This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-477 
entitled 'State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts' which was released on June 29, 2005. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate: 

May 2005: 

State Department: 

Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection 
Efforts: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-477]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-477, a report to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the 
State Department’s efforts to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, 
criminals, and others. State issued about 8.8 million passports in 
fiscal year 2004. During the same year, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud, and about 
300 persons were convicted. Passport fraud is often intended to 
facilitate other crimes, including illegal immigration, drug 
trafficking, and alien smuggling. GAO examined (1) how passport fraud 
is committed, (2) what key fraud detection challenges State faces, and 
(3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards could have 
on fraud detection. 

What GAO Found: 

Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of 
those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost, 
stolen, or damaged passports and child substitution are among the other 
tactics used. Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals 
conceal their activities and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist 
that they could also be used to help facilitate terrorism. 

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection 
efforts, and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. 
citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S. 
citizens listed in the federal government’s consolidated terrorist 
watch list is not systematically provided to State. Moreover, State 
does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by federal and state law 
enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 federal and state 
fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State’s Consular 
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One of those 
not included was on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. State does not 
maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, 
hindering information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing 
reductions and interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud 
referrals at some offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and 
investigative resources also hinder fraud detection efforts. 

Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on 
State’s fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to 
adjust the standards. State began implementing the new standards in 
January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more 
uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed 
concern that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to 
“shortcut” fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and 
examiner concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and 
made a number of other modifications and compromises. 

Crimes Suspected of 37 Federal and State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who 
Were Included in Our Test 

Type of crime: Murder; 
Federal fugitives: 5; 
State fugitives: 4. 

Type of crime: Felonious assault and related acts; 
Federal fugitives: 2; 
State fugitives: 7. 

Type of crime: Child sex offenses; 
Federal fugitives: 4; 
State fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Drug trafficking; 
Federal fugitives: 3. 

Type of crime: Attempted murder; 
Federal fugitives: 1; 
State fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Bombings; 
Federal fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Child kidnapping; 
State fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Other crimes; 
Federal fugitives: 4; 
State fugitives: 3. 

Total; 
Federal fugitives: 20; 
State fugitives: 17. 

Sources: State Department and other federal agencies. 

[End of table]

What GAO Recommends: 

This report makes six recommendations to the Secretary of State to 
consider ways to improve interagency information sharing, establish a 
centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, consider 
augmenting fraud prevention staffing, assess the extent to which 
interoffice workload transfers may hinder fraud prevention, and 
strengthen fraud prevention training and oversight. State generally 
concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it has begun 
taking steps to implement most of them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-477. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Identity Theft a Primary Means of Committing Fraud: 

State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts: 

Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection Remains 
Unclear: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables Tables: 

Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were 
Included in Our Test: 

Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were 
Included in Our Test: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Key State Department Units Involved in Passport-Related 
Operations: 

Figure 2: The Typical Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

Figure 3: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners: 

Abbreviations: 

CLASS: Consular Lookout and Support System: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

OIG: Office of the Inspector General: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

TDIS: Travel Document Issuance System: 

TSC: Terrorist Screening Center: 

Letter May 20, 2005: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the 
State Department's effort to protect U.S. citizens and interests at 
home and abroad in the post-September 11 world. The department issued 
about 8.8 million passports in fiscal year 2004. Each year, State 
passport examiners refer tens of thousands of applications they suspect 
may be fraudulent to their local fraud prevention offices. In fiscal 
year 2004, State's Diplomatic Security Service arrested about 500 
individuals for passport fraud and about 300 were convicted. Passport 
fraud is often intended to facilitate such crimes as illegal 
immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling. 

You asked us to assess State's efforts to detect passport fraud and 
whether new performance standards for passport examiners may require 
them to adjudicate passport applications too quickly to adequately 
detect such fraud. This report examines (1) how passport fraud is 
committed, (2) what key challenges State faces in its fraud-detection 
efforts, and (3) what effect new performance standards for passport 
examiners could have on fraud detection. 

To examine how passport fraud is committed, we reviewed fraud 
statistics maintained by State's Bureau of Consular Affairs and 
examined fraud statistics and selected investigative case files within 
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. To assess the key challenges 
State faces in detecting passport fraud, we directly observed State's 
fraud detection efforts at 7 of the 16 domestic passport-issuing 
offices located across the United States; tested State's use of 
electronic databases for fraud detection; ran the names of 67 different 
federal and state fugitives against State's name-check system; analyzed 
State's fraud referral statistics within the Bureaus of Consular 
Affairs and Diplomatic Security; and interviewed cognizant officials in 
Consular Affairs' Office of Passport Services, Office of Consular Fraud 
Prevention, and Consular Systems Division. We also met with cognizant 
officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of the 
Inspector General. To assess what effect new performance standards for 
passport examiners could have on fraud detection efforts, we reviewed 
the test results and methodology that State used in developing the new 
standards, and interviewed union representatives for passport 
examiners, select examiners, the fraud prevention managers at all 16 
domestic passport-issuing offices, and Consular Affairs officials 
responsible for developing and implementing the new standards. Our work 
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. (For a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology, see 
app. I.)

Results in Brief: 

Using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the 
primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. 
Imposters' use of legitimate birth and other identification documents 
belonging to others accounted for 69 percent of passport fraud detected 
in fiscal year 2004, while false claims of lost, stolen, or damaged 
passports; child substitution; and other methods accounted for the 
remaining 31 percent. According to State's Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security, passport fraud is often committed in connection with other 
crimes, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money 
laundering, and alien smuggling. Fraudulently obtained passports help 
enable criminals to conceal their movements and activities. Further, 
U.S. passports allow their holders entry into the United States with 
much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens and also allow 
visa-free passage into many countries around the world, providing 
obvious benefits to criminals operating on an international scale. 
Concerns exist that fraudulently obtained passports could also be used 
to help facilitate terrorism. 

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection 
efforts, including limited inter-and intra-agency information sharing 
and insufficient fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and 
investigative resources. These challenges make it more difficult to 
protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others who would 
harm the United States. Specifically, State does not currently receive 
information on U.S. citizens listed in the Terrorist Screening Center 
(TSC) database--the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch 
list--and State does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by both 
federal and state law enforcement authorities for various crimes. Many 
of these individuals are not identified in State's Consular Lookout and 
Support System (CLASS) name-check database for passports[Footnote 1] 
and could therefore obtain passports and travel internationally without 
the knowledge of appropriate authorities or, in some cases, potentially 
flee the country to escape charges. We tested the names of 67 different 
federal and state fugitives--some wanted for serious crimes--and found 
that fewer than half were in State's system. One of those not included 
was on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list. Though State, TSC, and the FBI 
began exploring options for more routine information sharing on certain 
passport- related matters in mid-to late 2004, such arrangements are 
not yet in place. Further, State does not maintain a centralized 
electronic fraud prevention library that enables comprehensive, well-
organized, and timely information sharing on fraud alerts, lost and 
stolen birth and naturalization certificates, counterfeit documents, 
and other fraud prevention resources among passport-issuing office 
personnel across the United States. We found that, in 2004, fraud 
prevention staffing changes at some domestic passport-issuing offices 
may have resulted in fewer referrals of potential fraud cases to 
Diplomatic Security for investigation. Interoffice transfers of 
passport adjudication cases may have resulted in fewer fraud referrals 
as well. We found that fraud prevention training is provided unevenly 
at different passport-issuing offices and that some examiners have not 
had formal fraud prevention training in years. Training and oversight 
of passport acceptance agent operations are even more sporadic. State 
does not have any way of tracking whether many acceptance agent 
employees are receiving required training, it makes oversight visits to 
only a limited number of acceptance facilities each year, and it does 
not maintain records of all of the individuals accepting passport 
applications at those facilities, posing a significant fraud 
vulnerability. 

Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on 
State's fraud detection efforts is unclear because State has continued 
to adjust the standards. To make passport adjudication work processes 
and related performance measurement more uniform across the 16 
different domestic passport-issuing offices, State began implementing 
the new standards in January 2004. The 2004 performance standards 
placed more emphasis on meeting numerical production quotas because, 
for the first time, a required average production rate stands alone as 
a performance-rating element for examiners. Passport examiner union 
representatives and some other examiners maintain that the numerical 
production standards force examiners to take "shortcuts" in fraud 
detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner concerns, 
State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a number of 
other modifications and compromises at various times during the year. 
As a result, while over 60 examiners were not achieving the required 
production rate midway through 2004, all but 18 of about 480 examiners 
nationwide were meeting the standards by year-end. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally concurred with 
our findings and conclusions. State indicated that it has already begun 
taking, plans to take, or is considering measures to address most of 
our recommendations. 

Background: 

A U.S. passport is not only a travel document but also an official 
verification of the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality. Under 
U.S. law, the Secretary of State has the authority to issue passports. 
Only U.S. nationals[Footnote 2] may obtain a U.S. passport, and 
evidence of citizenship or nationality is required with every passport 
application. For individuals 16 or older, a regular U.S. passport 
issued on or after February 1, 1998, is valid for 10 years from the 
date of issue; it is valid for five years for younger applicants. 
Federal regulations list those who do not qualify for a U.S. passport, 
including those who are subjects of a federal felony warrant. 

State Passport Operations: 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services oversees the 
Passport Services Office, within State's Consular Affairs Bureau. 
Passport Services, the largest component of Consular Affairs, consists 
of three headquarters offices: Policy Planning and Legal Advisory 
Services; Field Operations; and Information Management and Liaison. The 
Office of Consular Fraud Prevention addresses passport, visa, and other 
types of consular fraud. The Consular Systems Division is responsible 
for the computer systems involved in passport services and other 
consular operations. The Office for American Citizens Services handles 
most issues relating to passport cases at overseas posts. The Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security is responsible for investigating individual cases 
of suspected passport and visa fraud. The State Department Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) also has some authority to investigate 
passport fraud. Figure 1 shows the key State Department units involved 
in passport-related operations. 

