From the Office of Senator Kerry

Thursday, June 8, 2000

Mr. President, President Clinton has just returned from his first meeting with the new Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Arms control dominated their agenda – in particular, the U.S. plan to deploy a limited National Defense System, which would require amending the 1972 ABM Treaty. Russia is still strongly opposed to changing that Treaty, but I expect this will continue to be an issue of great discussion between the United States and Russia in the months – and probably years – to come. In fact, it is before the Senate today – this Defense bill authorizes funding for the construction of the NMD Initial Deployment Facilities.

Now, the question of whether, when and how the United States should deploy a defense against ballistic missiles is tremendously complex. I want to take some time today to walk through the issues at stake in this debate, to lay bare the implications it will have for U.S. national security.

No American leader can dismiss an idea that might protect American citizens from a legitimate threat. If there is a real potential of a rogue nation firing a few missiles at any city in the U.S., responsible leadership requires that we make our best, most thoughtful efforts to defend against that threat. The same is true of accidental launch. If it ever happened, no leader could ever explain not having chosen to defend against the disaster when doing so made sense.

The questions before us now are several: Does it make sense to deploy a National Missile Defense now, unilaterally, when the result could be to put America at greater risk? Do we have more time to work with allies and others to find a mutually acceptable, non-threatening way of proceeding? Have the threats to which we are responding been exaggerated, and are they more defined by politics than by genuine threat assessment and scientific fact? Have we sufficiently explored various technologies and architectures so that we are proceeding in the most thoughtful and effective way?

The President has set out four criteria on which he will base his decision to deploy an NMD: the status of the threat; the status and effectiveness of the proposed system’s technology; the cost of the system; and the likely impact of deploying the system on the overall strategic environment and U.S. arms control efforts. In my view, at this time, none of these criteria have not been met to satisfaction.

While the threat from developing missile programs has emerged more quickly than we expected, I do not believe it justifies a rush to action on the proposed defensive system, which is far from technologically sound and will probably not even provide an appropriate response to the threat as it continues to develop. More importantly, a unilateral U.S. decision to deploy an NMD system could undermine global strategic stability, damage our relationship with key allies in Europe and Asia, and weaken our continuing efforts to reduce the nuclear danger.

Turning first to the issue of the threat we face: This question deserves a great deal closer scrutiny than it has received so far.

Recently, the decades-long debate on the issue of deploying an NMD has taken on increased bipartisan relevance as the perceived threat from rogue ballistic missile programs has increased. I want to be very clear: At this point, I support the deployment – in cooperation with our friends and allies – of a limited, effective National Missile Defense system aimed at containing the threat from small, rogue ballistic missile programs or the odd accidental or unauthorized launch from a major power. But I do not believe that the United States should attempt to unilaterally deploy a national missile defense aimed at altering the strategic balance. We have made tremendous progress over the last two decades in reducing the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through bilateral strategic reductions with Russia and multilateral arms control agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. We must not allow these efforts to be undermined in any way as we confront the emerging ballistic missile threat.

Even as we have made progress with Russia on reducing our Cold War arsenals, ballistic missile technology has spread and the threat to the United States from rogue powers has grown. The July 1998 Rumsfeld Report found that the threat from developing ballistic missile programs in nations hostile to the United States, especially North Korea, Iran and Iraq, is developing faster than expected and could pose an imminent threat to the U.S. homeland in the next 5 years. That conclusion was reinforced just one month later when North Korea tested a 3-stage Taepo Dong-1 missile, launching it over Japan and raising tensions in the region. While the missile’s third-stage failed, the test confirmed that North Korea’s long-range missile program is advancing toward an ICBM capability that could ultimately threaten the United States, as surely as its shorter range missiles threaten our troops and our allies in the region today.

A 1999, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat found that, in addition to the continuing threat from Russia and China, the United States faces a developing threat from North Korea, Iran and Iraq. In addition to the possibility that North Korea might convert the Taepo Dong-1 missile into an inaccurate ICBM capable of carrying a light payload to the United States, the report found that North Korea could weaponize the larger Taepo Dong-2 to deliver a crude nuclear weapon to American shores, and it could do so at any time, with little warning. The NIE also found that, in the next 15 years, Iran could test an ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear weapon to the United States – and certainly to our allies in Europe and the Middle East – and that Iraq may be able to do the same in a slightly longer time frame.

