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entitled 'Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program 
Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes' 
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Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and 
Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

February 2008: 

Combating Terrorism: 

State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and 
More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes: 

Combating Terrorism: 

GAO-08-336: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-336, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of State’s (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 
program’s objectives are to provide partner nations with 
counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and 
increase respect for human rights. State’s Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, (DS/T/ATA) 
manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) State’s guidance for 
determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other 
counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program 
goals and measures, and (4) State’s reporting on U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed 
State documents and met with cognizant officials in Washington, D.C., 
and four ATA program partner nations. 

What GAO Found: 

S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program 
recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA do not systematically align ATA 
assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism 
needs. S/CT provides policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly 
meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list does not 
provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, 
objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not 
consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews 
to plan assistance. 

S/CT has established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with 
other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT holds 
interagency meetings with representatives from the Departments of 
State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as 
ambassador-level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not 
find any significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. 
international counterterrorism efforts. 

State has made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for 
the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA do not systematically assess the 
outcomes and, as a result, cannot determine the effectiveness of 
program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal 
focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA have not set clear measures of sustainability 
or integrated sustainability into program planning. 

State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad has been 
incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT has not provided a congressionally 
mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance 
related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, 
S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program. 
However, these reports contained inaccurate program information, such 
as the number of students trained and courses offered. Additionally, 
the reports lacked comprehensive information on the results of program 
assistance that would be useful to Congress. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO suggests that Congress reconsider the requirement that State 
prepare an annual report on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. GAO also 
recommends that State review its ATA program guidance, its use of needs 
assessments, and measures for assessing the ATA program. State 
generally agreed with our recommendations regarding the ATA program, 
and supported the matter we suggest for congressional consideration. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-336]. 

For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

State's Implementation of ATA Lacks Guidance and Use of Country Needs 
Assessments: 

S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program 
Assistance: 

State Has Made Progress in Establishing ATA Goals, but S/CT and DS/T/ 
ATA Do Not Assess Sustainability: 

State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been 
Incomplete and Inaccurate: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Top Recipients of ATA Funding, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix IVGAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA in Managing 
ATA: 

Table 2: Top Recipients of ATA Allocations, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Training Exercise at ATA Facility in Colombia: 

Figure 2: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs Appropriations for Antiterrorism Efforts, Fiscal Years 2000 to 
2008: 

Abbreviations: 

ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance: 

DS/T/ATA: Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of 
Antiterrorism Assistance: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993: 

S/CT: Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism: 

State: Department of State: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

February 29, 2008: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Shays: 

Combating terrorism has become the nation's top national security goal 
and the highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. The 
U.S. Department of State (State) is the lead federal agency responsible 
for coordinating and supervising U.S. international counterterrorism 
efforts, and directly supports the objectives set forth in the U.S. 
government's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism Abroad. This 
mission involves collaborating with various other U.S. government 
agencies working overseas, such as the Departments of Defense, Homeland 
Security, and Justice, as well as with foreign partners and allies 
facing terrorist threats. 

State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) has assumed an increasingly 
important role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and is a key mechanism 
in State's efforts to help foreign nations improve their ability to 
combat terrorism. Funding for ATA has increased over fourfold in recent 
years--from $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to $175 million in fiscal 
year 2007. ATA's legislatively mandated [Footnote 1] objectives are to 
(1) enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing 
counterterrorism training and equipment; (2) improve bilateral ties 
with partner nations by offering assistance; and (3) increase respect 
for human rights by sharing modern, humane and effective antiterrorism 
techniques with foreign civil authorities. Within State, the Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ 
ATA)[Footnote 2] oversee and manage ATA. Specific roles and 
responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA are described in a 1991 internal 
policy guidance memorandum and summarized in State's Foreign Affairs 
Manual. As outlined in these documents, S/CT is responsible for 
providing written policy guidance, including suggested regional and 
country training priorities, for ATA. DS/T/ATA is responsible for 
implementing and managing program operations, including developing 
annual, country-specific plans that designate the type of assistance to 
be provided, consistent with country program goals and objectives. 

In response to your request, we reviewed State's implementation, 
coordination, assessment, and reporting on ATA. Specifically, we 
assessed (1) State's guidance for determining country recipients and 
types of program assistance to provide; (2) how State coordinates ATA 
with other U.S. government counterterrorism programs; (3) the extent to 
which State establishes clear ATA goals, and measures sustainability of 
program outcomes; and (4) State's reporting on U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed State planning, 
funding, and reporting documents concerning ATA. Our work focused 
primarily on the time period from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, 
although we included more recent data where available and appropriate. 
We interviewed officials from S/CT and DS/T/ATA, including ATA program 
managers responsible for each of the six in-country programs-- 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines-
-and visited four of the six in-country programs.[Footnote 3] In these 
countries, we reviewed country-specific program documents, and 
interviewed ATA in-country program managers, course instructors, and 
other contractors; U.S embassy officials responsible for managing 
counterterrorism assistance and activities; and partner nation 
government officials. We also observed various types of ATA training 
and equipment that were provided to partner nation security units. We 
found funding and program data DS/T/ATA provided to us, with the 
exception of certain program data provided in DS/T/ATA annual reports 
to Congress, sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this 
performance audit from November 2006 through January 2008 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for a more complete 
description of our scope and methodology.) 

Results in Brief: 

In implementing ATA, S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize 
which countries receive program assistance, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA do 
not systematically align types of program assistance with U.S. 
assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism needs. 

* S/CT provides policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings 
in the form of a tiered list of priority countries. However, this list 
does not provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program 
goals, objectives, or training priorities that DS/T/ATA could use to 
implement a country-specific counterterrorism program and ensure that 
assistance provided is consistent with U.S. policy objectives. In 
addition, other factors influence which countries receive program 
assistance, such as an increase in the U.S. government's diplomatic or 
political interest in a country that, in some cases, may not have been 
on the tiered list. 

* S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not consistently use country-specific needs 
assessments and program reviews to plan what types of assistance to 
provide to partner nations. In five of the countries receiving the 
largest amounts of program assistance since fiscal year 2002, we found 
that program managers did not use the assessments as the basis for 
developing ATA country-specific plans. According to State policy 
documents, the assessments are to guide ATA resource decisions and form 
the basis of country-specific assistance plans. However, the 
assessments included broad-ranging recommendations for counterterrorism 
assistance, but they generally did not prioritize assistance to be 
provided. 

S/CT has established mechanisms to coordinate ATA with other U.S. 
international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT holds biweekly 
interagency meetings with representatives from the Departments of 
State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, and other agencies as well as 
ambassador-level regional strategic coordinating meetings in order to 
help coordinate all U.S. government international counterterrorism 
training assistance and avoid duplication of efforts. Based on our 
review of program documents and interviews and meetings with 
counterterrorism officials in the four countries we visited, we did not 
find any significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. 
international counterterrorism efforts. 

State has made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for 
ATA, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA do not systematically assess the outcomes of 
program assistance. Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents 
list sustainability--that is, enabling partner nations to achieve 
advanced and sustainable counterterrorism capabilities--as a key 
intended program outcome. State officials confirmed that sustainability 
is the principal focus of program assistance in all participant 
countries. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA have not set clear measures of 
sustainability, and have not integrated sustainability into program 
planning. As a result, S/CT and DS/T/ATA cannot determine the 
effectiveness of program assistance or assess the extent to which ATA 
is meeting its longer-term, congressionally mandated objectives; 
specifically: 

* Cognizant S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials were not aware that a key 2007 
State-level planning document[Footnote 4] included numerical targets 
and past results regarding the number of countries that had attained an 
advanced level of sustainable counterterrorism capability, and program 
officials also were unaware of any existing measures of sustainability. 

