<DOC>
[107 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:83718.wais]
S. Hrg. 107-807
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
AND
COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
__________
JULY 24, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
and the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
second session
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
HARRY REID, Nevada JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BOB GRAHAM, Florida JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
BARBARA BOXER, California GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
RON WYDEN, Oregon MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
Ken Connolly, Majority Staff Director
Dave Conover, Minority Staff Director
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
JULY 24, 2002
OPENING STATEMENTS
Chafee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island 71
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from the State of
Wisconsin...................................................... 93
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska....... 78
Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont..1, 100
Reports:
American Way to the Kyoto Protocol....................... 24-68
Clean Energy: Jobs for America's Future.................. 3-24
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 102
Sarbanes, Hon. Paul S., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland.. 69
WITNESSES
Connaughton, James, Chairman, White House Council on
Environmental Quality, Washington, DC.......................... 74
Prepared statement..........................................209-288
Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords...... 288
Dernbach, John C., Professor, Widener University Law School...... 89
Article, Synthesis........................................... 335
Prepared statement........................................... 300
Horner, Christopher C., Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 91
Prepared statement........................................... 304
Strong, Hon. Maurice, Chairman, Earth Council Institute Canada,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada....................................... 87
Prepared statement........................................... 292
Supplemental testimony....................................... 298
Turner, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC....................... 71
Prepared statement........................................... 103
Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords.....108-209
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Articles:
Investing in Health: Fighting Infectious Disease for
Sustainable Development.................................... 205
Modern Developments in the Treaty Process.................... 307
Synthesis, John Dernbach..................................... 335
Lists, Attendees to world environmental summits................109, 119
Policy Books, Global Climate Change...........215-246, 250-266, 266-288
Report, Working for a Sustainable World.........................125-201
Statements:
Global Climate Change, President George W. Bush............211, 246
Reisman, Jon................................................. 333
(iii)
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
room 406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Jeffords
[chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works],
presiding.
Present from the Committee on Environment and Public
Works:: Senators Jeffords, Chafee, and Corzine.
Present from the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators
Sarbanes and Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Jeffords. This hearing will come to order.
I am glad to be here with my distinguished co-chair from
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sarbanes, for this
joint hearing. I appreciate his willingness to explore today's
topic and the fact that he has joined me as a cosponsor of S.
556, the Clean Power Act. I would also like to applaud him for
his work to bring some truth and sanity to America's accounting
nightmare. Good luck.
The United States is an economic and military superpower,
perhaps the lone superpower. But as the old adage goes, with
great power comes great responsibility. We are able to project
great might far beyond our borders. We are also capable of
contributing to environmental and natural resource damage far
beyond our borders and far in excess of other countries.
The question is, are we acting responsibly to curb negative
impacts abroad and at home?
Are we being good global neighbors and, at a minimum,
keeping our word?
It seems that we may be keeping our literal word, given the
very broad language in many of the agreements, but, in
practical terms, it seems that we are not trying very hard to
keep up with the spirit of some of our commitments.
The time is ripe for Congress to review how the
Administration is implementing our environmental agreements and
commitments. Leaders of many countries will be meeting in
Johannesburg, South Africa, in late August at the World Summit
on Sustainable Development. The occasion is the tenth
anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environmental
Development held in Rio. I am pleased to note that the
Secretary General of that conference, Mr. Maurice Strong, is
here today to give us an historical perspective on the event
and its lasting effect.
The conferees will be met by a very different U.S.
delegation in South Africa. The previous Bush Administration
provided extensive support to the Rio Earth Summit and brought
many new initiatives to the negotiating table. But this
Administration is likely to send a smaller and lower level
delegation and has sought to narrow the scope of its
discussions. This has apparently included an effort to keep the
global climate change off the agenda.
I am troubled by the Administration's approach to global
warming, especially in light of the Sense of Congress approved
by the Foreign Relations Committee and made part of the Senate-
approved Energy Bill in April. That resolution says the United
States should take responsible action to ensure significant and
meaningful reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from all
sectors. But it does not appear that responsible action is
taking place and emissions continue to grow.
As my friend Senator Chafee pointed out during our
committee's markup on the Clean Power Act, the Administration's
Climate Action Report says, ``A few ecosystems such as alpine
meadows in the Rocky Mountains and some Barrier Islands are
likely to disappear entirely in some areas. Other ecosystems
are likely to experience major species shifts.''
Our treaty commitment says, ``The ultimate objective of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at the level
that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a
timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change.'' Since these ecosystems are likely to
disappear entirely because of the man-made global warming and
will not able to adapt naturally, it appears that we have
entered into a zone of ``dangerous interference.''
Since these are real threats of serious or irreversible
damage, the lack of full scientific certainty about cause and
effect should not be used as an excuse for not reducing
emissions now. That is our commitment. Instead of acting to
reduce emissions, the Administration's approach guarantees that
greenhouse gas emissions will rise. According to Mr.
Connaughton's recent testimony, there is no question about
that.
This kind of inaction does not compact with our commitments
under the Framework Convention and the Sense of Congress,
common sense, or the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA.
In 1969, NEPA became law. It was probably the first adoption of
a sustainable development philosophy by a government in the
world. To paraphrase it, it says, ``It is the continuing policy
of the Federal Government to use all practicable means and
measures to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.''
Unfortunately, the Administration seems to have lost sight
of these future generations of Americans. Economic development
that does not factor in the environment of quality of life of
those future generations is not sustainable. The Administration
and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol claim that the
actions that significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions cost
too much now. They need to look at the long term. They also
need to look at the many studies that have been done that show
a net positive impact of reducing emissions.
I ask unanimous consent that the two studies by Tellus
Institute and a list of other studies be placed in the record.
[The referenced documents follow:]
[World Wildlife Fund, October 2001]
Clean Energy: Jobs For America's Future
a study for world wildlife fund
(By Alison Bailie, Stephen Bernow, William Dougherty, Michael Lazarus,
Sivan Kartha, Tellus Institute and Marshall Goldberg, MRG & Associates)
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Katherine Silverthorne, Kathleen Sullivan, Brooks
Yeager and Freda Colbert of WWF for their assistance on this report. We
thank Hal Harvey, Marcus Schneider and Eric Heitz of Energy Foundation
for their help in supporting our modeling capabilities. The energy
efficiency analyses and inputs to our modeling effort for buildings,
industry and light duty vehicles were provided by ACEEE (Steve Nadel,
Howard Geller, Neal Elliott and Therese Langer) and John DeDicco of
Environmental Defense. Modifications to the NEMS model, particularly as
related to renewables in the electricity sector, were made at Tellus
with important input from Alan Nogee, Deborah Donovan and Steve Clemmer
of Union of Concerned Scientists; Laura Martin, Tom Petersik, Alan
Beamon, Zia Haq, and Jeff Jones of EIA; and other experts including
Walter Short of NREL, Jack Cadogan of ORNL, Dan Entingh of Princeton
Economic Research, Inc., Etan Gummerman, Lawrence Berkeley Labs,
Francis Wood of OnLocation, Inc., and Michael Brower. We also wish to
thank Francisco de la Chesnaye and Reid Harvey of USEPA, who provided
important data on non-CO<INF>2</INF> gases, and Kevin Gurney, who
provided useful insights on land-based carbon. We also thank Skip
Laitner for his ongoing input and insight.
About the Tellus Institute
Founded in 1976 as a nonprofit research and policy organization,
Tellus addresses a broad range of environment and resource issues. The
Institute's staff of 50 scientists and policy analysts is active
throughout North America and the world. Internationally, Tellus works
closely with the Stockholm Environment Institute, hosting SEI's Boston
Center since 1989. The transition to a sustainable world must occur at
many levels. Tellus contributes to this goal through its work on global
scenarios, regional and national strategies, community sustainability
and industrial ecology. Projects focus on such areas as energy, water,
waste, transportation, and integrated sustainability planning. This
institutes diverse sponsors--foundations, governments, multilateral
organizations, nongovernmental organizations and business--reflect this
varied program.
executive summary
Over the past three decades national energy policy has been the
subject of intense debate and policy innovation. Americans were
buffeted by oil embargoes and price increases in the 1970's, enjoyed
low energy prices in the 1980's, and today face the consequences of
electricity deregulation, energy supplier market power and regional
price spikes. To meet these challenges the public and policymakers have
called for the expansion of policies to ensure that energy services
remain readily available and affordable, while protecting public health
and the environment. These policies, which helped to produce the low
energy prices of the 1990's, include appliance efficiency standards,
energy-saving building codes, vehicle fuel efficiency and tailpipe
emissions standards, clean air legislation, and caps on pollution from
power plants. Over the 30-year period during which these policies have
been in effect, the United States has reduced its energy per unit Gross
Domestic Product by about one-third, even though the economy grew by
160 percent.
In order to create a responsible, forward-looking energy policy,
the United States will need to examine a number of important issues.
Will the policy help meet America's energy needs? Will it enhance
national security? Will it contribute to a strong economy? Will it help
meet America's needs for a safe and healthy environment? In order to
begin to answer these questions, World Wildlife Fund commissioned the
Tellus Institute to consider the potential impacts of implementing a
broad suite of clean energy policies over the next 20 years.
Our national choices regarding the production and use of energy
have serious implications for our environment. At every step of the
process, from extraction, to refining, to transport and combustion,
fossil fuels have negative impacts on land and water-based ecosystems.
In addition to these well-known effects, it is now clear that
overreliance on fossil fuels is a major cause of climate change.
Because we consider climate change one of the greatest global threats
to biodiversity, we chose to consider a suite of policies that would
address our energy needs while reducing our dependence on fossil fuels
and decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. We call this suite of
policies the Climate Protection Scenario.
This study analyzes the employment, macroeconomic, energy and
environmental impacts of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario.
These policies were compared with a base case based on Energy
Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2001).
Climate Protection Scenario
Buildings and Industry Sector
<bullet> Building Codes
<bullet> Appliance and Equipment Standards
<bullet> Tax Credits
<bullet> Public Benefits Fund
<bullet> Research and Development
<bullet> Voluntary Measures
<bullet> Cogeneration for Industrial and District Energy
Electric Sector
<bullet> Renewable Portfolio Standard
<bullet> NOx/SO<INF>2</INF> Cap and Trade
<bullet> Carbon Cap and Trade
Transport Sector
<bullet> Automobile Efficiency Standard Improvements
<bullet> Promotion of Efficiency Improvements in Freight Trucks
<bullet> Aircraft Efficiency Improvements
<bullet> Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
<bullet> Travel Demand Reductions and High Speed Rail
Implementing these policies would help address many of our most
pressing concerns about energy supply, the economy, employment, energy
security, and the environment. We found that they would lead to net
increases in employment over the next 20 years. They would reduce our
dependence on oil and other fossil fuels, thereby greatly increasing
our energy security. Household energy bills would decrease despite a
small increase in the price of electricity. And, we could mitigate
climate change and other air pollution problems. A more detailed
description of the benefits can be found in the findings section below.
The benefits of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario would
be spread widely across all States and all sectors of the economy--
including construction, transportation, motor vehicles, manufacturing,
services, retail trade and agriculture. However, some industries within
the energy sector would not share in the economic benefits from this
transition, as the economy's reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuels
would decline. This suggests that while there would be widespread gains
to workers throughout the economy, it would be necessary to provide
assistance and support in order to ensure a just transition for workers
who would otherwise be displaced during the beginning of this
transition.
findings
If Congress were to implement the policies outlined in WWF's
Climate Protection Scenario, the United States could reap the following
benefits:
<bullet> A net annual employment increase of over 700,000 jobs in
2010, rising to approximately 1.3 million by 2020;
<bullet> An 8.5 percent decline in carbon emissions between 2000
and 2010, as opposed to the approximately 20 percent increase projected
in the base case, and a 28 percent decline between 2000 and 2020 rather
than a 36 percent increase;
<bullet> Twenty percent of the electricity generation needed in
2020 would come from wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy;
<bullet> Oil consumption would decline by approximately 8 percent
between 2000 and 2020, rather than increase by about 31 percent,
thereby saving money and reducing the vulnerability of citizens and our
economy to oil price shocks;
<bullet> Overall dependence on the consumption of fossil fuels
would decline more than 15 percent between 2000 and 2020, rather than
increasing by 40 percent as in the base case;
<bullet> Households and businesses would accumulate savings of
over $600 billion by 2020;
<bullet> GDP would be about $43.9 billion above the base case in
2020;
<bullet> Energy-related emissions of air pollution would be
dramatically reduced--by 2020, emissions of sulfur dioxide would be
virtually eliminated, while nitrogen oxide emissions would be almost
halved, and emissions of fine particulates, carbon monoxide, volatile
organic compounds and mercury would be substantially reduced;
<bullet> An additional $51.4 billion in wage and salary
compensation by 2020 relative to the base case;
<bullet> Each State would experience a positive net job impact,
rising to about 140,000 in California by 2020; and
<bullet> Electricity sales from central station power stations
would be about half of projections for 2020, owing to the policy of
promotion of more efficient equipment in homes and offices and the use
of waste heat in combined heat and power plants in buildings and
factories.
introduction
Over the past three decades national energy policy has been the
subject of intense debate and policy innovation. Americans were
buffeted by oil embargoes and price increases in the 1970's, enjoyed
low energy prices in the 1980's, and today face the consequences of
electricity deregulation, energy supplier market power and regional
price spikes. To meet these challenges the public and policymakers have
called for the expansion of policies to ensure that energy services
remain readily available and affordable, while protecting public health
and the environment. These policies, which helped to produce the low
energy prices of the 1990's, include appliance efficiency standards,
energy-saving building codes, vehicle fuel efficiency and tailpipe
emissions standards, clean air legislation and caps on pollution from
power plants. Over the 30-year period during which these policies have
been in effect, the United States has reduced its energy per unit Gross
Domestic Product by about one-third, even though the economy grew by
160 percent.
In order to create a responsible, forward-looking energy policy the
United States will need to examine a number of important issues. Will
the policy help meet America's energy needs? Will it enhance national
security? Will it contribute to a strong economy? Will it help meet
America's needs for a safe and healthy environment? In order to begin
to answer these questions, World Wildlife Fund commissioned the Tellus
Institute to consider the potential impacts of implementing a broad
suite of clean energy policies over the next 20 years.
Our national choices regarding the production and use of energy
have serious implications for our environment. At every step of the
process, from extraction, to refining, to transport and combustion,
fossil fuels have negative impacts on land and water-based ecosystems.
In addition to these well-known effects, it is now clear that
overreliance on fossil fuels is a major cause of climate change.
Because we consider climate change one of the greatest global threats
to biodiversity, we chose to consider a suite of policies that would
address our energy needs while reducing our dependence on fossil fuels
and decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. We call this suite of
policies the Climate Protection Scenario.
This study analyzes the employment, macroeconomic, energy and
environmental impacts of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario.
These policies were compared with a base case based on Energy
Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2001).
Climate Protection Scenario
Buildings and Industry Sector
<bullet> Building Codes
<bullet> Appliance and Equipment Standards
<bullet> Tax Credits
<bullet> Public Benefits Fund
<bullet> Research and Development
<bullet> Voluntary Measures
<bullet> Cogeneration for Industrial and District Energy
Electric Sector
<bullet> Renewable Portfolio Standard
<bullet> NOx/SO<INF>2</INF> Cap and Trade
<bullet> Carbon Cap and Trade
Transport Sector
<bullet> Automobile Efficiency Standard Improvements
<bullet> Promotion of Efficiency Improvements in Freight Trucks
<bullet> Aircraft Efficiency Improvements
<bullet> Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
<bullet> Travel Demand Reductions and High Speed Rail
A detailed description of the policies can be found in Annex A.
By implementing this suite of policies we can bring together the
various strands connecting our energy, environment, climate, and
economic policies into a coherent and harmonious strategy. The expected
employment, energy and economic, and environmental impacts are
discussed in separate sections below. A detailed description of the
methodologies applied can be found in Annex B.
i. employment and macroeconomic impacts
The study finds that implementation of the Climate Protection
Scenario could lead to a net annual employment increase of over 700,000
jobs by 2010, increasing to about 1.3 million by 2020, while increasing
overall national GDP and incomes. These benefits are spread widely
across all sectors of the economy--including construction,
transportation, motor vehicles, manufacturing, services, retail trade
and agriculture. The benefits derive from using our energy resources
more efficiently and cost-effectively, commercializing cleaner
technologies, and recycling the revenues of an electric sector carbon
cap and permit trade system to households and businesses. Each State
would enjoy net increases in employment; incomes and economic output as
benefits are likely to be spread widely across the country.
As the economy's reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuels
declines, some industries within the energy sector would not share in
the economic benefits from this transition. This suggests that while
there would be widespread gains to workers throughout the economy, it
would be necessary to provide assistance and support that ensured a
just transition for workers who would otherwise be displaced during the
beginning of this transition. One source of financial resources for
this assistance could be a portion of the revenues derived from the
government auction of carbon permits. At the same time, energy
suppliers could offset some potential employment losses by moving
aggressively into the energy efficiency and renewable energy businesses
and assisting their work forces in transitioning to these new fields.
For example, with electric sector restructuring, some existing
utilities and suppliers could shift toward providing energy-efficiency
services and alternative energy. Similarly, natural gas and oil
suppliers could shift toward providing alternative fuels such as those
derived from biomass, wind, and solar resources.
National Impacts
Estimation of the macroeconomic impacts of the climate protection
policies was based on the incremental investments and savings required
to implement the policies found in the July 2001 study. The analysis
tracks expenditures on more efficient lighting, high efficiency motors,
more efficient automobiles and many other energy-using technologies
that reduce consumption of high carbon fuels. These expenditures create
incomes and jobs for the manufacturers and workers who produce the
equipment and for the industries and workers who supply and service
those producers. They also reduce the energy bills of offices, firms
and households who utilize the more efficient technologies. The savings
on energy bills will create additional income and jobs in the
industries and services in which these new savings are spent.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The set of policies analyzed here gives rise to large energy
savings, positive job impacts and new opportunities that far exceed the
losses that would occur in the traditional energy supply sectors. The
analyses also take account of recycling back to households and business
the revenues derived from government auction of carbon permits to
electricity suppliers.
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show the positive macroeconomic impacts of
the Climate Protection Scenario--overall increases above base case in
jobs, in incomes per household (a benefit in addition to household
energy bill savings) and in GDP. By the year 2020, there would be an
additional $400 per household increase in annual wage and salary
earnings ($51.4 billion total), while about 1.3 million net new jobs
would be created, relative to the base case. At the same time, GDP is
projected to be about $43.9 billion above the base case in 2020. Major
contributions to increases in annual wage and salary earnings arise
from purchases of energy efficient equipment and the spending of net
energy bill savings by businesses and households. While these increases
are significant, the impacts are relatively small in comparison to
overall economic activity. For instance, increasing the nation's GDP by
$43.9 billion in 2020 represents only 0.4 percent of the $11.8 trillion
(1998$) projected GDP for that year.
Table 1a shows that by 2010 there could be a net job increase of
almost 750,000 jobs, with a net increase in annual wage and salary
compensation of about $220 per household ($26 billion total) and a $23
billion net increase in GDP. Table 1b reveals that by 2020 these
figures could grow to a net job increase of slightly more than 1.3
million jobs, a net increase in annual wage and salary compensation of
about $400 per household ($51 billion total) and a net increase in GDP
of $44 billion.
Table 1a: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Change in Wage
---------------------------------------
Net Change and Salary
--------------------------- Net Change
Compensation in GDP
In Jobs (Million (Million
1998$) 1998$)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture..................... 18,600 $160 $530
Other Mining.................... 6,900 $420 $880
Coal Mining..................... (10,100) ($990) ($2,090)
Oil/Gas Mining.................. (26,900) ($2,280) ($9,040)
Construction.................... 353,200 $10,440 $14,990
Food Processing................. 2,700 $110 $210
Other Manufacturing............. 52,500 $3,980 $6,020
Pulp and Paper Mills............ 2,800 $240 $390
Oil Refining.................... (2,600) ($260) ($780)
Stone, Glass, and Clay.......... 14,100 $750 $1,260
Primary Metals.................. 11,800 $940 $1,360
Metal Durables.................. 30,400 $2,140 $3,520
Motor Vehicles.................. 36,500 $2,810 $4,610
Transportation, Communication, 21,500 $1,100 $2,240
and Utilities..................
Electric Utilities.............. (18,400) ($1,900) ($10,070)
Natural Gas Utilities........... (16,700) ($1,520) ($5,510)
Wholesale Trade................. 5,600 $350 $640
Retail Trade.................... 14,400 $290 $510
Finance......................... 31,600 $2,380 $4,890
Insurance/Real Estate........... (5,900) ($160) ($1,110)
Services........................ 191,900 $5,730 $8,080
Education....................... 3,800 $140 $140
Government...................... 27,200 $1,180 $1,550
Total....................... 744,900 $26,050 $23,220
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1b: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2020
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Change in Wage
---------------------------------------
Net Change and Salary
--------------------------- Net Change
Compensation in GDP
In Jobs (Million (Million
1998$) 1998$)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture..................... 63,100 $620 $2,120
Other Mining.................... 11,200 $870 $1,830
Coal Mining..................... (23,900) ($2,340) ($4,940)
Oil/Gas Mining.................. (61,400) ($5,210) ($20,600)
Construction.................... 340,300 $10,460 $15,030
Food Processing................. 16,100 $750 $1,380
Other Manufacturing............. 77,900 $9,360 $14,160
Pulp and Paper Mills............ 5,000 $570 $950
Oil Refining.................... (6,300) ($650) ($1,910)
Stone, Glass, and Clay.......... 24,800 $1,630 $2,750
Primary Metals.................. 18,600 $2,190 $3,180
Metal Durables.................. 42,000 $4,670 $7,670
Motor Vehicles.................. 54,300 $5,090 $8,350
Transportation, Communication, 50,500 $3,320 $6,750
and Utilities..................
Electric Utilities.............. (35,100) ($5,180) ($27,540)
Natural Gas Utilities........... (26,200) ($3,080) ($11,180)
Wholesale Trade................. 12,400 $1,030 $1,890
Retail Trade.................... 190,300 $4,410 $7,680
Finance......................... 42,100 $4,570 $9,410
Insurance/Real Estate........... 11,900 $350 $2,420
Services........................ 394,600 $13,080 $18,460
Education....................... 33,200 $1,330 $1,340
Government...................... 78,900 $3,550 $4,660
Total....................... 1,314,300 $51,390 $43,860
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-By-State Employment Impacts
The preceding analysis suggests that implementing the Climate
Protection Scenario policies would result in substantial net employment
gains at the national level. Yet, estimates of State-level impacts
provide important additional insight into the benefits of such a policy
initiative.
The detailed distribution of the national employment impacts across
the States is difficult to predict. However, it is likely that the
large net benefits found in tables 1a and 1b will be rather widely and
evenly distributed across the States, largely owing to the widespread
effects of respending the energy savings. The results of our indicative
analysis of the State-level employment are given in table 2.
Table 2: Job Impacts by State
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Net Job Gain 2010 Net Job Gain 2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
01...................................... Alabama......................... 13,100 22,600
02...................................... Alaska.......................... 2,800 5,000
04...................................... Arizona......................... 11,200 19,900
05...................................... Arkansas........................ 7,500 13,200
06...................................... California...................... 77,400 141,400
08...................................... Colorado........................ 10,000 17,700
09...................................... Connecticut..................... 7,800 14,100
10...................................... Delaware........................ 2,200 3,800
11...................................... District of Columbia............ 1,600 3,500
12...................................... Florida......................... 37,000 66,800
13...................................... Georgia......................... 21,300 38,300
15...................................... Hawaii.......................... 2,700 5,000
16...................................... Idaho........................... 3,500 6,200
17...................................... Illinois........................ 31,900 56,400
18...................................... Indiana......................... 20,900 36,000
19...................................... Iowa............................ 8,300 14,700
20...................................... Kansas.......................... 7,100 12,500
21...................................... Kentucky........................ 11,500 19,300
22...................................... Louisiana....................... 19,200 32,900
23...................................... Maine........................... 3,700 6,600
24...................................... Maryland........................ 12,500 22,000
25...................................... Massachusetts................... 14,500 26,700
26...................................... Michigan........................ 29,800 51,000
27...................................... Minnesota....................... 13,400 24,000
28...................................... Mississippi..................... 7,200 12,600
29...................................... Missouri........................ 15,100 26,600
30...................................... Montana......................... 2,300 4,000
31...................................... Nebraska........................ 4,700 8,500
32...................................... Nevada.......................... 5,300 9,100
33...................................... New Hampshire................... 2,800 5,000
34...................................... New Jersey...................... 20,200 36,200
35...................................... New Mexico...................... 4,200 7,100
36...................................... New York........................ 38,000 68,200
37...................................... North Carolina.................. 22,400 38,900
38...................................... North Dakota.................... 1,900 3,300
39...................................... Ohio............................ 34,600 59,900
40...................................... Oklahoma........................ 8,200 13,700
41...................................... Oregon.......................... 8,600 15,600
42...................................... Pennsylvania.................... 31,600 55,500
44...................................... Rhode Island.................... 2,100 3,900
45...................................... South Carolina.................. 11,500 20,000
46...................................... South Dakota.................... 2,000 3,500
47...................................... Tennessee....................... 17,100 29,800
48...................................... Texas........................... 71,500 123,400
49...................................... Utah............................ 5,700 10,300
50...................................... Vermont......................... 1,600 2,800
51...................................... Virginia........................ 18,500 32,100
53...................................... Washington...................... 16,600 29,700
54...................................... West Virginia................... 3,800 6,000
55...................................... Wisconsin....................... 14,900 26,300
56...................................... Wyoming......................... 1,700 2,600
Total........................... 744,900 1,314,300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some of these State-level employment impacts are associated with
the direct expenditures made for more efficient equipment and renewable
technologies and fuels. Although manufacturers and venders of relevant
products and services may not be uniformly spread across the States,
they are rather widely dispersed. For example, manufacturers of
advanced power plants, including gas turbines, natural gas combined
cycle systems, combined heat and power units and fuel cells are located
in many regions of the country. Manufacture of more efficient and
alternative-fuel automobiles is likely to continue to be located
largely with current manufacturers. Petroleum companies with experience
in industrial chemistry can play a role in providing cellulosic ethanol
or other synthetic fuels. Biomass fuels for transport and power
generation will come from States that could provide biomass feedstock.
In some States, farms could become sites for wind electric generators
and derive income from these facilities.
While these energy-related purchases can stimulate local economic
activity and jobs, the major drivers of the overall national employment
increases are the net energy-bill savings to households and businesses,
which tend to be spent on myriad other purchases across the economy.
This spending occurs broadly across all sectors, with much of it local.
In those States that supply fossil fuels, losses to these industries
and related businesses would be more than offset by gains in other
sectors of those State's economies, owing to the expenditures on more
efficient equipment and cleaner energy resources and re-spending of
energy bill savings. Thus, the national job increases--in construction,
services, education, finance, government, miscellaneous manufacturing,
agriculture and other sectors--would likely be widespread throughout
the country.
While this analysis indicates that there would be overall
employment benefits at the State as well as the national level, some
industries could face near-term losses before they could adapt to new
energy markets or before the benefits of the energy efficiency measures
were fully realized. Some of the savings realized from implementing the
policies could be used for assistance in a just transition for affected
workers and communities.
States such as Texas, which are large energy producers and have
relatively low energy prices compared with the national average, still
enjoy large benefits. As table 2 indicates, the State of Texas, which
currently leads the Nation in total energy consumed and is second only
to California in total energy expenditures, could expect to have a net
gain of about 120,000 jobs in 2020 if these national energy policies
were adopted.
ii. energy impacts
In this section we analyze expected impacts of the Climate
Protection Scenario policy package on energy consumption, energy
prices, and household and business energy budgets.
Figure 2a shows how the Climate Protection Scenario policies affect
our dependence on the consumption of fossil fuels, which declines by
more than 15 percent between 2000 and 2020, rather than increasing by
40 percent as in the base case. Oil consumption itself declines by
about 8 percent between 2000 and 2020 instead of increasing by 32
percent, largely from improved efficiency in vehicles and other
transportation modes, thereby saving money and reducing vulnerability
of citizens and our economy to oil price shocks. While most of this
reduced fossil fuel dependence results from policies that induce energy
efficiency, figure 2a also shows that the policy case increases the use
of renewable energy, which roughly doubles from current levels instead
of remaining essentially constant.
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Figure 2b shows how electricity sales from central station power
stations would be less than half of projections for 2020, owing to the
policy of promoting more efficient equipment in homes and offices and
using waste heat in combined heat and power plants in buildings and
factories. Electricity sales would decline by 33 percent from 2000 to
2020 rather than increase by 45 percent. By 2020, electricity purchases
by residential, commercial and industrial consumers would be 55 percent
below business as usual and 20 percent of the remaining generation
would come from wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy.
Figures 3a and 3b show how the policies affect natural gas prices
and the costs to households for electricity. Natural gas prices would
decline to about 25 percent lower than the base case by 2020. All
sectors would enjoy declines in their electricity bills, owing to
greater efficiency, even though prices per unit of power would increase
in moving to cleaner generation. By 2020 residential consumers would
pay about $24 less per month.
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Figures 4a and 4b show that net savings to households and business
would be substantial, reaching more than $600 billion combined by 2020.
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iii. environmental impacts
Virtually every step in the process of supplying energy from fossil
fuels damages the environment. Drilling, mining and pipeline
installation can disrupt whole ecosystems. Transportation of fossil
fuels results in spills, threatening wildlife and human communities
that depend on the natural environment. Fossil fuel combustion emits
pollutants that cause global warming, acid rain and smog. Smog and
other air pollutants can exacerbate lung disease and cause crop, forest
and property damage. Acid rain acidifies the soil and water, killing
plants, fish and animals that depend on them. The impacts of global
warming pose the greatest global threat to biodiversity.
These environmental threats could be mitigated by a proactive
effort to direct our energy supply system away from its current
dependence on fossil fuels and toward increased energy efficiency and
renewable energy technologies. However, current U.S. policies point in
the opposite direction. The fossil fuel and nuclear industries continue
to benefit from both direct and indirect subsidies from taxpayers,
citizens and the environment, while cleaner energy resources and more
efficient technologies are required to prove themselves in a not truly
competitive marketplace. Despite the proven economic and environmental
track record of energy efficiency, renewables, and pollution
limitations, the administration's energy plan and the House of
Representative's energy legislation continue to promote fossil fuels at
the expense of the environment and the economy.
The policies in the Climate Protection Scenario begin to reduce our
dependence on fossil fuels and would thereby dramatically change the
trajectory of U.S. carbon emissions from their current rapidly rising
path to a downward trajectory needed for long-term climate
stabilization. Figure 5 shows that between 2000 and 2010, carbon
emissions would decline by 8.5 percent rather than increase by the 20
percent projected in the base case. The July 2001 study shows that the
Kyoto Protocol target could be met by implementing these cost-effective
policies, reducing non-energy related greenhouse gases and utilizing
international trading mechanisms. Under the Climate Protection
Scenario, by 2020 carbon emissions would be 47 percent below business
as usual and 19 percent below 1990 levels.
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At the same time, the proposed policies would virtually eliminate
emissions of SO<INF>2</INF> and reduce NOx emissions by almost 30
percent, as shown in figures 6a and 6b below. In addition, the proposed
policies would substantially reduce emissions of fine particulates,
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds and mercury.
