8.
Public Interest and Private Risk Management
Introduction
Other chapters of this report have shown how derivatives
are used to manage risk and described the difficulties in measuring their
effects on a companys financial position. The huge size of international
derivative markets is evidence that private parties are better off when
they use derivatives; but Enrons failure and the earlier financial
crises discussed below raise the possibility that derivatives may shift
private risk to society as a whole, leaving open the question of their
overall economic impact. This chapter discusses four issues that are central
to a balanced assessment of the role of derivatives in the economy:
Would economically sensible investments be forgone in the absence of derivatives?
Alternatively, do derivatives increase a firms market value? If derivatives
do increase worthwhile investment, then there is a clear public interest
in their use. Do derivatives affect prices and volatility in the underlying
commodity and security markets? If they tend to decrease volatility, then
the functioning of markets would improve, and society would be better off.
Can firms with market power use derivatives to manipulate underlying spot
markets? If derivatives can be used to distort markets, then there might
be a case for regulatory intervention. Does the widespread use of derivatives
increase the likelihood of financial crisis? Is the public subsidizing private
risk-taking through deposit insurance and liquidity backing from the Federal
Reserve System? If derivatives do increase the likelihood of a public
bailout, how large are the likely costs?
Investment, Cost of Capital, and the Value
of the Firm
This section discusses how the use of derivatives could
affect the level and type of investment in energy-related businesses.
As described below, hedging does have the potential to increase the value
of the firm and the level of investment in it; however, the reasons are
subtle.
A tenet of finance is that a firm will undertake an investment
if the discounted present value of net revenues (revenues less operating
costs) is greater than its capital costs.112 Hedging can be a low-cost way of insuring against unexpectedly low prices
or high costs. Because hedging reduces the variability of revenues and
costs, it might seem that derivative use would reduce risk
and increase investment. Similarly, because the value of a firm is the
expected present value of the net revenues (discounted cash flows, revenue
inflows less cash outflows) of a companys investment portfolio,
hedging might seem to increase the value of the firm.
The general question of whether financial actions, including
hedging, can affect the value of the firm (or the level of investment)
was first analyzed within the context of debt versus equity financing
by Modigliani and Miller (M&M) in 1958. In this context, because debt
financing is less expensive than equity financing, one might think that
the use of debt would increase the firms value. M&M argued to
the contrary, that in a perfect world with no taxes, no bankruptcy costs,
etc., the financial decision as to how to fund a firms investment
(i.e., fund it using debt or equity financing) would not increase the
value of the firm. That is, according to M&M, in a perfect world any
financial activity would not affect the value of the firm or the level
of investment.
M&Ms arguments are complex and are only summarized
here.113 Suppose that the
management of the firm attempted to increase the firms value by
using debt financing. M&M show that the firms stockholders can
borrow (lend) funds to buy (sell) the firms stock, such that the
overall value of the firm is unaffected by the use of debt financing.114 In effect, they show that the owners of the firm would substitute their
own debt for the firms debt (using homemade leverage).
Thus, as long as investors can borrow and lend on their own account
on the same terms as firms can, they can offset changes in corporate leverage
with changes in personal leverage.115 This would leave the value of the firm unaffected by the use of leverage.
Stated somewhat differently, M&Ms arguments are
a straightforward application of the law of the conservation of
value, a law of finance which states that the value of the firm
is basically the present value of the expected future stream of income
from all its investments. In a perfect world, this value does not depend
upon whether the assets are owned by the stockholders or by the holders
of the firms debt.
In the real world of taxes, capital rationing, transaction
costs, imperfect information, and large bankruptcy costs, however, financing
matters. In subsequent work, M&M showed that, in a more realistic
world, the value of the firm could be increased by using debt. For example,
the Internal Revenue Service allows firms to deduct interest (return to
debt) as a cost for tax purposes, whereas dividends (the returns to equity)
are taxed at the corporate level. Because of this differential treatment
of taxes, the after-tax cost of capital would depend upon the use of debt.