* DS/T/ATA asserts that the needs assessments and program reviews are 
the primary means of measuring program results. Although the 
assessments and program reviews aim to evaluate overall partner nation 
counterterrorism capabilities across a broad range of areas, the 
process does not explicitly provide a means for evaluating 
sustainability or measuring the specific outcomes of program 
assistance. 

* DS/T/ATA program managers we interviewed had disparate views on the 
definition of sustainability, and had not received guidance on how to 
measure sustainability within the context of their respective country 
assistance programs. As a result, the country assistance plans we 
reviewed did not consistently address sustainability or establish 
annual objectives, measures, and program activities for achieving that 
outcome. 

State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad has been 
incomplete and inaccurate. Specifically, S/CT has not provided a 
congressionally mandated report to Congress on U.S. government-wide 
assistance related to combating international terrorism since 
1996.[Footnote 5] After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress 
annual reports prepared by DS/T/ATA on the program. Moreover, we found 
that the ATA annual reports we analyzed contained inaccuracies 
regarding basic program information, such as the number of students 
trained and courses offered. Additionally, the ATA annual reports 
lacked comprehensive information on the results of program assistance 
that would be useful to Congress in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
program. 

Given changes in the overall scope and nature of U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance and the fact that State has not submitted 
the mandated report on such matters since 1996, we include a matter for 
congressional consideration regarding the legislative requirement for 
State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, to 
ensure that ATA, as a key element of State's broader international 
counterterrorism efforts, is focused on improving partner nations' 
counterterrorism capabilities and aligned with overall U.S. 
counterterrorism policy goals, we recommend that the Secretary of State 
improve internal program guidance. We make other recommendations to 
help S/CT and DS/T/ATA more effectively link assistance needs to 
resource allocations and better assess program outcomes. 

State provided us comments on a draft of this report. (See app. III.) 
Overall, State agreed with our principal findings and recommendations 
regarding the ATA program, and outlined a number of actions to address 
these matters. State also supported the matter we suggest for 
congressional consideration. 

Background: 

Congress authorized State's ATA program in 1983 through the Foreign 
Assistance Act.[Footnote 6] According to the legislation, and as noted 
above, the purpose of ATA is "(1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills 
of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and 
counter terrorism; (2) to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United 
States with friendly governments by offering concrete assistance in 
this area of great mutual concern; and (3) to increase respect for 
human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, 
and effective antiterrorism techniques." 

ATA Program Assistance: 

ATA offers a wide range of counterterrorism assistance to partner 
nations, but most assistance consists of (1) training courses on 
tactical and strategic counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of 
counterterrorism equipment, such as small arms, bomb detection 
equipment, vehicles, and computers. DS/T/ATA also provides specialized 
consultations to partner nations on specific counterterrorism issues on 
an as-needed basis.[Footnote 7] ATA curricula and training focus on 
enhancing critical counterterrorism capabilities, which cover issues 
such as crisis management and response, cyberterrorism, dignitary 
protection, bomb detection, airport security, border control, kidnap 
intervention and hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents 
involving weapons of mass destruction, countering terrorist finance, 
and interdiction of terrorist organizations. According to DS/T/ATA, all 
of its courses emphasize law enforcement under the rule of law and 
sound human rights practices. 

DS/T/ATA provides training primarily through contract employees and 
interagency agreements with other U.S. law enforcement agencies. DS/T/ 
ATA selects, oversees, and evaluates all contracted instructors. 
According to DS/T/ATA, most instructors are retired law enforcement or 
military personnel who have expertise specific to the ATA curricula. 

DS/T/ATA provides training both onsite in the partner nation and at 
facilities in the United States, depending on the nature of the course 
and the availability of special equipment and necessary facilities. 
However, in fiscal year 2007, DS/T/ATA delivered nearly 90 percent of 
all training overseas due, in part, to the lack of domestic facilities 
in the United States during a transition in contracting for U.S.-based 
facilities.[Footnote 8] ATA has provided increasingly more assistance 
overseas over the past several years. An S/CT official noted that the 
trend reflects a recognition that training is generally more 
effectively delivered in the partner nation. 

DS/T/ATA has provided most overseas assistance by sending instructors 
to the partner nation to conduct a specific course. The partner nation 
and the U.S. embassy provide support in designating a facility or 
training site and assisting DS/T/ATA headquarters staff with other 
logistical issues.[Footnote 9] DS/T/ATA has established an in-country 
training presence through bilateral arrangements with six priority 
partner nations: Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and 
the Philippines. These countries were the largest recipients of program 
assistance from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2007. In general, 
these programs included permanent training facilities such as 
classrooms, computer labs, and shooting and demolition ranges, which 
DS/T/ATA used to provide training on an ongoing basis. Each of the in- 
country programs has a permanently posted in-country ATA program 
manager, along with other ATA staff at the U.S. post in the host 
nation--in some cases, in-country staff included trainers and course 
instructors. (See fig. 1.) 

Figure 1: Training Exercise at ATA Facility in Colombia: 

This figure is a photograph of a training exercise at ATA facility in 
Columbia. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

ATA Program Funding: 

ATA is State's largest counterterrorism program, and receives 
appropriations under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, 
and Related Programs account. Fiscal year 2002 appropriations for ATA 
increased to about $158 million--over six times the level of funding 
appropriated in fiscal year 2000. Appropriations for the program have 
fluctuated since fiscal year 2002, and increased to over $175 million 
in fiscal year 2007, including supplemental appropriations. (See fig. 
2.) 

Figure 2: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs Appropriations for Antiterrorism Efforts, Fiscal Years 2000 to 
2008: 

This figure is a combination vertical bar graph showing 
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs 
appropriations for antiterrorism efforts between fiscal years 2000 and 
2008. One bar represents antiterrorism assistance programs, and the 
other represents other antiterrorism programs. 

2000;	
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 31000;
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 3250. 

2001;	
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 38000; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 19000. 

2002; 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 157934; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 49000. 

2003; 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 90368; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 5000. 

2004; 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 141428; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 4971. 

2005; 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 134900; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 14136. 

2006; 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 122265; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 13860. 

2007; 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 175136; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 21880. 

2008 (Request); 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 124311; 
Other Antiterrorism Programs: 25713. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, 
fiscal years 2002 through 2008. 

Notes: Includes regular, emergency response fund, and supplemental 
appropriations for ATA in fiscal years 2002 to 2005, as well as a $50 
million supplemental appropriation in fiscal year 2007. 

Other antiterrorism programs include the Terrorist Interdiction 
Program, Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies, and Counterterrorism 
Financing, among other programs. 

[End of figure] 

From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, program assistance for the top 10 
recipients of ATA allocations ranged from about $11 million to about 
$78 million. The top 10 recipients represented about 57 percent of ATA 
funding allocated for training and training-related activities over the 
6-year period. ATA funding for the other 89 partner nations that 
received assistance during this period ranged from $9,000 to about 
$10.7 million. (See app. II for additional information on ATA funding 
for specific partner nations.) 