Figure 1: Key State Department Units Involved in Passport-Related 
Operations: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

State operates 16 passport-issuing offices in Boston; Charleston, South 
Carolina; Chicago; Honolulu; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; 
New York; Norwalk, Connecticut; Philadelphia; Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire; San Francisco; Seattle; and Washington, D.C.[Footnote 3] 
These 16 offices employ the approximately 480 passport 
examiners[Footnote 4] who are responsible for approving and issuing 
most of the U.S. passports that are printed each year. The number of 
passports issued by domestic passport offices has risen steadily in 
recent years, increasing from about 7.3 million in fiscal year 2000 to 
8.8 million in fiscal year 2004. Overseas posts deal with a much lower 
volume of passports by comparison, handling about 300,000 worldwide in 
fiscal year 2004. With only a few exceptions, applications submitted 
and approved overseas are transmitted electronically to a domestic 
passport office to be printed. 

Passport Application and Approval Process: 

The majority of passport applications are submitted by mail or in- 
person at one of almost 7,000 passport application acceptance 
facilities nationwide.[Footnote 5] Passport acceptance facilities are 
located at certain U.S. post offices, courthouses, and other 
institutions and do not employ State Department personnel. The passport 
acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible for, among other 
things, verifying whether an applicant's identification document (such 
as a driver's license) actually matches that applicant. Applications go 
to a passport office to be examined after their information is entered, 
and payments are processed by a State Department contractor, Mellon 
Bank, in Pennsylvania. 

Through a process called adjudication, passport examiners determine 
whether they should issue each applicant a passport. Adjudication 
requires the examiner to scrutinize identification and citizenship 
documents presented by applicants to verify their identity and U.S. 
citizenship. It also includes the examination of an application to 
detect potential indicators of passport fraud and the comparison of the 
applicant's information against databases that help identify 
individuals who may not qualify for a U.S. passport. When passport 
applications are submitted by mail or through acceptance facilities, 
examiners adjudicate the applications at their desks. A relatively 
small percentage of the total number of passport applications are 
submitted directly by applicants at one of State's domestic passport- 
issuing offices. Applicants are required to demonstrate imminent travel 
plans to set an appointment for such services at one of the issuing 
office's public counters. "Counter" adjudication allows examiners to 
question applicants directly or request further information on matters 
related to the application, while "desk" adjudication requires 
telephoning or mailing the applicants in such cases.[Footnote 6] Figure 
2 depicts the typical passport application and adjudication process. 

Figure 2: The Typical Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Passport Fraud Detection Tools: 

The passport adjudication process is facilitated by computer systems-- 
including the Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS), which appears on 
passport examiners' screens when the adjudication begins. Figure 3 
identifies the key computer databases available to help examiners 
adjudicate passport applications and detect potential fraud. 

Figure 3: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

TDIS automatically checks the applicant's name against several 
databases--including State's Consular Lookout and Support System 
(CLASS), which contains information provided by various offices within 
State and information on outstanding criminal warrants provided by the 
U.S. Marshal's Service, the FBI, and other state and federal agencies, 
as well as Health and Human Services' database, which identifies 
parents who have been certified by a state agency as owing more than 
$5,000 in child support and therefore are not eligible for a passport. 
If TDIS indicates the applicant may have applied for a passport at 
another agency or been issued a U.S. passport within the last 10 years, 
it prompts the examiner to reference computer databases outside of TDIS 
to determine whether the prompt refers to the applicant or rather 
someone who resembles the applicant. 

In addition, examiners scrutinize paper documents and other relevant 
information during the fraud detection process. Examiners compare the 
application submitted by the applicant to the information on the screen 
to make sure the information was entered properly, check for missing 
information, and analyze application documentation for various types of 
fraud indicators. In addition, examiners watch for suspicious behavior 
and travel plans. Examiners and acceptance agents are instructed to 
request additional proof of identification if they feel the documents 
presented are insufficient. State officials said that in such cases, 
some individuals abandon the application, and the names of those who do 
are placed in State's name-check system and are more stringently 
scrutinized if they apply again. When examiners detect potentially 
fraudulent passport applications, they send the applications to their 
local fraud prevention office for review and potential referral to 
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security for further investigation. 

Identity Theft a Primary Means of Committing Fraud: 

Using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the 
primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. 
Applicants also commit fraud through other means. Passport fraud is 
often linked to other crimes. 

Passport Fraud Most Commonly Attempted by Imposters Using the 
Legitimate Documents of Others: 

State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigators stated that 
imposters' use of assumed identities, supported by genuine but 
fraudulently obtained identification documents, was a common and 
successful way to fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport. This method 
accounted for 69 percent of passport fraud detected in fiscal year 
2004. Investigators found numerous examples of aliens and U.S. citizens 
obtaining U.S. passports using a false identity. One example identified 
by Diplomatic Security investigators involved an alien using another 
person's identity to obtain a U.S. passport. In 2003, a woman using a 
fraudulent identity claimed to be born in Puerto Rico[Footnote 7] and 
provided a Puerto Rican birth certificate when applying for a passport 
at a clerk of the court office in Florida. She also provided a Florida 
driver's license. 

Diplomatic Security investigators also found cases of U.S. citizens 
using the documentation of others to hide their true identity. In 1997, 
a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Cuba stole a Lear jet and 
transported it to Nicaragua for use in charter services. At the time of 
his arrest in 2003, he was using an assumed identity and possessed both 
false and legitimate but fraudulently obtained identification 
documents, including a U.S. passport in the name he used while posing 
as a certified pilot and illegally providing flight instruction. Seized 
at his residence when he was arrested were two Social Security cards, 
four driver's licenses, three Puerto Rican birth certificates, one U.S. 
passport, one pilot identification card, numerous credit cards and 
checking account cards, and items used to make fraudulent documents. In 
October 2004, he pled guilty to knowingly possessing five or more 
"authentication devices" and false identification documents, for which 
he was sentenced to 8 months' confinement. In another case, a man 
wanted for murdering his wife obtained a Colorado driver's license and 
a passport using a friend's Social Security number and date and place 
of birth. Three and four years later he obtained renewal and 
replacement passports, respectively, in the same assumed identity. He 
was later arrested and pled guilty to making a false statement in an 
application for a passport. He was sentenced to time served (about 7 
months) and returned to California to stand trial for murdering his 
wife. In a third example, a woman obtained a U.S. passport for herself 
and her daughter using the assumed identity of a friend and that 
friend's daughter. The individual fled the country, but was eventually 
caught, returned to the United States, and tried for forgery, criminal 
impersonation, and child abduction. 

Various Other Methods Used to Fraudulently Obtain Passports: 

Applicants commit passport fraud through other means, including 
submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; child 
substitution; and counterfeit citizenship documents. Some fraudulently 
obtain new passports by claiming to have lost their passport or had it 
stolen or that it was damaged. For example, one individual who used 
another person's Social Security number and Ohio driver's license to 
report a lost passport obtained a replacement passport through the one- 
day expedited service. This fraudulently obtained passport was used to 
obtain entry into the United States 14 times in less than three years. 
Diplomatic Security officials told us that another means of passport 
fraud is when individuals obtain replacement passports by using expired 
passports containing photographs of individuals they closely resemble. 
This method of fraud is more easily and commonly committed with 
children, with false applications based on photographs of children who 
look similar to the child applicant.[Footnote 8] Assuming the identity 
of a deceased person is another means of fraudulently applying for a 
passport. Diplomatic Security investigated an individual who had been 
issued a passport in the identity of a deceased person and was 
receiving Social Security benefits in the deceased person's name. The 
individual was charged with making false statements on a passport 
application. 

Passports Used to Commit Other Crimes: 

According to State Bureau of Diplomatic Security documents, passport 
fraud is often commited in connection with other crimes, including 
narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and alien 
smuggling. According to Diplomatic Securityofficials, concerns exist 
within the law enforcement and intelligence communities that passport 
fraud could also be used to help facilitate acts of terrorism. Using a 
passport with a false identity helps enable criminals to conceal their 
movements and activities, according to a State Department document. 
U.S. passports provide their holders free passage into our country with 
much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens. U.S. passports 
also allow visa-free passage into many countries around the world, 
providing obvious benefits to criminals operating on an international 
scale. According to State officials, the most common crime associated 
with passport fraud is illegal immigration. For example, one woman was 
recently convicted for organizing and leading a large-scale passport 
fraud ring that involved recruiting American women to sell their 
children's identities, so that foreign nationals could fraudulently 
obtain passports and enter the United States illegally. According to 
the Department of State, the woman targeted drug-dependent women and 
their children, paying them about $300 for each identity and then using 
the identities to apply for passports. The woman then sold the 
fraudulently obtained passports to illegal aliens for as much as $6,000 
each. Other leaders of alien smuggling rings have also been recently 
convicted. One such ring had been smuggling hundreds of undocumented 
aliens from Ecuador and other parts of South America into the United 
States for fees of $12,000 to $14,000 each. 

State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts: 

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection 
efforts. Limited interagency information sharing between State and law 
enforcement and other agencies makes it more difficult to protect U.S. 
citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others who would harm the 
United States. Intra-agency information sharing between passport- 
issuing offices and headquarters, and between offices, is also limited 
because State lacks a centralized and up-to-date fraud library 
accessible by all staff. Additionally, insufficient fraud prevention 
staffing, training, and oversight has resulted in reduced fraud 
detection capabilities at the issuing offices. Finally, overstretched 
investigative resources within State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
and Office of Inspector General have prevented investigators from 
devoting adequate time and continuity to passport fraud investigations. 

Limited Interagency Information Sharing May Allow Individuals with 
Terrorism Ties and Criminal Fugitives to Obtain Passports: 

One of the key challenges to State's fraud detection efforts is limited 
interagency information sharing. State does not have access to certain 
information in the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) consolidated 
watch list database. Additionally, State's CLASS name-check system does 
not include names of all criminals wanted by federal and state law 
enforcement authorities. Further, access to information from other 
agencies varies. 

