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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, 
and Accountability, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT: 

Monday, July 10, 2006: 

Maritime Security: 

Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving: 

Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues: 

Maritime Security: 

GAO-06-933T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-933T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Government Management, Finance, and Accountability of the Committee on 
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in 
federal efforts to secure the nation’s ports against a potential 
terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in 
coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has 
established area maritime security committees—forums that involve 
federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a 
port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance 
information sharing and port security operations by establishing 
interagency operational centers—command centers that tie together the 
efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. 

This testimony is a summary and update to our April 2005 report, 
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, 
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-
394. It discusses the impact the committees and interagency operational 
centers have had on improving information sharing and identifies any 
barriers that have hindered information sharing. 

What GAO Found: 

Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved 
information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port 
locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that 
the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous 
information-sharing efforts. The types of information shared included 
assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the 
Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO’s 
ongoing work indicates that these committees continue to be useful 
forums for information sharing. 

Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information 
sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they 
receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and 
sensors. The Coast Guard has developed its own centers—called sector 
command centers—at 35 port locations to monitor information and to 
support its operations planned for the future. As of today, the 
relationship between the interagency operational centers and the sector 
command centers remains to be determined. 

In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the 
lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of 
committees or centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to 
field offices that clarified their role in obtaining clearances for 
nonfederal members of committees or centers. In addition, the Coast 
Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to 
monitor application trends. As of June 2006, guidance was put in place 
and according to the Coast Guard, was responsible for an increase in 
security clearance applications under consideration by the Coast Guard. 
Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 467 nonfederal members of 
area maritime security committees with a need to know received some 
type of security clearance. This is an improvement from February 2005, 
when no security clearances were issued to 359 nonfederal members of 
area maritime security committees members with a need to know security 
information. 

Figure: Harbor Patrols Coordinated by Interagency Operational Centers: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO> 

[End of Figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at 
(202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the improvements made in the 
practice of sharing maritime-related security information. Securing the 
nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack has become one of 
the nation's security priorities since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist 
attack include their location near major urban centers, their inclusion 
of critical infrastructures such as oil refineries and terminals, and 
their importance to the nation's economy and trade. Although no port- 
related terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States, 
terrorists overseas have demonstrated their ability to access and 
destroy infrastructure, assets, and lives in and around seaports. 

Ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional 
boundaries; therefore, the need to share information among federal, 
state, and local agencies is central to effective prevention and 
response. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal 
government has taken a number of approaches designed to enhance 
information sharing.[Footnote 1] One of these approaches provides the 
Coast Guard with the authority to create area maritime security 
committees at the port level.[Footnote 2] These committees--with 
representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors-- 
offer a venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around 
ports, as well as a forum for sharing information on issues related to 
port security. Another approach developed to share information is the 
creation of interagency operational centers at certain port 
locations.[Footnote 3] These centers are command posts that tie 
together intelligence and operational efforts of various federal and 
nonfederal participants. Often information regarding port security is 
classified, and requires security clearances for those who need access 
to this information. Lacking access to such information through a 
security clearance can disadvantage officials in their efforts to 
respond to or combat a terrorist threat. 

My testimony today is a summary of and update to our April 2005 report, 
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, 
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05- 
394. That report provides additional background and examples related to 
our findings. Specifically, my testimony provides an examination of the 
efforts that the Coast Guard and other federal agencies have made in 
improving information sharing among federal, state, local, and industry 
stakeholders, including (1) the impact of area maritime security 
committees on information sharing, (2) the impact of interagency 
operational centers on information sharing, and (3) the barriers, if 
any, that have hindered improvements in information sharing among port 
security stakeholders. 