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ANNEX A
policies
This study examines a broad set of national policies that would
increase energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy
technologies, and shift to less use of carbon-intensive fossil fuels.
The policies address major areas of energy use in the buildings,
industrial, transport, and electrical sectors. Analyses of the
investment costs and energy savings of policies to promote energy
efficiency and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and
industrial sectors were taken primarily from the American Council for
an Energy Efficient Economy (1999; 2001).
Below we group these policies into the particular sector where they
take effect, and describe the key assumptions made concerning the
technological impacts of the individual policies. Unless otherwise
indicated, each of the policies is assumed to start in 2003.
As explained further in the methodology discussion in the next
section, we adapted the Energy Information Administration's 2001
Reference Case Forecast (EIA 2001) to create a slightly revised ``base
case.'' Our policies and assumptions build on those included in this
base case forecast (i.e., we avoid taking credit for emissions
reductions, costs, or savings already included in the EIA 2001
Reference Case). When taken together, the policies described in this
section represent a Climate Protection Scenario that the United States
could pursue to achieve significant carbon reductions.
Policies in the Buildings and Industrial Sectors
Carbon emissions from fuel combustion in the buildings (including
both residential and commercial) sector account for about 10 percent of
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, while emissions from the industrial
sector account for another 20 percent. When emissions associated with
the electricity consumed are counted, these levels reach over 35
percent for buildings and 30 percent for industry. We analyzed a set of
policies that include new building codes, new appliance standards, tax
incentives for the purchase of high efficiency products, a national
public benefits fund, expanded research and development, voluntary
agreements, and support for combined heat and power.
Building Codes
For this policy, we assume that DOE enforces the commercial
building code requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) and
that States comply. We also assume that relevant States upgrade their
residential energy code to either the 1995 or 1998 Model Energy Code,
voluntarily or following adoption of a new Federal requirement.
Furthermore, we assume that the model energy codes are significantly
improved during the next decade, and that all States adopt mandatory
codes that go beyond current ``good practice'' by 2010. To quantify the
impact of these changes, we assume a 20 percent energy savings in
heating and cooling in buildings in half of new homes and commercial
buildings.
New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards
For this policy, we assume that the government upgrades existing
standards or introduces new standards for key appliances and equipment
types: distribution transformers, commercial air conditioning systems,
residential heating systems, commercial refrigerators, exit signs,
traffic lights, torchiere lighting fixtures, ice makers, and standby
power consumption for consumer electronics. We also assume higher
energy efficiency standards for residential central air conditioning
and heat pumps than was recently allowed by the Bush Administration.
These are measures that can be taken in the near term, based on cost-
effective available technologies.
Tax Incentives
This policy provides initial tax incentives for a number of
products. For consumer appliances, we assumed a tax incentive of $50 to
$100 per unit. For new homes that are at least 30 percent more
efficient than the Model Energy Code, we assumed an incentive of up to
$2,000 per home; for commercial buildings with at least 50 percent
reduction in heating and cooling costs relative to applicable building
codes, we applied an incentive of $2.25 per square foot. For building
equipment such as efficient furnaces, fuel cell power systems, gas-
fired heat pumps, and electric heat pump water heaters, we assumed a 20
percent investment tax credit. Each of these incentives would be
introduced with a sunset clause, terminating them or phasing them out
in approximately 5 years, to avoid their becoming permanent subsidies.
National Public Benefits Fund
Electric utilities have historically funded programs to encourage
more efficient energy-using equipment, assist low-income families with
home weatherization, commercialize renewables, and undertake research
and development (R&D). Such programs have typically achieved
electricity bill savings for households and businesses that are roughly
twice the program costs (Nadel and Kushler, 2000). Despite these
successes, electric industry restructuring, deregulation, and
increasing price competition have caused utilities to reduce these
``public benefit'' expenditures over the past several years. In order
to preserve such programs, 15 States have instituted public benefits
funds that are financed by a small surcharge on all power delivered to
consumers.
This study's policy package includes a national-level public
benefits fund (PBF) fashioned after the proposal introduced by Sen.
Jeffords (S. 1333). The PBF would levy a surcharge of 0.2 cents per
kilowatt-hour on all electricity sold, costing the typical residential
consumer about $1 per month. This Federal fund would provide matching
funds for States for approved public benefits expenditures. In this
study, the PBF is allocated to several different programs directed at
improvements in lighting, air conditioning, motors, and other cost-
effective energy efficiency improvements in electricity-using
equipment.
Expand Federal Funding for Research and Development in Energy Efficient
Technologies
Federal R&D funding for energy efficiency has been a spectacularly
cost-effective investment. The DOE has estimated that the energy
savings from 20 of its energy efficiency R&D programs has been roughly
$30 billion so far--more than three times the Federal appropriation for
the entire energy efficiency and renewables R&D budget throughout the
1990's (EERE, 2000).
Tremendous opportunities exist for further progress in material-
processing technologies, manufacturing processing, electric motors,
windows, building shells, lighting, heating/cooling systems, and super-
insulation, for example. EPA's Energy Star programs have complemented
and amplified the impact of Federal R&D, by labeling and certifying to
increase consumer awareness of energy efficiency opportunities. R&D
efforts should be increased and EPA should be allocated the funds to
broaden the scope of its Energy Star program, expanding to other
products (refrigerators, motors) and building sectors (hotels,
retailers), and the vast market of existing buildings that could be
retrofitted. In this study, we assume that increased funding to expand
research and development efforts in industry (e.g., motors), buildings
(e.g., advanced heating/cooling), and transport (e.g., more fuel-
efficient cars and trucks) will lead to more energy-savings products
becoming commercially available.
Industrial Energy Efficiency through Intensity Targets
There is great potential for cost-effective efficiency improvements
in both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive industries (Elliott
1994). For example, an in-depth analysis of 49 specific energy-
efficient technologies for the iron and steel industry found a total
cost-effective energy savings potential of 18 percent (Worrell, Martin,
and Price 1999). In this study, we assume Federal initiatives to
motivate and assist industry to identify and exploit energy efficiency
opportunities. Government agencies would provide technical and
financial assistance, and expand R&D and demonstration programs. In
addition to these carrots, government may need to brandish a stick in
order to induce a large fraction of industries to make serious energy
efficiency commitments. If industry does not respond to the Federal
initiatives at a level sufficient to meet progressive energy efficiency
targets, a mandatory, binding energy intensity standard should be
triggered to ensure the targets are attained.
Support for Co-generation
Cogeneration (or, combined heat and power--CHP) is a super-
efficient means of coproducing two energy-intensive products that are
usually produced separately--heat and electricity. The thermal energy
produced in cogeneration also can be used for (building and process)
cooling or to provide mechanical power. While CHP already provides
about 9 percent of all electricity in the United States, there are
considerable barriers to its wider cost-effective implementation
(Elliott and Spurr, 1999). In this study, we assume the adoption of
policies to establish a standard permitting process, uniform tax
treatment, accurate environmental standards, and fair access to the
grid to sell or purchase electricity. Such measures would help to
unleash a significant portion of the enormous potential for CHP. In
this study, we assumed 50 GW of new CHP capacity by 2010, and an
additional 95 GW between 2011 and 2020. With electricity demand reduced
by the various energy efficiency policies adopted in this study,
cogenerated electricity reaches 8 percent of total remaining
electricity requirements in 2010 and 36 percent in 2020.
Policies in the Electric Sector
A major goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to
dramatically reduce carbon and other pollutant emissions from the
electric sector, which is responsible for more than one-third of all
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the
electric sector that include standards and mechanisms to help overcome
existing market barriers to investments in technologies that can reduce
emissions. Three major policies--a renewable portfolio standard, a cap
on pollutant emissions, and a carbon cap and trade system--were
analyzed as described below.
Renewable Portfolio Standard
A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-oriented
policy for progressively increasing the use of renewable energy
resources and technologies for electricity production. An RPS sets a
minimum requirement for the fraction of total electricity generation to
be met by renewable electricity in each year, and requires each
supplier of electricity to meet the minimum either by producing that
fraction in its mix or by acquiring credits from suppliers that exceed
the minimum. The market determines the portfolio of technologies and
geographic distribution of facilities that meet the national target at
least cost. This is achieved by a trading system that awards credits to
generators for producing renewable electricity and allows them to sell
or purchase these credits. Thirteen States--Arizona, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin--already have Renewable
Portfolio Standards. Senator Jeffords has introduced a bill (S. 1333)
that would establish a national RPS.
The RPS provides strong incentives for suppliers to design and site
the lowest cost, highest value and most reliable renewable electricity
projects. It also provides assurance and stability to renewable
technology vendors, by guaranteeing markets for renewable power and
allowing them to capture the financial and administrative advantages
that come with planning in a more stable market environment. Yet it
still maintains a competitive environment that encourages developers to
innovate. Finally, by accelerating the deployment of renewable
technologies and resources, the RPS also accelerates the learning and
economies of scale that will allow renewable resources and technologies
to become increasingly competitive with conventional technologies. This
is particularly important, as the demands of climate stabilization in
coming decades will require more renewable energy than we can deploy in
the next two decades.
In this study, we have applied an RPS that starts at a 2 percent
requirement in 2002, grows to 10 percent in 2010, and to 20 percent in
2020, after all efficiency policies are included. Wind, solar,
geothermal, biomass, and landfill gas are eligible renewable sources of
electricity, but environmental concerns exclude municipal solid waste
(owing to concerns about toxic emissions from waste-burning plants) and
large-scale hydro (which raises environmental concerns and need not be
treated as an emerging renewable resource as it already supplies nearly
10 percent of the nation's electricity supply). We also assume a
subsidy to grid-connected solar photovoltaic electricity generation, in
order to introduce a small amount of this technology into the
generation mix. The purpose of this is to induce technology learning,
performance improvement and scale economies to help achieve increased
technology diversity and another zero emissions option for the longer
term. The level is kept small so that cost and price impacts are
minimal.
Tightening of SO<INF>2</INF> and NOx Emission Regulations
The Clean Air Act Amendments currently require minimal to modest
emissions reductions through 2010 and no reductions after that. Yet,
despite the improvements brought about by the Clean Air Act and its
amendments, recent studies have confirmed that SO<INF>2</INF> and NOx
continue to damage lake and forest ecosystems, decrease agricultural
productivity and harm public health through its impact on urban air
quality (Clean Air Task Force, 2000.)
In this study, we assume a tightened SO<INF>2</INF> cap-and-trade
system that reduces sulfur dioxide emissions to roughly 40 percent of
current levels by 2010 and to one-third of current levels by 2020. We
also impose a cap-and-trade system on NOx emissions in the summertime,
when NOx contributes more severely to photochemical smog. This system
expands the current cap-and-trade program, which calls on 19 States to
meet a target in 2003 that then remains constant and includes all
States with a cap that is set first in 2003 but decreases in 2010,
relative to 1999 levels. The cap results in a 45 percent reduction from
current annual electric sector NOx emissions by 2010 and 83 percent by
2020.
Carbon Cap-And-Trade Permit System
This study assumes that a cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide
emissions is introduced in the electric sector. The cap is set to
achieve progressively more stringent targets over time, starting in
2003 at 2 percent below current levels, increasing to 12 percent below
current levels by 2010 and 30 percent below by 2020. A progressively
more stringent target reduces demand for coal, and hence both
combustion-related air pollution and mining-related pollution of
streams and degradation of landscapes and terrestrial habitats.
In the SO<INF>2</INF>, NOx, and CO<INF>2</INF> trading systems,
permits are distributed through an open auction, and the resulting
revenues can be returned to households (e.g., through a tax reduction
or as a rebate back to households). Recent analyses suggest that an
auction is the most economically efficient way to distribute permits,
as it would meet emissions caps at lower cost than allocations based on
issuing grandfathered allowances or equal per kWh allowances (Burtraw,
et al. 2001). Implementing such auctions for the electric sector also
could set the stage for an economy-wide approach to carbon reduction in
future years based on auctioning. In this study, the price of auctioned
carbon permits reaches $100 per metric ton carbon.
With a cap-and-trade system in place for CO<INF>2</INF>, SOx and
NOx, this scenario reduces multiple emissions from power plants in a
manner similar to proposals currently under consideration in Congress.
The reductions in these three pollutants are as deep as those imposed
in four pollutant bills, and are achieved within a comparable
timeframe. (The Department of Energy's NEMS model unfortunately does
not explicitly track mercury, making it impossible to compare the
results of this study to the mercury requirement in S. 556 and H.R.
1256.)
Policies in the Transport Sector
Another goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to reduce
oil use, carbon emissions and pollution from the transport sector,
which is responsible for about one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the transportation sector
that include improved efficiency (light duty vehicles, heavy duty
trucks and aircraft), a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels,
measures to reduce road travel, and high speed rail.
Strengthened Fuel Economy Standards
Today's cars are governed by fuel economy standards that were set
in the mid-1970's. The efficiency gains made in meeting those standards
have been entirely overwhelmed by increases in population and driving,
as well as the trend toward gas-guzzling SUVs. When the fuel economy
standards were implemented, light trucks only accounted for about 20
percent of personal vehicle sales. Light trucks now account for nearly
50 percent of new vehicle sales; this has brought down the overall fuel
economy of the light duty vehicle fleet, which now stands at its lowest
average fuel economy since 1981. If the fuel economy of new vehicles
had held at the levels for vehicles sold in 1981, rather than tipping
downward, American vehicle owners would be importing half a million
fewer barrels of oil each day.
In this study, we introduce a strengthened Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standard for cars and light trucks, along with
complementary market incentive programs. Specifically, fuel economy
standards for new cars and light trucks rise from EIA's projected 25.2
mpg for 2001 to 36.5 mpg in 2010, continuing to 50.5 mpg by 2020. This
increase in vehicle fuel economy would save by 2020 approximately twice
as much oil as could be pumped from an Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
oil field over its entire 50-year lifespan (USGS, 2001). Based on
assessments of near-term technologies for conventional vehicles, and
advanced vehicle technologies for the longer-term, we estimate that the
2010 CAFE target can be met with an incremental cost of approximately
$855 per vehicle, and the 2020 CAFE target with an incremental cost of
$1,900. \1\ To put these costs in perspective, the fuel savings at the
gasoline pump for these more efficient vehicles would be two to three
times these incremental costs over the vehicle's lifetime. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Assuming a mean value at a market price of oil of $20/barrel.
\2\ Assuming a retail price of gasoline of $1.50/gallon, a 10-year
life of the vehicle, and 12,000 miles per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improving Efficiency of Freight Transport
We also assume policies to improve fuel economy for heavy-duty
freight trucks, which account for approximately 16 percent of all
transport energy consumption. Improvements such as advanced diesel
engines, drag reduction, rolling resistance, load reduction strategies,
and low friction drivetrains would increase the fuel economy, and thus
decrease the oil requirements, of freight trucks. Many of these
technologies are available today while others, such as advanced diesel
and turbine engines, have been demonstrated technically but are not yet
commercially available.
To accelerate the improvement in heavy duty truck efficiency, we
have assumed expanded R&D for heavy duty diesel technology, vehicle
labeling and promotion, financial incentives to stimulate the
introduction of new technologies, efficiency standards for medium-and
heavy-duty trucks, and fuel taxes and user-fees calibrated to eliminate
the existing subsidies for freight trucking. Together, it is estimated
that these policies could bring about a fuel economy improvement of 6
percent by 2010, and 23 percent by 2020, relative to today's trucks.
Improving Efficiency of Air Travel
Air travel is the fastest growing mode of travel, and far more
energy intensive than vehicle travel. One passenger mile of air travel
today requires about 1.7 times as much fuel as vehicle travel. \3\ We
assume policies to improve the efficiency of air travel, including R&D
for efficient aircraft technologies, fuel consumption standards, and a
revamping of policies that subsidize air travel through public
investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Assuming typical vehicle load factors of 0.33 for autos and
0.6 for aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We assume that air travel efficiency improves by 23 percent by
2010, and 53 percent by 2020, owing to a combination of aircraft
efficiency improvements (advanced engine types, lightweight composite
materials, and advanced aerodynamics), increased load factor, and
acceleration of air traffic management improvements (Lee et al., 2001;
OTA, 1994; Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000). This is in contrast to
the base case in which efficiency increases by 9 percent by 2010 and 15
percent by 2020. While we assume that air travel can reach 82 seat-
miles per gallon by 2020 from its current 51, it is technologically
possible that far greater efficiencies approaching 150 seat-miles per
gallon could be achieved, if not in that time period then over the
longer term (Alliance to Save Energy et al., 1991).
Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
Transportation in the United States relies overwhelmingly on
petroleum-based fuels, making it a major source of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. We introduce here a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor
fuels, similar in concept to the Renewable Portfolio Standard for the
electric sector.
The policy assumed in this study requires a 3 percent reduction in
the average national GHG emission factor of fuels used in light duty
vehicles in 2010, increasing to a 7 percent reduction by 2020. Expanded
R&D, market creation programs, and financial incentives would
complement this policy. Such a program would stimulate the production
of low-GHG fuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biomass-or solar-based
hydrogen.
For this study, we assume that most of the low-GHG fuel is provided
as cellulosic ethanol, which can be produced from woody matter from
agricultural residues, forest and mill wastes, urban wood wastes, and
short rotation woody crops (Walsh et al., 1997; Walsh et al., 1999). As
cellulosic ethanol can be coproduced along with electricity, we assume
that electricity output reaches 10 percent of ethanol output by 2010
and 40 percent by 2020 (Lynd, 1997). We assume that the price of
cellulosic ethanol falls to $1.40 per gallon of gasoline equivalent by
2010 owing to the accelerated development of the production technology,
and remains at that price thereafter (Interlaboratory Working Group,
2000).
Improving Alternative Modes to Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled
The amount of travel in cars and light duty trucks continues to
grow due to increasing population and low vehicle occupancy. Between
1999 and 2020, the rate of growth in vehicle miles traveled is
projected to increase in the base case by about 2 percent per year. The
overall efficiency of the passenger transportation system can be
significantly improved through measures that contain the growth in
vehicle miles traveled through land-use and infrastructure investments
and pricing reforms to remove implicit subsidies for cars, which are
very energy intensive. We assume that these measures will primarily
affect urban passenger transportation and result in a shift to higher
occupancy vehicles, including carpooling, vanpooling, public
transportation, and telecommuting. We consider that the level of
reductions of vehicle miles traveled that can be achieved by these
measures relative to the base case are 8 percent by 2010 and 11 percent
by 2020.
High Speed Rail
High speed rail offers an attractive alternative to intercity
vehicle travel and short distance air travel. In both energy cost and
travel time, high-speed rail could compete with air travel for trips of
roughly 600 miles or less, which account for about one-third of
domestic air passenger miles traveled. Investments in rail facilities
for key intercity routes (such as the Northeast corridor between
Washington and Boston, the east coast of Florida between Miami and
Tampa, and the route linking Los Angeles and San Francisco) could
provide an attractive alternative and reduce air travel in some of the
busiest flight corridors (USDOT, 1997). High-speed rail can achieve
practical operating speeds of up to 200 mph. Prominent examples include
the French TGV, the Japanese Shinkansen and the German Intercity
Express. An emerging advanced transport technology is the MAGLEV system
in which magnetic forces lift and guide a vehicle over a specially
designed guideway. Both Germany and Japan are active developers of this
technology.
In this analysis we have taken the USDOT's recent estimates of the
potential high speed rail ridership which, based on projected mode
shifts from air and automobile travel in several major corridors of the
United States, reaches about 2 billion passenger miles by 2020 (USDOT,
1997). While this level of high speed rail ridership provides
relatively small energy and carbon benefits by 2020, it can be viewed
as the first phase of a longer-term transition to far greater ridership
and more advanced, faster and efficient electric and MAGLEV systems in
the ensuing decades.
ANNEX B
methodology: economic impacts analysis
The overall energy and economic analysis starts with a business-as-
usual energy-economic forecast based on the U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook for 2001.
This base case reflects a continuation of existing energy consumption
and technology trends and policies, and presumes no efforts are taken
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Employment impacts from the policy scenarios were computed as net
incremental impacts in specified future years. They are derived from
the changes in expenditures on energy:
. . . operating costs and fuel costs--brought about by investments in
energy efficiency and renewable technologies in each sector. The
net impacts of these changes on the nation's economy were computed
from the following: 1) the net changes in employment; 2) the net
changes in wage and salary compensation, measured in millions of
1998 dollars; and 3) the net changes in Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), also measured in millions of 1998 dollars.
The analysis used data derived from IMPLAN (IMpact Analysis for
PLANning), a widely used input-output (I-O) model that analyzes
interactions between different sectors of the economy. IMPLAN was used
to track the changes in each sector's demand and spending patterns, as
caused by shifts in fuel consumption and energy technology investments
owing to the policies, and the shifts induced in other sectors' levels
of output (and the inputs required).
The results of these interactions are captured through appropriate
sectoral multipliers (jobs, income, and GDP per dollar of output). For
each benchmark year (2010 and 2020), each change in a sector's spending
pattern is matched to an appropriate sectoral multiplier. The
analytical approach used here is similar to that in Geller, DeCicco and
Laitner (1992); Laitner, Bernow and DeCicco (1998); Goldberg et al.
(1998); and Bernow et al. (1999). These reports offer a more in-depth
discussion of methodological issues.
Input-output models were initially developed to trace supply
linkages in the economy. Thus, the impacts generated from the policy
scenario depend on the structure of the economy. For example, I-O
models can show how increasing purchases of more efficient lighting
equipment, more efficient cars, high efficiency motors, modular
combined heat and power plants, or biomass energy not only directly
benefit their respective producers, but also benefit those industries
that provide inputs to the manufacturers. I-O models also can be used
to show the benefits from indirect economic activity that occur as a
result of these transactions (e.g., banking and accounting services)
and the re-spending of energy bill savings throughout the economy.
Therefore, spending patterns for energy have an effect on total
employment, income (i.e., wage and salary compensation), and GDP.
For each sector of the economy, multipliers were used to compute
the impacts of the incremental expenditures. These multipliers
identified the employment or economic activity generated from a given
level of spending in each sector. Changes in expenditures were matched
with appropriate multipliers. For instance, employment multipliers show
the number of jobs that are directly and indirectly supported for each
one million dollars of expenditure in a specific sector.
For this analysis, a job is defined as sufficient wages to employ
one person full-time for 1 year. The employment multipliers for key
sectors of the economy are listed in table A.1, below.
The analysis in this study includes several modifications made to
the methodology of merely matching expenditures and multipliers. First,
an assumption was made that 85 percent of the efficiency investments
would be spent within the United States. While local contractors and
dealers traditionally carry out upgrades of energy efficiency, this
analysis recognizes that foreign suppliers and contractors may also be
involved.
Second, we made an adjustment in the employment impacts to account
for future changes in labor productivity in specific sectors. Utilizing
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Economic and Employment
Projections 1988, 1998, and 2008, we developed productivity trends for
our analysis. These trends suggest that productivity rates are expected
to vary widely among sectors. Annual productivity gains are forecast to
range from 0.4 percent annually in the construction sector (which will
experience a large influx of employment as those sectors become more
important to the economy) to 7.4 percent annual productivity gain in
oil and gas mining. These factors are given in table A.2, below.
Third, we assumed that 80 percent of the investment upgrades would
be financed by bank loans carrying an average 10 percent real interest
rate over a 5-year period. No parameters were established to account
for changes labor participation rates or for changes in interest rates
as less capital-intensive technologies (i.e., efficiency investments)
are substituted for conventional supply strategies. Although the higher
cost premiums associated with the efficiency investments might be
expected to increase the level of borrowing in the short term, and
therefore, interest rates, this could be offset somewhat by avoided
investments in new power plant capacity, exploratory well drilling, and
new pipelines. Similarly, while a demand for labor may tend to increase
the overall level of wages (and potentially lessen economic activity),
the employment benefits from the scenario are relatively small compared
with the national level of unemployment.
Fourth, for the residential and commercial sectors, it was assumed
that program and marketing expenditures would be required to help
promote market penetration of efficiency improvements due to the
dispersed nature of the decisionmakers and the need for greater efforts
toward market transformation. This was set at 15 percent of the
efficiency investments for those sectors. No program or marketing
expense was included for the industrial sector or transportation
sector. We assume market penetration is naturally occurring in the
industrial sector as decisionmakers adopt cost-effective and more
efficient processes and older, less efficient equipment is replaced
with newer, higher efficiency models. In the transportation sector
efficiency improvements are assumed to be a part of all new vehicle
purchases.
Finally, the analysis took account of the fact that the electric
sector carbon cap-and-trade system would involve government auctioning
of carbon allowances to electricity suppliers. This was modeled by (1)
assuming purchases of the requisite allowances by utilities from the
government; (2) payments for the corresponding higher costs of
electricity by households and businesses; and (3) a return of the
revenues collected by the government to households and businesses.
These results should be taken as indicative, as there are always
limits to such a modeling exercise. The analyses do not account for
feedback through final demand reductions, input substitution owing to
price changes, feedback from inflation, and the constraints on labor
and money supplies. They also assume that available labor, plant and
materials are not fully utilized. Thus, for example, they assume that
there is unemployment in those existing or potential skill areas, for
which demand could be induced by policies that shift expenditures to
nonenergy commodities. This is contrary to many other economic models,
which in effect assume that there is full employment, and that the
shift in expenditures from energy to other commodities would not create
new jobs. Their view would be that the shift in expenditures would
provide largely counter-recessionary jobs, but not many sustained job
increases. Yet, it is well known that there is structural as well as
business-cycle unemployment. Moreover, economic activity in some
sectors such as construction (which enjoys the largest amount of
induced jobs in our analysis) where job entry is impeded by cyclical
and unstable demand and expectations, could experience sustained
increases if a sustained path of increased final demands were
established as they are in our policy scenarios.
In addition, while the models used for the energy analyses capture
some policy-induced technology innovation, this is limited primarily to
the electric sector. The I-O analysis also does not include the
potential productivity benefits that could stem from the investments in
new and more efficient equipment, and associated changes in
organization, know-how and inter-industry interactions. Industrial
investments that improve energy efficiency could be accompanied by
improved product quality, lower capital and operating costs, increased
employee productivity, easier and less costly environmental compliance,
and entry into niche markets (see, e. g., Elliott et al. 1997; Laitner
1995; OTA 1994; Porter and Van Linde 1995). Even under full employment,
energy policies that improve the efficiency of the economy could
increase incomes per worker. Finally, such job-inducing policies could
help counteract recessionary business cycles. It would be valuable to
develop tools and refine the analyses to account for some of these
factors and obtain a more detailed characterization of the results.
For the State-by-State employment impacts, we developed indicative
estimates of the distribution of the approximately 1.3 million net
national jobs gained by 2020 across the 50 States and the District of
Columbia. Absent a more detailed analysis of each individual State or
region, we allocated the national job impacts by weighting the key
variables to create an overall State-by-State assessment. This estimate
reflects the significant energy and economic differences across the
States. The key variables used in this assessment were differences in
energy prices; the level of energy consumed for each dollar of economic
activity in the State; the number of energy-related jobs as a percent
of total State employment; and the number of State jobs as a percent of
national employment. The results are presented in table 2, which shows
a positive net job impact in each State, ranging up to a high of about
140,000 in California by 2020.
Table A.1
Employment Multipliers for Select Economic Sectors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sector Multiplier
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture................................................ 27.3
Coal Mining................................................ 9.9
Oil/Gas Mining............................................. 8.2
Other Mining............................................... 10.4
Construction............................................... 18.1
Food Processing............................................ 16.9
Pulp and Paper Mills....................................... 11.6
Oil Refining............................................... 6.9
Stone, Glass, and Clay..................................... 13.2
Primary Metals............................................. 12.8
Metal Durables............................................. 13.1
Motor Vehicles............................................. 10.6
Other Manufacturing........................................ 13.3
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities............... 13.9
Electric Utilities......................................... 5.2
Natural Gas Utilities...................................... 6.6
Wholesale Trade............................................ 13.4
Retail Trade............................................... 29.2
Finance.................................................... 10.7
Insurance/Real Estate...................................... 8.1
Services................................................... 22.9
Education.................................................. 28.9
Government................................................. 18.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A.2
Labor Productivity Rates for Select Economic Sectors Employment
Multipliers for Select Economic Sectors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sector Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture................................................ 1.6 percent
Coal Mining................................................ 5.2 percent
Oil/Gas Mining............................................. 7.4 percent
Other Mining............................................... 2.4 percent
Construction............................................... 0.4 percent
Food Processing............................................ 1.0 percent
Pulp and Paper Mills....................................... 3.0 percent
Oil Refining............................................... 3.3 percent
Stone, Glass, and Clay..................................... 2.2 percent
Primary Metals............................................. 4.0 percent
Metal Durables............................................. 4.7 percent
Motor Vehicles............................................. 2.0 percent
Other Manufacturing........................................ 4.7 percent
Transportation, Communication, and Other Utilities......... 2.5 percent
Electric Utilities......................................... 2.5 percent
Natural Gas Utilities...................................... 1.5 percent
Wholesale Trade............................................ 3.0 percent
Retail Trade............................................... 1.4 percent
Finance.................................................... 3.7 percent
Insurance/Real Estate...................................... 0.8 percent
Services................................................... 1.1 percent
Education.................................................. 1.0 percent
Government................................................. 0.4 percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[From the Tellus Institute and Stockholm Environment Institute--Boston
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The American Way to the Kyoto Protocol: An Economic Analysis to Reduce
Carbon Pollution
a study for: world wildlife fund
(By Alison Bailie, Stephen Bernow, William Dougherty, Michael Lazarus,
Sivan Kartha)
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Jennifer Morgan, Katherine Silverthorne and Freda
Colbert of WWF for their assistance on this report. We thank Hal
Harvey, Marcus Schneider and Eric Heitz of Energy Foundation for their
help in supporting our modeling capabilities. The energy efficiency
analyses and inputs to our modeling effort for buildings, industry and
light duty vehicles were provided by ACEEE (Steve Nadel, Howard Geller,
Neal Elliott and Therese Langer) and John DeDicco of Environmental
Defense. Modifications to the NEMS model, particularly as related to
renewables in the electricity sector, were made at Tellus with
important input from Alan Nogee, Deborah Donovan and Steve Clemmer of
Union of Concerned Scientists, Laura Martin, Tom Petersik, Alan Beamon,
Zia Haq, and Jeff Jones of EIA, and other experts including Walter
Short of NREL, Jack Cadogan of ORNL, Dan Entingh of Princeton Economic
Research, Inc., Etan Gummerman, Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Francis Wood of
OnLocation, Inc., and Michael Brower. We also wish to thank Francisco
de la Chesnaye and Reid Harvey of USEPA, who provided important data on
non-CO<INF>2</INF> gases, and Kevin Gurney, who provided useful
insights on land-based carbon.
1. Executive Summary
This report presents a study of policies and measures that could
dramatically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over the next two
decades. It examines a broad set of national policies to increase
energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy
technologies, and shift energy use to less carbon-intensive fuels. The
policies address major areas of energy use in residential and
commercial buildings, industrial facilities, transportation, and power
generation.
This portfolio of policies and measures would allow the United
States to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol Together when
combined with steps to reduce the emissions of non-CO<INF>2</INF>
greenhouse gases and land-based CO<INF>2</INF> emissions, and the
acquisition of a limited amount of allowances internationally. This
package would bring overall economic benefits to the United States,
since lower fuel and electricity bills would more than pay the costs of
technology innovation and program implementation. In 2010, the annual
savings would exceed costs by $50 billion, and by 2020 by approximately
$135 billion.