State Lacks Access to TSC Database: 

State currently lacks access to the names of U.S. citizen "persons of 
interest" in TSC's consolidated terrorist watch list database. TSC was 
created in 2003 to improve information sharing among government 
agencies. By consolidating terrorist watch lists, TSC is intended to 
enable federal agencies to access critical information quickly when a 
suspected terrorist is encountered or stopped within the United States, 
at the country's borders, or at embassies overseas. Because State's 
CLASS name-check database for passports does not contain the TSC 
information, U.S. citizens with possible ties to terrorism could 
potentially obtain passports and travel internationally without the 
knowledge of appropriate authorities. 

Although TSC has been operational since December 1, 2003, State and TSC 
did not begin exploring the possibility of systematically uploading 
data from TSC database into passport CLASS until December 2004. State 
initiated discussions with TSC after an official in State's Passport 
Services Office attended an interagency meeting and became aware that 
information on certain U.S. citizens was available in the TSC database. 
A TSC official told us that the center had devoted substantial effort 
in the first 16 months of its operation to reaching out to federal 
agencies that could benefit from TSC information. However, efforts to 
prevent the entry of or locate foreign citizens who would do harm to 
the United States had been a higher immediate priority in the early 
stages of operation than information-sharing efforts involving U.S. 
citizens. The official also noted that, while TSC plays an outreach 
role with other agencies, it is up to the individual agencies involved 
to define their own specific information requirements. 

State and TSC have not reached an agreement about the information- 
sharing proposal, though State sent an official proposal to TSC in 
January 2005. TSC has noted that it is in the process of addressing 
certain legal questions relating to privacy. A TSC official told us 
that she does not foresee any technical limitations because TSC already 
has an "elaborate interface" with State's CLASS system for visas. She 
added that TSC agrees that it is important to work out an agreement 
with State. 

State's CLASS Name-Check System Does Not Include Names of All Fugitives 
Wanted by Federal and State Law Enforcement Authorities: 

Because the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do not currently 
provide State with the names of all individuals wanted by federal law 
enforcement authorities, State's CLASS name-check system does not 
contain the names of many federal fugitives, some wanted for murder and 
other violent crimes; these fugitives could therefore obtain passports 
and potentially flee the country. The subjects of federal felony arrest 
warrants are not entitled to a U.S. passport. According to FBI 
officials, FBI databases contain the names of approximately 37,000 
individuals wanted on federal charges. State Department officials 
acknowledge that many of these individuals are not listed in CLASS. We 
tested the names of 43 different federal fugitives and found that just 
23 were in CLASS; therefore, passport examiners would not be alerted 
about the individuals' wanted status if any of the other 20 not in 
CLASS applied for a passport. One of these 20 did obtain a U.S. 
passport 17 months after the FBI had listed the individual in its 
database as wanted. 

A number of the 20 federal fugitives who were included in our test and 
were found not to be in CLASS were suspected of serious crimes, 
including murder. Table 1 lists the crimes suspected of the federal 
fugitives in our test. Fourteen were wanted by the FBI--including one 
on its Ten Most Wanted list (the names of all 14 were posted on the 
FBI's Web site). Six other fugitives not in CLASS were wanted by other 
federal agencies--two by the U.S. Marshal's Service; two by the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and two by the U.S. 
Postal Service. 

Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were 
Included in Our Test: 

Type of crime: Murder; 
Number of fugitives: 5. 

Type of crime: Felonious assault and related crimes; 
Number of fugitives: 2. 

Type of crime: Child sex offenses; 
Number of fugitives: 4. 

Type of crime: Drug trafficking; 
Number of fugitives: 3. 

Type of crime: Attempted murder; 
Number of fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Bombings; 
Number of fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Other crimes; 
Number of fugitives: 4. 

Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the 
State Department's CLASS name-check system. 

[End of table]

State officials told us they had not initiated efforts to improve 
information sharing with the FBI on passport-related matters until the 
summer of 2004 because they had previously been under the impression 
that the U.S. Marshal's Service was already sending to CLASS the names 
of all fugitives wanted by federal law enforcement authorities. The 
officials noted that the U.S. Marshal's Service had been cooperative in 
providing names to CLASS from its main database of fugitives. However, 
prior to the summer of 2004, State officials were not aware that the 
information in the U.S. Marshal's database was not as comprehensive as 
that contained in the FBI-operated National Crime Information Center 
database. State officials became aware of this situation when the union 
representing passport examiners brought to their attention that a 
number of individuals on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list were not in 
CLASS. 

In the summer of 2004, State requested, and the FBI agreed, to provide 
the names from the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list, though State officials 
told us they often obtain this information by periodically checking the 
FBI's Web site. As part of these discussions, State and FBI explored 
other information-sharing opportunities as well, and FBI headquarters 
officials sent a message instructing agents in its field offices how to 
provide names of U.S. citizens who are FBI fugitives (other than those 
from the Ten Most Wanted list) to State on a case-by-case basis. 
Additionally, State began discussions with the FBI about receiving 
information on individuals with FBI warrants on a more routine and 
comprehensive basis. During the most recent negotiations, in December 
2004, FBI officials told State officials that they would need a written 
proposal outlining State's specific technical and information needs, 
following which negotiations could begin to develop a formal agreement. 
One possibility that was discussed for additional name sharing was for 
the FBI to send State weekly extracts from its databases, while another 
possibility would be to give State officials the ability to access the 
FBI's wanted-persons database. According to State, it sent a written 
request to the FBI outlining its needs in April 2005. State also noted 
that it had reached agreement in principal with the FBI on information 
sharing efforts related to FBI fugitives. 

According to FBI officials, State requested that the FBI provide only 
the names of FBI fugitives and not those of individuals wanted by other 
federal law enforcement entities. A State official told us that the 
information provided by the U.S. Marshal's Service together with that 
to be requested from the FBI would enable State to meet its regulatory 
requirement that it not issue passports to subjects of federal felony 
arrest warrants. However, we noted that the limited information State 
was receiving on fugitives wanted by the U.S. Marshal's Service was not 
as comprehensive or up to date as State officials believed: two of nine 
individuals wanted by the U.S. Marshal's Service were not in CLASS at 
the time of our test. The FBI is the only law enforcement agency that 
systematically compiles comprehensive information on individuals wanted 
by all federal law enforcement agencies, and, according to FBI 
officials, it is the logical agency to provide such comprehensive 
information to State. 

The FBI is also the only law enforcement agency that compiles 
comprehensive information on individuals wanted by state and local 
authorities. According to FBI officials, FBI databases contain the 
names of approximately 1.2 million individuals wanted on state and 
local charges nationwide. FBI officials told us they believed it would 
be more useful for State to have a more comprehensive list of names 
that included both federal and state fugitives. These officials pointed 
out that some of the most serious crimes committed often involve only 
state and local charges. We tested the names of 24 different state 
fugitives and found that just 7 were in CLASS; therefore, the CLASS 
system would not flag any of the other 17, were they to apply for a 
passport.[Footnote 9] Table 2 lists the crimes suspected of the 17 
state fugitives not in CLASS who were included in our test. 

Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were 
Included in Our Test: 

Type of crime: Murder; 
Number of fugitives: 4. 

Type of crime: Felonious assault and related crimes; 
Number of fugitives: 7. 

Type of crime: Child sex offenses; 
Number of fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Attempted murder; 
Number of fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Child kidnapping; 
Number of fugitives: 1. 

Type of crime: Other crimes; 
Number of fugitives: 3. 

Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the 
State Department's CLASS name-check system. 

[End of table]

State Department officials told us that having a comprehensive list of 
names that included both federal and state fugitives could "clog" 
State's CLASS system and slow the passport adjudication process. They 
also expressed concern that the course of action required of State 
would not always be clear for cases involving passport applicants 
wanted on state charges. The officials pointed out that, though the law 
is specific about denying passports to individuals wanted on federal 
felony charges, the law was not as clear cut about doing so in the case 
of state fugitives. However, FBI officials told us that, at a minimum, 
State could notify law enforcement authorities that such individuals 
were applying for a passport. Then, the relevant law enforcement 
authorities could make their own determination about whether to obtain 
a court order that would provide a legal basis for denying the passport 
or to simply arrest the individual or take some other action. State 
officials noted that, to work effectively, such an arrangement would 
require the FBI to establish some sort of liaison office that State 
could contact in such instances. 

Access to Information from Other Agencies Varies: 

State receives varying degrees of information from several other 
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), and individual state departments of motor 
vehicles. 

* Health and Human Services provides names of parents who have been 
certified by a state agency as owing more than $5,000 in child support 
payments and are therefore not eligible for a U.S. passport. According 
to State officials, this information-sharing arrangement has been very 
successful in preventing such individuals from obtaining passports. 

* State is negotiating with DHS to gain access to naturalization 
records to verify applicants' citizenship. State officials currently 
rely on ad hoc information from DHS colleagues, according to Passport 
Services officials, and irregular notifications from DHS when 
fraudulent passports are confiscated. 

* State currently uses limited information from Social Security records 
which are quickly becoming outdated that SSA provided to State on a one-
time basis in 2002. Though State and SSA signed an April 2004 
memorandum of understanding giving State access to SSA's main database 
to help verify passport applicant's identity, the memorandum had not 
been implemented as of March 2005 because the system was still being 
tested to ensure SSA privacy standards. The agreement will not include 
access to SSA death records, though State officials said they are 
exploring the possibility of obtaining these records in the future. 

* Issuing office officials have contact with officials in individual 
state departments of motor vehicles to confirm, for example, the 
physical characteristics of individuals presenting drivers licenses as 
identification. However, these are informal contacts cultivated by 
individual State officials. 

Limited Intra-agency Information Sharing and Unclear Fraud Support 
Responsibilities May Be Affecting Fraud Detection Capability: 

State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud 
prevention library, which would enable passport-issuing office 
personnel in the United States, and overseas, to efficiently share 
fraud prevention information and tools. As a result, fraud prevention 
information is provided inconsistently to examiners among the 16 
domestic offices. Though offices share information through local fraud 
prevention files or by e-mailing relevant fraud updates, the types and 
amount of information shared with passport examiners in each office 
vary widely. For example, at some offices, examiners maintain 
individual sets of fraud prevention materials. Some print out 
individual fraud alerts and other related documents and file them in 
binders. Others archive individual e-mails and other documents 
electronically. Some examiners told us that the sheer volume of fraud- 
related materials they receive makes it impossible to maintain and use 
these resources in an organized and systematic way. 