To obtain this information, we reviewed the activities of area maritime 
security committees at four ports, selected to provide a diverse sample 
of security environments and perspectives. The ports were Baltimore, 
Maryland; Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle, 
Washington. To review the activities of the interagency operational 
centers, we visited and interviewed participants at the three centers 
in operation at the time of our published report. We also discussed 
information-sharing issues with nonfederal stakeholders, including 
private sector officials, officials from port authorities, and local 
law enforcement. We examined the Coast Guard's procedures for 
processing security clearances for members of area maritime security 
committees. We reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports 
related to information sharing, interviewed agency officials, and 
reviewed numerous other documents and reports on the issue. We 
interviewed Coast Guard officials involved in sharing information and 
received updated information about their efforts in 2006. All of our 
work has been conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

Judging from the four ports we visited for our 2005 report, area 
maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the 
timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing between 
federal and nonfederal stakeholders. Stakeholders said the newly formed 
committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing 
efforts because they established a formal structure for communicating 
information and established new procedures for sharing information. 
Stakeholders stated that, among other things, the committees have been 
used as a forum for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing 
information on illegal or suspicious activities, and providing input on 
portwide security plans--called area maritime security plans--that 
describe the joint strategies of the Coast Guard and its partner 
agencies for protecting key infrastructure against terrorist 
activities. Nonfederal stakeholders, including state officials, local 
port authority operators, and representatives of private companies, 
said the information sharing had increased their awareness of security 
issues around the port and allowed them to identify and address 
security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard officials 
said the information they received from nonfederal participants had 
helped in mitigating and reducing risks. While committees at each of 
the locations we visited had the same guidance, they varied in such 
ways as the size of the membership and the types of stakeholders 
represented. 

The three interagency operational centers we visited for our 2005 
report allow for even greater information sharing because the centers 
operate 24 hours a day and receive real-time operational information 
from radars, sensors, and cameras, as well as classified data on 
personnel, vessels, and cargo, according to center participants. In 
contrast, the area maritime security committees, while they have a 
broader membership, primarily provide information through meetings, 
documents, and other means that are often used for long-term planning 
purposes rather than day-to-day operations. The three operational 
interagency centers and two additional centers under construction 
should fulfill varying missions and operations, and thus share 
different types of information. For example, the center in Charleston, 
South Carolina, focuses on port security alone and is led by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). In contrast, the center in San Diego 
supports the Coast Guard's missions beyond port security, including 
drug interdiction, alien migrant interdiction, and search and rescue 
activities, and is led by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard also has 
developed its own operational centers--called sector command centers-- 
at 35 port locations, including four sector command centers with 
enhanced surveillance and collaboration capabilities,[Footnote 4] to 
monitor maritime information and to support Coast Guard operations. 

One barrier to sharing information--the lack of security clearances 
among nonfederal officials--is being addressed by the Coast Guard. In 
our April 2005 report, we noted that while information sharing has 
generally improved, a major barrier mentioned most frequently by 
stakeholders as hindering information sharing was the lack of federal 
security clearances among port security stakeholders. This lack of 
security clearances may limit the ability of state, local, and industry 
officials, such as those involved in area maritime security committees 
or interagency operational centers, to deter, prevent, and respond to a 
potential terrorist attack. By February 2005--or over 4 months after 
the Coast Guard had developed a list of 359 nonfederal area maritime 
security committee participants as having a need for a security 
clearance--only 28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for the 
background check. As of June 2006, Coast Guard identified 467 
nonfederal area maritime security committee participants with a need to 
know security information. Of the 467 nonfederal participants, 197 
security clearance applications were received--20 received interim 
clearances, and 168 received final security clearances. Therefore, 
according to the Coast Guard, 188 out of 467 area maritime security 
committee participants with a need to know have received some type of 
clearance. Although we reported in 2005 that progress in moving these 
officials through the application process had been slow, it appears 
that as of June 2006, the Coast Guard's efforts have improved 
considerably. However, continued management attention and guidance 
about the security clearance process would strengthen the program, and 
it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete 
information as they carry out their law enforcement activities. 

Background: 

Ports Are Important and Vulnerable: 

Ports play an important role in the nation's economy and security. 
Ports are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of 
dollars; generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans 
and our trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are 
used to move cargo containers, and bulk agricultural, mineral, 
petroleum, and paper products. Ports are also important to national 
security by hosting naval bases and vessels and facilitating the 
movement of military equipment and supplying troops deployed overseas. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation's 361 seaports 
have been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist 
attacks. Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven 
with complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan 
areas, and easily accessible. Ports contain a number of specific 
facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including military 
vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams and 
locks, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports 
complexes, and other critical infrastructure. 

Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved: 

The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a 
shared responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with 
federal, state, and local organizations involved. For example, at the 
federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall 
homeland security responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the 
department, has lead responsibility for maritime security. Port 
authorities provide protection through designated port police forces, 
private security companies, and coordination with local law enforcement 
agencies. Private sector stakeholders play a major role in identifying 
and addressing the vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, 
which may include oil refineries, cargo facilities, and other property 
adjacent to navigable waterways. 

Information Sharing Is Important: 

Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is 
central to port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
recognizes that the federal government relies on state and local 
personnel to help protect against terrorist attacks, and these 
officials need homeland security information to prevent and prepare for 
such attacks.[Footnote 5] 

Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials 
can involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In 
order to gain access to classified information, state and local law 
enforcement officials generally need to apply for and receive approval 
to have a federal security clearance. As implemented by the Coast 
Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified 
information is an individual's need to know, which is defined as the 
determination made by an authorized holder of classified information 
that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified 
information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized 
governmental function.[Footnote 6] To obtain a security clearance, an 
applicant must complete a detailed questionnaire that asks for 
information on all previous employment, residences, and foreign travel 
and contacts that reach back 7 years. After submitting the 
questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of screenings and 
checks. 

Area Maritime Security Committees: 

The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain 
many potential security targets, provided for area maritime security 
committees--composed of federal, state, local, and industry members--to 
be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country.[Footnote 
7] A primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of 
the Port--the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee--to 
develop a security plan--called an area maritime security plan--to 
address the vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone.[Footnote 8] 
The committees also serve as a link for communicating threats and 
disseminating security information to port stakeholders. As of June 
2006, the Coast Guard organized 46 area maritime security committees, 
covering the nation's 361 ports.[Footnote 9] 

Interagency Operational Centers: 

Another approach at improving information sharing and port security 
operations involves interagency operational centers--command centers 
that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various 
federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide 
intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors, 
radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal 
participants 24 hours a day. These interagency operational centers 
represent an effort to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port 
facilities, and port operations. In general, these centers are jointly 
operated by federal and nonfederal law enforcement officials. The 
centers can have command and control capabilities that can be used to 
communicate information to vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and 
stations involved in port security operations. 

Port-Level Information Sharing Supported by National-Level 
Intelligence: 

While area maritime security committees and interagency operational 
centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and 
provide support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. 
National-level departments and agencies in the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities may offer information that ultimately could be 
useful to members of area maritime security committees or interagency 
operational centers at the port level. These intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies conduct maritime threat identification and 
dissemination efforts in support of tactical and operational maritime 
and port security efforts, but most have missions broader than maritime 
activities as well. In addition, some agencies also have regional or 
field offices involved in information gathering and sharing.[Footnote 
10] 

Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing: 

Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and 
Usefulness of Shared Information: 

Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve 
the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. A 
primary function served by the committees was to develop security plans 
for port areas--called area maritime security plans. The goal of these 
plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in and 
around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide 
range of facilities and infrastructure. In doing so, the committees 
established new procedures for sharing information by holding meetings 
on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on suspicious 
activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents, including 
vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself, 
according to committee participants. Also, participants noted that 
these committees allowed for both formal and informal stakeholder 
networking, which contributes to improvements in information sharing. 

Our continuing work on the Coast Guard and maritime security, while not 
specifically focused on information sharing, has continued to indicate 
that area maritime security committees are a useful tool for exchanging 
information. For example, we have done work at eight additional ports 
and found that stakeholders were still using the committees as a 
structured means to regularly share information about threat conditions 
and operational issues. In addition, Coast Guard personnel and port 
stakeholders are using the area maritime security committees to 
coordinate security and response training and exercises. Also, in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials shared information 
collaboratively through their area maritime security committees to 
determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen a port for 
commerce. 

Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which 
They Share Information: 

While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding 
their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is 
allowed the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects 
the needs of its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including 
the geographic area covered and the type of operations that take place 
there. These port-specific differences influence the number of members 
that participate, the types of state and local organizations that 
members represent, and the way in which information is shared. 

Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing: 

Centers Process and Share Information on Operations: 

Information sharing at interagency operational centers represents a 
step toward further improving information sharing, according to 
participants at the centers we visited. They said maritime security 
committees have improved information sharing primarily through a 
planning process that identifies vulnerabilities and mitigation 
strategies, as well as through development of two-way communication 
mechanisms to share threat information on an as-needed basis. In 
contrast, interagency operational centers can provide a continuous flow 
of information about maritime activities and involve various agencies 
directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar, 
sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities. 
Other data are available from intelligence sources and include data on 
vessels, cargo, and crew. 

Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has 
also enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. 
Unlike the area maritime security committees, these centers are 
operational in nature--that is, they have a unified or joint command 
structure designed to receive information and act on it. At the centers 
we visited, representatives from the various agencies work side by 
side, each having access to databases and other sources of information 
from their respective agencies. Officials said such centers help 
leverage the resources and authorities of the respective agencies. For 
example, if the Coast Guard determines that a vessel should be boarded 
and inspected, other federal and nonfederal agencies might join in the 
boarding to assess the vessel or its cargo, crew, or passengers for 
violations relating to their areas of jurisdiction or responsibility. 

Variations across Centers Affect Information Sharing: 

The types of information and the way information is shared vary at the 
centers we visited, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership 
and organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to 
officials at the centers. In our report of April 2005, we detailed 
three interagency operational centers at Charleston, South Carolina; 
Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. As of June 2006, the 
Coast Guard has two additional interagency command centers under 
construction in Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Both 
are being established as Sector Command Centers--joint with the U.S. 
Navy--and are expected to be operational in 2006. 

Of the interagency centers we visited, the Charleston center had a port 
security purpose, so its missions were all security related. It was led 
by DOJ, and its membership included 4 federal agencies and 16 state and 
local agencies. The San Diego center had a more general purpose, so it 
had multiple missions to include not just port security, but search and 
rescue, environmental response, drug interdiction, and other law 
enforcement activities. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its 
membership included 2 federal agencies and 1 local agency. The Norfolk 
center had a port security purpose, but its mission was focused 
primarily on force protection for the Navy. It was led by the Coast 
Guard, and its membership included 2 federal agencies and no state or 
local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shared information 
that focused on law enforcement and intelligence related to port 
security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency 
officials. The San Diego center shared information on a broader scope 
of activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and 
local agency officials. The Norfolk center shared the most focused 
information (security information related to force protection) among 
two federal agencies. 

The centers also shared different information because of their 
technologies and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers had an 
array of standard and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to 
Coast Guard and various national databases, while the Charleston center 
had these as well as additional systems and databases. For example, the 
Charleston center had access to and shared information on Customs and 
Border Protection's databases on incoming cargo containers from the 
National Targeting Center. In addition, Charleston had a pilot project 
with the Department of Energy to test radiation detection technology 
that provided additional information to share. The Charleston center 
was funded by a special appropriation that allowed it to use federal 
funds to pay for state and local agency salaries. This arrangement 
boosted the participation of state and local agencies, and thus 
information sharing beyond the federal government, according to port 
stakeholders in Charleston. While the San Diego center also had 24-hour 
participation by the local harbor patrol, that agency was paying its 
own salaries. 

Coast Guard Continues to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports: 

In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard planned to develop up 
to 40 of its own operational centers--called sector command centers--at 
additional ports. These command centers would provide local port 
activities with a unified command and improve awareness of the maritime 
domain through a variety of technologies. As of June 2006, the Coast 
Guard reported to us that 35 sector command centers have been created, 
and that these centers are the primary conduit for daily collaboration 
and coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partner agencies. 
The Coast Guard also reported that it has implemented a maritime 
monitoring system--known as the Common Operating Picture system--that 
fuses data from different sources.[Footnote 11] According to the Coast 
Guard, this system is the primary tool for Coast Guard commanders in 
the field to attain maritime domain awareness. 