Currently, the Bush Administration is promoting an energy strategy
based on augmenting fossil fuel supplies. This strategy does not help
the United States shift away from diminishing fossil fuel supplies, it
does not enhance U.S. energy security, and it does not reduce the
environmental impacts of energy use. America needs an energy policy
that takes us forward into the 21st Century by making climate change
mitigation an integrated part of the plan.
Far from being the economically crippling burden that the Bush
Administration alleges, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and ambitiously
reducing greenhouse gas emissions could initiate a national
technological and economic renaissance for cleaner energy, industrial
processes and products in the coming decades. In the United States, we
therefore face an important challenge. We can embrace the challenge of
climate change as an opportunity to usher in this renaissance,
providing world markets with the advanced technologies needed to
sustain this century's economic growth. Or we can be followers, leaving
other more forward-looking countries to assume the global leadership in
charting a sustainable path and capturing the energy markets of the
future.
Policies and measures
The climate protection strategy adopts policies and measures that
are broadly targeted across the four main economic sectors: buildings,
electricity generation, transportation, and industry. The policies
considered for residential and commercial buildings include
strengthened codes for building energy consumption, new appliance
efficiency standards, tax incentives and a national public benefits
fund to support investments in high efficiency products, and expanded
research and development into energy efficient technologies. For the
electric sector, policies included a market-oriented ``renewable
portfolio standard'', a cap on pollutant emissions (for sulfur and
nitrogen), and a carbon emissions permit auction. In the transport
sector, policies are adopted to improve the fuel economy of passenger
vehicles, freight trucks, and aircraft through research, incentives,
and a strengthened vehicle fuel efficiency standards. Policies are also
modeled to set a fuel-cycle greenhouse gas standard for motor fuels,
reduce road travel through land use and infrastructure investments and
pricing reforms, and increase access to high speed rail as an
alternative to short distance air travel. In the industry sector,
policies are adopted to exploit more of the vast potential for
cogeneration of heat and power, and to improve energy efficiencies at
industrial facilities through technical assistance, financial
incentives, expanded research, and demonstration programs to encourage
cost-effective emissions reductions.
Results
Energy use in buildings, industries, transportation, and
electricity generation was modeled for this study using the U.S.
Department of Energy's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). The NEMS
model version, data and assumptions employed in this study were those
of EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2001), which also formed the basis
for the Base Case. We refined the NEMS model with advice from EIA,
based on their ongoing model improvements, and drawing on expert advice
from colleagues at the Union of Concerned Scientists, the National
Laboratories and elsewhere.
Table ES. 1 Summary of results.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2020
1990\1\ 2010 Base Climate 2020 Base Climate
Case Protection Case Protection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
End-use Energy (Quads)......................... 63.9 86.0 76.4 97.2 72.6
Primary Energy (Quads)......................... 84.6 114.1 101.2 127.0 89.4
Renewable Energy (Quads)
NON-HYDRO.................................. 3.5 5.0 10.4 5.5 11.0
Hydro...................................... 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Net GHG Emissions (MtCe/yr).................... 1,648 2,204 1,533 -- ----
Energy Carbon.............................. 1,338 1,808 1,372 2,042 1,087
Land-based Carbon.......................... -- -- -58 -- ----
Non-CO<INF>2</INF> Gases.............................. 310 397 279 -- ----
International Trade........................ -- -- -60 -- ----
Net Savings\2\
Cumulative present value (billion $)....... -- -- $105 -- $576
Levelized annual (billion $/year).......... -- -- $113 -- $49
Levelized annual per household ($/year).... -- -- $113 -- $375
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Under Kyoto, the base year for three of the non-CO<INF>2</INF> GHGs (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) is 1995, not 1990, and the 1995
levels for these emissions are reported here.
\2\ Savings are in 1999 $. The 2010 savings include $2.3 billion costs per year ($9 billion cumulative through
2010) of non-energy related measures needed to meet the Kyoto target. Costs are not included in 2020 since
these measures policies do not extend past 2010.
Table ES. 1 provides summary results on overall energy and
greenhouse gas impacts and economic impacts of the policy set for the
Base Case and Climate Protection Case for 2010 and 2020. The policies
cause reductions below in primary energy consumption that reach 11
percent by 2010 and 30 percent in 2020, relative to the Base Case in
those years, through increased efficiency and greater adoption of
cogeneration of heat and power (CHP). Relative to today's levels, use
of non-hydro renewable energy roughly triples by 2010 in the Climate
Protection Case, whereas in the Base Case it increases by less than 50
percent. Given the entire set of policies, non-hydro renewable energy
doubles relative to the Base Case in 2010, accounting for about 10
percent of total primary energy supplies in 2010. When the electric
sector RPS is combined with the strong energy efficiency policies of
this study, the absolute amount of renewables does not increase
substantially between 2010 and 2020 because the percentage targets in
the electric sector have already been met. A more aggressive renewables
policy for the 2010-2020 period could be considered (ACEEE, 1999).
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The reductions in energy-related carbon emissions are even more
dramatic than the reductions in energy consumption, because of the
shift toward lower-carbon fuels and renewable energy. Since 1990,
carbon emissions have risen by over 15 percent, and in the Base Case
would continue to rise a total of 35 percent by 2010, in stark contrast
to the 7 percent emissions reduction that the United States negotiated
at Kyoto. In the Climate Protection case, the United States promptly
begins to reduce energy-related carbon emissions, and by 2010 emissions
are only 2.5 percent above 1990 levels, and by 2020, emissions are well
below 1990 levels. Relative to the Base case, the 2010 reductions \3\
amount to 436 MtC/yr.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Throughout this report we refer to U.S. emissions target for
the year 2010 to mean the average of the 5 year period from 2008 to
2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy-related carbon emissions are the predominant source of U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions for the foreseeable future, and their
reduction is the central challenge for protecting the climate. However,
because the United States has made only minimal efforts to reduce
emissions since it ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, it may not be able to meet it's Kyoto obligation with
net economic benefits based solely on reductions in energy-related
carbon dioxide emissions. Therefore, in order to meet the Kyoto target,
the Climate Protection case also considers policies and measures for
reducing greenhouse gases other than energy-related carbon dioxide.
In the Climate Protection case, land-based activities, such as
forestry, changes in land-use, and agriculture, yield another 58 MtC/yr
of reductions. (This figure corresponds to the upper limit for the use
of land-based activities in the current negotiating text proposed by
the current President of the U.N. climate talks Jan Pronk.) Methane
emissions are also reduced, through measures aimed at landfills,
natural gas production and distribution systems, mines, and livestock
husbandry. The potent fluorine-containing greenhouse gases can be
reduced by substituting with non-greenhouse substitutes, implementing
alternative cleaning processes in the semiconductor industry, reducing
leaks, and investing in more efficient gas-using equipment. In total,
the Climate Protection case adopts reductions of these other greenhouse
gases equivalent to 118 MtC/yr by 2010.
All together the reduction measures for energy-related carbon (436
MtC/yr), land-based carbon (58 MtC/yr), and non-carbon gases (118 MtCe/
yr) amount to 612 MtCe/yr of reductions in 2010. Through these
measures, the United States is able to accomplish the vast majority of
its emissions reduction obligation under the Kyoto Protocol through
domestic actions. This leaves the United States slightly shy of its
Kyoto target, with only 60 MtC/yr worth of emissions allowances to
procure from other countries though the ``flexibility mechanisms'' of
the Kyoto Protocol--(Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the
Clean Development Mechanism). The Climate Protection case assumes that
the United States will take steps to ensure that allowances procured
through these flexibility mechanisms reflect legitimate mitigation
activity. In particular, we assume that United States restrains its use
of so-called ``hot air'' allowances, i.e, allowances sold by countries
that received Kyoto Protocol targets well above their current
emissions.
In addition to greenhouse gas emission reductions, the set of
policies in the Climate Protection case also reduce criteria air
pollutants that harm human health, cause acid rain and smog, and
adversely affect agriculture, forests, water resources, and buildings.
Implementing the policies would significantly reduce energy-related
emissions as summarized in Table ES. 2. Sulfur oxide emissions would
decrease the most--by half in 2010 and by nearly 75 percent in 2020.
The other pollutants are reduced between 7 and 16 percent by 2010, and
between 17 and 29 percent by 2020, relative to Base case levels in
those years.
Table ES. 2: Impact of policies on air pollutant emissions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2020
1900 2010 Base Climate 2020 Base Climate
Case Protection Case Protection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO............................................. 65.1 69.8 63.8 71.8 59.8
NOx............................................ 21.9 16.5 13.9 16.9 12.0
SO<INF>2</INF>............................................ 19.3 12.8 6.2 12.7 3.3
VOC............................................ 7.7 5.5 5.1 5.9 4.9
PM<INF>10</INF>........................................... 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The complete Climate Protection package--including measures to
reduce energy-related, land-related, and non-carbon greenhouse gas
emissions, as well as modest purchases of allowances--provides a net
economic benefit to the United States. It also positively affects
public health, by reducing emissions of the key air quality-reducing
pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,
particulates, and volatile organic compounds. By dramatically reducing
energy consumption, the Climate Protection strategy reduces our
dependence on insecure energy supplies, while enhancing the standing of
the United States as a supplier of innovative and environmentally
superior technologies and practices.
2. Introduction
The earth's atmosphere now contains more carbon dioxide than at
anytime over the past several hundred millennia. This precipitous rise
in the major greenhouse gas, due to the combustion of fossil fuels
since the dawn of the industrial age and the clearing of forests, has
warmed the globe and produced climatic changes. What further changes
will occur over the coming decades depends on how society chooses to
respond to the threat of a dangerously disrupted climate. A concerted
global effort to shift to energy-efficient technologies, carbon-free
sources of energy and sustainable land-use practices, could keep future
climate change to relatively modest levels. If, on the other hand,
nations continue to grow and consume without limiting GHG emissions,
future climate change could be catastrophic.
Dramatic climate change could unleash a range of dangerous
physical, ecological, economic and social disruptions that would
seriously undermine the natural environment and human societies for
generations to come. Fortunately, a variety of effective policies,
which have already been demonstrated, would mobilize current and new
technologies, practices and resources to meet the challenge of climate
protection. Strong and sustained action to reduce the risk of climate
change could also reap additional benefits, such as reducing other air
pollutants and saving money, plus help to usher in a new technological
and institutional renaissance consistent with the goals of sustainable
development. Here we focus on the U.S., which emits almost one-fourth
of global carbon dioxide emissions. As a Nation, we have both the
responsibility and the capability to take the lead in climate
protection, and can directly benefit from actions taken. Recently,
however, the Bush Administration has gravely disappointed the
international community, proposing an energy strategy that is devoid of
significant steps to protect the climate.
This report presents a study of policies and measures through which
the United States could dramatically reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions over the next two decades, while spurring technological
innovation, reducing pollution, and improving energy security. The
study is the latest in a series to which Tellus Institute has
contributed, dating back to 1990, which have shown the economic and
environmental benefits of energy efficiency and renewable energy
resources. It updates and refines America's Global Warming Solutions
(1999), which found that annual carbon emissions could be reduced to 14
percent below 1990 levels by 2010, with net economic benefits and
reductions in air pollution.
Unfortunately, since that study, and indeed over the past decade
since the Framework Convention on Climate Change was ratified by the
U.S., the promise of these technologies and resources has gone largely
unfulfilled, and little has been done to stem the tide of rapidly
growing energy use and carbon emissions. This delay and paucity of
action has rendered even more difficult the goal of reaching our Kyoto
Protocol emissions target of 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2010.
Nonetheless, the present study shows the substantial carbon reduction
and other benefits that could still be achieved by 2010 with sensible
policies and measures, even with this delayed start, and even greater
benefits over the following decade. The policy and technological
momentum established through 2020 would set the stage for the further
reductions needed over the longer term to ensure climate stabilization.
The Risk of Climate Change
The world's community of climate scientists has reached the
consensus that human activities are disrupting the Earth's climate
(WGI, SPM, 2001; NAS, 2001; Int'l Academies of Science, 2001). Global
emissions of CO<INF>2</INF> have steadily risen since the dawn of the
industrial age, and now amount to about 6 billion tons of carbon
released annually from fossil fuel combustion and 1 billion tons
annually from land-use changes (mainly burning and decomposition of
forest biomass). Without concerted efforts to curb emissions,
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels would be driven inexorably higher by
a growing global population pursuing a conventional approach to
economic development.
While it is impossible to predict with precision how much carbon
dioxide we will be emitting in the future, in a business-as-usual
scenario annual emissions would roughly triple by the end of the
century. By that time, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
would have risen to three times pre-industrial levels (IPCC WGI, 2001).
The climatic impacts of these rising emissions could be dramatic.
Across a range of different plausible emissions futures explored by the
IPCC, global average temperatures are calculated to rise between 3 to
10 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 to 6 degrees Centigrade), with even greater
increases in some regions (IPCC 2001). Such temperature changes would
reflect a profound transformation of the Earth's climate system, of the
natural systems that depend upon it and, potentially, of the human
societies that caused the changes.
The potential consequences of such climate change are myriad and
far-reaching. Sea level could rise between 3.5 to 35 inches (9--88
centimeters) (IPCC WGI, 2001), with severe implications for coastal and
island ecosystems and their human communities. Hundreds of millions of
people in the United States and abroad live in coastal regions that
would be inundated by a 17 inch (44 cm) rise in sea level. Most of
these regions are in developing countries that can scarcely afford to
expend resources on building dikes and resettling communities. Climate
disruption would also entail more frequent, prolonged, and intense
extreme weather events, including storms and droughts, the timing,
conditions and character of which would remain unpredictable.
Under the stresses courted by continuing current energy practices,
climate and ecological systems could undergo very large and
irreversible changes, such as a shift in the major ocean currents.
Global warming itself could increase the rate of greenhouse gas
accumulation, uncontrollably accelerating global warming and its
impacts. For example, a thawing of the arctic tundra could release
methane at rates far beyond today's anthropogenic rates, and a warming
of the oceans could shift them from a net sink to a net source of
carbon dioxide.
Moreover, large and irreversible changes could occur very rapidly.
Recent scientific evidence from pre-historic ice cores shows that major
climate changes have occurred on the time scale of about a decade
(Schneider 1998; Severinghaus et al. 1998). Rapid change could cause
additional ecological and social disruptions, limiting our ability to
adapt. This could render belated attempts to mitigate climate change
more hurried, more costly, less effective, or too late. Consequently,
early and sustained action, across many fronts, is needed to effect the
technological, institutional and economic transitions to protect global
climate and the ecological and social systems that depend on climate
stability.
Protecting the Climate
The carbon dioxide already released by human activities will linger
in the atmosphere for a hundred years or so. This carbon has already
changed the climate, and will continue to do so as long as it remains
in the atmosphere. But the degree of climate change to which we're
already committed pales in comparison to the disruption that humankind
would wreak if it continues to recklessly emit more carbon.
An aggressive strategy to curb emissions might limit warming to
less than 2 degrees F over the next century (on top of the 1.0 degrees
C that has already occurred over the past century). A temperature
increase of about 0.2 degrees F per decade would still exceed natural
variability, but would occur gradually enough to allow many, though not
all, ecosystems to adapt (Rijsberman and Swart, 1990). To be sure, this
goal would not entirely eliminate the risks of disruptive climate
change. Warming in some areas would significantly exceed 2 degrees F,
the rising sea level would inundate some coastal areas, and changing
rainfall patterns could make some regions more prone to drought or
floods. A more ambitious stabilization target might well be warranted,
but we suggest this goal as an illustration of what might be an
environmentally acceptable and practically achievable climate
protection trajectory.
To achieve this goal, CO<INF>2</INF> concentrations would have to
be stabilized at approximately 450 ppm, which is about 60 percent above
pre-industrial concentrations. This would require keeping total global
carbon emissions within a budget of 500 billion tons of carbon over the
course of the 21st century, whereas a business-as-usual trajectory
would have us emitting about 1,400 billion tons. Annual global carbon
emissions from fossil fuels would have to be at least halved by the end
of the century, from today's 6 billion tons/yr to less than 3 billion
tons/yr, and deforestation would need to be halted, in contrast to a
business-as-usual trajectory which grows to 20 billion tons/yr. With a
growing global population, this implies a decrease in the annual per
capita emissions from today's 1 ton to about 0.25 tons, whereas the
business-as-usual per capita emissions grow to almost 2 tons. Figure
2.1, which shows these two radically different emissions trajectories,
conveys the ambitiousness of this target.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Figure 2.1: Global carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion (1890-
2100)--Business-as-usual trajectory (IPCC IS92a scenario) and
trajectory for climate stabilization at 450 ppm
The industrialized countries are responsible for about two-thirds
of global annual carbon, at more than 3 tons per-capita, with the
United States at 5.5 tons per capita, while on average developing
countries emit only 0.5 tons per capita. Even if emissions in the
developing countries were to vanish instantly, implying a nightmarish
devolution of their economies, the industrialized world would still
need to almost halve its emissions in order to protect the climate.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Figure 2.2: Carbon emissions for stabilization of GHG concentrations at
450 ppm, broken out by developing and industrialized countries
Figure 2.2 shows the global carbon trajectory for stabilization at
450 ppm, as shown in Figure 2.1, broken out into emission paths for
both the industrialized and developing countries. In this illustrative
allocation, emissions converge to equal per capita emissions (?0.25 tC
per capita) by the end of the 21st century. Clearly, it is essential
that the industrialized countries begin early and continue steadily to
decrease their emissions on a trajectory to meet these climate
protection requirements. Industrialized countries on the whole would
have to roughly reduce their per capita emissions ten-fold, and the
United States in particular would have to reduce by more than a factor
of twenty.
Emissions from the developing countries could grow in the near
term, as they undergo economic development and transition toward
advanced, efficient and low-carbon technologies, and then decline
rapidly during the latter half of the century. Ultimately, the
developing countries would need to halve their per capita emissions
relative to today's levels, notwithstanding the considerable economic
growth that they are expected to realize over this century. This would
involve economic development predicated upon use of energy technologies
and energy resources that would entail a ``leap-frogging'' over the
fossil-based economic development that has occurred in the
industrialized countries directly to cleaner energy sources. Such a
transition would require concerted technology and institutional
cooperation, with associated financial assistance, among developing and
industrialized countries.
Stabilization and equalization would thus be served by a dual
technological transition in which the industrialized countries can take
the lead, by demonstrating their commitment to addressing a problem for
which it bears primary responsibility, and fostering the first wave of
technological innovation from which both developing and industrialized
countries could benefit.
The Kyoto Protocol
Although only a first small step, the Kyoto Protocol offers a
pivotal opportunity to shift away from the climate-disrupting path down
which the world is now headed, and onto a climate-protecting path. It
is well understood that the Kyoto Protocol is the basis for future
emissions reductions as well. If it enters into force, the Kyoto
Protocol will legally bind industrialized countries that ratify it to
specific GHG reduction targets, to be attained during the during the 5
year ``budget period'' from 2008 to 2012. For the United States, the
target is 7 percent less than the 1990 emission levels. The limit is 6
percent for Japan, 0 percent for Russia, and an average of 8 percent
for the European Union countries. Across all industrialized countries,
the emissions budget is 5 percent below 1990 emissions rate, whereas
the business-as-usual emissions rate is projected to increase by
approximately 20 percent by 2010.
The Kyoto Protocol offers a number of options to lower the cost of
meeting their targets. Many of these so-called ``flexibility
mechanisms'' were included at the request of the United States in
Kyoto. They allow countries to carry out projects that reduce carbon
emissions (or enhance carbon absorption) from biological stocks such as
forests and possibly agricultural land, or can reduce emissions of GHGs
other than carbon. \4\ Countries can also undertake GHG mitigation
projects in other countries \5\ and acquire credits for the resulting
reductions, or can simply purchase excess carbon allowances from
countries that surpass their targets. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\The GHGs that are covered by the Kyoto Protocol include carbon
dioxide (CO<INF>2</INF>), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perflourocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur
hexaflouride (SF6).
\5\''Joint Implementation'' (JI) is the relevant mechanism if the
host country is an industrialized country with a target, and ``Clean
Development Mechanism'' (CDM) if the host country is a developing
country.
\6\Purchase of allowances is known as ``Emissions Trading''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, these flexibility mechanisms should be implemented with
caution, lest they undermine effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Given
its modest reduction targets relative to the much deeper reductions
ultimately needed for climate protection, the main purpose of the
Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by launching a global
transition in technologies and infrastructure for energy production and
use. The first budget period should end with a decisive shift away from
conventional energy investments, real progress in institutional
learning and technological innovation, and momentum to deepen and
expand these changes over the longer term. An over-reliance on the
flexibility mechanisms may permit too slow a start, and too weak a
signal, to motivate this fundamental transition.
Excessive use of the flexibility mechanisms could undermine the
needed transition in several ways. First, the emissions trading system
is in danger of being severely diluted by cheap carbon allowances from
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, whose negotiated targets are far
above the emission levels they will reach by 2010 even without
reduction efforts. Second, inadequate rules for credits from project-
based mechanisms could generate ``free-rider'' credits that reflect
inflated estimates of their mitigation value, thereby undermining the
Protocol's targets. Third, mitigation activities that rely on
biological sequestration strain our current technical ability to
reliably measure carbon changes, are based on uncertain science, and
take pressure off of fossil fuel reduction. Perhaps more importantly,
institutions are not yet in place to ensure that such projects do not
harm biodiversity and human communities.
The attraction and rhetoric of solutions that lie outside the
borders of the industrialized countries is misguided at this time. To
be sure, there are important opportunities to help developing countries
advance along a sustainable, low carbon path. But unfettered use
overseas options, justified by lower short-term costs for the
industrialized countries, would be a head-in-the-sand approach to the
long-term responsibility of climate protection. The quantity of such
offsets should be limited and their quality guaranteed. Procedures
should be established to help ensure that the various flexibility
mechanisms help protect the climate and advance sustainable
development. These include consistency with local ecological, cultural,
economic conditions and constraints, guaranteed public participation in
project design, certification and review, strong ecological and social
criteria, human and institutional capacity-building goals, strong and
equitable relationships for technology cooperation, and acceptable
procedures for monitoring, verification and accreditation of offset
actions and transactions. Until then it is premature to rely on the CDM
for more than a very small part of the required emissions reductions.
If the United States relies too heavily on the flexibility
mechanisms, it could forego opportunities to reap the co-benefits of
decreasing carbon emissions at home. These include the reduced health
and ecological damages resulting from decreased emissions of mercury,
fine particulates and other pollutants, and the improvements in
technologies, skills and productivity accompanying deployment and use
of more advanced technologies and practices. It could also find itself
in a poorer position to meet the stricter emissions reduction
commitments expected for subsequent budget periods. The Nation could
become a follower rather than a leader in advanced technologies in
domestic and world markets. Thus, it could miss the opportunity
provided by the Kyoto Protocol for a national technological and
economic ``renaissance'' with cleaner energy, processes and products in
the coming decades.
3. Policies
This study examines a broad set of national policies that would
increase energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy
technologies, and shift to less carbon-intensive fossil fuels. This
policy package contrasts sharply with the Bush Administration's energy
strategy, which heavily focuses on fossil fuels and lacks any
significant effort to protect the climate. The policies address major
areas of energy use in the buildings, industrial, transport, and
electrical sectors. Analyses of the investment costs and energy savings
of policies to promote energy efficiency and co-generation in the
residential, commercial, and industrial sectors were taken primarily
from the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (1999; 2001).
Below we group these policies into the particular sector where they
take effect, and describe the key assumptions made concerning the
technological impacts of the individual policies. Unless otherwise
indicated, each of the policies is assumed to start in 2003.
As explained further in the methodology discussion in the next
section, we adapted the Energy Information Administration's 2001
Reference Case Forecast (EIA 2001) to create a slightly revised ``base
case.'' Our policies and assumptions build on those included in this
base case forecast (i.e., we avoid taking credit for emissions
reductions, costs, or savings already included in the EIA 2001
Reference Case). When taken together, the policies described in this
section represent a Climate Protection Scenario that the United States
could pursue to achieve significant carbon reductions.
3.1. Policies in the Buildings and Industrial Sectors
Carbon emissions from fuel combustion in the buildings (including
both residential and commercial) sector account for about 10 percent of
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, while emissions from the industrial
sector account for another 20 percent. When emissions associated with
the electricity consumed are counted, these levels reaches over 35
percent for buildings and 30 percent for industry. We analyzed a set of
policies that include new building codes, new appliance standards, tax
incentives for the purchase of high efficiency products, a national
public benefits fund, expanded research and development, voluntary
agreements and support for combined heat and power.
Building codes
Building energy codes require all new residential and commercial
buildings to be built to a minimum level of energy efficiency that is
cost-effective and technically feasible. ``Good practice'' residential
energy codes, defined as the 1992 (or a more recent) version of the
Model Energy Code (now known as the International Energy Conservation
Code), have been adopted by 32 States (BCAP 1999). ``Good practice''
commercial energy codes, defined as the ASHRAE 90.1 model standard,
have been adopted by 29 States (BCAP 1999). However, the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (EPAct) requires all States to adopt a commercial building
code that meets or exceeds ASHRAE 90.1, and requires all States to
consider upgrading their residential code to meet or exceed the 1992
Model Energy Code.
This policy assumes that DOE enforces the commercial building code
requirement in EPAct and that States comply. We also assume that
relevant States upgrade their residential energy code to either the
1995 or 1998 Model Energy Code either voluntarily or through the
adoption of a new Federal requirement. Furthermore, we assume that the
model energy codes are significantly improved during the next decade
and that all States adopt mandatory codes that go beyond current ``good
practice'' by 2010. To quantify the impact of these changes, we assume
a 20 percent energy savings in heating and cooling in buildings in half
of new homes and commercial buildings.
New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards
The track record for electricity efficiency standards is
impressive, starting with the National Appliance Energy Conservation
Act of 1987 and continuing through the various updates that were
enacted in early 2001 for washers, water heaters, and central air
conditioners. These standards have removed the most inefficient models
from the market, while still leaving consumers with a diversity of
products. An analysis of Department of Energy figures by the American
Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, estimates nearly 8 percent of
annual electricity consumption will be saved in 2020 due to standards
already enacted (Geller et al. 2001). However, many appliance
efficiency standards haven't kept pace with either legal updating
requirements or technological advances. The Department of Energy is
many years behind its legal obligation to regularly upgrade standards
for certain appliances to the ``maximum level of energy efficiency that
is technically feasible and economically justified.''
In this study, we assume that the government upgrades existing
standards or introduces new standards for several key appliances and
equipment types: distribution transformers, commercial air conditioning
systems, residential heating systems, commercial refrigerators, exit
signs, traffic lights, torchiere lighting fixtures, ice makers, and
standby power consumption for consumer electronics. We also assume the
higher energy efficiency standards for residential central air
conditioning and heat pumps than was allowed by the Bush
Administration. These are all measures that can be taken in the near
term, based on technologies that are available and costeffective.
Tax incentives
A wide range of advanced energy-efficient products have been proven
and commercialized, but have not yet become firmly established in the
marketplace. A major reason for this is that conventional technologies
get ``locked-in''; they benefit from economies of scale, consumer
awareness and familiarity, and already existing infrastructure that
make them more able to attract consumers, while alternatives are
overlooked though they could be financially viable once mass-produced
and widely demonstrated. Initial, temporary tax incentives can help
usher advanced alternatives into the market place, which--once
established--can proceed to gain significant market share without
further subsidy.
In this study, we consider initial tax incentives for a number of
products. For consumer appliances, we considered a tax incentive of $50
to $100 per unit. For new homes that are at least 30 percent more
efficient that the Model Energy Code, we considered an incentive of up
to $2,000 per home; for commercial buildings with at least 50 percent
reduction in heating and cooling costs relative to applicable building
codes, we applied an incentive equal to $2.25 per square foot.
Regarding building equipment such as efficient furnaces, fuel cell
power systems, gas-fired heat pumps, and electric heat pump water
heaters, we considered a 20 percent investment tax credit. Each of
these incentives would be introduced with a sunset clause, terminating
them or phasing them out in approximately 5 years, so as to avoid their
becoming permanent subsidies. Versions of all of the tax incentives
considered here have already been introduced into bills before the
Senate and/or House. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\The bills include those introduced by Senators Murkowski and
Lott (S. 389); Bingaman and Daschle (S. 596), Smith (S. 207), Hatch (S.
760), and Representative Nussle (H.R. 1316).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Public Benefits Fund
Electric utilities have historically funded programs to encourage
more efficient energy-using equipment, assist low-income families with
home weatherization, commercialize renewables, and undertake research
and development (R&D). Such programs have typically achieved
electricity bill savings for households and businesses that are roughly
twice the program costs (Nadel and Kushler, 2000). Despite the proven
effectiveness of such technologies and programs, increasing price
competition and restructuring have caused utilities to reduce these
``public benefit'' expenditures over the past several years. In order
to preserve such programs, 15 States have instituted public benefits
funds that are financed by a small surcharge on all power delivered to
consumers.
This study's policy package includes a national level public
benefits fund (PBF) fashioned after the proposal introduced by Sen.
Jeffords (S. 1369) and Rep. Pallone (H. 2569) in the the 106th
Congress. The PBF would levy a surcharge of 0.2 cents per kilowatt-hour
on all electricity sold, costing the typical residential consumer about
$1 per month. This Federal fund would provide matching funds for States
for approved public benefits expenditures. In this study, the PBF is
allocated to several different programs directed at improvements in
lighting, air conditioning, motors, and other cost-effective energy
efficiency improvements in electricity-using equipment.
Expand Federal funding for Research and Development in Energy Efficient
Technologies
Federal R&D funding for energy efficiency has been a spectacularly
cost-effective investment. The DOE has estimated that the energy
savings from 20 of its energy efficiency R&D programs has been roughly
$30 billion so far--more than three times the Federal appropriation for
the entire energy efficiency and renewables R&D budget throughout the
1990's (EERE, 2000). At a time when energy issues are in the forefront
of the national debates, such R&D efforts should be increased and
should be thought of as a remedy for the real energy crises engendered
by continued fossil fuel dependence--climate change, environmental
damage, and diminishing fossil fuel supplies.
Tremendous opportunities exist for further progress in material-
processing technologies, manufacturing processing, electric motors,
windows, building shells, lighting, heating/cooling systems, and super-
insulation, for example. The EPA's Energy Star programs have also saved
large amounts of energy, building on the achievements of R&D efforts
and ushering efficient products into the marketplace. By certifying and
labeling efficient lighting, office equipment, homes and offices,
Energy Star has helped foster a market transformation toward much more
efficient products and buildings. Currently, roughly 80 percent of
personal computers, 95 percent of monitors, 99 percent of printers, and
65 percent of copiers sold are Energy Star certified (EPA, 2001; Brown
et al, 2001). In light of these successes, EPA should be allocated the
funds to broaden the scope of its Energy Star program, expanding to
other products (refrigerators, motors) and building sectors (hotels,
retailers), and the vast market of existing buildings that could be
retrofitted. In this study, we assume that increased funding to expand
research and development efforts in industry (e.g., motors) buildings
(e.g., advanced heating/cooling), and transport (e.g., more fuel
efficient cars and trucks) will lead to more energy-savings products
becoming commercially available.