If a firm can reduce its tax liabilities by using debt financing, the
use of debt will increase cash flows and increase investment.116
Baron (1976) used a perfect world argument
similar to that of the original M&M model to conclude that any financing
strategy, including the use of derivatives to hedge risk, will not affect
the value of the firm and, therefore, will not affect the overall economics
of the investment project.117 In other words, given these assumptions, the investment and financing
decisions are completely separable.
Over the past 20 years there have been a series of studies
examining how certain market imperfections affect the incentives
to hedge, the value of the firm, and the level of investment. Most importantly,
Froot et al. (1993) argued that hedging helps ensure that a corporation
has sufficient funds available to take advantage of investment opportunities.118 Here the market imperfection is one that would cause external funding
to be more costly than internal funding. Thus, without hedging, low cash
flow forces a company either to bypass profitable investment opportunities
because they could not be funded internally or to increase the cost of
the investment because it must use more expensive external funds. The
latter would decrease the overall economics of the project; however, hedging
will reduce the probability of facing shortages in cash flows caused by
decreases in output prices or increases in costs. Thus, hedging would
decrease the probability that a firm would bypass economic investments.
Two studies published in the late 1980s argued that hedging
reduces expected bankruptcy costs by reducing variability in cash flows.
There are three types of bankruptcy costs. The first are the direct costs.
In bankruptcy cases, lenders generally recover about 30 to 50 percent
of the amount borrowed. When bankruptcy occurs the lawyers have first
claim to the firms assets.119 After that, bondholders have first (senior) claims on the firms
assets. Whatever remains after their claims are satisfied is distributed
to shareholders. The other costs include the loss of tax shields
and the losses of valuable growth options.120
There are also costs incurred when there is a real chance
that a firm might go bankrupt. For example, a firm that could go bankrupt
may lose customers to other firms. In the case of Enron, this in fact
occurred. Additionally, as noted by Shapiro, when a firm faces financial
duress, there are incentives to exit lines of business under conditions
when they would otherwise continue to operate, and/or to reduce
the quality of goods and services.121 Thus, by reducing the probability of default, hedging would reduce the
expected costs associated with near, or actual, bankruptcy.
Bessembinder has made a somewhat similar argument. Analysts
have noted that the issuance of senior claimants (debt) creates incentives
to underinvest. Because the benefits from increased investment
are shared with senior claimants, equity holders bypass some economic
projects. Bessembinder has shown that hedging, which again lowers the
variability of a projects returns, reduces the incentive to underinvest
because it shifts individual future states from default to non default
and this increases the number of future states in which equity holders
are the residual claimants.122 Thus, hedging would effectively increase investment and the value of the
firm.
There are also some incentives to hedge that are related
to the progressive nature of the corporate tax structure. First, given
the existence of progressive corporate tax rates, increases in the variability
of the firms income will increase the present value of its future
tax liabilities, because the increased variability in income will increase
the probability that the firm will fall into higher tax brackets. The
same increase in variability will also increase the probability of losses
and a corresponding reduction in tax liabilities, but there are no subsidies
paid to companies by governments in that event. Thus, hedging, which reduces
variability in income, will cause a reduction in expected taxes and thereby
increase expected cash flows, after-tax profitability of investment, and
the level of investment and value of the firm.
The preceding discussion suggests that firm managers could
use hedging to increase firm value and the level of investment. Managers
may choose not to use derivatives or to use derivatives for speculation
instead of hedging, depending in part on how they are compensated.123 Whether the use of derivatives induced by actual incentives will increase
the firms value is unclear.
Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) have argued that
the method of compensating managers can affect the incentive for them
to hedge against variations in the firms income. Managers
compensation often includes bonuses that are tied to accounting measures
of earnings. If managers avoid risk, everything else being equal, they
will prefer less variability in their income. One way of reducing this
variability is to reduce the variability in the firms earnings by
hedging. If a risk-averse manager has a significant share of his personal
wealth in company stock he will be inclined to hedge.124
Often managers do not hold a large proportion of their
wealth in stock but are eligible for stock options. Options have become
a popular way of tying a managers income to the performance of the
firm. If the strike price of the option is much higher than the current
price of the stock, there is an incentive for the manager to take some
risks by not hedging the firms cash flows.125 That is, management might be inclined to roll the dice in
hope of huge gains from which they will profit, forgoing surer options
with less upside potential. In fact, as discussed below, there is some
empirical evidence for a negative correlation between hedging and the
use of stock options in managers compensation packages. That is,
increases in the use of stock options in a managers compensation
package may lead to less hedging of the firms income.
