations Staging Area at Camp Beauregard (in Pineville, Louisiana – 220 miles from New Orleans) than any previous storm (although less than the amount discussed at Hurricane Pam).⁸⁸

Consistent with the assumptions in the Hurricane Pam exercise, the flooding that resulted from Katrina left some parish governments' resources incapacitated,⁸⁹ making it necessary for FEMA and LOHSEP to push commodities to them without waiting for requests.⁹⁰ Before and after landfall, LOHSEP's operating principle for moving commodities was "if you can't get it yourself, then you turn to FEMA."⁹¹

Some parishes, however, asked for more commodities than the state or FEMA could provide.⁹² LOHSEP and the National Guard also experienced difficulties in coordinating the delivery of commodities and the equipment needed by parishes.⁹³ In some cases a commodity delivery would be made by the National Guard to a parish distribution point, but the parish did not have access to a forklift, thus making unloading the delivery unnecessarily problematic.⁹⁴ Although the magnitude of the operation overwhelmed the manpower and equipment of Louisiana National Guard, making it necessary to rely on support from other states,⁹⁵ those needs should have been anticipated and planned for accordingly.

Some of the parishes' needs could have been met through better long-term planning and preparation. First, had FEMA and the state had executed more contracts with vendors before the storm for critical supplies, that would have saved time during the post-storm crisis.⁹⁶ Second, key commodities were not sent until two days after landfall from Zephyr Field, FEMA's post-landfall operational staging area in Jefferson Parish, to the Superdome.⁹⁷ Third, high-water vehicles were needed to deliver commodities to flooded areas like the Superdome. The Louisiana National Guard failed to anticipate needing to use its high-water vehicles to distribute commodities and failed to anticipate the manpower and equipment needs of a large-scale commodities distribution.⁹⁸ Fourth, planners failed to ensure that all supply PODs in affected areas would be set up on high ground. Many parish-designated PODs were flooded.⁹⁹ LOHSEP and the parishes had to establish alternative drop points.¹⁰⁰ Fifth, although Hurricane Pam working groups had discussed establishing Search and Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs), temporary collection sites for rescuees on highway overpasses, neither FEMA nor the state had planned or prepared for a coordinated system of commodities distribution to the SARBOOs, where the situation became critical as transportation to evacuate the rescuees was delayed.¹⁰¹

Sanitation

Masses of people gathered at the Superdome, Convention Center, and various search-and-rescue drop points around town without basic sanitation. Superdome plumbing ceased to operate shortly after a levee breached and the pumps that maintained water pressure failed.¹⁰² FEMA public-affairs official Marty Bahamonde characterized the Superdome as

a shelter of last resort that cascaded into a cesspool of human waste and filth. Imagine no toilet facilities for 25,000 people for five days. Women and children were forced to live outside in 95-degree heat because of the horrid smell and conditions inside. Hallways and corridors were used as toilets, trash was

everywhere, and amongst it all children – thousands of them. It was sad, it was inhumane, it was heart-breaking, and it was so wrong.¹⁰³

Sanitary conditions at the Convention Center were little better, although the relatively smaller crowd did have more open area available.¹⁰⁴

On Tuesday, the New Orleans Police Department and the Louisiana National Guard requested portable toilets for the Superdome.¹⁰⁵ A FEMA representative at the Superdome promised to have toilets delivered the next day, Wednesday.¹⁰⁶ But law-enforcement agencies had checkpoints set up on major highways and prevented individuals without credentials from getting past some checkpoints. According to one portable-toilets vendor, he was turned away twice at security checkpoints in Plaquemines Parish (where his supply yard was located) when he tried to fulfill the order. Eventually, the National Guard provided an armed escort that enabled him to make the delivery on Saturday. By that time, the Superdome evacuation was nearly complete.¹⁰⁷

Superdome

As the storm approached, city, state, and federal officials raced on the day before landfall to stock the Superdome with the additional food and water that would be needed for the refuge of last resort's massive incoming population.¹⁰⁸

While FEMA and the National Guard were able to provide additional MREs and water before landfall,¹⁰⁹ officials were able to locate enough food for Sunday and Monday only. Despite some “touch and go” moments as deliveries lagged behind the arrival of more people seeking shelter,¹¹⁰ officials were able to feed the Superdome population twice a day.

On Monday and Tuesday, however, federal and state officials described the situation at the Superdome as “desperate”¹¹¹ and “beyond critical,”¹¹² as an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 people gathered there.¹¹³

While Superdome residents never experienced an outright food and water shortage (as Bahamonde predicted to Brown),¹¹⁴ other essential commodities – portable generators, lights, and batteries – did not arrive before the evacuation.¹¹⁵ Better long-term planning would have avoided these pitfalls.

On Tuesday, Mayor Nagin asked Brown for many of these commodities, which FEMA officials knew were staged at Zephyr field, 10 miles west of the Superdome.¹¹⁶ Lack of security and usable roadways did not interfere with the delivery of those commodities to the Superdome. At any time after the storm abated on Monday, officials at the Superdome could receive commodities at nearby highway overpasses, where they would be loaded onto high-water vehicles for delivery to the Superdome.¹¹⁷ It remains unclear which entity bears responsibility for the failure to deliver commodities to the Superdome.

Convention Center

Unlike the Superdome, which emergency planners at all levels of government expected to become a refuge of last resort, Mayor Nagin's opening of the Convention Center as a refuge two days after landfall was largely unplanned. As a result, over the weekend, no food or water was pre-positioned there, and no commodities arrived there until Friday, September 2. Lokey said, “The state and the locals did not preplan or preposition anything, and so there was obviously a problem there.”¹¹⁸

Although the City made no pre-landfall preparations to use the Convention Center as a refuge, Mayor Nagin included the possibility of using the Convention Center in lieu of the Superdome on a list he presented to FEMA Director Brown on Tuesday, the same day on

which Mayor Nagin opened the Convention Center. The document stated, under the heading “Refuge of Last Resort–Superdome”:

(Alternative Need) Access to the Convention Center to use it as the refuge of last resort in lieu of the Superdome; *if this option is exercised*, each of the above-listed needs [generators, lights, video equipment, security and food and water] would be required for the Convention Center and, additionally, vehicles and drivers to coordinate the transport from the Superdome to the Convention Center would be required.¹¹⁹ [Emphasis added.]