This picture of the evolving threat to the United States from ballistic missile programs in hostile nations has changed minds in the United States Senate about the necessity of developing and testing a national missile defense. It has certainly changed my mind. If Americans in Alaska or Hawaii must face this threat, however uncertain, I do not believe we can responsibly tell them, We will not take steps to protect you.

But as we confront the technological challenges and the political ramifications of developing and deploying a national missile defense, we must take a closer look at the threat we are rushing to meet. I believe that the missile threat from North Korea, Iran and Iraq is real but not imminent, and that we confront today much greater, much more immediate dangers, from which national missile defense can not protect us.

To begin, it is critical to note that both the Rumsfeld Commission and the National Intelligence Estimate adopted new standards for assessing the ballistic missile threat in response to political pressures from the Congress. The 1995 NIE was viciously criticized for underestimating the threat from rogue missile programs, and some in Congress accused the Administration of deliberately downplaying the threat to undermine their call for a National Missile Defense. To get the answer they were looking for, the Congress established the Rumsfeld Commission to review the threat. Now that Commission was made up of some of the best minds in U.S. defense policy, both supporters and skeptics of the National Missile Defense idea. I am not suggesting that the Commission’s report was somehow “fixed.” These are men who have devoted their lives in honorable service to their country, and this report reflects no less than their best assessment of the threat. But in reaching the conclusions that have alarmed so many about the immediacy of the threat, we must take note that they departed from the standards we have always used to measure the threat.

First, the Commission reduced the range of ballistic missiles we consider to be a threat, from missiles that can reach the continental U.S. to those that can reach Hawaii and Alaska. I think this is a minor distinction, because certainly no responsible leader will suggest that we should leave Americans in Hawaii and Alaska exposed to an attack. Second, it shortened the time period for considering a developing program to be a threat, from the old standard of when a program could actually be deployed to a new standard of when it could be tested. Again, this is a relatively minor distinction, because if a nation is intent on using one of these weapons, it may not wait to meet the stringent testing requirements we usually try to meet before deploying a new system. It may just test a missile, see that it works, and make plans to use it.

So these changes are relatively minor, though they did have the affect of increasing our perception of the urgency of the threat. But the third change is significant: both the Rumsfeld Commission and the 1999 NIE abandoned the old standard of assessing the likelihood that a nation would use its missile capacity, in favor of a new standard of whether a nation simply has the technical capacity for a missile attack, with no analysis of the other factors that go into a decision to actually put that capability to use. This is tremendously important, because as we know from the Cold War, threat is more than simply a function of capability, it is a function of intention and other political and military considerations. And through diplomacy and deterrence, the United States can often alter the intentions of nations who pursue ballistic missile programs, and so alter the threat they pose to us.

This is not simply wishful thinking. There are many examples today of nations who possess the technical capacity to attack the United States, but whom we do not consider a threat. For instance, India and Pakistan have made dramatic progress in developing their medium-range ballistic missile programs – which would enable them to reach American troops and American allies, if not U.S. soil. But the Intelligence Community does not consider India and Pakistan to pose a threat to U.S. interests. Their missile capability alone does not translate into a threat, because these nations do not hold aggressive intentions against us.

Clearly, North Korea, Iran and Iraq are hostile to us, and our ability to use diplomacy to reduce the threat they pose will be limited. But having the capacity to reach us and an animosity towards us does not automatically translate into an intention to use weapons of mass destruction against us. In the 40 years that we faced our Soviet adversary with the raw capability to destroy one another, neither side resorted to using its arsenal of missiles. Why not? Because even in periods of intense animosity and tension, under the most unpredictable and isolated of regimes, political and military deterrence have a powerful, determining affect on a nation’s decision to use force. We are already seeing this at work in our efforts to contain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. And we saw it at work in the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein was deterred from using his weapons of mass destruction by the sure promise of a devastating response from the United States.

During the summer of 1999, intelligence reports indicated that North Korea was preparing the first test-launch of the Taepo Dong-2. Regional tensions rose, as Japan, South Korea and the United States warned Pyongyang that it would face serious consequences if it went ahead with another long-range missile launch. The test was indefinitely delayed, for “political reasons,” which no doubt included U.S. military deterrence and the robust diplomatic efforts by the United States and its key allies in the region.