Industrial Energy Efficiency through Intensity Targets
There is remarkable quantity of untapped, cost-effective energy
efficiency potential in today's industrial facilities (Elliott 1994),
and some corporate managers have shown impressive initiative in moving
to realize that potential. In 1995, Johnson and Johnson set a goal of
reducing its energy costs 10 percent by 2000 through adoption of ``best
practices'' in its 96 U.S. facilities. Building on this work, in 2000
Johnson & Johnson pledged to reduce global warming gases by 7 percent
below 1990 levels by the year 2010, with an interim goal of 4 percent
below 1990 levels by 2005.
In 1998, British Petroleum announced it would voluntarily reduce
its carbon emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010,
representing almost a 40 percent reduction from projected emissions
levels in 2010 given ``business-as-usual'' emissions growth (Romm
1999). And in September 1999, DuPont announced it would reduce its GHG
emissions worldwide by 65 percent relative to 1990 levels, while
holding total energy flat and increasing renewable energy resources to
10 percent of total energy inputs, by 2010. DuPont appears to be on
track for achieving earlier commitments to reduce energy intensity 15
percent and total GHG emissions 50 percent, relative to 1990 levels, by
2000 (Romm 1999). Companies as diverse as Alcoa, Kodak, Polaroid, IBM
and Royal Dutch Shell also find it cost-effective to establish
worldwide greenhouse gas reduction targets. The practices these
companies are developing make them better prepared for an economy that
places a value on carbon reductions.
There is substantial potential for cost-effective efficiency
improvement in both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive
industries (Elliott 1994). For example, an in-depth analysis of 49
specific energy efficiency technologies for the iron and steel industry
found a total cost-effective energy savings potential of 18 percent
(Worrell, Martin, and Price 1999).
We consider in this study Federal initiatives to motivate and
assist industry to identify and exploit energy efficiency
opportunities. Government agencies can support industry by providing
technical and financial assistance, and by expanding Federal R&D and
demonstration programs.
In addition to these carrots, government may need to brandish a
stick in order to induce a large fraction of industries to make serious
energy efficiency commitments. If industry does not respond to the
Federal initiatives at a level sufficient to meet certain energy
efficiency targets, a mandatory, binding energy intensity standard
should be triggered to ensure the required targets are attained.
Support for Cogeneration
Cogeneration (or, combined heat and power--CHP) is a super-
efficient means of co-producing two energy-intensive products that are
usually produced separately--heat and power. The technical and
economical value of CHP has been widely demonstrated, and some European
countries rely heavily on CHP for producing power and providing heat to
industries, businesses, and households. The thermal energy produced in
co-generation can also be used for (building and process) cooling or to
provide mechanical power.
While CHP already provides about 9 percent of all electricity in
the United States, there are considerable barriers to its wider cost-
effective implementation (Elliott and Spurr, 1999). Environmental
standards should be refined to recognize the greater overall efficiency
of CHP systems, for example by assessing facility emissions on the
basis of fuel input, rather than useful energy output. Non-uniform tax
standards discourage CHP implementation in certain facilities.
Moreover, utility practices are generally highly hostile to prospective
CHP operators, through discriminatory pricing and burdensome technical
requirements and costs for connecting to the grid.
In this study, we consider the impact of introducing policies that
would establish a standard permitting process, uniform tax treatment,
accurate environmental standards, and fair access to electricity
consumers through the grid. Such measures would help to unleash a
significant portion of the enormous potential for CHP. In this study we
assumed 50 GW of new CHP capacity by 2010, and an additional 95 GW
between 2011 and 2020. With electricity demand reduced by the various
energy efficiency policies adopted in this study, co-generated
electricity reaches 8 percent percent of total remaining electricity
requirements in 2010 and 36 percent percent in 2020.
3.2. Policies in the Electric Sector
A major goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to
dramatically reduce carbon and other pollutant emissions from the
electric sector, which is responsible for more than one-third of all
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the
electric sector that include standards and mechanisms to help overcome
existing market barriers to investments in technologies that can reduce
emissions. Three major policies--a renewable portfolio standard, a cap
on pollutant emissions, and a carbon cap and trade system--were
considered as described below.
Renewable Portfolio Standard
A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-oriented
policy for accelerating the introduction of renewable resources and
technologies into the electric sector. An RPS sets a schedule for
establishing a minimum amount of renewable electricity as a fraction of
total generation, and requires each generator that sells electricity to
meet the minimum either by producing that amount of renewable
electricity in its mix or acquiring credits from generators that exceed
the minimum. The market determines the portfolio of technologies and
geographic distribution of facilities that meet the target at least
cost. This is achieved by a trading system that awards credits to
generators for producing renewable electricity and allows them to sell
or purchase these credits. Thirteen States--Arizona, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin--already have RPSs, and
Senator Jeffords introduced a bill in the 106th Congress (S. 1369) to
establish a national RPS.
The RPS provides strong incentives for suppliers to design the
lowest cost, most reliable renewable electricity projects, and to
identify niche applications and consumers where the projects will have
the greatest value. It also provides assurance and stability to
renewable technology vendors, by guaranteeing markets for renewable
power, allowing them to capture the financial and administrative
advantages that come with planning in a more stable market environment.
Yet it still maintains a competitive environment that encourages
developers to innovate. Finally, by accelerating the deployment of
renewable technologies and resources, the RPS also accelerates the
learning and economies of scale that allow renewables to become
increasingly competitive with conventional technologies. This is
particularly important, as the demands of climate stabilization in
coming decades will require more renewable energy than we can deploy in
the next two decades.
In this study, we have applied an RPS that starts at a 2 percent
requirement in 2002, grows to 10 percent in 2010, and to 20 percent in
2020, after all efficiency policies are included. Wind, solar,
geothermal, biomass, and landfill gas are eligible renewable sources of
electricity, but environmental concerns exclude municipal solid waste
(owing to concerns about toxic emissions from waste-burning plants) and
large-scale hydro (which also raises environmental concern and need not
be treated as an emerging energy technology as it already supplies
nearly 10 percent of the nation's electricity supply).
As a modest addition to the RPS we provide a subsidy to grid-
connected solar photovoltaic electricity generation. The purpose of
this subsidy is to introduce a small amount of this technology so that
it can play a role in the generation mix, seeking to induce technology
learning, performance improvement and scale economies, and ultimately
increased fuel diversity and another zero emissions option for the
longer term. The level is kept small so that costs and price impacts
are minimal.
Tightening of SO<INF>2</INF> and NOx Emission Regulations
Acid rain and urban air pollution remain serious problems in the
United States. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments attempted to address
these problems, by introducing a cap-and-trade system to roughly halve
the electric sector's SO<INF>2</INF> emissions by 2000, and imposing
technology-specific standards for NOx emissions. Compliance with the
SO<INF>2</INF> standard proved markedly cheaper than initially
expected; initial estimates were mostly based on investments in
``scrubbers'' but the discovery of large low-sulfur coal reserves in
the Wyoming basins and a sharp decline in the cost of rail transport
resulted in lower costs.
Despite the improvements brought about by the Clean Air Act and its
Amendments, recent studies have confirmed that SO<INF>2</INF> and NOx
continue to harm lake and forest ecosystems, decrease agricultural
productivity and affect public health through its damaging affects on
urban air quality (Clean Air Task Force, 2000). The Clean Air Act only
calls for minimal reductions in the cap by 2010 and no reductions after
that.
In this study, we tighten the SO<INF>2</INF> cap so as to reduce
sulfur emissions to roughly 40 percent of current levels by 2010 and
one third of current levels by 2020. We also impose a cap-and-trade
system on NOx emissions in the summertime, when NOx contributes more
severely to photochemical smog. This system expands the current cap and
trade program, which calls on 19 States to meet a target in 2003 that
then remains constant, to include all States with a cap that is set
first in 2003 but decreases in 2010, relative to 1999 levels. The cap
results in a 25 percent reduction of annual NOx emissions by 2003, and
a 50 percent reduction by 2010.
Carbon Cap-And-Trade Permit System
This study introduces a cap-and-trade system for carbon in the
electric sector; with the cap set to achieve progressively more
stringent targets over time, starting in 2003 at 2 percent below
current levels, increasing to 12 percent below current by 2010 and 30
percent below by 2020. Restricting carbon emissions from electricity
generation has important co-benefits, including reduced emissions of
SO<INF>2</INF> and NOx, as discussed above, fine particulate matter,
which is a known cause of respiratory ailments, and mercury, which is a
powerful nervous system toxin and already contaminates over 50,000
lakes and streams in the United States. A progressively more stringent
target also reduces demand for coal, and hence mining-related pollution
of streams and degradation of landscapes and terrestrial habitats.
In the SO<INF>2</INF>, NOx, and CO<INF>2</INF> trading systems,
permits are distributed through an open auction, and the resulting
revenues can be returned to households (e.g., through a tax reduction
or as a rebate back to households). Recent analyses suggest that an
auction is the most economically efficient way to distribute permits,
meeting emissions caps at lower cost than allocations based on
grandfather allowances or equal per kWh allowances (Burtraw, et al.
2001). Implementing such auctions for the electric sector will also
clear the way for an economy-wide approach in future years based on
auctioning. In this study, the price of auctioned carbon permits
reaches $100 per metric ton carbon.
While not specifically targeted by the trading programs, the
operators of the 850 old ``grandfathered'' coal plants built before the
Clean Air Act of 1970, which emit 3-5 times as much pollution per unit
of power generated than newer coal power plants, will likely retire
these plants rather than face the cost of purchase the large amount of
credits necessary to keep them running. When the Clean Air Act was
adopted, it was expected that these dirty power plants would eventually
be retired. However, utilities are continuing to operate these plants
beyond their design life, and have in fact increased their output over
the last decade. By subjecting these old plants to the same
requirements as newer facilities, as has been done or is being
considered in several States including Massachusetts and Texas,
operators would be obliged to modernize the old plants or to retire
them in favor of cleaner electric generation alternatives.
With a cap and trade system in place for CO<INF>2</INF>, SOx and
NOx, this scenario reduces multiple emissions from power plants, in a
manner similar to that adopted in the Four Pollutant Bill currently
before the House (H.R., 1256) and the Senate (S. 556). The reductions
in these three pollutants are as deep as those imposed in the Four
Pollutant bills, and are achieved within a comparable timeframe. (The
Department of Energy's NEMS model unfortunately does not explicitly
track mercury, making it impossible to compare the results of this
study to the mercury requirement in the Four Pollutant Bill. \8\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\On December 15, 2000, the EPA announced that mercury emissions
need to be reduced, and that regulations will be issued by 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.3. Policies in the Transport Sector
Another goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to reduce
carbon emissions from the transport sector, which is responsible for
about one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set
of policies in the transportation sector that include improved
efficiency (light duty vehicles, heavy duty trucks and aircraft), a
full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, measures to reduce road
travel, and high speed rail.
Strengthened CAFE Standards
Today's cars are governed by fuel economy standards that were set
in the mid-1970's. The efficiency gains made in meeting those standards
have been entirely wiped out by increases in population and driving, as
well as the trend toward gas-guzzling SUVs. When the fuel economy
standards were implemented, light duty trucks only accounted for about
20 percent of vehicle sales. Light trucks now account for nearly 50
percent of new vehicle sales; this has brought down the overall fuel
economy of the light duty vehicle fleet, which now stands at its lowest
average fuel economy since 1981. If the fuel economy of new vehicles
had held at 1981 levels rather than tipping downward, American vehicle
owners would be importing half a million fewer barrels of oil each day.
We introduce in this study a strengthened Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standard for cars and light trucks, along with complementary
market incentive programs. Specifically, fuel economy standards for new
cars and light trucks rise from EIA's projected 25.2 mpg for 2001 to
36.5 mpg in 2010, continuing to 50.5 mpg by 2020. This increase in
vehicle fuel economy would save by 2020 approximately twice as much oil
as could be pumped from Arctic National Wildlife Refuge oil field over
its entire 50-year lifespan (USGS, 2001). \9\ Based on assessments of
near-term technologies for conventional vehicles, and advanced vehicle
technologies for the longer-term, we estimate that the 2010 CAFE target
can be met with an incremental vehicle cost of approximately $855, and
the 2020 CAFE target with an incremental cost of $1,900. To put these
incremental costs in perspective, they are two to three times less than
the fuel savings at the gasoline pump over the vehicle's lifetime. \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\Assuming a mean value at a market price of oil of $20/barrel.
\10\Assuming a retail price of gasoline of $1.50/gallon, a 10-year
life of the vehicle, and 12,000 miles per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improving Efficiency of Freight Transport
We also consider policies to improve fuel economy for heavy duty
truck freight transport, which accounts for approximately 16 percent of
all transport energy consumption. A variety of improvements such as
advanced diesel engines, drag reduction, rolling resistance, load
reduction strategies, and low friction drivetrains offer opportunities
to increase the fuel economy of freight trucks. Many of these
technologies are available today while other technologies like advanced
diesel and turbine engines have been technically demonstrated but are
not yet commercially available.
To accelerate the improvement in heavy duty truck efficiency, we
have considered measures that expand R&D for heavy duty diesel
technology, vehicle labeling and promotion, financial incentives to
stimulate the introduction of new technologies, efficiency standards
for medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and fuel taxes and user-fees
calibrated to eliminate the existing subsidies for freight trucking.
Together, it is estimated that these policies could bring about a fuel
economy improvement of 6 percent by 2010, and 23 percent by 2020,
relative to today's trucks.
Improving Efficiency of Air Travel
Air travel is the quickest growing mode of travel, and far more
energy intensive than vehicle travel. One passenger mile of air travel
today requires about 1.7 times as much fuel as vehicle travel. \11\ We
consider here policies for improving the efficiency of air travel,
including R&D in efficient aircraft technologies, fuel consumption
standards, and a revamping of policies that subsidize air travel
through public investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Assuming typical load factors of 0.33 for autos and 0.6 for
air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We assume that air travel efficiency improves by 23 percent by
2010, and 53 percent by 2020. This is in contrast to the Base Case
where efficiency increases by 9 percent by 2010 and 15 percent by 2020,
owing to a combination of aircraft efficiency improvements (advanced
engine types, lightweight composite materials, and advanced
aerodynamics), increased load factor, and acceleration of air traffic
management improvements (Lee et el, 2001; OTA, 1994; Interlaboratory
Working Group, 2000). While we assume that air travel can reach 82
seat-miles per gallon by 2020 from its current 51, it is
technologically possible that far greater efficiencies approaching 150
seatmiles/gal could be achieved, if not in that time period then over
the longer term. (Alliance to Save Energy et al, 1991).
Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
Transportation in the United States relies overwhelmingly on
petroleum-based fuels, making it a major source of GHG emissions. We
introduce here a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, similar
in concept to the RPS for the electric sector. The standard is a cap on
the average GHG emissions from gasoline, and would be made
progressively more stringent over time. Fuel suppliers would have the
flexibility to meet the standard on their own or by buying tradable
credits from other producers of renewable or low-GHG fuel.
The policy adopted in this study requires a 3 percent reduction in
the average national GHG emission factor of fuels used in light duty
vehicles in 2010, increasing to a 7 percent reduction by 2020. The
policy would be complemented by expanded R&D, market creation programs,
and financial incentives. Such a program would stimulate the production
of low-GHG fuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biomass-or solar-based
hydrogen.
For this modeling study, we assume that most of the low-GHG fuel is
provided as cellulosic ethanol, which can be produced from agricultural
residues, forest and mill wastes, urban wood wastes, and short rotation
woody crops (Walsh et al 1998; Walsh, 1999). As cellulosic ethanol can
be co-produced along with electricity, in this study we assume that
electricity output reaches 10 percent of ethanol output by 2010 and 40
percent by 2020 (Lynd, 1997). Due to the accelerated development of the
production technology for cellulosic ethanol, we estimate that the
price falls to $1.4 per gallon of gasoline equivalent by 2010 and
remains at that price thereafter (Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000).
Improving Alternative Modes to reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled
The amount of travel in cars and light duty trucks continues to
grow due to increasing population and low vehicle occupancy. Between
1999 and 2020, the rate of growth in vehicle miles traveled is
projected to increase in the Base Case by about 2 percent per year. The
overall efficiency of the passenger transportation system can be
significantly improved through measures that contain the growth in
vehicle miles traveled through land-use and infrastructure investments
and pricing reforms to remove implicit subsidies for cars, which are
very energy intensive.
We assume that these measures will primarily affect urban passenger
transportation and result in a shift to higher occupancy vehicles,
including carpooling, vanpooling, public transportation, and
telecommuting. We consider that the level of reductions of vehicle
miles traveled that can be achieved by these measures relative to the
Base Case are 8 percent by 2010 and 11 percent by 2020.
High Speed Rail
High speed rail offers an attractive alternative to intercity
vehicle travel and short distance air travel. In both energy cost and
travel time, high speed rail may be competitive with air travel for
trips of roughly 600 miles or less, which account for about one-third
of domestic air passenger miles traveled. Investments in rail
facilities for key inter-city routes (such as the Northeast corridor
between Washington and Boston, the East cost of Florida between Miami
and Tampa, and the route linking Los Angeles and San Francisco) could
provide an acceptable alternative and reduce air travel in some of the
busiest flight corridors (USDOT, 1997).
High speed rail can achieve practical operating speeds of up to 200
mph. Prominent examples include the French TGV, the Japanese
Shinkansen, and the German Intercity Express. An emerging advanced
transport technology is the maglev system in which magnetic forces lift
and guide a vehicle over a specially designed guideway. Both Germany
and Japan are active developers of this technology.
In this analysis we have taken the DOT's recent estimates of the
potential high speed rail ridership which, based on projected mode
shifts from air and automobile travel in several major corridors of the
United States, reaches about 2 billion passenger miles by 2020 (DOT,
1997). While this level of HRS ridership provides relatively small
energy and carbon benefits by 2020, it can be viewed as the first phase
of a longer-term transition to far greater ridership and more advanced,
faster and efficient electric and MAGLEV systems in the ensuing
decades.
4. Methods and Assumptions
The modeling for this study was based primarily on the National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS) of the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration (DOE/EIA) (EIA, 2001). The NEMS model
version, data and assumptions employed in this study were those of
EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2001), which also formed the basis for
the Base Case. We refined the NEMS model with advice from EIA, based on
their ongoing model improvements, and drawing on expert advice from
colleagues at ACEEE and the Union of Concerned Scientists, the National
Laboratories and elsewhere. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\More detailed discussions of the approach taken for sectoral
policy analyses upon which this study was based can be found in Energy
Innovations (EI 1997), the Energy Policy, Special Issue on Climate
Strategy for the United States (1998), and Bernow et al. (1998 and
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NEMS model takes account of the interactions between
electricity supply and demand (aggregated residential, commercial and
industrial), taking account of the mix of competitive and still
regulated pricing in the United States. It accounts for the feedback
effects between electricity market and power plant construction
decisions, as well as the links between fuel demands, supplies and
prices.
Our use of NEMS for this project focused on the Electricity Market
Module (EMM), complemented by the Oil and Gas Supply Module (OGSM). The
EMM starts with the detailed fleet of existing power plants in the 13
electric sector regions of the U.S, and also represents power imports
from neighboring Canadian regions. It makes dispatch, construction,
interregional purchase and retirement decisions based upon the regional
electricity demands and the cost and performance characteristics of
existing and new electric supply options, adhering to national
pollutant caps and any State-level RPS requirements. It also takes
account of cost reductions of new power plants with increased units in
operation (learning and scale economies). The OGSM tracks changes in
prices of natural gas and petroleum fuels based on changes in their
demand.
Analyses of the costs and demand impacts of policies to promote
energy efficiency and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and
industrial sectors were taken primarily from American Council for an
Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE, 1999; ACEEE, 2001). The electric
generation, fuel, emissions and monetary savings from these policies
were obtained using NEMS, to take account of all of the interactive and
feedback effects described above. NEMS was used also to obtain the
interactive effects of the policies affecting electricity demand and
those, such as renewable, carbon and emission standards, which affect
the electricity supply mix.
For example, we used information from ACEEE to lower the fuel and
electricity demand within NEMS based on policies in the demand sectors.
We ran NEMS to determine the new mix of electricity generation (based
on changes in both electricity demand and the electricity sector
policies). This resulted in decreased demand for oil and gas, leading
to lower prices. NEMS iterates internally between energy supply and
demand to seek a consistent solution.
Analyses of the policy impacts in the transportation sector took
account of vehicle stock turnover, fuel-efficiencies and travel
indices, and were benchmarked to the structure, data and baseline
projections of the AEO<INF>2</INF>001. Following assumptions for light
duty vehicle efficiency in ACEEE (2001) and other sources (DeCicco,
Ross and An, 2001), we accounted for both autonomous and policy-induced
vehicle efficiency improvement, shifts between transport modes, and
changes in demand for transport services.
5. Results
Carbon dioxide emissions in the United States have been rising over
the past decade, and now exceed by more than 15 percent the 1990
emission rate of 1338 MtC/yr (EIA, 2001b). The U.S. Department of
Energy (EIA, 2001a) business-as-usual scenario projects that these
emissions will to continue to rise to 1808 MtC/yr in 2010--a 35 percent
increase above 1990 levels. This is in stark contrast to the emissions
limit that the United States negotiated at Kyoto--a 7 percent decrease
below 1990 levels.
5.1. Overview of Results
Table 5.1 provides summary results on overall energy and carbon
impacts, pollutant emissions impacts, and economic impacts for the Base
and Climate Protection cases for 2010 and 2020. The portfolio of
carbon-reducing policies and measures composed for this Climate
Protection scenario brings the United States a long way toward meeting
its Kyoto target, reducing carbon emissions from today's level to 1372
MtC/yr by 2010--but still 2.5 percent above 1990 levels. Reductions
continue beyond 2010, and national emissions are reduced to 1087 MtC/yr
in 2020, well below 1990 levels.
Table 5.1 Summary of results.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2020
1990\13\ 2010 Base Climate 2020 Base Climate
Case Protection Case Protection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
End-use Energy (Quads)......................... 63.9 86.0 76.4 97.2 72.6
Primary Energy (Quads)......................... 84.6 114.1 101.2 127.0 89.4
Renewable Energy (Quads)
Non-Hydro.................................. 3.5 5.0 10.4 5.5 11.0
Hydro...................................... 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Net GHG Emissions (MtCe/yr).................... 1,648 2,204 1,533 -- ----
Energy Carbon.............................. 1,338 1,808 1,372 2,042 1,087
Land-based Carbon.......................... -- -- -58 -- ----
Non-CO<INF>2</INF> Gases.............................. 310 397 279 -- ----
International Trade........................ -- -- -60 -- ----
Net Savings\14\................................
Cumulative present value (billion $) -- -- $105 -- $576
Levelized annual (billion $/year).......... -- -- $13 -- $49
Levelized annual per household ($/year).... -- -- $113 -- $375
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Under Kyoto, the base year for three of the non-CO<INF>2</INF> GHGs (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) is 1995, not 1990, and the 1995
levels for these emissions are reported here.
\14\ Savings are in 1999 $. The 2010 savings include $2.3 billion costs per year ($9 billion cumulative through
2010) of non-energy related measures needed to meet the Kyoto target. Costs are not included in 2020 since
these measures policies do not extend past 2010.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Overall, the national policies and measures were estimated to
achieve an 11 percent reduction in primary energy use by 2010, and a
nearly 30 percent reduction by 2020, while maintaining the same level
of energy services to consumers. The use of renewable energy is doubled
in 2010 relative to the Base case and remains roughly at that level
through 2020.\15\ The policies would also produce reductions in air
pollutant emissions owing to reduced fossil fuel consumption and
greater use of renewable energy. This is most evident for
SO<INF>2</INF> for which 2010 levels in the Climate Protection case are
almost half of Base case levels, due in great part to the effect of the
more stringent cap in the electric sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\This takes account of the percentage levels required by the
Jeffords Bill for the electric sector (10 percent renewables by 2010,
and 20 percent by 2020). However, when this RPS is combined with the
strong energy efficiency policies of this study, the absolute amount of
renewables in the electric sector does not increase substantially
between 2010 and 2020 because the percentage targets have already been
met. A more aggressive renewables policy for the 2010-2020 period could
be considered (ACEEE, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The analysis showed that national savings in energy bills would
exceed the net incremental investments in more efficient technologies
and expenditures for low carbon fuels. By 2010, the average savings
exceed the additional costs of new equipment by $13 billion per year,
or nearly $113 per household.
5.2. Sectoral Impacts
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b compare the carbon trajectories for the Base
and Climate Protection scenarios, and shows the carbon reductions
obtained by the policies to reduce energy-related carbon emissions.
Carbon emissions reductions can be reported by where they are emitted
(i.e., by source, 5.1a) or by the sectors to which the policies are
directed (i.e., by policy, 5.1b).
Thus, for example: the refinery emissions reductions owing to
decreased transportation oil use are attributed to the transport
policies, while the refinery emissions reductions owing to decreased
industrial oil use are attributed to the industrial policies; the
electric generation emissions reductions and emissions increased onsite
fuel use, owing to increased CHP are attributed to the industrial
policies.
The first graph, Figure 5.1a, shows the emissions reductions in the
sectors of their origin, that is, in which the combustion of fossil
fuels occurs. Thus, it shows emissions from onsite fossil fuel
combustion in buildings, industry, transportation and electricity
production. The largest reductions arise in the electric sector, owing
to the enduse energy efficiency policies that reduce demand, plus the
emissions and renewables policies for power supply that change the
generation mix for electricity generation. Figure 5.1b shows the
reductions from the various sectoral policies.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Table 5.2 summarizes the cost of saved carbon for each policy for
2010 and 2020. These costs were computed by summing the incremental
annualized capital costs, administrative costs, incremental O&M and
fuel costs, and subtracting O&M and fuel cost savings. A 5-percent
discount rate was used for both costs and carbon emissions. \16\
Overall, the cost of saved carbon for the Climate Protection policy
package results in net savings of $115/tC in 2010, and $576/tC in 2010.
The net savings for the demand policies more than offset the
incremental costs of saved carbon for the electric supply policies.
Details regarding the impact of the policies within the sectors are
summarized in the following sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Carbon emissions are discounted based on the presumption that
they will have a commodity value within some form of tradable permits
regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building and Industrial Sectors
The efficiency improvements in residential and commercial
buildings, induced through enhanced building codes, strengthened
standards for appliances and equipment, tax incentives, as well as
policies to encourage CHP, leads to a decrease in net electricity usage
of 19 percent by 2010 and nearly 50 percent by 2020. Despite the
additional natural gas required to fuel CHP in buildings, onsite fuel
use declines by 3 percent in 2010 and 10 percent in 2020, relative to
the Base case. The net impact is a decline in carbon emissions by
nearly one-third in 2010, and two-thirds by 2020, relative to the Base
case.
Industrial energy efficiency measures undertaken largely through
voluntary measures and tax incentives, cause the industrial sector to
reduce it's direct energy consumption by 9 percent in 2010 and 14
percent in 2020 in the Climate Protection case relative to the Base
case. In addition, largely because of the aggressive introduction of
cogeneration, net electricity consumption is lower dramatically, by 30
percent in 2010 and 70 percent in 2020. The combined impact of these is
that carbon emissions due to the industrial sector are lower by 26
percent in 2010 and 46 percent in 2020, relative to the Base case.
Table 5.2. Carbon reductions, net costs, and cost per saved carbon in 2010 and 2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2020
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Cumulative
Net Cost Cost of Net Cost Cost of
Carbon (present saved Carbon (present saved
Savings MtC/ value) carbon Savings MtC/ value) carbon
yr billion (1999)$ yr billion (1999)$
(1999)$ per tC (1999)$ per tC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buildings & Industry Sectors
Appliance standards................... 29 -$24 -$315 45 -$84 -$256
Building Codes........................ 7 -$5 -$353 13 -$23 -$244
Voluntary measures.................... 61 -$50 -$229 78 -$112 -$179
Research and design................... 21 -$18 -$257 37 -$53 -$186
Public Benefits Fund.................. 50 -$29 -$224 73 -$101 -$187
Tax Credits........................... 4 -$4 -$292 7 -$8 -$152
CHP and DES........................... 21 -$53 -$611 33 -$151 -$554,
Subtotal.......................... 193 -$183 -$301 285 -$533 -$121
Electric Sector
RPS
NOx/SO<INF>2</INF> Cap and Trade
Carbon trading see below .......... ........ see below
Subtotal.......................... 147 $140 $258 180 $258 $188
Transport Sector
Travel Reductions..................... 29 -$50 -$496 37 -$126 -$495
LDV efficiency improvements........... 38 -$19 -$270 136 -$149 -$296
HDV efficiency improvements........... 8 -$3 -$179 33 -$22 -$214
Aircraft efficiency improvements...... 10 -$3 -$106 28 -$14 -$129
Greenhouse Gas Standards.............. 11 $4 $136 22 $11 $99,
Subtotal.......................... 95 -$71 -$283 255 -$301 -$279,
TOTAL............................. 436 -$114 -$82 721 -$576 -$124
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Across both sectors, the policies result in combined fuel and
electricity savings of 9.6 quads in 2010 and 24.6 quads by 2020. The
cumulative investment in efficiency measures to achieve these savings
is $80 billion by 2010 and $365 billion by 2020 (discounted 1999$).
Electric Sector
The policies in the buildings and industrial sectors lead to major
reductions in the total amount of electricity required from the
nation's power stations. This impact is illustrated in Figure 5.2a and
shows that energy efficiency measures entirely displace growth in
electricity demand after 2005. Relative to today's level, electricity
demand declines 15 percent by 2010 and 35 percent by 2020.
In addition to this reduced demand for electricity, the mix of
fuels used to generate electricity changes dramatically, as shown in
Figure 5.2b. The electric sector policies shift the generation mix away
from a heavy reliance on coal, and avoid the rapid buildup of natural
gas generation, by relying much more on renewable energy and,
especially, cogeneration. Cogeneration grows from roughly 300 TWh today
to 660 TWh in 2010, and 1260 in 2020, whereas in the Base case
cogeneration increases modestly to 380 TWh in 2010 and 440 TWh in 2020.
Non-hydro renewable energy consumption increases almost five times by
2010 over the Base case, and remains roughly at this level through
2020.
While effective at reducing carbon emissions, the electric sector
policies do so at a net economic cost, increasing the average unit cost
of electricity by about 2 cents / kWh in 2010. This effect diminishes
over time as the electric sector is able to respond to the new policies
and electricity demand reductions lead to fewer new power plants; by
2020, the electricity price is only about 1 cent / kWh higher than the
base case. This price increase primarily reflects the fact that
continued operation of existing coal plants, and construction and
operation of new ones, remain economically attractive in the emerging
price competitive restructured industry. In part, this is because the
use of coal for electricity generation doesn't include environmental
externalities.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
By 2010, a total of 4.3 quads of fossil fuel reductions are
achieved at power stations, and 6.5 quads by 2020. The cumulative
investment to achieve these savings and greater utilization of
renewable energy is $166 billion by 2010 and $333 billion by 2020
(discounted 1999$). Although the costs per unit of electricity
increase, measures for demand-side efficiency lead to an overall
decrease in endusers' electricity bills, and in the overall costs of
electricity services.