What the Data Show
Researchers are just beginning to test whether the arguments
described above are consistent with real-world data. Empirical research
has lagged because firms were not required to report their derivative
positions until 1990. To date, the limited empirical evidence is consistent
with the notion that factors such as taxes and distress costs influence
firms use of derivatives.
For example, a 1993 study by Nance, Smith, and Smithson
found that firms which hedged faced more progressive tax structures and
had higher expenditures on research and development.126 Additionally, a 2000 study by Haushalter of hedging activity in the oil
and gas industry found evidence that firms with higher amounts of financial
leverage hedged more. This result is consistent with the notion that reducing
distress costs is an incentive to hedge. He also found that companies
with production facilities closer to Henry Hub hedged more than those
located farther from Henry Hub, because they had less basis risk. Haushalter
also found that large firms hedged more than smaller ones, perhaps reflecting
the fact that larger firms are better able to specialize.127
As noted above, some of the reasons managers might hedge
(or not) have more to do with their own compensation than with increasing
stockholder wealth. Tufano (1996) found that as the number of stock options
increases, the amount of hedging decreases, and as the value of the stock
held by managers and directors increases, hedging increases.128
Most importantly, a 2001 study by Allayannis and Weston
found that hedging activity increases the value of the firm. Specifically,
they used a sample of firms that faced currency risk directly because
of foreign sales or indirectly because of import competition. They found
that firms with sales in foreign countries that hedged with currency derivatives
had a 4.87-percent higher firm value (hedging premium) than similar firms
that did not use derivatives.129 Firms that did not have foreign sales but faced currency risk indirectly
had a smaller, but statistically insignificant, hedging premium. The study
also found evidence that after firms began hedging, their market value
increased, and that after firms quit hedging, their value fell. Thus,
there is evidence that hedging increases the value of the firm and, by
implication, increases investment.
Effects of Derivatives on the Volatility of Market
Prices
The theoretical work described above assumes that the use
of derivatives will not affect the overall volatility of the market. If
this assertion is not correct, hedging could reduce social welfare even
if it increased firm value. The general issue of the effects of speculation
goes as far back as Adam Smith in 1776 and John Stuart Mill in 1871.130 Both argued that speculators profit by buying when prices are low and
selling when they are high. Successful speculation would be expected,
therefore, to lower price volatility. Milton Friedman made similar arguments
for almost 60 years, beginning in the 1940s.131
Kaldor (1939) argued that sophisticated speculators would
exacerbate price changes by selling to less informed agents at prices
above the competitive price. In a more formal model, Baumol (1957) argued
that speculators amplified price changes by buying after prices have increased,
causing additional price increases.132
Because derivatives are highly leveraged investments, they
enhance both the incentive and means for speculation. Thus, if speculation
is destabilizing, the introduction of derivatives will increase volatility.
Additionally, derivatives can increase the speed at which new information
about the fundamentals of a product is reflected in prices. Thus, in markets
with derivatives, prices should respond more quickly to new information,
which would increase volatility in the commodity market. In this case,
however, the greater volatility would be associated with more accurate
prices and improved allocation of resources.133
Academic researchers have intensively studied the actual
relationship between derivatives and market volatility. A recent literature
review included more than 150 published studies in this area.134 The results of studies dealing with commodities are shown in Table
16. (Because the focus of this report is on energy, the volatility
studies dealing with financial assets are not discussed here.)
Almost all the studies found that the use of derivatives
either reduced or had no effect on market volatility. Two of the studies
examined the relationship between the use of derivatives and crude oil
prices. It appears that there have been no studies of the effect of derivatives
on the volatility of electricity and natural gas markets.