In contrast, the issuing office in Seattle developed its own online 
fraud library that contained comprehensive information and links on 
fraud alerts nationwide. Some information was organized by individual 
state, including information such as the specific serial numbers of 
blank birth certificates that were stolen. The library contained 
sections on Social Security information, government documents related 
to U.S. territories, recent fraud updates, and fraud-related news, 
among other information. It included examples of legitimate as well as 
counterfeit naturalization certificates, false driver's licenses, fraud 
prevention training materials, and a host of other fraud prevention 
information resources and links. Seattle offered a static version of 
its library on CD-ROM to other issuing offices at an interoffice fraud 
prevention conference in 2003. A few of the other offices used this 
resource to varying degrees, but their versions have not been regularly 
updated since 2003. An Office of Consular Fraud Prevention official 
told us that they uploaded at least some of the information onto its 
Web site, but that material has not been regularly updated, either. The 
developer of the library has since been reassigned. Most of the 16 
fraud prevention managers we talked to believed that the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs should maintain one centralized, up-to-date fraud 
prevention library, similar to the Seattle-developed model, that serves 
offices nationwide. 

Consular Affairs' Office of Consular Fraud Prevention maintains a Web 
site and "e-room" with some information on fraud alerts, lost and 
stolen state birth documents, and other resources related to fraud 
detection, though fraud prevention officials told us the Web site is 
not kept up to date, is poorly organized, and is difficult to navigate. 
Fraud prevention officials also told us that most of the information on 
the site relates to visas rather than U.S. passports. We directly 
observed information available on this Web site and in the "e-room" 
during separate visits to State's passport-issuing offices and noted 
that some of the material was outdated. For example, in September 2004, 
we noted that certain information on state birth and death records had 
not been updated since September 2003 and that information on 
fraudulent U.S. passports had not been updated in more than a year. 

In addition to limited information sharing, State's fraud prevention 
support services are not closely coordinated with the passport-issuing 
offices. Multiple headquarters offices, including the Office of 
Consular Fraud Prevention and Office of Passport Policy Planning and 
Legal Advisory Services, claim some responsibility for fraud trend 
analysis and fraud prevention support but fraud detection personnel in 
issuing offices are unclear as to which offices provide which services. 
Most of the 16 fraud prevention managers we interviewed said they do 
not clearly understand the respective roles of these headquarters 
offices in helping them with their fraud detection efforts. Also, while 
officials in these two offices said they are responsible for analyzing 
fraud-related data to identify national or region-specific trends on 
factors such as the types, methods, and perpetrators of fraud, most 
fraud prevention managers told us they could not recall having received 
much analysis on fraud trends from these offices beyond individual 
fraud alerts. We noted that the Office of Passport Policy Planning and 
Legal Advisory Services only recently began to perform some basic fraud 
trend analysis on a systematic basis.[Footnote 10] Office of Consular 
Fraud Prevention officials told us they spend most of their time on 
visa fraud because each domestic agency has its own fraud detection 
apparatus. While this office provides some training services, these are 
limited, and much other training is provided by issuing offices and is 
not coordinated with headquarters. 

Insufficient Fraud Prevention Staffing, Training, Oversight, and 
Investigative Resources Make Fraud Detection More Difficult: 

Limited fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and 
investigative resources pose additional challenges to fraud detection 
efforts. A staffing realignment reduced the time available to Fraud 
Prevention Mangers to review cases and make decisions on fraud 
referrals. Additionally, interoffice transfers of passport 
adjudications have, in some cases, led to fewer fraud referrals back to 
the originating offices. Further, State's lack of a standard refresher 
training curriculum and schedule has led to uneven provision of such 
training. Additionally, sporadic training and limited oversight of 
passport application acceptance agents constitute a significant fraud 
vulnerability. Finally, overstretched investigative resources hinder 
fraud detection efforts. 

Staffing Change Reduced Time Available to Review Fraud Cases: 

In January 2004, State eliminated the assistant fraud prevention 
manager position that had existed at most of its domestic passport- 
issuing offices, and most Fraud Prevention Managers believe that this 
action was harmful to their fraud detection program, in part by 
overextending their own responsibilities. State eliminated the 
permanent role of assistant primarily to expand participation of senior 
passport examiners serving in that role on a rotational basis; the 
purpose was to help the examiners gain a deeper knowledge of the 
subject matter and, in turn, enhance overall fraud detection efforts 
when the examiners returned to adjudicating passport applications. 
[Footnote 11] Prior to the permanent position being abolished, 12 of 
the 16 passport issuing offices had at least one assistant manager (2 
offices had two).[Footnote 12] Of the 4 offices that did not have 
permanent assistants, 3 did not have them because they had relatively 
low workloads and 1 had been in operation only for a few years and had 
not yet filled the position. Managers at 10 of the 12 offices that had 
assistants told us that the loss of this position had been harmful to 
their fraud detection program. In particular, managers indicated that 
the loss of their assistant impacted their own ability to concentrate 
on fraud detection by adding to their workload significant additional 
training, administrative, and networking responsibilities. Fraud 
Prevention Managers also said that taking on their assistant's tasks 
had diverted their attention from their fraud trend analysis as well as 
their preparation of reports to Washington, D.C., and cases for 
referral to Diplomatic Security. Some managers said they are now 
performing more case work than before because they lack an experienced 
assistant and do not always believe they can rely on rotating staff to 
do this work unsupervised. 

Fraud Prevention Managers and other State officials have linked 
declining fraud referrals to the loss of the assistant fraud prevention 
manager position. In the 12 offices that previously had permanent 
assistants, fraud referral rates from the managers to Diplomatic 
Security decreased overall by almost 25 percent from fiscal year 2003 
through 2004,[Footnote 13] the period during which the position was 
eliminated, and this percentage was much higher in some 
offices.[Footnote 14] Fraud Prevention offices screen fraud referrals 
received from examiners, perform certain checks on applicant 
information, and assess the examiner's rationale for making the 
referral before the fraud prevention manager can determine whether to 
refer the case to Diplomatic Security for further investigation. 
Without their assistants helping them with these and other duties, 
managers said they are making fewer fraud referrals to Diplomatic 
Security because they lack the time and do not believe they can fully 
rely on new rotational staff to take on this responsibility. In one 
issuing office where referrals to Diplomatic Security were down 41 
percent, the manager indicated that loss of his assistant had slowed 
his ability to get cases to Diplomatic Security because he had to 
perform many of the assistant's duties. A Diplomatic Security agent in 
another issuing office, where the fraud referral rate was down by 55 
percent, said the overall effect of eliminating the assistant manager 
position had been harmful to fraud detection efforts at least in part 
because the permanently assigned assistants had developed valuable 
personal contacts and cooperative arrangements over time with state and 
local law enforcement authorities, department of motor vehicle 
officials, and others, and that such relationships could not be easily 
developed or maintained by rotating staff. 

Most Fraud Prevention Managers acknowledged the value of having senior 
examiners rotate into the fraud prevention office for temporary 
assignments; however, the managers said that rotating staff should 
augment the efforts of a permanent assistant and not serve in place of 
that role. Passport Services management told us they were not planning 
to re-establish the permanent assistant role,[Footnote 15] but that 
they are in the process of filling one to two additional fraud 
prevention manager positions at each of the 2 offices with the largest 
workloads nationwide. Both of these offices operate multiple shifts 
each workday, and the new managers are intended to provide more 
comprehensive fraud prevention support for all of the shifts. State 
also plans to establish one additional fraud prevention manager 
position at another issuing office with a large workload. There are no 
current plans for additional positions at any of the other 13 offices. 

Interoffice Transfers of Passport Adjudication Workload Result, in Some 
Cases, in Fewer Fraud Referrals Back to Originating Office: 

As adjudication workload and production capacity fluctuate at 
individual passport-issuing offices, State routinely transfers 
adjudication cases among the different offices to keep workload and 
capacity in balance at each location. Fraud Prevention Managers at a 
number of issuing offices said they had noticed that a lower percentage 
of fraud referrals are being returned to them from the 3 offices that 
were assigned the bulk of workload transfers from other 
offices.[Footnote 16] The Fraud Prevention Managers noted that, over 
the course of a year, the many thousands of passport applications 
originating from one particular region should generally be expected to 
generate a consistent rate of fraud referrals. In fiscal year 2004, 28 
percent of passport applications were transferred to 1 of these 3 
offices for adjudication, while other issuing offices adjudicated 72 
percent. Although these 3 offices received 28 percent of the 
applications, they provided only 11 percent of total fraud referrals to 
the originating agencies; the other 89 percent were provided by 
regional agency passport examiners (74 percent) and others, including 
acceptance agents (15 percent). For fiscal year 2003, the 3 processing 
centers adjudicated 26 percent of the applications but provided only 8 
percent of the fraud referrals. In 2004, 1 of the issuing offices 
transferred out to processing centers 63 percent of its applications 
(about 287,000) but received back from the processing centers only 2 
percent of the fraud referrals it generated that year. In 2003, this 
office transferred out 66 percent of its workload, while receiving back 
only 8 percent of its total fraud referrals. 

Fraud Prevention Managers and other officials told us that one reason 
fewer fraud referrals return from these 3 offices is that passport 
examiners handling workload transfers from a number of different 
regions are not as familiar with the demographics, neighborhoods, and 
other local characteristics of a particular region as are the examiners 
who live and work there. For example, some officials noted that, in 
instances when they suspect fraud, they might telephone the applicants 
to ask for additional information so they can engage in polite 
conversation and ask casual questions, such as where they grew up, what 
school they attended, and other information. The officials noted that, 
since they are familiar with at least some of the neighborhoods and 
schools in the area, applicants' answers to such questions may quickly 
indicate whether their application is likely to be fraudulent. One 
examiner in an office that handled workload transfers from areas with 
large Spanish-speaking populations said that the office had an 
insufficient number of examiners who were fluent in Spanish. She and 
other officials emphasized the usefulness of that skill in detecting 
dialects, accents, handwriting, and cultural references that conflict 
with information provided in passport applications. Moreover, some 
officials added that passport examiners at centers handling workload 
transfers are not always well trained in region-specific fraud 
indicators and do not have the same opportunity to interact directly 
with applicants as do the examiners working at public counters in 
regional offices. 