Unfortunately, when Mayor Nagin opened the Convention Center as a refuge, the city did not provide food and water to those it would house, and did not tell federal officials that the Convention Center had been opened.¹²⁰

When questioned about opening the Convention Center, Mayor Nagin testified that he asked FEMA two or three times a day to deliver supplies there.¹²¹ But when pressed to provide specific examples of requests, Mayor Nagin suggested that the Committee speak to Colonel Terry Ebbert, Director of the New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety, as the person who would have told FEMA about the city’s opening of the Convention Center as a shelter.¹²² When the Committee asked Colonel Ebbert whether he told FEMA of the city’s decision to open the Convention Center, he stated that the city never made an official decision to open the Convention Center.¹²³ When pressed further on whether he made a request for food and water to be delivered to the Convention Center, Colonel Ebbert said, “I did not make that request.”¹²⁴ The first written request for food and water at the Convention Center came on Friday.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, Lokey said that Colonel Jeff Smith, the Acting Deputy Director for the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, made him aware on Tuesday or Wednesday that thousands of people were beginning to congregate at the Convention Center.¹²⁶ The state asked FEMA to send food and water to the Convention Center, but security concerns delayed their delivery until Thursday, according to Lokey.¹²⁷ Lokey also said that he was depending on requests from the state before sending any other commodities to the Convention Center.¹²⁸

Further complicating the response to the developing situation at the Convention Center was confusion among Department of Homeland Security HSOC officials, who were tasked



Sorting through donations
U.S.Coast Guard photo

with gathering and disseminating critical information, and who erroneously believed the Convention Center and the Superdome were the same location.¹²⁹

The result of Mayor Nagin and Colonel Ebbert's lack of planning, preparation, action, and coordination, combined with security concerns and DHS's lack of situational awareness, was that food and water for the 19,000 people at the Convention Center began to arrive on Thursday, but did not arrive in meaningful quantities until Friday, when the National Guard arrived with food and water provided by FEMA.¹³⁰

Mississippi Commodities

The Federal Logistics System Failed to Provide an Adequate Supply of Commodities in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi

Hurricane Katrina disrupted the state's economic and physical infrastructure, complicating the ability of authorities and citizens to acquire commodities such as food, water, ice, and fuel.¹³¹

The federal logistics system could not adequately respond. FEMA's Federal Coordinating Officer in Mississippi, William Carwile, said that only about 25 percent of requested water and ice, and a short supply of MREs arrived in Mississippi in the first week and a half after landfall.¹³² Robert Latham, Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), estimated that Mississippi had to make do with even less – 10 percent to 20 percent of requests during the critical days after landfall.¹³³

Positioning Supplies Prior to Landfall

Prior to landfall, state authorities realized that the massiveness of the storm required pre-landfall preparations. Tom McAllister, MEMA's Response and Recovery Director, said that MEMA requested that FEMA pre-position supplies at Meridian Naval Air Station in east-central Mississippi near the Alabama border.¹³⁴ Bob Fenton, a FEMA Region IX (covering the western United States) official, who served as Director of Operations for Mississippi during Katrina, upped the request.¹³⁵ Unfortunately, FEMA was unable to provide the requested supplies. In fact, McAllister, and apparently Fenton, were never able to discover how much had been pre-staged.¹³⁶ McAllister said the initial failure to pre-position adequate supplies left Mississippi "critically shorthanded."¹³⁷

Post-landfall State and Federal Supply "Pipelines"

Both the federal and state governments supplied commodities. Because the FEMA logistical system fell short, the State of Florida and the National Guard maintained the "pipeline" until FEMA recovered.¹³⁸ Valuable help also came from Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs), such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

Supplies from FEMA

Local authorities transferred requests they couldn't fulfill to MEMA,¹³⁹ which conveyed them to FEMA in cases when it couldn't help. MEMA and FEMA officials in Mississippi alike complained that requests disappeared as if into a "black hole."¹⁴⁰ As Carwile said, "During Hurricane Katrina we seldom had visibility of critical resources, i.e., body bags, refrigerated trucks for temporary morgues, etc., because FEMA does not have a reliable system for tracking commodities, equipment, and personnel."¹⁴¹ As a result, local and state authorities were often "totally in the dark," causing friction.¹⁴² The ice, food, and water that *were* delivered went to "staging areas" serving regions within the state,¹⁴³ and then to smaller Points of Distribution (PODs)¹⁴⁴ operated by the Mississippi National Guard.

The Florida “Pipeline”

Before entering the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina had passed over south Florida, appearing to pose a risk to the Florida Panhandle, as Hurricane Ivan had done in 2004. Florida readied emergency-management assets, which were thus readily available when the storm finally struck further west.¹⁴⁵ Using the Stennis Space Center, located near the Gulf Coast and close to the Louisiana border, as a staging area, “Task Force Florida” brought food, water, and ice, as well as law-enforcement personnel, search-and-rescue assets, and other assistance.¹⁴⁶ The Florida teams “basically circumvented” FEMA’s logistical system, as MEMA’s McAllister said.¹⁴⁷

Florida’s contributions raised Mississippi to 40 to 50 percent of requested amounts, which proved crucial to the distribution of commodities.¹⁴⁸ “Robert [Latham] and I continue to rely on you all (FL),”¹⁴⁹ Carwile wrote in a September 3 e-mail to Craig Fugate, the Director of Florida’s emergency-management agency. Florida’s operation in Mississippi lasted for approximately six weeks, with most personnel and assets returned to Florida by October 1.¹⁵⁰

The National Guard “Pipeline”

On Wednesday, August 31, the National Guard realized that not only were an insufficient number of MREs being delivered to south Mississippi, but massive debris fields were preventing individuals in need from reaching distribution points.¹⁵¹ In response, Major General Harold Cross, the head of Mississippi’s National Guard, requested that Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the federal military command responsible for North America, send MREs from military stocks.