Two basic methodologies were used in the research summarized
in Table 16.
One method compared the volatility of the underlying cash market before
and after derivative trading began. This approach is useful in isolating
the short-term effects, but the comparisons do not isolate other factors
that may have caused the observed changes. The other method correlated
increases (decreases) in the level of derivative trading with volatility.
Other studies have used different measures of volatility.
The earlier studies simply looked at high-low ranges or used simple standard
deviations before and after derivatives were introduced into a given market.
The later studies introduced methodological refinements, the most important
of which were adjusting for seasonal factors and allowing for the fact
that volatility might not be constant in the pre- and post-event samples.
Given the different approaches, the consistency of the results is remarkable.
Two studies examining the effects of derivative trading
on the crude oil market produced some slightly different results. The
more recent of the two, by Fleming and Ostdiek, found some evidence that
volatility increased in the 3-week period after the introduction of NYMEX
crude oil futures, but the introduction of crude oil options and derivatives
for other energy commodities had no effect on crude oil price volatility.135 The earlier of the two studies, by Antoniou and Foster, did not find any
evidence that the introduction of futures contracts on Brent crude oil
in 1988 increased the volatility of Brent crude oil prices.136
There are a number of differences in the two studies that
might explain why they obtained different results. First, Brent crude
oil futures studied by Antoniou and Foster are traded on the International
Petroleum Exchange in the United Kingdom, whereas the crude oil futures
studied by Fleming and Ostdiek are traded on the NYMEX in the United States.
There are differences in the structure of the two markets that perhaps
could explain the differences in the results of the two studies. Second,
removing the seasonal and other factors from the measure of volatility
is difficult, and differences in the methods of computing volatility in
the two studies might also explain the differences in the results.
Lastly, as can be seen from Table 16, the bulk of the studies
dealt with agricultural commodities, and only two of them focused on one
energy commoditycrude oil. Oil and natural gas have some important
similarities: both can be stored, and both are traded in large liquid
spot markets. Thus, it is plausible that future studies will also find
that derivatives have not affected the volatility of natural gas prices.
For the reasons discussed in Chapter 4, however, it would be premature
to extrapolate these results to electricity markets.
Market Power
The analysis so far suggests that there are benefits from
using derivatives. There are also costs. Issues dealing with the risks
from the use of derivatives and possible third-party failures are discussed
in the next section. The question discussed here is whether a firm with
market power in the cash market can use derivatives to distort commodity
prices. For example, there is evidence of market power in the deregulated
electricity markets,137 suggesting
that such a firms use of derivatives could increase market volatility.
Economic theory suggests that a firm with market power
can influence price by altering supply.138 The analytical question is whether the existence of derivative markets
gives the firm another way to manipulate supply. There have been a number
of theoretical papers in this area. Unfortunately, there is but one empirical
paper, which deals with the electricity market in New Zealand.
One way of manipulating the spot (cash) market is by cornering
and squeezing it. Under this strategy, a firm will buy large amounts
of future contracts and then demand delivery of the good as the contracts
become due. By cornering the futures market, the firm has
artificially increased demand for the good. At the same time, the firm,
which has market power in the cash market, would restrict supply to squeeze
the market. The combination of the two can cause substantial increases
in price. In other words, the dominant firm can amplify the price effects
of withholding supply by becoming a large trader and simultaneously increasing
demand.
The best real-world example of such a strategy is the infamous
manipulation of the silver market by the Hunt family (and others) who
at one time held about $14 billion worth of silver. In January 1979, before
the market manipulation, silver was selling for about $6 an ounce. Then
in 1979, the Hunts began to buy silver futures and demand delivery (i.e.,
they cornered the market). At the same time, they bought large quantities
of silver and held the physical silver off the market (i.e., the market
was squeezed). As a result, in January 1980 silver prices reached about
$48 an ounce. Then, the regulators and the exchanges instituted liquidation-only
trading. That is, traders were only allowed to close existing contracts;
they could not establish any new positions. This forced traders (the Hunts
and others) to exit the market as existing contracts became due, so that
the manipulators could not continue to accrue large numbers of contracts
and were gradually forced to withdraw from the market. The day after the
rule was passed, silver prices fell by $12 per ounce, and by March 27,
1980, they fell to about $10 per ounce.
