<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:21828.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-353
ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESULTS IN FEDERAL BUDGETING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina D. Tyrer, Chief Clerk
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska THOMAS CARPER, Delaware
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Katy French, Staff Director
Sean Davis, Legislative Assistant
Sheila Murphy, Minority Staff Director
John Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Liz Scranton, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Coburn............................................... 1
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 5
Senator Carper............................................... 13
WITNESSES
Tuesday, June 14, 2005
Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 3
Hon. Clay Johnson, III, Deputy Director for Management, Office of
Management and Budget.......................................... 4
Eileen Norcross, M.A., Research Fellow, Government Accountability
Project, The Mercatus Center of George Mason University........ 22
Beryl A. Radin, Ph.D., Professor of Government and Public
Administration, University of Baltimore........................ 24
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Johnson, Hon. Clay, III:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Norcross, Eileen, M.S.:
Testimony.................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Radin, Beryl A., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 74
Walker, Hon. David M.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 33
APPENDIX
Questions and responses for the Record from:
Mr. Walker................................................... 78
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 81
Ms. Radin.................................................... 83
``An Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget's Program
Assessment Rating Tool (PART),'' June 2005, by Eileen C.
Norcross, Mercatus Center, George Mason University............. 87
ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESULTS IN FEDERAL BUDGETING
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, and International Security,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Coburn,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Coburn, Carper, and Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN
Senator Coburn. The Subcommittee will come to order. This
hearing today is on Accountability and Results in Federal
Budgeting. The Federal Government is expected to spend $2.5
trillion in the next fiscal year, which comes to $22,000 per
family in the United States, a significant sum. While the first
hearing of this Subcommittee focused broadly on the President's
Management Agenda, also known as PMA, today, we will more
specifically discuss efforts to increase accountability in
Federal budgeting--accountability as seen through transparency,
on-time reports, evaluation, and assessment.
As part of the PMA, OMB released in 2003 the Program
Assessment Rating Tool, or PART. Used to evaluate the design,
goals, and performance of Federal programs, PART seeks to find
ways to ultimately improve overall performance through the
format of a basic questionnaire and evaluation of that. Thus
far, PART has been used to evaluate 607 Federal Government
programs, roughly 60 percent of the Federal budget. Of these
607 programs, 15 percent have been rated effective, less than
90; 26 percent moderately effective; 4 percent ineffective; 29
percent could not demonstrate results, and 26 percent,
adequate.
That last number that I gave you, the 29 percent that could
not demonstrate results, it was almost a third of the Federal
Government's programs.
We will also discuss today the latest iteration of OMB's
scorecard, which is a set of quarterly grades for each Federal
agency. Ratings of red, yellow, and green are given to each
agency for each of five initiatives: Human capital, competitive
sourcing, financial performance, e-government, and budget and
performance integration. Ratings are given for both current
status and progress in implementing the PMA, the President's
Management Agenda.
When the first scorecard was issued in June 2002, only 4
agencies received yellow current status ratings for their
budget performance and integration, while the remaining 22
agencies all received red ratings. In the latest scorecard, 6
agencies have red ratings, 12 have yellow ratings, and 8 have
green current ratings for budget performance and integration.
While the latest of these scores are encouraging, they also
demonstrate that the Federal Government has a lot to do when it
comes to managing the way it spends the taxpayers' money.
As part of the President's budget proposal for fiscal year
2006, OMB released a list of roughly 150 discretionary programs
for which it proposed either reduced funding or complete
elimination. The termination of many of these programs has been
proposed before. For example, the OMB proposed the termination
of the Advanced Technology Program four separate times. The
termination of earmarks for the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention was proposed not only in fiscal year 2006, but in
2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, as well. The termination of the
program for Community Technology Centers has been proposed six
separate times.
It is absolutely stunning that we continue to fund programs
that time after time, year after year, fail to produce positive
results or measurable results. I hope we will hear substantive
proposals today to either terminate or measurably reform these
programs.
We are pleased to have with us today representatives from
both government and academia. On our first panel, the Hon.
David Walker, Comptroller General of the Government
Accountability Office, and the Hon. Clay Johnson, III, the
Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and
Budget, will give us their perspective on efforts to increase
accountability and ultimately improve results in Federal
budgeting.
We are also privileged to have on our second panel Eileen
Norcross, a Research Fellow with George Mason University and
The Mercatus Center, and Beryl Radin, a professor of Government
and Public Administration at the University of Baltimore. They
will both give us a helpful non-governmental perspective on the
effect of government accountability efforts.
Our Ranking Member, Senator Carper, will be here in a
moment. We will ask him for his opening statement at that time.
At the present time, I would like to introduce our witnesses.
Our first witness is the Hon. David Walker, Comptroller General
of the United States. Mr. Walker began his 15-year term as the
Nation's chief accountability officer and was appointed in 1998
as the head of the then-General Accounting Office, now referred
to as the Government Accountability Office. Through his role as
Comptroller General, Mr. Walker oversees GAO's work to improve
the performance and accountability of the Federal Government,
including measures to improve the efficient and effective use
of taxpayer dollars.
Our second witness on the first panel today is the Hon.
Clay Johnson, III, Deputy Director of Management for the Office
of Management and Budget. In this role, Mr. Johnson provides
government-wide leadership to the Executive Branch agencies to
improve the agency and program performance. Prior to this
position, Mr. Johnson served as Assistant to the President for
Presidential personnel and as the Executive Director of the
Bush-Cheney transition team.
I would like to thank both Mr. Walker and Mr. Johnson for
being here. They have been here before and will be here again.
We are very pleased with your work, and I would note that your
submitted statements will be made a part of the record and you
will each be recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER,\1\ COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
back before this Subcommittee. I appreciate your commitment to
improving government performance and ensuring accountability
for the American people. I thank you for including my entire
statement into the record. I will now move to summarize it.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on
page 33.
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I am pleased to come here before the Subcommittee today to
talk about the concept of performance budgeting in general and
the Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating
Tool, or PART, in particular. As you know, Mr. Chairman, our
Nation is currently on an unsustainable fiscal path. I have two
graphics that I would like to refamiliarize you and the other
Members and key staff with.\2\
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\2\ The graphics referred to in Mr. Walkers prepared statement
appear in the Appendix on pages 39 and 40 respectively.
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Both are based upon GAO's long-range budget simulations.
This first one is based on CBO's 10-year baseline projections
and the requirements that CBO, by law, must comply with. Those
requirements, among other things, include: (1) no new laws will
be passed in the next 10 years, (2) all expiring tax cuts will,
in fact, sunset, and (3) discretionary spending will grow by
the rate of inflation during the next 10 years, and (4), that
the alternative minimum tax will not be fixed.
Mr. Chairman, I have asked individuals in every speech that
I have given in the last 2 months whether or not they believe
any of those four assumptions are true, and so far, I have less
than ten out of several thousand that believe that those
assumptions are reasonable. Unfortunately, this is the basis
Congress is using to make decisions.
The next chart demonstrates what an alternative scenario
would look like if all expiring tax cuts are made permanent and
if discretionary spending grows by the rate of the economy
during the entire period. It is clearly a very dramatic and
unacceptable outcome.
As a result, it is critically important that a fundamental
reexamination of major spending and tax policies and priorities
be undertaken in order to recapture our fiscal flexibility for
the future and address key social, economic, and security
changes and challenges in the 21st Century. Clearly,
performance budgeting holds promise as part of a fundamental
reexamination of the basis of the Federal Government. Existing
performance budgeting efforts, such as the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and PART, (or the Program
Assessment Rating Tool), can provide a foundation for a
baseline review of existing Federal policies, programs,
functions, and activities.
As I testified before this Subcommittee in April, the
President's Management Agenda and its related initiatives,
including PART, demonstrate the Administration's commitment to
improving not only Federal financial management but also
overall management while enhancing government performance.
However, it is not clear that PART has had any significant
impact on Congressional authorization, appropriations, and
oversight activities to date.
In our view, there are three key factors that we believe
are critical to sustaining successful performance budgeting
over time. One, we have to build a supply of credible
performance information. Two, we have to encourage demand for
that information and its use in Congressional processes by
garnering stakeholder buy-in. And three, we need to take a
comprehensive and cross-cutting approach to assessing related
programs and policies which must be not just vertical, but
horizontal, and must consider not just spending, but also tax
policies and preferences.
The Federal Government is in a period of profound
transition. We face an array of changes, challenges, and
opportunities to enhance performance and assure accountability.
Much is at stake in the development of a collaborative
performance budgeting process. This is an opportune time for
the Executive Branch and the Congress to consider and discuss
how agencies and committees can best take advantage of and
leverage the new information and perspectives coming from the
reform agenda currently underway. Some program improvements can
come solely through Executive Branch action, but for PART to
meet its intended goal, there must be greater buy-in by the
Congress, which to date has not been forthcoming.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you and the
other Members of the Subcommittee may have, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Mr. Walker. Mr. Johnson.
TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAY JOHNSON, III,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lautenberg, thank you. I
contend that agencies are better managed today, and they are
more focused on results than ever before. But we are not as
focused on results as we can and need to be.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix
on page 56.