Threatening to cut off nearly $1 billion of food assistance and KEDO funding to North Korea should the test go forward, while also holding out the possibility of easing economic sanctions if the test were called off, helped South Korea, Japan and the United States make the case to Pyongyang that its interests would be better served through restraint. An unprecedented dialogue between the United States and North Korea, initiated by former Secretary of Defense William Perry during the height of this crisis, continues today. It aims to verifiably freeze Pyongyang’s missile programs and end 50 years of North Korea’s economic isolation.

Acknowledging that these political developments can have an important impact on the concept of threat, the intelligence community, according to a May 19 article in the Los Angeles Times, will reflect in its forthcoming NIE that the threat from North Korea’s missile program has eased since last fall. We must continue to work with our allies either to bring North Korea gradually out of its isolation from the community of law-abiding nations, or to vigilantly contain and deter its military programs. In Iraq, too, the United States must maintain its robust military containment of Saddam Hussein while urging our friends and allies to hold fast to the international sanctions that deny Baghdad the money and materiel it needs to further develop its missile program. And we must continue our work to deny Iran the technological assistance it seeks to bring its missile program to maturity. In short, Mr. President, even as we remain clear-eyed about the threat these nations pose to American interests, we must not look at the danger as somehow preordained and unavoidable. In cooperation with our friends and allies, we must vigorously employ the tools of diplomacy to reduce the threat, and we must redouble our efforts to stop the proliferation of these deadly weapons. And we can not just dismiss the importance of the U.S. military deterrence. Only madmen bent on self-destruction would launch a missile against U.S. soil and invite the sure, swift, devastating U.S. response.

My second major concern about the current debate over the missile threat is that it does nothing to address equally dangerous, but more immediate and more likely threats to U.S. interests. For one, U.S. troops and U.S. allies today confront the menace of theater ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. We saw during the Gulf War how important theater missile defense is to maintaining allied unity and enabling our troops to focus on their mission. We must continue to push this technology forward, regardless of whether we deploy an NMD system.

The American people also face the very real threat of terrorist attack. The 1999 State Department report on Patterns of Global Terrorism shows that, while the threat of state sponsored terrorism against the U.S. is declining, the threat from non-state actors – who increasingly have access to chemical and biological weapons, and possibly even small nuclear devices – is on the rise. These terrorist groups are most likely to attack us covertly, quietly slipping explosives into a building, unleashing chemical weapons into a crowded subway, or sending a crude nuclear weapon into a busy harbor. An NMD system won’t protect American citizens from these threats.

Finally, on the issue of the missile threat we are confronting, I am deeply concerned about Russia’s command and control over its nuclear forces. Russia has more than 6,000 strategic missiles armed with nuclear war-heads. Maintaining these missiles on high-alert significantly increases the likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized launch. In 1995, the Russian military misidentified a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway as a possible attack on the Russian Federation. With Russia’s strategic forces already on high-alert, President Yelstin and his advisors had just minutes to decide whether to launch a retaliatory strike on the United States.

And yet, in an effort to reassure Russia that the proposed NMD system would not prompt an American first strike, the Administration seems to be encouraging Russia to maintain its strategic forces on high alert, to allow for a quick, annihilating counterattack that would overwhelm the proposed NMD system. Given the steady deterioration of Russia’s nuclear command system since the end of the Cold War, any NMD agreement that promotes a continuation of Russia’s high-alert status will not make the American people safer. And while a limited NMD system could shield the United States from an accidental or unauthorized launch of a few Russian missiles, our efforts to secure and reduce the Russian arsenal – through the Comprehensive Threat Reduction program and continued arms control negotiations – can eliminate this threat more effectively.

In sum, Mr. President, the threat from rogue missile programs is neither as imminent nor as immutable as some have argued. We have time to use the diplomatic tools at our disposal to try to alter the political calculation a rogue nation will make before it decides to use its ballistic missile capability. Moreover, the United States faces other, more immediate threats that can not be met by a National Missile Defense. To meet the full range of threats to our national security, we must simultaneously address the emerging threat from rogue ballistic missile programs, maintain a vigorous defense against theater ballistic missiles and acts of terrorism, and avoid actions that could undermine the strategic stability we have fought so hard to establish.

In making his deployment decision, the President will also consider the technological readiness and effectiveness of the proposed system. I have grave concerns that we are sacrificing careful technical development of this system in order to meet an artificial deadline. And those concerns are shared by people far more expert than I am. Moreover, even if the proposed system works as planned, I am not convinced that it will provide the most effective defense against the developing missile threat.

