SENATOR EVAN BAYH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. I'd like to begin with a comment and then a question. Dr. Fingar, I think it would be for you.

Nothing is more important to our nation's security than the credibility of our intelligence services. It is not helpful, to say the least, when the motivation of our analyses are questioned or suggestions of political motivations creep into the public dialogue. It's just not very helpful.

Dr. Fingar, I think you know that some of that has surrounded at least part of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). I refer to the question that Senator Reed asked you.

There are several members of the Intelligence Committee that are upset about the fact that the hypothetical of a precipitous withdrawal was posited in the NIE, but other hypotheses, which in fact were more likely, were not considered in the NIE. There are CIA analysts who participated in authoring the draft who will say that they were ordered to include that hypothesis, even though they felt it to be very unlikely.

I understood your answer to Senator Reed to be that it was included because it was out there, that the presence of our troops was perhaps contributing to the problem so you had to entertain the thought of what would the situation be if the American troops weren't there.

That doesn't get to the way in which they are withdrawn. There are a lot of options other than, quote, "precipitous withdrawal:" partial withdrawal, gradual withdrawal, withdrawal to other parts of the country, things along those lines.

I'd like to ask you to respond to that. I would encourage you strongly that, in the future, if you're going to consider hypotheticals, you at least consider those that are more likely than less likely.

No one has, to my knowledge, or at least very, very few people are suggesting, quote, "Precipitous withdrawal."

DR. THOMAS FINGAR: "Precipitous withdrawal" is not the terminology used in the estimate, Senator. It was "rapid withdrawal.”

BAYH: We won't argue about the distinction there.

FINGAR: Let me begin by repeating the answer to a question I had in the open Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Were we under political pressure to shape this estimate? Were we advised to have a certain outcome? The answer is unquestionably and categorically we were not. This estimate is the product of the intelligence community.

As I responded to Senator Reed, the purpose of estimates is not, has not been, to evaluate options for United States policy or for...

BAYH: Why didn't you consider rapid withdrawal?

FINGAR: As I explained, the effort was to both bound the problem, situation, with the coalition presence and what happens if the coalition is not there. Since, again, when the estimate was undertaken, there was the argument that violence in Iraq was substantially a function of the presence of coalition targets. If the targets were not there...

BAYH: I heard your answer to Senator Reed. I'm just telling you, the way in which the estimate was done has opened you up to this kind of critique. 

FINGAR: It was anticipated that we would be subjected to that critique. And, again, I will invite General Maples to correct me if he thinks I am wrong. In choosing the term of a “rapid withdrawal” over the period of this estimate, which was 12 to 18 months, that under General Landry's guidance, who was working this part of the estimate, that to remove entirely the coalition presence within the period of this estimate would, by definition, be rapid. 

BAYH: I don't want to just devote my time to this, but very, very few people are suggesting that the entire coalition presence be removed in that time frame. Perhaps changing our role to training troops and a variety of other things, hunting Al Qaeda operatives, that sort of thing.

My point simply is that, if your position is you don't consider policy options, you put one policy option on the table. I think in fairness, to avoid these kinds of critiques, you ought to put other policy options on the table, particularly those that more people are espousing than fewer. 

I want to be fair about this: I'm not criticizing your bona fides, but I do care about the credibility of your work product. I know you do, too. When you start down that slippery slope, you just get into these kinds of arguments. So, enough said about that. 

Admiral, I'd like to ask you about our situation in the world today compared to a year or two ago. As I understand your testimony, I think the words that you used were, "We're moving in a negative direction." You said this in response to a question about Iraq. "We're moving in a negative direction."

I think all of you indicated that Iraqi political developments were ultimately the key for a positive resolution in that country. Is that correct?

VICE ADMIRAL JOHN MCCONNELL: That's correct.

BAYH: I think the direct quote you used is that the Iraqi leaders faced a, quote, "close to impossible task," close quote. I wrote those words down when you spoke them. Was that correct?

MCCONNELL: With 20-20 hindsight, I probably would have said a very difficult task, but difficult nonetheless.

BAYH: I think "very difficult" was the wording of the NIE. So my question is, if the political situation in Iraq is the key, if the Iraqi leaders face a, quote, "close to impossible task," or a very difficult task, how, then, do you characterize our task?

MCCONNELL: Our task with regard to...

BAYH: Iran.

MCCONNELL: I talked with Ambassador Negroponte as I relieved him in this process-- I was trying to understand timing and why did we choose the options you were just asking Dr. Fingar about.

When we started that estimate, we had a set of conditions. As we worked through the estimate, our strategy, in fact, changed. The options considered by this body started to change. We were at a point in time where we were trying to do an estimate. That said, your question to me, is our task...

BAYH: You've been very candid here, and I would associate myself with Senator Nelson's remarks and compliment you for your openness and your forthrightness.

It seems to me that if the Iraqi political situation is the key to this, and they face either a very difficult task or a close to impossible task, we need to be honest with the American people and say that our task, logically, is somewhat similar.

MCCONNELL: Our task is similar in that it is very, very difficult. The key to the situation now is stability, because we couldn't make progress without some level of stability, and that's the question...

BAYH: This difficulty that we're experiencing in Iraq, I would assume, has not occurred overnight. It's been in the process for some time now, or the better part of the year or maybe longer. Is that a fair assessment?

MCCONNELL: I would agree with that, yes, sir.

BAYH: If someone indicated in the last four months or so that we were absolutely winning in Iraq, that is a mistaken assessment?

MCCONNELL: I wouldn't agree that we were winning. I think the conditions in 2006, where it became most dramatically evident that the strategy was not being successful-- and my sense is that's why there were adjustments made to the strategy.

BAYH: Based upon your understanding today, if in the last couple of months someone came to me and said that we had absolutely had enormous successes in Iraq, what would your response to that be?

MCCONNELL: Enormous successes in previous years?
BAYH: The bottom line in Iraq was that we had had enormous successes.

MCCONNELL: Sir, as we said in the estimate, it was going in a negative direction. The sectarian violence was increasing. And my view is that's why the policy changed.

BAYH: I would encourage you to communicate, and I'm sure you will, forthrightly with the higher reaches of our government. Those statements were made by both the President and the Vice President of the United States in the last four months.

LEVIN: Senator Bayh, thank you very much.