Market corners and squeezes are illegal, but hard to prove.
In fact, the Hunts, their co-conspirators, and their brokers were sued,
and a $200 million judgement was awarded. The brokers and Lamar Hunt paid
about $34 million and $17 million, respectively. The remaining amounts
were never collected, because the other parties declared bankruptcy.
There are two other ways in which a dominant firm can use
futures to increase prices. First, the key factor in the corner and squeeze
strategy is the supply response of the dominant producer. Consider a world
where there is one dominant firm that can set the market price and a number
of smaller firms that simply react to the price. A number of theoretical
studies have argued that under certain circumstances it would be rational
for the dominant firm to lower futures prices, because the smaller firms
response to the lower prices would be to reduce output.139 As a result of this strategy, the market share of the dominant firm would
increase. In traditional market power analysis, there is a pricing strategy
called predatory pricing, where the dominant firm lower prices
below marginal costs to force smaller firms out of the market. Again,
it can be shown that under certain circumstances a dominant firm can achieve
a similar outcome by using derivatives.
The dominant firm could also attempt to introduce some
instability into the futures markets, thereby increasing risk and thus
costs for the other firms, which would reduce their output and benefit
the dominant firm. It should be noted that most analysts view this type
of manipulation as more theoretical than practical, because in most cases
the costs of introducing instability would exceed the benefits.140
It must be stressed that all of these strategies to use
derivative markets to increase market power in the cash market are rational
only under special circumstances. The research suggests that there is
no general case to be made against futures trading when there is imperfect
competition in the product market.
In a recent analysis, Wolak examined how one type of derivative
(a contract for differences, also called a swap) could affect the spot
price of electricity. A contract for differences could have the effect
of fixing the price of electricity at a given level, creating an incentive
to bid very low prices to ensure that the power is dispatched. When everyone
does this, prices will fall. In the early days of the restructured electricity
market in New Zealand, prices were indeed very low. Wolak noted that the
government required generators to enter into a large number of futures
contracts when the New Zealand market was restructured. He had some evidence
that the low prices were partly the result of those contracts. He concluded
that if one is concerned about market power, then effective price
regulation can be imposed by forcing a large enough quantity of hedge
contracts on newly privatized generators.141
Derivatives and Financial Failure
Derivative contracts generally require little money up
front but can impose huge cash obligations on their writers and
buyers. The trouble begins when unforeseen market changes require one
party to the contract to post large amounts of cash quickly to cover collateral
obligations. This section discusses some infamous cases in which the use
of derivatives has been involved with large-scale financial failures.
Enrons collapse is not examined; analysis of its collapse will occupy
scholars for decades.
Apart from the human tragedies, private failures are of
public interest because they could lead to the failure of other firms
to the point of a public bailout. Such a bailout could have
important public policy implications. First, as was the case with the
Savings and Loan debacle in the late 1980s, a bailout could have major
budgetary implications. Second, if decisionmakers perceive that there
is a real possibility of a bailout, there may be an incentive to undertake
investments that are too risky. (In economics, this problem is called
moral hazard.) At least according to some, one example of
this would be deposit insurance that induced the owners of some savings
and loan institutions to make very risky real estate loans. After outlining
the reasons for four of the largest derivatives-related failures, this
section briefly discusses the protections in place to limit public liability
for private failures.
An example of a failure resulting from the use of derivatives
to speculate is the bankruptcy of Orange County, California. In the early
1990s, the manager of the Orange County Investment Pool successfully invested
the funds in long term bonds. When interest rates fell, bond prices increased,
and as a result the funds yield was greater than the market rate
of return. Then, in 1993, believing that interest rates would continue
to fall, the manager undertook a more aggressive investment strategy,
buying inverse floaters whose returns were inversely related
to the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR). He also made extensive use
of reverse reposan investment strategy that amounts
to buying Treasury bonds on margin. In both cases, profits were potentially
very large if interest rates continued to fall. Unfortunately, just the
opposite happened. In February 1994, the Federal Reserve Board started
to increase interest rates, and by late 1994 they had been increased six
times. In addition, the LIBOR rate rose from 3.6 percent to 6.8 percent.