Transportation
The vehicle efficiency and transportation demand management
initiatives in the Climate Protection case result in energy savings of
4.6 quads in 2010, and 12.6 quads by 2020 (12 percent in 2010 and 28
percent in 2020, respectively, relative to the Base case). Carbon
emissions fall slightly more relative to the base case (13 percent in
2010 and 31 percent in 2020) due to the small shift to less carbon-
intensive fuels (specifically, cellulosic ethanol). By 2010, ethanol is
contributing about 2 percent of transport fuel demand, and 4 percent in
2020. As in other biomass-intensive industries, this enables the co-
production of electricity, thereby increasing the carbon benefits of
this measure to the extent that it displaces fossil-fuel derived
electricity. Reduced fuel production also adds to the carbon benefits,
because it reduces emissions from refineries.
The cumulative investment to achieve these savings and greater
utilization of renewable energy is $52 billion by 2010 and $213 billion
by 2020 (discounted 1999$). The transport efficiency measures result in
net savings, because fuel cost savings offset the slight increase in
investment costs. These net savings more than offset the cost of the
transportation fuel carbon content standard--which is the only net-cost
transportation policy considered here. The overall net economic benefit
achieved by the entire set of transportation policies provides an
opportunity to pursue the carbon content standard, which begins a
process of progressive technological improvement that is a critical
element of obtaining the much deeper carbon emissions reductions in the
transport sector needed later.
5.3. Air Pollution Reductions
A variety of air pollutants, associated with the use of fossil
fuels, can cause or exacerbate health problems and damage the
environment. Reducing use of fossil fuels would reap important local
health benefits by lowering the amount of air pollutants inhaled.
Recent scientific findings confirm that pollutants such as fine
particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone (formed by a mix of volatile
organic compounds and nitrogen oxides in presence of sunlight) can lead
to health damages, including premature death. Research shows that small
children and the elderly are particularly at risk from these emissions
(Dockery et al., 1993; Schwartz and Dockery, 1992).
The policies would reduce national, regional and local pollution,
owing to reduced fossil fuel use, providing important environmental
benefits and health benefits, especially for small children and the
elderly. Table 5.3 summarizes the impacts of the policies on criteria
air pollutant emissions. Sulfur-dioxide emissions are about 52 percent
lower in 2010 than the Base case, and about 68 percent below 1990
levels. Nitrogen oxides are 16 percent lower in 2010, and about 37
percent below 1990 levels. Particulates are about 13 percent lower in
2010, and about 24 percent below 1990 levels. Carbon monoxide emissions
are about 9 percent lower in 2010, and about 2 percent below 1990
levels. Finally, volatile organic compounds are about 7 percent lower
in 2010, and about 33 percent below 1990 levels.
Table 5.3: Impact of policies on air pollutant emissions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2020
2010 Base Climate 2020 Base Climate
Case Protection Case Protection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO............................................. 65.1 69.8 63.8 71.8 59.8
NOx............................................ 21.9 16.5 13.9 16.9 12.0
SO<INF>2</INF>............................................ 19.3 12.8 6.2 12.7 3.3
VOC............................................ 7.7 5.5 5.1 5.9 4.9
PM<INF>10</INF>........................................... 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 5.3 shows the impacts of the Climate Protection policies
over time. The large reductions in particulates emissions arise from
the substantial decrease in coal generation in the policy cases.
Sulfur-dioxide decreases in the baseline projections arising from the
cap/trade provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, are
augmented by the policies. Similarly, baseline declines in nitrogen
oxides, volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide, which arise
from tailpipe emissions standards as new cars enter the fleet, are
augmented by the policies that affect vehicle travel patterns.
The reductions in nitrogen, sulfur, and carbon are similar to those
introduced in the Four Pollutant Bill currently before the House and
the Senate. The Climate Protection scenario achieves the required
levels of reduction a few years earlier (for carbon) or later (for
nitrogen and sulfur) than the Four Pollutant Bill's 2007 target date,
with substantially deeper reductions continuing thereafter.
5.4. Economic Impacts
The portfolio of policies and measures considered here is a very
aggressive package that goes a long way toward meeting the U.S. Kyoto
Protocol obligation and continues to reduce emissions beyond the
initial target period. Despite the ambitiousness of this package and
the impressive carbon impacts, it would bring net economic benefits to
the United States.
Figure 5.4 shows the benefits and costs at similar levels up to
2010 but benefits significantly outpacing costs in later years,
reflecting in part the longer term benefits of reduced costs as new
technologies are commercialized and as the system adjusts to the new
policies. The costs derive from additional investments in more
efficient lighting, high efficiency motors, more efficient automobiles,
and other technologies that reduce the reliance on high carbon fuels.
The savings derive from the avoided fuel costs. Both the additional
investment and the net savings create additional income and jobs in the
industries and services (and their suppliers) in which these funds are
spent.
Figures 5.5 (demand side policies) and 5.6 (supply side policies)
provide additional details regarding the costs effectiveness of the
policies in 2010 and 2020. These figure indicate the allocation of
costs and benefits between equipment investments and fuel savings and
between demand and supply sectors. The policies in the demand sector,
where large savings exist for energy efficiency measures, are very
cost-effective, and yield substantial net benefits. Fuel and O&M
savings are over 3 times the investment costs the in 2010 and about two
and half times in 2020, yielding cumulative discounted net benefits of
$259 billion and $844 billion, respectively, in those years.
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On the other hand, the supply sector policies are not cost-
effective on their own and result in net costs. These costs, in
capital, fuel, and O&M, are due to moving from coal generation to
cleaner fuels like renewables and natural gas. The result is that
cumulative discounted net costs for electric sector policies reach of
$144 billion in 2010 and $268 billion in 2020.
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When all policies are combined, the cumulative savings exceed the
costs by $114 billion in 2010, and by 2020 the net benefits amount to
approximately $576 billion. While the savings estimated here are
significant, they are relatively small in comparison to overall
economic activity. For instance, the annual net savings in 2010 of $48
billion is a small fraction of the $13.2 trillion projected GDP in that
year.
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6. Achieving Kyoto
The foregoing analysis addressed policies to curb emissions of
carbon dioxide from energy use in the U.S. Energy-related
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions are the predominant source of U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions for the foreseeable future, and their reduction is the
central and ultimate challenge for protecting the climate. However,
because of its delayed and weak emissions mitigation policies
heretofore, and delayed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the United
States may not be able to rely solely on energy sector policies and
technologies to meet its Kyoto obligation of emissions 7 percent
reduction below 1990 levels with no net economic cost. As our analysis
has shown, such efforts, if aggressively pursued, would slow our growth
in energy sector CO<INF>2</INF> emissions from a projected 35 percent
to 2.5 percent above 1990 levels by 2010 and still achieve a small net
economic benefit. This would be a major accomplishment, but would still
leave us 128 MtC/yr short of achieving a target of 1244 MtC/yr by 2010,
if the Kyoto target were confined only to the domestic energy sector. A
tighter carbon cap for the electric sector could increase domestic
energy-related emission reductions to meet the Kyoto requirement, but
this would incur incremental costs that could eliminate the net benefit
and lead to a modest overall net cost.
Of course, there is more to the Kyoto agreement. The Kyoto targets
cover six gases--methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) and carbon
dioxide (CO<INF>2</INF>) . The use of these gases is currently growing,
due to the ongoing substitution of ozone depleting substances (ODS)
with HFCs, and to a lesser extent, to growth in CH4 emissions from
livestock and coal and natural gas systems, in N20 from fertilizer use,
and in PFC emissions from semiconductor manufacture (EPA, 2000).
The U.S. commitment requires emissions of all six gases, in
aggregate, to be reduced to 7 percent below their baseline levels. \17\
When all of the six ``Kyoto gases'' are considered, baseyear emissions
amount to 1680 MtCe/yr, making the--7 percent Kyoto reduction target
equal to 1533 MtCe/yr, as shown in the third column of Figure 6.1. The
projected 2010 emissions for all six gases is 2204 MtCe/yr (first
column), thus the total required reduction is expected to be 672 MtCe/
yr. The energy-CO<INF>2</INF> policies described in the previous
sections yield 436 MtCe/yr in reductions by 2010 (second column),
leaving the United States with 236 MtCe/yr additional reductions to
achieve from other policies and measures.
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\17\These gases can be controlled interchangeably, using 100 year
Global Warming Potentials (GWP), so long as the total carbon-
equivalents (Ce) are reduced to 93 percent of their baseline levels. In
contrast to the main three gases (CO<INF>2</INF>, CH4, and N2O), which
have a 1990 base year, the high GWP gases have a base year of 1995.
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The Kyoto agreement provides us with several options for obtaining
the additional 236 MtCe/yr of reductions. Two of these options involve
domestic reductions: the control of non-CO<INF>2</INF> gases (``multi-
gas control'') and the use of ``sinks'' or biotic sequestration,
through the land use, land use change and forestry options allowed
under the Protocol. The other options involve obtaining credits and
allowances from international sources. Under the Kyoto Protocol,
countries can purchase credits and allowances through the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation, or Emissions Trading
(ET) to offset domestic emissions exceeding our 7 percent reduction
target. This section examines how we might meet the Kyoto target
through the use of these options, and what the costs and other
implications might be.
6.1. Domestic options Article 3.3/3.4 and Sinks
GHG emissions and removals from land use and land use change and
forestry (LULUCF) are a subject of great controversy and scientific
uncertainty. The Kyoto Protocol treats LULUCF activities in two
principal categories: afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation
under Article 3.3, and ``additional human-induced activities'' such as
forest and cropland management under Article 3.4. Different
interpretations of these two articles can have widely varying impacts
on the U.S. reduction commitment. \18\ For instance, the U.S. estimate
of business-as-usual forest uptake during the first commitment period
is 288 MtCe/yr. If fully credited as an Article 3.4 activity, this
uptake could provide credit equal to more than 40 percent of the U.S.
reduction requirement, with no actual mitigation effort. However, the
vast majority of countries do not interpret the Protocol as allowing
credit for business-as-usual offsets, and therefore believe they should
be excluded.
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\18\For instance, different accounting methods and rules have been
considered regarding: a) what constitutes a forest; b) which biotic
pools and lands are counted; c) which activities are considered
eligible for crediting under Article 3.4; and d) uncertainties in
measuring above and below ground carbon stocks.
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The starting point of our LULUCF analysis is the assumed adoption
of the ``consolidated negotiating text'' of Jan Pronk, President [of
COP6], as issued on June 18, 2001. \19\ The so-called ``Pronk text''
reflects an attempted compromise among various parties on a number of
contentious issues. The most relevant here is the proposal for Articles
3.3 and 3.4. \20\ In short, the Pronk text would cap total U.S.
crediting from Article 3.4 activities and afforestation and
reforestation projects in the CDM and JI at roughly 58 MtCe/yr. \21\
Domestic forest management activities would be subject to an 85 percent
discount. Thus, if one assumes the U.S. estimate above, the Pronk rules
would result in 42 MtCe/yr of essentially zero-cost credit for forest
management activities that are expected to occur anyway. \22\ In
addition, agricultural management (e.g. no-till agriculture, grazing
land management, revegetation) would be allowed under a net-net
accounting approach that would allow the United States to count another
expected 10 MtCe/yr of business-as-usual, i.e. zero-cost, credit toward
the cap. In sum, the Pronk proposal translates to 52 MtCe/yr of
``free'' carbon removals, and another 6 MtCe/yr that could be accrued
through new domestic forest or agricultural management activities. \23\
Based on a recent summary of LULUCF cost estimates, we assume that this
relatively small amount of offsets could be purchased for $10/tCe. \24\
A total of 58 MtCe/yr of LULUCF credit would therefore be available to
help meet the reduction requirement of 236 MtCe/yr remaining after
having adopted the energy-related CO<INF>2</INF> policies described
above.
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\19\See ``Consolidated negotiating text proposed by the
President'', as revised June 18, 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/2/Rev.1, http://
www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/02r01.pdf
\20\Our assumption of Pronk conditions is a matter of ``what if''
analysis, rather than a tacit approval. The Pronk text may be
insufficient in a number of ways, but the analysis and critique of the
Pronk text is not the focus of this report.
\21\The Pronk text would prohibit first commitment period
crediting of CDM projects that avoid deforestation.
\22\This figure is drawn from the Annex Table 1 of the April 9
draft of the Pronk text, which adopts Pronk adopts the accounting
approach for Article 3.3. activities suggested by the IPCC Special
Report of LULUCF. This approach yields an Article 3.3 debit of 7 MtCe/
yr from net afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation activity,
which under the Pronk approach could be offset fully by undiscounted
forest management activities. Thus the 42 MtCe/yr estimate is based on
85 percent x (288--7) MtCe/yr.
\23\The Pronk proposal also allows this cap to be filled through
afforestation and deforestation activities in the CDM.
\24\Missfeldt and Haites (2001) use a central estimate of 50 MtCe/
year at $7.50/tCe for CDM afforestation and reforestation projects.
They also assume the availability of 150 MtCe/year at $15/tCe for
Article 3.4 sinks in Annex B countries. Note however that the Pronk 85
percent discount on forest management projects would, in principle,
increase their cost accordingly (by 1/.15 or 6.7 times). However, given
the relatively small quantity (6 MtCe) that could be purchased, lower
cost opportunities in cropland management or the CDM should more than
suffice.
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Multi-gas control
Multi-gas control is a fundamental aspect of the Protocol, and its
potential for lowering the overall cost of achieving Kyoto targets has
been the subject of several prominent studies (Reilly et al, 1999 and
2000). Table 6.1 shows baseline and projected emission levels for the
non-CO<INF>2</INF> gases. \25\
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\25\USEPA (1999, 2000) expects voluntary Climate Change Action
Plan (CCAP) activities to reduce 2010 methane and high GWP gas
emissions by about 10 percent and 15 percent, respectively, reductions
that are not included in their 2010 projections shown in Table 1.
Instead these reductions are embodied in both their and our cost
curves.
Table 6.1. Baseline and Projected Emissions for non-CO<INF>2</INF> Kyoto Gases (MtCe/yr)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7
Base percent
Gas Year Below Projected Reductions Sources
(1990/ Base 2010 Required \1\
95) Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methane.................................. 170 158 186 28 (EPA 1999)
Nitrous Oxide............................ 111 103 121 18 (Reilly et al 1999b; EPA
2001a)
High GWP Gases (HFC, PFC, SF6)........... 29 27 90 63 (EPA 2000)
Total................................ 310 288 397 109
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These are the reductions that would be needed if each gas were independently required to be 7 percent below
its base year level.
Methane emissions are expected to grow by only 10 percent from 1990
to 2010, largely because of increased natural gas leakage and venting
(due to increased consumption), enteric fermentation and anaerobic
decomposition of manure (due to increased livestock and dairy
production). Methane from landfills, which accounted for 37 percent of
total methane emissions in 1990, are expected to decline slightly as a
consequence of the Landfill Rule of the Clean Air Act (EPA, 1999),
which requires all large landfills to collect and burn landfill gases.
Several measures could reduce methane emissions well below
projected levels. USEPA estimates that capturing the methane from
landfills not covered by the Landfill Rule, and using it to generate
electricity, is economically attractive at enough sites to reduce
projected landfill emissions by 21 percent (USEPA, 1999). At a cost of
$30/tCe, the number of economically attractive sites increases
sufficiently that 41 percent of landfill emissions can be reduced.
Similarly, USEPA has constructed methane reduction cost curves for
reducing leaks and venting in natural gas systems, recovering methane
from underground mines, using anaerobic digesters to capture methane
from manure. and reducing enteric fermentation by changing how
livestock are fed and managed.
We have used a similar USEPA study to estimate the emissions
reductions available for the high GWP gases (USEPA, 2000). Table 1
shows that the high-GWP gases, while only a small fraction of baseline
emissions (first column), are expected to rise so rapidly that they
will account for majority of net growth in non-CO<INF>2</INF> emissions
relative to the 7 percent reduction target (last column). In many
applications, other gases can be substituted for HFCs and PFCs, new
industrial process can implemented, leaks can be reduced, and more
efficient gas-using equipment can be installed. For instance, minor
repairs of air conditioning and refrigeration equipment could save an
estimated 6.5 MtCe/yr in HFC emissions by 2010 at cost of about $2/tCe.
New cleaning processes for semiconductor manufacture could reduce PFC
emissions by 8.6 MtCe/yr by 2010 at an estimated cost of about $17/tCe.
In all, USEPA identified 37 measures for reducing high GWP gases, a
list which is likely to be far from exhaustive given the limited
experience with and data on abatement methods for these gases.
The major source of nitrous oxide in the United States is the
application of nitrogen fertilizers, which results in about 70 percent
of current emissions. Given the tendency of farmers to apply excess
fertilizer to ensure good yields, effective strategies for N2O
abatement from cropping practices has thus far been elusive. Thus,
aside from measures to reduce N2O from adipic and nitric acid
production (amounting to less than one MtCe/yr), and from mobile
sources as a result of transportation policies (see below), we have not
included a full analysis of N2O reduction opportunities (USEPA, 2001).
Relying largely on recent USEPA abatement studies (1999, 2000,
2001b), we developed the cost curve for reducing non-CO<INF>2</INF>
gases depicted in Figure 2 below. \26\ In addition to what is covered
in the USEPA studies, we assumed that:
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\26\The result is a cost curve that is similar and more up-to-date
than that used in widely cited multiple gas studies (Reilly et al,
1999a; Reilly et al, 1999b; EERE, 2000).
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<bullet> Only 75 percent of the 2010 technical potential found in
the USEPA studies would actually be achieved, and that policies and
programs needed to promote these measures would add a transaction cost
of $5/tCe.
<bullet> The savings in 2010 fossil fuel use resulting from the
policies and measures implemented in the energy sector will yield
corresponding benefits for several categories of non-CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions. In particular, we assumed that a) reduced oil use in the
transport sector (down 14 percent) will lead to a proportional decrease
in N2O emissions from mobile sources \27\; b) reduced natural gas
demand (down 13 percent) will result in proportionately fewer methane
emissions from leaks and venting; and c) reduced coal production (down
49 percent) will lead to decreased underground mining and its
associated emissions. \28\
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\27\A similar assumption is used by European Commission (1998).
Approximately 15 percent of N2O emissions are a byproduct of fuel
combustion, largely by vehicles equipped with catalytic converters
(USEPA, 2001a).
\28\We assume that coal production is a proportional to coal use
(i.e. we ignore net imports/exports). USEPA expects that the marginal
methane emissions rate will increase with production as an increasing
fraction is expected to come from deeper underground mines (USEPA,
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 6.2 shows that domestic options, taken together, are
insufficient to reaching the Kyoto target. The line on the left is the
``supply curve'' of non-CO<INF>2</INF> abatement options, and the line
on the right is the reduction requirement after both energy-related and
Article 3.3/3.4 sinks are accounted for. Under current conditions (only
9 years left until 2010), the supply of remaining domestic options
appears insufficient to satisfy demand. This gap ranges from 107 MtCe/
yr at $10/tCe to 60 MtCe/yr at $100/tCe as shown. Therefore, to meet
our Kyoto obligations, we are now in a situation of looking to the
international market to fill this gap.
6.2 International options
The Kyoto Protocol creates are two principal types of greenhouse
gas offsets in the international market: the purchase of surplus
allowances from countries that are below their Kyoto targets and the
creation of carbon credits through project-based mechanisms, CDM and
JI.
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Emissions allowance trading/hot air
The combination of emission targets based on circa 1990 emissions
and the subsequent restructuring and decline of many economies in
transition (EITs) means that these countries could have a large pool of
excess emissions allowances, typically referred to as ``hot air''.
Estimates of available hot air during the first commitment period range
from under 100 MtCe/yr to nearly 500 MtCe/yr, largely from Russia and
Ukraine. \29\ This source of offsets could fulfill a significant
fraction of the U.S. demand for additional reductions at very low cost
(depending upon the level of competing demands of other Annex 1 parties
for these allowances). \30\ We assume however, that relevant actors in
government and/or private sector charged with meeting emissions
obligations will effectively limit the use of hot air. Relying heavily
or entirely on hot air would be poor climate policy; as hot air
supplants legitimate mitigation activity. It is also bad public
relations; hot air has a stigma arising from years of negotiations
controversy. Therefore, we assume that hot air will constitute no more
than 50 percent of all international trading, and we assume a maximum
availability of 200 MtCe/yr, based on a recent analysis (Victor et al,
2001).
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\29\A range of 100-350 MtCe/yr is cited in Vrolijk and Grubb,
2000. Missfeldt and Haites, 2001 use a base estimate of approximately
240 MtCe/yr, with high estimate of 480 MtCe/yr. For this analysis, we
assume the availability of 200 MtCe/yr, based on a recent analysis by
Victor et al (2001).
\30\Since these credits are a form of windfall credits, it has
been suggested that these economies could help protect the
environmental integrity of the agreement by dedicating the income from
``hot air'' sales to energy projects that will bring about additional
emissions reductions.
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CDM and JI
CDM and JI projects, can be an important part of a comprehensive
climate policy, providing they truly contribute to sustainable
development in the host countries and create genuine, additional GHG
benefits. It is reasonable to expect that the U.S. Government and other
stakeholders will want to develop the CDM and JI market in order to
involve developing countries, engage in technology transfer, develop
competitive advantages, and prepare for future commitment periods.
With the rules yet to be established on critical issues like
additionality and baselines for CDM \31\,and with a limited
understanding of CDM/JI markets and transaction costs at high volumes
of activity, cost and volume estimates for CDM and JI remain highly
speculative. As with all GHG mitigation analysis exercises, both
bottom-up and top-down methods can be used to develop such estimates.
We have examined the data and literature for both approaches in coming
up with a rough, aggregate cost curve for CDM and JI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\CDM projects are required to be ``additional'' emissions
reductions but rules have not been agreed to which would determine what
is additional. In addition, credits will be given based on reductions
in comparison to a baseline. A methodology for establishing baselines
is also the subject of ongoing negotiations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A bottom-up CDM/JI cost assessments can examine emerging project-
based GHG trading markets--private broker transactions, the Prototype
Carbon Fund (PCF), the Dutch ERUPT program, GEF activity, and so on--to
get a sense of current ``real-world'' prices and transaction costs.
However, the size of this market remains very small in comparison with
the total flows that are likely once CDM and JI are underway. \32\ The
type of activities being undertaken today, such as the first PCF
project, a landfill gas capture effort in Latvia, could well represent
``lowhanging fruit'' that would be unable to supply the several
hundreds MtCe/yr of CDM and JI activity that are expected under some
Kyoto compliance scenarios (Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Grubb and
Vrolijk, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current
international GHG emission credit market is at about $25 million in
transactions per year. In addition the PCF and ERUPT have committed
another $225 million over the next few years. This figure compares with
the $10-20 billion/year market (about 400-500 MtCe/year at $20-40/tCe)
that some analysts project under CDM alone (Missfeldt and Haites,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To get a better sense of the costs of projects available at higher
volumes, these ``early project'' estimates can be combined with non-
Annex B ``country studies''--the many national GHG abatement studies
performed with support from UNEP, UNDP, U.S. Country Studies, and other
bilateral and national programs. A study by the Dutch Energy Foundation
(ECN, et al., 1999) provides a good example of such an analysis.
Extrapolating from GEF projects along with 25 country studies, this
study found that 440 MtCe/yr of non-Annex 1 reductions could be
available at less than $22/tCe.
However, the uncertainty related to these bottom-up studies is
fundamentally quite high. National studies typically exclude a
significant number of abatement options due to sheer lack of data,
resources, or necessity. At the same time, abatement costing studies
may understate transaction and barrier removal costs, especially those
specific to CDM and JI projects. For instance, transaction costs for
project preparation, baselines, certification, and monitoring and
evaluation could also change from current levels, once the CDM and JI
markets take off and clear rules are established. Finally, the ultimate
approach adopted for deciding on project additionality and baselines
could have a major impact on the size and shape of the market.
Similarly, the possibility of limited crediting lifetimes, or
discounting of carbon reductions in future projects years, as proposed
by some, could increase the effective cost per tCe. In a recent
analysis, Bernow et al. (2000) illustrated how different approaches to
standardizing baselines could lead to differences in additional power
sector activity (tCe) of a factor of 4. These types of considerations
are rarely included in CDM/JI analyses, either bottom-up or top-down.
Many climate policy assessments rely on CDM and JI cost curves
developed by a handful of ``top-down'' modelers. Ellerman and Decaux
(1998) applied the MIT-EPPA computable general equilibrium model to
develop parameterized cost curves for five non-Annex 1 regions, which
have since been widely used (Reilly et al, 1999; Haites, 2000; Krause
et al, 2001; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Grutter, 2001). Applications
of the ABARE-GTEM model have been used in a similar manner (Vrolijk and
Grubb, 2000; Grutter, 2001; EMF, 1999). While compared with bottom-up
studies, the EPPA and GTEM model runs provide more comprehensive
assessments of reduction potential and cost from an economy-wide
perspective, they do a poorer job of reflecting the dynamics of
project-based investments.
It turns out that the GTEM, EPPA, and bottom-up ECN studies, do
yield rather similar results. At $20/tCe, the total CDM potential under
the GTEM run is 470 MtCe/yr, while under EPPA it is 480 MtCe/yr, and as
noted above, and for ECN et al (1999), the figure is closer to 440
MtCe/yr. \33\ Given the small differences, we adopt the GTEM results,
since they provide a fuller CDM curve, include multiple gases, and
provide a cost curve for JI investments as well.
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\33\The EPPA and GTEM figures are drawn from the CERT model
described in Grutter, 2001. The EPPA scenario used here includes only
CO<INF>2</INF>, while the GTEM scenario includes all gases. All of
these studies exclude sinks, which is largely consistent with the
implications of the Pronk proposal.
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6.3 Combining the options
There are two ways to combine the available options to meet our
Kyoto target. We can prioritize which options to rely on more heavily,
based on their strategic advantages and co-benefits, as we have done
for energy/CO<INF>2</INF> policies. Or we can simply seek lowest-cost
solution for the near term. A long-term climate policy perspective
argues for the former approach. For example, rules and criteria for JI,
and especially CDM, should be designed so that additionality,
sustainability, and technology transfer are maximized. Ideally, our
cost curves for CDM and JI would reflect only investments that are
consistent with those criteria. However, our current ability to reflect
such criteria in quantitative estimates of CDM and JI potential is
limited. \34\
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\34\We did briefly examine the potential contribution of a CDM
fast track for renewables and efficiency, as embodied in the Pronk
text. Applying the power sector CDM model developed by Bernow et al
(2001), we found that a carbon price of $20/tCe would induce only 3
MtCe/yr of new renewable energy project activity by 2010. At a price of
$100/tCe, this amount rises to 18 MtCe/yr. Given that a large technical
potential for energy efficiency projects exists at low or negative cost
per tCe, fast track efficiency projects (under 5 MW useful energy
equivalents according to Pronk text) could significantly increase the
amount available at lower costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is possible to model priority investment in the domestic
reductions of non-CO<INF>2</INF> gases by implementing some measures
that are higher cost than the global market clearing carbon price. Just
as energy/CO<INF>2</INF> measures like a Renewable Portfolio Standard
can be justified by the technological progress, long-term cost
reductions, other co-benefits that they induce, so too can some non-
CO<INF>2</INF> measures. While we have not attempted to evaluate
specific policies for nonCO<INF>2</INF> gases as we have for
CO<INF>2</INF>, we have picked a point on the non-CO<INF>2</INF> cost
curve, $100/tCe, to reflect an emphasis on domestic action. At $100/
tCe, domestic non-CO<INF>2</INF> measures can deliver 118 MtCe/yr of
reductions, still about 60 MtCe/yr short of the Kyoto goal, to which we
must turn to the international market.
To model the global emissions trading market, we used the CDM/JI
cost curves, and hot air assumptions described above, together with
assumptions regarding the demand for credits and allowances from all
Annex B parties. \35\ This model yields market-clearing prices and
quantities for each of the three principal flexible mechanisms: CDM,
JI, and ET/hot air. \36\ The results are shown in Table 6.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\For the estimated demand for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air from
other Annex 1 parties, we used a combination of EPPA and GTEM cost
curves.35 (Reilly et al, 1999b, and Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Vrolijk
and Grubb, 2000; Grutter, 2001).
\36\Our approach is similar to that used in a few other recent
studies (Grutter, 2001; Haites, 2000; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001;
Krause et al, 2001; Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first row of the table shows that 93 MtCe/yr are available at
net savings or no net cost, over half from the non-additional or
``anyways'' forest management and other Article 3.4 sinks activities
implicit in the Pronk text. Another 77 MtCe/yr of non-CO<INF>2</INF>
gas savings are available as we climb the cost curve from $0-100/tC
(second row). The net result is that nearly $1.8 billion per year is
invested in technologies and practices to reduce non-CO<INF>2</INF> GHG
emissions by 118 MtCe/yr in 2010. Another $60 million per year is
directed toward the 6 MtCe/yr of expected additional sinks projects
allowed under the Pronk proposal. The third row shows that of the 60
MtCe/yr of international trading, half comes from CDM projects, and
much of the rest from hot air. The model we use estimates a market-
clearing price of about $8/tCe for this 60 MtC/yr of purchased credits
and allowance, amounting to a total annual cost of less than $500
million. \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\The market clearing price is lower here than in other similar
studies, due in large part to a much lower U.S. demand for
international trade, which results from of our aggressive pursuit of
domestic abatement options and the fact that we assume that domestic
policies and investments should be done as a matter of sound energy and
environmental policy (i.e. they are price-inelastic).
Table 6.2: Reductions available in 2010 up from various sources (in MtCe)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Domestic Options International Trade
--------------------------------------------------
Non-CO<INF>2</INF> Hot air Total
gases Sinks CDM JI (ET)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount available at < or = $0/tCe (MtCe)............ 41 52 ........ ........ ........ 93
Amount available at $0-$100 (MtCe).................. 77 6 ........ ........ ........ 83
Amount available at $8 (MtCe)....................... ........ ........ 30 6 25 60
Annual costs ($Million)............................. $1,783 $60 $235 $48 $196 $2,322
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, of the 672 MtCe/yr in total reductions needed to reach
Kyoto by 2010, nearly 65 percent comes from energy sector
CO<INF>2</INF> reduction policies, 18 percent from domestic non-
CO<INF>2</INF> gas abatement, 9 percent from domestic sinks, and 9
percent from the international market. The net economic benefits
deriving from the energy-related carbon reductions reach nearly $50
billion/yr in 2010. The total annual cost for the 35 percent of 2010
reductions coming those last three options--non-CO<INF>2</INF> control,
sinks, and international trading--is estimated at approximately $2.3
billion, making the total package a positive economic portfolio by a
large margin. Had we taken the other approach noted at the beginning of
the section--aiming for the lowest near-term compliance cost--we would
rely more heavily on international trading. We modeled this scenario,
and found that it would nearly double the amount of international
trading, and lower the overall annual cost to $0.9 billion, and reduce
the amount of non-CO<INF>2</INF> control by over 40 percent. This
additional benefit is minor in comparison to the economic and
environmental benefits of the entire policy portfolio.
7. Conclusions
This study shows that the United States can achieve its carbon
reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol--7 percent below 1990 levels
for the first budget period of the Protocol. Relying on national
policies and measures for greenhouse gas reductions, and accessing the
flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol for a small portion of its
total reductions, the United States would enjoy net economic savings as
a result of this Climate Protection package. In order to achieve these
reductions, policies should be implemented as soon as possible to
accelerate the shift away from carbon-intensive fossil fuels and toward
energy efficient equipment and renewable sources of energy. Such action
would lead to carbon emission reductions of about 24 percent by 2010
relative to the Base Case, bringing emissions to about 2.5 percent
above 1990 levels. Furthermore, emissions of other pollutants would
also be reduced, thus improving local air quality and public health.