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Agencies are assessing program performance with the PART
instrument and using this information to inform management and
budget actions. The Administration is proposing Sunset and
Results Commissions legislation to involve Congress more
directly in holding agencies accountable for results.
Some say the PART assessments have not had any impact on
authorizations, appropriations, or oversight. To that, I say it
has had some impact, but clearly, we can do a better job
convincing Congress of the usefulness of performance
information. I point out that this effort was designed to span
5 years. Only this past year did we assess programs accounting
for more than 50 percent of the budget. We are only in the
fourth year of a 5-year effort, and there is more attention
being paid this year than last.
Some would also say that PART assumes that each program has
one goal and that all programs are alike. To that, I say all
programs are alike in that they should be able to account for
what taxpayers are getting for their money. Most importantly, I
point out, though, that the PART asks unique questions for
different kinds of programs. They ask unique questions for
competitive grant programs, block grant programs, regulatory-
based programs, capital asset programs, credit programs, and
research and development programs.
Some say that good performance data is hard to come by. I
agree, but shame on us if we are not always looking for the
best way, no matter how imperfect, to measure what our programs
do, and what outcomes they achieve.
And some say that the Results and Sunset Commissions that
we are about to propose are ways to get rid of programs we do
not like. To that, I say we want programs to work. The history
of Sunset Commissions and similar programs is that they are
much more apt to drive program improvement than they are to
result in program elimination.
We all want to get more for the money we spend. The biggest
opportunity is to get programs to work better. Yes, we debate
in the preparation of our budgets and in appropriations
legislation on whether to eliminate $5 or $10 billion of
programs or how else to spend it, but this pales in comparison
to the $20-plus billion associated with every 1 percent
improvement in performance. The most significant opportunity we
have is to drive better program performance.
We believe that the PART now, and the soon to be proposed
Sunset and Results Commissions, help us achieve these savings
for the taxpayers. They help us focus on results. Thank you.
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Senator Lautenberg, would you like to make an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Forgive my tardiness. I am sorry that I missed the Subcommittee
meeting that you had, but it was impossible to be back here
from distant travel.
I do thank you for convening this hearing, and thanks also
for giving us an opportunity to discuss the issue. Mr.
Chairman, I think everyone knows I came out of the business
community, and before I arrived in the Senate, when I left that
company 23 years ago, we had 16,000 employees and the cardinal
principle was to make sure everybody carried their share and we
held them accountable. As a result of that kind of supervision,
we had a really successful career as a company and it continued
on way past my chairmanship, so apparently I got them off on a
good start.
So I applaud the President's desire to hold the government
programs and employees accountable for their performance. The
first step in accountability is an ability to measure
performance, and that is what the PART program is about.
Measuring performance is like any other tool in business or
government. It can be effective, but only if it is used
properly, and that, Mr. Chairman, is my concern about the PART
program.
We have to ask the right questions, measure the right
things. If we don't, we will never get good results. So we have
to make sure that the questions are directed in such a way that
there is an objective review. Programs should be judged based
on how well they achieve the goals set for them and whether or
not they have any political pressure to present the results of
their review.
Since this hearing is about a performance-based budget,
there is one thing that I would like to mention in passing, and
that is in business, there is a measure of success that we
don't have available to us here and that is the financial
result, financial bottom-line. But government just doesn't and
can't really do it the same way. Our definition of success is
much more complicated. When a program doesn't perform, we have
to ask why not.
For instance, the Manufacturing Extension Partnership
Program lost points on its PART evaluation because in spite of
its successes in leveraging financial support, it serves only a
small percentage of small manufacturers each year, and that
evaluation was used to cut the funding for the program. It
doesn't make sense. If the program is working, it doesn't have
enough resources to make a big enough impact, we should decide
on whether or not we are going to increase it or get rid of the
program.
In short, Mr. Chairman, we should demand accountability for
the Federal Government to make sure they accomplish the goals
that we set for them, but we have to examine the outcomes of
these programs honestly, fearlessly, and without any bias in
the way we see the programs other than in their efficiency and
their results.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for doing this.
Senator Coburn. Thank you. I would clarify for the record,
in both Mr. Walker's testimony and Mr. Johnson's testimony, I
believe there is reference to the fact that when programs fall
low on the PART assessment, that sometimes it is because not
enough money has been given. So I think they recognize that
weakness and they have testified that way.
I want to go back to your chart, because whether we have a
Results or a Sunset Commission or whether we have a PART
evaluation, right now, we are sitting at about 19.6 percent of
our GDP, the government consuming it, according to what you
have right there, and estimated to grow to approximately 40
percent by the year 2040.
We have a tool now that we are using--that we are
attempting to use. We are not effectively using it in a lot of
ways because a lot of the agencies aren't responding with the
management expertise based on the measurement tool that is
going to be used there. What is the plan to move those numbers
down through PART, through results, through Sunset Commission,
so even though we have this long run of mandatory spending, how
in the world are we going to achieve that area that we can
achieve and how are we going to be able to implement this?
We are in the third year, fourth year of this. What do we
see? Are we seeing improvements? The criticisms of the PART
system, are they legitimate? Is it resistance to just being
measured, or are there some legitimate criticisms to the PART
system, either one of you that might want to respond to that.
Mr. Walker. I will start, Mr. Chairman, by refamiliarizing
you, and I know you have read this at least once, the booklet
that we put out----
Senator Coburn. Twice.
Mr. Walker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Specifically, I am referring to the booklet that we put out on
February 16 which lays out the business case pretty strongly
that we are on an imprudent and unsustainable fiscal path. As a
result we are going to have to look at the basis of the Federal
Government, both as it relates to spending and as it relates to
tax policy.
With regard to the subject of this hearing today, in
addition to trying to answer the 202-plus questions in the
booklet that illustrate the need to reexamine the base of the
government, I do believe there is strong conceptual merit to
having some type of periodic assessment of programs, policies,
functions, and activities. My personal view is that the
agencies should be on the front line. This should be a normal
and recurring part of their job.
I think in order for these assessments to work, several
things have to happen. It is important what the process is. It
is important what the principles and the criteria are. It is
also important who the players are that are involved in
generating the results that will be considered by the Congress,
as well as by the President, to the extent of the Executive
Branch, in trying to make decisions.
In that regard, I think there is a need for and an
opportunity to institutionalize a periodic assessment process
that builds upon the principles that are laid out in this
booklet, including the generic questions, as well as the
principles and generic questions that are outlined in the PART.
By doing so we can try to come up with something that has a
chance of being sustained over time and can generate more
meaningful results, both financially and non-financially,
irrespective of what administration might currently be in
power.
Mr. Johnson. I think we have great opportunity to use the
PART. Whatever it is called 5 years or 10 years from now there
should be an instrument that we use consistently across all
programs to assess performance, and today is it called the PART
and there are 25 questions, plus or minus. It should be a part
of our job. It should be part of what agencies do on a day-in
and day-out basis. That is the assumption in the PART now.
Part of the PART program is you evaluate different aspects
of the program and then you are supposed to develop recommended
next steps, things that you, the program manager, are going to
do this next year to improve performance, reduce cost, or both,
and we are set up to monitor that and to hold agencies
accountable for the follow-through--we, OMB, are set up to
follow through, hold agencies accountable and then follow
through on those recommendations.
And some of these programs' recommended next steps are
really significant. They are going to invest more money in IP.
They are going to reorganize this. They are going to change the
rules, get a bill changed, new legislation, or whatever. Others
are less aggressive.
They all should be held accountable for having a commitment
to improve performance every year. That is built into the
system. We are now at the point where we have some programs
that are now in the second year and the third year since its
asessment, so we are now able to start holding agencies
accountable for that follow-up on what they said they could do
to improve performance.
The other thing we need to do and are preparing to do is to
make this information more public so there is more discussion
about PART and about what the desired outcomes are, what the
performance measures are, and so forth. All this information is
available now on the website. You have to really want to find
it and you have to be able to speak that form of English that
only OMB and a few Congressional staffers are adept at
speaking.
What we want to do is to take this information, just put it
in English, put it in lay terms for all the world to see. Here
is what we are spending your money on. Here is how we evaluate
these programs. Here is how we measure success, and here is
what the recommended next steps are. This more public
information, we believe, is going to drive more dialogue
between the public and Members of Congress.
There will be more dialogue between think tanks and good
government groups and Members of Congress and the Executive
Branch about how much better this performance measure is than
that performance measure, how much stronger and more aggressive
this recommended next set of actions is than that one, and
there will be more pressure, more dialogue, more discussion
about how to drive performance even better. Make it more
public, make it more transparent, and get more impetus behind
using the information to drive performance. Both of those
things--the first one exists and the second one is in the
process of being developed.
Senator Coburn. It seems to me we have three problems. One
is creating a culture where you use management tools of
assessment and outcomes to drive policy, refinements, and
efficiency within programs.
The second is just the management expertise of demanding
more with less, which is nowhere in any of this that I have
found anywhere. We still have yearly budgets that come in at
baseline rather than zero-based budgeting. So that is the
second part.
And the third part is to engage Congress. The Congress is
going to get surprised in about 4 years and we are going to be
making major cuts to major programs to handle our financial
difficulties. It seems to me whatever we can do to awaken
Congress to what is about to happen to us in terms of
international financial markets, the force that is going to be
placed on the Congress.