Let’s look at the system currently under consideration. The Administration has proposed a limited system to protect all fifty states against small-scale attacks by ICBMs. In the simplest terms, this is a ground-based hit-to-kill system – an interceptor fired from American soil must hit the incoming missile directly in order to destroy it. Most of the components of this system are already developed and are undergoing testing. It will be deployed in 3 phases and is to be completed by about 2010, if the decision to deploy is made this year. The completed system will include 200-250 interceptors, deployed in Alaska and North Dakota, to be complemented by a sophisticated array of upgraded early-warning radars and satellite-based launch detection and tracking systems.

I have two fundamental questions about this proposed NMD system: Will the technology work as intended? And, is this system the most appropriate and effective defense against the likely threat?

There are three components to consider in answering the first question: the technology’s ability to function at the most basic level; its operational effectiveness against real world threats; and its reliability. I don’t believe that the compressed testing program and decision deadline allow us to draw definitive conclusions about these three, fundamental elements of readiness.

In a Deployment Readiness Review scheduled for late July 2000, the Pentagon will assess this system, largely on the results of three intercept tests. The first of these in October 1999 was initially hailed as a success, because the interceptor did hit the target. But on further examination, the Pentagon conceded that the interceptor had initially been confused and drifted off course, ultimately heading for the decoy balloon and possibly striking the dummy warhead only by accident. The second test in January 2000 failed because of a sensor coolant leak. The third test, initially planned for April 2000, was postponed until late June, and has recently been postponed again. It is now expected sometime in early July, only a few weeks before the Pentagon is to begin its review.

So to begin, after 2 tests – neither satisfactory – it is still unclear whether this system will function at a basic level, under the most favorable conditions. Even if the next test is a resounding success, it would not be enough to rationalize a deployment decision.

On the second issue of whether the system will be operationally-effective, we have very little information to go on. We have not yet had an opportunity to test operational versions of the system’s components in anything like the environment they would face in a real defensive engagement. We are only guessing at this point how well the system would respond to targets launched from unanticipated locations, or how it would perform over much longer distances and at much higher speeds than those at which it has been tested.

Finally, the question of reliability is best answered over time and extensive use of the system. Any program in its developing stages will run into technical glitches, and this program has been no different. This doesn’t mean the system won’t ever work properly, but that we need more time to work the bugs out. This is one more reason to postpone the deployment decision and give the Pentagon time to conduct a thorough, rigorous testing program.

Two independent reviews have reached a similar conclusion about the risks of rushing this system to deployment. In February 1998, a Pentagon panel led by former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch characterized the truncated testing program as a “rush to failure.” The panel’s second report recommended delaying the decision to deploy until 2003 at the earliest to allow key program elements to be fully tested and proven.

The concerns of the Welch Panel were reinforced by the release in February 2000 of a report by the Defense Department’s office of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E). The Coyle Report decried the “undue pressure” being applied to the NMD testing program, and warned that rushing through testing to meet artificial decision deadlines has “historically resulted in a negative effect on virtually every troubled DoD development program.” The Report recommended that the Pentagon postpone its Deployment Readiness Review to allow for a thorough analysis and clear understanding of the results of the third intercept test (now scheduled for early July), which will be the first “integrated systems” test of all the components except the booster.

The scientific community is worried about more than the risks of a shortened testing program. The best scientific minds in this country have also begun to warn that, even if the technology functions as planned, the system could be defeated by relatively simple countermeasures. The 1999 NIE that addressed the ballistic missile threat concluded that the same nations developing long-range ballistic missile systems could develop – or buy – countermeasure technologies by the time they are ready to deploy their missile systems. Just think: we could expend billions, upset the strategic balance, initiate a new arms race, and not even get a system that withstands remarkably simple, inexpensive countermeasures. Now, there’s a stroke of brilliance!

The proposed National Missile Defense is an exo-atmospheric system, meaning the interceptor is intended to hit the target after boost phase, when it has left the atmosphere, and before reentry. An ICBM releases its payload immediately after boost phase, and if that payload consists of more than simply one warhead, an interceptor will have more than one target to contend with after boost phase. The Union of Concerned Scientists recently published a thorough technical analysis of three countermeasures that would be particularly well-suited to overwhelming this kind of system: chemical and biological bomblets, anti-simulation decoys, and warhead shrouds.