Adopting these policies at the national level through legislation
will not only help America meet its Kyoto targets but will also lead to
economic savings for consumers, as households and businesses would
enjoy annual energy bill reductions in excess of their investments.
These net annual savings would increase over time, reaching nearly $113
per household in 2010 and $375 in 2020. The cumulative net savings
would be about $114 billion (present value 1999$) through 2010 and $576
through 2020.
Greenhouse emissions in the United States are now about 15 percent
higher than they were in 1990. Together with the looming proximity of
the first budget period, and a realistic start date no earlier than
2003 for the implementation of the national policies, reductions in
energy-related carbon would have to be augmented by other greenhouse
gas reduction options in order to reach the Kyoto target. In total, the
Climate Protection case in 2010 includes 436 Mtc/yr energy-related
carbon reductions, 58 MtC/yr domestic land-based carbon reductions, 118
MtC/yr reductions in domestic non-carbon greenhouse gases, and 60 MtC/
yr in allowances purchased through the ``flexibility mechanisms'' of
the Kyoto Protocol.
While implementing this set of policies and additional non-energy
related measures is an ambitious undertaking, it represents an
important transitional strategy to meet the long-term requirements of
climate protection. It builds the technological and institutional
foundation for much deeper long-term emission reductions needed for
climate protection. Such actions would stimulate innovation and
invention here in the United States while positioning the United States
as a responsible international leader in meeting the global challenge
of climate change.
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EPA, 2001. ``The Power of Partnerships, Climate Protection Partnerships
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(Final Report): A report produced for DGXI by AEA
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emissions.pdf
Grutter, J. 2001. World Market for GHG Emission Reductions: An analysis
of the World Market for GHG abatement, factors and trends
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World Bank's National AIJ/JI/CDM Strategy Studies Program,
March, 2001.
Harvey, R. and F. de la Chesnaye, 2000. ``The Potential for Cost-
Effective Reductions of NonCarbon Dioxide Greenhouse Gas
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Krause, F., Baer, P., DeCanio, S. 2001. Cutting Carbon Emissions at a
Profit: Opportunities for the U.S., International Project
For Sustainable Energy Paths, El Cerrito, California,
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Efficient Light Trucks, Cambridge, Mass.: Union of
Concerned Scientists.
Missfeldt, F., and E. Haites. forthcoming 2001, The Potential
Contribution of Sinks to Meeting Kyoto Protocol
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Strategy for Advancing Energy Efficiency.'' The Electricity
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Reilly, J., M. Mayer, and J. Harnisch. 2000. Multiple Gas Control Under
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Reilly, J. et al, 1999a. Multi-Gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol,
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MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global
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Schwartz, J. and Dockery, D., 1992. Increased Mortality in Philadelphia
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Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions, U.S.
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Radiation, September. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo.
USEPA, 2000. Estimates of U.S. Emissions of High-Global Warming
Potential Gases and the Costs of Reductions, Review Draft,
Reid Harvey, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office
of Air and Radiation, March. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo.
USEPA, 2001a. Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Sinks: 1990--1999. EPA, Washington, DC, September, 2001.
USEPA, 2001b. Draft U.S. Nitrous Oxide Emissions 1990-2020:
Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions.
EPA, Washington, DC, September, 2001.
USEPA, 2001c. Draft Addendum to the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990-2020:
Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions
Report. EPA, Washington, DC, October, 2001.
Victor, David G., Nakicenovic, Nebojsa, and Victor, Nadejda, 2001,
``The Kyoto Protocol Emission Allocations: Windfall
Surpluses for Russia and Ukraine,'' Climatic Change 49
(3):263-277, May 2001
Vrolijk, C., Grubb, M. 2000. Quantifying Kyoto: How will COP-6
decisions affect the market? Report of a workshop organized
by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK, in
association with: Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies, Japan; World Bank National Strategies Studies
Program on JI and CDM; National Institute of Public Health
and the Environment, Netherlands; Erik Haites, Canada; and
Mike Toman, U.S. on 30-31 August 2000, Chatham House,
London.
Appendix 1: Energy and Carbon Summaries
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Appendix 2. Modeling Global Carbon Markets
We first construct an aggregate Annex 1 demand curve for
international emissions reductions from CDM, JI, and ET/hot air. This
demand curve represents how short, at a given price, Annex 1 countries
are from meeting their Kyoto target using only domestic options (energy
sector CO<INF>2</INF>, non-CO<INF>2</INF> gas, and Article 3.3/
3.4options). We can then compare this demand curve with the supply
curve for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air (based on the assumptions described
above) to find the market-clearing price. Our approach is similar to
that used in a few other recent studies (Grutter, 2001; Haites, 2000;
Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Krause et al, 2001; Vrolijk and Grubb,
2000).
To create the Annex 1 demand curve, we combine a U.S. demand
curve--the ``additional required reductions'' line in Figure 6.2 minus
the cost curve or amount available from non-CO<INF>2</INF> measures at
a given price--with estimated demand for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air from
other Annex 1 parties, excluding EITs. We estimate the non-US demand
using a combination of EPPA and GTEM cost curves. \38\ There is a
resulting asymmetry in this approach, since the non-US cost curves we
use do not embody the aggressive pursuit of domestic energy sector
reductions found in our analysis for the United States. As a result the
total demand for and use of international trading, as well as the
resulting market clearing price, is significantly higher than it would
be were we to have looked at a similarly aggressive approach in all
Annex 1 countries. The result is shown in the figure at right.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\The first scenario is based on EPPA cost curves (Reilly et al,
2000 and Ellerman and Decaux, 1998) and RIIA 1990 emission estimates
(Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000), and yields an estimated 2010 demand from
Annex II countries of 507 MtC. The second scenario uses GTEM results
and assumed 1990 emissions reported via personal communication from the
model developers, and yields an estimated 2010 demand from Annex II
countries of 344 MtC. As found in Grutter (2001).
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__________
A Partial Listing of Studies Showing a Positive Economic Benefit from
an Innovation-Led Climate Strategy
Barrett, James P., J. Andrew Hoerner, Steve Bernow, and Bill Dougherty,
2002. Clean Energy and Jobs: A Comprehensive Approach to
Climate Change and Energy Policy, Center for a Sustainable
Economy, Washington, DC.
Bernow, Stephen, Karlynn Cory, William Dougherty, Max Duckworth, Sivan
Kartha, Michael Ruth, 1999. America's Global Warming
Solutions, Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund.
Energy Innovations, 1997. Energy Innovations: A Prosperous Path to a
Clean Environment. Washington, DC: Alliance to Save Energy,
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Tellus Institute, and Union of
Concerned Scientists.
Geller, Howard, Stephen Bernow, and William Dougherty, 1999. Meeting
America's Kyoto Protocol Target: Policies and Impacts,
Washington, DC: American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy, November.
Hanson, Donald, and Skip Laitner, 2000. ``An Economic Growth Model of
Investment, Energy Savings, and CO<INF>2</INF> Reductions:
An Integrated Analysis of Policies that Increase
Investments in Advanced Efficient/Low-Carbon
Technologies,'' by Proceedings of the 93rd Air & Waste
Management Association Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, June
18-22, 2000.
Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Clean-Energy
Technologies, 2000. Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future,
prepared for Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.
Koomey, Jonathan G., R. Cooper Richey, Skip Laitner, Robert J. Markel,
and Chris Marnay, 2001. ``Technology and greenhouse gas
emissions: An integrated scenario analysis using the LBNL-
NEMS model,''. In Richard Howarth and Darwin Hall, editors,
Beyond a Doubling: Issues in the Long-term Economics of
Climate Change, Elsevier Publishing.
Laitner, John A. ``Skip'', Stephen Bernow and John DeCicco, 1998.
``Employment and Other Macroeconomic Benefits of an
Innovation-Led Climate Strategy for the United States,''
Energy Policy. Volume 26, Number 5, pages 425-432. April.
Laitner, Skip, Kathleen Hogan, and Donald Hanson, 1999. ``Technology
and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Integrated Analysis of
Policies that Increase Investments in Cost Effective
Energy-Efficient Technologies,'' Proceedings of the
Electric Utilities Environment Conference, Tucson, AZ,
January.
Laitner, John A. ``Skip'', 1997. ``WYMIWYG (What You Measure is What
You Get): The Benefits of Technology Investment as a
Climate Change Policy,'' a paper given to the 18th Annual
North American Conference of the USAEE/IAEE, San Francisco,
CA. September 7-10.
Peters, Irene, Stephen Bernow, Rachel Cleetus, John A. (``Skip'')
Laitner, Aleksandr Rudkevich, and Michael Ruth, 2001. ``A
Pragmatic CGE Model for Assessing the Influence of Model
Structure and Assumptions in Climate Change Policy
Analysis,'' in Lawrence A. Kreiser, editor, Critical Issues
in International Environmental Taxation, CCH Incorporated,
Chicago, IL..
Sanstad, Alan H., Stephen J. DeCanio, and Gale A. Boyd, 2000.
``Estimating Bounds on the Economy-Wide Effects of the CEF
Policy Scenarios,'' Energy Policy 29 (2001) 1299- 1311.
Tellus Institute, 1997. Policies and Measures to Reduce CO<INF>2</INF>
Emissions in the United States: An Analysis of Options for
2005 and 2010. Boston, MA: Tellus Institute.
Senator Jeffords. There is no question that we must be
concerned with threats of today, like the thousands of people
dying prematurely every year from power plant pollution. But we
cannot let the press of quarterly reports or the hunt for
short-term profits prevent us from acting to reduce the threats
of tomorrow. That is especially true in the case of terrorism
or global warming where we have been presented with credible
information about the threats.
As some of my colleagues know, I have a special interest in
the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification and pressed hard
for its ratification. Senator Helms was instrumental in moving
that treaty and I want to thank him for his work and that of
his staff in helping me and others get that agreement approved.
That treaty addressed land degradation in some of the most
impoverished areas of the world. It is designed to encourage
participatory democracy and stakeholder involvement. I look
forward to seeing the implementation of that treaty.
I have an interest in ratifying and implementing the
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. I have introduced
legislation maintaining the spirit of that treaty, and I hope
we will be able to get that moving as soon as the U.S. can
participate in the ``Conference of Parties'' and the review
committee.
There seems to be a general good news regarding chemicals
that harm the ozone layer. From all indications, the Montreal
Protocol has been a success, though I gather there are some
additional amendments coming soon. I will be interested to
learn how our efforts have reduced that ozone hole.
There is less clear news on the status of the Convention of
Biologic Diversity, which was signed in 1993 but which has been
not sent to the Senate for confirmation and ratification.
I would also appreciate hearing an update from our
witnesses on the progress made toward the implementation of the
Basel Convention regarding the International Transportation of
Hazardous Waste.
Finally, I would note something that is a little different
between international agreements and our more conventional
environmental laws. They often seem to be missing performance
criteria or include very weak commitments. Unfortunately, in
the case of climate change, even when commitments are minimal,
such as reporting on the policies and measures we have adopted
and achieved in 1990 levels, we have failed. So I would urge
our negotiators to push for more specific environmental laws
using targets and timetables. That will make it easier for the
Senate to know whether the treaties we have ratified are
succeeding. Also, I believe the result will be better for the
environment and sustainable development.
I want to thank you for being with us here today. I now
turn to my good co-chairman friend, Senator Sarbanes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords. I
am very pleased to join my colleague, Senator Jeffords, in this
joint hearing between the Environment and Public Works
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
very important issue of the review of the implementation of
environmental treaties.
Senator Jeffords, as we all well know, has been a very
strong advocate of the need to protect our environment across
the range of issues. I certainly want at the very outset to
thank him for his leadership. The country, not just the
country, in a sense the world, and I am going to make reference
to this later, these environmental issues know no national
boundaries, and we are all extremely grateful to him.
I also want to thank him for suggesting this idea of a
joint hearing undertaken by the two committees. Joint hearings
can I think provide a useful opportunity to examine issues that
cut across committee jurisdiction, and I think they also serve
to encourage Members of Congress as well as the Administration
and private sector to think about the wider implications of the
issues with which we are wrestling. That is obviously one of
our purposes here today.
Treaties are often negotiated over many months, indeed,
even longer, and in many cases in a very painstaking way. So
when they come into force many people heave a sigh of relief
that the process has been completed. Of course, we review the
treaties in the Foreign Relations Committee and we try to
carefully examine them, and then once we ratify them we think
well that is over and done with. But the fact of the matter is
that once the treaty is ratified, the process has only begun.
And what really matters, in addition to adopting the treaty to
begin with, is how governments, including our own, actually
implement the treaties.
This hearing will examine a number of environmental
treaties that the United States has ratified. Just to mention a
few, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, and the U.N. Convention to Combat
Desertification, which Senator Jeffords made reference to. I do
not think that treaty would ever have been approved but for his
efforts.
We will ask witnesses from the Administration and private
sector specialists for their appraisal of our Government's
implementation of these various treaties. For example:
Are we living up to our commitments under these treaties?
Are we providing sufficient resources, both financial and
technical, to help developing countries meet their commitments
under these treaties?
What are the success stories?
Where are we falling short, and what can be done to ensure
that we do a better job?
What are the international ramifications of a failure on
our part to meet our commitments under these treaties?
I look forward to hearing our witnesses address some of
these important questions.
The protection of the environment is something that I think
we have come to understand is a matter of the first priority,
hopefully here in the Congress, certainly across the country.
In fact, I am inclined to think that the country is often ahead
of the Congress and ahead of the Administration on this very
important issue. Not only do we have an obligation to ensure
that our Government is honoring its environmental commitments,
but we should encourage our Government to play a leading role
in assisting others around the world to help them meet their
commitments. We constantly brag that we are first, and we ought
to be first in this regard, as well as in other respects.
Environmental problems, as we all know, have no boundaries.
An environmental problem halfway around the globe can have
adverse consequences for our own families here in the United
States. Similarly, an environmental problem here in this
country can affect the lives of millions of people overseas.
The Chernobyl nuclear accident, to take but one example, had
consequences far, far beyond the boundaries of where the event
occurred.
So I think this is an important joint effort here by the
two committees and I want to again thank Senator Jeffords for
suggesting this. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, I ought to say at the outset, because of my
involvement in the other bill to which you made reference, I do
not know that I am going to be able to stay through the morning
but I certainly wanted to be here at the outset. I may have to
leave, maybe I can get back. But this is certainly a very
important initiative and I thank you for it.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you for being here. Your presence
makes this a much more rewarding situation for the hearing, but
I do understand that you have got a few little problems you are
dealing with.
Senator Chafee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords, for
holding the hearing. As Senator Sarbanes said, certainly the
world is looking at us as to how we are going to act on these
treaties and are we going to be a responsible member of the
global community on these environmental issues which have such
immense ramifications for future generations.
We hold a certain place in the world after the fall of the
Berlin Wall and are kind of at the top of the heap. With that
comes enormous responsibility. We have to exercise it on these
treaties that have been negotiated over many, many months. It
is my thought that we have the responsibility to protect our
world for future generations. And whether it is global warming
or desertification or the health of our fisheries, the onus is
on us. Everybody is looking at us to see, are we going to be a
leader? Are we going to be a country that all around the world
people look at and say they are doing the right thing, they are
protecting these valuable resources? That not only are they
consuming resources at an enormous rate in the United States of
America, but they are looking ahead and trying to do the right
thing for many, many generations.
So thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
today.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Senator Chafee. It is a
pleasure to have you with us.
Now on our first panel the first witness is John F. Turner,
the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC, and the other member of
our panel is Mr. James Connaughton, Chair of the White House
Council on Environmental Quality, Washington, DC.
Welcome. It is a pleasure to have you with us.
Mr. Turner, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. TURNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE
BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Turner. Chairman Jeffords, Chairman Sarbanes, Senator
Chafee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you
today with my colleague, Jim Connaughton, to review the U.S.
implementation of some important environmental treaties
initiatives.
I believe the United States has a strong record on global
environmental issues. And as one who has been involved in
conservation most of my career, I want to pause and thank each
one of you for the dedication and commitment, leadership you
have given to domestic and international environmental affairs.
But I am proud of the leadership our country has shown to
spearhead the negotiation agreements and their subsequent
implementation on issues ranging from ozone depletion to
stemming illegal trade in endangered species. As an example of
this continuing leadership, the President just recently
submitted to the Senate an important treaty between the United
States and Russia that would strengthen the conservation of our
shared polar bear resources.
The State Department plays an important role in
negotiating, coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of
environmental agreements and then working through the
interagency and international processes to ensure U.S.
interests are served. Often, however, as you realize, other
agencies within our Government are actually responsible for
implementation of some of these treaties.
In addition to my written statement submitted for the
record, I would just like to briefly describe our efforts
related to five agreements the United States currently is
implementing.
First, the Montreal Protocol. As you are aware, during the
1980's, indeed, the United States led a global effort to
negotiate an agreement to phaseout the production and
consumption of substances that deplete the ozone layer and
threaten human health with the deliberating effects of skin
cancer and cataracts. Over the last 15 years, the
implementation of the Protocol and its subsequent amendments
have yielded remarkable progress in protecting the
stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out much of the
consumption and use of ozone depleting substances on a global
scale. The protocol does include a multilateral fund to provide
financial and technical assistance to developing countries to
assist them in meeting their own obligations under the treaty.
As the largest contributor to the fund, the United States has
made available over $350 million to the fund since the
beginning.
The second treaty I would like to discuss is the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, known as CITES. CITES conservation goals are to restrict
international trade in endangered species, and assist countries
toward a sustainable management of species through
international trade.
CITES Parties regulate wildlife trade through controls and
regulations on species listed in three distinct appendices. In
addition, each Party must appoint a CITES management authority
and scientific authority. Of course, for the United States it
is the Fish and Wildlife Service at the Department of Interior
that provides us with the management authority and scientific
authority for CITES. That agency also plays a major law
enforcement role in its implementation.
With regard to implementation, the U.S. implements CITES
primarily through regulations developed under the Endangered
Species Act and also under the Lacey Act. The United States is
proud of its record in implementing CITES. We are at the
forefront of CITES Parties in fulfilling these obligations.
Third, I would like to just briefly touch on the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which I know you are
very interested in. The Framework Convention creates a broad
global framework for addressing the challenge of climate
change. My colleague, Jim Connaughton, will discuss the overall
approach of this Administration to address this serious global
challenge. Let me just briefly refer to a portion of this
strategy where I believe the United States is demonstrating
superb leadership.
In the two major announcements of President Bush on our
policy regarding global climate change, he committed us to
intensifying efforts with other nations to address the
challenge of climate change. Toward this end, the United States
has initiated a series of bilateral climate change
relationships with important partners, including, and I would
like to mention them, Australia, Central America, the European
Union, Canada, China, India, Italy, and Japan. We have
discussions underway on additional relationships with Brazil,
Mexico, Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, and the
Ukraine. Including the U.S.' participation, these relationships
would represent 78 percent of the total greenhouse gas
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels around the world.
Fourth, let me just mention the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, commonly referred to as the NAFTA
environmental side agreement. This serves as an important
framework for cooperation among the three North American
governments on a wide range of environmental efforts. Among
other things, the NAFTA side agreement established the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation, the CEC, which
coordinates such cooperation.
This agreement has promoted strong cooperation among the
three countries on a number of important environmental issues,
achieved primarily through the implementation of the CEC work
program funded at the level of $9 million annually where each
party contributes equally. These include the promotion of
enforcement and compliance with environmental laws, protecting
children's environmental health, protecting animal species that
migrate throughout North America, and minimizing the use of
persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT.
Fifth, and last, Mr. Chairman, let me just touch on the
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, CCD. Indeed, I would
like to thank you, Senator Jeffords, for your leadership in the
ratification of this important global measure. As you are
aware, this Convention arose out of the 1992 Earth Summit. The
purpose of the Convention is to combat desertification and
mitigate the effects of drought on arid and semi-arid lands
through effective local, national, regional, and global action.
The Convention's central objective is to promote the
sustainable use of dry lands worldwide, but especially in
Africa, and to make more efficient use of aid resources,
thereby helping to solve Africa's and other affected regions'
chronic hunger problems and availability of fresh water. Many
of the principles used in the U.S. over the past 70 years have
been incorporated in the language of the CCD.
In conclusion, let me observe that while significant
progress in protecting the environment has been made, we are
all aware that enormous challenges lie ahead. And as you have
noted, Chairman Jeffords, the upcoming World Summit on
Sustainability in Johannesburg, South Africa, provides the
United States with a unique opportunity to take stock of our
past accomplishments and to build on them in helping to advance
economic and social environmental stewardship.
We have learned a great deal since Rio. WSSD gives the
United States a chance again to demonstrate its leadership, to
create a new paradigm that stresses sound economic policy,
national capacity for good governance, anti-corruption,
transparency, the role of science, poverty reduction, and sound
environmental stewardship. Working with our international
friends and allies, the Bush Administration is committed to the
success of the Johannesburg Conference to ensure we all work
together to build a positive legacy of natural resources
sustainability for current and future generations of the global
citizenry.
Thank you Chairmen. I would be happy to respond to any
questions you may have later on.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
Now we will hear from Mr. Connaughton, Chairman of the
White House Council on Environmental Quality. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES CONNAUGHTON, CHAIR, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Mr. Connaughton. Thank you Chairman Jeffords, Chairman
Sarbanes, Senator Chafee. I want to note at the outset, Mr.
Chairman, your reference to NEPA. Certainly, I share your view
that NEPA was the original sustainable development statute. And
the fact that it has been adopted by I think more than 50
countries worldwide and the legacy that that articulation of
what sustainable development is about is sort of a test case
for the beginnings of American leadership in this area.
Of particular note in that statute, and I think we had
talked about this a little bit during my confirmation hearing,
is the concept of man and nature living together in productive
harmony. That is an important concept. And this hearing today,
actually bringing together the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, I think is
a key important next step as we get various committees of
jurisdiction looking across their lines, as we must, consistent
with your statement, to figure out how to better integrate our
environmental and our social objectives into our other policies
and into other activities. That is really what was behind the
spirit of NEPA. And I think that is why today's hearing is so
important and useful, because it then turns, Chairman Sarbanes,
on what you referenced, that the largest questions before us
are the questions of implementation: are we implementing at the
domestic level and equally, and perhaps today even more
importantly, at the international level; and where are the
important places where we can make meaningful progress on
implementing these documents that were so hard worked over. So
I look forward to our discussion today.
What I want to do is briefly spend some time talking about
where we are with implementation of the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change and then throw in just a little
aside on the world summit, my own view with respect to the
upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development.
With respect to climate change, President Bush has
committed the Nation to ambitious, yet realistic, goals that
are based on a set of six principles that largely derive from
the framework that we have set out in that Convention. First
is, consistency with the long-term goal of stabilizing
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at a level that
would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system.
This, of course, refers to the fundamental long-term obligation
under the Convention, to which the President has reaffirmed our
Government's strong commitment. Second is that we should
proceed with measured actions as we learn more from the science
and build on it. Third is the concept of flexibility, to adjust
to new information and take advantage of new technology. Fourth
is ensuring continued economic growth and prosperity without
which we actually cannot make the kinds of investments that we
will need to over the near-to mid-term to achieve our
greenhouse gases emission reduction goals. We need to pursue
market-based incentives that will spur technological
innovation. And finally, and very importantly, is the concept
of global participation along the lines that my good colleague
John Turner just described. We need to find ways to engage the
developing countries in a constructive path, on a path whereby
they, too, can make meaningful progress together with their
international partners.
The President has set a goal, a near-term goal, which is
committing the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing
America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our
economy by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This goal is
comparable to the kinds of emission reductions that countries
participating in the Kyoto Protocol expected to achieve. We
believe that this way of articulating progress is a means by
which we can open a dialog with developing countries because it
is consistent with their need for economic growth, but to do it
in the kind of efficient and more productive way that we
ourselves continue to demonstrate leadership on in the United
States of America.
Importantly, it will set us on a path to slow the growth of
our emissions. Our emissions are growing. Emissions around the
world are growing. A key first step in making meaningful
progress on climate change is to, in fact, slow that growth
significantly and, as science justifies, to stop the growth in
emissions, and then reverse that growth. This will require a
sustained commitment and significant investment and effort from
our Nation's farmers, small businesses, workers, industries,
and, most important, individual citizens. In recent time, the
largest growth in emissions have resulted from the actions of
individual citizens in their homes, in their transport, in
their commercial activities. We need to be working on
incentives and education and other methods, we have a whole
series of programs, by which to engage the American citizens of
the whole toward this effort.
The President's policy recognizes that meaningful progress
depends on the development and deployment of new technology.
That is key. We all recognize that. There is a large
international consensus on that. We need to advance the science
further because there are key gaps in our knowledge that can
help us make smart policy choices in the near-and mid-term. We
need to develop and promote energy efficiency, conservation,
and sequestration technologies and practices in addition to
building on international cooperation.
What I would like to do is just quickly run through the
various components, and I will just take a minute to do that.
The President's fiscal year budget calls for a $700 million
increase in our Federal effort in regard to climate change.
That will support a $4.5 billion program of research on climate
science and energy technology and create significant new
incentives that will help advance those technologies and deploy
them. That is unmatched in the world. We are committed to a
program of up to $7.1 billion over the next 10 years that is
dedicated to technology development and the incentives to
deploy that technology. That, too, is unmatched in the world.
Senator Jeffords, you were a strong supporter of a strong
conservation title in the Farm Bill, as was the Bush
Administration. That will unleash up to $49 billion, a
significant portion of which is going to enable and incentivize
our farmers on their working lands and our ranchers on their
working lands to engage in the kind of sequestration activities
and smarter land management that we would like to see while not
putting them off their property. We far outmatch anything along
those lines in the rest of the world.
That said, I want to note that we have the upcoming World
Summit on Sustainable Development coming up in Johannesburg. We
have a real opportunity to forge the kinds of partnerships that
will in fact implement the rich tapestry and body of
international norms and international treaties and laws that we
have all committed to over the last couple of decades. We are
looking forward to really setting off a dialog around which we
can in fact make meaningful progress on each of those
commitments and come up with real partnerships that can
demonstrate measurable success. So, again, we look forward to
talking to you about that today. Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you both.
Senator Corzine, do you have a brief statement you would
like to make?
Senator Corzine. I will have one for the record, but thank
you. I appreciate your holding the hearing.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Mr. Turner, President Bush attended the Earth Summit in
1992. I understand that more than 100 heads-of-state plan to
attend the World Summit in Johannesburg. Will the President
lead the United States delegation to the World Summit?
Mr. Turner. Senator, there is obviously considerable
interest around the world as to who will head the U.S.
delegation. All I can tell you is that decision has not been
made yet. I can tell you that the commitment to make the World
Summit a success has captured the interest of the White House,
the National Security Council, cabinet members, and the
agencies. So we are committed to see that we have a dynamic and
bold agenda as we go to Johannesburg. But the decision on who
would lead the delegation has not yet been made.
Senator Jeffords. I just hope the President can because I
think it would be very, very helpful to the world.
Mr. Connaughton, in preparation for the Earth Summit of
1992, CEQ held a series of regional public conferences around
the United States and compiled extensive documentation based on
the concerns presented at these public meetings. What
comparable effort has CEQ undertaken in preparation for the
World Summit?
Mr. Connaughton. I will speak to the process point and then
turn to the substance point. We are jointly working with the
State Department and have coordinated a fairly extensive
interagency process to ensure that as we get to the World
Summit we actually have broad agency participation in that
effort. That is the immediate process and we have been working
on that.
In terms of the outreach, the first Rio Summit actually was
critical in setting the agenda and setting the numerous areas
in which we needed to make meaningful progress. Whether it is
reducing the number of people without access to safe drinking
water, whether it is reducing the number of people without
access to clean, reliable, affordable energy sources, issues
such as biodiversity and the like, all of those have unfolded
in the last 10 years through quite extensive both national and
international dialog. So where we are today is very different
from where we were 10 years ago, and where we are today is with
this very complete agenda, whether it is Agenda 21, or whether
it is the Millennium Goals. We have this very rich agenda. If
anything, the level of outreach on an agency-by-agency basis,
and certainly with the State Department through our
international fora, we have more fora engaged in the subject of
sustainable development than anyone might have in fact imagined
in 1990.
Our effort, and certainly CEQ's push, what we are trying to
emphasize is can we in fact forge the kind of partnerships with
respect to these commitments that have now developed and that
we have held ourselves to, can we forge the kind of real
concrete partnerships where 2 years from now, 3 years from now,
5 years from now we can actually say that with respect to our
commitment, for example, on access to safe drinking water we
have real plans toward making meaningful progress on each of
those goals. And so that is where my office has come in and
will stay diligent on that, because also I think it is
important to emphasize with the World Summit, just as Rio was
not the end of the conversation, it was actually the beginning
of the conversation, we would like to see this World Summit be
the beginning of a very new and hard emphasis on really
implementing our goals toward lifting the world out of poverty
and assuring for them the kind of quality of life that we enjoy
here in America.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Connaughton, the Framework Convention
commits the United States and all the Parties to reporting
detailed information on its policies and measures ``with the
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels
of these man-made emissions of greenhouse gases.'' Which of the
programs outlined in the Administration's Climate Action Report
aims to return our emissions to the 1990 levels, and by when?
Mr. Connaughton. The Action Report, which, as you know,
Senator, goes on at great length, outlines more than 60 Federal
programs and mentions numerous activities at the State and
local level, all of which are oriented toward mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, we have an extensive
program of research and development and technology deployment,
not just on the pure technology side, for example, in
sequestration and how we can capture carbon, but also in the
land management side of things in terms of how we can better
utilize our natural resources and the acreage that we have in
the United States toward meeting our Nation's agricultural and
wood products and other needs.
That set of programs covers every sector of the economy. It
includes a range of mandatory measures, a range of voluntary
measures, a range of incentive-based measures. And, again, when
you sort of line it up program for program, it is a level of
effort that far outpaces much of what the rest of the world is
currently doing.
In terms of a timeline of when, we cannot set one. I think
the non-binding aim of the Framework Convention was not met by
the United States or by most of the rest of the developed
nations of the world. I think we need to set ourselves on a
realistic course, consistent with economic growth, by which we
can all make meaningful progress toward that long-term goal of
stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Senator Jeffords. I am sorry, but the question is, which
ones aim at 1990?
Mr. Connaughton. The entire package aims at reducing the
growth in our greenhouse gas emissions, Senator. There is no
particular silver bullet program by which we could achieve that
goal.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Jeffords. I have a
little bit of business. Senator Hagel, a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, asked me to submit for the record his
opening statement.
Senator Jeffords. It will be accepted, without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
Statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska
Mr. Chairman--Thank you for holding this hearing. This is an
opportunity for the Administration to discuss the progress that has
been made on these five environmental treaties, all of which have been
ratified by the U.S. Senate.
Of course, much of the talk today is also likely to focus on a
treaty that was signed by President Clinton but never submitted to the
Senate, the Kyoto Protocol.
I would like to remind my colleagues of a bit of Senate history on
this issue.
Tomorrow will mark the 5-year point since the Senate voted
unanimously to provide President Clinton and Vice President Gore with
clear advice regarding the Kyoto Protocol. It is unfortunate that the
Clinton Administration ignored the Senate's 95-0 vote on S.Res. 98, or
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, but the conditions outlined in that
resolution remain the guideposts for U.S. international climate change
policy.