Within seven or eight hours, aircraft were arriving at the Gulfport Combined Regional Training Center (CRTC), the National Guard airbase near the Gulfport airport, with MREs and water.¹⁵² All vehicles leaving the CRTC were required to take along at least 10 cases of water and 10 cases of MREs, to be handed out whenever National Guardsmen encountered survivors.¹⁵³

Starting August 30, the National Guard also delivered commodities by air after advance helicopters scouted for support needs, often by landing and talking with survivors.¹⁵⁴ Commissioner of Public Safety George Phillips, whose agency also had helicopters assessing the situation, recalled the desperation: “It was horrible ... the minute people heard helicopters, ... they came, people came running out, holding up signs SOS and need help and food and water.”¹⁵⁵ If supply helicopters couldn’t touch down, they would drop the supplies.¹⁵⁶ Approximately 1.2 million MREs and over 1 million gallons of water were distributed in this way, mostly in the September 1 through September 9 period.¹⁵⁷

Difficulties Arise in the Distribution System

While all three of the supply “pipelines” were operational soon after landfall, the distribution system did not work smoothly. Michael Beeman, FEMA Division Director for Harrison County, the central county on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast, noted that the first trucks with water and ice arrived without notice on August 30.¹⁵⁸ Often supplies would be discovered only when an official happened to spot a truck and approached the driver.¹⁵⁹ In an e-mail sent on September 4, a FEMA official in Mississippi informed Carwile and Fenton that a priority commodity shipment to Pearl River County, a county on the Louisiana border approximately 20 miles north of the coast, was a “no show,” leaving lines of people waiting in vain for food and water.¹⁶⁰

Many trucks arrived at the Meridian staging area mislabeled. Others bypassed staging areas and traveled directly to the coast, with no specific destination.¹⁶¹ Stennis Space Center, in essence, became a large terminal where supply trucks were loaded and unloaded, but without



C-130 transport unloading
U.S. Air Force photo

expert truck management. This problem was also reflected in numerous reports of trucks standing idle at Stennis. As one official said, Stennis did not have “real terminal operations going on out there.”¹⁶²

An apparent shortage of trucks aggravated the problem.¹⁶³ Many truck drivers refused to leave staging areas without armed escorts.¹⁶⁴ Others, as McAllister explained, did not grasp the urgency of their tasks.¹⁶⁵

McAllister estimated that much of the reported confusion at Stennis began ten days after landfall. He attributed this confusion to difficulties in determining the rate at which the PODs were distributing supplies. Immediately following landfall, the tremendous need for supplies ensured that the supplies were sent out of Stennis to the PODs right after they arrived. Beginning around day ten, more supplies were flowing into Stennis than were being distributed to the PODs; this resulted in a backlog of trucks. It took four to five days for officials at Stennis to balance the supply of commodities being delivered to Stennis with the demand for commodities at the PODs Stennis supported. By this point, the PODs were also becoming increasingly useful because road-clearing work was enabling more people to get to them.¹⁶⁶

Difficulties with Fuel

Fuel shortages created another problem.¹⁶⁷ The fuel shortage had a number of causes, including damage to Mississippi’s refining capacity; fuel suppliers no longer keeping a large quantity of fuel in stock due to price fluctuations; the loss of electricity crippling service stations’ ability to pump fuel; and incompatibility between many tankers and vehicles requiring fuel.¹⁶⁸

The emergency manager for Jones County, located approximately 70 miles north of the coast, noted that following Hurricane Katrina, “Fuel turned out to be as important as food, water, and ice.”¹⁶⁹ The loss of electricity in Mississippi forced parts of the state’s infrastructure to rely on fuel for power. Because of this, the fuel shortage had the potential to cause significant problems.¹⁷⁰ When the City of Gulfport, located on the central part of

the coast, loses electricity, as it did following Katrina, its water wells rely on a back-up fuel supply. The generators contain enough diesel fuel to operate independent of the electric grid for 24 hours. If this back-up fuel runs out, Gulfport loses its water supply and depends on bottled water. Following Katrina, Gulfport came perilously close to running out of fuel.¹⁷¹ Fuel shortages were also a problem for hospitals, many of which had no more than a three-day supply.¹⁷²

While state and local officials were able to make do with what fuel they had and with what was brought into the state through FEMA, the shortage came perilously close to causing a crisis. Given the importance of fuel to first responders and private citizens, as well as its importance to infrastructure, emergency managers must place a higher priority on ensuring an adequate supply in the aftermath of a disaster.

Private-Sector Logistics

The companies that testified at the Committee's private-sector hearing all had in place deliberate plans for deploying and tracking material and personnel. From batteries, fuel, and generators to food and water, Wal-Mart, Starwood, IBM, and Mississippi Power knew what they would need, had those commodities either in place or at staging areas outside the storm's path, and had a plan for moving them in immediately after the storm.¹⁷³ These companies also had employees from unaffected regions at the ready, to assist in the region once the storm passed, and they responded proactively.¹⁷⁴

Within seven days of Katrina's making landfall, Mississippi Power had 11,000 workers on the ground from 23 states and Canada.¹⁷⁵ They utilized mutual-assistance agreements, in place prior to the storm, to "borrow" employees from other utility companies.¹⁷⁶ IBM knew their services would be needed after the storm and deployed a Crisis Response Team to Baton Rouge to immediately begin working with government and non-governmental organizations to address critical needs.¹⁷⁷ Starwood also had a corporate-response team staged at a safe distance, but ready to move in once the storm had passed.¹⁷⁸