My follow-up question is, what about the second and the
third part? What about the more for less that is every
business. Senator Lautenberg asked that of his business every
year. Give me more for less. That is called efficiency. That is
called productivity. He asked that and got it. What about that
component of it?
And the second question I would ask you about is how do you
engage Congress? How do you engage Congress to address what
those charts show, and how do we make the changes that are
necessary, create an awareness in Congress to do the reform?
There are a lot of programs out there that are great. This
isn't going to be just about programs that are great ideas. It
is going to end up being what about the programs that we cannot
afford? Which is the best of those? That is the other reason
why we should have such a good assessment tool. We cannot
afford everything that we are promising today.
So please answer those two subparts of that question, if
you would, and then I will defer to Senator Lautenberg.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully suggest that
we need to integrate and institutionalize those two concepts
into the current processes that we already have. For example,
we have the Government Performance and Results Act, which
requires strategic and annual performance planning, and annual
performance and accountability reporting. A key component of
that should be the concept of getting more done with whatever
resources and authorities you have, and it could be with less,
or it could be the same amount.
Second, I think we also have to look at the budget process
and the materials that are provided to the Congress. We need to
move beyond baselines. The baselines are not sustainable. The
baselines, to a great extent, represent an amalgamation and
combination of programs, policies, functions, and activities
that made sense when they were put into place but haven't been
subject to fundamental review and reexamination. Performance
information needs to be included as part of that process.
I think we need to make the agencies responsible for doing
this. I think there needs to be a role for OMB on behalf of the
Executive Branch and the President, whoever the President might
be. I also think there needs to be a role for GAO, because the
fact of the matter is that every administration has a President
who is associated with a political party. They change from time
to time, but by definition, the Congress has to feel
comfortable with the process, the principles, and the players.
As a result it is important not just to get an Executive Branch
assessment but also the GAO's assessment since we are an
independent, nonpartisan, nonideological agent and a subsidiary
of the Congress.
Mr. Johnson. When they first started using the PART 40 some
odd percent of the programs could not demonstrate a result. So
it was impossible to hold the head of programs accountable for
the accomplishment of a goal. They couldn't define what the
goal was. They didn't know what they were trying to accomplish
or they knew what they were trying to accomplish, but they
couldn't measure it, or whatever, some combination of the
above.
With performance information for programs, you now have
information that you can use to hold program managers
responsible for the accomplishment of desired outcomes at
desired costs, and it is at that point, and we are just now
getting to that point, where you can start setting annual goals
with program managers that we want to get more for less, or we
want to get the same for less, or we want to get more for the
same. And that needs to be part of holding managers
accountable, holding employees accountable.
That is one of the basic concepts for why there ought to
be, we propose and will recommend here shortly, civil service
modernization government-wide. It helps create an environment
where people, managers in particular, are held more accountable
for how their programs perform, and also how to better engage
Congress.
When we started this, the whole PMA was designed to focus
on opportunities to better manage the Federal Government that
involved Congress initially as little as possible. Nothing
against Congress, but we wanted to work as much as we could
within the Executive Branch to drive performance. Now there is
more information available. There is information on 60 percent
of the budget. We have information now that can be used to
inform budget decisions, programs, continuation of programs,
and elimination kind of decisions. So now there is enough
information to more significantly involve Congress.
So this is why we are having these kinds of hearings. This
is why you are interested in this. We can get more buy-in about
what the stated purpose is. We can get more buy-in to the
validity of these performance measures. We can get more buy-in
to the validity of these efficiency measures.
And I think one of the key things that is going to lead to
the credibility and validity of these numbers is if we are able
to show Congress how this information is being used within the
Executive Branch, not to eliminate, add, or subtract programs,
but to drive performance. We can show that this makes sense.
Program managers are using these new definitions of desired
outcomes, and we are making these kinds of changes in the way
programs are being managed and achieving different kinds of
results, more desirable results, than we were several years ago
before we had this information.
I believe that is going to make a big difference in terms
of how credible this information is with Congress, and then
these kinds of trends also make it much more necessary for
Members of Congress and the Executive Branch to pay attention
to what is working and what is not, and what we are getting for
the money.
Senator Coburn. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
These two witnesses are very knowledgeable people. We see
them with some degree of regularity.
Mr. Johnson. We have the same agent. [Laughter.]
Mr. Walker. We get the same fee.
Mr. Johnson. The same fee, Senator, zero. [Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. Well, we can discuss that at another
time, but what I----
Mr. Walker. More for less. [Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. I got a little concerned when Mr.
Johnson made some reference, and I thought that there was a
suggestion in there that maybe the Congress ought to be rated
the same way, using PART. If that is the case, I will recuse
myself from that hearing. [Laughter.]
But in any event, thank heaven that we are not measured by
the same yardstick. It is fair to say that there might even be
some political influence around here.
How sure are you, Mr. Walker, can we be, that there is no
political urging, to use the politest term I can, because this
is all that I share with the Chairman here. We have gotten to
know each other some and we know that in terms of how we
operate, there is consistency of view.
As I listened to what each of you had to say, I thought
about the differences in departments. How do you measure the
museum performance and how do you measure a transportation
program or the manufacturing program, which I think is a very
good idea? You are left in kind of a discovery area. Who do you
talk to--who gets spoken to when these decisions are being
reviewed or questions are being asked? Who in the line of
command typically gets talked with? Do the employees get to
respond? Do the staff within these units get to respond, or is
this strictly a management review?
Mr. Johnson. I don't know how far down it gets. It is both
agency and OMB, but I don't know how far down, if it gets down
to the Forest Service person in whatever Western State.
There are four basic areas of questioning in the PART that
really are good questions that would apply to your form of
business, my form of business, any kind of Federal program. Is
there a clear, defensible purpose? There are several questions
related to that. Are there valid short-term and long-term
goals? Is the management sound or the management practices
good? And what are the results of the program relative to the
goals? Now, those are generic questions that apply to any kind
of program.
There is work done by OMB and people working on individual
programs within the agencies. They get agreement or
disagreement on what the ratings are. We are this year
establishing an appeals board in case there is an impasse at
what the evaluation ought to be, and it goes to a selection of
deputy secretaries to review that and make some determination
on what the ruling ought to be on that.
But I feel comfortable that there are good assessment from
both objective and pride of authorship. The people involved in
the program standpoint, and the questions that are asked are
generic in nature, but very focused on whether the programs are
working or not.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Senator Lautenberg, you having been in the
private sector for many years and I having been in the private
sector for 21 years, these are management 101 concepts that
apply to government as well as the private sector and the not-
for-profit sector. They are not inherently partisan in nature.
And yet the fact of the matter is, the government hasn't done
much in this area for many decades, irrespective of which party
was in power.
I would respectfully suggest that the agencies have to be
primarily responsible and accountable for doing what needs to
be done here. I would also agree that OMB has a role to play.
At the same point in time, I don't believe that it can stop at
OMB. Given the fact that OMB is part of the Executive Branch,
and works directly for the President--whoever the President
might be and whichever party that President might be associated
with--I think you need to have a check and balance. I think
part of that check and balance possibly is to have a role for
GAO. Ultimately, it is not only going to require action by the
Executive Branch, it is also going to require action by the
Legislative Branch in order to achieve meaningful and lasting
results.
Rightly or wrongly, I know there is concern in the Congress
with regard to just relying upon the PART. There is also
interest in having some checks and balances in the process.
That is how our Constitution is based.
Senator Lautenberg. In the business world, again, each of
our witnesses here has talked about the experiences in the
private world. I think that the most reliable measure is to see
how the customers like it. I don't know whether we include that
as part of our review. Again, I note that the museum is here,
and I wonder, have we done any assessment or do we do any about
visitors, whoever the customers may be. Unfortunately, it takes
time to catch up with that opinion. The cart and horse thing
that is so often used as a reference here is whether the
resources are adequate to give the facility or the program
enough time and enough direction to work effectively.
Mr. Walker. Senator Lautenberg, I would respectfully
suggest, as Clay Johnson touched on the criteria need to be
customized to the particular entity involved. Let us take GAO
as an example, which I know firsthand. We are a professional
services organization. We have four primary measures. Measure
one, results, financial and non-financial results. Two, what do
our clients, meaning the Congress, think about our work? Three,
what do our employees think about our agency? And then four,
what do our partners, both within government and outside of
government domestically and internationally, think about us?
Those four measures work very well, and there are a lot of
details behind those measures, but the framework has a lot of
conceptual merit. However, the details obviously have to be
tailored to the particular enterprise and their workforce.
Senator Lautenberg. And each of you is satisfied that there
is--that these results are free of any skewing for political or
ideological decisions?
Mr. Johnson. I am totally satisfied that they are free of
those biases.
Mr. Walker. We haven't evaluated that. I believe that to
the extent that you have a process that provides for checks and
balances, then it can provide additional assurance, not just
for today, but 5 years from now, and 50 years from now.
Mr. Johnson. I want to talk about customer service in a
second, but one thing, there is less bias in our assessment of
the ratings than will be there in Congress' assessment of
whether programs work or not, to your point that you made
earlier.