I would also remind my colleagues, and this frequently gets
forgotten in the discussion, perhaps even more significant than the 95-
0 vote was that the Byrd-Hagel Resolution had 65 bipartisan cosponsors.
As we know, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution was very clear. It called on
the President not to sign the Kyoto Protocol, or any other
international climate change agreement, unless two minimum conditions
were met.
First, S. Res. 98 directed the President not to sign any treaty``.
. . unless the protocol or agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.'' The
message was simple. Yet as we know, the Kyoto Protocol does not include
a single developing nation. These are the very nations, such and China
and India, that will soon lead the world in manmade greenhouse
emissions. Any treaty that exempts them from participation is folly.
Second, the Resolution stated the President should not sign any
treaty that``. . . would result in serious harm to the economy of the
United States.'' The Kyoto Protocol would have legally bound the United
States to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to 7 percent below 1990
levels by the years 2008 to 2012. As President Bush stated in February,
this would have cost the U.S. economy $400 billion and resulted in the
loss of 4.9 million jobs.
The Clinton Administration never submitted it to the Senate for
debate and consideration. I suspect it is because they knew what is
still true today--if put to a vote in the Senate, the Kyoto Protocol
would face resounding defeat.
Other nations are also reconsidering their early ardent advocacy
for the Kyoto Protocol. Japan has ratified the treaty, but has no
enforceable plan to meet its obligations. The same is true for the
European Union. Australia has joined the United States in saying it
will not ratify the protocol. Canada and Russia have not made final
commitments to ratification.
The Kyoto Protocol is collapsing under the weight of the reality of
its economic consequences.
Does that mean the United States should turn its back on
international efforts to address potential climate change? No, that
would be irresponsible.
In his February 14 announcement of the Administration's climate
change policies, President Bush stated, ``I intend to work with
nations, especially the poor and developing nations, to show the world
that there is a better approach, that we can build our future
prosperity along a cleaner and better path.''
he Administration has backed up the President's words with funding
and tangible international cooperation. I'm sure the witnesses here
today will expand on these efforts and I look forward to their
testimony.
Next month, nations will gather for the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. We should stay focused on
science, programs and resources that enhance international cooperation
to produce tangible environmental benefits for all nations. Not worn-
out debates over dead treaties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you. Mr. Turner, to follow up on the
Summit in Johannesburg, what are the goals that we will be
setting out for us as we attend this summit? What do we hope to
accomplish?
Mr. Turner. Senator, I think we are committed to success.
And then you are asked the question, how will we measure
success? I think we will measure success by getting some
commitments to concrete actions by the world community to make
a difference in places around the world. By that, I think the
United States is advancing themes based on the need for good
governance, the need to increase the total flow of resources to
eradicate poverty and lift the quality of people's lives. We
need concrete commitments. In fact, the United States is
working on deliverables in the following areas. The three most
important seem to be: Access to energy. We have great
opportunities in providing clean energy technology. It is
inexcusable that we have almost 2 billion people today without
access to fresh water. So I think water will be a priority.
Third, the problem of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.
So, health, fresh water, and energy would be the top three
areas for deliverables. We are also working on packages in
forestry, oceans and fishery biodiversity, food security, and
education. We feel this package helps invest in people, it
helps build a platform which will not only help economic growth
but environmental sustainability.
So I think our opportunity is to get beyond lofty rhetoric,
the negotiation of text, and get into real partnership
commitments. We have an ongoing dialog with other countries,
both developed and developing, trying to forge these
partnerships, a dialog with the nonprofit community both
domestically and internationally, and business groups to see if
for the first time we can build on a continuum offered us by
the Doha Conference on Trade, the Monterrey Conference, to
increase the total flow of resources to impoverished areas of
the world. Johannesburg is an opportunity to bring this all
together with real concrete commitments. The United States, I
have to say, is really leading that international effort right
now to forge those commitments.
Senator Chafee. Very good goals to have for the conference.
I support them and wish you good luck at building consensus
with other nations around the world. Certainly health and fresh
water and curtailing the spread of infectious diseases are a
good place to start and help build an economy. So I will
certainly be supportive of those efforts.
Mr. Connaughton, in your statement you talk about measured
actions as we learn more from science. I am curious as to when
does the science finally convince the Administration to take
action. Where is the Administration on global warming in
relation to the science? Is it a little apprehensive of it at
this point, or beginning to come to the point of this is an
issue that needs aggressive action?
Mr. Connaughton. Where we are with the science is there is
a significant scientific enterprise that has produced a number
of projections that are sufficient to give us cause for action.
The issue is are we calibrating our action to the current state
of the science. I believe the President's plan does precisely
that in terms of taking us to the next step of slowing the
growth in emissions and yet not taking us so far down the road,
given the uncertainties of the science, that we are actually
having significant detrimental effects on jobs, the American
workers, which is important, and it is not just American
workers, but it is the kinds of effects that you would see with
quite restrictive actions in other countries of the world.
So when is the science done? We have had a couple of
decades of scientific enterprise. We are looking at many more
decades, funded with the U.S. carrying the largest share of
that funding, in which we have to stay on top of this. Our
research effort in climate change, again, it is unmatched in
the world and it far outpaces our research in many other areas
of more immediate consequence to people in the United States of
America. But it is important enough to stay up with the
science.
What we are trying to do, though, is we are trying to get a
more focused management program to some of that spending, not
all of it, but some of that spending so it can actually begin
to answer some of the more difficult questions that help us
design programs that would be meaningful. We need to know more
about some of the effects of, for example, the effects of
aerosols, the effects of clouds, the effects of changes and
adaptations to climate. We need to know more about that in
order then to develop the kinds of policies that do not lead us
to significant economic mistakes. Because, of course, if we put
our economy further into reverse, we actually will not get the
kinds of investments we need to make the progress toward that
next generation of capital that we need to deploy to get new
capital stock, to get the new cars everybody wants, to get more
efficient manufacturing, and, importantly, more efficient homes
and more efficient commercial enterprises, because that is
where the real growth is.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
take a little bit of what you just said, Mr. Connaughton, and
ask whether you think that some of the capital investment that
I think we all think is important for generating economic
growth is somewhat inhibited because there is an uncertainty
and a conflict between what we sense are requirements of our
international obligations and both the political debate that we
have in America about climate change and the uncertainty that
seems to revolve around what certainly I read in our
international requirements. For instance, I would cite under
Article 3.3 of the Convention, talking about the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, ``Parties should take
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage. Lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures.''
Sometimes it does not feel that our policies are taking
into account what we have as mandates, at least in some sense,
from our international conventions. I would think as an
investor in dealing with some of these needs that people might
be confused, particularly as they see increasing evidence
published that some of these considerations, particularly with
regard to carbon, are a serious problem.
How is the United States resolving this sort of dilemma of
debate that exists in the context of what our international
obligations are? Not only yourself, but Mr. Turner as well, I
would like to hear your comments on that.
Mr. Connaughton. First, I think that the President's
announcement on February 14 was a key next step in providing
further clarity that you describe, Senator, in terms of making
clear at least what this Administration's expectation is on the
greenhouse gas side of the equation in terms of a realistic but
still ambitious goal for further efficiency and productivity in
our economy. That is our expectation.
The second component of that, which has to do with perhaps
the investment uncertainty you describe, is we look very
closely at the approach that certainly Senator Chafee
championed, that numerous members of the Senate championed,
toward not just getting our information flows better in terms
of improving our registry of reductions in the various sectors,
but also to create a credible crediting system by which those
who do make investments today have some high level of assurance
that those investments will be recognized in whatever a future
policy could hold, whether it is an incentive-based policy,
whether it is a market-based policy, which we would emphasize
as the better path forward, or through even additional
mandatory programs that might come to the fore in terms of
where we are falling short of real action.
Senator Corzine. Is the White House supporting the
Brownback-Corzine amendment on registry of carbon dioxide
emissions?
Mr. Connaughton. We do not support that because we do not
think there is a need for at this time a mandatory reporting
element. We think enhancing the registry is a great idea. I
would think creating----
Senator Corzine. As you know, it is not mandatory for the
first 5 years as long as we meet some kind of reduction
standards, and would not become mandatory if people met those
standards.
Mr. Connaughton. I am aware of that and that is our point
of departure.
Mr. Turner. Senator, I want to respond and just offer some
reflections of a trip I just returned from. China was my first
trip and a real learning experience, where we completed some
high level dialog with China on a diverse array of
environmental issues, and then I was able to travel through
China. China, to me, was a great reflection on the broader
approach and its justification that the United States is taking
in engaging countries like China and India and others that will
represent a significant amount of emissions.
I was impressed in going to China that that is a country on
the move economically. To improve the lives of their citizens,
their energy consumption is going to go up exponentially. Their
technology and science is extremely poor, and they are the
first to admit that. The emission of greenhouse gas is
significant. They are making a significant effort but the
utilization is not good and not efficient. So there is an
excellent opportunity for the United States to take science, to
take technology and partnership with them.
I went to one of the poorest regions in China where they
have some significant desertification and erosion, over-
grazing, dust issues. They admit it, as our science admits it,
that the dust is now coming all the way across the United
States from the Mongolian-Tibetan plains of China.
We have been accused of being isolated on global climate. I
submit the absolute opposite is true. The United States in fact
is leading the effort to engage the developing world in this
dialog and approach to collective strategies on climate. That
impact has significant opportunities to address this serious
issue. We need to do much more in our international efforts,
but the United States is really leading, trying to get the
attention of the President's commitment to engage other nations
in this whole effort on climate.
Senator Jeffords. What did you mean by trying to get the
President's attention?
Mr. Turner. No, excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I mean in trying
to follow through on the President's appropriate commitment of
the United States. Part of our strategy is to work with other
nations, engage other nations in approaches to the serious
issue of climate. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Senate voted,
and the President concurred, that one of the failings of the
Kyoto process was we were leaving out too many countries,
members of the world community that not only today emit a lot
of greenhouse gases, but the potential for significant
increases in the future based on old technology really has
frightening ramifications for where we go in climate. So I am
proud of what we are doing to engage other countries,
especially the developing countries.
Senator Jeffords. I am very interested in this. I was in
China and I started an organization dealing with more efficient
use of energy. They sent some men over who looked at China's
incredible need. To just improve the technology, they could
reduce their emissions immensely. What does the United States
intend to do to try to get these countries to be more efficient
in their use and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
Mr. Turner. Senator, obviously, in our discussion with
other countries, their needs and interests are different. But
it is a spectrum going from providing science and technology,
which seems to be the biggest need, to, as Mr. Connaughton
referred to, the need for more information; i.e., climate
research. We have committed to a global climate research
system. And, again, the United States is leading that effort to
answer many of the legitimate questions that we still have out
on climate change, and we are partnering with other countries
in setting up global monitoring stations. I visited a very
remote one we put up in China. So science and technology,
global research, looking at opportunities to comment together
and work on global policy.
Japan, as an example, we have three working groups on
research, science and technology, and how together we can go
out and help developing countries, and then looking at future
markets, which is business opportunities for both countries. In
India, for an example, Mr. Chairman, India, it is astounding to
me that we have 600,000 women dying each year from indoor air
pollution from the use of pre-industrial fuel use, poorly
ventilated stoves. So India's need for new types of energy for
basic heating and so forth, that is unique to India.
So each country has unique opportunities for the United
States to take its research, its technology, engage the private
sector, engage the nonprofit community, engage the academic
community. There are so many significant needs out there in the
world that I think it will be an opportunity for the United
States to contribute significantly to where we go in the coming
decades on climate change.
Mr. Connaughton. Senator, if I might add.
Senator Jeffords. Yes.
Mr. Connaughton. The Monterrey consensus by which we are
trying to create harder criteria for countries we think can be
successful is also important to this overall enterprise. We
need to create the kind of economic, social, and political
environment in some of the developing world in some of these
larger developing countries by which we can actually get the
kind of long-term investment that we enjoy in the United
States, which, as you know, tends to deliver the better
technologies. If you are in an unstable environment, if you are
in an environment where capital is not protected, if you are
not engaged in the international trade world by which you have
to become competitive on efficiency and productivity grounds,
you just will not get those kinds of investments that will turn
things around faster.
So I do not want to leave off the other programs that do
not necessarily obviously have the effect that we are
discussing in terms of the environmental dimensions of that.
But from an environmental perspective and also from a
greenhouse gas perspective, those agendas are really critical
toward making real progress on a much shorter time line in some
of these countries toward environmental protection. And it
opens the door for the kinds of very rich dialogs we have going
on right now, but it will open the door for even more
consequential dialog as we are able to share technical
capacity, share regulatory mechanisms, the ones that work, the
ones that do not work, and maybe help them leapfrog through
some of our lessons as we now get to a more streamlined, more
market-based system of addressing some of our issues.
Senator Jeffords. A question for both of you. What are the
top three U.S. substantive priorities for the Summit of clear
sustainable development outcomes? What do you think the Summit
will achieve in terms of real sustainable development results
at home and abroad?
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I think I would answer that in a
couple of ways. The top three sectoral areas that we have
opportunities to make commitments in are I think, as I
mentioned, in the area of fresh water, health, and the
availability of energy. A more thematic approach, I think it is
an opportunity to implement the realization that taking care of
the environment starts with taking care of people, the
opportunity for the United States to reduce poverty around the
world. And third, I think we have an opportunity to change the
way we have traditionally done assistance around the world, and
not just economic assistance for developing nations, but to in
fact incorporate a new theme where we help countries help
themselves with better ruling capacity, help them invest in
their own people, help them encourage entrepreneurship and
involvement of the private sector.
So I think we have an opportunity to build a new paradigm
of partnerships out around the world.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Connaughton, why do you believe that
the more environmentally sound EPA straw proposal on
multipollutant legislation was rejected by the White House?
Mr. Connaughton. That was an initial straw proposal that
then went through extensive analysis, economic analysis,
feasibility analysis, toward what we think is a quite strong
proposal, a 70 percent reduction in the three criteria
pollutants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury, but is
also one that is attainable. We can go quite far, Senator, as
you know, but we can do it in a way that keeps us within the
realm of not having an impact on consumers, making
unprecedented strides in terms of the environmental protections
that that would deliver and do it on a timeline by which the
economic community can actually make investments toward these
leapfrogging efforts and give them the long-term certainty with
their investments where they can actually do some significant
capital planning. So there were a number of factors that came
into our policy that led us to a different place, but not a
markedly different place.
I would also note, and I want to emphasize because it comes
up frequently, the issue of coal. Coal represents 50 percent of
electricity generation today. Coal is affordable, it is
reliable, and it is here, it is domestically secure. But what
we need to do is we need much cleaner coal-fired generation.
The way you do that is to create the right kind of incentives,
and we have got a lot of money on the table toward clean coal
technologies as part of our climate policy as well as part of
our air policy, but you also then need to create the kind of
timelines so that the plants can turn over in a way that makes
sense to business investors so that they will actually invest
in the application of these technologies. As you know, Senator,
it is quite exciting the technologies that are potentially
available. If we create the right timeframe, make the levels
economically reasonable, we think we can spur the investment
toward the application of those technologies, the broad
application, which then preserves a role for coal even as we
continue with a more diversified energy system.
We need more nuclear, we need more natural gas, we have to
look to solar wind and some of these other renewable
technologies in which we have quite a strong commitment. But we
should not lose sight of the incentive we have, not just for
the United States, because if we can advance coal technologies
in the United States, then we can take them to places like
China where they are not going to be creating massive wind
farms to address their energy needs. And they are putting in a
lot of baseload capacity. It would be really helpful for us to
take our success here and take it international.
So a whole lot of factors went into it and we really did
try to look at this holistically and consistent with our
overall energy and economic goals. We think we hit the right
balance.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Turner, is the U.S. prepared to agree
to seek higher appropriations in the outyears to replenish the
global environmental facility GEF in order to leverage other
donors?
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the President
committed us to I believe $178 million on the GEF, realizing
this is an important outreach especially in developing
countries. So for the first time we recommended catching up
with our arrears and adding in $70 million for the first time.
Currently, the third replenishment negotiations are under
way and we plan to participate in those in a dialog with the
world community to see where the world wants to go next. The
focus of the GEF is extremely important to the United States.
But I am pleased that we made a significant increase in our
request to the Congress on the GEF. The consideration of the
next round is under review.
Senator Jeffords. I am pleased to hear that. It seems like
this would be necessary to fully implement the Convention to
Combat Desertification and the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants and the prior informed consent
Convention. So I appreciate that information.
For both of you. The Senate-passed Sense of Congress on
Climate Change, Section 1001 of the Energy Policy Act of 2002,
says the U.S. should take responsible actions to ensure
significant and meaningful reductions in emissions of
greenhouse gases from all sectors, and take part in
international negotiations that lead to U.S. participation in a
fully binding climate change treaty. Is the U.S. presenting
anything at the World Summit in terms of clear targets and
timetables for addressing climate change and reducing emissions
consistent with this?
Mr. Connaughton. With respect to the World Summit, first
off, climate change will be discussed but it is not an agenda
for action because just a few short weeks later the Conference
of the Parties will be meeting again. And so there is a
separate international meeting to continue to carry out the
discussions under the Framework Convention and under the Kyoto
Protocol.
With respect the first point, I think the answer to that is
yes, we are moving forward with the kind of international
bilateral and multilateral process that Assistant Secretary
Turner outlined for you to, in fact, re-engage, since we are
not participating in the Kyoto Protocol, engage outside of that
particular forum to come up with common strategies, again, not
just domestically but with our international partners,
including other countries who may or may not become part of the
Kyoto Protocol. So we are not waiting for decisions on that to
take the kind of action that that resolution urged.
We remain guided by the precursor resolution that we need
to have an approach that does not significantly impact the
economy, and also an approach that does engage developing
countries, which were the two key pieces that were missing. So
we remain guided by that as well. And we are looking forward to
seeing significant progress. I would note that the President's
commitment of an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas
intensity, that alone in 2010 would result in 100 million
metric tons avoided from business as usual, which is quite a
consequential amount of tons of carbon avoided. We think that
also is consistent with the spirit of the Senate resolution.
Senator Jeffords. As you both know, I have deep concerns
over the way we are handling the results of pollution from our
power companies. Have you been involved in any of the decisions
related to the release of the New Source Review documents to
the Congress or in discussions of adopting a new policy and
providing less information to Congress? That is kind of a
little nasty question.
Mr. Connaughton. First of all, yes, the New Source Review
policy was the--EPA was directed under the National Energy
Plan, in consultation with the Department of Energy, to prepare
the report on the impacts of the New Source Review program on
electricity supply. So that was a joint exercise between the
two agencies in which the various White House offices, as part
of our interagency process, we were apprised of its progress
and where that was heading.
In terms of the recommendations that came from EPA, there
too, consistent with other processes, EPA kept us informed of
where that was going. We had extensive interagency
conversations about the various recommendations that EPA was
considering. The end product was produced by EPA and then was
received back into the interagency process to see what it
meant.
When EPA's regulatory proposals to implement the
recommendations are complete, those will come over to the
Office of Management and Budget and, consistent with our
traditional processes, those will receive interagency review as
well, as do all other significant regulations, and we expect to
be a part of the review of the regulations at that time.
In response to your final point, the dig on information, we
understand you had information requested out to EPA and they
got some information to you and others not to you on quite the
timeframe you expected. But it is my understanding that the
large body of that has made it up to the committee. And so
while I suppose we could talk about timelines for getting it to
you, it is my understanding it has made its way to you. So, if
there is more to discuss on that, I would be happy to do what I
can and talk to EPA.
Senator Jeffords. I cannot tell you how disturbing it is
with that particular issue, which is a life-saving issue, as
you well know, that we have had such troubles in that regard.
So I appreciate that.
There are other Senators who could not be here today
because of their busy schedules, and thus they will have the
opportunity to submit questions to you to be responded to in
writing. So I just want to let you know that. I also want to
thank you very much for being here today and candidly
participating in our question and answer period.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time, and
Chairman Sarbanes, and your interest in giving the
Administration the opportunity to discuss a very important
subject matter, and that is the implementation of our
international obligations. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connaughton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you both.
We will now move on to our next panel. Our first witness is
the Honorable Maurice Strong. He is a native of Canada and
resides in Buckhorn, Ontario. Mr. Strong has long-standing ties
with the private and public sectors and has served in an
impressive array of business, government, and nongovernmental
organizations. Currently, Mr. Strong is a Special Advisor to
the Secretary General of the United Nations, President of the
Council for the University for Peace, a Senior Advisor to the
President of the World Bank, and Chairman of the Earth Council.
Mr. Strong was the Secretary General of the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, and the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and subsequently
became the Executive Director of the United Nations
Environmental Program.
Mr. Strong, thank you for traveling all the way from Canada
to be here with us today. Let me introduce the other two on the
panel and then we will start with you for a statement.
The second member of the panel is Mr. John Dernbach. He is
a professor of law at Widener University Law School. He is
editing a book, ``Stumbling Toward Sustainability,'' that
assesses progress the U.S. has made on the sustainable
development in the past 10 years and recommends the next steps.
Welcome. We look forward to hearing from you.
Also, we have Christopher Horner, who serves as a Senior
Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and as Counsel
of the Cooler Heads Coalition. That sounds like what we need.
Please proceed, Mr. Strong.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAURICE STRONG, CHAIRMAN, EARTH COUNCIL
INSTITUTE CANADA, TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA
Mr. Strong. Distinguished Chairman, Senator Jeffords,
Senator Feingold, ladies and gentleman. First let me
congratulate you, Senator Jeffords, on your leadership on these
issues and say what a privilege it is for me to have the
opportunity of testifying before these two important committees
of the U.S. Senate as you consider issues which are at the
center of my own life interests and concerns. It is
particularly encouraging to know that you are addressing these
issues at a time when the position of the United States of
America in respect to these issues has never been more
important to the human future.
The United States has been at the center of the movement to
develop since the first Stockholm Conference first put these
issues on the international agenda an international regime of
cooperation and of institution-building to deal with the
dilemma which Stockholm revealed. The fact that through our
economic life we are impinging on the resource environmental
and life systems on which the future of all life on earth and,
indeed, our economic welfare also depend.
And as we move toward the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg that will meet next month, these
issues have special importance. Because if we fail at that
conference to re-ignite the momentum that we achieved at Rio de
Janeiro 10 years ago, I do not know when that momentum is
likely to be rejuvenated. So I am deeply encouraged by these
hearings and pleased and grateful at the opportunity you have
provided to hear some views. Those views are primarily
reflected, Mr. Chairman, in my written presentation. I have to
say, I got your invitation when I was down in Central America,
so I had to do it rather hurriedly. But I do hope they will
help to amplify some of the comments I will now make briefly.
The recent retreat by the United States from much of its
long stand role as the leading driver of these issues, as
particularly evidenced by its withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol of the Climate Change Convention, threatens the
progress that has been made in collaborative management of our
environmental problems in the past thirty years and the
prospects for further progress that is so essential for our
future. And let me say, Senator, I probably have spent as much
time in my life in the United States as I have in my home
country. I think I have paid more taxes here than I have in my
home country.
Senator Jeffords. We appreciate that very much.
Mr. Strong. So I come here as a friend and admirer of all
things American. My comments are expressions of my concern, not
to be taken as criticism, but expressions of concern that I
believe reflect the concerns of many Americans and people
throughout the world concerning the nature of the U.S. position
on these issues. They have indeed cast a cloud over prospects
for the World Summit on Sustainable Development which will
convene next month in Johannesburg.
What the United States does or fails to do matters,
Chairman, as you so well know, and that is why you have
convened these hearings. It matters immensely. Not only in
substance, but in example. As the most powerful nation in the
world, indeed you are a nation that gives a signal to others.
Therefore, any withdrawal of your commitment to international
negotiating processes and to the agreements that have been
reached over so many years really does undermine the very
fabric of international cooperation and the international legal
system, which the United States itself and the whole world owes
it a great debt of gratitude, Senator, for its leadership in
these past thirty years in developing that framework. It is
still far from perfect. We cannot allow it to slip back.
So I am really encouraged by these hearings that you are
focusing now on the whole process by which the United States,
yes, and others, have performed under existing commitments and
decisions of past conferences. There is a whole spectrum I do
not need to elaborate. There are agreements reached at
conferences and ratified by fora such as the General Assembly
of the United Nations.
In Rio we made considerable progress. Yes, we did not do
everything that we had hoped for. But we did make very
significant progress. And the United States and others really
signed on to some very important agreements: the agreement on
climate change, the Convention on Climate Change, the Framework
Convention; the Convention on Biodiversity, both of which has
now been ratified by the United States; the Convention to
Combat Desertification, which you, Senator Jeffords, have taken
such an important leadership role in. And so we very much hope
now that there will be a renewal in that leadership.
I was pleased to hear Administration officials here, who I
know, presenting the case for continued strong support for so
many of these issues, but frankly not all of the ones where
U.S. leadership is important.
I see my time has lapsed, so I would be delighted to expand
on any of these concerns in the question period. And again
thank you, Senator Jeffords.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
Next is Professor John Dernbach. He is a Professor of law
at Widener University Law School. He is editing a book,
``Stumbling Through Sustainability,'' that assesses progress
that the U.S. has made on sustainable development in the past
10 years and recommends next steps. Welcome, Professor.
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. DERNBACH, PROFESSOR, WIDENER UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
Mr. Dernbach. Thank you, Chairman Jeffords, Senator
Feingold. It is a delight to be here. I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss U.S. adherence to its sustainable
development commitments, particularly those made at the Earth
Summit in 1992. As you mentioned, I am the editor of a 32-
chapter book on U.S. sustainable development efforts in this
past 10 years. The book is being published this week by the
Environmental Law Institute here in Washington. The book's 42
contributors come from universities and law schools,
nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and State
Government. They are respected experts in their fields.
What I would like to do is briefly review some of the
book's findings and then share some of its basic
recommendations in a little greater detail.
The U.S. has, unquestionably, begun to take some steps
toward sustainable development, largely because of our
environmental and conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the
United States is now far from being a sustainable society, and
in many ways is farther away than it was at the time of the
Earth Summit in 1992.
International leadership begins at home. With 5 percent of
the world's population, the United States was in 1992
responsible for about 24 percent of the world's energy
consumption and almost 30 percent of the world's raw materials
consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials use has
increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased
21 percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have
increased by 13 percent. Over and over, the books contributors
found increases in materials and energy efficiency, and in the
effectiveness of pollution controls for individual sources,
were outweighed by increases in consumption and increases in
pollution related to the manner in which things were made.
Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in
the past decade, for example, U.S. generation and disposal of
municipal solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996.
According to Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, ``four
more planet Earths'' would be needed for ``every person in the
world to reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing
technology.'' Yet the U.S. standard of living, equated with
high levels of consumption and the ``good life,'' is widely
envied and emulated throughout the world.
In this and in many other ways, though not all ways, the
United States has not exercised the kind of leadership
necessary for sustainable development. My sense is that we are
often unwilling to face such issues because we do not feel like
we have the tools. The book provides an issue-by-issue roadmap
for sustainable development in the United States and ways that
would enhance prosperity and protect and restore our
environment.
For starters, the Federal Government should adopt and
implement a national strategy for sustainable development, with
specific goals and priorities, to harness all sectors of
society to achieve our economic, social, environmental, and
security goals. The strategy would lead to a stronger, more
prosperous America with higher quality of life because we would
be pursuing these goals in ways that support each other in
greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermine
each other. The strategy could be modeled on that of the
European Union or States such as Oregon and New Jersey, and
specifically address climate change, biodiversity,
international trade, and other major issues. The President
could get the process started with an appropriate Executive
Order to Federal agencies under the Government Performance and
Results Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. An
executive-level entity would be needed to coordinate and assist
in the implementation of the strategy. A counterpart entity in
Congress would also be helpful. A set of indicators to measure
progress in achieving goals would make the strategy more
effective and meaningful.
In addition, the United States needs to recognize that its
substantial consumption levels, coupled with domestic
population growth, have serious environmental, social, and
economic impacts. Americans also need to understand that human
well-being can be maintained and enhanced by more efficient and
effective use of materials and energy and by less polluting
means of production. There are a variety of legal and policy
tools available to deal with this, including a number of policy
and legal tools that have been applied at the State level,
including renewable energy portfolio standards, Senator, as you
know, and smart growth legislation. Northern European countries
are also experimenting with a shift in taxes on materials and
energy, on one hand, they are shifting some of the tax to there
from labor and income, on the other hand. And there is some
very interesting research on that.
The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive
role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad
range of issues related to sustainable development. Congress
should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that
encourage unsustainable development. Protection of natural
resources and the environment must focus more holistically on
the resources to be protected, and on understanding those
resources. Finally, transportation, public health, and other
social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and
operated to further economic, environmental, and security goals
at the same time.
We know what we need to do, and we also know why. The
challenge I think is to deliver on what we know. Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Christopher Horner. He serves as Senior
Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and is counsel
to the Cooler Heads Coalition. We need you. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, SENIOR FELLOW, COMPETITIVE
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Horner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, for
your interest. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before
this joint panel on what is a very important topic. The scope
of the hearing is broad, as evidenced by the Administration's
testimony regarding all of its efforts and all of the treaties
we have committed to. So I am going to limit my testimony to
the propriety or impropriety of the U.S. implementing or, more
accurately, amending the Rio Treaty, the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, by adopting or ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol.
For whatever specific reasons, be they economic growth,
failure to foresee the energy requirements of the new economy,
or other, the U.S., like many nations, failed to meet its Rio
targets, the specific numerical target of 1990 greenhouse gas
emission levels, although not our funding targets and other
efforts we did implement successfully. Now some advocates
assert, because the U.S. has not met its Rio goal, we must
commit to even greater, that is, more unrealistic, mandatory
reductions, that is, Kyoto. Attempting instead to comply with
the initial treaty seems the more appropriate response, for
several reasons.
Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did
not request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation
implementing Rio, which was not an inherently self-implementing
treaty. Authority and precedent make clear that responsibility
for proposing such programs lies with the White House. If our
non-binding Rio obligations in fact bound the U.S. to achieve
specific reductions, contrary to contemporary Senate and
Executive assertions of U.S. intentions, then the Executive
interpretation of Rio Article 4 specifically throughout the
1990's was actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending
question is apparently, does the U.S. respond by attempting to
meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even deeper,
binding promises?
Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.' Rio promises, in
favor of Kyoto's binding commitments even greater than those we
have failed to attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this
of course is that precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, happy
anniversary, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it recognized
was an unacceptable drift away from the U.S.' Rio stance
adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing
what was developing, asserted its ``advice'' pursuant to
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, passing Byrd-Hagel
S. Res. 98 unanimously.
Subsequent to and despite this advice, U.S. negotiators
clearly disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations:
Kyoto did not require developing countries to share our
commitments, and even the Clinton White House economic advisors
have recanted their refutations of the Kyoto cost estimates.
Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does
not still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is
likely that very few Senators, though new members have arrived,
have amended their position against a treating causing
``serious economic harm.'' However, Clinton Administration
officials did admit that they began working on the plan for
binding commitments within 1 year after Rio went into effect.
Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a
``treaty hopping'' campaign; even the models on which it is
based predict an undetectable climatic impact, at a cost to the
U.S. of up to $400 billion annually, according to EIA, yet
maybe 1/30th of what its proponents seek. Rio and Kyoto offer
differing commitments but purport ``the same ultimate
objective.'' The U.N. IPCC has said that this means reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 60 to 80 percent, which
of course wildly exceeds Kyoto's specified ambitions.