State Lacks Established Refresher Training Curriculum; Such Training Is 
Provided Unevenly across Offices: 

State has not established a core curriculum and ongoing training 
requirements for experienced passport examiners, and thus such training 
is provided unevenly at different passport-issuing offices. While State 
recently developed a standardized training program for new hires that 
was first given in August 2004, the Fraud Prevention Managers at each 
passport-issuing office have developed their own fraud detection 
refresher training approaches and materials. We reviewed the training 
programs and materials at all 7 issuing offices we visited and 
discussed the programs and materials at other offices with the 
remaining nine Fraud Prevention Managers by telephone and found that 
the topics covered and the amount and depth of training varied widely 
by office. Some had developed region-specific materials; others relied 
more heavily on materials that had been developed by passport officials 
in Washington, D.C., much of which were outdated. Some scheduled more 
regular training sessions, and others held training more sporadically. 
Several examiners told us they had not received any formal, interactive 
fraud prevention training in at least 4 years. 

Some Fraud Prevention Managers hold brief discussions on specific fraud 
cases and trends at monthly staff meetings, and they rely on these 
discussions to serve as refresher training. Some Fraud Prevention 
Managers occasionally invite officials from other government agencies, 
such as the Secret Service or DHS, to share their fraud expertise. 
However, these meetings take place when time is available and may be 
canceled during busy periods. For example, officials at one issuing 
office said the monthly meetings had not been held for several months 
because of high workload; another manager said he rarely has time for 
any monthly meetings; and two others said they do not hold such 
discussions but e-mail to examiners recent fraud trend alerts and 
information. 

Sporadic Training and Limited Oversight of Acceptance Agents Constitute 
Significant Fraud Vulnerability: 

Numerous passport-issuing agency officials and Diplomatic Security 
investigators told us that the acceptance agent program is a 
significant fraud vulnerability. Examples of acceptance agent problems 
that were brought to our attention include important information 
missing from documentation, such as evidence that birth certificates 
and parents' affidavits concerning permission for children to travel 
had been received, and identification photos that did not match the 
applicant presenting the documentation. Officials at one issuing office 
said that their office often sees the same mistakes multiple times from 
the same agency. 

These officials attributed problems with applications received through 
acceptance agents to the sporadic training provided for and limited 
oversight of acceptance agents. State has almost 7,000 passport 
acceptance agency offices, and none of the 16 issuing offices provide 
comprehensive annual training or oversight to all acceptance agency 
offices in their area. Instead, the issuing offices concentrate their 
training and oversight visits on agency offices geographically nearest 
to the issuing offices, those in large population centers, those where 
examiners and Fraud Prevention Managers had reported problems, and 
those in high fraud areas.[Footnote 17] Larger issuing offices in 
particular have trouble reaching acceptance agency staff. At one larger 
issuing office with about 1,700 acceptance facilities, the Fraud 
Prevention Manager said he does not have time to provide acceptance 
agent training and that it is difficult for issuing office staff to 
visit many agencies. A manager at another large issuing office that 
covers an area including 11 states said she does not have time to visit 
some agencies in less populated areas and concentrates her efforts in 
higher fraud areas, which tend to be in the larger cities. 

Officials at one issuing agency noted that State had worked together 
with the U.S. Postal Service to develop CD-ROM training for use at 
Postal Service acceptance facilities. The officials noted that, while 
they believed the training had been well designed, State does not have 
any way of tracking whether all postal employees responsible for 
accepting passport applications actually receive the training. 
Additionally, issuing office officials also said that acceptance agent 
staff should receive training from outside agencies such as state 
departments of motor vehicles, local police, and the FBI on document 
authenticity and fraud. Other issuing office officials said acceptance 
agents should also receive interview training. 

Finally, while State officials told us it is a requirement that all 
acceptance agency staff be U.S. citizens, issuing agency officials told 
us they have no way of verifying that all of them are. Management 
officials at one passport-issuing office told us that, while their 
region included more than 1,000 acceptance facilities, the office did 
not maintain records of the names of individuals accepting passport 
applications at those facilities and the office did not keep track of 
how many individuals acted in this capacity at those facilities. 

Overstretched Investigative Resources Hinder Fraud Detection: 

Although State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security has provided additional 
resources for investigating passport fraud in recent years, its agents 
must still divide their time among a number of competing demands, some 
of which are considered a higher priority than investigating passport 
fraud. A Diplomatic Security official told us that, after the September 
11 terrorist attacks, the bureau hired about 300 additional agents, at 
least partially to reduce investigative backlogs.[Footnote 18] 
Diplomatic Security and passport officials told us that, while the 
increased staff resources had helped reduce backlogs to some degree, 
agents assigned to passport fraud investigations are still routinely 
pulled away for other assignments. For example, a significant number of 
agents from field offices across the country are required to serve on 
"protective detail" in New York when the United Nations General 
Assembly convenes and at various other diplomatic events. We found that 
at most of the offices we visited during our fieldwork, few of the 
agents responsible for investigating passport fraud were actually 
physically present. At one office, all of the agents responsible for 
investigating passport fraud were on temporary duty elsewhere, and the 
one agent who was covering the office in their absence had left his 
assignment at the local Joint Terrorism Task Force to do so. A number 
of agents were on temporary assignments overseas in connection with the 
2004 Summer Olympics in Greece. Agents at one office said that five of 
the eight agents involved in passport fraud investigations there were 
being sent for temporary duty in Iraq, as were many of their colleagues 
at other offices. 

Agents at all but 2 of the 7 bureau field offices we visited said they 
are unable to devote adequate time and continuity to investigating 
passport fraud because of the competing demands on their time. The 
agents expressed concerns about the resulting vulnerability to the 
integrity of the U.S. passport system. We noted that the number of new 
passport fraud investigations had declined by more than 25 percent over 
the last five years, though Diplomatic Security officials attributed 
this trend, among other factors, to refined targeting of cases that 
merit investigation. A number of Diplomatic Security agents pointed out 
that passport fraud investigations are often "time sensitive" and that 
opportunities to solve cases are often lost when too much time elapses 
before investigative efforts are initiated or when such efforts occur 
in fits and starts. The rotation of Diplomatic Security agents to new 
permanent duty stations every 2 or 3 years also makes it more difficult 
to maintain continuity for individual investigations. Passport-issuing 
office officials told us that cases referred to Diplomatic Security 
sometimes take a year or more to investigate. The officials also said 
that the investigating agents often do not have time to apprise 
passport-issuing offices of the status of individual investigations 
and, thus, that the opportunity to convey valuable "real-time" feedback 
on the quality of fraud referrals was lost. The Special-Agent-in-Charge 
of a large Diplomatic Security field office in a high fraud region 
expressed serious concern that, in 2002, the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security began requiring that most cases be closed after 12 months, 
whether or not the investigations were complete. This requirement was 
meant to reduce the backlog of old cases. The agent said that about 400 
cases at his office were closed before the investigations were complete 
and that this action had taken place over his strenuous objection. A 
Diplomatic Security official in Washington, D.C., told us that, while 
field offices had been encouraged to close old cases that were not 
likely to be resolved, there had not been a formal requirement to close 
all cases that had remained open beyond a specific time limit. 

State officials agreed that Diplomatic Security agents are not 
currently able to devote adequate attention to investigating passport 
fraud. State officials told us that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
plans to hire 56 new investigative agents over the next few years to 
augment passport fraud investigation resources at each Diplomatic 
Security field office nationwide. According to State officials, these 
new investigators will be solely dedicated to investigating passport 
and visa fraud and will not participate in protective details or other 
temporary duties that would distract them from their investigative 
work. The new hires are to be civil service employees and will not be 
subject to the frequent rotations to new duty stations that regular 
Diplomatic Security agents experience as foreign-service officers. 

State Department OIG officials told us that the OIG also has authority 
to investigate passport fraud. However, OIG officials told us that 
budgetary constraints and related staffing reductions in recent years 
had severely restricted its ability to investigate such fraud. The OIG 
has invested more resources in efforts to pursue visa fraud, primarily 
because visa fraud is more prevalent than passport fraud. The OIG has 
focused most of its more recent passport-related efforts on assessing 
systematic weaknesses in fraud detection efforts. The idea was to 
produce broad findings that would be of greater benefit than individual 
passport fraud investigations could be expected to yield with such a 
low investment of staff resources available. 

Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection Remains 
Unclear: 

Although State's approach to developing new nationwide passport 
examiner production standards, which were implemented in January 2004, 
raises a number of methodological concerns, subsequent changes to the 
standards make an assessment of their impact on fraud detection 
premature. State intended that the new nationwide standards would make 
performance expectations and work processes more uniform among its 16 
issuing offices. State tested examiner production capabilities before 
standardizing the passport examination process and used the test 
results in conjunction with old standards to set new nationwide 
standards. The new standards put additional emphasis on achieving 
quantitative targets. Responding to concerns about their fairness, 
State made a number of modifications to the production standards during 
the year, making it unclear what impact the standards have had on 
passport fraud detection. 

Methodological Concerns Exist Regarding State's Development and 
Implementation of New Performance Standards: 

Consular Affairs officials stated that they created nationwide 
production standards to make performance expectations of examiners and 
the passport examination process as similar as possible at all domestic 
passport offices. Though the issuing offices already had production 
standards for their examiners, the average number of cases examiners 
were expected to adjudicate per hour varied from office to office, 
creating confusion and raising questions about equity among passport 
examiners, according to State officials. In an effort to identify 
reasonable production standards that would be applicable nationwide, 
State tested examiner production capabilities at all of its domestic 
passport-issuing offices. Issuing office management in each of the 16 
offices measured the number of passport cases completed by each 
examiner over a two-week period in April 2003 and computed the hourly 
average for their office. Management did not inform examiners that 
their production rates were being measured for the test. 

