For Immediate Release

The Bush Preemptive Agenda: A Shortsighted World Vision
Remarks by Senator Christopher J. Dodd at the Center for International Policy Conference on "Cowboy Diplomacy: Putting the Nation at Risk"

October 21, 2003

Today's conference is entitled "Cowboy Diplomacy: Putting the Nation at Risk" -- an intriguing topic for consideration.

You will recall that in the best tradition of the American West, which most of us learned via Hollywood's interpretations, there was always a clear and easy case of right and wrong, good and evil. There were the good guys and there were the bad guys.

The bad guy -- easily identified by a black hat and ominous background music -- perpetrated his evil on a community. The good guy arrived on the scene and after suitable drama eliminated the bad guy, rescued the damsel in distress, and rode off into the sunset. There must have been hundreds of movies made with this formula.

There were rarely any shades of gray, rarely any hints that the good guy might not have a noble spirit, rarely any question that the good guy and his team might lack sufficient force to save the day, and rarely any possibility that the bad guys might return for revenge after the hero rode off into the sunset.

In the history of America's relations with the rest of the world, there have been occasional episodes which smacked of cowboy diplomacy, cases where we struck first and asked questions later, if at all. The Spanish American War comes to mind as a good example of this approach, one which might be called impetuous righteousness.

For most of the Twentieth Century, however, we have followed a different tradition. After finding ourselves engaged in a Second World War in less than twenty-five years after the first Great War, we came to the conclusion - a correct one, in my eyes -- that we could protect ourselves better when we worked in a collaborative manner with other nations. The United States took the lead in promoting this new collective approach through organizations like the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The United Nations, despite its critics and shortcomings, has provided a unique forum where all nations regularly meet, bring many of their problems and seek peaceful solutions. In addition to its great humanitarian and regulatory programs, the United Nations has had important successes on the security front. I think immediately of the Korean War, dozens of peacekeeping operations around the globe, and, of course, the first Gulf War in 1991, which was fought with the blessing of a United Nations resolution and a broad international consensus.

NATO not only provided protection from the Soviet threat during the Cold War, but it created an integrated military command where former European enemies learned cooperation.

NATO in recent years has been active in establishing security in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

Occasionally, the United States has strayed from this collective approach and pursued unilateralism. In most cases, these have been lightning strikes with limited objectives against poorly armed foes. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 come easily to mind.

The most glaring example of American unilateralism in the Twentieth Century was the War in Vietnam. However, Vietnam did not come about as the result of a conscious decision to go to war. Rather, our leaders always felt that a few more troops could do the job. We put our toe in the water of Vietnam, stepped gradually in deeper and deeper until we were up to, at least, our waists, some might say our necks. Yes, there were allies -- some Korean and Australian troops -- but the rationale for involvement, the leadership and the bulk of the foreign fighting force was American. And we all know how Vietnam turned out.

The War in Iraq breaks with American past traditions in many ways. I think that everyone here is sufficiently aware of the basic outline of events over the past year that I need not repeat them. Rather, I would like to mention briefly some of the ways which seem to set this war apart from past confrontations, even from the War in Vietnam.

With respect to Iraq, the crisis emerged suddenly. Iraq had not engaged in any recent aggression against the US or its allies. Recall that it was little more than a year ago, in August of 2002, when Vice President Cheney first spoke about the threat of Iraq. Few Americans knew that it posed a threat to American security. Iraq had not been on the radar screen as a serious problem, even among foreign policy professionals, since the Gulf War and the departure of the last team of UN inspectors in 1998.

But once the Administration publicly identified Iraq, the drum began to beat relentlessly for action. The President and his top advisors claimed repeatedly that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to world security because he was developing weapons of mass destruction and had ties to the Al Qaeda terrorists responsible for the attacks of 9/11.

There had been no clamor for action by the American people. The clamor came from the civilian leadership at the Pentagon and their allies in the press. Neither the intelligence community, the State Department, nor the uniformed military leadership seemed to share the enthusiasm of the White House and the Pentagon's civilians for a confrontation with Iraq.

I can't recall a past confrontation where there was so much division about the nature of the threat before we went to war.

The President sought Congressional authority for war, arguing that he needed this support in order to induce the United Nations to take a strong stand in favor of a vigorous inspection and disarmament proposal. I joined with my colleagues in the Senate in voting to give the President that authority. The House followed suit. We in the Congress all applauded when Colin Powell used the Congressional authorization to achieve a unanimous Security Council Resolution. We assumed -- perhaps over-optimistically -- that this meant an effective inspection/disarmament regime was in place to address any threat posed by Iraq.

As the inspectors began their work, some skeptics noted the continuing build up of American military presence in the region around Iraq, the repeatedly dismissive statements from the Administration about the effectiveness of the inspectors, and the White House press spokesman's call for "regime change" at the time inspectors were making a report to the Security Council. Many of us in Congress became increasingly concerned, but we hoped that these actions were strategic ploys on the part of the administration to ensure the effectiveness of the inspections.
Very quickly, the Bush Administration saw the results of the inspections as half empty; most of the rest of the world saw them as half-full and wanted them to continue. Unable to mobilize support for a second resolution authorizing invasion, the Bush Administration chose the unilateral approach. They referred to the invading troops as the "Coalition Force," but it was, and still is, composed almost exclusively of American and British forces.

