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United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

December 5, 2008: 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable David E. Price: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Harold Rogers: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States House of Representatives: 

Subject: Transportation Security Administration's Suspension of the 
Butane Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft: 

This letter formally transmits the enclosed briefing in response to the 
explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Division E). The 
statement directed the Comptroller General to report on its assessment 
of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) report to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives 
on the anticipated security benefits and vulnerabilities associated 
with TSA's decision to suspend enforcement of the prohibition on butane 
lighters onboard aircraft. For a summary of the results of our work, 
see slide 13. Based on the results of our review, we are not making any 
recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies to the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security for TSA. This report will also be available at no 
charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you 
or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact me 
at (202) 512- 3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report were David Bruno, 
Assistant Director; Tracey Cross; Robert Lowthian; Alana Finley; 
Stanley Kostyla; Thomas Lombardi; and Adam Vogt. 

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

Enclosure: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: Briefing Slides: 

Transportation Security Administration’s Suspension of the Butane 
Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft: 

Briefing to Congressional Committees: 

November 20, 2008: 

Contents: 

Introduction: 
Objectives, Scope and Methodology: 
Results in Brief: 
Findings: 
Agency Views: 

Introduction: 

The August 2006 attempt by individuals to carry liquid explosives 
onboard multiple commercial aircraft bound for the United States from 
the United Kingdom has highlighted both the continued importance of 
securing the civil aviation system and the potential that improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) may be smuggled onboard passenger aircraft. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which has primary 
responsibility for ensuring the security of civil aviation, maintains a 
prohibited items list that informs both the Transportation Security 
Officers (TSO)[Footnote 1] who conduct passenger screening and the 
traveling public of items that will not be allowed into an airport 
sterile area or onboard an aircraft.[Footnote 2] 

Passenger screening is a process by which TSOs inspect individuals and 
property at designated screening locations to deter and prevent the 
carriage of any items included on TSA’s prohibited items list onboard 
an aircraft or into an airport sterile area.

Timeline of Events Related to TSA’s Ban on Lighters: 

December 2004: Section 4025 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) required TSA to add butane 
lighters to its list of prohibited items. 

March 2005: TSA stated that it would be difficult for TSOs to 
distinguish between butane lighters and other common lighters fueled by 
some other gas or liquid, so TSA modified the prohibited items list to 
include all lighters. 

July 2007: TSA notified Congress of its intent to suspend enforcement 
of the ban on butane lighters in accordance with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295), 
which provided TSA with the authority to refrain from enforcing the 
statutory butane lighter ban if the Assistant Secretary determined that 
butane lighters are not a significant threat. 

August 2007: TSA began allowing passengers to carry butane and other 
common lighters onboard aircraft.[Footnote 3] TSA continued to ban the 
carriage of torch lighters.[Footnote 4] 

May 2008: In accordance with the explanatory statement accompanying the 
DHS Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Div.E), TSA issued a 
report to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives (the “May 2008 report to Congress”) on the anticipated 
security benefits and vulnerabilities associated with its decision to 
suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. The explanatory statement also 
directed the Comptroller General to report on its assessment of TSA's 
report 180 days after TSA’s report is submitted.

The cornerstone of DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
is its risk management framework.[Footnote 5] The framework includes: 

* setting security goals and performance targets; 

* identifying key assets and sector information; and: 

* assessing risk information including both general and specific threat 
information, potential vulnerabilities, and the potential consequences 
of a successful terrorist attack. 

The NIPP requires that federal agencies use this information to inform 
the selection of risk-based priorities and for the continuous 
improvement of security strategies and programs to protect people and 
critical infrastructure through the reduction of risks from acts of 
terrorism. 

DHS’s and TSA’s Strategic Plan both promote a risk management approach. 

* According to DHS’s Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2008-2013, DHS 
plans to use qualitative and quantitative risk assessments to inform 
resource decisions.

* According to TSA’s Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2005-2009, TSA 
plans to make risk-based resource allocation decisions. 

Objectives, Scope and Methodology Objectives: 

1. On what basis did TSA suspend enforcement of the ban on lighters 
onboard aircraft, and what are industry stakeholder views of this 
change? 

2. To what extent did TSA conduct analysis to determine the impacts its 
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban had on public safety 
and screening operations? 