Passport Services officials set the new performance standards, but they 
did not fully standardize some work processes and methods of counting 
production until after the new numbers were set. After considering 
nationwide test results, offices' old standards, and passport office 
partnership council feedback,[Footnote 19] headquarters officials at 
Passport Services decided on the new standards for both desk and 
counter adjudication. The new standards were implemented in January 
2004 and varied by pay grade level. After deciding on the production 
standards, State standardized the work processes and counting methods 
that were the basis of examiners' production averages. For example, 
State officials encouraged all domestic passport offices to include 
expedited cases in examiners' production averages to make examiners' 
work more comparable nationwide, though some examiners and issuing 
office managers said expedited cases take longer to complete because 
they require additional steps. Also, State's decision to base 
examiner's production averages on a 7-hour day starting in January 2004 
marked a change for offices that previously had measured production 
based on a 6½-or 7½-hour day. 

State's decision to measure and compile nationwide production averages 
before fully standardizing the application examination process and the 
way completed cases are counted at the passport-issuing offices limited 
the validity of State's test results. GAO has reported that consistency 
is a key element for data reliability and that the data obtained and 
used must be clear and well-defined enough to yield similar results in 
similar analyses. However, we found that State had attempted to 
uniformly measure production capacity at its 16 issuing offices when 
the individual offices were still using differing work processes and 
methods of counting production. Upon visiting 7 of the 16 offices after 
the new standards had been implemented, we found that several 
differences in passport adjudication practices and methods for counting 
production still existed. For example, at some offices, the more 
complex and time-consuming cases were included in examiner production 
averages, while at other offices they were not. In addition, issuing 
office and headquarters management told us that contract staff at some 
issuing offices performed certain tasks that helped speed up examiner 
production, while such tasks were performed by examiners at other 
offices. State told us 5 months after they had implemented the 
standards that domestic offices' requirements for counting completed 
cases still varied and that this situation could make it easier for 
examiners at some offices to meet their production standard. State 
officials acknowledged that these processes and procedures should be 
standardized to ensure that the standards are fair. If State had 
standardized its work processes and procedures for measuring 
performance before testing production, the test would presumably have 
produced more valid results that could have been used to set uniformly 
attainable production standards. 

Production Standards' Effect on Fraud Detection Unclear: 

Because State adjusted the impact of production on examiners' 
evaluations, the production standards implemented in 2004 placed 
increased pressure on examiners to focus on production numbers. Before 
State introduced the new standards, quantitative production 
requirements were grouped together with qualitative measures for 
performance ratings. For example, one former evaluative element paired 
the requirement that a GS-11 examiner adjudicate 25 to 28 cases per 
hour with a qualitative assessment of the examiner's overall knowledge 
of the adjudication process. Supervisors and management officials at 
some of the domestic passport offices we visited said that if in 
previous years examiners failed to meet their minimum production 
number, the supervisor could still rate the examiner fully successful 
based on better performance against qualitative standards within the 
same rating element. However, the 2004 standards separated the 
quantitative performance measures--production numbers and error rates-
-from qualitative elements. Examiners not meeting the minimum hourly 
production average for the year were to receive an unsuccessful rating 
on that performance element, regardless of qualitative 
performance.[Footnote 20] An unsuccessful rating in one element results 
in an unsuccessful rating overall, even if the examiner rates 
outstanding in the other three skill elements. State officials said 
they made this change to clarify the criteria on which examiners were 
rated. 

Since the new production standards were set, State has incorporated 
computer upgrades and process changes that have enhanced fraud 
detection, but may have slowed the examination process. For example, at 
passport office counters, State upgraded the computer system to allow 
examiners to perform cashiering functions and to produce a receipt 
immediately for all financial transactions, thus adding time to each 
case requiring a fee. In addition, State added a page to the standard 
passport application in March 2005, thus requiring more information 
from each new applicant. Headquarters officials, regional office 
managers, and examiners agreed that these changes enhance fraud 
prevention efforts. But while they were pleased with the enhanced fraud 
detection capabilities, some examiners and examiners' union 
representatives told us the changes may slow production now that 
examiners are required, for example, to scrutinize longer applications. 

Passport examiners and union officials argue that the new standards' 
emphasis on production combined with changes to the examination process 
have made it more difficult to meet the new production standards 
without shortcutting fraud detection efforts. Some examiners we talked 
to said changes to annual evaluation criteria and to the examination 
process put additional pressure on them to focus on their numbers more 
than their efforts to detect fraud. Some also told us they believe the 
new standards were evidence that management prioritizes quantity of 
work over quality. Union representatives said examiners frequently 
complain that, to achieve their number targets, they have to skip 
required steps in the examination process or scrutinize applications 
less thoroughly than necessary to adequately detect fraud. A number of 
examiners at each domestic office we visited either stated they take 
shortcuts themselves or know colleagues who do. Some said, for example, 
they do not thoroughly check Social Security information provided on 
the computerized examination software against the information on the 
individual's application. Others reported they do not thoroughly check 
all "hits" generated by the computer software--information that may 
help identify applicants flagged as fugitives or raise other concerns 
in one of State's passport-related databases. An examiner noted that 
most hits, when further scrutinized, prove to be invalid, and thus the 
chances of missing a valid hit were low. Union representatives said 
they are hesitant to share such examples with passport management 
because examiners fear negative repercussions. 

Headquarters and regional office management said it is difficult to 
assess the number or magnitude of shortcuts being taken and the impact 
of shortcuts on fraud detection. Management officials at some of the 
offices we visited said supervisors audit only a limited percentage of 
cases after they are examined and that audits would not necessarily 
reveal that examiners had taken shortcuts. The impact of shortcuts on 
fraud detection is also difficult to assess because the overall 
incidence of detected fraud is low. One examiner noted that if she 
failed to check any fraud indicators at all and granted a passport to 
every applicant, she would be right more than 99 percent of the time. 
State data show that less than one-half of 1 percent of applications in 
2004 were identified as potential frauds. 

Because State has modified the 2004 production standards in response to 
management, union, and examiner concerns, the standards' effect on 
fraud detection is unclear. State officials told us that, from the 
outset of implementing the production standards, they had planned to 
reassess the standards regularly and to adjust them as necessary. In 
July 2004, State responded to a union suggestion to reduce by one-half 
hour the number of daily work hours used to calculate the hourly 
production average, thus acknowledging that time examiners spend doing 
essential tasks, such as reading e-mail updates, should not be factored 
into their hourly production averages. Both desk and counter 
examination production standards were lowered during 2004, and certain 
offices were exempted from either desk or counter measurement due to 
regional workload variations. One such exemption occurred in September 
2004, when State informed regional management that neither New York nor 
Hawaii should rate examiners on desk examination production averages in 
2004 because their desk workloads were too low to enable a fair rating 
of examiners. Also, headquarters passport management lowered the 
counter production requirement for GS-9 and GS-11 passport examiners 
retroactive to January 1, 2004. While about 63 examiners were not 
achieving the required production rate after the first quarter of 2004, 
all but 18 of State's approximately 480 examiners nationwide had met 
the standards by the end of the year. Because State's changes to the 
production standards continued throughout 2004, the standards' net 
effect on fraud detection efforts remains unclear. 

Conclusions: 

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is an essential 
component of State's efforts to help protect U.S. citizens from those 
who would harm the United States. The steadily increasing volume of 
passports issued each year underscores the importance of this task. 
State has a range of tools and resources at its disposal to help detect 
passport fraud, and it has taken a number of important measures in 
recent years to enhance its efforts in this area. However, State still 
faces a number of key challenges. Included among them is limited 
information sharing with TSC, the FBI, and other agencies, making it 
more difficult to protect the United States from terrorists, criminals, 
and others. State has begun working with these agencies to address this 
problem and is dependent on their cooperation to remedy it. Limited 
intra-agency information sharing and insufficient fraud prevention 
staffing, training, oversight, and investigative resources also make 
fraud detection more difficult. Together, these challenges constitute a 
serious concern to the overall effort to secure the borders of the 
United States and protect its citizens. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the coordination and execution of passport fraud detection 
efforts, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following six 
actions: 

* Expedite, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney General, Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Secretary of Homeland 
Security, arrangements to enhance interagency information sharing, and 
reach agreement on a plan and timetable for doing so, to ensure that 
State's CLASS system for passports contains a more comprehensive list 
of individuals identified in the Terrorist Screening Center database as 
well as state and federal fugitives and that such information is made 
available to State in an efficient and timely manner. 

* Establish and maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud 
prevention library that would enable passport agency personnel at 
different locations across the United States to efficiently access and 
share fraud prevention information and tools. 

* Consider designating additional positions for fraud prevention 
coordination and training in some domestic passport-issuing offices. 

* Assess the extent to which and reasons why workload transfers from 
one domestic passport-issuing office to another were, in some cases, 
associated with fewer fraud referrals, and take any corrective action 
that may be necessary. 

* Establish a core curriculum and ongoing fraud prevention training 
requirements for all passport examiners, and program adequate time for 
such training into the staffing and assignment processes at passport- 
issuing offices. 

* Strengthen fraud prevention training efforts and oversight of 
passport acceptance agents. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. 
II). State generally concurred with our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. State indicated that it had agreed in principle with 
the FBI on information-sharing arrangements concerning subjects of 
federal felony arrest warrants and planned to establish an automated 
mechanism for obtaining information from the FBI on the subjects of 
state warrants. State said that it was designing a centralized passport 
"knowledgebase" for passport examiners that includes information on 
fraud prevention resources. It said it would consider rotating GS-12 
Adjudication Supervisors through local fraud prevention offices to 
relieve Fraud Prevention Managers of some of their training 
responsibilities. State is also establishing a standardized national 
training program for passport examiners, instituting a regular 
nationwide quality review program for passport acceptance agent work, 
and adapting and expanding computer-based training for U.S. Postal 
Service acceptance facilities for more widespread use among acceptance 
agents nationwide. State did not address our recommendation that it 
assess the extent to which and reasons why workload transfers from one 
domestic passport issuing-office to another were, in some cases, 
associated with fewer fraud referrals and to take any corrective action 
that may be necessary. 