As a result, the fund lost about $1.7 billion, leading to the Countys
bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy of Barings, PLC, in early 1995 also illustrates
the problems that can occur when derivatives are used for speculation
and when the trading activity is not properly controlled. In early 1995,
a trader working for Barings Future Singapore (BFS) wrote both put and
call options on Japans Nikkei 225 stock index with the same strike
price. This strategy, called a straddle, was not authorized.
A straddle will be profitable if the price of the underlying asset (in
this case the Nikkei 225) remains close to the option strike price. If,
however, prices either increase or decrease relative to the option strike
price, very large losses will result. Unfortunately for Barings, the Nikkei
225 did fall substantially. As a result, Barings lost about $1.5 billion
and was placed in administration by the High Court in the
United Kingdom. Indeed, this failure shows what can happen when appropriate
risk control systems are not in place.
Hedging can require substantial amounts of ready cash (liquidity).
In practice hedging will only reduce (but will not eliminate) risk. For
example, MG Corporation (MGRM), the U.S. oil trading arm of Metallgesellschaft
(MG), sold forward supply contracts that committed it to supply about
160 million gallons of motor gasoline and heating oil over a 10-year period
at a fixed price. This obviously exposed MGRM to substantial losses if
spot prices were greater than the agreed-upon fixed selling price, and
MGRM decided to hedge the risk with oil futures (and swaps).
The problem was that the futures contracts were very short
term (a few months) in nature, while the supply contracts were longer
term. Thus, every few months MGRM had to replace the futures contracts,
and this presented some problems. First, MGRM had to do a lot of trading
and was therefore dependent upon the liquidity of the NYMEX market. Additionally,
the oil products it was contracted to deliver were in different locations
from the products traded on the futures exchanges, exposing the company
to some basis risk. Lastly and most importantly, the rollover strategy
is not without costs unless the price of oil for immediate delivery (nearby
oil) is equal to the price of futures contracts (deferred
month oil).
Based on historical price patterns, on average, nearby
prices were greater than deferred month prices, and thus MGRM could expect
its rollover strategy to generate some profits. However, because oil prices
fell in the first year, the nearby prices were less than the deferred
prices, and the rollovers of the futures contracts generated substantial
cash losses, causing some funding problems. As a result, in late 1993
the company closed out all the positions and took a loss of about $1.3
billion. (That decision turned out to be an unfortunate one. Over the
next year futures prices returned to their historical patterns, and the
rollover strategy could have produced some gains.)
Even after the decision was made to terminate MGRMs
hedging program, experts disagreed about the appropriateness of that decision.142 Nevertheless, one lesson here is that hedging strategies can be complex
and are not without costs and risks. Indeed, management should anticipate
risks and liquidity requirements before entering into such strategies.
Additionally, when spot market oil prices fell in 1993, the value of MGRMs
forward contracts increased. Under German accounting rules at the time,
MG was not permitted to include the unrealized gains in its forward contacts
as income, but it was required to deduct the unrealized losses on its
futures contracts. As a result, its losses were overstated. At least according
to Steinherr, this could have affected the MG boards decision.143 Additionally, one study argued that the increase in the value of the forward
contracts was less than 50 percent of the losses from rolling the futures
contracts over. Thus, the hedge was far from perfect. There was no agreement
among the experts about whether there was any better hedging strategy.144
The failures just discussed were largely the result of
managerial factors. The collapse of Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM) was due to the fact that history did not repeat itself.
LTCM was a very risky hedge fund that invested heavily in derivatives.
(A hedge fund is a limited partnership, managing the investment of wealthy
people. Minimum investments are over $300,000, and each partnership has
fewer than 99 investors.) The hedging strategies used in this fund were
based on a very detailed mathematical model, and many of the relationships
were based largely on historical experience.
One key for LTCM was the spread between developed and developing
countries government bond prices. In particular, their investment
strategy was based on a historical relationship which suggested that if
this spread became unusually wide it would subsequently narrow to normal
levels. However, in mid-1998, after the Russian government devalued the
rubble and declared a moratorium on future debt repayments, the spread
increased rather than narrowed. As a result, the funds capital fell
from $4.8 billion to about $600 million. The Federal Reserve Bank of New
York organized a consortium of banks and investment houses to rescue the
fund. LTCM survived but had to turn over 90 percent of the funds
equity to its rescuers.
As this history demonstrates, derivative use is not without
costs, which in some cases can be ruinous. In principle, a major failure
could start a series of failures of otherwise solvent firms and disrupt
other financial and physical markets. Indeed, fear of contagion was the
rationale for the Feds intervention in the rescue of LTCM. It must
be noted, however, that for a number of reasons large failures are in
fact uncommon.
Bad experience has given managers ample reason to understand
the risks associated with their hedging operations and to discipline traders.
Even so, a well-conceived, well-executed hedging strategy has a small
chance of material losses. The small risk of failure is inherent and cannot
be eliminated. Recognizing this, rating companies and trade organizations
have taken steps to identify firms subject to losses they cannot withstand
and to contain the inevitable failures.
Moodys Investors Services, for example, is currently
reexamining the creditworthiness of all energy trading firms.145 Moodys is essentially assessing the ability of firms to raise enough
cash to cover claims quickly in the event that unlikely but plausible
market conditions move against them. Their focus is on . . . sustainable
cash flow generation, debt levels, and the quality and diversity of assets
. . . and on . . . disclosure in financial reporting . . .
.146,147 The Edison Electric Institute has initiated a master netting agreement
for use by companies trading electricity-related derivatives and is heading
the industrys effort to adopt credit standards and to guarantee
performance. This effort is in the spirit of Moodys suggestion
that energy trading would benefit from . . . a clearing system that
would provide liquidity, transparency and a more efficient transfer of
credit risk . . . .148
In addition, the banking authoritiesthe U.S. Federal
Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporationhave imposed financial safeguards on the few
investment banks that remain active in energy trading. The banking system
also provides investment banks with subsidies in the form of liquidity
(access to the Feds discount window) in the event of crisis and
with deposit insurance. Recent research indicates that these subsidies
are small and probably are offset by regulatory costs, and that they are,
in any case, effective in preventing liquidity crises.149
Over-the-counter energy traders, such as Mirant, Duke Capital,
Williams, and Reliant, face far less government oversight than do investment
bankers conducting similar business, and the private initiatives mentioned
above may prove ineffective. On the other hand, Enrons case showed
that the collapse of the largest U.S. energy trader was not enough to
threaten domestic financial markets.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined four issues related to the societal
benefits and costs that result from using derivatives. Existing theoretical
and empirical work suggests that the use of derivatives does in fact increase
the level of investment and increase a firms market value.
The bulk of the empirical studies find that the use of derivatives has
either reduced or had no effect on the volatility of commodity prices;
however, one of the two studies examining the effects of futures trading
on crude oil markets found that in the short term the introduction of
futures increased the volatility of crude oil prices. As just noted,
this result is the exception rather than the rule. There
have been no published academic studies examining whether derivative use
increases the volatility of natural gas or electricity prices. Additionally,
theoretical analyses on whether firms with market power can use derivatives
to manipulate spots markets are inclusive.
The use of derivatives can be very risky, and there have
been some cases in which their misuse has proved to be ruinous; however,
the public as a whole was not affected by those failures. Moreover, the
Federal Reserve, by its implicit commitment to provide liquidity and avert
financial crisis, is providing a small subsidy to those banks that use
derivatives, because banks are heavily involved with derivative use. The
subsidy probably is overwhelmed by the costs of bank regulation and is
in any case unavoidable and appears to be worth the cost.
Chapter 8 - Table
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