Wal-Mart managed logistics effectively and delivered commodities quickly when responding to Katrina.¹⁷⁹ Wal-Mart has its own fleet of trucks, 100 distribution centers, and stores located all over the country.¹⁸⁰ Of the 100 distribution centers, eight have reserved "disaster merchandise" square footage, with approximately \$4.7 million in "disaster merchandise" stockpiled for emergencies, including more than 250,000 gallons of drinking water.¹⁸¹ Wal-Mart also has relationships with vendors that help with surge requests during times of emergency.¹⁸² The company has a specific protocol for responding to disasters, and operates an emergency operations center year-round to coordinate crises around the country.¹⁸³

With Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart used its expertise to move in supplies and operate effectively.¹⁸⁴ In the first three weeks after landfall, the company "delivered approximately 2,500 trailers of emergency supplies ... including trucks of water and supplies that flowed into the New Orleans metropolitan area beginning on Saturday, September 3, for emergency service workers, shelters, and hospitals. A total of three temporary mobile pharmacies [were] provided to support communities, and a 16,000-square foot 'tent store' was erected to serve a community where the store had been all but demolished."¹⁸⁵ Based on past experience with major storms and hurricanes, Wal-Mart knew what supplies would be sought prior to the hurricane making landfall and what would be needed for the recovery phase after the storm.¹⁸⁶

- 1 Written statement of Sec. Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department's Preparation and Response*, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 5.
- 2 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency*, Sept. 27, 2005.
- 3 In January 2005, FEMA leaders acknowledged in the internal review called the "MITRE Report" the weakness of FEMA logistics with comments such as "We are not good at tracking assets," "If the White House asks, 'Where are the water trucks?' I can't tell them" and "We've had 3 or 4 people ordering water for the same people." The MITRE Report was a report commissioned by FEMA Director Brown to review FEMA's "policies, plans, organization and systems to increase consistency, effectiveness, timeliness, and effectiveness in carrying out its core mission." Participants were members of FEMA's senior leadership. MITRE Corp., Draft Statement of Work, Planning Support for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee.
- 4 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 151.
- 5 Ken Burris, e-mail to Matt Jadacki, Sept. 18, 2004, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000120 through 0000121 ("I have broken the request from response and recovery into the following strategic areas and the following amounts. Let me know what you think and I will have it put in a formalized document.").
- 6 Michael Brown, memorandum to various FEMA officials, "Disaster Support Initiatives," Jan. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000093 through 0000095.
- 7 Ken Burris, e-mail to Matt Jadacki, Sept. 18, 2004, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000120 through 0000121. *See also*: FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000130 ("The staffing level of the DSIC, Logistics Centers and transportation support staff has remained at the same level as commissioned over seven years ago.").
- 8 FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000133.
- 9 FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000130.
- 10 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 37.
- 11 Theresa Gauger, e-mail to Lisa Williams, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0000772. *See also*: Committee staff interview of Marie Sloan, Chief, Disaster Workforce Section, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript p. 31.
- 12 Kerry Young, e-mail to Jules Hurst, II, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0011518.
- 13 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 35.
- 14 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 35-37.
- 15 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 56.
- 16 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 68.
- 17 FEMA, *DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana*, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 10 [hereinafter *DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash*, Feb. 13, 2006].
- 18 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 59-61 ("I have no idea. I have no way to contact them. ... The problem with the system is it's a bit like ... the bombing of Pearl Harbor. ... We don't know. We mark these things in when it goes through the gate. They pass it to another individual, who passes it to another individual, and they get distorted numbers by the time it get back to us. It is a nightmare trying to get the right information. ... Not only is it with my shop, it's also then on the other side with the FCO's log people when they're trying to get accurate numbers on what they have, and they call, they pick the phone up and they got one person and they are also busy and they say, well, you've got ten, and they find out they've got 20, or it's even more ridiculous. Someone might tell them you've got 100 out there and you've got 500 out there.").
- 19 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 167.
- 20 *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, prepared by IEM, Inc. for Louisiana Office of Homeland Security (LOHSEP) and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 6 [hereinafter *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, Sept. 2005].
- 21 Committee staff interview of Col. Jadwin Mayeaux, Louisiana Army National Guard (Ret.), Deputy Director, Homeland Security, LOHSEP, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 163-164; Com-

mittee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Thibodeaux, Joint Director, Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 1.

22 At 8:19 a.m. on Aug. 27, 2005 FEMA's Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode e-mailed the Acting Director of Response a request for a copy of the New Orleans Catastrophic Plan. *Source:* Patrick Rhode, e-mail to David Garratt, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003866. At 9:07 a.m. Lokey replied to Rhode, Brown, and others that "Copies are being made as we speak." *Source:* William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode and David Garratt, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860. At 10:35 a.m. Sharon Blades e-mailed 25 FEMA personnel including William Lokey, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, and Wayne Fairley an electronic version of the plan, and told them that copies were being printed. *Source:* Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michel Pawlowski, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003570. Later that afternoon Deputy Chief of Staff Brooks Altshuler e-mailed twice asking for additional copies for the front office. *Source:* Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Sharon Blades, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325. A few minutes later he received a reply that 50 copies were being printed. *Source:* Michel Pawlowski, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003570. At 8:37 p.m. that night Blades again e-mails Altshuler: "We have printed up more plans and they are on the mezz in Area A. We are also printing copies of the latest drafts and a preface explaining the planning process and the various documents because they all have not been finalized and assembled into one document. This will, we hope, avoid confusion." *Source:* Sharon Blades, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325.

23 *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, Sept. 2005, Appendix 5, p. 10.

24 *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, Sept. 2005, p. 24. The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan (Hurricane Pam) includes charts to convert individual servings of commodities into truckloads. Example: one truckload of water = 4,750 gallons. *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, Sept. 2005, Appendix 4, p. 8.

25 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19.

26 *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, Sept. 2005, Appendix 4, Appendix 5, p. 10.