North Korea, Iran and Iraq are all believed to have programs capable of weaponizing chemical and biological weapons, which are cheaper and easier to acquire than the most rudimentary nuclear warhead. The most effective means of delivering CBW on a ballistic missile is not to deploy one large warhead filled with agent, but to divide it up into as many as 100 submunitions or “bomblets.” There are few technical barriers to weaponizing CBW this way, and it allows the agents to be dispersed over a large area, inflicting maximum casualties. Because the limited NMD system will not be able to intercept a missile before the bomblets are dispersed, it could quickly be overpowered by just three incoming missiles armed with bomblets – and that is assuming every interceptor hit its target. Just one missile carrying 100 targets would pose a formidable challenge to the system, with possibly devastating effects.

The exo-atmospheric system is also vulnerable to missiles carrying nuclear warheads armed with decoys. Using anti-simulation, an attacker would disguise the nuclear warhead to look like a decoy by placing it in a lightweight balloon and releasing it along with a large number of similar, but empty balloons. Using simple technology to raise the temperature in all the balloons, the attacker could make the balloon containing the warhead indistinguishable to infrared radar from the empty balloons, forcing the defensive system to shoot down every balloon to ensure that the warhead is destroyed. By deploying a large number of balloons, an attacker could easily overwhelm the limited NMD system. Alternately, by covering the warhead with a shroud cooled by liquid nitrogen, an attacker could reduce the warhead’s infrared radiation by a factor of at least one million, making it incredibly difficult for the NMD system’s sensors to detect the warhead in time to hit it.

I have only touched briefly on the simplest countermeasures that could be available to an attacker with ballistic missiles. This discussion raises serious questions about a major operational vulnerability in the proposed system and about whether this system is the best response to the threats we are most likely to face in the years ahead. I don’t believe it is. There is a simpler, more sensible, less threatening and more manageable approach to missile defense that deserves more consideration.

Rather than pursuing the single layer, exo-atmospheric system, I believe we should focus our research efforts on developing a forward-deployed boost-phase intercept system. Such a system would build on the current technology of the Army’s land-based THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Air Defense) and the Navy’s sea-based Theater-Wide Defense systems, to provide forward-deployed defenses against both theater ballistic missile threats and long-range ballistic missiles in their boost phase.

The Navy already deploys the Aegis fleet air defense system aboard 84 cruisers and destroyers. An upgraded version of this ship-based system could be stationed off the coast of North Korea or in the Mediterranean to shoot down an ICBM in its earliest and slowest stage. The ground-based THAAD system could be similarly adapted to meet the long-range and theater ballistic missile threats. Because these systems would target a missile in its boost phase, they would eliminate the current system’s vulnerability to countermeasures. This approach could also be more narrowly targeted at specific threats, and it could be used to extend ballistic missile protection to U.S. allies and to our troops in the field.

As Dick Garwin, an expert on missile defense and a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, has so aptly argued, the key advantage to the mobile, forward-deployed missile defense system is that, rather than having to create an impenetrable umbrella over the entire United States territory, it would only require us to put an impenetrable lid over the much-smaller territory of a potential adversary. The technological challenge of containing North Korea, Iraq or Iran is simply much more manageable than the challenge posed by having to defend half a continent.

And a targeted system, by explicitly addressing specific threats, would be much less destabilizing than a system designed only to protect U.S. soil. It would reassure Russia that we do not intend to undermine its nuclear deterrent and enable Russia and the U.S. to continue to reduce and secure our remaining strategic arsenals. It would reassure U.S. allies that they will not be left vulnerable to these missile threats and that they need not consider deploying nuclear deterrents of their own. In short, this alternative approach could do what the proposed NMD system will not: it could make us safer.

There are two major obstacles to deploying this boost-phase system, but I believe both obstacles can and must be overcome. First, the technology is not yet there. The Navy Theater-Wide Defense system was designed to shoot down cruise missiles and other threats to U.S. warships. Without much faster intercept missiles than are currently available, this system would not be able stop high-speed ICBMs, even in their relatively slow boost phase. The THAAD system, which continues to face considerable challenges in its demonstration and testing phases, is being designed to stop ballistic missiles, but it has not been tested against targets with speeds approaching those of an ICBM.

