5. Prospects for Derivatives in Energy Industries
Introduction
Derivatives have proven to be useful in the petroleum and
natural gas industries, and they still are being used in the electricity
industry despite the setbacks discussed in Chapter 4. They probably would
be used more extensively if financial and market data were more transparent.
Managers may limit derivative use because their presence in company accounts
is troubling to some classes of investors. In addition, the lack of timely,
reliable spot price and quantity data in most markets makes it difficult
and expensive for traders to provide derivatives to manage local risks.
The prospects for the growth of an active electricity derivatives market
are tied to the course of industry restructuring. Until the electricity
spot markets work well, the prospects for electricity derivatives are
limited.
Transparency of Financial Information
The crucial question to be asked about the new Statement
133 from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) for reporting
derivatives is whether the guidelines for corporate financial reporting
of derivatives are sufficient for investors to understand the risks companies
are taking.74 Two aspects of accounting practice
will be particularly important in determining the answer to that question:
estimation of the fair value of derivatives and the scope of accounting
for them.
Fair Value Estimation
The issue of transparent commodity prices and determining
the value of derivative contracts will also have implications with respect
to how they are reported on a firms financial statements. Most important,
derivatives are to be recognized in financial statements at fair value.
The guidance from Statement 133 on measurement of fair value states that,
Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of
fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available.
The Statement recommends that when market prices are unavailableas,
for example, in an over-the-counter (OTC) forward contractfair value
should be estimated
. . . based on the best information available in
the circumstances. The Statement allows for the use of valuation
techniques, stating that, Those techniques should incorporate assumptions
that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future
revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates,
default, prepayment, and volatility.75
Market prices are readily available for futures contracts
traded on exchanges and for traded options; however, futures markets account
for a minority of energy derivatives activity in the United States. OTC
forward contracts and other OTC energy derivatives not only are the major
form of energy derivatives but also have been the most rapidly growing.
In the case of electricity derivatives, OTC forward contracts are the
most commonly used, particularly after the cessation of trading in electricity
futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Fair value
measurement is clearly a concern as the United States moves toward greater
deregulation of electricity and a corresponding increase in the use of
OTC derivatives in the electricity sector.
In the absence of market price information, guidance provided
by Statement 133 appears to be quite general. The documentation required
for hedge accounting could contain enough description of fair value estimation
to allow a reasonable assessment by investors of the prudence of the methods
used; however, rigorous documentation is not required for non-hedge derivative
accounting. Perhaps materiality criteria might induce disclosure of valuation
methods for non-hedge holdings of derivatives. For example, if changes
in fair value totaled more than 5 percent of net income, companies might
be required to provide detailed disclosure of their valuation techniques.
Valuation techniques may be the subject of future opinions and standards
issued by the accounting authorities.
Scope of Derivatives Accounting
Statement 133 has broadened the scope of what is included
as a derivative. According to an expert accountant in risk management,
If you are buying or selling energy in the wholesale commodity market,
whether you hedge or not, assume this is a derivative unless proven otherwise.76 Most contracts for future purchase or delivery of energy commodities will
be considered derivatives unless they qualify for the normal purchase
or sale exception. If a contract is an energy derivative, then mark-to-market
valuation of the contract will be used, and the change in fair value will
be reported quarterly.
Some contracts for future purchase or delivery of energy
commodities can have long periods of performance. Contracts for natural
gas or power stretching over 10 years are not rare in the United States.
Some liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects that involve heavy investment
in natural gas production and processing for transport to distant destinations
are based on long-term contracts that can have terms lasting up to 20
years. If the future deliveries in the contract can be settled on a net
basis even though delivery is expected by the contracting parties, then
the contract could be treated as a derivative if the normal purchases
and sales exception is not elected through documentation. Long-term contracts
for energy commodities not documented as normal sales and purchases could
be reportable as derivatives and carried on company balance sheets at
fair value under Statement 133. Further, at inception, the contracts
estimated fair value would be recognized in current earnings, on an amortized
basis.
This treatment of long-term energy commodity contracts
could be problematical. First, there may be time spans of several years
between inception of a long-term contract and expected delivery of an
energy commodity. Recognition on the balance sheet of the fair value of
such a contract at its inception does not convey the uncertainty that
accompanies the long lead times to first delivery. Second, such contracts
are sparsely traded, if traded at all, and typically do not have market
values. Fair value will have to be estimated by market valuation techniques.
Given the long lead times and lengthy periods of performance of long-term
energy contracts, the variance surrounding such estimates is likely to
be so large as to seriously impair their credibility.