27 FEMA Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 16-17; FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

28 Committee staff interview of Ken Burris, former Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, transcript p. 14; FEMA, Federal Operational Staging Area, Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0080-0000005 through 0000006; FEMA, FEMA LC's, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017.

29 FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

30 Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 18-19.

31 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 14.

32 FEMA, FEMA LC's, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017; FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

33 Michael Brown, e-mail to William Carwile, Michael Lowder, Edward Buikema, and Gary Moore, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000329.

34 William Carwile, e-mail to Mary Lynne Miller, Michael Lowder, and Edward Buikema, Sept. 6, 2005, 4:47 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000742.

35 Written Statement of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi*, Dec. 7, 2005.

36 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Office of Homeland Security, City of New Orleans, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 140.

37 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 150.

38 *DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash*, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 16.

39 Committee staff interview of Col. Al Jones, U.S. Army, Senior Army Advisor, Georgia Army National Guard, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 31.

40 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 158 ("Our logistics just sucked. It was awful."); Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2005, transcript p. 71.

41 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 185.

42 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Sept. 1, 2005, 8:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS 0000927. The mission assignment was later cut to 500 million on Sept. 7.

43 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134. *See also*: Committee staff interview of Col. Roberta Woods, U.S. Army, Chief of Plans and Operations Division, Logistics Directorate, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 82-83 (the \$1 billion was an estimate).

44 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: The Defense Department's Role in the Response*, Feb. 9, 2006.

45 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2005, p. 137 (“I’m not sure they ever took over that. . . . This, to me, was a broad, encompassing statement to cover any eventuality, and the military may have assisted in moving ice and water, but I’m not aware of that. As far as I’m concerned, all the requests came through my logistics train to our people supporting this out of Camp Beauregard.”). Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), former Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript p. 64 (“Q: Do you know whether DOD actually did end up taking over the procurement, transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and medical supplies? A: They did not. They augmented and supplemented . . . no, not the full logistical.”).

46 FEMA, Hurricane Katrina billing spreadsheet. Provided to Committee.

47 Department of the Army, “1604DR-MS-DOD-19 – Uses of Funds.” Provided to Committee (indicating \$51,122,526.05 designated for “Lunch meals w/ drinks; meals tailored operational; commercial meals; meals individual; DLA MRSs; freight charges”); FEMA, Hurricane Katrina billing spreadsheet. Provided to Committee (indicating \$2,981,123.90 expended for “ship lease, port /canal charges, & prop fuel for Algol, Altair, Bellatrix, Pollux, Pillilaa”; \$1,084,587.24 for Diesel fuel; \$39.56 for “unleaded gasoline”).

48 Sec. Michael Chertoff, All Things Considered, NPR, “Michael Chertoff discussed US aid effort being criticized in New Orleans,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8 a.m.

49 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 116.

50 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Officer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript p. 28.

51 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General – Air, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 65-66; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117.

52 Committee staff interview of Terry Vallarautto, Interoperability Coordinator, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 1, 2006, transcript pp. 39-40; Committee staff interview of Matt Farlow, Information Technology Division Chief, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 53;

53 Vallarautto interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 39-40; Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 53.

54 Vallarautto interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 42.

55 Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corp., conducted on Jan. 25, 2006 (untranscribed).

56 Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 56.

57 Wells interview, Nov. 11, 2004, pp. 205-206.

58 Testimony of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA's Operations Professionals*, Dec. 8, 2005.

59 Wells, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005.

60 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 128.

61 Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 16.

62 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 53.

63 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 108-113.

64 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 51; *DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash*, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 32 (“It is estimated that the ERT had 25% of the staff that were needed.” “DHS/FEMA needs to have 24/7 staffing capability for each section. The agency needs to be willing and able to provide heavy staffing at the start of a disaster, and establish minimum staffing requirements based on responsibilities of the sections. Failure to do so causes fatigue, mistakes and errors in judgments in the units.”).

65 Scott Wells, e-mail to Michael Hall, Sept. 9, 2005, 5:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0040-0003030.

66 *DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash*, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 38

67 *DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash*, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 38

68 Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, *Emergency Operations Plan*, Apr. 2005, p. 10 [hereinafter *Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan*]; Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 32.

- 69 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 35.
- 70 Committee staff interview of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Service Corporation, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 6, 12-13.
- 71 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 35-38.
- 72 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 36.
- 73 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 38.
- 74 Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe*, Jan. 30, 2006.
- 75 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 108-113.
- 76 EMAC was established by Congress through Joint Resolution in 1996 (P.L. 104-321), 110 Stat. § 3877.
- 77 For information on EMAC, see <http://www.emacweb.org>.
- 78 California joined on Sept. 21, 2005, after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. California, Office of the Governor, "Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Emergency Management Compact Legislation," press release, Sept. 13, 2005. Provided to Committee.
- 79 P.L. 104-321 (Oct. 19, 1996).
- 80 Once a state requests EMAC support, a team is deployed to the disaster area and works with the state to determine requirements and match those needs to available resources. *Source*: National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), "How does EMAC work?" <http://www.emacweb.org>. Accessed on Apr. 15, 2006. EMAC representatives are located within the NRCC as well, to help facilitate requests and ensure there is no duplication of effort at the federal level. *Source*: Committee staff interview of Richard Gray, Team Leader, Information and Assessment Team and Team Leader, National Response Coordination Center, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 31-33.
- 81 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, "Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events," Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee.
- 82 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006. transcript pp. 63-64.
- 83 Written Statement of William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA's Operations Professionals*, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 5.
- 84 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe*, Feb. 2, 2006.
- 85 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, "Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events," Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee.
- 86 *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, prepared by IEM, Inc. for the LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Transportation, Staging and Distribution of Critical Resources: Draft Functional Plan, p. 1.
- 87 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 88-89; Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 19-20.
- 88 To help push these commodities closer to the disaster area, FEMA and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness worked together at the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge before landfall to bring more commodities to the staging area and, therefore, into the "pipeline." *Source*: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 20-21, 64-65 (acknowledging that Pineville was FEMA's main operational staging area for commodities). Both before and after landfall, FEMA sent commodities from Pineville to Regional Staging Areas in Hammond (a city 60 miles northwest of New Orleans) and Harrahan (a suburb just to the west of New Orleans). *Source*: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 64-65. FEMA also drew on supplies stockpiled at Barksdale Air Force Base in northwest Louisiana and elsewhere in the country. *Source*: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 21, 64-65, 98.
- 89 *Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan*, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Transportation, Staging and Distribution of Critical Resources: Draft Functional Plan, p. 1.
- 90 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 25-26; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 157 ("We thought about ... we've got to push commodities down regardless, because we know people are going to need food and water. And we weren't - you know, we didn't wait for a request for that. We said, we know we're going to need to move food and water down to the area.").
- 91 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 20-21.
- 92 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 56-57. *See also*: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 68-69 ("MR. ADELBERG: It was areas that you weren't staffing. It was just places where people were asking for commodities to be supplied? COL MAYEAUX: Yes, sir. MR. ADELBERG: And for one reason or another, the word wasn't getting to you that they needed more than you were able to provide? COL MAYEAUX: That is correct, more than I could provide. I didn't know there were people there.").
- 93 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