On customer service, we had talked about that. I can tell
you that every program that has a large customer service
component, which is almost all of them, does a lot of customer
service measuring. All of our lending operations, all of our
grant-making operations, all of our e-Government initiatives
are measuring customer satisfaction, and like many government
issues, they are comparing our ability to take a reservation
for a campsite with orbit.com's satisfaction with their ability
to take an airline reservation. So we are looking for private
sector benchmarks and trying to build that into program
managers' goals.
The thing we have to realize, our ability to assess
programs are in a pretty infant stage. We are now in a 3-plus
year process of measuring program performance. We haven't even
evaluated all the programs yet. The program metrics and
measurements we use will be way better 5 years from now than
they are now and better still 10 years from now. We will get
better at measuring. We will get better at correlating this
with results and so forth.
We talked about how we don't have customer satisfaction
measures in all of our customer service programs. It is in
some, but not all. That needs to be corrected. That will be
corrected. But we are going from a situation 2 years ago where
50 percent of the programs could not demonstrate any result,
forget the right result, any result. We are now coming to the
point where we have measures, a lot of them are very
rudimentary and basic, and now we are going to build from there
and make them much better and use that information to hold the
program managers more accountable for the delivery of more for
less.
Senator Coburn. Senator Carper, welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
running a little late. Our caucus luncheon ran until about
2:15. We had a heated discussion on energy policy, and as I was
making my way over here, my cell phone went off and it was our
Lieutenant Governor from Dover, Delaware calling, from
Legislative Hall, to give me the results of the elections in
Boys' State and he was standing next to the newly-elected Boys'
State Lieutenant Governor, our oldest son, Christopher Carper,
who we are just very proud of.
Senator Coburn. All right.
[Applause.]
Senator Carper. Nobody has asked for a recount. [Laughter.]
So, I think we are in a moment of real pride. He had lunch
at the Governor's house today, where we used to live. Tuesday
in Delaware, we have a legislative leadership luncheon where
Democrat and Republican leaders in the legislature and the
Governor and the Lieutenant Governor all have lunch, and
sitting right there at the table was--literally in a room where
he grew up for 8 years, was our boy, real special.
I have a statement I would like to give, not now but maybe
during our break between our panels, if you don't mind. I want
to say to our witnesses that I don't think I have ever seen the
two of you before, but it is great to see you. [Laughter.]
People are going to start talking, but we are glad you are
both here. Thank you for your testimony and your response to
our questions.
Let me just start off, if I could, with a question for you,
Mr. Johnson, and I am going to ask Mr. Walker to respond to it,
as well. I will give you the first shot at it, if I can.
I have read criticisms, and you have probably heard them,
too, of the Program Assessment Rating Tool which argue that
OMB's ratings sometimes ignore the will of Congress with
respect to our intent in creating certain programs. I just
wonder, is it possible for a program to get a poor rating
simply because it does what is required by statute and not
necessarily what OMB might like for that program to do?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator Carper. All right. What should we do about that?
Mr. Johnson. What we challenge our agencies to do is----
Senator Carper. I want the record to show, that is the
shortest answer I have ever gotten from any witness in the 4-
plus years I have been here. Could you be more direct?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Johnson. We charge agencies to have outcome goals for
each program, and if the enabling legislation doesn't provide
that or leaves that vague or there are contradictory outcomes
called for, we make it the responsibility of the agencies to go
back to the appropriate body here and fix that.
They say, well, but I can't control that. Then we say,
well, we are not saying who is at fault here. We are saying we
have a program that does not have a defined outcome, or it has
a defined outcome and perhaps in some cases the measures are
undefined--or the goals are so broad or so vague that you could
never hold anybody accountable for their accomplishment. That
needs to be fixed. And if it involves working with Congress to
fix it, then it is their responsibility to work with Congress
to fix it.
Again, the assessment is not of Congress--it is of the
program, but the program manager is responsible for doing what
they can to get the most result for the amount of money spent
for that program, and if it involves corrective legislation,
that is what they need to go try to get.
Senator Carper. Mr. Walker, any thoughts, please?
Mr. Walker. First, I think one of the things that Congress
needs to do when it is enacting legislation, whether it be a
new program, or whether it be a new tax policy, is it needs to
think about why is it doing it, what is it trying to achieve,
and how should success be measured. Therefore, at the very
creation of a program or policy, these are issues that should
be focused on by the Congress, since it is the body that causes
it to be created and appropriates money on a recurring basis.
That is generally not being done at the present time.
Second, it is important that we not just look at the
programs with regard to the different departments and agencies,
but we need to have additional emphasis on horizontal
activities, because many times there are many programs that are
being operated and trying to accomplish a similar goal within
many different departments and agencies, and we need to focus
on employing more of a horizontal and integrated approach.
Last, I think we can't forget about tax policy. We spend as
much in this country, or fore go as much in revenue in this
country in some years as a result of tax expenditures and tax
preferences as we do in total discretionary spending.
Discretionary spending includes national defense, homeland
security, judicial system, education, the environment, GAO,
OMB, etc. It is important that we not let tax preferences/
expenditures off the radar screen. They have to be on the radar
screen, too.
Senator Carper. I have to ask this question. It is not
really germane to our hearing today, but you mentioned tax
expenditures and revenue flow gone. Is there any significant
revenue flow gone simply because taxes that are owed and are
not being collected?
Mr. Walker. Over $300 billion is the estimated tax gap, of
which there are sub-elements to that, some because people
aren't claiming the income, some because they have understated
their gains, some because they have overstated their losses,
some because they have delinquencies that we haven't collected.
And we had a hearing on that before the Senate Finance
Committee and that is an issue that needs more attention, as
well.
Senator Carper. So $300 billion, is that like a one-time
number or is that a recurring number?
Mr. Walker. Every year.
Senator Coburn. The Chairman and I have talked about that
and I think that might be the subject of some subsequent
inquiries not today, but that is an issue for another day.
We had another hearing in our full Committee, Mr. Chairman,
this morning, and out of the mouths of a couple of our
witnesses came the words ``Government Performance and Results
Act,'' and I don't remember anybody ever mentioning that in a
hearing before, at least not that I can recall. Anyway, it was
mentioned a time or two in our earlier hearing.
What I would like to do is ask, if I could, just start with
Mr. Johnson to ask a little bit about how we coordinate the
rating tool with the Government Performance and Results Act,
which I think might have been adopted about a dozen or so years
ago but I think it goes back to the early or mid-1990s. How
does OMB take into account programs' successes in fulfilling
obligations, placed on them in their agency's long-range or
annual performance plan? Does the rating tool ignore the
Government Performance and Results Act? How do we just
coordinate the two and use them both effectively, or is that
impossible?
Mr. Johnson. No, it is not impossible at all. In fact, they
should be used together. The Government Performance and Results
Act was adopted 12 years ago and----
Senator Carper. Could you just take a second and give us a
little short primer on the Government Performance and Results
Act, if you are able to? And if you are not, you are OK.
Mr. Johnson. I am known to be a pretty good delegator, and
so I am going to call on my good friend, Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. That is called delegating up, Senator, but that
is OK. [Laughter.]
Mr. Johnson. Whatever you want to call it, just do it for
me.
Mr. Walker. He is very adept at delegating.
Senator Carper. Well, we have all done it.
Mr. Walker. I would say, Senator, one of the things that I
mentioned before was I think it is very important that we
recognize that we do have a number of statutory provisions in
place, one of which is the Government Performance and Results
Act, GPRA. My personal view is that we need to take a lot of
these concepts, and integrate them into the current framework.
We also need to institutionalize them such that they will exist
irrespective of what administration is in power and
irrespective of which party controls the Senate and the House
of Representatives.
I do not think they are mutually exclusive. They should
both be done. One should be a subset of the other.
Senator Carper. How did he do?
Mr. Johnson. It wasn't much of a summary, but----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Walker. Oh, you want me to summarize GPRA? I apologize.
Senator Carper. Just a primer, if you would, on----
Mr. Walker. Yes. The Government Performance and Results
Act, which I believe was created in----
Mr. Johnson. I would give him a----
Senator Carper. An incomplete?
Mr. Johnson. No----
Senator Carper. You are taking my time.
Mr. Walker. The answer is that the Government Performance
and Results Act, which I believe was created in 1993, provides
for a number of things. One, it provides that agencies do a
strategic plan periodically. Second, it provides that agencies
prepare an annual performance plan. Third, it requires that
agencies publish an annual performance and accountability
report.
I might note for the record that, as frequently is the
case, many times, these pieces of legislation are passed and
only apply to the Executive Branch. In this particular case, as
in many others, we have voluntarily adopted it at GAO, not just
to comply, but to try to lead by example.
It was a very valuable concept and we have made a lot of
progress in the last 12 years with regard to this. But we still
have a ways to go. I believe that some of the concepts we are
talking about today represent a prime example of how we need to
integrate these concepts into our existing mechanism. However,
we need greater involvement by the Legislative Branch,
including the Congressional committees, because to a great
extent, whether it is budget, whether it is appropriations,
whether it is authorizations or reauthorizations or whether it
is oversight, this type of information is not used to the
extent that it should be.
Mr. Johnson. David and I were on a panel a couple of years
ago with Pat McGinnis with the Council on Excellence in
Government and Congressman Armey talking about the Government
Performance and Results Act, and I think that it was the
feeling of everybody on that panel that the Government
Performance and Results Act had not lived up to its potential.