Another effect of the wider scope of derivatives and consequent
increased application of mark-to-market pricing will be greater volatility
in reported earnings and stockholders equity. It appears possible
that improved reporting of derivatives (which are often used to reduce
earnings volatility) through Statement 133 might increase the apparent
volatility of earnings. Greater volatility in earnings and shareholders
equity can complicate investors efforts to review and assess companies
financial disclosures. The same problems might also complicate ratemaking
and regulatory review for pipelines and electric power. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has recently proposed incorporation of significant
parts of Statement 133 into a number of reports filed with the Commission.
Financial Reporting and Abuse of Derivatives: Some
Recent Examples
The story of derivatives in the energy industry and the
accounting for them is incomplete without an examination of the ways in
which Enron and other companies have used derivatives for purposes other
than risk management, such as managing reported earnings, and for other
financial engineering goals, such as hiding debt. Such accounting and
financial engineering objectives may have been responsible for at least
some of the explosive growth in the derivatives markets in the late 1990s.
Some examples of how Enron and other energy traders have used energy derivatives
to manage earnings and hide debt are provided below.
Managing Earnings Using Derivatives Valuation
As energy companies expanded their role from being just
producers and distributors to become energy traders as well, they found
increased opportunities to use derivatives for earnings management. The
main reason for this development is the accounting requirement of mark-to-market
accounting for derivatives. As discussed in Chapter 7, the accounting
rules require all financial contracts, even those energy derivatives that
are not actively traded in the futures markets, be marked up or down to
their estimated market values on the balance sheet. For complex, non-traded
derivatives, companies must develop theoretical valuation models describing
the derivatives value over time, make appropriate assumptions about
model variables (such as price curves and demand), and compute the value.
For long-term derivatives, mark-to-market gains typically
are non-cash; the actual cash flows may not be realized for several years.
Consequently, a company may report large accounting earnings while at
the same time consuming large amounts of cash flow. Investors can get
some feel for this phenomenon by examining the difference between earnings
and cash flow from operations (CFO) reported in companies
cash flow statements. Consider, for example, the following data for net
income and CFO for Enron for the year 2000, compiled from its quarterly
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Item |
Stated
Value (Million Dollars)
|
Q1 |
Q2 |
Q3 |
Q4 |
Annual |
Net Income |
338 |
289 |
292 |
60 |
979 |
Cumulative Net Income |
338 |
627 |
919 |
979 |
|
Cash Flow from Operations |
-457 |
-90 |
647 |
4,679 |
4,779 |
Cumulative Cash Flow |
-457 |
-547 |
100 |
4,779 |
|
As shown, Enron reported large and positive net income
in each of the quarters during 2000, but its cumulative CFO was negative
or negligible for most of the period. Transactions completed in the fourth
quarter (often in December) made the cash flow positive for the year on
a cumulative basis. The same pattern was also apparent for the companys
net income in 1997, 1998, and 1999. Cash flow red flags such
as these often suggest, although they do not provide conclusive proof,
that an energy company might be managing its reported earnings by using
mark-to-market gains from derivatives.
The mark-to-market valuation data provided to analysts
by another large energy trader, The Williams Companies, show the extent
of flexibility available to management in reporting mark-to-market gains.
Williams reported that, as of the end of 2001, the gross unrealized cash
future flows from its derivative contracts were $7.82 billion.77 It then used its subjective risk assessment of the contracts to
determine the appropriate discount rates to use over the terms of the
contracts and applied the discount rates to determine the net present
value (NPV) of future cash flows as $3.03 billion. Next, it made additional credit adjustment provisions to account for the specific and known
riskiness of its counterparties and reduced the NPV to $2.12 billion.
Finally, it made a valuation adjustment to the contracts for additional
unspecified risks, and further reduced the recognized value of the contracts
to $1.37 billion, which was the amount reported in its financial statements.
Although Williams clearly was conservative in assessing
the value of its derivative holdings, the data point to the enormous flexibility
inherent in the valuation process in taking a $7.82 billion gross cash
flow down to the reported $1.37 billion value. Critics have said that
Enrons traders used these and other so-called prudency reserves that were not recognized in the companys accounting systems to subjectively
set aside the value of gains and losses on contracts from one period for
potential use in a later period.
This example makes clear that the potential for earnings
management using derivatives is higher when the derivative contracts are
long-term in nature. In addition, the potential for earnings management
increases when derivatives are entered into for trading or speculative
purposes rather than for pure economic hedging, which would require a
corresponding valuation assessment and valuation management for the hedged
item as well.