The FBI also reviewed a draft of this report for technical accuracy. 
The FBI's comments have been incorporated into the report, as 
appropriate. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 
30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to 
interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. We will 
also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Additional 
GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Jess T. Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To examine how passport fraud is committed, we reviewed State 
Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security closed passport fraud case 
files and Bureau of Consular Affairs statistics on passport fraud. We 
also met with officials at State's Diplomatic Security Headquarters 
Criminal Division and at Diplomatic Security's Field Office in Miami 
and conducted telephone interviews with Diplomatic Security officials 
at field offices in Chicago and San Francisco. 

To identify and assess the key challenges State faces in detecting 
passport fraud, we directly observed State's fraud detection efforts at 
7 of its 16 domestic passport-issuing offices; tested State's use of 
electronic databases for fraud detection; analyzed fraud referral 
statistics from the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic 
Security; and interviewed cognizant officials in both of these bureaus. 
We visited State's passport-issuing offices in Charleston, South 
Carolina; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New York; Seattle; and 
Washington, D.C. We chose these fieldwork locations to gain an 
appropriate mix of geographic coverage, workload, levels and types of 
passport fraud, and counter-to-desk adjudication ratios. In addition, 
we chose the Charleston office because it is one of the two passport 
"megacenters" responsible for adjudicating applications from other 
regions. 

To test the electronic databases that State uses to help detect fraud, 
we ran the names of 67 different federal and state fugitives against 
State's CLASS name-check system. Our test was not intended to employ a 
representative sample, and we did not generalize our results to the 
universe of wanted U.S. citizens. The test results were intended to 
provide a firsthand illustration of a problem that State and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials acknowledge exists. 

* We selected names of individuals with federal and state warrants from 
a variety of government agencies and offices--the FBI; U.S. Marshal's 
Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Drug 
Enforcement Administration; U.S. Postal Service; and various state and 
local law enforcement offices. Many of the names were taken from 
publicly available Internet sites, including those operated by the FBI 
and Department of Justice. 

* We verified that all of the individuals were listed as "wanted" in 
the FBI's national criminal database as of the date of our test in 
December 2004. 

* In December 2004, we supervised the entry of the name and date of 
birth of each of the 67 fugitives into State's system by an Office of 
Passport Services official. Three GAO employees verified each entry's 
accuracy. 

* For each entry, we recorded whether State's system contained a record 
of that fugitive and, if it did, we noted the type of "lookout" that 
had been entered, such as wanted person information from the U.S. 
Marshal's Service or a child support "lookout" from Health and Human 
Services. 

We analyzed fraud referral statistics from the Consular Affairs Office 
of Passport Services and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for fiscal 
years 2000 through 2004. We reviewed the statistics and verified their 
accuracy by comparing select data with the individual issuing offices' 
monthly reports that are State's original source for compiling these 
data. Together with Passport Services officials, we identified the 
methods used to capture and compile the data and determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable and generally usable for the purposes 
of our study. We did not use data elements that we did not deem 
reliable. 

At each of the 7 offices we visited, we conducted interviews with 
officials such as the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, 
Fraud Prevention Manager, Adjudication Manager, Customer Service 
Manager, supervisors, and certain passport examiners.[Footnote 21] We 
interviewed some examiners who expressed an interest in meeting with us 
and chose others at random. We conducted telephone interviews with the 
Fraud Prevention Managers at all 9 of the offices that we did not 
visit, using a list of questions identical to that used in interviews 
with their counterparts at offices we visited. We also met with 
Diplomatic Security agents attached to field offices responsible for 
investigating fraud suspected at the offices we visited. In addition, 
we interviewed cognizant officials in Consular Affairs' Office of 
Passport Services, Office of Consular Fraud Prevention, and Consular 
Systems Division; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; and the Office of 
the Inspector General. We also met with FBI and Terrorist Screening 
Center officials, including attorneys, to discuss technical and 
potential legal issues that might affect interagency information 
sharing arrangements with State. 

To assess the potential effect of new performance standards, which were 
implemented in January 2004, on State's fraud detection efforts, we 
reviewed the methodology and criteria that State used in developing the 
new standards. We compared the adjudication processes that were in 
place when State tested examiner production capacity with those in 
place when State implemented the new standards and against which it 
applied them. We interviewed passport examiner union representatives 
and select examiners at the 7 offices we visited and the fraud 
prevention managers at all 16 domestic passport-issuing offices to 
obtain their views on the potential effect of the new standards on 
fraud detection efforts. We also obtained views on the same subject 
from the Consular Affairs Passport Services officials who oversaw the 
development and implementation of and ongoing adjustments to the new 
standards. 

We conducted our work from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

MAY 12 2005: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "STATE 
DEPARTMENT: Improvements Needed to Strengthened U.S. Passport Fraud 
Detection Efforts," GAO Job Code 320267. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact John 
Hotchner, Director, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Passport 
Services, at (202) 663-2427. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christopher B. Burnham: 

cc: GAO - Michael Courts; 
CA - Maura Harty; 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on Draft Report by the Government 
Accountability Office Entitled: "Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts." (GAO-05-477 GAO Code 320267): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
report of the Government Accountability Office entitled: State 
Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud 
Detection Efforts (GAO-05-477). 

The integrity of the U.S. passport and the issuance process is of 
paramount importance to the Department of State. In view of the global 
desirability of the U.S. passport, we have long recognized that people 
may attempt to obtain one fraudulently. The Department has made 
significant technological and security enhancements throughout all 
aspects of our passport system to assist in combating fraud. The tragic 
events of September 11 inspired the Department to carefully review all 
aspects of passport operations to see where the security of the 
passport document and issuance processes could be enhanced, while 
providing the American traveling public with the best possible level of 
service. These efforts are ongoing and include a partnership between 
the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security and also 
involve other federal agencies. 

Interagency Information Sharing Efforts: 

The Department is committed to working with other Federal agencies and 
State governments to share information to ensure the safety and 
security of our citizens and our nation, and was proactive in this area 
well before 9/11. An example of this effort is the Department of 
State's partnership with the Department of Health and Human Services 
incorporating their 3-million plus name database of persons with child 
support arrearages into Passport CLASS to ensure that such individuals 
who are ineligible for a passport do not receive them. 

Federal Level: 

We have a long-standing and effective working relationship with the law 
enforcement community. Today, we have nearly 50,000 names of fugitives 
or individuals of interest to law enforcement in the Passport CLASS 
lookout system. About half were entered individually as a result of our 
reaching out to the law enforcement community and advising them of our 
ability to help with interdicting fugitives. The other half of the law 
enforcement entries represent the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) federal 
fugitive warrants, a database that the Department took the initiative 
to obtain. 

While our efforts with USMS have been successful, we can and do want to 
do more to ensure that we have a comprehensive list of persons subject 
to federal warrants. Thus, we now have an agreement in principle with 
the FBI Headquarters Violent Crimes Section. The letter mentioned on 
page 12 of the GAO report was discussed in draft with the FBI at the 
end of February, and was sent in final on April 20. Making the data 
exchange a reality at the earliest possible moment is among our highest 
priorities. 

In terms of terrorism, the Department of State already receives 
extensive information from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) on 
foreign terrorists. We want similar information from the TSC on U.S. 
persons of interest to be included in Passport CLASS. Both the 
Department and TSC are actively working to establish this important 
link. 

State Level: 

In the matter of wanted persons at the state level, the Department 
receives some of this information directly from state and local law 
enforcement agencies, largely as a result of our reaching out to the 
law enforcement community and advising them of our ability to help with 
interdicting fugitives. In this regard, in 2004 the Assistant Secretary 
for Consular Affairs wrote to all the States' Attorneys General to 
offer our services. State is anxious to establish an automated 
mechanism through which we can integrate a comprehensive database of 
state warrants information into Passport CLASS. We are continuing to 
work toward this goal with both the FBI and the USMS, which maintains 
an electronic file of state fugitive information. 

Staffing of Passport Agency Fraud Office: 

In 2003, the Department decided to increase the training of all 
Passport Specialists in fraud prevention work by rotating them through 
the fraud office and move away from permanent AFPM assignments. This 
decision was made to afford all GS-11 Passport Specialists specialized 
experience in detecting fraud. There are now at least two rotating 
Specialists working in the fraud office of most agencies, one of whom 
is on a long-term detail to serve as a back up to the FPM. The 
Department continues to believe that rotating Specialists through the 
Fraud Office will have the long-term effect of increasing fraud 
detection by our front-line personnel. 

This decision is already paying dividends. Statistics for the first 
four months of FY 2005, after nearly a year of Passport Specialist 
rotations, demonstrate that referrals to the fraud offices from 
Passport Specialists are up 5% over last year, and referrals of 
presumptive fraud from the FPMs to Diplomatic Security (DS) are up 11%. 
This indicates that not only the quantity of referrals is up from the 
Specialists, but also the quality of the referrals. 

As further evidence of our anti-fraud efforts, we began last month the 
first of a series of unannounced post-adjudication audits at our field 
agencies and centers to determine the effectiveness of our Fraud 
Prevention Program. The reviews are conducted on passport applications 
that have been adjudicated, but not yet issued. The first of these 
audits occurred the week of April 18. Three-person adjudication teams 
visited four passport agencies/centers. In each agency the teams 
examined a statistically valid number of applications with a confidence 
interval of more than 98% and ran Choice Point checks on approximately 
40% of the sample. As the attached report indicates, the teams reported 
finding only minor adjudicative errors. 

The move away from "permanent AFPM assignments" is still relatively 
new. In response to concerns expressed by the FPMs about the amount of 
time spent training newly assigned Specialists, we are currently 
considering whether to rotate a GS-12 Adjudication Supervisor through 
both the fraud prevention and customer service offices to shift more of 
the training responsibility to that function rather than the FPM. We 
will continue to seek input from our agency staff on ways to strengthen 
our fraud prevention program. 

