Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide vital information in support of military operations. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion in existing and new airborne ISR acquisition systems. This represents a marked increase over prior ISR investments. Given the significant investments, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) assess the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. To assess cost and schedule status, we reviewed programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate investment decisions, we collected information on system capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for similarities.
DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop, procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy ISR systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common Sensor affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective budgets by 185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO found that the newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a knowledge-based acquisition strategy before entering the development process. A good business case requires the manager to match the system requirements with mature technologies and a system design that can be built. This requires sufficient knowledge about the system gained through basic system engineering concepts and practices. Although it fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly. Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems independently. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and other programs that have less collaborative efforts and could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. For example, the Navy and Army have collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout, but in contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as collaborative on the Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently plan unique solutions to their similar needs.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Michael J. Sullivan
Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management
(937) 258-7915
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: While DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or ongoing, there have been no substantive actions recently implemented to gain greater jointness in ISR acquisition programs. Therefore, DOD should develop and implement an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy approach that is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of potential and viable alternative solutions, considering cross-service solutions including new acquisitions and modifications to legacy systems within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD. This strategy should draw on the results of ongoing studies, like the portfolio management pilot program, but should include the necessary authority and controls needed to ensure a single point of accountability for resource decisions.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that processes were well underway to achieve greater jointness, and considers this recommendation closed. However, GAO remains concerned that those processes are not resulting in the benefits DOD expected. The Portfolio Management Experiment, which includes ISR programs, is not yet complete and GAO reported separately that assessments of warfighting needs continue to be driven by the services rather than ensuring that DOD pursues needs that its resources can support. In addition, GAO recently found that the UAS and ISR roadmaps, which were to assess operational and management issues, lack key elements of sound strategic planning such as metrics to assess performance and a long-term vision of what capabilities are required to achieve strategic goals, assess performance, and measure progress. GAO plans to follow up on this recommendation in work currently being considered for staffing.
Recommendation: While DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or ongoing, there have been no substantive actions recently implemented to gain greater jointness in ISR acquisition programs. Therefore, DOD should report to the defense committees by August 1, 2007, the results of the ISR studies and identify the specific plans and actions needed and intended to make joint acquisition decisions in ISR programs and improve the way it plans, buys, organizes, manages, and executes its ISR acquisition programs and operations.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation but non-concurred with the date GAO proposed and suggested delaying the date by four months. The DODIG action officer responsible for following up the status of the agreed-upon findings and recommendations in the report asked for an update from the OSD audit focal point in a memorandum dated May 2008 with a suspense of June 2008. The memorandum requested copies of two studies with portions highlighted, which address how DOD will achieve an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for ISR, including planned changes to policy, guidance, organization, and authority. The status is still pending a response from the DOD point of contact on the report.