ATA Program Management: 

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the head of S/CT, is 
statutorily[Footnote 10] charged with the overall supervision 
(including policy oversight of resources) and coordination of the U.S. 
government's counterterrorism activities. The broadly mandated[Footnote 
11] role of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the head 
of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, includes implementing security 
programs to protect diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission 
on security matters. Specific roles and responsibilities for S/CT and 
DS/T/ATA regarding ATA are described in a 1991 internal policy guidance 
memorandum, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986,[Footnote 12] 
and incorporated into State's Foreign Affairs Manual.[Footnote 13] 
Table 1 provides a summary of key responsibilities described in the 
guidance. 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA in Managing 
ATA: 

S/CT: Provide written policy guidance, including regional, country, and 
training priorities, and general guidance on the fiscal parameters of 
the program; 
DS/T/ATA: Develop country-specific training proposals for new host 
nation participants, including type of assistance to be provided, 
location of training, budget, and other relevant factors, consistent 
with S/CT policy guidance and the results of an initial assessment of 
host nation counterterrorism needs. 

S/CT: Lead delegation of U.S. government counterterrorism experts to 
assess needs, and establish policy goals and training objectives with 
partner nations in consultation with DS/T/ATA; 
DS/T/ATA: Develop annual training plan for each currently participating 
host nation that specifies types of assistance and short-term 
objectives, consistent with S/CT policy guidance. 

S/CT: Evaluate the extent to which ATA programs are furthering overall 
U.S. government counterterrorism goals; 
DS/T/ATA: Develop all training curricula, identify and select 
instructors, and coordinate all training logistics. 

DS/T/ATA: S/CTDS/T/ATA: Evaluate training effectiveness and progress 
toward training program objectives. 

Source: GAO summary of State policy guidance. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 1, S/CT is responsible for leading the initial 
assessment of a partner nation's counterterrorism needs, and DS/T/ATA 
is responsible for developing annual, country-specific plans. Under 
current program operations, DS/T/ATA conducts an initial assessment of 
a new participant nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and conducts 
subsequent assessments--referred to as program reviews--every 2 to 3 
years thereafter. In general, the needs assessments include input from 
the embassy teams, but the assessments themselves are conducted by 
technical experts contracted by DS/T/ATA. According to DS/T/ATA, the 
purpose of the needs assessment and program review process is to 
determine the forms of assistance for a partner nation to detect, 
deter, deny, and defeat terrorism; and to evaluate program 
effectiveness. 

State's Implementation of ATA Lacks Guidance and Use of Country Needs 
Assessments: 

ATA lacks guidance beyond a tiered list of priority countries and 
assistance is not systematically aligned with counterterrorism needs. 
S/CT provides minimal policy guidance to help determine ATA priorities 
and ensure that assistance provided supports broader U.S. policy goals. 
In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use country- 
specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan what types of 
assistance to provide partner nations in accordance with State policy 
guidance. The assessments we reviewed had weaknesses and 
inconsistencies. 

S/CT Provides a Tiered Country List, but Little Additional Policy 
Guidance: 

In accordance with the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum, S/CT 
prepares a tiered list of countries to help prioritize and determine 
where to provide ATA assistance. However, S/CT provides little 
additional guidance to DS/T/ATA regarding program priorities and how to 
allocate program funding. Additionally, other factors besides those 
reflected in the tiered list influence which countries receive 
assistance. 

According to State officials, S/CT places countries on the tiered list 
in one of four priority categories based on criteria that address 
several factors, including country-specific threats and the level and 
depth of diplomatic and political engagement in a country. State 
officials indicated that other factors also may be considered in 
determining whether and where a country is placed on the list, such as 
the presence of a U.S. military base or a planned international 
sporting or cultural event with U.S. participation. Since 2006, S/CT 
has reviewed and discussed the tiered list--including changes, 
additions, or deletions--with DS/T/ATA during quarterly meetings. DS/T/ 
ATA officials stated that DS/T/ATA was able to provide more substantial 
input and suggestions for the latest version of the tiered list because 
S/CT provided a draft list to DS/T/ATA for comment for the first time 
prior to the August 2007 meeting. As of August 2007, over 70 countries 
were on the list, with 12 to 24 countries in each of the four 
categories. However, countries were not ranked or prioritized within 
each category. 

In addition to the quarterly meetings, S/CT told us that they had 
established a series of regional roundtable discussions in 2006 between 
S/CT regional subject experts and DS/T/ATA counterparts. According to 
the S/CT official, the roundtables are intended as a means of 
identifying priority countries and their counterterrorism needs for 
purposes of developing budget requests. 

S/CT provides little guidance to DS/T/ATA beyond the tiered list, 
although the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum states that S/CT's 
written policy guidance for the program should include suggested 
country training priorities. State's Office of Inspector General 
previously reported that earlier versions of S/CT's tiered list 
included additional guidance, such as the rationale for support, and 
suggested areas for training. However, S/CT began providing 
increasingly abbreviated guidance as its responsibilities beyond ATA 
grew after September 11, 2001.[Footnote 14] While S/CT provides some 
additional guidance to DS/T/ATA during quarterly meetings and on other 
occasions, DS/T/ATA officials in headquarters and the field stated they 
received little or no guidance from S/CT beyond the tiered list. 
Officials responsible for the ATA in-country program in Colombia stated 
they had minimal interaction with S/CT. As a result, neither S/CT nor 
DS/T/ATA can ensure that program assistance provided to specific 
countries supports broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals. 

Other factors beyond S/CT's tiered list of countries, such as 
unforeseen events or new governmental initiatives, also influence which 
countries receive program assistance. We found that 10 countries on the 
tiered list did not receive ATA assistance in fiscal year 2007, while 
13 countries not on the tiered list received approximately $3.2 
million. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials stated that assistance does not 
always align with the tiered list because U.S. foreign policy 
objectives sometimes cause State, in consultation with the President's 
National Security Council, to provide assistance to a non-tiered-list 
country. 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA Do Not Systematically Align Program Assistance with 
Counterterrorism Needs: 

According to the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum and DS/T/ATA 
standard operations procedures, ATA country-specific needs assessments 
and program reviews are intended to guide program management and 
planning. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the 
assessments to determine what types of assistance to provide to partner 
nations or develop ATA country-specific plans. In addition, the 
assessments we reviewed had several weaknesses and inconsistencies. 
Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that S/CT should lead 
the assessment efforts, a senior S/CT official stated that S/CT lacks 
the capacity to do so. As a result, DS/T/ATA has led interagency 
assessment teams in recent years, but the assessments and 
recommendations for types of assistance to be provided may not fully 
reflect S/CT policy guidance concerning overall U.S. counterterrorism 
priorities. 

DS/T/ATA Does Not Consistently Use Country Needs Assessments: 

DS/T/ATA officials responsible for five of the top six recipients of 
ATA support--Colombia, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines[Footnote 15]--did not consistently use ATA country needs 
assessments and program reviews in making program decisions or to 
create annual country assistance plans. DS/T/ATA officials responsible 
for the in-country programs in four of these countries had not seen the 
latest assessments for their respective countries. While some officials 
responsible for three of these five in-country programs stated they had 
reviewed at least one of the assessments conducted for their countries 
since 2000, the officials said that the assessments were either not 
useful or that they were used for informational purposes only. 