94 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

95 Committee staff interview Col. Steven Dabadie, former Chief of Staff, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript pp. 138-39 (“We were simply out of capabilities and resources because we got overwhelmed with the flood, and we needed to get those EMAC forces in. For example, you know, commodity distribution almost took an entire brigade. They struck a brigade out of – Pennsylvania National Guard, they were the ones doing the commodity distribution when they came in.”).

96 The Department of Homeland Security recommended this year that FEMA “establish contracts for priority resources prior to the onset of disasters.” *Source: DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash*, Feb. 13, 2006, pp. 10-11 (stating that the “lack of pre-negotiated contracts for large recurring services impacted the overall response”). The National Guard acknowledged in its After Action Report that “last minute scrambling to locate & contract required equipment and services to support commodity distribution (e.g., forklifts, Port-a-Lets, tents, meal contractors, etc.) created delays in supporting Parish requests.” *Source: Louisiana National Guard, After Action Report, Task Force Griffin, Commodities Distribution*, Jan. 4, 2006 (recommending that LOHSEP, FEMA, and local authorities execute such contracts in advance of future storms). Nevertheless, LOHSEP’s Col. Mayeaux claimed that the state did not run out of bulk commodities. *Source: Col. Mayeaux interview*, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 64.

97 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans*, Feb. 1, 2006.

98 Louisiana National Guard, After Action Report, Task Force Griffin, Commodities Distribution, Jan. 4, 2006; Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

99 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 158-59.

100 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 33-34.

101 While it is difficult to quantify the problem, there is anecdotal evidence of people clamoring for food and water wherever they could find authorities who might be able to help. For example, Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze had difficulty establishing a medical evacuation point on Wednesday morning because “we had a lot of evacuees who were assembling there and asking for water and food, which was interfering with the medical staff who were trying to attend to the patients on the ground.” Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina, pp. 3-4.

102 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 90.

103 Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Director, External Affairs, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response*, Oct. 20, 2005.

104 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Thibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 131.

105 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 91; Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 63.

106 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 89-91, 162-163.

107 Committee staff interview of Chris Villar, Owner, Go-Cans, LLC, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006 (untranscribed).

108 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 66. When NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain arrived at the Superdome on Sunday, he immediately called the city’s Office of Emergency Preparedness and requested food and water, which Deputy Chief Swain said the Louisiana National Guard ultimately delivered before landfall. *Source: Swain interview*, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 44-47. The National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to provide “some limited support to some special needs people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was for our troops. *Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview*, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 86-87. Gen. Jones quickly put out a call for MREs and found enough from nearby National Guard contingency stocks to supply people with two servings a day until Tuesday afternoon. *Source: Swain interview*, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 66. LANG Col. Glenn Curtis also ordered trucks to move food and water from Camp Beauregard to the Superdome on Sunday, Aug. 28, 2005. *Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff, Louisiana National Guard*, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 129-130. As the Louisiana National Guard’s Deputy Commander for Katrina, Col. Glenn Curtis, said: “Once it became a shelter of last resort we just knew we would need food and water there.” *Source: Col. Curtis interview*, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 134.

109 Louisiana National Guard officials stated that their requests for additional food and water before landfall were met. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 69-74.

110 NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain testified that officials were able to feed the population at the Superdome twice a day, but that the flow of food and water was at times “touch and go” and resulted in periodic frustration. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 65-68.

111 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 86-87 (The National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to provide “some limited support to some special needs people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was for our troops.”).

112 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Director, External Affairs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 2005, transcript p. 191 (“There was not enough food in the Superdome, there was not enough water in the Superdome to properly provide meals and water for the continued growing number of people that were constantly coming to the Superdome. It never really stopped. They kept coming. Estimates now were up to 25,000, 30,000 people at the Superdome.”).

113 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 191.

114 Although Bahamonde recalled being “once again consumed with finding food” on Wednesday, it does not appear that food or water ever ran out at the Superdome. *Source:* Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 195; Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 88. The fact that an MRE is designed to feed a person for up to two days helped: “You can actually survive for two days on one MRE. So had it gotten really desperate, we would have come up with a plan to bust them open and split them up.” *Source:* Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 87. *See also:* Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 127-28; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 132.

115 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 65 (“We never received flashlights or batteries. We never received generators. Period.”).

116 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005; Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

117 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 93 (“I don’t think they were able to come in – well, on Monday, they would have been able to; yes. Tuesday morning is when the water came in. After that, supply trucks were not able to drive into the Dome. They were driven up on to the up ramp or down ramp of the interstate, the I-10, and from there I think they were unloaded or whatever on to, I guess, the high-water vehicles, and supplies were brought in.”).

118 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 116.

119 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005, p. 1.