Which raises the second obstacle to deploying this kind of system: current interpretation of the ABM Treaty, as embodied in the 1997 Demarcation Agreements between Russia and the United States, does not allow us to test or deploy theater ballistic missile systems capable of shooting down an ICBM. I will address this issue in full in a moment, but for now, let me say that I am deeply disturbed by the suggestion that the United States should withdraw from the ABM Treaty and unilaterally deploy an NMD system. In the long-run, such a move would undermine U.S. security rather than advance it. I believe it is possible and necessary to reach agreement with Russia on changes to the ABM Treaty that will allow us to deploy an effective, limited defense system. I don’t agree with the Administration’s choice in NMD system, but I commend the President for working hard to reach an agreement with Russia that will allow us both to deploy appropriate defenses against the emerging threat.

I want to briefly address the issue of cost, which I find to be the least problematic of the four criterion under consideration. Those who oppose the idea of a missile defense point to the fact that, in the last forty years, the United States has spent roughly $120 billion trying to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles. And because this tremendous investment has still not yielded definitive results, they argue that we should abandon the effort before pouring additional resources into it.

I disagree. I believe that we can certainly afford to devote a small portion of the Defense budget to develop a workable national missile defense. The projected cost of doing so varies – from roughly $4 billion to develop a boost-phase system that would build on existing defenses to an estimated $60 billion to deploy the three-phased ground-based system currently under consideration by the Administration. These estimates will probably be revised upward as we confront the inevitable technology challenges and delays. But, spread out over the next 5 to 10 years, I believe we can well afford this relatively modest investment in America’s security, provided that our research efforts focus on developing a realistic response to the emerging threat.

My only real concern about the cost of developing a national missile defense is in the perception that addressing this threat somehow makes us safe from the myriad other threats that we face. We must not allow the debate over NMD to hinder our cooperation with Russia, China, and our allies to stop the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile technology. In particular, we must remain steadfast in our efforts to reduce the dangers posed by the enormous weapons arsenal of the former Soviet Union. Continued Russian cooperation with the expanded Comprehensive Threat Reduction programs will have a far greater impact on America’s safety from weapons of mass destruction than deploying an NMD system. We must not sacrifice the one for the other.

Finally, I believe a unilateral U.S. decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system would have a disastrous effect on the international strategic and political environment. It could destabilize our already difficult relationships with Russia and China and undermine our allies’ confidence in the reliability of U.S. defensive commitments. It would jeopardize current, hard-fought arms control agreements and erode more than 40 years of U.S. leadership on arms control.

The Administration clearly understands the dangers of a unilateral U.S. deployment of NMD. President Clinton was not able to reach agreement with Russian President Putin on the proposed amendments to the ABM Treaty that would make such a deployment possible, but he seems to have made progress in convincing the Russian leadership that the ballistic missile threat from rogue nations is real. To be clear, I do not support the Administration’s current NMD proposals, but I do support its efforts to work with Russia on this important issue. The next administration must continue these conversations with the Russian leadership if the deployment decision is to truly advance, rather than undermine U.S. national security.

While simply declaring our intent to deploy an NMD system would not constitute an abrogation of the ABM Treaty, it would surely signal that U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty is imminent. The first casualty of such a declaration would be START II. Article II, paragraph 2 of the Russian instrument of ratification gives Russia the right to withdraw from START II if the U.S. withdraws from or violates the 1972 ABM Treaty. Russia would probably also stop implementation of START I, as well as cooperation with our Comprehensive Threat Reduction programs. Continued cooperation with Russia on these arms control programs is critical to reducing the nuclear danger and preventing the proliferation of WMD. The American people will be less safe, not more, if we sacrifice these efforts to a hasty, unilateral decision on National Missile Defense.

Furthermore, no matter how transparent we are with Russia about the intent and capabilities of the proposed NMD system, Russia’s military leadership will interpret a unilateral deployment as a direct threat to their deterrence capacity. While Russia does not have the economic strength today to significantly enhance its military capabilities, there are recent examples of Russia’s ability to wield formidable military power when it wants to. We must not allow a unilateral NMD deployment to provoke the Russian people into setting aside the difficult but necessary tasks of democratization and economic reform in a vain effort to return to Russia’s days of military glory.

Finally with regard to Russia, a unilateral deployment by the United States would jeopardize our cooperation on a whole range of significant issues. However imperfect it is, U.S.-Russian cooperation will continue to be important on matters from stopping Tehran’s proliferation efforts and containing Iraq’s weapons programs to promoting stability in the Balkans.