To describe TSA’s basis for suspending enforcement of the ban on 
lighters, we reviewed and analyzed TSA’s: 

* notification to Congress of its plan to suspend enforcement of the 
lighter ban; 

* confidential threat assessment on lighters; 

* Office of Intelligence Civil Aviation Threat Assessment; 

* Explosives Detection Improvement Task Force reports; and: 

* May 2008 report to Congress on the Impact of the Decision to Suspend 
Enforcement of the Ban on Butane Lighters Aboard Aircraft. We compared 
TSA’s decision-making to DHS’s guidance on risk management.[Footnote 6] 

* We interviewed officials from TSA’s Office of Security Operations to 
obtain information on their rationale behind the change. 

To obtain aviation industry stakeholders’ views on TSA’s decision to 
suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, we conducted interviews with 12 
stakeholders within the aviation industry,[Footnote 7] including: 

* representatives from seven aviation associations[Footnote 8] and:  

* five aviation security experts, selected based on their depth of 
experience in the field of aviation, employment history, and their 
recognition in the aviation security community. 

We interviewed officials at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
both within the Department of Transportation (DOT). In addition, we 
interviewed officials at the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS), a 
component of TSA. We interviewed these officials to obtain their views 
regarding TSA’s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. We 
selected these organizations because of their role in ensuring the 
safety or security of civil aviation. 

To determine what TSA identified as the impacts of its decision to 
suspend enforcement of the ban on lighters, we reviewed TSA’s May 2008 
report to Congress. 

* To determine the impacts on public safety, we reviewed TSA’s daily 
security incident reports from August 2007, when the lighter ban was 
suspended, to August 2008.[Footnote 9] 

* To determine the impacts on screening operations, we analyzed TSA’s 
data[Footnote 10] on the: 

- number of surrendered items at airport checkpoints; 

- number of training hours completed by TSOs; 

- lighter disposal costs; and: 

- results of Threat Image Projection (TIP) testing and IED Screening 
Checkpoint Drills.[Footnote 11] 

* We compared TSA’s evaluation methods used to determine the impacts on 
screening operations to generally accepted social science 
standards,[Footnote 12] and GAO guidelines on performance measures and 
evaluation.[Footnote 13] 

* We interviewed TSA officials and 10 Federal Security Directors (FSD) 
to obtain their views on the impacts the change to the lighter ban had 
on screening operations.[Footnote 14] 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to November 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

Consistent with DHS risk management guidance, TSA used the results of 
its threat assessment to support its decision to suspend enforcement of 
the ban on lighters, and the majority of aviation industry stakeholders 
we interviewed agreed with TSA’s decision because they generally 
believed that lighters did not pose a significant threat to the 
security of civil aviation. 

TSA reported in May 2008 that as a result of its decision to suspend 
enforcement of the ban on lighters, there were no reported incidents 
that involved the use of a lighter to ignite an IED and that screening 
operations improved. The results of our analysis of TSA’s security 
incident reports support TSA’s finding that there were no reported 
incidents that involved the use of a lighter to ignite an IED; however, 
we cannot validate all the results of TSA’s evaluation because it did 
not use generally accepted social science standards in evaluating the 
impacts of its decision on screening operations. 

* For example, TSA did not isolate the effects its decision had on 
screening operations (such as TSO performance) to account for other 
factors — such as training— that could have affected TSO performance. 
Thus, TSA could not demonstrate a direct correlation between the 
results of its decision and the impact it had on screening operations. 

Objective 1 - Findings: 

TSA’s Basis for Suspending the Ban on Lighters: 

TSA based its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban 
onboard aircraft primarily because it found lighters were not a 
significant threat to the security of civil aviation. TSA used the 
results of its threat assessment to support its decision, which is 
consistent with DHS’s risk management guidance. 

* In making its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, TSA 
reported that it determined that based on intelligence driven threat 
assessments, lighters did not pose a significant threat to the security 
of civil aviation. TSA also reported that the effectiveness of 
screening operations would be enhanced if the time and resources 
devoted to detecting, collecting, and disposing of low-threat, high 
effort lighters was shifted to the search for higher threat items. TSA 
also reported that shifting attention from lower security risks to 
address markedly higher security risks was fundamental to a risk-based 
approach. 