Hiding Debt Using Derivatives
Consider the example of a hypothetical energy company with
a prepaid forward contract to deliver natural gas to an entity one year
from now. The company receives $1 million in cash up front and takes
on a liability to deliver the gas. Also assume that, simultaneously, the
company enters into a cash-settlement forward contract with another entity,
in which it agrees to buy the same amount of gas as specified in the first
contract one year from now and pay cash on delivery for $1.06 million.
Both contracts are derivatives, and they may well be legitimate financial
transactions with goals such as risk management. But what if the counterparty
for each of the two contracts is effectively the same? For example, both
might be wholly owned entities of the same company. Canceling out the
gas delivery and gas purchase, we are left with what looks like a $1 million
loan transaction with an interest rate of about 6 percent. Published media
articles show that Enron and several other energy companies may have abused
long-term derivatives in this way to raise billions of dollars of loans
and hide them from shareholders and other creditors.
It is important to note that the loan raised in the above
example is not a case of an off balance sheet item. In fact,
the loan is fully disclosed on the balance sheet. However, it is not reported
in a visible way as a loan. Instead, it is hidden on the balance sheet
by being submerged into another liability line, called price risk
management activities (PRM). Because energy traders typically would
have very large PRM assets and liabilities arising from their legitimate
trading portfolios, it would be impossible for an investor to know whether
the PRM also includes loans.
The magnitude of the PRM item on energy traders balance
sheets is usually large, making it difficult for an investor or regulator
to know whether any loans have been hidden in it. For example, the following
table shows the amount of PRM asset and liability on the 2001 balance
sheets of Enron and Dynegy.
Item |
Stated
Value (Million Dollars)
|
Enron
(Sept. 30, 2001) |
Dynegy
(Dec. 31, 2001) |
Assets from Price Risk
Management Activities
|
14,661 |
6,347 |
Total Assets |
52,996 |
24,874 |
PRM Assets as Percent
of Total Assets |
28% |
26% |
Liabilities from Price
Risk Management Activities |
13,501 |
5,635 |
Total Liabilities |
41,720 |
17,396 |
PRM Liabilities as Percent
of Total Liabilities |
32% |
32% |
As an example of the use of PRM to hide debt, it has been
widely quoted in the media and in litigation that Enron raised $350 million
through a 6-month bank loan from J.P. Morgan Chase (Chase) by structuring
it as a series of derivative transactions between Enron, Chase, and an
entity owned by Chase known as Mahonia.78 To make
the loan look like several independent and presumably arms-length derivative
deals, Enron and Chase entered into a series of variable-price commodity
delivery contracts, which transferred a certain payment amount from Enron
to Mahonia, then from Mahonia to Chase, and finally from Chase back to
Enron. In other words, the variable payment obligations were merely canceled
out, leaving only the fixed payment of $350 million from Chase to Enron,
and a fixed payment of $356 million from Enron to Chase after 6 months.
In another reported transaction, Dynegy raised $300 million through a
loan from Citigroup, using a similarly structured financing deal called
Project Alpha.79
Since the Enron debacle, the SEC, the FERC, and debt-service
agencies such as Moodys have required energy traders to disclose
information about transactions similar to Project Alpha. As a result,
it is likely that the potential for abuse of derivatives to hide loans
will be considerably reduced in the future.
Transparency of Market Information
The applications of derivatives to risk management are
limited by the availability of spot market dataspecifically, timely,
public, and accurate information on prices and quantities. In addition,
to judge the creditworthiness of counterparties and the risks managers
are taking, their financial statements should be transparent.
Accurate, timely price and quantity data from spot markets
are critical for the design and pricing of derivatives that can be used
to manage rather than amplify price risk. As mentioned in Chapter 2, settling
futures, swaps and option contracts requires an unambiguous price for
the underlying commodity. The formulas used to value (price) derivatives
themselves are based on an idealized description of the underlying physical
markets. From time to time, the differences between the theoretical and
actual commodity markets are significant. For example, commodities sometimes
cannot be sold or can only be sold at prices substantially different from
the last reported market price.80 Sometimes market
prices are manipulated.81
Of more practical concern, in order to value energy price
derivatives, analysts must evaluate long time series of historical and
current energy prices.82 In the best of circumstances,
forecasting future energy prices is difficult. Without long series of
reliable data, forecasting and estimation amount to a leap of faith. And
modeling prices with inadequate data and estimation of value can itself
introduce as much risk as does the market.
As shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the price and quantity data
available for natural gas and electricity markets are of decidedly mixed
quality. Published prices from different sources are not always the same.
Volume data specific to individual spot markets generally are not available.
That would not be a problem for an idealized competitive market where
all the participants are small relative to the overall size of the market.
In real markets, traders need market volume statistics both to assess
the depth of a market and to judge whether their trades might affect market
prices.83
In the natural gas industry there are a number of firms
that more or less informally poll natural gas traders to arrive at various
prices. Depending on the source, the published prices may reflect binding
bids, offers, actual trades, or starting points for negotiation. Whatever
they are, they do not represent the results of a verifiable process.84 The reporting of energy prices and trade volumes is erratic, informal, and often far after the fact. Prices are reported by interested parties,
and in general no one knows the actual prices and volumes traded.
Electricity prices published by the Independent System
Operators (California, PJM, New York, and New England) do accurately report
binding, market-clearing day-ahead and real-time prices for electricity
and some supporting services. Outside those areas, reporting is idiosyncratic.
Even the FERC and the Department of Energy have been forced to resort
to secondary sources for high-frequency, market-specific data on electricity
prices.85
The question of whether domestic energy (commodity) markets
are sufficiently transparent, liquid, and competitive to support most
beneficial uses of derivative instruments is unsettled. The inconclusive
evidence that is available suggests that location dependence tends to
make energy markets smaller, less liquid, and more subject to manipulation
than they otherwise would be.86 The extent to
which the use of derivatives is limited by these problems is not known;
however, the necessity for valuing derivative contracts on the basis of
market data suggests that they constitute a significant barrier. Timely,
accurate market data could only encourage the wider use of derivatives
to manage local energy price risks.
Electricity Spot Markets
Until electricity spot markets are working well and providing
electricity reliably at competitive prices (near marginal cost), prospects
for growth in the market for price-based derivatives are limited. Weather
derivatives, outage insurance contracts, and similar risk management instruments
are likely to fill the breach partially until such time as electricity
markets stabilize.
Recent academic and business literature reflects a growing
consensus on what will have to happen in order for electricity markets
to become better behaved.87 Three fundamental
elements of that consensus are:
- Some portion of demand must be exposed to real-time prices.
- Transmission must be open, and its cost must be based on congestion
charges and any physical marginal costs.
- Rules must be standardized over large areas.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, one cause of extremely high
electricity prices is that consumers do not see the actual cost of their
use. As a consequence, they continue consuming while the supply system
is under stress. Academic economists and many engineers now argue that
exposing as little as 10 percent of demandgenerally, industry and
large commercial userswould decisively reduce price spikes. Price-responsive
demand would also be a countervailing force to the exercise of market
power.
The U.S. electricity grid was not built to support competition,
and transmission service has not been priced to reflect the actual costs
of using the system. There is general agreement that substantial investments
will be required to increase the capability of the grid to support competition.88
What is currently lacking is a market indication of which
investments are worth the cost. Generally, in the present situation, transmission
charges are set without regard to current congestion and do not reflect
actual wear and tear on the grid. When lines are congested, users are
cut back according to their priority, and the priorities do not reflect
the relative values of canceled and permitted transactions. Economists
argue for charges that vary to reflect the real-time congestion that individual
generation and consumption decisions impose on the grid.
If transmissions charges reflected actual costs, the usage
data could be a reliable indicator of the value of particular transmission
lines to users. Heavy usage in the presence of high transmission charges
would indicate demand for more capability. Given that information, planners
would have a market-based reason for investing in particular grid expansions.
At present, however, the rules for market participants depend almost entirely
on their location. This balkanization of market rules is a source of complexity
that increases the cost of participating in the markets. The FERCs
Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) and Standard Market Design (SMD)
initiatives, if successful, are likely to reduce both complexity and costs
significantly.89 They do not however directly
address the need for price responsive demand.
Even with the development of a generally competitive market,
using derivatives to manage electricity price risk will remain difficult.
The simple pricing models used to value derivatives in other energy industries
do not work in electricity. Barring transmission that is unlimited and
free, some participants will be able to manipulate prices in some markets
some of the time. These considerations suggest that innovative derivatives,
based on something other than spot prices, will be important for the foreseeable
future.
Conclusion
The development of energy derivative markets is strongly
influenced by the transparency of financial and spot market data. The
development of the electricity derivative market is especially dependent
on the success of restructuring. None of these problems can be solved
solely by private initiative. Whether and how associations (both trade
and consumer) and governments will address these issues is an open question
that is unlikely to be answered soon.
Sources |