While the impact of a limited U.S. NMD system on Russian security considerations will be largely perceptual – as long as it remains limited – its impact on China’s strategic posture will be real and immediate. China today has roughly 20 long-range missiles. The proposed NMD system would undermine China’s strategic deterrent as surely as it would contain the threat from North Korea. And this poses a problem, because unlike North Korea, China has the financial resources to build a much larger arsenal.

The Pentagon believes it is likely that China will increase the number and sophistication of its long-range missile arsenal as part of its overall military modernization effort, regardless of what the U.S. decides on NMD. But as with Russia, if an NMD decision is made absent consultation with China, the leadership in Beijing will perceive the deployment as at least partially directed at them. Given the recent strain in U.S.-China relations and uncertainty in the Taiwan Strait, the vital U.S. national interest in maintaining stability in the Pacific would be greatly undermined by an NMD decision made too rashly.

Nobody understands the destabilizing effect of a unilateral U.S. NMD decision better than our allies in Europe and the Pacific. The steps Russia and China would take to address their insecurities about the U.S. system will make their neighbors less secure. And a new environment of competition and distrust will undermine regional stability by impeding cooperation on proliferation, drug trafficking, humanitarian crises, and all the other transnational problems we are confronting together. We must find a way to deploy an NMD system without sending even a hint of the message that the security of the American people is becoming decoupled from that of our allies. In Asia, both South Korea and Japan have the capability to deploy nuclear programs of their own. Neither has done so, in part because both have great confidence in the integrity of U.S. security guarantees and in the U.S. nuclear umbrella that extends over them. They also believe that, while China does aspire to be a regional power, the threat it poses is best addressed through engagement and efforts to anchor China in the international community. Both of these assumptions would be undermined by a unilateral U.S. NMD deployment. First, our iron-clad security guarantees will be perceived as somewhat rusty if we pursue the current NMD proposal to create a shield over U.S. territory. U.S. cities would no longer be vulnerable to the same threats from North Korea that Seoul and Tokyo would continue to face. This would raise the question of whether we would be willing to risk war to protect them from missiles that won’t reach us. Second, China’s response to a unilateral U.S. NMD will make it, at least in the short term, a greater threat to regional stability than it poses today. If South Korea and Japan change their perceptions both of the threat they face and of U.S. willingness to protect them from it, they could be motivated to explore independent means of boosting their defenses. The threat of an arms race in Asia is yet another argument in favor of a forward-deployed boost-phase system, which would cut-off a ballistic missile threat in its earliest stage, protecting our allies and eliminating the dangers decoupling would create.

Our European allies have expressed the same concerns about decoupling as I foresee developing in Asia. And we certainly must not dismiss the calculations Great Britain, France and Germany will make about the impact a U.S. NMD system might have on their defensive posture. But I believe their concerns hinge largely on the affect a unilateral decision would have on Russia, concerns that would be greatly ameliorated if we make the NMD decision with Russia’s cooperation.

Finally, much has been made of the impact a U.S. national missile defense system would have on the international arms control regime. For all the reasons I’ve just discussed, a unilateral decision will greatly damage U.S. security interests – including our interest in arms control – and it must not be contemplated.

The history of unilateral steps in advancing strategic weaponry illustrates a dangerous pattern of sure response and escalation. In 1945, the United States exploded the first atomic bomb. The Soviets followed in 1949. In 1948, we unveiled the first nuclear-armed intercontinental bomber. The Soviets followed in 1955. In 1952, we exploded the first hydrogen bomb. The Soviets followed a year later. In 1957, the Soviets launched the first satellite into orbit and perfected the first ICBM. We followed suit within 12 months. In 1960, the United States fired the first submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Soviets followed in 1968. In 1964, we developed the first multiple warhead missile and tested the first MIRV (multiple, independently-targetable re-entry vehicle). The Soviets MIRVd in 1973. And so on, throughout the Cold War.

In response to this terrible phenomenon of action-reaction, George Kennan offered this assessment:

“We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, missile upon missile, new levels of destructiveness upon old ones, helplessly, almost involuntarily, like victims of some sort of hypnotism, like man in a dream, like lemmings headed for the sea.”

The rationale for testing and deploying a missile defense is to make America and the world safer. It is to defend against the threat (however realistic) of rogue state/terrorist launch of an ICBM or the accidental launch of an ICBM. No one has been openly suggesting a public rationale of a defense against any and all missiles such as the original Star Wars envisioned but some have not given up on such a dream. It is, in fact, the intensity and tenacity of their continued advocacy for such a system that drives other people’s fears of what the U.S. may be up to and which significantly complicates the test of selling even a limited, legitimately restrained architecture,

In diplomacy – as in life – other nations make policies based not only on real fears or legitimate reactions to an advocacy/non-friend’s actions, they also make choices based on perceived fears – on worst case scenarios defined to their leaders by experts. We do the same thing.

The problem with a unilaterally deployed defense architecture is that other nations may see intentions and long term possibilities that negatively affect their sense of security. For instance, a system that today is limited, but exclusively controlled by us and exclusively within our technological capacity is a system that they perceive could be expanded and distributed at any time in the future to completely alter the balance of power – the balance of terror as we have thought of it. That may sound terrific to us and even be good for us for a short period of time – but every lesson of the arms race for the last 55 years shows that the advantage is short lived, the effect is simply to require everyone to build more weapons at extraordinary expense, and the advantage is inevitably wiped out with the world becoming a more dangerous place in the meantime. That is precisely why the ABM treaty was negotiated – to try to limit the unbridled competition, stabilize the balance and create a protocol by which both sides could confidently reduce weapons.

The negotiation of the ABM Treaty put an end to this cycle of ratcheting up the strategic danger. After 20 years of trying to outdo each other -- building an increasingly dangerous, increasingly unstable strategic environment in the process – we recognized that deploying strategic defenses, far from making us safer, would only invite a response and an escalation of the danger. There is no reason to believe that a unilateral move by the United States to alter the strategic balance would not have the same affect today as it had for forty years. At the very least, it would stop and probably reverse the progress we have made on strategic reductions.

Under START I levels, both sides agree to reduce those arsenals to 6,500 warheads. Under START II, those levels come down to 3,500 warheads. And we are moving toward further reductions in our discussions on START III, down to 2,000 warheads. With every agreement, the American people are safer. A unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would stop this progress in its tracks. No NMD system under consideration can make us safe enough to justify such a reckless act.

I strongly disagree with my colleagues who argue that the United States is no longer bound by our legal obligations under the ABM Treaty. No president has ever withdrawn us from the Treaty, and President Clinton has reaffirmed our commitment to it. We retain our obligations to the Treaty under international law, and those obligations continue to serve us well. It would never have been possible to negotiate reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces without the ABM Treaty’s limit on national missile defense. The Russians continue to underscore that linkage. And since, as I’ve already argued, Russia’s strategic arsenal continues to pose a serious threat to the United States and her allies, we must not take steps – including the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty – that will undermine our efforts to reduce and contain that threat.

However, the strategic situation we confront today is worlds apart from the one we faced in 1972, and we must not artificially limit our options as we confront the emerging threats to our security. Under the forward-deployed boost-phase system I have described, the United States would need to seek Russian agreement to change the 1997 ABM Treaty Demarcation agreements, which establish the line between theater missile defense (TMD) systems that are not limited by the Treaty and the strategic defenses the Treaty proscribes. In a nutshell, these agreements allow the United States to deploy and test the PAC-3, THAAD and Navy Theater-Wide TMD systems, but prohibit us from developing or testing capabilities that would enable these systems to shoot down ICBMs.

As long as we are discussing ABM Treaty amendments with Russia, we should work with them to develop a new concept of strategic defense. A boost-phase intercept program would sweep away the line between theater and long-range missile defense. But by limiting the number of interceptors that could be deployed and working with Russia – and China, if possible – to maximize the transparency of the system, we can strike the right balance between meeting new and emerging threats without abandoning the principles of strategic stability that have served us well for decades.

Mr. President, one of the most important challenges for U.S. national security planners in the years ahead will be to work with our friends and allies to develop a defense against the emerging ballistic missile threat. How we respond to that threat is important. We must not rush into a hasty, politically-driven decision on NMD that will make us less secure.

I urge President Clinton to delay the deployment decision indefinitely. The threat we face is real, and it is growing, but it is not imminent. We have the time – and we need to take the time – to develop and test the most effective defense. We will need time to build international support for deploying a system, but I believe that support will be more forthcoming if the United States is seen to be responding to a changing security environment, rather than simply buckling to political pressure.

For forty years, we have led international efforts to reduce and contain the danger from nuclear weapons. We can continue that leadership by exploiting our technological strengths to find a defense against ballistic missiles, and by extending that defense to our friends and allies. We must not abrogate the responsibilities of leadership with a hasty, short-sighted decision that will have lasting consequences.