We reviewed TSA’s July 2007 confidential threat assessment on lighters 
and determined that: 

* TSA’s utilization of threat assessment results to assist decision-
making is consistent with DHS’s NIPP risk management guidance and DHS’s 
and TSA’s Strategic Plans, and: 

* TSA’s determination that lighters do not pose a significant threat is 
consistent with threat assessments conducted by TSA’s Office of 
Intelligence and TSA’s Explosives Detection Task Force.[Footnote 15] 

TSA provided information in its confidential threat assessment 
regarding its claim that because TSOs are no longer searching for 
lighters, they would be able to focus on other threats. 

However, TSA officials acknowledged that no analysis was conducted 
specifically to support the notion that suspending enforcement of the 
lighter ban would save TSOs’ time to focus on greater threats.[Footnote 
16] 

Stakeholders’ Views: 

The majority (9 of 12) of the aviation industry stakeholders we 
interviewed supported TSA’s decision to suspend enforcement of the ban 
on lighters. 

* In general, these stakeholders did not have a concern about allowing 
lighters onboard aircraft, and did not see a difference between 
allowing matches and allowing lighters onboard aircraft.[Footnote 17] 

* Two of the 12 stakeholders we interviewed were opposed to TSA’s 
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, as they believed 
that lighters do pose a safety and security concern onboard 
aircraft.[Footnote 18] For example, one stakeholder stated a lighter 
could be used to start a fire as a diversion method to attempt a 
hijacking. 

TSA’s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban onboard 
aircraft was generally supported by FAMS, FAA, and PHMSA. 

* According to FAMS officials, FAMS personnel are trained to respond to 
a wide range of in-flight threats and the presence of lighters raises 
no additional specific safety or security concerns. 

* FAA and PHMSA officials stated that they supported TSA’s decision to 
suspend enforcement of the lighter ban because the Hazardous Materials 
Regulations[Footnote 19] permit airline crew members and passengers to 
carry a lighter for personal use in carry-on baggage.[Footnote 20] 

Objective 2 - Findings: 

Impacts on Public Safety: 

TSA reported that as a result of its decision to suspend enforcement of 
the lighter ban, there were no security incidents in which a lighter 
was used to initiate an IED.[Footnote 21] The results of our analysis 
of TSA’s security incident reports support TSA’s findings that there 
were no incidents related to a lighter being used to ignite an IED. 
Incidents involving disruptive passengers using lighters were reported 
to TSA. 

* According to TSA’s May 2008 report to Congress, no significant 
security incidents related to lighters had occurred onboard aircraft 
since TSA suspended enforcement of the lighter ban in August 2007. TSA 
officials explained that for its May 2008 report, they defined 
significant security incidents to be those incidents in which a lighter 
was used to initiate an IED. 

Our review of TSA’s daily security incident reports from the time 
period following the suspended enforcement of the lighter ban (August 
2007) through August 2008, found: 

* No significant security incidents in which a lighter was used to 
initiate an IED. 

* Seven incidents had been reported to TSA during this time period that 
involved disruptive passengers using lighters. 

In October 2008, TSA officials acknowledged that the absence of an 
onboard incident involving lighters does not preclude the possibility 
of such an incident occurring in the future. However, officials stated 
they believed that the risk was low and that the benefits they 
identified outweighed the risks. 

Impacts on Screening Operations: 

Although TSA performed some analysis to support its claims about the 
benefits obtained as a result of its decision to suspend enforcement of 
the lighter ban, TSA’s analysis generally did not establish a causal 
relationship between its decision and the reported benefits. 

* GAO guidelines on performance measurement and evaluation state that 
agencies should conduct evaluations to ensure that the anticipated 
effect is achieved.[Footnote 22] 

* Generally accepted social science standards identify that evaluations 
should include elements such as whether evaluation data were collected 
before and after program implementation, how program effects were 
isolated, and the appropriateness of sampling, outcome measures, 
statistical analyses and other reported results.[Footnote 23] 

Although TSA conducted some analyses to determine the impact of its 
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, TSA did not isolate 
the effects of suspending the lighter ban when evaluating the impact 
its decision had on TSO performance and staffing flexibility. 

TSA also did not collect data to determine if the number of physical 
bag searches conducted at passenger screening checkpoints had been 
reduced and did not conduct any analysis to determine the effect of 
suspending the lighter ban on passenger anxiety. 

Because of the limitations in TSA's evaluation, we can not validate its 
results. However, given that TSA made its decision to suspend the ban 
on lighters based on threat information, it would probably not be cost-
beneficial for TSA to reassess its evaluation of the impacts resulting 
from its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. 

TSA cited the following benefits associated with its decision to 
suspend the enforcement of the lighter ban: 

* a reduction in the number of lighters surrendered by passengers, 

* an improvement in TSOs’ performance in detecting IEDs and other 
dangerous items, 

* a reduction in bag searches that accorded FSDs more staffing 
flexibility, and: 

* a reduction in passenger anxiety. 

Lighters Surrendered: 

TSA reported the number of lighters surrendered has decreased since the 
lighter ban was suspended. Our analysis of TSA’s data confirms this 
assertion. 

* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that the number of 
lighters surrendered has decreased by approximately 98 percent since 
the suspension of the lighter ban, allowing TSOs to focus on more 
threatening items. Specifically, TSA reported that: 

- in January 2007, there were almost 700,000 lighters collected, and: 

- in April 2008, the number of lighters collected was about 10,000, as 
torch lighters are still surrendered. 

* As a result of the decrease in the number of lighters surrendered, 
TSA reported that its disposal costs have declined from $4.3 million in 
calendar year 2006 to $268,000 from January 2008 to July 2008.[Footnote 
24] 

* Our review of TSA’s data on surrendered items from January 2007 to 
April 2008, the time period reviewed by TSA, shows the decline in 
lighters to be 98.5 percent. 

* In addition to lighters, TSA tracks 13 other categories of 
surrendered items, such as explosives and tools. In comparing the 12 
months preceding TSA’s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter 
ban, August 2006 to July 2007, to the 12 months following TSA’s 
decision, August 2007 to July 2008, we found that most of the 14 
categories of surrendered items did not decline at the same rate as 
lighters. 

- For example, during this same time frame, while the percent of 
lighters surrendered decreased by 97 percent, 10 of the other 
categories of surrendered items decreased by less than 20 percent. The 
remaining three categories of surrendered items decreased by 28, 48, 
and 90 percent during this time frame. 

TSO Performance: 

It is unclear if TSA’s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter 
ban has directly resulted in improved TSO performance, as reported by 
TSA in May 2008 because TSA did not account for other factors that 
could have improved TSO performance. 

* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that suspending 
enforcement of the lighter ban allowed TSOs to focus on the detection 
of IEDs and other dangerous items. TSA reported that it based this 
conclusion on: 

- improvement in TIP scores, 

- improvement in IED Screening Checkpoint Drills, and: 

- field reports that confirmed an increase in TSO performance.[Footnote 
25] 

* The results of TSA TIP testing and IED Screening Checkpoint Drills 
are considered sensitive security information and thus could not be 
included in this report. 

* TSA reported in May 2008 that field reports confirmed that TSOs had 
been able to focus on detection of IEDs and other dangerous prohibited 
items since the lighter ban was suspended. 

* Our interviews with FSDs revealed that although nine of ten FSDs we 
interviewed agreed that they have seen a shift in TSOs’ focus to 
greater threats as a result of the suspended enforcement of the lighter 
ban, five FSDs noted that TSOs received a lot of testing on detecting 
items or that there had also been training targeted at detecting IEDs 
since the lighter ban was suspended which could have impacted TSO 
performance. 

* TSA did not isolate the effect the suspended enforcement of the 
lighter ban had on TSOs’ performance. Multiple factors could have 
accounted for the changes in TSOs’ performance over time. The following 
initiatives were implemented at around the same time as the suspended 
enforcement of the lighter ban, all of which could affect TSOs’ 
performance: 

- IED Screening Checkpoint Drills, 

- TSOs training conducted by Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO),[Footnote 26 
and: 

- the deployment of new technology. 

* In October 2008, TSA officials acknowledged that there was no 
evidence of a direct correlation between the lighter ban and 
improvement in TIP scores. However, officials stated that when combined 
with other programs, such as Checkpoint Evolution[Footnote 27] and 
training, the ability of TSOs to concentrate on IEDs improved and the 
additional benefits of removing lighters from the TSOs’ focus made the 
training and IED drills more effective. 

Staffing Flexibility: 

Although TSA stated that its decision to suspend enforcement of the ban 
on lighters onboard aircraft would allow FSDs more staffing flexibility 
because of a reduction in bag searches, TSA did not collect the 
necessary data to support this assertion. 

* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that the number of bag 
searches had declined as a result of the suspended enforcement of the 
lighter ban. 

* TSA also reported that the decline in bag searches provided FSDs with 
additional flexibility in staffing and has allowed them to qualify TSOs 
as Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) and Travel Document Checkers 
(TDC).[Footnote 28] TSA reported that having staff in these new 
positions strengthened TSA’s layered approach to aviation security. 

* In October 2008, TSA officials stated that they did not collect data 
on the number of bag searches conducted at passenger screening 
checkpoints. 

* TSA officials stated that they based their determination that the 
number of bag searches declined on an inference that suspending 
enforcement of the ban on lighters reduced the number searches since 
lighters accounted for a significant portion of the prohibited items 
surrendered. Officials also stated that feedback from the airports 
confirmed a drastic reduction in the number of bag searches 
conducted.[Footnote 29] 

* Four of the ten FSDs we interviewed stated that they believed that 
the number of bag searches had not declined since the suspension of the 
lighter ban, three were unsure, and three believed it had declined. 

- Three of the four FSDs reported that they believed the number of bag 
searches had not declined because TSOs are searching bags for other 
prohibited items or they are conducting more random searches. The three 
FSDs who reported a decline in the number of bag searches stated that 
this was anecdotal information and was not based on data collected.

Since TSA did not collect data to determine that there was a reduction 
in bag searches that resulted in increased staffing flexibility, TSA 
can not attribute the increase in the number of BDOs and TDCs to its 
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. 

* In October 2007, shortly after the suspended enforcement of the 
lighter ban, TSA had over 1,500 TDCs and about 300 BDOs on staff. By 
May 2008, TSA data shows that it had almost 32,000 TDCs and 800 BDOs. 
This number has increased to over 37,000 and nearly 1,500, 
respectively, by August 2008.[Footnote 30] 

* Although TSA made the assertion that its decision to suspend 
enforcement of the lighter ban would increase the number of BDOs that 
FSDs could qualify in its May 2008 report to Congress, in October 2008, 
TSA officials explained that since BDOs are part of a different 
staffing allocation than TSOs, the number of BDOs was not affected by 
its change to the lighter ban. 

* Further, seven of the ten FSDs we interviewed stated that they have 
noticed no increase in their flexibility for staffing as a result of 
suspending enforcement of the lighter ban and two stated that they were 
not able to determine whether there had been a difference in their 
staffing flexibility. 

* One FSD explained there had been an increase in staff flexibility as 
a result of suspending enforcement of the lighter ban since not as many 
directed bag searches were being conducted and staff could be devoted 
to other activities without slowing the throughput at checkpoints. 

Passenger Anxiety: 

TSA reported that its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter 
ban would decrease passenger anxiety, but TSA did not conduct any 
analysis to determine this and FSDs’ views were mixed on whether they 
believed TSA’s decision impacted passenger anxiety. 

* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that it was 
implementing a Checkpoint Evolution program that combines new screening 
technologies and efforts to more easily distinguish between normal and 
abnormal passenger behavior. TSA reported that eliminating the stress 
and anxiety of passengers allows for a more effective detection of 
certain behaviors by BDOs, and that passenger anxiety is reduced by the 
suspended enforcement of the lighter ban. 

* In October 2008, TSA officials stated that no specific analysis had 
been performed to determine whether there had been a reduction in 
passenger anxiety as a result of its decision to suspend enforcement of 
the lighter ban. However, officials stated that a great deal of 
experiential and anecdotal information supports the point that 
passengers were distressed when they were required to surrender a 
personal use lighter. 

* The ten FSDs we interviewed had mixed views regarding whether 
suspending enforcement of the lighter ban affected passenger anxiety. 

- Four stated that they could not determine whether there was an impact 
on passenger anxiety as a result of suspending enforcement of the 
lighter ban. 

- Four stated that they had not seen an impact on passenger anxiety as 
a result of suspending enforcement of the lighter ban. 

- Two reported that suspending enforcement of the lighter ban did 
reduce passenger anxiety, although one stated that the change to the 
lighter ban was just one of many initiatives that have helped reduce 
passenger anxiety. 

In October 2008, TSA acknowledged that various other factors, in 
addition to the change to the lighter ban, contributed to the benefits 
cited in its May 2008 report. 

* Other variables or changes made contemporaneous with the suspension 
of the lighter ban, include: 

- deployment of BDOs, 

- deployment of TDCs, 

- implementation of new TSO training, including IED Screening 
Checkpoint Drills and training conducted by BAOs, and: 

- implementation of aspects of the Checkpoint Evolution initiative. 

* Six of the ten FSDs we interviewed stated that it was difficult to 
isolate the effect of the lighter ban suspension because of the various 
other changes that occurred around the same time or after the lighter 
ban was suspended. Two FSDs stated that they had not noticed any impact 
as a result of the suspended enforcement of the lighter ban.[Footnote 
31]  

In addition, TSA reported that allowing lighters onboard aircraft 
further harmonizes U.S. requirements with those of other countries, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and with 
DOT.[Footnote 32] 

* TSA reported that at the time the United States had banned passengers 
from carrying lighters onboard commercial aircraft, it was the only 
country doing so.[Footnote 33] 

* ICAO allows crew members and passengers to carry a lighter onboard 
aircraft.[Footnote 34] 

* DOT regulations, promulgated by PHMSA, allow a passenger to carry a 
lighter onboard aircraft for the individual’s use on his or her person 
or in carry-on baggage.[Footnote 35] 

* The majority (8 of the 12) of stakeholders we interviewed emphasized 
the importance of harmonizing security measures. Stakeholders 
identified benefits of harmonization that included ensuring aircraft 
flying into the United States are secure, optimizing resources so 
screening does not have to be duplicated in all countries, and easing 
passenger travel by having similar requirements. 

Agency Views: 

We provided a draft of the information included in this briefing to TSA 
for review and comment. On November 13, 2008, TSA officials provided 
oral comments to the briefing slides. TSA generally agreed with the 
information presented and our findings. TSA also provided us with 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For purposes of this report, "TSO" includes both screeners employed 
by TSA (TSOs) and screeners employed by private screening companies 
under contract to TSA through its Screener Partnership Program. 

[2] Sterile areas are locations within an airport that provide 
passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which access generally is 
controlled by TSA or a party under contract to TSA. 

[3] For purposes of this report, "lighters" refers to butane or other 
common-use lighters, other than torch lighters. 

[4] Torch lighters create a thin, needle-like flame that is hotter 
(reaching 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit) and more intense than those from 
common lighters. Torch lighters are often used for 5 pipes and cigars, 
and maintain a consistent stream of air-propelled fire regardless of 
the angle at which it is held. According to a TSA official, TSOs are 
well experienced and trained to determine a torch lighter from other 
lighters. However, the official acknowledged that TSOs may not be 
consistently detecting 100 percent of torch lighters. 

[5] 5 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (Washington, D.C. 2006). NIPP provides a base plan that 
is to serve as a road map for how DHS and other relevant stakeholders, 
such as owners and operators of key critical infrastructure, should use 
risk management principles to prioritize protection activities within 
and across sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. 

[6] Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (Washington, D.C. 2006). 

[7] Perspectives obtained from aviation industry stakeholders can not 
be generalized to the entire population, but they provided additional 
insight into aviation security. 

[8] Specifically, we met with officials from the Air Transport 
Association, National Air Carrier Association, Regional Airline 
Association, Air Carrier Association of America, International Air 10 
Transport Association, Air Line Pilots Association, and Association of 
Flight Attendants. 

[9] Although it is possible that there were some incidents involving 
lighters that occurred during the time period of our review that were 
not reported to TSA, and thus not recorded in the incident reports, we 
found the incident reports sufficiently reliable for purposes of this 
review. 

[10] We determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. 

[11] The TIP system is designed to test TSOs’ detection capabilities by 
projecting threat images, including guns, knives, and explosives, onto 
carry-on bags as they are screened during actual operations. TSOs are 
responsible for identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to 
be searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the TSO whether the 
threat is real and then records the TSO’s performance in a database 
that could be analyzed for performance trends. 

[12] Social science research standards are outlined in Donald T. 
Campbell and Julian Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental 
Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas D Cook and 
Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues 
for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Carol H. Weiss, 
Evaluation Research: Methods for Assessing Program Effectiveness 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward Suchman, 
Evaluation Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and 
Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD–10.1.4 
(Washington, D.C.: May 1991). 

[13] GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and 
Relationships, GAO/GGD-98-26 (Washington, D.C., April 1998). 

[14] FSDs are the ranking authorities responsible for leading and 
coordinating security activities at U.S. airports at which TSA provides 
for or oversees the provision of screening activities. Information 
obtained from our interviews with these FSDs cannot be generalized; 
however, these interviews furthered our understanding of the impacts of 
TSA’s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. 

[15] The TSA Office of Intelligence Civil Aviation Threat Assessment 
addresses the threat to civil aviation aircraft and airports. The 
Explosives Detection Task Force was established in October 2005 to 
respond to the threat of IEDs being carried through airport 
checkpoints. The goal of the Task Force was to apply a risk-based 
approach to screening passengers and their baggage in order to enhance 
TSA’s ability to detect IEDs. These reports are considered sensitive 
security information or for official use only and have not been 
included in this report. 

[16] In October 2008, TSA officials stated that checkpoint task 
analysis and modeling conducted revealed that an average bag search was 
estimated to take 3 minutes to perform. Given this information and the 
11 million lighters surrendered in 2006, TSA concluded that the time 
associated with conducting bag checks would decrease radically after 
the ban. However, this analysis was conducted separate of TSA’s 
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. Further, TSA does 
not collect metrics on whether surrendered lighters were divested by 
the individual or discovered as a result of a bag search called in 
response to the suspected presence of a lighter. 

[17] TSA permits passengers to carry one book of safety (non-strike 
anywhere) matches as a carry-on item. 

[18] The final stakeholder did not provide an opinion on TSA’s 
decision. 

[19] See 49 C.F.R. § 175.10(a)(2) (providing that aircraft passengers 
or crewmembers may carry one packet of safety matches or a lighter 
intended for use by an individual when carried on one’s person or in 
carry-on baggage only). 

[20] The Hazardous Materials Regulations are issued by the PHMSA and 
govern the transportation of hazardous materials by highway, rail, 
vessel, and air. The Hazardous Materials Regulations do not distinguish 
torch lighters from butane and other common lighters. See, e.g., 49 
C.F.R. pt. 175 (governing the carriage of hazardous materials by 
aircraft). 

[21] TSA considers any incident that threatens the security or safety 
of an aircraft or its passengers and flight crew to be a security 
incident. These could include activities such as disruptive passenger 
behavior, violence against a passenger or crew member, hijacking 
attempts, or the use of an IED. 

[22] GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and 
Relationships, GAO/GGD-98-26 (Washington, D.C., April 1998). 

[23] Social science research standards are outlined in Donald T. 
Campbell and Julian Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental 
Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas D Cook and 
Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues 
for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Carol H. Weiss, 
Evaluation Research: 22 Methods for Assessing Program Effectiveness 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward Suchman, 
Evaluation Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and 
Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD–10.1.4 
(Washington, D.C.: May 1991). 

[24] Disposal costs include the fixed cost for the contract allocated 
to the lighter disposal effort, the cost of containers to store 
lighters, and the cost to have lighters picked up and removed. 

[25] TSA officials stated that the field reports collected were 
informal e-mails that were solicited from the Assistant FSDs for 
Screening at about ten airports. These Assistant FSDs serve on the 
National Advisory Council, and represent all airports. 

[26] BAOs are available to respond to unresolved alarms at the 
checkpoint that involve possible explosive devices. 

[27] The Checkpoint Evolution initiative combines new screening 
technologies, such as Advanced Technology that will improve carry-on 
bag screening and enhance airline passenger security, additional 
investments in TSA human resource capabilities and training, and 
efforts to “increase the contrast” at airports whereby abnormal 
behaviors stand out from normal airport routines. 

[28] 28 BDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior 
in individuals approaching the checkpoint. TDCs are specially trained 
TSOs positioned in the front of the screening checkpoint who check 
passengers’ boarding passes and identification. 

[29] TSA officials explained that feedback is obtained from various 
interactions with airport personnel, such as interactions that occur at 
FSD and Assistant FSD conferences. 

[30] Data on BDOs came from the National Finance Center Personnel 
Database. 

[31] The other two FSDs did not state that it was hard to isolate the 
impacts of the suspended enforcement of the lighter ban, but they did 
indicate that other changes occurred around the same time as the 
suspension the lighter ban that could have affected screening 
operations. 

[32] The term harmonization is defined differently by various 
international aviation security stakeholders. In the context of this 
report, the term harmonization is used to describe  efforts to 
coordinate security practices to enhance security and increase 
efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. 

[33] We did not independently verify whether the United States was the 
only country that had banned lighters onboard aircraft. 

[34] Nations that are members of ICAO agree to cooperate with other 
member states to meet standardized international aviation security 
measures. 

[35] See 49 C.F.R. § 175.10(a)(2). 

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