Column
from U.S. Senator Russ Feingold
More U.S. troops to Afghanistan?
October 24, 2008
Christian Science Monitor
Washington policymakers and
others are increasingly recognizing that we need to return our attention
to Afghanistan and the threat of Al Qaeda. While the administration
has pursued a misguided war in Iraq, the Taliban has regrouped in Afghanistan,
Al Qaeda has established a stronghold across the border in Pakistan,
and Al Qaeda affiliates have gained strength around the world.
But few people seem willing
to ask whether the main solution that's being talked about– sending
more troops to Afghanistan – will actually work.
If the devastating policies
of the current administration have proved anything, it's that we need
to ask tough questions before deploying our brave service members –
and that we need to be suspicious of Washington "group think."
Otherwise, we are setting ourselves up for failure.
For far too long,
we have been fighting in Afghanistan with too few troops. It has been
an "economy of force" campaign, as the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff put it. But we can't just assume that additional troops
will undo the damage caused by years of neglect.
Sending more US
troops made sense in, say, 2006, and it may still make sense today.
The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated badly over the past year,
however, despite a larger US and coalition military presence.
We need to ask: After seven
years of war, will more troops help us achieve our strategic goals in
Afghanistan? How many troops would be needed and for how long? Is there
a danger that a heavier military footprint will further alienate the
population, and, if so, what are the alternatives? And – with
the lessons of Iraq in mind – will this approach advance our top
national security priority, namely defeating Al Qaeda?
We must target Al Qaeda aggressively,
and we cannot allow Afghanistan to be used again as a launching pad
for attacks on America. It is far from clear, however, that a larger
military presence there would advance these goals.
To the contrary, it might
only perpetuate a counterproductive game of cat and mouse that has led
to a steep erosion in Afghans' support for foreign forces in southwestern
Afghanistan, the main Taliban stronghold. One of the most recent polls
found that, while most Afghans support the US presence, only a minority
rate it positively.
Regardless of whether we
send more troops, we need to understand that, as in Iraq, there is ultimately
no military solution to Afghanistan's problems. Unless we push for diplomacy
and a regional approach, work to root out corruption, stamp out the
country's narcotics trade, and step up development and reconstruction
efforts, Afghanistan will probably continue its downward trajectory.
Many of the biggest threats
we face in Afghanistan emanate from across its long border with Pakistan.
The US intelligence community concluded last year that Al Qaeda has
"a safe haven in the Pakistani Federal Administered Tribal Areas."
The Taliban also enjoys a
haven in Pakistan from which it launches cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
No policy in Afghanistan will succeed without a change in our policy
toward Pakistan, to one that encourages a sustained pursuit of Al Qaeda
leadership as well as broad engagement with Pakistan's civilian institutions,
its population, and civil society.
We must also work with other
key nations, such as Saudi Arabia and China. In late 2001, the Bush
administration was able to bring all the regional players together to
develop an internationally recognized, post-Taliban framework for Afghanistan.
We should consider a similar high-level diplomatic initiative. The way
forward requires a renewed strategy that has the support of Afghanistan's
neighbors and stakeholders.
In addition, we need to help
build a more stable, more representative, less corrupt Afghan government.
We cannot rely on a single leader while turning a blind eye to corruption
and repression, as we did in Pakistan.
The establishment of the
rule of law and strong civil institutions is critical. Otherwise, Afghanistan
may end up being devoured by parasitic warlords who hold sway over key
ministries and impede critical reform.
Afghanistan's massive opium
production, and the involvement of prominent government officials in
the narcotics business, are serious problems. So far, we have relied
too much on poppy eradication, even though similar efforts have not
been effective in other parts of the world.
The US government should
provide support for robust rural development programs, which provide
alternative opportunities for farmers, thereby undermining the incentive
to grow poppies.
Finally, the US has yet to
deliver on much of the development assistance it had planned for Afghanistan.
Its infrastructure needs are immense, from decent hospitals to functioning
schools and passable roads. Every day that those needs go unmet, more
Afghan people may turn away from their own government and allow the
Taliban to move in.
In the long run, regional
diplomacy, government reforms, and infrastructure development may be
more important to Afghanistan's success – and to our own national
security – than committing additional troops.
The decision to go to war
in Afghanistan was the right one, but after years of misplaced priorities
and muddling through, we have to do some hard thinking before asking
our military to create the stability and security that are badly needed
there.
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