120 Penny Moses-Fields, letter to The Honorable Susan M. Collins and The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Jan. 30, 2006, “Attachment A: Timeline of Mayor Nagin’s Activities, Aug. 26, 2005 – Sept. 6, 2005.” Timeline entries include: Wed., Aug. 31 – “Convention Center – numbers growing, no food or water Still no food and water”; Thurs., Sept. 1 – “Center – numbers growing, no food or water.”

121 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

122 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

123 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 131.

124 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 139.

125 FEMA, Action Request Form, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

126 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 116 (“Q: When did you become aware of any problems or issues at the convention center? A: Sometime Tuesday or Wednesday, when we got word from Jeff Smith that people were showing up at the convention center. The first thing we heard, there were 5,000 people there. Then we heard there were 25,000 people there. ... But early in the game, we heard that people were congregating there, too, mainly probably late Tuesday, because Tuesday was when the flooding really--when people started leaving their homes and wading and swimming and everything toward the Dome and the convention center.”).

127 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117:

Mainly what I did was respond to the State’s request to get food and water to them, because again, the States and the locals did not preplan or preposition anything, and so there was obviously a problem there. And I remember sending, and again, I don’t know how many, but trucks of food and water. And after they were dispatched from Camp Beaugard, I remember hearing all the things about loss of control and law and order and things like that and I got worried about my truck drivers driving into a situation like that and getting mobbed. Then I heard that the local officials, whoever that is, the National Guard was holding the trucks and were going to go in the next morning, whatever morning that was, probably Wednesday or Thursday morning, when they went in with security to establish order. And they would have to speak to that, exactly what they did, but again, we got a lot of the rumors about the law and order breakdown and what not. But I do remember that my trucks didn’t go down there without appropriate protection when they went in on the morning, so I’m guessing that might have been Thursday morning with just all the things that were going on, but I do not know for sure.

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117.

128 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 117-118 (“Well, again, some of our medical assets may have been sent [to the Convention Center], but again, we respond to requests from the State as a result of requests from the local governments, and other than getting the people out of there and getting food into them, I don’t have a recollection of another specific request from Jeff Smith at the time relative specific to the [Convention Center], other than the evacuation and the life-sustaining food and water.”).

129 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 171-172.

130 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Significant Events for Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005. Provided to Com-

mittee. The National Guard did not move to the Convention Center until noon on Friday. When the Guard did arrive at the Convention Center on Friday, they saw people barbecuing food outside the Convention Center. *Source:* Lt. Col. Thibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 122-123, 126-127. It is not clear from the record where the people at the Convention Center obtained the means to grill food outside, but the Guard who approached the Convention Center for the first time on Friday correctly saw the outdoor cooking as a sign that their missions to establish law and order and to provide relief there would be executed without incident. *Source:* Lt. Col. Thibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 126-127 (“It was an extremely heart moving thing to see these people that needed help come to you and say ‘thanks, I appreciate you guys are here.’”); Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 194-195 (“In fact, quite the contrary to what we thought, or what our intelligence had told us the situation was, and what the Mayor and some of the other folks told us, the people actually cheered us, you know, as we came in. And we had absolutely no problem getting control of the Convention Center, setting up the food distribution point. They were very orderly.”). In contrast to the optimism engendered from seeing a working barbecue outside the Convention Center, LANG officials became pessimistic when they first entered the structure because they saw what seemed to be about 100 people lying dead all over the floor of the building. But when those officials returned to the inside of the structure, hours after they had provided food, water, and medical relief to the crowd, not one of the people they had presumed to be dead were there: they were never dead; they were asleep, passed out from exhaustion, dehydration and malnourishment. This turn of events came as a great relief to the LANG officials at the Convention Center. *Source:* Lt. Col. Thibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 159-60. Within five hours of their noon arrival, the Guard had brought in food and drink for the people there. *Source:* Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 66-67 (“The crowd did that in a very orderly manner. We had no problems. We fed them. We gave them all they wanted and told them that we would be shortly evacuating them.”); Lt. Col. Thibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127, 141-142 (“We drove down in there and immediately began to interact with the crowd. The questions that – the comments they made to us is ‘we need help.’ ‘We need food, water. How are we going to get out of here. Please just help us. What is going on. Thank you. Thank you so much for coming here.’”). Troops patrolled throughout the night, encouraging people to eat as much as they wanted and informing them of the following day’s evacuation. *Source:* Lt. Col. Thibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 157.

131 While there is a consensus that food and water are vital, lifesaving commodities, some dispute exists as to whether ice belongs in that same category.

132 Written Statement of Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 6.

133 Written Statement of Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 3.

134 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 5-7.

135 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 5-7.

136 In an interview with Committee staff, McAllister explained: “I never saw them. And the problem we had on my side as far as stateside, I never had visibility of those. I never knew how many we actually had. And I kept trying to find out, you know, how many do we have staged? How much is there? ... I never got an answer of any kind. ... It was in the pipeline, it’s en route or it’s – you know, it was those type of answers we were getting out of Nashville in logistics. I mean, Bob [Fenton] was even frustrated ... because he couldn’t get any visibility on them either. You know, he couldn’t – he wanted to be able to tell me I’ve got 250 ice sitting in Meridian. Well, we never did know that. We never knew what was actually there at Meridian, or I didn’t.” McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 7-8.

137 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

138 Committee staff interview of Mike Beeman, Director, National Preparedness Division, Region II, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 168.

139 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 32-34.

140 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 27-30.

141 William L. Carwile III, White Paper, “The Response and Initial Recovery to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi: A Field Perspective,” Feb. 22, 2006, p. 25. Provided to Committee.

142 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 27-30.

143 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System*, Mar. 1, 2004, p. 136.

144 In Harrison County, the county operated an LSA within the county that would receive supplies from Stennis and then distribute them to the PODs. Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 74-76.

145 Florida had prepositioned supplies off of I-10 near Jacksonville, Florida and was prepared to move into Mississippi to respond to the storm’s impact. Committee staff interview of Mike DeLorenzo, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Preparedness and Response, Florida Division of Emergency Management, conducted on Feb. 9, 2006 (untranscribed).