* The Regional Security Officer, Deputy Regional Security Officer, and 
DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Kenya had not seen any of the assessments 
that had been conducted for the country since 2000. Although the in- 
country program manager for Kenya was familiar with the assessments 
from her work in a previous position with DS/T/ATA, she stated that in 
general, the assessments were not very useful for determining what type 
of assistance to provide. She said that the initial needs assessment 
for Kenya failed to adequately consider local needs and capacity. 

* The Regional Security Officer and Assistant Regional Security Officer 
for Indonesia stated they had not seen the latest assessment for the 
country. The DS/T/ATA program manager for Indonesia said that he 
recalled using one of the assessments as a "frame of reference" in 
making program and resource decisions. The in-country program manager 
also recalled seeing one of the assessments, but stated that he did not 
find the assessment useful given the changing terrorist landscape; 
therefore, he did not share it with his staff. 

* The DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Pakistan stated that decisions on 
the types of assistance to provide in Pakistan were based primarily on 
the knowledge and experience of in-country staff regarding partner 
nation needs, rather than the needs assessments or program reviews. He 
added that he did not find the assessments useful, as the issues 
identified in the latest (2004) assessment for the country were already 
outdated. 

Needs Assessments Generally Lacked Prioritized Recommendations and Were 
Inconsistent: 

We reviewed 12 of the 21 ATA country-specific needs assessments and 
program reviews[Footnote 16] that, according to ATA annual reports, DS/ 
T/ATA conducted between 2000 and 2007 for five of the six in-country 
programs.[Footnote 17] The assessments and reviews generally included a 
range of recommendations for counterterrorism assistance, but did not 
prioritize assistance to be provided or include specific timeframes for 
implementation. Consequently, the assessments do not consistently 
provide a basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a 
partner nation's greatest counterterrorism assistance need. Only two of 
the assessments--a 2000 needs assessment for Indonesia and a 2003 
assessment for Kenya--prioritized the recommendations, although a 2004 
assessment for Pakistan and a 2005 assessment for the Philippines 
listed one or two recommendations as priority ATA efforts. In addition, 
the information included in the assessments was not consistent and 
varied in linking recommendations to capabilities. Of the 12 
assessments we reviewed: 

* Nine included narrative on a range of counterterrorism capabilities, 
such as border security and explosives detection, but the number of 
capabilities assessed ranged from 5 to 25. The 2001 needs assessment 
for Colombia included narrative on the government's antikidnapping 
capability and equipment needs, but did not assess any counterterrorism 
capabilities. The 2002 assessment for Indonesia provided narrative on 
ATA assistance provided, but did not include an assessment of any 
counterterrorism capabilities. 

* Only four of the assessments that assessed more than one capability 
linked recommendations provided to the relevant capabilities. Most of 
the recommendations in the assessments we reviewed were for ATA 
assistance, although some recommended host government actions to 
improve counterterrorism capability, or other U.S. government 
assistance. 

* Six included capability ratings, but the types of ratings used 
varied. A 2003 assessment for Colombia rated eight capabilities, rating 
them 1 through 5 with definitions for each rating level; the 2004 
assessment for Colombia rated 24 capabilities, rating them as poor, 
low, fair, or good, without any definitions. 

* Two used a format that DS/T/ATA began implementing in 2001. The 
assessments following the new format generally included consistent 
types of information and clearly linked recommendations provided to an 
assessment of 25 counterterrorism capabilities. However, they did not 
prioritize recommendations or include specific timeframes for 
implementing the recommendations. 

Country Assistance Plans Were Not Used or Were Not Linked to Needs 
Assessments: 

Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that DS/T/ATA should 
create annual country assistance plans that specify training objectives 
and assistance to be provided based upon the needs assessments and 
program reviews, we found that S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically 
use the assessments to create annual plans for the five in-country 
programs. DS/T/ATA officials we interviewed regarding the five in- 
country programs stated that in lieu of relying on the assessments or 
country assistance plans, program and resource decisions were primarily 
made by DS/T/ATA officials in the field based on their knowledge and 
experience regarding partner nation needs. Some DS/T/ATA officials said 
they did not find the country assistance plans useful. The program 
manager for Pakistan stated that he used the country assistance plan as 
a guide, but found that it did not respond to changing needs in the 
country. The ATA program manager for Kenya said that he had not seen a 
country assistance plan for that country. 

We requested ATA country assistance plans conducted during fiscal years 
2000-2006 for the five in-country programs included in our review, but 
S/CT and DS/T/ATA only provided three plans completed for three of the 
five countries. Specifically, S/CT and DS/T/ATA provided a 2006 ATA 
country assistance plan for Colombia, a 2007 plan for Pakistan, and a 
plan covering fiscal years 2006-2008 for the Philippines. DS/T/ATA 
officials stated that they were able to locate only draft and informal 
planning documents for Indonesia and Kenya, and that S/CT and DS/T/ATA 
did not develop plans for any programs prior to 2006. 

Of the three ATA country assistance plans DS/T/ATA provided, we found 
that the plans did not link planned activities to recommendations 
provided in the needs assessments and program reviews. The current plan 
for the Philippines included a brief reference to a 2005 needs 
assessment, but the plan did not identify which recommendations from 
the 2005 assessment were intended to be addressed by current or planned 
efforts. The plan for Pakistan did not mention any of the assessments 
conducted for that country. 

S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program 
Assistance: 

As a part of its responsibility, S/CT has established mechanisms to 
coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. government international 
counterterrorism training assistance and to help avoid duplication of 
efforts. S/CT chairs biweekly interagency working group meetings of the 
Counterterrorism Security Group's Training Assistance Subgroup to 
provide a forum for high-level information sharing and discussion among 
U.S. agencies implementing international counterterrorism 
efforts.[Footnote 18] The Training Assistance Subgroup includes 
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, 
Homeland Security, Treasury, and other agencies. S/CT also established 
the Regional Strategic Initiative in 2006 to coordinate regional 
counterterrorism efforts and strategy. S/CT described the Regional 
Strategic Initiative as a series of regionally based, interagency 
meetings hosted by U.S. embassies to identify key regional 
counterterrorism issues and develop a strategic approach to addressing 
them, among other goals. A senior S/CT official stated that meetings 
have generated new regional training priorities for ATA. As of November 
2007, Regional Strategic Initiative meetings have been held for the 
East Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq and Neighbors, Latin America, 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, Trans-Sahara, and Western Mediterranean 
regions.[Footnote 19] 

Based on our review of program documents, interviews, and meetings with 
officials in the four countries we visited, we did not find any 
significant duplication or overlap among U.S. agencies' country- 
specific training programs aimed at combating terrorism. Officials we 
met with in each of these countries noted that they participated in 
various embassy working group meetings, such as Counterterrorism 
Working Group and Law Enforcement Working Group meetings, during which 
relevant agencies shared information regarding operations and 
activities at post. DS/T/ATA officials also coordinated ATA with other 
counterterrorism efforts through daily informal communication among 
cognizant officials in the countries we visited. 

State Has Made Progress in Establishing ATA Goals, but S/CT and DS/T/ 
ATA Do Not Assess Sustainability: 

In response to concerns that ATA lacked elements of adequate strategic 
planning and performance measurement, State recently took action to 
define goals and measures related to the program's mandated objectives. 
S/CT and DS/T/ATA, however, do not systematically assess 
sustainability--that is, the extent to which assistance has enabled 
partner nations to achieve and sustain advanced counterterrorism 
capabilities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA lack clear measures and processes for 
assessing sustainability, and program managers do not consistently 
include sustainability in ATA planning. 