I think one of the reasons is that the unit of evaluation,
I suggest, should not be an agency. It is difficult to say that
an agency has succeeded, an agency is the sum of its programs.
There are some agencies like Commerce that have the most
unbelievably wide diversity of programs--they all do, but some
of them are incredible. And to say that Commerce is doing this
or doing that overall, it is not really relevant.
So I think now having program information gives us
information about relevant units of measure, relevant component
parts of agencies that can now be incorporated into our overall
discussion about if Commerce, if Interior, if the State
Department is meeting its mission? Is it accomplishing its
strategic goals?
Three years ago, we only had program information for 20
percent of the programs, then 40, now 60. We are in 80. This
next year is for us the time when all of us should figure out
how to really bring these two things together, because I think
it gives us an opportunity to realize even more completely the
full potential of the Government Performance and Results Act of
12 years ago.
Senator Carper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walker. One last thing, Senator Carper, we still need a
government-wide plan. We don't have a government-wide strategic
plan. We don't have a government-wide performance plan. We do
have, I would argue, a performance and accountability report,
but we still need the government-wide plan.
The budget is, by definition, not a strategic plan because
it doesn't look out far enough.
Senator Carper. Who should be responsible for developing
that?
Mr. Walker. The President, and presumably the President
would use his very valuable agent, OMB.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Gentlemen, thanks very much.
Senator Coburn. I want to go back for just a moment. Mr.
Johnson, in your testimony, you stated that the Administration
is proposing two new commissions, the Sunset and the Results
Commissions. Can you talk in some detail about what those
commissions would do, how would they be created, and how they
would be structured, and what their purposes would be?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, and I know I am going to miss a few of
these facts. The Sunset Commission is a concept, I think it is
employed by about half the States. Texas is one. What we are
proposing is that there be a seven-member commission, four in
the majority party--or in the Administration, three not. Four
members appointed by the President with consultation from the
majority and minority leaders in both Houses.
There would be a list put together with Congress, a
schedule of when programs or agencies would come up for review
over a 10-year period of time. So it would set a 10-year review
cycle. If Congress and the President agreed that the department
of X ought to be reviewed in total, it will be on that list. If
they agree that it only ought to be programs or it ought to be
these programs but not those programs, or it shouldn't be
defense programs, or it should be--that will be worked out, but
there will be a 10-year review cycle.
Then every year, those programs, and so we are talking
about 1,200 programs--let us say it is only program specific--
it would be 1,200 programs. About 120 programs a year would
come up for consideration. If they are not affirmatively agreed
to to be continued, they would sunset.
My understanding is that the experience in the States is
that the programs tend not to then go away. They tend to know
that their judgment day is coming up, so there is
accountability--Congress is on the line, calling for
performance. The Executive Branch is on the line, calling for
performance. Program managers really feel held accountable for
how their programs perform, and it tends to drive more
significant performance, more focus on results, and more focus
on efficiency.
And so what happens is programs get better. Improvements
get better. Occasionally, the Sunset Commission will come out
with a recommendation to modify a program or change the
measures or less of this and more of that as opposed to this
thing should go away altogether. If something needs to be done
away with, my guess is, and I think the experience in States
is, it will generally be done away with long before it ever
comes up before sunset review. So it is a mechanism for driving
a formal focus on results. Congress would be involved and the
Executive Branch involved, both calling for results.
The Results Commission is to deal with the programs like
job training or community and economic development or programs
dealing with disadvantaged youth or world water quality, where
there are issues that many agencies and many programs are
involved with which makes it very difficult for the Executive
Branch and for the Congress to deal with these matters, because
you get into jurisdictional issues, you get into so many
different budgets, you get into issues about, well, is it
Commerce's fault, is it Interior's fault, is it whatever.
If Congress agreed to the concept, then what would happen
is the President would propose that we ought to create a
specific Results Commission on the subject of job training.
Congress would agree that was not too controversial a topic or
it was a good enough amount of money or a substantive issue
that we should create a Results Commission to deal with that.
They would agree to do that. The President would form a seven-
person commission, four in consultation with the majority and
minority leaders in both Houses. But it would be seven people
who have expertise of various sorts on the subject of job
training in this case. It would be a commission put together to
deal with the specific issue at hand.
They would then have 9 months to receive a proposal on how
to organize these multi-agency, multi-program efforts
differently, do away with some, add some things, combine them
over here, combine them into--whatever the recommendation is,
take that, have hearings, decide what they believe--how the
President's recommendation ought to be amended, if at all, come
back to the President with that. There is some dialogue back
and forth. Anyway, but then that goes to the Congress for
expedited consideration, like a BRAC-kind of a process.
So one deals with single agency kinds of performance
issues. The other one deals with single program performance.
The other one deals with multiple departments, multiple
agencies, multiple programs dealing with the same issue.
I have left a lot of the details out, but----
Senator Coburn. Talk with me for a minute about the fact
that we are going to approve $170 billion worth of spending
this year for programs that aren't authorized. How does the
Results or the Sunset Commission deal with that? In other
words, we are going to spend $170 billion. We are going to
appropriate it this year for programs that are totally
unauthorized. In other words, the Congress hasn't done this
job, either won't reauthorize them, don't have the votes to
reauthorize and appropriate them anyway. How do you address
that problem? Thirty percent of our discretionary budget is
appropriated without any authorization.
Mr. Johnson. I am not familiar with the particulars, but
when the Congress and the Executive Branch are developing that
list of programs, that schedule to review all programs, it
would decide whether they are reviewing just authorized
programs, or unauthorized programs. They might decide to put
all those unauthorized programs in the first couple years of
sunset review.
So Congress is integrally involved with the Executive
Branch to decide what is involved and in what order these
different programs are involved. So this would be a mechanism
for doing that.
Senator Coburn. We really could do that if we had effective
oversight, without either of those commissions, couldn't we?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully suggest the
commission wouldn't deal with that issue. The fact of the
matter is that you already have a number of programs that have
not been reauthorized yet, even though they are supposed to be
reauthorized, and yet the Congress has decided to continue to
appropriate.
There is absolutely no question that we need additional
emphasis on whether or not programs, policies, functions, and
activities are achieving real results. There is absolutely no
question that we need additional emphasis on mechanisms to
determine whether and to what extent programs should be
continued.
However, we should integrate those mechanisms into other
ongoing processes and institutionalize them. I haven't seen the
proposed legislation and I would reserve any comment on the
proposed legislation until I see it. However, historically, we
have done a lot of work at GAO with regard to commissions that
work and commissions that don't work. The commissions that
typically have worked the best are the ones that had a finite
term and a specific mission to be accomplished. What I am
hearing is something that could go on indefinitely.
The real key is, how can we end up making sure that the
Congress is engaged to a greater extent? How can we make sure
that more of this type of information is automatically
considered? How can we increase the transparency of this
information, not only for the benefit of the Congress, but also
for the benefit of the public so there are incentives to start
dealing with some of the tough issues that have accumulated
over time and that we are going to be forced to deal with
because of the fiscal picture that I outlined earlier?
Senator Coburn. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Just a couple more questions, if I could.
Let me just ask, and again, I sort of direct this to you, if I
could, Mr. Johnson, and then to ask Mr. Walker to respond, as
well, but what factors do the views of stakeholders or the
individuals or groups that benefit from a given program, what
factors would their views play with respect to OMB's ratings of
a particular program and how, if at all, does OMB actually
solicit their views?
Mr. Johnson. I know that we pay attention to if programs
are working or not, and if they are supposed to serve a given
community, the most important stakeholder group is the
community of citizens that are supposed to be served, and so
there are different measurements of whether they are being
served or not.
But the exact method of doing that and the degree to which
it happens across the board, I don't know, but I can get back
to you with that information.
Senator Carper. General, do you want to take a shot at that
one, as well?
Mr. Walker. He would be in a better position to say on
PART. I do believe that it is a factor that should be
considered. At the same point in time, just because you have a
lot of people that are happy that the program exists doesn't
mean that the program or policy, if it is on the tax side, is
achieving the desired results.
All too frequently, in the absence of having performance
and outcome-based information, the assumption is if we spend
more money, we will get more results, or if we give more tax
preferences, we will get more results. That is not necessarily
true, and that is part of the whole purpose here. We need to
find out what works and what doesn't work because we are not
going to be able to afford and sustain all that we have right
now. We also need to make room for other things that the
Congress will want to do because of emerging needs and
challenges facing the country in the future.
Senator Carper. OK. And one last question, if I could.
Based on the analysis of the rating tool scores, grant
programs, as I understand it, are less likely to receive
effective scores and much more likely to be deemed ineffective
or to receive a score of results not demonstrated. I just
wonder, why do you think this is, and how do rating tool
questionnaires differentiate between different types of
programs?
Mr. Johnson. There are questions that are asked of grant
programs that are specific to grant programs. I was giving a
talk to the SESes at EPA about a month ago and a couple fellows
came up to me at the end and said PMA is great and getting more
results and better defined goals and so forth. We need to get
States and local communities to, once we grant them the money,
get focused on getting more for the money.