146 DeLorenzo interview, Feb. 9, 2006.

147 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

148 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 32-34.

149 William Carwile, e-mail to Craig Fugate and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 3:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS 0003582.

150 DeLorenzo interview, Feb. 9, 2006.

151 In an interview with Committee staff, Lieutenant Colonel Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support for the Mississippi Army National Guard, stated that: "Getting on into the 31st of Aug., 1st of Sept. we were getting some commodities in and we realized really on the 31st of Aug. that there was no way given what we thought the number of people who did not evacuate was, which my rough estimates was about 100,000 people along . . . the six coastal counties. . . . we knew that there was no way that with central distribution points, with the debris fields that were out there, that people could come in and get water, ice and MREs." Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 43-45.

152 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi Military Department, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 21-22, 28.

153 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General's Office, "Hurricane Katrina Narrative," Oct. 20, 2005, p. 2.

154 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General's Office, "Hurricane Katrina Narrative," Oct. 20, 2005, p. 3.

155 Committee staff interview of George Phillips, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Public Safety, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript p. 41.

156 Lt. Col. Smithson explained this process during an interview with Committee staff: "[W]e would send our small helicopters out and they would find pockets of displaced Americans or whatever you want to call them, and it was really easy to find them because they'd hear the helicopters coming and they'd make signs and hold them up. So they would radio back and that's where we would go in and drop things." Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 44.

157 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General's Office, "Hurricane Katrina Narrative," Oct. 20, 2005, p. 3.

158 Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 61.

159 Mike Beeman related the following anecdote in an interview with Committee staff:

There were times when the trucks would just pull off the highway. We'd find them parked along [U.S.] 49. . . . One of the requirements for the sheriff's department and the local police departments was whenever they saw a diesel truck sitting somewhere that might be idling the engine and all that, the truck driver was asleep, go over and find out who he was, what he had in the back end, because we many times [we] knew items were sent to us, but we didn't know where they were because the system, once [Stennis] sent it out, we had no idea what was sent. . . . We knew that we were expecting ice, water, and food, but if something else were sent, we wouldn't know it, because again, we had no notification process and information process that it was coming to us. . . . We'd finally find maybe five or six truckloads of water or ice that were sitting off the roadway in some apron at a supermarket or whatever and we'd just send them on down to this site, get them back on track. Some of them sat sometimes two or three days. I found 25 trucks one day, all with blue tarps on them, that were sitting down at the Wal-Mart [on U.S. 49]. . . . But they were sitting there. Somebody told me all these trucks were down there, so I drove down there and started knocking on the truckers' doors and I said, 'What do you have in the back end?' And they said, 'Tarps.' And I said, 'Tarps?' Well, ultimately it turned out to be blue roof, the stretch material, but they were just sitting, and sitting there for three or four days. They were just sitting there, waiting for somebody to tell them where to go with the loads of blue tarp, blue stretch material. . . . I have no idea where they came from. . . . They just appeared.

Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 80-82.

160 James Russo, e-mail to William Carwile and Robert Fenton, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:01 a.m. Provided to Committee; filed as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0094-0002227.

161 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 55-57.

162 He described management of the trucks as amounting to: "Guys in golf carts going up and waking up a truck driver saying, what have you got in the truck, that kind of thing. And then, okay, take this truck and go over two roads because there's just - I mean, there were literally - the road network out at the ammunition plant looks like this calendar, you know, you've got a lot of east-west, north-south roads that just go nowhere, they're just a road with trees on either side of them. So there were at times hundreds of trucks just parked out there. And, you know, that took them a while to get it under control." Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 103-104.

163 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 34.

164 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 105-106. This was confirmed in an interview with officers of the Gulfport Police Department. Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Alan Weatherford, Gulfport Police Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript p. 90.

165 As he explained during an interview with Committee staff: "Truck drivers are not emergency [personnel]. They may load up and go to the house for two days. They may park it. They're going to take their days off. And that load that you loaded out on Friday, you may not see it until Tuesday. And that caused us frustrations, you know. Some days we had big loads - you know, you can always count on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday you had a bunch of trucks because everybody that loaded out at the end of the week can take a couple days off. Now, Monday, they're ready to roll." McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 34-35.

166 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 40-45.

167 Latham testified before the House that, “The fuel issue was something that, to be honest with you, just caught us out of left field.” Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi*, Dec. 7, 2005.

168 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 75-77.

169 Don McKinnon, e-mail to James McKay, Senate Committee staff member, Feb. 16, 2006, 5:53 p.m.

170 These problems were often made worse because of the apparent difficulties with FEMA even acquiring generators. In a questionnaire submitted for an after action report, Gulfport Public Works Director Kris Riemann wrote that: “FEMA support for items such as generators often took 2-4 days to get. In many cases we already had a generator from another source by the time FEMA went through their long process. I would think there would be a faster way to get generators in place especially for the water and sewer system when every day counts so much to our residents.” Kris Riemann, Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, MS, “Hurricane Katrina Post-Incident Survey,” sent to Crystal Johnson, Nov. 3, 2005.

171 Committee staff interview of Kris Riemann, Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 60-62.

172 Committee staff interview of Jim Craig, Director of Health Protection, Mississippi Department of Health, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 44.

173 Written Statement of Jason Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?*, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6; Written Statement of David M. Ratcliffe, President and CEO, Southern Company, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?*, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2; Written Statement of Kevin T. Regan, Regional Vice President, Hotel Operations, Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?*, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

174 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 7; Written Statement of Ratcliffe, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2; Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

175 Written Statement of Ratcliffe, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

176 Written Statement of Ratcliffe, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

177 Written Statement of Stanley S. Litow, Vice President, Corporate Community Relations, IBM Corporation, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?*, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

178 Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

179 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

180 Testimony of Jason Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?*, Nov. 16, 2005.

181 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

182 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

183 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

184 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

185 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 9.

186 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