State Has Recently Established ATA Goals and Measures, and Emphasizes 
Sustaining Partner Nations' Counterterrorism Capabilities: 

State did not have measurable performance goals and outcomes related to 
the mandated objectives for ATA prior to fiscal year 2003, but has 
recently made some progress to address the deficiency. State's Office 
of Inspector General recommended in 2001, 2005, and 2006 reports that 
S/CT and DS/T/ATA take steps to establish measurable long-term goals 
and evaluations of program performance. Similarly, State responded to 
issues raised in a 2003 Office of Management and Budget 
assessment[Footnote 20] of ATA by developing specific goals and 
measures for each of the program's mandated objectives. 

Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents, including department 
and bureau-level performance plans, have listed enabling partner 
nations to achieve advanced and sustainable counterterrorism 
capabilities as a key program outcome. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials 
further confirmed that sustainability is the principal intended outcome 
and focus of program assistance. In support of these efforts, DS/T/ATA 
appointed a Sustainment Manager in November 2006. The Sustainment 
Manager's broadly defined responsibilities include coordinating with 
other DS/T/ATA divisions to develop recommendations and plans to assist 
partner nations in developing sustainable counterterrorism 
capabilities. 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA Do Not Assess Sustainability of Capabilities: 

Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes, 
State has not developed clear measures and a process for assessing 
sustainability and has not integrated the concept into program 
planning. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993[Footnote 
21] (GPRA) requires agencies in charge of U.S. government programs and 
activities to identify goals and report on the degree to which goals 
are met. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials noted the difficulty in developing 
direct quantitative measures of ATA outcomes related to partner 
nations' counterterrorism capabilities. However, GPRA and best 
practices cited by the Office of Management and Budget, us, and others 
provide flexible guidelines for agency and program managers to develop 
adequate measures of program effectiveness. Our past work also has 
stressed the importance of establishing program goals, objectives, 
priorities, milestones, and measures to use in monitoring performance 
and assessing outcomes as critical elements of program management and 
effective resource allocation.[Footnote 22] 

We found that the measure for ATA's principal intended program outcome 
of sustainability is not clear. In its fiscal year 2007 Joint 
Performance Summary, State reported results and future year targets for 
the number of countries that had achieved an advanced, sustainable 
level of counterterrorism capability. According to the document, 
partner nations that achieve a sustainable level of counterterrorism 
would graduate from the program and no longer receive program 
assistance. However, program officials in S/CT and DS/T/ATA directly 
responsible for overseeing ATA were not aware that the Joint 
Performance Summary listed numerical targets and past results for the 
number of partner nations that had achieved sustainability, and could 
not provide an explanation of how State assessed the results. DS/T/ 
ATA's Sustainment Manager also could not explain how State established 
and assessed the numerical targets in the reports. The Sustainment 
Manager further noted that, to his knowledge, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not 
yet developed systematic measures of sustainability. 

DS/T/ATA's current mechanism for evaluating partner nation capabilities 
does not include guidance or specific measures to assess 
sustainability. According to program guidance and DS/T/ATA officials, 
needs assessments and program reviews are intended to establish a 
baseline of a partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities and 
quantify progress through subsequent reviews. DS/T/ATA officials also 
asserted that the process is intended to measure the results of program 
assistance. However, the process does not explicitly address 
sustainability, and provides no specific information or instruction 
regarding how reviewers are to assess sustainability. Moreover, the 
process focuses on assessing a partner nation's overall 
counterterrorism capabilities, but does not specifically measure the 
results of program assistance. The assessment and review process also 
does not provide S/CT and DS/T/ATA a means for determining whether a 
partner nation's capabilities changed because of program assistance, 
the country's own efforts, or through assistance provided by other U.S. 
agencies or third countries. The head of DS/T/ATA's Assessment, Review, 
and Evaluations Unit told us that he had not received guidance to 
assess progress toward sustainability, and had only limited interaction 
with the Sustainment Manager on integrating sustainability into the 
assessment and review process. 

DS/T/ATA has not systematically integrated sustainability into country- 
specific assistance plans, and we found a lack of consensus among 
program officials about how to address the issue. In-country program 
managers, embassy officials, instructors, and partner nation officials 
we interviewed held disparate views on how to define sustainability 
across all ATA participant countries, and many were not aware that 
sustainability was the intended outcome for the program. Several 
program officials stated that graduating a country and withdrawing or 
significantly reducing program assistance could result in a rapid 
decline in the partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and 
could undermine achieving other program objectives, such as improving 
bilateral relations. Further, although State has listed sustainability 
in State-level planning documents since 2006, S/CT and DS/T/ATA have 
not issued guidance on incorporating sustainability into country- 
specific planning, and none of the country assistance plans we reviewed 
consistently addressed the outcome. As a result, the plans did not 
include measurable annual objectives or planned activities targeted at 
enabling the partner nation to achieve sustainability. For example, 
Colombia's assistance plan listed transferring responsibility for the 
antikidnapping training to the Colombian government and described 
planned activities to achieve that goal. However, the plan did not 
include measurable objectives to determine whether activities achieve 
intended results. Although the plan for the Philippines stated that the 
country program goal for fiscal year 2007 was to "maximize 
sustainment," it did not include measures of sustainability or describe 
how planned activities would contribute to the intended outcome. 

State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been 
Incomplete and Inaccurate: 

Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional 
mandate[Footnote 23] to report to Congress on U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, State's annual reports on 
ATA have contained inaccurate data regarding basic program information, 
do not provide systematic assessments of program results, and lack 
other information necessary to evaluate program effectiveness. 

S/CT Has Not Prepared a Mandated Report: 

The Foreign Assistance Act requires the Secretary of State to report 
annually on the amount and nature of all assistance provided by the 
U.S. government related to international terrorism.[Footnote 24] Since 
1996, State has submitted ATA annual reports rather than the report 
required by the statute. 

The legislation that authorized ATA in 1983[Footnote 25] required 
annual presentations to Congress of aggregate information on all 
countries that received program assistance. In 1985, Congress added a 
new, broader reporting obligation, requiring the Secretary of State to 
report on all assistance related to international terrorism provided by 
the U.S. government during the preceding fiscal year.[Footnote 26] 
Although the original ATA-specific 1983 reporting provision was 
repealed in 1996,[Footnote 27] the requirement for the broader report 
remains. 

S/CT is responsible for preparing the reports on U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance. The S/CT official directly responsible for 
ATA told us that he only recently became aware of the reporting 
requirement and noted confusion within State over what the statute 
required. He also asserted that the ATA annual report, which is 
prepared by DS/T/ATA, and State's annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" 
report[Footnote 28] were sufficiently responsive to congressional 
needs. He further noted that, in his view, it would be extremely 
difficult for State to compile and report on all U.S. government 
terrorism assistance activities, especially given the significant 
growth of agencies' programs since 2001. Officials in State's Bureau of 
Legislative Affairs indicated that, to their knowledge, they had never 
received an inquiry from congressional staff about the missing reports. 
DS/T/ATA officials told us DS/T/ATA has continued to produce the ATA 
annual report to Congress even after the reporting requirement was 
removed in 1996. However, State has not issued DS/T/ATA's annual report 
to Congress on ATA for fiscal year 2006 that was planned for release in 
2007. DS/T/ATA officials noted that they did, however, complete and 
circulate the final report within State. 