Passport Specialists Performance Standards: 

The Department is committed to the integrity of the passport process, 
and will continue to monitor the Passport Specialists performance 
standards in light of changing operational, technological and security- 
related aspects of the passport function. 

Headquarters Support: 

The Department fully recognizes that workload changes and our enhanced 
focus on security must be reflected in the way we staff and manage 
Passport Services. The reorganization of Passport Services now in 
progress calls for a reduced span of control for the Office Director 
responsible for fraud prevention, as well as a division and division 
chief to focus on fraud prevention. 

Diplomatic Security: 

Diplomatic Security (DS) support of the fraud prevention program is 
increasing. DS will create 16 civil service Special Agent positions 
this fiscal year for assignment to the DS field offices. These 16 
agents will focus on providing continuity in the DS criminal 
investigations program and mentoring new Foreign Service Special Agents 
in investigations. The 16 positions will join 8 civil service Special 
Agents placed in the field offices in FY 04. DS plans to establish 
approximately 40 additional Special Agent positions as soon as 
feasible. 

As with any other law enforcement agency, DS must prioritize and 
concentrate on the most substantive criminal investigations. The goal 
is to devote more time to criminal investigations that have a higher 
impact on the safety and security of the United States. High priority 
investigations include cases with a possible terrorist nexus, vendors 
of travel documents, fugitives, passports issued in error, or identity 
theft. Simple passport fraud involving cases where the applicant never 
obtained the passport, used low quality documents or unsophisticated 
methods that were easily detected, and that have no apparent nexus to 
terrorism are given a lower priority and fewer investigative assets are 
assigned. In recent years field offices and headquarters criminal 
investigative elements have been directed to prioritize their 
investigations, which is critical given the large number of cases DS 
investigates each year. 

Fraud Prevention Training: 

Acceptance Agents: 

Each passport agency and center maintains an Acceptance Agent training 
plan. Acceptance agents undergo continuous development including 
through computer based training, monthly newsletters, periodic 
bulletins, and classroom instructions that includes fraud detection 
techniques. Some passport agencies conduct quality reviews of 
acceptance facility work in their regions, with the Customer Service 
Manager or assistant providing feedback directly to the facility. These 
reviews have been so successful in improving the quality of the 
applications received in those regions that we will institute a review 
program nationwide. Additionally, plans are well underway to adapt the 
comprehensive computer-based training USPS developed for its passport 
acceptance staff for use with other types of acceptance agents. 

National Training Program: 

Another indication our commitment to the integrity of the passport 
process is the implementation of a standardized national training 
program, which covers adjudication and processing procedures for 
Passport Specialists. Rather than providing training at the agency 
level, we now train our Passport Specialists centrally so that all 
Specialists receive the same level of training. We continue to review 
and modify the curriculum to further enhance the program and to 
accommodate changes in the law as they occur. 

Passport Knowledge: 

The Department recognizes that having a centralized data base of 
passport information accessible to all Passport Specialists will 
greatly enhance the adjudication process and our ability to combat 
passport fraud. The Department is designing a centralized passport 
"knowledgebase" for use by passport specialists. This on-line reference 
library will include extensive sections on fraud prevention, 
citizenship law and its application, and customer service. 

Attachment: 

Post Adjudication Audit Results: 

Interim Report Passport Adjudication Audits Conducted Week of April 18- 
22, 2005: 

Agency: Boston; 
Applications Reviewed: 1230; 
Category 1: 1226; 
Category 2: 2; 
Category 3: 0; 
Category 4*: 2. 

Agency: CPC; 
Applications Reviewed: 1282; 
Category 1: 1269; 
Category 2: 12; 
Category 3: 0; 
Category 4*: 1. 

Agency: CT; 
Applications Reviewed: 1121; 
Category 1: 1121; 
Category 2: 0; 
Category 3: 0; 
Category 4*: 0. 

Agency: NPC; 
Applications Reviewed: 1242; 
Category 1: 1238; 
Category 2: 4; 
Category 3: 0; 
Category 4*: 0. 

Totals: 
Applications Reviewed: 4875; 
Category 1: 4854; 
Category 2: 18 (.00369%); 
Category 3: 0; 
Category 4*: 3(.00063%). 

Category 1 -No fraud problems detected or suspected; no or only minor 
adjudication practice problems. 

Category 2 - Serious adjudication flaws that should be brought to (lie 
attention of the Adjudication Manager. 

Category 3 - Presumed frauds based on findings and/or ChoicePoint; 
referred to the Agency FPM for referral to DS. 

Category 4 -Possible frauds, referred to (he FPM for further work 
including verification of citizenship and/or identity evidence. 

Extending these results out to a total workload of 9,750,000 
applications results in: 
Serious adjudication flaws: 36,000; 
Possible frauds: 4,000. 

* Category 4 (Possible Frauds) relates only to cases that were referred 
for additional checking. They may turn out not to be frauds; one was 
determined not to be a fraud while the team was on-site, and has been 
deducted from the Possibel Frauds figure shown. The other cases 
referred to the FPM will undergo further review and will be accounted 
for in the final report. 

Notes: 

* About 30% of the applications were run against ChoicePoint. 

This was the first group of reviews, and in some sense was a test of 
the methodology, and review team concept. In general, these proved out. 
Teams recommended that more applications be reviewed and that glitches 
in the ChoicePoint process be worked out. The next set ofAudits will be 
scheduled once the final report is complete, and those suggestions will 
be considered. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Michael Courts, (202) 512-8980: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Joseph 
Carney, Paul Desaulniers, and Edward Kennedy made key contributions to 
this report. Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos 
provided technical assistance. 

(320267): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] State maintains a separate CLASS database for visas. References to 
CLASS throughout this report relate to the CLASS database for passports 
only. 

[2] National means a citizen of the United States or a noncitizen owing 
permanent allegiance to the United States. 

[3] There are two passport-issuing offices in Washington, D.C.: a 
regional passport agency and a special issuance agency that handles 
official U.S. government and diplomatic passports. 

[4] State's official title for the position of passport examiner is 
passport specialist. 

[5] Number is as of March 2005. State officials noted that this number 
changes frequently as new acceptance facilities are added and others 
are dropped. 

[6] Applications accepted and adjudicated at the counter also undergo a 
number of desk adjudication steps to complete the fraud detection 
process before deciding whether to approve each passport. 

[7] Many issuing office managers and Diplomatic Security agents said 
that applicants fraudulently using legitimate Puerto Rican birth 
certificates is a key fraud concern. They said that legitimate Puerto 
Rican birth certificates are readily available because they are 
commonly required in Puerto Rico as identification for enrolling 
children in school and other activities, and they aren't subsequently 
taken care of properly. Also, there have been many instances of lost 
and stolen blank Puerto Rican birth certificates. State recently began 
requiring examiners to give additional scrutiny to Puerto Rican birth 
certificates, and State officials also met with senior officials of the 
Puerto Rican government to encourage them to impose more controls over 
the issuance of multiple birth certificates. 

[8] In an effort to address this problem, State established a new 
requirement in February 2004 that children aged 14 and under appear 
with their parents when applying for a passport to allow comparison of 
the children to the photographs being submitted. 

[9] We also noted that 10 of the 20 tested federal fugitives that were 
not in CLASS were also wanted on state charges. Thus, if State 
fugitives had been listed in CLASS, these individuals would have been 
flagged, even if information on their federal warrants had been missed. 

[10] About 10 years ago, the Office of Consular Fraud Prevention 
stopped doing case work on individual potentially fraudulent 
applications in an effort to become more involved with overall program 
management and to identify overall trends. 

[11] All 16 offices now have senior examiners rotate through the fraud 
office--generally two at a time, one short and one longer term. The 
long-term rotator is expected to do some of the tasks the assistant 
manager performed; however, Fraud Prevention Managers said that not all 
long-term rotational staff are capable of handling these tasks as well 
as the permanent assistants had. Further, most managers spend 
considerable time training rotating staff coming into the fraud office. 

[12] Of the 12 offices, 10 already had senior examiners routinely 
rotating through the office to assist in running the fraud prevention 
program. 

[13] In the 4 offices that did not previously have permanent 
assistants, fraud referral rates decreased on average by only 7 percent 
during the same period. As noted, 3 of these offices have low 
workloads. One of the 4 has the second highest workload nationwide, and 
its fraud referral rate remained relatively static during this period. 

[14] Two offices that had assistant fraud prevention managers in 2003 
saw increases in their fraud referral rates. These 2 offices received 
just over 8 percent of the total applications received by offices that 
had assistants. 

[15] State officials told us they did not wish to re-establish the 
permanent assistant fraud manager role at least in part because it had 
never been an official State Department position with a position 
description. 

[16] Two of these 3 offices--Charleston, South Carolina, and 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire--are passport processing "megacenters" that 
do not cover a specific region of the country but rather process 
applications from across the country. The third office, New Orleans, 
does cover a specific region; however, it also performs some of the 
functions of a megacenter by processing a substantial number of 
applications that originate in regions other than its own. 

[17] Management officials at one office said some acceptance facilities 
have a particularly high fraud risk and their work has to be 
scrutinized carefully. Management officials at another issuing office 
said their goal is to train all acceptance agents once every 3 years, 
but that they have not yet reached this goal. 

[18] State officials also noted that the Bureau of Consular Affairs 
funds more than 120 Diplomatic Security agent positions nationwide to 
help support efforts to investigate passport fraud. 

[19] Passport office partnership council participants include issuing 
office management and union-designated employees. 

[20] Examiners meeting the production requirement but not meeting 
minimal requirements in the areas of adjudicative knowledge, customer 
service, or fraud prevention would also receive an unsuccessful rating. 

[21] At each office we visited, we met with almost all of these 
officials. In a few instances, one or two of these officials were not 
available during our visit, and, in these cases, we addressed the 
relevant questions to their superiors. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading. 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 

Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director,

NelliganJ@gao.gov

(202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office,

441 G Street NW, Room 7149

Washington, D.C. 20548: