Improving Efficiencies and Identifying Financial Savings for Homeland Security Research and Development
Opportunities exist for reducing costs and improving efficiencies for homeland security research and development activities. The federal government has allocated billions of dollars for researching, developing, and testing technologies and other countermeasures to address chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other threats facing the nation. For example, total budget authority for the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)—the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) primary research and development arm—and DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was nearly $4 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2007. However, GAO and others have reported on problems with the management and implementation of DHS's research, development, and testing efforts, including problems related to its strategic planning activities, partnerships and coordination, and financial management controls. Improvements in planning activities, coordination, cost estimating, and management controls could help reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland security research and development efforts. Specific challenges include the following:
- GAO raised concerns regarding S&T's unexpended obligations, which have substantially increased since fiscal year 2004—from about $460 million in fiscal year 2004 to about $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2007, according to DHS data. S&T had not determined whether such unexpended obligations were necessary to maintain or whether they could be de-obligated and used to offset future budget requests. In response to GAO's concerns, S&T implemented a new validation and verification process to determine whether prior year obligations should remain open or be de-obligated. It may be appropriate for S&T to report its findings of unexpended obligations to Congress, so that Congress can better assess S&T's funding needs.
- GAO identified problems with DHS's testing, development, and cost estimates of next generation radiation detection equipment. For example, DHS used questionable methods that enhanced the performance of the next generation equipment, and the tests generally did not constitute an objective and rigorous assessment of the equipment. Moreover, DHS had not yet provided Congress with the full scope or costs of its radiation portal monitor program, which could pose additional financial risk for the U.S. government over the life of the program. Specifically, in March 2008, DNDO estimated the total cost of the radiation portal monitor project at $2.1 billion. However, DNDO's estimate was unreliable because it omitted major project costs and relied on a flawed methodology. As a result, DNDO's cost estimates and budget requests for the radiation portal monitor project were too low, possibly leading to significant cost overruns later in the project. DHS should delay any purchase of radiation detection equipment until all tests have been completed, evaluated, and validated, and it should revise cost estimates to reflect radiation portal monitors' design and development, sustainment, maintenance, deployment, and procurement needs and plans.
GAO-08-1108R (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-07-1247T (PDF) - Congress granted DHS special acquisition authority, known as "other transaction" authority, for prototype and research and development projects. While other transaction agreements can carry the benefit of tapping into innovative homeland security technologies through nontraditional contractors, as they are exempt from federal procurement regulations, they also carry the risk of reduced accountability and transparency if not properly managed. DHS successfully used its other transaction authority to attract nontraditional contractors to develop innovative technologies to address homeland security needs, and it continues to implement the policies and procedures needed to manage the inherent risks of these agreements. However, DHS lacked the resources—in terms of knowledge and workforce capacity—to ensure that its agreements were transparent and maximized their potential benefits. If other transaction authority is made permanent, it will be important for DHS to take a systematic approach to assessing its experience with other transaction authority and identifying and addressing contracting workforce needs. These steps would not only enable DHS to more strategically manage its agreements in the future, but would also provide Congress with useful information on the benefits of the authority.
Highlights of GAO-08-1088 (PDF) - DHS made some progress in managing its transportation security research and development programs, but challenges and delays negatively affected technology deployment. For example, despite DHS's efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening technologies, limited progress had been made in fielding explosives detection technology at airport checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS components faced in coordinating research and development efforts. Further, DHS had not yet completed vulnerability and criticality assessments for all transportation modes. GAO reported that until DHS completed all of these assessments, Congress and other stakeholders would not have a reliable means of assessing DHS's progress toward achieving its research and development goals or determining whether the millions of dollars that were being invested in transportation security research and development projects were being spent cost-effectively and addressed the highest transportation security risks.
Highlights of GAO-08-1024T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-04-890 (PDF) - The DHS Office of the Inspector General (IG) identified concerns with S&T's process for selecting research and development programs. The IG reported that S&T's processes for identifying, prioritizing, and selecting basic research and some innovation projects were not clear or documented, making the directorate vulnerable to concerns of real or perceived conflicts of interest. Although ultimately the IG did not find any statutory or regulatory violations, it identified three projects that initially appeared to have been chosen for improper reasons. Had there been a process in place and record of the rationale for selecting those projects, those appearances of bias may have been prevented. DHS should develop and document clear, repeatable processes with objective criteria for prioritizing and selecting basic research projects. OIG-08-85
^ Back to topKey Reports
- Department of Homeland Security: Improvements Could Further Enhance Ability to Acquire Innovative Technologies Using Other Transaction Authority
- GAO-08-1088, September 23, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 29 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department's Previous Cost Estimates
- GAO-08-1108R, September 22, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Full Report (PDF, 52 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains
- GAO-08-1024T, July 24, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 17 pages) Accessible Text
- Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment
- GAO-07-1247T, September 18, 2007
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 18 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management
- GAO-04-890, September 30, 2004
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 70 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