ATA Annual Reports Contain Inaccuracies: 

Recent ATA annual reports have contained inaccurate data relating to 
basic program information on numbers of students trained and courses 
offered. For example, DS/T/ATA reported inaccurate data on program 
operations in ATA's two top-funded partner nations--Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. 

* Afghanistan. ATA annual reports for fiscal years 2002 to 2005 contain 
narrative passages describing various ATA training and training-related 
assistance activities for the Afghan in-country ATA program. According 
to these reports, 15 students were trained as part of a single training 
event over the 4-year period. DS/T/ATA subsequently provided us data 
for fiscal year 2005 training activity in Afghanistan, which corrected 
the participation total in that year from 15 participants in 1 training 
event to 1,516 participants in 12 training events. DS/T/ATA officials 
acknowledged the report disparities. 

* Pakistan. According to the fiscal year 2005 ATA annual report, ATA 
delivered 17 courses to 335 participants in Pakistan that year. 
Supporting tables in the same report listed 13 courses provided to 283 
participants. Further, a summary report provided to us from the DS/T/ 
ATA internal database produced a third set of numbers describing 13 
courses provided to 250 course participants during fiscal year 2005. 
DS/T/ATA officials acknowledged this inconsistency, but they were 
unable to identify which set of figures was correct. 

DS/T/ATA officials noted that similar inaccuracies could be presumed 
for prior years and for other partner nations. Significantly, the 
officials indicated that inaccuracies and omissions in reports of the 
training participants and events were due to a lack of internal 
policies and procedures for recording and reporting program data. In 
the absence of documented policies and procedures, staff developed 
various individual processes for collecting the information that 
resulted in flawed data reporting. Additionally, DS/T/ATA officials 
told us that its inadequate information management system and a lack of 
consistent data collection procedures also contributed to inaccurate 
reporting. 

ATA Annual Reports Lack Performance and Other Useful Program 
Information: 

DS/T/ATA's annual reports to Congress on ATA from fiscal year 1997 to 
2005 did not contain systematic assessments of program results. 
Further, the reports did not consistently include information on key 
aspects of the program, such as program activities, spending, and 
management initiatives that would be helpful to Congress and State in 
evaluating ATA. 

GPRA, Office of Management and Budget guidance,[Footnote 29] and our 
previous work provide a basis and rationale for the types of 
information that are useful in assessing program performance. According 
to this guidance, key elements of program reporting include clearly 
defined objectives and goals, comparisons of actual and projected 
performance that include at least 4 years of annual data, explanations 
and plans for addressing unmet goals, and reliable information on the 
program's activities and financial activity. 

We reviewed ATA annual reports for fiscal years 1997 through 2005, and 
found that the reports varied widely in terms of content, scope, and 
format. Moreover, the annual reports did not contain systematic 
assessments of program performance or consistent information on program 
activity, such as number and type of courses delivered, types of 
equipment provided, and budget activity associated with program 
operations. In general, the reports contained varying levels of detail 
on program activity, and provided only anecdotal examples of program 
successes, from a variety of sources, including U.S. embassy officials, 
ATA instructors, and partner nation officials. DS/T/ATA program 
officials charged with compiling the annual reports for the past 3 
fiscal years noted that DS/T/ATA does not have guidance on the scope, 
content, or format for the reports. 

Conclusions: 

Although ATA plays a central role in State's broader effort to fight 
international terrorism, deficiencies in how the program is guided, 
managed, implemented, and assessed could limit the program's 
effectiveness. Specifically, minimal guidance from S/CT makes it 
difficult to determine the extent to which program assistance directly 
supports broader U.S. counterterrorism policy goals. Additionally, 
deficiencies with DS/T/ATA's needs assessments and program reviews may 
limit their utility as a tool for planning assistance and prioritizing 
among several partner nations' counterterrorism needs. As a result, the 
assessments and reviews are not systematically linked to resource 
allocation decisions, which may limit the program's ability to improve 
partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities. 

Although State has made some progress in attempting to evaluate and 
quantitatively measure program performance, ATA still lacks a clearly 
defined, systematic assessment and reporting of outcomes, which makes 
it difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the program. 
This deficiency, along with State's noncompliance with mandated 
reporting requirements, has resulted in Congress having limited and 
incomplete information on U.S. international counterterrorism 
assistance and ATA efforts. Such information is necessary to determine 
the most effective types of assistance the U.S. government can provide 
to partner nations in support of the U.S. national security goal of 
countering terrorism abroad. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Congress should reconsider the requirement that the Secretary of State 
provide an annual report on the nature and amount of U.S. government 
counterterrorism assistance provided abroad given the broad changes in 
the scope and nature of U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad, in 
conjunction with the fact that the report has not been submitted since 
1996. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of State take the following four 
actions: 

1. Revisit and revise internal guidance (the 1991 State policy 
memorandum and Foreign Affairs Manual, in particular) to ensure that 
the roles and responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA are still relevant 
and better enable State to determine which countries should receive 
assistance and what type, and allocate limited ATA resources. 

2. Ensure that needs assessments and program reviews are both useful 
and linked to ATA resource decisions and development of country- 
specific assistance plans. 

3. Establish clearer measures of sustainability, and refocus the 
process for assessing the sustainability of partner nations' 
counterterrorism capabilities. The revised evaluation process should 
include not only an overall assessment of partner nation 
counterterrorism capabilities, but also provide guidance for assessing 
the specific outcomes of ATA. 

4. Comply with the congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S. 
international counterterrorism assistance. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

State provided us oral and written comments (see app. III) on a draft 
of this report. State also provided technical comments which we have 
incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate. 

Overall, State agreed with our principal findings and recommendations 
to improve its ATA program guidance, the needs assessment and program 
review process, and its assessments of ATA program outcomes. State 
noted that the report highlights the difficulties in assessing the 
benefits of developing and improving long-term antiterrorism and law 
enforcement relationships with foreign governments. State also outlined 
a number of ongoing and planned initiatives to address our 
recommendations. Some of these initiatives were underway during the 
course of our review and we refer to them in the report. We will follow 
up with State to ensure that these initiatives have been completed, as 
planned. 

However, although State supported the matter we suggest for 
congressional consideration, it did not specifically address our 
recommendation that it comply with the congressional mandate to report 
on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
after the report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report 
to interested congressional committees and to the Secretary of State. 
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-7331, e-mail 
johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. Other GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in 
appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.: 
Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess State's guidance for determining country recipients, aligning 
program assistance with partner nation needs, and coordinating 
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) with other U.S. government 
counterterrorism programs, we: 

* Interviewed cognizant officials from the Office of Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (S/CT) and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office 
of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA) in Washington, D.C., including 
senior officials responsible for overseeing and managing ATA and ATA 
program managers responsible for each of the six in-country programs: 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines. 

* Reviewed and analyzed State planning, funding, and reporting 
documents concerning ATA, including relevant reports from State's 
Office of Inspector General on the management and implementation of 
ATA; S/CT's fiscal year 2007 tiered lists of priority countries for ATA 
assistance and S/CT criteria for establishing the tier list; DS/T/ATA 
budget information for fiscal years 2000 to 2008; a 1991 State policy 
memorandum delineating S/CT's and DS/T/ATA's roles and responsibilities 
for ATA; relevant sections of State's Foreign Affairs Manual 
summarizing roles and responsibilities for ATA; DS/T/ATA internal 
policy and procedure documents, including DS/T/ATA's Assessment, Review 
and Evaluations Unit's most current (2004) standard operations 
procedures; State documents and U.S. embassy cables regarding the 
Regional Strategic Initiative; and DS/T/ATA's Annual Reports to 
Congress on the ATA for fiscal years 1997 to 2005. 