And I said, what is fabulous is that you are asking me
about this. I bet you 5 years ago, you never would have been
inclined to think about how we can now focus on what our grant
recipients do with the money, because that is what we are
holding agencies accountable for. The goal is not to give
monies to States and municipalities in an efficient, effective
fashion. The goal is to get good things happening with the
money that States and municipalities are spending in a
prescribed nature.
So that means not only we have to define what the goals
are, but we have to hold States and municipalities, to the
extent to which we can, accountable for spending the money as
designed and in an effective fashion. Right now, we are not
particularly equipped to do that, and I think that disconnect
between us giving them the money and them spending the money
wisely or them spending the money as intended or them producing
or measuring the results of that is not what it needs to be.
But now our agencies know that they are being held accountable
for how their grant recipients spend the money and so they are
going to turn around and work with States or municipalities and
maybe make the money they get next year dependent on how well
they spend the money this year.
We can get better at this. We just generally have not been.
That has not been our goal, is to seek the performance against
desired outcomes at the bottom level.
Senator Carper. All right. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Several thoughts, Senator. One, there are
different forms of grants, including block grants, and I think
one of the things that we need to keep in mind is that we need
more performance-related information, we need more transparency
so that we can have more accountability both at the Federal
level as well as the State and local level, depending upon the
facts and circumstances.
Second, we have a finite amount of resources, which are
going to get tighter as time goes forward based upon known
demographic trends, rising health care costs, and other
factors. As a result, we need to be more value and risk
oriented. We also need to be more targeted with regard to
expenditures as well as tax preferences.
The last thing is, and it is a concern that I have, there
are other practices that exist that can complicate this. For
example, the practice of Congressional earmarking. When you are
in a situation where you have a finite amount of resources and
it is going to get tighter and you are trying to get people to
focus on results, to the extent that there is going to be more
earmarking, then there is going to be less flexibility to be
able to target, to achieve desired outcomes, to mitigate risk,
which could establish a vicious cycle that should be of concern
to all parties.
Senator Carper. Good enough. Thank you both very much.
Senator Coburn. Thank you. I am going to submit some
questions in writing so we don't carry this out too long.
The other point I would make, the number one stakeholder in
all these programs is the next two generations. It is not the
stakeholders that are meant to serve, because if we don't solve
the financial problem, there is not going to be any service and
the stakeholders, the next two generations, are going to be
paying the bill for things that we have already spent the money
long ago.
So it is important for us to--the ultimate stakeholder is
the American taxpayer for all these programs, because since we
are running on a deficit to the tune of about $22,000 per man,
woman, and child per year in this country, and the people
sitting in this room, the vast majority, aren't going to be
paying that money back, it is going to be our children or
grandchildren, it is important to keep perspective of who the
real stakeholder is.
I want to thank you for your testimony. I am sure we will
invite you back. We appreciate so much you being with us, and
with that, we will dismiss the first panel.
Senator Carper, while our second panel is coming up, I will
ask you to----
Senator Carper. I think I would just ask unanimous consent
that my statement appear in the record and we will go right to
the second panel.
Senator Coburn. Without objection.
Senator Carper. Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
OPENING PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very timely hearing.
As you and all of our witnesses are well aware, our country is
facing record budget deficits. We're just embarking on another
appropriations season here in Congress where we'll be called on to make
some very difficult decisions about what to do with scarce Federal
dollars.
At the same time, as GAO and General Walker have pointed out
countless times before this Subcommittee and elsewhere, we're at a kind
of turning point right now where we need to decide what we want our
government to do in the 21st Century. Nearly 4 years after the attacks
on September 11, we still have a whole new set of needs and priorities
that must be balanced against older needs and priorities and scores of
popular programs.
And with the challenge of the retiring Baby Boom generation on the
horizon, we just can't afford to do all of the things we might want to
do--at least not well. That's why proposals like OMB's Program
Assessment Rating Tool are so interesting.
We should never be afraid of taking a hard look at Federal programs
to determine whether or not they're accomplishing what we intended for
them to accomplish when we first created them. In this day and age, we
simply can't afford to allow poorly-managed programs to continue
without reform or, frankly, for a program that has run its course and
achieved its goals to continue draining resources from other
priorities. That said, we need to be certain that the Program
Assessment Rating Tool or whatever mechanism we use to make these
evaluations is itself effective.
To be effective, a program like the Program Assessment Rating Tool
must be totally separated from politics and ideology. It must also be
closely coordinated with existing mechanisms agencies and Congress use
to align budgets with program goals and outcomes, such as the
Government Performance and Results Act. And perhaps most importantly,
we also need to make sure that a program's intended beneficiaries
outside of Washington have a say before an evaluation is completed.
While I'm keeping an open mind on this issue, I've some evidence that
the Rating Tool might fail all three of these tests.
I'd just say in closing, Mr. Chairman, that we're not going to
close the budget deficit by reducing spending on a program here or
eliminating a program there. President Bush called for the curtailment
or elimination of 154 programs in his Fiscal Year 2006 budget proposal.
Even if Congress were to eliminate every single one of those programs,
I think the savings would only cover a fraction of our budget deficit.
Non-defense discretionary spending, the target of many of the
spending reductions and program eliminations in the President's budget
proposal, makes up only about 16 percent of the Federal budget. I'm
sure we can find ways to improve the management of some of the funding
in that 16 percent, or even to find and eliminate waste or inefficient
use of resources. If we truly want to tackle the fiscal problems facing
us right now, however, we--meaning Congress--need to take a look at the
entire budgetary picture, on both the spending and revenue side, and
make some tough decisions.
Senator Coburn. Our second panel, we are privileged to have
with us today two scholars from the academic community to give
us their perspectives on Federal Government accountability
efforts.
Our first witness on the second panel is Eileen Norcross
from the Mercatus Center in George Mason University. Much of
Ms. Norcross's academic research effort has focused on the
analysis of budget and performance integration and agency
performance reports. We look forward to hearing from her today.
Our second witness on the panel is Dr. Beryl Radin,
Professor of Government and Public Administration with the
University of Baltimore. She has written extensively on the
role of the Federal management as an instrument of policy
implementation, and we look forward to hearing her thoughts on
the current initiative to make government more accountable and
outcome-oriented.
Ms. Norcross, if you would.
TESTIMONY OF EILEEN NORCROSS,\1\ RESEARCH FELLOW, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, THE MERCATUS CENTER OF THE GEORGE MASON
UNIVERSITY
Ms. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman Coburn and Senator Carper
and Members of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, for inviting me to testify on the state
of accountability and results in Federal budgeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Norcross appears in the Appendix
on page 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much of my research at the Mercatus Center is on the
progress agencies have made towards developing outcome
measures, the Program Assessment Rating Tool, and the extent to
which Congress and the Executive Branch use performance
information in the budget. I would like to submit for the
record my paper analyzing the results of the fiscal year 2006
PART. Additionally, I would like to submit a copy of our 2004
annual scorecard for your reference.
Why should we bother to evaluate the performance of
agencies or program results? What is the purpose of linking
performance information with cost information? Policy makers
can and do debate values and priorities, but such a debate is
about ends, not means. Policy makers often articulate many
worthwhile ends--reducing homelessness, eradicating disease, or
ensuring we are secure from terrorism. If we are to accomplish
these ends, we must know if results are being achieved. This
means holding programs to a fact-based, not values-based,
standard.
If our goal is to reduce homelessness, does the program
actually do this? If so, to what extent does it succeed? Do
other approaches reduce homelessness more effectively? How many
fewer homeless people would we have if we moved resources from
a less-effective to a more-effective program?
Answering such questions requires reliable performance and
financial information. Linkage of results information and cost
information tells us which means are most likely to accomplish
the ends policy makers decide are worthwhile. Measuring results
enables us to know what public benefits arose from a given
activity.
Agencies are statutorily required to report on their annual
performance by articulating their goals, designing performance
measures, and assessing results achieved. This then requires
that agencies link their goals, objectives, and performance
measures with their budgets.
According to our annual scorecard, which evaluates how well
agencies are meeting their reporting requirements, we find many
agencies lag in linking performance information and financial
information. Not until our third annual scorecard in 2002 did
an agency, SBA, receive the highest score in this category.
They achieved this because each of their performance indicators
included a cost estimate, and some included a cost per output
measure. This practice continued in 2003.
This measure is important because where there are programs
of equal efficacy, then the best means of comparing them is the
cost per unit of success. This allows us to know how resources
might be used to increase the public benefit.
Some agencies have made improvements in recent years. In
our first scorecard in 1999, 14 agencies showed no linkage of
cost to goals. This year, 7 agencies allocated their costs
among goals and objectives, falling short of the highest score
only because they failed to link these costs to individual
performance measures.
With the fiscal year 2004 budget, the Bush Administration
attempted to forward the use of performance budgeting with
PART. By formally linking budget requests to program
performance, PART provides a view into how the Executive Branch
is making some of its budgetary decisions.
This approach has several merits. It is program-focused.
Budget decisions are often made at the program level. Where
multiple programs attempt to accomplish similar outcomes, PART
assessments can facilitate comparisons. OMB has made the
assessments publicly available, ensuring the process is
transparent and open to the public.
There are some shortcomings. We may agree or disagree on
individual PART assessments. The yes/no format may oversimplify
agency answers. There are difficulties in relating individual
program assessments to GPRA's assessment of performance goals.