In April 2005, we also reported that the Coast Guard requested in 
fiscal year 2006 over $5 million in funding to improve awareness of the 
maritime domain by continuing to evaluate the potential expansion of 
sector command centers to other port locations, and requested 
additional funding to train personnel in Common Operating Picture 
deployment at command centers and to modify facilities to implement the 
picture in command centers.[Footnote 12] In June 2006, the Coast Guard 
reported to us that no additional funding for this program was 
requested for fiscal year 2007. 

Coast Guard Report on Interagency Operational Centers: 

Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the existing interagency 
operational centers, covering such matters as the composition and 
operational characteristics of existing centers and the number, 
location, and cost of such new centers as may be required to implement 
maritime transportation security plans and maritime intelligence 
activities.[Footnote 13] This report, called for by February 2005, was 
issued by the Coast Guard in April 2005. While the report addresses the 
information sought by Congress, the report did not define the 
relationship between interagency operational centers and the Coast 
Guard's own sector command centers. 

Port stakeholders reported to us the following issues as important 
factors to consider in any expansion of interagency operational 
centers: (1) purpose and mission--the centers could serve a variety of 
overall purposes, as well as support a wide number of specific 
missions; (2) leadership and organization--the centers could be led by 
several potential departments or agencies and be organized a variety of 
ways; (3) membership--the centers could vary in membership in terms of 
federal, state, local, or private sector participants and their level 
of involvement; (4) technology deployed--the centers could deploy a 
variety of technologies in terms of networks, computers, 
communications, sensors, and databases; and (5) resource requirements-
-the centers could also vary in terms of resource requirements, which 
agency funds the resources, and how resources are prioritized. 

Other Ad Hoc Arrangements for Interagency Information-Sharing: 

Our work identified other interagency arrangements that facilitate 
information sharing and interagency operations in the maritime 
environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task force, 
which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the Homeland 
Security Task Force, South-East--a working group consisting of federal 
and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional 
responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration 
of immigrants affecting southeast Florida. When a mass migration event 
occurs, the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency 
effort to share information and coordinate operations to implement a 
contingency plan. 

Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing 
can occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency 
to respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own 
command centers for both District Seven and Sector Miami, located in 
Miami, Florida. While these centers normally focus on a variety of 
Coast Guard missions and are not normally interagency in structure, 
they have established protocols with other federal agencies, such as 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident command structure should 
it be needed. These Coast Guard centers make it possible to host 
interagency operations because they have extra space and equipment that 
allow for surge capabilities and virtual connectivity with each partner 
agency. 

Interagency Information-Sharing Concerns Go Beyond Maritime Area: 

While our findings on maritime information sharing are generally 
positive, we have some concerns regarding interagency information 
sharing that go far beyond the maritime issue area. In January 2005, we 
designated information sharing for homeland security as a high-risk 
area because the federal government still faces formidable challenges 
in gathering, identifying, analyzing, and disseminating key information 
within and among federal and nonfederal entities.[Footnote 14] While we 
recognize the efforts that some agencies have undertaken to break out 
of information "silos" and better share information, we reported in 
2006 that more than 4 years after September 11, the nation still lacks 
comprehensive policies and processes to improve the sharing of 
information that is critical to protecting our homeland.[Footnote 15] 
We made several recommendations to the Director of National 
Intelligence, who is now primarily responsible for this effort, to 
ensure effective implementation of congressional information sharing 
mandates. 

We continue to review agencies and programs that have the goal of 
improving information sharing among federal, state, and local partners. 
For example, we have ongoing work assessing DHS' efforts to enhance 
coordination and collaboration among interagency operations centers 
that operate around the clock to provide situational awareness. We plan 
to report on this later this year. Also, we have just begun work on 
state fusion centers--which are locations where homeland security- 
related information can be collected and analyzed--and their links to 
their relevant federal counterparts, which we plan to report on in 
2007. 