* Reviewed and analyzed available country-specific program documents 
for five of the in-country programs--Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines[Footnote 30]--including country-specific 
needs assessments conducted for each of these partner nations; country 
assistance plans; data on the number of ATA courses provided and 
personnel trained in these countries; and memoranda of intent between 
the U.S. government and host country governments regarding ATA in these 
countries for fiscal years 2000 to 2007. These five countries were 
among the largest six recipients of program assistance for fiscal years 
2002 to 2007 and each country received a range of ATA training and 
other assistance during the period we reviewed. DS/T/ATA was unable to 
provide four of the needs assessments that, according to annual 
reports, were conducted for two of these countries in that time, and 
was only able to provide three ATA country assistance plans that were 
completed for three of the five countries for fiscal years 2006 to 
2008. 

* Conducted fieldwork between July and September 2007 in four countries 
where ATA provides a range of assistance through an in-country 
presence: Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines. These four 
programs represented about 55 percent of ATA allocations for training 
and training-related activities in fiscal year 2006, and about 43 
percent of funding in fiscal year 2007. As this was not a 
generalizeable sample, our observations in these four countries may not 
be representative of all programs. In these countries, we interviewed 
ATA in-country program managers, course instructors, and other 
contractors; U.S. embassy officials responsible for managing 
counterterrorism assistance and activities; and partner nation 
government officials. We also observed various types of ATA training 
and examined equipment that was provided to partner nation security 
units. Additionally, to assess the extent to which State establishes 
clear ATA goals and measures sustainability of program outcomes, and 
State's reporting on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance, 
we: 

* Interviewed cognizant officials from S/CT and DS/T/ATA in Washington, 
D.C., including senior officials responsible for overseeing and 
managing ATA and ATA program managers responsible for each of the six 
in-country programs: Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, 
and the Philippines. Additionally, we interviewed cognizant officials 
in DS/T/ATA's Assessment, Review, and Evaluations Unit, Training 
Curriculum Division, Training Delivery Division, and Training 
Management Division, including the Sustainment Manager. 

* Reviewed and analyzed State strategic planning and performance 
reporting documents related to ATA for fiscal years 2001 to 2007, 
including State budget justifications, State Performance Plans; State 
Performance Summaries; Bureau Performance Plans; Mission Performance 
Plans for Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines; and DS/T/ATA annual reports to Congress on ATA as noted 
above. We also reviewed Office of Management and Budget's fiscal year 
2003 review of ATA and relevant State Office of Inspector General 
reports relating to performance measurement issues for ATA. 
Additionally, we reviewed all available S/CT and DS/T/ATA guidance 
related to assessing program performance, including internal standard 
operating procedure documents and course evaluation instruments, as 
well as ATA authorizing legislation and related revisions. To further 
assess State's reporting on international counterterrorism assistance, 
we reviewed DS/T/ATA's annual reports on ATA for consistency and 
accuracy. As noted earlier, we found some errors with these reports, 
and have concerns about the data on training and nontraining 
activities. Although we describe the errors, we did not use these data 
in our analyses. To assess the reliability of the data on funding to 
recipient countries, we interviewed ATA officials and performed some 
cross-checks with other sources. We determined the data on funding were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Top Recipients of ATA Funding, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007: 

As shown in table 2, program assistance for the top 10 recipients of 
ATA funding from fiscal years 2002 to 2007 ranged from about $11 
million to about $78 million. The top 10 funding recipients received 
about 57 percent of ATA funding allocated for training and training 
related activities over the 6-year-period. ATA has established an in- 
country presence in each of the top six partner nations, including in- 
country program staff and permanent training facilities such as 
classrooms, computer labs, and shooting and demolition ranges. 
Afghanistan received the most funding over the six-year-period. 
According to DS/T/ATA officials, the scope of the in-country program in 
Afghanistan is more narrowly defined than other ATA programs; it 
focuses principally on training and monitoring a Presidential 
Protective Service. 

Table 2: Top Recipients of ATA Allocations, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007: 

(Dollars in thousands) 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DS/T/ATA budget data on allocations for 
training and training-related activities. 

Note: Italicized, bolded countries have an in-country ATA program. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Washington, D. C. 20520 

February 19, 2008: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating 
Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved 
Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes," GAO Job Code 
320457. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Greg 
Olmstead, Special Assistant, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, at (571) 
226-9632. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Sid Kaplan (Acting): 
cc: GAO — Matthew Helm: 
DS — Greg Starr: 
State/OIG — Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report 

Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs 
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes (GAO-08-
336, GAO Code 320457): 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled 
Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs 
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes. The 
Department of State has long been a strong supporter of efforts to 
improve the Antiterrorism Assistance to nations partnered with the U.S. 
in the fight against terrorism and welcomes the GAO report on this 
subject. The report provides timely information on several aspects of 
the ongoing effort to systematize the documentation of Antiterrorism 
Assistance. This review highlights the difficulties in attempting to 
reduce to numeric metrics the benefits of foreign assistance in 
developing and improving long-term antiterrorism and law enforcement 
relationships with foreign governments. 

The Department of State acknowledges the main findings and conclusions 
of the GAO report. We believe that GAO's assessment of Antiterrorism 
Assistance is fair. As the report notes, efforts to quantify the 
results of Antiterrorism Assistance to foreign governments and to 
assess the "sustainability" of their antiterrorism programs are quite 
difficult. The Department of State agrees fully with the need to 
determine quantifiable metrics and is working in this direction. In 
fact, efforts to re-write standard operating procedures for the ATA 
Needs Assessment and Program Review process, as well as accurately 
define metrics of success are currently under way. 

The GAO notes concerns over the process of coordination between the 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and DS/T/ATA. 
S/CT works closely with DS/T/ATA to ensure that the annual budget 
submission will accomplish U.S. counterterrorism priorities. The 
recently established Foreign Aid budgeting process forges coordination 
between S/CT and DS/T/ATA through "round table" discussions and reviews 
of proposed budgets on a country-by-country basis. The resulting 
document is then cleared through the Department, OMB, and submitted to 
Congress. Any funding reallocations require Congressional Notification. 
While the S/CT "tiered list" of countries approved for antiterrorism 
support is used as one tool for prioritizing antiterrorism support, 
Congressional and national security concerns over terrorism identified 
during each year do re-direct funding for Antiterrorism Assistance 
causing unexpected, although necessary, deviations from the "tiered 
list". S/CT and DS/T/ATA participate in the Technical Assistance Sub-
Group meetings to ensure that counterterrorism policy guidance is 
coordinated into effective operational programs within the interagency 
community. Additionally, during meetings between the Ambassadors of 
each Regional Strategic Initiative grouping, requests for refinement in 
delivery of Antiterrorism Assistance are received in order to provide 
guidance and adjustments to assistance. The Department of State 
welcomes the GAO's recommendation to revise internal guidance on the 
roles and responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA in order to ensure the 
documentation is current. The Department will review all applicable 
documentation to determine where relationships may be updated in order 
to facilitate the delivery of Antiterrorism Assistance. 