PART must remain open to constructive criticism in terms of
its methodology and mechanics, but it would be a setback to the
use of performance information if the concept of trying to
objectively assess program results were abandoned altogether.
In the fiscal year 2006 budget, the President recommended
155 programs for termination or program cuts. Fifty-four of
these programs have been PARTed. Of the 99 recommended for
termination, 32 have been PARTed. Of the 55 recommended for
cuts, 23 have been PARTed. These 55 programs represent about
$10 million in savings, or 0.4 percent of the proposed $2.57
trillion budget. Within the 55 programs, it appears PART was
used in conjunction with other information to make funding
decisions. Twenty-five of the 175 programs rated results not
demonstrated, and half of the 22 programs rated ineffective to
date were recommended for elimination or cuts. There is not a
perfect correlation between a PART score and funding decisions.
PART is not the only means to better integrate performance
information into the budget. Important criticisms remain about
its methodology, question format, and ratings classifications.
But PART remains a consistent, systematic, and transparent
attempt to evaluate government programs. By focusing on
individual programs where budgetary decisions are often made,
PART is a valuable approach that can only improve the effort to
advance performance budgeting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Carper, and Members of the
Committee for taking on this important subject. The integration
of performance information into the budget is a vital means of
guaranteeing that the stewardship of public funds will achieve
the most effective results and show the greatest public
benefits. I hope this testimony will be helpful as the
Subcommittee considers the role of performance information in
the Federal budgetary process.
Senator Coburn. Dr. Radin.
TESTIMONY OF BERYL A. RADIN,\1\ PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE
Ms. Radin. Chairman Coburn, Ranking Member Carper, my name
is Beryl A. Radin and I am a Professor of Government and Public
Administration at the University of Baltimore and an elected
Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration, and I
will be joining the faculty at American University's School of
Public Affairs this coming fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Radin appears in the Appendix on
page 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more than a decade, I have been studying the efforts
within the Federal Government to improve the effectiveness and
accountability of Federal programs and have published a number
of articles on this subject. Like many others, I believe it is
important to find ways to assure that limited Federal dollars
are used effectively to carry out the goals and objectives of
programs that have been created by both the Congress and the
Executive Branch. But while the focus on performance is
extremely important, I have serious questions about the current
procedures that have been put in place to carry it out.
The effort that has been undertaken in OMB through PART may
have been motivated by a legitimate and appealing concern, but
I do not think that this model is an appropriate way, or is a
limited way to measure program performance.
The six issues that I will discuss today explain why there
appears to be a disconnect between many of the PART evaluations
overseen by OMB and the budget proposals that were found in the
President's current budget. They illustrate how difficult it is
to impose a single model in an extremely complex Federal system
with a diverse array of programs. We should heed what H.L.
Mencken once said, ``Explanations exist. They have existed for
all times, for there is always an easy solution to every human
program, neat, plausible, and wrong.''
Let me summarize my six points. First, many Federal
programs have multiple and conflicting goals. The PART process
does not really reflect that reality, and most of the
evaluations that have been done assume there is a single goal
for programs.
Second, not all Federal programs are alike. There are major
differences, and we heard some of that earlier, between
competitive grant programs, block grant programs, research
efforts, regulatory programs, and other program forms. Yet the
PART approach largely treats them alike, even though OMB
acknowledges the differences and GAO has actually written about
that extensively. Perhaps most importantly, the PART process
does not recognize the decisions by Congress to enact programs
in different form. Instead, OMB actually second-guesses
Congress in terms of assessment of program purpose and design.
My third point, OMB budget examiners and OMB itself have a
limited perspective on programs. It does not make sense to rely
on only one perspective to determine whether programs should
live or die. Congress itself has recognized that as it has
separated the authorizing and appropriating functions. A yearly
budget is not the only way to look at what are often very
detailed and complex programs.
Fourth, there are many different types of information that
are useful to those who are charged with running or assessing
programs. The information that is used in the PART process is
not value-neutral. Rather, it reflects markedly different
reasons for concern about performance. Significantly, the
information that is emphasized by OMB often is not useful to
program managers, policy planners, or evaluators, or judging
from the quite tepid reaction on Capitol Hill, to those charged
with appropriations recommendations.
Fifth, OMB calls for new data sources but does not
acknowledge that agencies are not able to collect that data. A
number of agencies would like to collect data on the
achievement of program outcomes. However, they are constrained
both by the mandates of the Paperwork Reduction Act as well as
by their inability to receive appropriations that would give
them the sources to develop these data systems.
And sixth, PART focuses on an Executive Branch perspective
and is not easily transferred to the Congressional branch. The
one-size-fits-all approach that is found in the PART process is
not compatible with a Legislative Branch with multiple
committees and subcommittees as well as separating between
authorizing and appropriations perspectives. The multiple
venues within the Congress for discussing issues are one of the
strongest attributes of our democracy, even though the
complexity it creates is sometimes frustrating.
In conclusion, I suggest that this Subcommittee and the
Congress avoid attempting to adopt the PART process and
instead, by focusing on accountability and results, emphasize
the existing resources that are unique to the Legislative
Branch. Instead of searching for a one-size-fits-all approach,
the Congress has rich resources within the appropriations and
authorizing committees structure that could be used to craft
definitions of results within the framework of specific
programs. Performance can best be handled within the confines
of specific program development and traditional Congressional
oversight.
The Congress has oversight capacity that can be used to
provide more robust information than that from the PART
process. The oversight process gives the Congress access to a
range of information from GAO, from CBO, CRS, and the
Inspectors General, as well as from non-governmental sources.
Each of these sources has a somewhat different perspective, but
collectively, they offer a rich view of program performance.
Congress has the ability to develop a regularly-scheduled
assessment of programs within its oversight role.
Thank you for inviting me to testify, and I am available to
work with the Subcommittee and its staff to continue this
conversation. Thank you.
Senator Coburn. Thank you both for your testimony.
I know that the oversight is there. The Congress, less than
7 percent of their hearings are oversight. Ms. Radin, my
question is, how are you going to change that? How are you
going to get Congress to do the oversight that is necessary and
how are we going to measure performance if Congress won't do
the oversight?
Ms. Radin. Has there been an attempt to try to prop up the
process?
Senator Coburn. That is one of the things that Senator
Carper and I are doing with this very Subcommittee, but it is a
new attempt. We are going to average about two Subcommittee
hearings a week. That is about 60 or 70, maybe even 80 hearings
on oversight.
But the fact is, if you look at all the hearings in
Congress, the vast majority of them are not oversight hearings.
The vast number are on the basis of new legislation or
appropriations. So my question to you is, if we are not going
to use the PART performance tool, which everybody recognizes it
has weaknesses, what tool are we going to use?
Let us also assume all the programs out there are good. Let
us just make that assumption from it. They are all good, but we
are going to come up with this budget hurdle we are going to
face. So the thing we have to know is how do we prioritize
them? Which is the best, because some are going to go away. I
promise you, in the next 10 years, a large portion of the
Federal Government is going to go away because we will not be
able to afford it. So how do we measure what do we give best to
the Federal Government?
Ms. Radin. The Subcommittee certainly can't do everything
on its own. But can't there be some effort in the organization
of the Senate and in the House to really focus on the
authorizing committees, because they are the ones that really
know the programs. It seems to me that there has not been a
priority given to oversight in those committees, and that seems
to me something that the organizers of the Congress can push.
It is not going to happen all at once. We know that there
have been attempts to try to rationalize the budget process and
it is maybe a little bit less irrational than it was in the
past, but the system is so complex that thinking that we can
deal with it in one fell swoop is just not realistic.
Senator Coburn. With all due respect, I don't think we are
thinking we can do it in one fell swoop. We have seen a
transition process. And the PART may not be the answer, but
some measure of performance and some level of accountability so
that people understand what the end goal is that is associated
with a relook at how you are performing on that end goal has to
be a component of every Federal Government program that we
have. We have to start asking the hard questions because we are
going to get the hard questions asked about the end, the tough
ones in the next 5 to 10 years.
Ms. Radin. I am not arguing that you shouldn't ask those
questions. I am suggesting that Congress has to grapple with
that in its own terms and that turning it over to OMB really is
violating what the Constitution has created. The ball is in
your court.
Senator Coburn. That is exactly why we are having the
hearing. We haven't turned it over to OMB. But a measurement of
performance, no matter who does it, still gives some
information with which the Congress can act on. And the
question may not be whether Senator Carper and I agree on a
program. The question may be which of the following ten
programs, two out of them are going to have to go if we are
going to live within the constraints for our grandchildren.
Which two, and how do we measure that?
To have a ratings program or an assessment program within
the agencies within the program in terms of creating the
expectation for performance is not a bad idea. I don't think
that there is anybody up here that is suggesting Congress is
about to give that over. They are not, because the only way you
change it is through Congress.
The other point that I would just ask is you recognize that
over 25 percent of our discretionary budget is unauthorized
right now. There is no expertise on it because there is no
authorizing language and hasn't been for 10 or 15 years. So
Congress has its own problems in terms of authorizing the
spending that we have.