Coast Guard Making Progress Granting Security Clearances: 

Lack of Security Clearances May Limit Ability to Confront Terrorist 
Threats: 

According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted 
for our 2005 report, the shared partnership between the federal 
government and state and local entities may fall short of its potential 
to fight terrorism because of the lack of security clearances. If state 
and local officials lack security clearances, the information they 
possess may be incomplete. According to Coast Guard and nonfederal 
officials, the lack of access to classified information may limit these 
officials' ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a potential 
terrorist attack. 

While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in 
interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast 
Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime 
security committees. For the purposes of our 2005 report, we examined 
in more detail the Coast Guard's efforts to address the lack of 
security clearances among members of area maritime security committees. 

Coast Guard Continues to Take Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to 
State, Local, and Industry Officials: 

In April 2005, we reported that as part of its effort to improve 
information sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in 
July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime 
security committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in 
submitting their applications for a security clearance. We also 
reported that as of February 2005, only 28 of 359 nonfederal committee 
members who had a need to know had submitted the application forms for 
a security clearance. As shown in table 1, as of June 2006, of the 467 
nonfederal committee members who had a need to know, 197 had submitted 
security clearance applications--20 received interim clearances, and 
168 were granted a final clearance, which allows access to classified 
material. 

Table 1: Comparison of February 2005 Coast Guard Data Regarding 
Security Clearances and June 2006 Coast Guard Data Regarding Security 
Clearances: 

Security clearance totals: Nonfederal committee members verified as 
needing clearances; 
February 2005: 359; 
June 2006: 467. 

Security clearance totals: Members who had submitted security clearance 
case paperwork; 
February 2005: 28 (8 percent of 359); 
June 2006: 197 (42 percent of 467). 

Security clearance totals: Members granted interim clearances pending 
final investigations from Office of Personnel Management; 
February 2005: 24 (7 percent of 359); 
June 2006: 20 (4 percent of 467). 

Security clearance totals: Members with final clearances at Secret 
level; 
February 2005: 0 (0 percent of 359); 
June 2006: 168 (36 percent of 467). 

Source: Coast Guard. 

[End of table] 

Data Are Being Used to More Effectively Manage the Security Clearance 
Program: 

A key component of a good management system is to have relevant, 
reliable, and timely information available to assess performance over 
time and to correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two 
databases that contain information on the status of security clearances 
for state, local, and industry officials. The first database is a 
commercial off-the-shelf system that contains information on the status 
of all applications that have been submitted to the Coast Guard 
Security Center, such as whether a security clearance has been issued 
or whether personnel security investigations have been conducted. We 
reported in April 2005 that the Coast Guard was testing the database 
for use by field staff, but had not granted field staff access to the 
database. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard granted access to this 
database--named Checkmate--to field staff. The second database--an 
internally developed spreadsheet on the area maritime committee 
participants--summarizes information on the status of the security 
clearance program, such as whether officials have submitted their 
application forms and whether they have received their clearances. 

We reported in 2005 that these Coast Guard has databases could be used 
to manage the state, local, and industry security clearance program, 
but that formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to 
follow up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify 
the status of clearances had not been developed by the Coast Guard. 
While it is unclear that the Coast Guard developed formal procedures, 
as of June 2006, the Coast Guard reported that it has developed 
guidance for using its data on committee participants. According to the 
Coast Guard, the guidance released to field commands regarding the 
state, local, and industry security clearance program clarified the 
process for nonfederal area maritime security committee members to 
receive clearances and specifically outlined responsibilities for 
working with applicants on completing required paperwork, including the 
application packages. The Coast Guard reported that as a result of this 
guidance, the number of received and processed security clearance 
packages for area maritime security committee members has increased. 