The GAO also makes several observations regarding efforts to 
systematically align program assistance with counterterrorism needs. 
The Department of State considers the need to align limited resources 
with national security and foreign policy objectives to be essential. 
The dramatic growth of the important Antiterrorism Assistance program 
over the past five years has stressed the original framework for 
aligning assistance resources. DS/T/ATA is in the process of revising 
standard operating procedures for both its Assessment, Review, 
Evaluation (ARE) Unit and Training Management Division. The resulting 
revisions integrate and streamline the process of identifying 
capability limitations of partner nations and developing assistance 
plans to address those requirements. Additionally, S/CT is working 
closely with the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance to 
clarify the revised roles and responsibilities within the Department 
for setting goals, objectives, and funding requirements for bilateral, 
regional, and global antiterrorism programs. 

The Department of State notes the GAO's conclusion that 
"sustainability" of partner nation capabilities has not been clearly 
defined. During the past year, the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance 
has appointed a "Sustainment Coordinator" and is working on a 
methodology to quantify levels of achievement of foreign governments in 
the area of fighting terrorism, which can be applied internationally 
and against the differing capacities of each country. DS/T/ATA is 
planning to realign the "Sustainment Coordinator" with the ARE 
assessments unit in order to be able to provide objective capability 
ratings during an initial country assessment and each successive 
country report. The reference of "sustainability" will be further 
evaluated to consider whether a more easily definable and measurable 
metric exists for determining the long-term results of Antiterrorism 
Assistance. The GAO also assessed the Department's reporting on U.S. 
counterterrorism assistance raising "a matter for congressional 
consideration regarding the legislative requirement for State's 
reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance." The Department 
encourages Congress to consider the requirement that the Secretary of 
State provide an annual report on the nature and amount of all U.S. 
government counterterrorism assistance, considering the wide scope of 
this task. Further consideration is requested as part of the detailed 
annual consultations now conducted by the Office of the Director of 
U.S. Foreign Assistance in compliance with the Section 653(a) process 
for confirmation of the final allocations of foreign assistance funds 
under each fiscal year's appropriation. 

As the GAO report indicates, Antiterrorism Assistance "is a key U.S. 
effort to help foreign partner nations combat terrorism." 
Implementation of improved assessment and review processes will help 
increase confidence in the results of this assistance in fighting 
terrorism and improving cooperation with partner nation law enforcement 
agencies. A well coordinated and effective program for increasing 
international antiterrorism capabilities, and cooperation with the U.S. 
in this effort, has long been a priority for the U.S. Government. In 
this respect, the Department of State has a continuing responsibility 
to evaluate carefully the effectiveness of assistance to fulfill this 
objective. Implementing changes will require the Department to 
thoroughly evaluate the possible need to define new metrics for the 
success of Antiterrorism Assistance which can be quantified against all 
77 ATA partner nations. That said, we are strongly committed to 
sustaining the progress against international terrorism obtained 
through this program and accurately reporting such results.

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Albert H. Huntington, III, 
and David C. Maurer, Assistant Directors; Karen A. Deans; Matthew E. 
Helm; Elisabeth R. Helmer; Grace Lui; and Emily T. Rachman made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa, 2349aa-1. 

[2] ATA is part of a training directorate within Diplomatic Security 
comprised of the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, the Office of 
Training and Performance Support, and the Office of Mobile Security 
Training. 

[3] The four countries we visited comprised about 55 percent of total 
ATA funding for training and training-related activities in fiscal year 
2006, and about 43 percent of funding in fiscal year 2007. 

[4] Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, 
Joint Performance Summary, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, D.C., 2008). 

[5] 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7 (requiring the Secretary of State to report 
annually on the amount and nature of all assistance provided by the 
U.S. government related to international terrorism). 

[6] Pub. L. No. 87-195, Pt. II, §571, as added by Pub. L. No. 98-151, 
§101(b)(2), 97 Stat. 972 (1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349a). 

[7] For example, DS/T/ATA trainers conducted a critical infrastructure 
evaluation and provided training for the Bahamian government in 
preparation for the 2006 Cricket World Cup. 

[8] Between fiscal years 2000 and 2006, DS/T/ATA provided most U.S.- 
based training through cooperative agreements for facilities and 
instructional services. Pursuant to State's Office of Inspector General 
concerns about the cost and lack of DS/T/ATA direct control of program 
management under the agreements, DS/T/ATA discontinued the cooperative 
agreements at the end of fiscal year 2006. State has issued a request 
for proposals to procure similar services, but the contract has not yet 
been awarded. 

[9] Diplomatic Security's Regional Security Officers are directly 
responsible for overseeing the ATA program in each partner nation that 
receives assistance. 

[10] 22 U.S.C. § 2651a. 

[11] State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an 
outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 
1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105). 

[12] Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105. 

[13] The general responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA regarding the 
ATA program are described in the 2007 U.S. Department of State Foreign 
Affairs Manual, Volume 1-Organization and Functions, 1 FAM 022.5 and 1 
FAM 262.3-1. 

[14] See United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Office 
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Report Number ISP-I-06-25A 
(March 2006). 

[15] Each of these five countries receive a range of ATA training and 
other assistance through an in-country presence. The sixth in-country 
program, Afghanistan, also received significant program assistance 
during this period. According to DS/T/ATA officials, the scope of the 
in-country program in Afghanistan is more narrowly defined than other 
ATA programs; it focuses principally on training and monitoring a 
Presidential Protective Service. 

[16] DS/T/ATA was unable to provide nine assessments that were 
reportedly conducted for four of these countries between 2002 and 2007. 
According to DS/T/ATA officials, they were either unable to locate 
these assessments, written reports on the assessment visits were not 
completed, or the annual reports stating that they had been completed 
were inaccurate. 

[17] he ATA in-country program in Afghanistan was not included in this 
analysis because the scope of the program is narrowly focused on 
presidential protection training. 

[18] The Counterterrorism Security Group is chaired by the National 
Security Council and is intended to serve as a means for U.S. agencies 
to share information and coordinate the response to terrorist threats 
against U.S. interests domestically and abroad. 

[19] A recent Congressional Research Service report noted that while 
interagency coordination on U.S. government efforts to strengthen weak 
and failing states appears to be increasing, analysts and U.S. 
officials have raised concerns about a lack of a strategic approach to 
related U.S. programs and policies. See CRS Report for Congress, Weak 
and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Order 
Code RL34253 (Nov.15, 2007). 

[20] Office of Management and Budget conducted the review using the 
Program Assessment Rating Tool. These reviews examine specific program 
purpose and design; performance measurement, evaluations, and strategic 
planning; program management; and program results. 

[21] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 287-88 (1993). 

[22] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives 
to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute 
Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2007). 

[23] 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7. 

[24] 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7. 

[25] Pub. L. No. 98-151, § 101(b)(2), 97 Stat. 972 (1983). 

[26] Pub. L. No. 99-83, Title V, § 502, 99 Stat. 220 (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 2349aa-7). 

[27] Pub. L. No. 104-164, Title I, § 121(c), 110 Stat. 1428 (1996). 

[28] S/CT prepares this annual report, which is required by a separate 
statute (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(a)). The report primarily describes 
international terrorist activity. 

[29] See, for example, Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-136, 
Financial Reporting Requirements, July 24, 2006. 

[30] A sixth in-country program, Afghanistan, also received significant 
ATA funding during the time period we reviewed, but assistance was more 
narrowly focused on training and monitoring a Presidential Protective 
Service. GAO is conducting ongoing work focused on U.S. government 
training and equipping of Afghanistan National Security Forces that is 
expected to be released in spring 2008. 

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