First of all, unanimous consent to put the Mercatus Center
evaluation into the record, and without objection, that is so
ordered.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``An Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget's Program
Assessment Rating Tool (PART),'' June 2005, by Eileen C. Norcross,
Mercatus Center, George Mason University, appears in the Appendix on
page 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Coburn. Ms. Norcross, compare the Mercatus Center
to the evaluation by OMB and their process. If you line those
two up, what did you see?
Ms. Norcross. The annual scorecard?
Senator Coburn. Yes.
Ms. Norcross. Our annual scorecard evaluates performance,
the annual performance reports that agencies must submit. And
what we found this year was that about 11 percent of the budget
is represented by good reporting, and what we mean by that is
that these agencies receive a satisfactory score according to
our criteria, which assess reports on whether they produce
public benefits, how transparent they are, and on leadership.
The PART tool assesses government programs. So the annual
scorecard we produce really evaluates a GPRA requirement. The
PART tool evaluates on the program level.
Senator Coburn. OK. Thank you. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Let me just start off by welcoming you and
thank you very much for being here and for the thought you have
given to these issues and your counsel to us today and to the
Congress.
Let me start off by asking, where do you think the two of
you agree in terms of your advice to us and where do you
disagree?
Ms. Radin. Well, I think we both agree that assessing
performance is important, that the question is how do you do it
and whether you acknowledge that there is incredible diversity
of programs in the Federal portfolio.
I am concerned about the PART evaluations that I think have
really ignored the will of Congress. David Walker talked about
the importance of Congress defining goals. Now, some of the
goals and programs are outcome goals, but some of them are also
process goals and those are legitimate. And yet the approach
that we have used in both GPRA and in PART have suggested that
process goals aren't important.
So, for example, Congress may develop a goal that says we
want to involve particular groups in the decisionmaking process
who have not been involved before. That goal is not new. The
Cooperative Extension Service back in the 1930s really created
process goals, and I think that is a very legitimate role for
Congress.
We have also seen efforts in research, for example, that
are really process goals and not outcome goals. We focus on
process because we don't know what is going to occur as a
result of a research effort.
In other cases, Congress has actually determined the means
for developing particular programs. In both the Clean Water
Revolving Fund and the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
Congress told the agency not to use cost-benefit analysis in
making their decisions about programs, yet those agencies got
very low ratings because they didn't have a cost-benefit
analysis.
Now, you asked earlier whether OMB, there were times in
which OMB, in a sense, preempted the voice of Congress, and it
has happened. In another example, the Appalachian Regional
Commission got a low rating because it was playing a
coordination role and wasn't outcome-oriented. But the very
fact of that Appalachian Regional Commission is to focus on
coordination. That is its goal. But it is not an outcome goal,
it is a process goal.
So I think this makes things a lot more difficult for the
agency to fit into the PART process.
Senator Carper. Let me go back to my original question, and
I will direct it this time to Ms. Norcross. Where do you see
you and Dr. Radin agreeing in your testimony? Where do you see
you disagreeing?
Ms. Norcross. I would say we both agree on the importance
of using performance information. We might have disagreements
on the PART itself and the extent to which it should be used by
Congress. I don't know that I advocate PART being used by
Congress wholesale. I think the Executive Branch took the
initiative to develop a tool that would evaluate the government
on a program level and I would like to see Congress also
incorporating that kind of performance information, whether it
is the PART or not, once Congress demands performance
information, agencies have to produce it. They have to know how
their programs are doing and they have to produce better data,
and it just gives us more objective data to make better
decisions.
Senator Carper. Early this morning, on the way down on the
train, I had a telephone conference call with my State director
and with the person who is in charge of our largest county for
me. We were talking about the results of a faith-based housing
initiative, a home ownership initiative that we have going in
each of our three counties, and we were talking about how the
program was going with respect to being successful or not.
And the question I asked, and I ask this question a lot of
my staff, is how do we measure success? And the response that
came back was that we measure success with respect to how many
people are involved in home ownership counseling programs. And
I said, is that really the way we want to measure success, or
do we want to measure success with respect to the number of
people who become homeowners because of their participation in
this process.
I am sort of reminded of that conversation here today, Mr.
Chairman, because how we measure success is really important as
to how we evaluate these programs.
First of all, we have to answer that question. How do we
measure success, whether it is a home ownership program or
whether it is a program to get people off of welfare or any
variety of programs to make us safer, but to be able to
determine how we measure success is just critical and I don't
know that we spell that out all that often in legislation that
we pass. Since we don't spell it out, I think it makes it all
the more difficult for OMB or anybody else to come in and say
programs are a success or are doing what they are supposed to
or not because we have not ourselves said, in order for this
program to be successful, this has to happen.
Ms. Radin. I would say that what you are describing is a
reliance on output measures rather than outcomes. One of the
reasons why we tend to fall back on output measures is because
so many of the outcomes are not measurable today but in the
future. Yet we are talking about annual budget processes. You
have to give a program, let us say, 5 years or 10 years to
really show any outcomes. So we use the outputs as an
indicator, and this is a classic problem for the whole
evaluation field. People have really tried to figure out how
you can focus on outcomes when you have a time delay in the
process.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
Senator Coburn. Well, the important thing is that we have
some process ongoing to measure, and it is not just that we are
going to measure it, it is that we are going to create the
expectation that it is going to be measured, which is just as
important as the measurement itself.
Just a couple of things. First of all, I thank each of you
for coming. I have not gotten through the Center's evaluation.
I am going to do that. I would like to leave the record open so
that we can send you additional questions.
I guess one additional question for you, Dr. Radin. Can you
not measure process? In other words, if the Appalachian
Regional Commission is a coordinator of effort, can you not
measure that coordination?
Ms. Radin. You can, but the way that we have approached
these kinds of processes----
Senator Coburn. Now you are talking about OMB's approach.
Ms. Radin. Yes.
Senator Coburn. OK.
Ms. Radin. I think you can measure processes as long as you
acknowledge that the process is what Congress is trying to
accomplish with the program. That will be different from
outcomes.
Senator Coburn. I think that is true, and I would assure
you with the diversity in the Senate that what OMB brings to
us, we are going to look at that evaluation and then we are
going to make an independent judgment on what is or what isn't
going to be funded--and unfortunately, from my viewpoint, a lot
of things are going to get funded that shouldn't and a lot of
things may not get funded that should, and just the opposite
viewpoint on somebody sitting on a different political
spectrum.
But the most important thing is to reach above that and
say, no matter whether we agree or not, let us say we agree on
all of them needing to be funded. How are we going to measure
which ones have to have priority, because that is really what
is coming. What is the priority for the Federal Government in
how we spend, what we spend, and where do we spend it?
We are not going to see the polarization on issues, I
think, in the future because the problems economically are
going to be so difficult. It is going to be which ones have the
highest priority and which ones do we as a group think needs to
be funded first, second, third, fourth, and fifth. So
measurement of whether it is outcome or output or trend lines
on outcome or output are going to become very valuable for us.
Ms. Radin. One of the things that I have been concerned
about is that I think most of the effort in the performance
area (not just PART), has really focused on efficiency values.
But there also are effectiveness values and there are also
equity values and we shouldn't forget them because many
programs have all of those elements.
Senator Coburn. And I think the other thing that we heard
before you came is that there are some programs that aren't
performing because they are underfunded. In other words, they
are not going to achieve the critical mass to achieve the goal
that Congress wanted them to because the resources haven't been
put there. So we need to look at all of that.
Any other comments either of you might want to make?
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, I do have one last question,
if I could. This discussion really reminds me of conversations
I have had with my colleagues before about programs that are
not being authorized, not being reauthorized, not being
revisited, and yet the funding continues. In some cases, it
makes sense. In other cases, frankly, it does not. In some
cases, it reflects not an inappropriate thing to go forward and
to fund a program that has not been reauthorized. In other
cases, I think it really reflects a failure on our part in the
Legislative Branch.
I would like to ask Dr. Radin, one last question, if you
don't mind. I think you argue, I believe in your testimony,
that at least some of the ratings given by OMB reflect some of
the views that critics have held about programs for some time.
Are there weaknesses within the Program Assessment Rating Tool
or in the way it has been implemented that allow or maybe even
encourage bias?
And as a follow-up, do you think it is possible for OMB,
regardless of whether it is staffed by Democrats or by
Republicans, is it possible for OMB to do the kind of work and
make the kind of determinations that the rating tool calls for
without introducing some level of bias, whether it be political
or ideological?
Ms. Radin. I think one of the points that GAO made in its
report a year ago January was that there is incredible
variability in OMB in the way the budget examiners have been
dealing with PART. And so you have some cases in which a budget
examiner for the last 20 years has been trying to kill a
program, makes a recommendation for zero budgeting and Congress
puts the money back. And then there are other cases in which
the budget examiner loves the program and so it does extremely
well.
And so I think that this process really gives an incredible
amount of authority to the individual budget examiner. Much of
that is not really transparent so that we don't know why a
rating occurs. The child welfare community-based Child Abuse
Prevention Program was rated in a number of elements that,
``this element is not applicable.'' Yet the overall rating was
``results not demonstrated'' and nobody really quite
understands how you got from that, the ``not applicable'' to
the ``results not demonstrated.''
So the fact that this isn't transparent, I think is a big
issue, and that is why this process is too important to really
have it centralized in the hands, really, of a small number of
people in OMB.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks to both of you very much.
Senator Coburn. Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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