American troops, braving sandstorms and uncertainty about possible chemical and biological hazards, moved like clockwork across Iraq, capturing Baghdad and securing most of the country in less than six weeks. This was a clear victory for the prowess of the American military machine, but the President may have been a little hasty in declaring on May 1 an end to combat operations. American soldiers have now suffered more casualties in the post war period than they did during the invasion.

The Pentagon may have had good plans for an invasion of Iraq, but the same cannot be said for the post-war period. We succeeded in dismantling the Saddam Hussein regime, but we have neither captured Saddam Hussein nor established a reasonable security blanket for the country. In recent weeks terrorist incidents have become everyday occurrences, taking as victims not only American troops, but UN humanitarian officials, foreign diplomats, and Iraqi citizens from all walks of life. As these attacks continue, our military and intelligence leaders wonder aloud: Who are the terrorists? Are they Saddam loyalists, Iraqis angry about a foreign occupation, or Al Qaeda activists seizing upon an opportunity to inflict harm and embarrassment upon the United States?

Questions persist about the size and composition of a future security force -- and the role for a new Iraqi security element. Similar questions persist about Iraq's economic and political future. How much will it cost to rebuild that nation and how long will it take before Iraq resumes its sovereignty?

The Bush Administration has sought $20.3 billion for Iraqi security and infrastructure from its request of $87 billion in emergency funding. Despite serious misgivings about some elements of the package, most especially the lack of burden sharing by the international community --the House and Senate passed the request last week and a reconciliation version of the two bills will shortly go to the President for his signature.

None of us should kid ourselves that this will be the last request for monies for Iraq.

How much more the US taxpayers will have to contribute will depend upon whether the Bush administration is willing to share decision making over the future of Iraq. We will all be watching to see what happens at the Madrid Conference over the next few days to see how much our friends in Europe and elsewhere are prepared to make available to help us rebuild Iraq.

The post-war period has revealed many troublesome factors about the planning and implementation phases of the war. Americans on the ground in Iraq have discovered no evidence of weapons of mass destruction, no delivery systems capable of having created an imminent threat, and no connections with the Al Qaeda organization.

As inspectors continue to search, perhaps in vain, for evidence of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in Iraq, we are confronted with two disturbing possibilities: one, that the extent of Saddam's weapons programs was misunderstood or exaggerated, or a second, far more frightening prospect: that these weapons did exist in Iraq, but managed to slip out of the country during the fog of war.

At the Washington end, we have learned how the Pentagon controlled and drove the decision process leading to the war. We have learned that the caveats and footnotes from intelligence officers at the CIA and the State Department in the original threat assessments were given scant attention.

We have learned that the post-war planning efforts at the State Department were discarded in favor of a planning effort at the Pentagon. "Cowboy diplomacy" seemed to be the preferred approach in dealing not only with the Iraqis, our allies and the United Nations, but also with the Congress, the rest of the Executive Branch, and anyone else who dared express any misgivings about the Defense Department's plans for Iraq.

As the shortcomings of our postwar plans for Iraq and the bureaucratic infighting in Washington have become increasingly apparent, the White House has reorganized responsibilities under the National Security Council. This will permit closer White House control over developments in Iraq, but also puts the responsibility for any problems closer to the President.

The difficulties on the ground in Iraq have brought the US back to the UN for support, but the Bush Administration has insisted on keeping essential authorities in its own hands. They have recently obtained a new UN resolution which calls upon the Iraqi Governing Council to prepare by December 15 a timetable for drafting of a constitution and holding elections. This is a positive development, but time will tell whether it will be sufficient to increase the resources and international support necessary to bring peace and stability to Iraq.

The term "Cowboy Diplomacy" could never be applied to any past foreign crises with the same meaning that the Iraq War brings. The World rallied to our side following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In two short years public opinion around the world has turned against the US. Our unilateralism has squandered the opportunity to take the world's support and mold it into effective multilateral action against international terrorism or any number of other difficult issues.

In today's Iraq, the villain in the black hat - in this case, I suppose, the black beret - has disappeared. Where he has gone, nobody knows. And with the prospect of danger around virtually every street corner, the United States stands alone as the self-appointed sheriff. And we have no one to blame for this situation but ourselves.

Today's conference organizers have not invited the strategists from the Bush administration who put together America's current vision of the world to speak to you today. Nor have they invited administration critics from either the policy or the academic worlds.

Rather you will be very fortunate to hear from what I would describe as practitioners -- people who have worked the issues in the field and observed the impact of America's new approach on a first hand basis. Their insights should reveal much about the unilateralism and militarism which have become the principal themes of the Bush Administration's approach to the problems of the world. And I'm sure we will all benefit from hearing what they have to say.