July 22, 2004

The tragedy of 9/11 continues to echo today with each family that lost a loved one that horrible day. No report can alleviate that loss or wash away the heart-wrenching pain felt by these families but it will help up learn what went wrong and how best to correct intelligence failures.

Today marks the release of the 9-11 Commission's final report, which details the US government's handling of intelligence leading up to the tragic attacks on September 11. This report highlights some important findings and makes some noteworthy recommendations.

First, it should be noted that according to the Commission, both the Clinton and Bush Administrations missed opportunities to derail the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, without a measure of luck, the Commission notes, preventing such attacks might not have been possible for either Administration.

I believe that the report does demonstrate that there were differences, pre 9-11, in the approaches of the Clinton and Bush Administrations to the issue of terrorism. The numbers are telling. During the eight years of the Clinton Administration, the Commission found that four opportunities to derail the September 11 attacks were missed. But six opportunities were missed by the Bush Administration during its first eight months.

From that I conclude that the Clinton Administration clearly was engaged - and deeply - on the issue of terrorism. I don't believe that the same can be said of the Bush Administration prior to September 11. And I would venture to say that this lack of attention by the Bush Administration was a direct result of its myopic focus on other issues, especially Iraq, which the 9-11 Commission has asserted had no connection with Al Qaeda. Moreover, the record is clear that the Bush Administration resisted for some time the establishment of the commission. It also made the Commission's work difficult by responding very slowly to its requests for access to documents and officials including the National Security Advisor.

But I want to move beyond partisan debate, because there is so much at stake here. The Commission has done our nation a great service by not only trying to find out what happened and why, but in looking to the future and proposing ways to prevent such heinous acts from happening again. Indeed, the recommendations of the Commission are perhaps more important than its findings. The most important of these recommendations is that our nation's 15 separate intelligence agencies be united under the direction of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Some experts, including former and current intelligence officials, oppose this recommendation, and endorse alternative approaches such as expanding the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

There will be a serious debate in the Congress about this recommendation and other recommendations proposed by the Commission. And there should be. I don't pretend to know what the outcome of that debate will be. But the Commission is a bi-partisan group whose members have dutifully dedicated well over a year of their lives to this issue. The Congress has an obligation to give full and serious consideration to all of its recommendations, especially the one recommending the fundamental restructuring of our intelligence community.

Entrenched bureaucracies are always opposed to fundamental changes. There will be resistance to many of the recommendations that the Commission has made. The establishment of a high level post of Director of National Intelligence within the White House to oversee intelligence matters may or may not be the answer that we're looking for. However, what is very clear from the Commission's report and from the experience of 9-11 is that our intelligence system is broken - it failed the American people.

The status quo will not stand. I stand ready to work on a bipartisan basis with my colleagues in the Senate and with our counterparts in the House to consider every recommendation to make our nation safer. That work should begin immediately.

- 30 -