Concluding Observations: 

As we reported in April 2005, and reaffirm today, effective information 
sharing among members of area maritime security committees and 
participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the 
partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can 
improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries 
for deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack 
at the nation's ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of 
granting security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to 
improve information sharing, and although we reported in 2005 that 
progress in moving these officials through the application process had 
been slow, it appears that as of June 2006 the Coast Guard's efforts to 
process security clearances to nonfederal officials has improved 
considerably. However, continued management attention and guidance 
about the security clearance process would strengthen the program, and 
it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete 
information as they carry out their law enforcement activities. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my 
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that 
you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L. 
Caldwell Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at 
(202) 512-9610, or at caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found at the last 
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this 
testimony include Susan Quinlan, David Alexander, Neil Asaba, Juliana 
Bahus, Christine Davis, Kevin Heinz, Lori Kmetz, Emily Pickrell, Albert 
Schmidt, Amy Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future 
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006. 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 
May 17, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, 
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05- 
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 
2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 
January 14, 2005. 

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime 
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: 
December 10, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective 
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: 
September 30, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate 
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. 
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning 
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, 
D.C.: June 30, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing 
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 
31, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 
D.C.: December 16, 2003. 

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04- 
315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003. 

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, 
D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term 
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force 
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02- 
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] For the purposes of this testimony, "homeland security information 
sharing" is defined as an exchange of information, including 
intelligence, critical infrastructure, and law enforcement information, 
among federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector 
(industry) to establish timely, effective, and useful communications to 
detect, prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist attacks. 

[2] The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), P.L.107- 
295, contains many of the homeland security requirements related 
specifically to port security. The area maritime security committees 
are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified at 46 U.S. C. § 
70112(a)(2) and implemented at 33 C.F.R. Part 103. 

[3] We use the term "interagency operational centers" to refer to 
centers where multiple federal (and in some cases, state and local) 
agencies are involved in monitoring maritime security and planning 
related operations. Members of these interagency operational centers 
include the Department of Homeland Security (through the U.S. Coast 
Guard), the Department of the Navy, and the Department of Justice. 

[4] The four sector command centers with enhanced surveillance and 
collaboration capabilities are Miami, Florida; San Diego, California; 
Charleston, South Carolina; and Hampton Roads, Virginia. The Coast 
Guard told us that the long-term goal is to provide all sector command 
centers with enhanced surveillance and collaboration capabilities. 

[5] P.L. 107-296, § 891 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

[6] Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, Section 
1.1(h). 

[7] See 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2). Prior to MTSA, some port locations had 
harbor safety committees that had representatives from federal, state, 
and local organizations. In addition, port security committees had been 
organized and still exist at ports where substantial out-load and in- 
load of military equipment occurs. 

[8] See 33 C.F.R. § 103.500. 

[9] Because some ports are located close to one another, some 
committees cover several ports. For example, the Puget Sound area 
maritime security committee includes the ports of Seattle, Tacoma, 
Bremerton, Port Angeles, and Everett. 

[10] For a more detailed description of the departments and agencies/ 
components involved in maritime information sharing at the national and 
port levels, see appendix II of Maritime Security: New Structures Have 
Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing 
Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 
2005). 

[11] The Coast Guard reported to us that some of the data systems 
included in its maritime monitoring system include data from the 
Department of Defense, Shipboard Command and Control System; data from 
Integrated Deepwater Systems; imagery from aircraft; data from Vessel 
Traffic Service, Ports and Waterways Safety Stems, Joint Harbor 
Operations Commands, Automated Identification Systems, Inland Rivers 
Vessel Movement Center, and the Vessel Monitoring System. However, 
according to the Coast Guard, not all of these data are available to 
all units; full integration is a future goal of the Coast Guard. 

[12] The Common Operational Picture is primarily a computer software 
package that fuses data from different sources, such as radar, sensors 
on aircraft, and existing information systems. 

[13] See the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, P.L. 
108-293, § 807 (August 9, 2004). While the statute uses the term "joint 
operational centers," we are using the term "interagency operational 
centers" to denote centers where multiple agencies participate. 
According to Coast Guard officials, the term "joint" refers to command 
centers where the Coast Guard and Navy are involved in carrying out the 
responsibilities of the center. 

[14] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington D.C.: 
January 2005). 

[15] GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to 
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and 
Sensitive but Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 2006).

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