As such, the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of
ratifying any further agreements, express acknowledgement not
only of the actual ``ultimate goal,'' but that it is committed
to its practical requirements, in this case up to ``30
Kyotos.'' In this case, to a degree, I agree with Professor
Dernbach, which is we need to set out specifically where we are
going and what this requires. Now, I do not agree entirely with
the Professor's testimony, but in concept, if this is where we
are going, we need to expressly set it out in advance, now
given that knowledge has changed, the interpretation of the
ultimate goal has changed.
Such treaty hopping agendas illustrate the importance of
Senate treaty ``reservations,'' or the Senate's second bite at
the ``advice'' apple. This comes of course during the
``consent'' function, which function the U.S. negotiators
unfortunately eviscerated. After agreeing to terms incompatible
with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted Kyoto's
prohibition on reservations, or the Senate's ability to specify
the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S.
commitment. This despite the Senate having also forewarned the
Administration about this in advance of Kyoto.
In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions
of having ``reject'' Kyoto with the requisite submission to the
U.N. to that effect, as was done regarding the International
Criminal Court. In the absence of that, the White House must at
minimum assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto--
we sent that letter to the U.N. for a reason. Signatures carry
responsibilities--by requesting the Senate disapprove of the
treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate should recognize
that there is no reverse equivalent of the ``presentment
clause'' regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any
constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a
signed treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric
surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing the
U.S.' ambiguous role, the Senate should take matters into its
own hands and decide the fate of the treaty.
That resolution should by definition, for the process
problems I identified, be rejection of Kyoto. Otherwise, by
accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and
prohibiting reservations, this body would condone Executive
circumvention of the Senate's constitutional treaty role. Thank
you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you for that advice. I appreciate
it.
Senator Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to be here today. I think the idea of having the
Foreign Relations and Environment and Public Works Committees
come together to conduct oversight of the implementation of
U.S. commitments under the environmental treaties that the
Senate has ratified is both a good idea and it is long over-
due. So I think you, as I frequently feel toward this Chairman.
The United States was among the principal architects of
each of the agreements we are examining today. U.S. negotiators
worked hard to develop and craft these agreements and ensure
our Government and our interests were well-represented. The
Senate then ratified these agreements with the view that
desertification, ozone depletion, global climate change, trade
in endangered species, and sustainable development through
trade were important national and global issues. I am
concerned, given our history and leadership, about the growing
perception internationally that the United States is backing
away from our international environmental commitments. I am
pleased that the Administration testified on this. I am eager
to hear more because I suspect that much of the ongoing
diplomatic effort on these agreements may be under-reported in
the press.
Nonetheless, I believe that there is a serious perception
problem, and one that needs remedied. It is my view that unless
the United States exercises leadership for sustainable
development in all relevant international forums, it will
continue to miss many opportunities to improve environmental
and social conditions worldwide, and it will perpetuate a
perception that the United States does not keep its sustainable
development commitments.
As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Foreign Relations Committee--excuse me, as the Chairman of the
subcommittee, thanks to Senator Jeffords----
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold. I used to be the Ranking Member. That is
why I said I thank him a lot. But I have had the opportunity to
see first-hand how valuable the provisions of these agreements
are to the people of Africa, where nearly one-quarter of dry
lands are moderately or severely desertified, ozone level
changes only exacerbate that problem, and endangered species
contribute significantly both culturally and economically to
many African states.
These issues cut across borders and affect entire regions.
One of the primary benefits, in my view, of U.S. participation
in these agreements is the opportunity to take advantage of
multilateral coordination to address these problems.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And if you would permit, I
have just a couple of questions.
Senator Jeffords. Please proceed.
Senator Feingold. Let me first say that I was pleased to
come here because of the importance of the hearing. But I am
particularly thrilled because Professor Dernbach is a friend of
mine who I have not seen in about thirty years. We debated
against each other in high school. He is one of the smartest
guys I have ever met. I think we each won some, is that fair to
say, John?
Mr. Dernbach. Something like that, yes.
Senator Feingold. I have admired his work on environmental
issues from afar. He is a wonderful choice to have before the
Committee, and a native of our great State of Wisconsin.
Let me ask a question first of Mr. Strong. You mentioned in
your statement a concern that I share, as I have just
indicated, that the perception that the United States' efforts
on environmental issues is dwindling and that it is affecting
our bilateral relationship. Would you share for the record the
effects you have observed with our closest neighbor, Canada.
Mr. Strong. Yes. Thanks, Senator. I do not of course speak
for Canada, but I have less reticence to express my concerns
about the Canadian position that I do here in this Senate about
the U.S. position. I have to say that your sum of the retreat,
what I have called retreat from leadership, and of course it is
not an across-the-board retreat on every issue, has spilled
over to Canada.
We have a very serious national controversy now about
whether Canada should or should not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
That is probably the most significant single impact. Of course
the decision of the United States has immense influence, and
there are immense constituencies in the industry in which I
used to be, the energy industry, there is quite strong
resistance, though not across-the-board resistance. Our Prime
Minister has committed his government to ratify, but the
provinces in Canada have significant rights and some of them,
particularly Alberta and even Ontario, where I live, have come
out against that. So they have not made their decision. But
there is no question that on this issue and so many others,
what the U.S. does influences Canada.
And to just add to that, there is significant public
concern about the current U.S. position on some of these
issues. The polls in Canada show, as I believe they do here in
the United States, a higher degree of public concern than is
expressed yet at the top political levels.
So, yes, what the U.S. says and does matters in Canada. But
it also I have to say, as one who spends a lot of my time
outside of this continent, it matters everywhere.
Senator Feingold. Professor Dernbach, I think you would
agree that U.S. concern over cost of compliance contributes
significantly to the current difficulties with the Kyoto
Protocol. I believe you looked at this issue in some detail.
Would you share with the committee some of the economically
beneficial actions we have taken to implement our commitments
under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and just
highlight briefly some opportunities for further meeting our
current commitments at low-cost, even if the U.S. Government
does not actually ratify Kyoto.
Mr. Dernbach. A lot of the positive things that have been
done on climate change in the last 10 years have occurred at
the State level. There is actually a fairly large number of
legal and policy tools that have been employed at the State
level--tax credits metering, which would allow somebody with a
big windmill to sell their excess electricity back to the grid;
renewable energy portfolio standards that require electricity
providers to scale-up the amount of renewable energy that they
provide on a fairly steady basis. There are many, many of those
kinds of tools out there that are being used.
What is particularly interesting about State use of those
tools is the justifications the States use, justifications that
you do not hear in the national climate debate. Let me share
what I mean by that.
At the State level, there is a lot of conversation about
creating jobs, developing technology, protecting poor people
from the adverse effects of fossil fuel price fluctuations,
reducing other pollutants, and strengthening the economic base
of the State. Climate change is almost incidental in a lot of
those discussions, even though reducing greenhouse gases is
surely one of the results.
I think that what that suggests is that if we look hard at
the various types of things that States have been doing,
looking at the effects of those, you could fashion I think a
fairly potent, fairly effective, fairly economically beneficial
package of legislation to deal with climate change at the
Federal level that would create jobs, develop technology,
enhance our export markets, would attract capital investment,
would drive down costs of renewable energy and make electricity
a lot more affordable for other folks, among many, many other
things.
So, in sum, the experience of the States on climate change
suggests a very different way of thinking about both the
benefits and the costs of climate change than a lot of the
conversation that I hear at the national level.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Professor Dernbach. It is good
to see you again. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your generous amount of time.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you for coming. We appreciate your
presence here. It is important.
Let me now turn to some questions. Mr. Strong, what do you
see as the major differences between preparations for Rio and
Johannesburg, and what has impeded the current process?
Mr. Strong. Mr. Chairman, part of the difference of course
is the change of political climate. The preoccupation of the
United States and other countries with the war against
terrorism, the economic implications of the downturn, I think
this has all created a more difficult climate. Also, I think
there has been perhaps a less extensive involvement of the
various constituencies, the civil society constituencies, et.
cetera. And most of all, I would say the cloud cast over the
Summit by the recent actions of the United States that have
been reported here both internationally and domestically which
signal a significant backing away, should I say, of the kind of
leadership that the world community has looked to the United
States for for so much of the thirty years since Stockholm put
the issue on the agenda.
There is a response to that. For the first time, as you
know, Senator, some of the traditional friends of the United
States which have always followed its leadership in the past,
even when they were a little uncomfortable about it, are not
necessarily now following its leadership on these issues. As
you know, the European Union and Japan, despite controversies,
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. We still have not got enough
to make that 55 percent. I hope my own country will weigh in on
that. The position of Russia is still not certain. But this has
cast a cloud.
Now it is true that the United States, as the
Administration officials have said, are doing some very good
work in some very good areas. But on the more fundamental
issues that literally affect the future of our civilization and
of our economies, there is a huge concern that Johannesburg
will actually see some slippage from the performance under the
commitments reached at Rio and before.
So I see Johannesburg as a very, very important milestone,
not, Senator, because conferences solve everything, but because
they provide the gathering point where you can either breakdown
in your attempt to move forward or you can actually move
forward. At the moment, the signs are very, very disconcerting.
I believe that if we lose the opportunity of Johannesburg to
move ahead on these issues that literally we will face threats
to our security and our economy over time even greater than
those that we face from the horrendous terrorist acts.
May I mention one other thing, sir. In my statement, I
would like just to call your attention to a couple of specific
suggestions that I will not elaborate here. But my conviction
is that the reason for slippage fundamentally in our
commitments is motivation. That is why I am spending so much of
my time on the motivational issues. What are they? One is the
economic motivation, the whole system of fiscal measures,
taxes, policies, regulations by which governments incent the
behavior of corporations and industries. And in all countries,
including this, they are heavily skewed to continue to incent
unsustainable behavior. I believe it is quite possible for
those measures to meet their primary objectives without having
the same consequences. And I think if this body could even
initiate a review of that whole system, in a sense do an
environmental performance review on fiscal tax subsidy
policies, et. cetera.
The second motivational aspect is moral and ethical. That
becomes very, very important and it is deeply important for
America which is based on values. A distinguished American,
David Rockefeller, headed the group that has drafted the Earth
Charter, a statement of basic moral and ethical principles
designed to guide the conduct of nations and peoples toward the
earth and toward each other. That we hope the U.S. will
support. It does not have to agree to it in a formal manner,
but we hope that the United States delegation will recognize
it. Your Conference of Mayors and many U.S. organizations
representing literally several millions of Americans have
endorsed this. We would like to see, sir, America recognize
this because, again, our moral and ethical values are at the
root of the way in which we set our priorities and the way in
which we respond to this challenge.
This country's history and its example has been based on
its commitment to moral and ethical values. Therefore, I am
hopeful and encouraged that you are going to rise to that. And
this hearing certainly underscores and reinforces that, sir. I
am sorry I took a little long to respond to your question, but
I do feel strongly, as I know you do, about these issues.
Senator Jeffords. Very excellent statement. I am taking it
under careful advisement. Thank you.
Mr. Horner?
Mr. Horner. I would like to distinguish Rio and
Johannesburg and possibly break new ground for me and praise
the Administration for what they are doing in preparation for
Johannesburg. First, with Rio we had a cue of treaties that had
been developed over years that were to be culminated in Rio. We
do not really face that now. We face, as the Administration
witnesses testified, talking more about details, actual
implementation, the state of implementation, next steps. And I
do applaud what the Administration is trying to do regarding
good governance, saying in essence capacity-building, which is
a term used in the environmental treaty context quite a bit, we
will pay countries to be ready to receive what they will
receive under the treaties. We are trying to build capacity for
good governance through economic and judicial reforms,
openness, to say are you ready to take this environmental and
general foreign aid and not have it go down the rat hole, for
which I applaud them.
Now they did get off track with handling environmental
issues very poorly, including again recently, May-June, and
with that submission their efforts at focusing on known
problems that purportedly would be worse under, for example,
climate change. They redirected the focus back to climate
change, but they were doing very well in advancing it toward
safe drinking water, the world's number one environmental
threat, which purportedly would be worse. But for a cost of a
year of Kyoto you could make significant advances in that.
AIDS, infectious diseases, they need to get the dialog back
where it was.
They have made progress. The focus on good governance,
capacity-building for receiving this aid so we can have actual
environmental improvement for environmental aid, it is the
right direction. I just hope they stay focused.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Mr. Dernbach, what is your prognosis for the World Summit?
And what follow-up activities are needed?
Mr. Dernbach. My hope for the World Summit is that we come
out of it with specific targets and timetables, not just for
the social issues, as important as the social issues are, but
also for environmental issues. And what I mean by targets and
timetables are the kinds of things that have been suggested by
a great many organizations including the OECD, which is to say
by a certain date we achieve a certain result, either
internationally or regionally or nationally. Without targets
and timetables, you have goals with no deadline that are in
some basic way as a result not goals at all. So that is what I
would hope would come out of the World Summit.
But beyond that, and I think this is the important message
from the book, is that what we do for sustainable development
is not just what we agree to or do not agree to in
Johannesburg, it is what we do at home. That is why the book is
overwhelmingly directed at the United States and actions that
decisionmakers in the United States ought to be making at the
national level, State level, the local level, corporation
decisionmakers, deans in colleges and universities, businesses
and others. And that is what I hope will really come out of
Johannesburg, that it will provide a kind of lift, if you will,
to the Rio process, engage people on the importance of
reconciling our environmental goals with our social, economic,
and security goals.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Horner?
Mr. Horner. I just want to get back to leadership I guess,
in following on Professor Dernbach's comments. We need to
recognize that for all intents and purposes the Bush position,
despite bad-mouthing Kyoto, is indistinguishable from the
Clinton-Gore position on Kyoto. For twenty-five months after
signing the treaty for which it was open for ratification, they
never sent it to the Senate. My thesis in my testimony is that
is not necessary. But they did not do it. President Bush will
not send it apparently. Neither would withdraw from it. One
bad-mouths it, one talks a good game about killing it, though
not really doing it. One talked a good game about pursuing it,
though not really doing it. The position is indistinguishable.
Leadership, of course, does not mean abandoning your own
perspective, and the U.S. certainly has its own perspective on
this, in large part it is because it would be the most greatly
impacted by the treaty. So I think the Administration and the
U.S. as a whole deserves to maintain its own perspective
without others claiming that it has abandoned leadership by not
doing what everybody else has done.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Strong, comments?
Mr. Strong. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to see some
other initiatives. Energy was one of the issues that our
friends from the Administration highlighted. It is at the heart
of so many issues. I come from the energy industry myself and
so I feel very deeply about that. One of the particular
initiatives that I believe the United States could put on the
table that would totally in line with I believe the general
approach of this Administration is to call for the creation of
a consultant group on clean energy, modeled very much on the
consultant group on international agriculture research which
did so much in the last quarter century so to relieve the
prospect of an eminent food shortage in the world. And it is
not even an incorporated entity. It is a mechanism that brings
private and public interests together around the table to
determine priorities for research and development, particularly
in the developing world, and how to mobilize the funds to
permit the developing countries, in particular, to afford the
best available technologies. And it is not a new organization,
but it is a very effective mechanism. I believe it would be
entirely feasible for the United States to champion the
establishment of such a thing.
I think you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, about the importance
of the global environment facility, of closing that gap that
must be closed, that must be closed almost immediately to
permit the replenishment to take place. That would also give
prospects and morale for Johannesburg a boost.
And then, finally, one initiative that I believe could
emanate from this Senate, and that is we understand that you
are to receive a report from the General Accounting Office soon
setting out the U.S., and I am not sure if it covers others,
performance under existing agreements. This could provide I
suggest, Mr. Chairman, the basis for establishment of a regular
monitoring process with reports coming out each year or 2
years, very much like the State Department reports on human
rights and one or two other things, which would highlight the
performance of the United States and others in respect of the
commitments that they have already put in place. It would be a
fairly easy thing to do based on the report of the General
Accounting Office, which I think is on its way. It is just one
modest suggestion, sir, of how in a practical way there are
still a lot of things that you could do working toward those
larger issues.
Most of all, sir, I am concerned that it really give people
a new sense that their leaders really are responding to this
challenge, that there is real movement, that there is a new
spirit of international cooperation, and international faith in
the United States as the leader of that cooperation.
Senator Jeffords. Any final comments?
Mr. Horner. I would like to say in the spirit of that,
although the State Department offers me a tortured definition
of the term ``Parties to Kyoto,'' the United States can let
other ratifying Parties have what they claim to want. If the
U.S. withdraws, we have 55 percent because 55 percent of X is
now 55 percent of a much smaller number. It takes a very
difficult interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol to read
otherwise. If that is what they want, if some people truly
believe that will help save the Planet, while we have not
arrived at that position, we ought to withdraw and let them
have what they want. If the other sides offer the
interpretation of, well, we cannot have this go into effect
against us yet, that would be interesting, but it would also
likely bring negotiations back to a sane plane.
I hope we all remember when these negotiations fell apart.
They were in the Hague in 2000. The U.S. elections had occurred
but had not been decided. Pause, wait for comment. Some members
of the Foreign Relations Committee were there. I saw Senator
Kerry. The EU refused to take yes for an answer because they
saw desperation in our eyes. They changed the definition of
``sinks'' from ``sinks shall be used'' to ``but not really,''
and then ``but not really if you are the U.S. but certainly if
you are Russia,'' giving them millions of more dollars but
making it very difficult for us to at least initially even
comply. They fell apart in November 2000 and they have not
recovered since.
I believe if this is something the Administration really
wants to negotiate, that is, a Byrd-Hagel compliant binding
agreement, the place to start is by withdrawing from Kyoto,
have the other Parties decide if they want it to go into effect
against themselves, or interpret it otherwise and say we are
going to now start renegotiating with you but this time in a
little better faith. Because what happened in the Hague really
defies a good faith explanation.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Dernbach?
Mr. Dernbach. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. I think this is an incredibly important
issue. There is a lot more at stake here than the
environmental, and there is a lot more at stake here than any
specific environmental issue.
If we have learned anything in the last couple of decades,
it is that the environment is connected to everything else that
we care about--peace and security, economic development,
national governance, and social well-being. We now face an
enormous problem of environmental degradation around the world
and a growing gap between the rich and the poor. The problems
are quite real and they are not going to go away. Put a little
different way, poverty and environmental degradation are deeply
destabilizing because they stifle or reduce opportunities and
quality of life for many, many people.
The next fifty years global population is projected to
increase by 3 billion. The global economy is likely to grow by
four or five times. As difficult as things now are, as
challenging as the domestic and international situation now is,
environmental degradation and the gap between the rich and the
poor are likely to get worse and greater if we continue with
business as usual. The question that I would leave is whether
that should be our legacy for our children and our
grandchildren.
There are things that we can do. We know we can do them. We
ought to know that we need to do them. And I want to
congratulate you again for holding a hearing to focus on these
questions. Thank you so much.
Senator Jeffords. Thank all of you for your really
excellent presentations. I was listening very strongly and I
just feel concerned, as you do, that we must change our ways if
we are going to be the leader that this Nation should and must
be as we move into the future.
And I want to especially thank all of those that are
attending here who have been very, very entertaining in the
sense of looking very interested, and I believe you all are. If
I asked a show of hands, how many agree with the last
presentations that were made here?
[No response.]
Senator Jeffords. Nobody?
[Laughter.]
Senator Jeffords. I just wanted to check on you.
Thank you everyone. It has been a very interesting and
enlightening morning. We were pleased to have you all here.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committees were adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of their respective Chairs.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator from the State of
Vermont
I'm glad to be here with my distinguished co-chair from the Foreign
Relations Committee for this joint hearing. I appreciate his
willingness to explore today's topic, and the fact that he has joined
me as a sponsor of S. 556, the Clean Power Act. I would also like to
applaud him for his work to bring some truth and sanity to America's
accounting nightmare.
The United States is an economic and military superpower, perhaps
the lone superpower. But, as the old adage goes, with great power comes
great responsibility. We are able to project great might far beyond our
borders. We are also capable of contributing to environmental and
natural resource damage far beyond our borders and far in excess of
other countries. The question is, are we acting responsibly to curb
negative impacts abroad and at home?
Are we being good global neighbors and, at a minimum, keeping our
word? It seems that we may be keeping our literal word, given the very
broad language in many of the agreements. But in practical terms, it
seems that we're not trying very hard to keep up with the spirit of
some of our commitments.
The time is ripe for Congress to review how the Administration is
implementing our environmental agreements and commitments. Leaders of
many countries will be meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, in late
August at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The occasion is
the 10th anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development held in Rio.
I'm pleased to note that the Secretary General of that Conference,
Mr. Maurice Strong, is here today to give us some historical
perspective on that event and its lasting effect.
The conferees will be met by a very different U.S. delegation in
South Africa. The previous Bush Administration provided extensive
support for the Rio Earth Summit and brought many new initiatives to
the negotiating table.
But this Administration is likely to send a smaller and lower-level
delegation and has sought to narrow the scope of the discussions. This
has apparently included an effort to keep global climate change off of
the agenda.
I am troubled by the Administration's approach to global warming,
especially in light of the Sense of Congress approved by the Foreign
Relations Committee and made part of the Senate approved energy bill in
April. That Resolution says the United States should take responsible
action to ensure significant and meaningful reductions in emissions of
greenhouse gases from all sectors.
But it doesn't appear that responsible action is taking place and
emissions continue growing. As my friend Senator Chafee pointed out
during our Committee's markup of the Clean Power Act, the
Administration's Climate Action Report says, ``A few ecosystems, such
as alpine meadows in the Rocky Mountains and some barrier islands, are
likely to disappear entirely in some areas. Other ecosystems . . . are
likely to experience major species shifts . . .''
Our treaty commitment says, ``The ultimate objective of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should
be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change. . . .''
Since these ecosystems are likely to disappear entirely because of
manmade global warming and will not be able to adapt naturally, it
appears that we have entered the zone of ``dangerous interference.''
Since these are real threats of serious or irreversible damage, the
lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect shouldn't be
used as an excuse for not reducing emissions now. That is also our
commitment.
Instead of acting to reduce emissions, the Administration's
approach guarantees that greenhouse gas emissions will rise. According
to Mr. Connaughton's recent testimony, there is``. . . no question
about that.''
This kind of inaction doesn't comport with our commitments under
the Framework Convention, the Sense of Congress, common sense or the
National Environmental Policy Act (or NEPA). In 1969, NEPA became law.
It was probably the first adoption of a sustainable development
philosophy by a government in the world. To paraphrase, it says:``. . .
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all
practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.''
Unfortunately, the Administration seems to have lost sight of those
future generations of Americans. Economic development that does not
factor in the environment or quality of life of those future
generations is not sustainable.
The Administration and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol claim
that actions to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions cost too
much now. They need to look at the long term. They also need to look at
the many studies that have been done that show a net positive impact of
reducing emissions.
I ask unanimous consent that two such studies by the Tellus
Institute and a list of other studies be placed in the record.
There is no question that we must be concerned with the threats of
today, like the thousands of people dying prematurely every year from
power plant pollution. But, we can't let the press of quarterly reports
or the hunt for short term profits prevent us from acting to reduce the
threats of tomorrow. That's especially true in the case of terrorism or
global warming, where we have been presented with credible information
about the threat.
As some of my colleagues know, I have a special interest in the
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification and pressed hard for its
ratification. Senator Helms was instrumental in moving that treaty and
I want to thank him for his and his staff's efforts in helping me and
others get that agreement approved. This treaty addresses land
degradation in some of the very impoverished parts of the world. It is
designed to encourage participatory democracy and stakeholder
involvement. I look forward to seeing how implementation is going.
I also have an interest in ratifying and implementing the
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. I have introduced
legislation maintaining the spirit of that treaty. I hope we'll be able
to get that moving soon so the U.S. can participate in the Conference
of Parties and the Review Committee.
There seems to be generally good news regarding chemicals that harm
the ozone layer. From all indications, the Montreal Protocol has been a
success, though I gather there are some additional amendments coming
soon. I'll be interested to learn how our efforts have reduced the
ozone hole.
There is less clear news on the status of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, which was signed in 1993 but has not been sent to
the Senate for ratification. I would also appreciate hearing an update
from our witnesses on the progress toward implementation of the Basel
Convention regarding the international transportation of hazardous
waste.
Finally, I would note something that is a little different between
international agreements and our more conventional environmental laws.
They often seem to be missing performance criteria or include very weak
commitments.
Unfortunately, in the case of climate change, even when commitments
are minimal, such as reporting on the policies and measures we have
adopted to achieve 1990 levels, we have failed.
So, I would urge our negotiators to push for more specific
environmental goals, using targets and timetables. That will make it
easier for the Senate to know whether the treaties we have ratified are
succeeding. Also, I believe the result will be better for the
environment and sustainable development.
Thank you.
__________
Statement of Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today on an
essential topic--our nation's implementation of our international
commitments on the environment. I regret that I am unable to attend
today, but I must preside over the markup of the homeland security bill
in the Governmental Affairs Committee.
Ten years ago, the world took a dramatic step toward a sustainable
future when it convened the Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro during the
tenure of the first President Bush. The Summit resulted in several of
our most critical environmental agreements, including the Conventions
on Climate Change and Biodiversity.
Unfortunately, as we prepare for the next ``Earth Summit'' a decade
later, this Bush Administration does not appear to have taken as
aggressive an approach to our global commitment to environmental
protection as its predecessor did. In fact, we appear to be going to
the summit in Johannesburg with little more than a plan to delay
enforceable action on the planet's critical needs.
The most visible--and most integral--of the Rio agreements for our
sustainable future may be the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change. As is well-known by now, however, this Administration has
abdicated our nation's leadership on the issue, withdrawing from the
Kyoto Protocol and offering no alternative path forward. That's
disturbing enough. But now we also appear ready to distract the world's
attention from addressing this problem.
As I understand it, the United States has affirmatively stated to
the world community that President Bush will not attend the conference
in Johannesburg next month if the climate change treaty is discussed.
It is one thing to ignore this pressing problem domestically, as
President Bush's business-as-usual proposal is essentially doing. But
it is entirely another to ask the rest of the world to put it aside as
well.
Luckily, in lieu of executive leadership, we have other branches
and levels of government that can act, and are acting. The Environment
Committee recently passed the Clean Power Act, legislation limiting the
release of greenhouse gases from power plants. Governor Gray Davis of
California just this week signed legislation limiting greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles. And many other proposals are in the
works. The world understands we need to move ahead on this issue, the
States understand we need to move ahead on this issue, and American
citizens understand we need to move ahead on this issue. It is time for
the President to understand.
I therefore call on him to attend the Johannesburg summit and take
the climate change issue on, head on. Perhaps, when he does, he will
see the light.
__________
Statement of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department
of State
Introduction
Chairmen Jeffords and Sarbanes, and other members of the
Environment and Public Works Committee and the Foreign Relations
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
review U.S. implementation of environmental treaties. The United States
has a strong record on global environmental issues. We are a leader in
addressing environmental challenges on the international level, having
spearheaded efforts to negotiate environmental agreements on issues
ranging from ozone depletion to stemming illegal trade in endangered
species. Just a few weeks ago, the President submitted to the Senate an
important treaty between the United States and Russia that would
strengthen the conservation of our shared polar bear population through
a coordinated sustainable harvest management program.
In the case of toxic chemicals, the Administration submitted to
Congress this spring, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POPs) and additional legislation that would allow the
United States to implement this agreement, in addition to a regional
agreement POPs agreement and a treaty on Prior Informed Consent. These
multilateral agreements affirm the U.S. commitment to cooperate with
other countries on global health and environmental challenges. My
distinguished colleague, Jim Connaughton, just discussed the enormous
challenges we face addressing climate change and how the Bush
Administration intends to tackle the problem while ensuring our economy
continues to grow.
These treaties are just a few examples of environmental agreements
that serve as noteworthy tools in our foreign policy arsenal. The
Department of State plays an important role in monitoring the
implementation of these agreements and working inter-agency and
international processes to ensure U.S. interests are served. For
illustrative purposes, we would like to describe our efforts related to
the following five agreements we have ratified and currently are
implementing--the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES); the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change; the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation; and the U.N.
Convention to Combat Desertification.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
During the 1980's, the United States led a global effort to
negotiate an agreement to phaseout the production and consumption of
substances that deplete the ozone layer. Scientific evidence showed
that strong steps were needed to protect human health from the
debilitating effects of ozone depletion, such as increased incidence of
skin cancer and cataracts. These global efforts resulted in the
adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer in September 1987, which was ratified by the United States in
1988, and has now been ratified by 182 other countries.
Over the last 15 years, implementation of the Montreal Protocol and
its subsequent amendments has yielded remarkable progress in protecting
the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out the consumption and use of
ozone depleting substances on a global scale. The United States has met
its obligations under the Montreal Protocol by phasing out
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl
chloroform.
Although the State Department is the lead agency responsible for
coordinating our participation in the Protocol, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is the principal entity responsible for
domestic implementation of the Protocol, under authority provided by
the Clean Air Act. (The Clean Air Act specifically authorizes EPA to
take steps necessary to ensure that our domestic regulations are
consistent with our obligations under the Protocol.) Additionally, the
Department of Justice and EPA have played an important role by
identifying and prosecuting individuals engaged in illegal smuggling of
ozone-depleting substances, making the United States a world leader in
these law enforcement activities.
The Protocol also includes provisions to establish a Multilateral
Fund to provide financial and technical assistance to developing
country Parties to assist them in meeting their obligations under the
Protocol. As the largest contributor to the Multilateral Fund, the
United States has made available over $340 million to the Fund since
its inception.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES)
CITES, called by some the Washington Convention, concluded on March
3, 1973 in Washington, DC. and entered into force on July 1, 1975. As
of July 1st of this year, 158 Parties have adopted the Convention.
CITES conservation goals are to: monitor international trade in
endangered species; maintain those species in an ecological balance;
and assist countries toward a sustainable use of species through
international trade. The contracting Parties to CITES recognize that
international cooperation is essential for the protection of wild flora
and fauna.
CITES Parties regulate wildlife trade through controls and
regulations on species listed in three appendices. Appendix I lists
species threatened by extinction which are or may be affected by trade.
Trade in Appendix I species is allowed only in exceptional, non-
commercial circumstances and only with permits from both the exporting
and importing country. Appendix II species include species which, while
not now threatened with extinction, may become so unless trade in such
specimens is subject to strict regulation. Export permits are required
from the country of export, and both exporting and importing countries
must monitor the use of those permits. Trade in Appendix III species
requires a certificate of origin and an export permit based on a
finding of legal acquisition and satisfaction of preparation and
shipping conditions. Listing or de-listing of species in Appendix I or
II requires consideration by the Conference of the Parties of species
proposals submitted by Parties. To succeed, such proposals must gain a
two-thirds majority in a vote of the Parties. Individual Parties can
list species under their jurisdiction in Appendix III for the purpose
of preventing or restricting exploitation or if they deem a need for
cooperation in controlling the trade. A Party may take a reservation to
the listing of a species on Appendix I or II within 90 days of the vote
and anytime after the addition of a species to Appendix III. As the
trade impact or other threats to a species increase or decrease,
species may be shifted between, added to, or removed from these
Appendices.
CITES also regulates international trade through a system of import
and export permits that are required before specimens leave a country.
Each Party must appoint a CITES Management Authority and a CITES
Scientific Authority. The Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the
Interior, is the Management Authority and Scientific Authority for
CITES for the United States and also plays the major law enforcement
role. The Management Authority is responsible for issuing permits and
implementation of the trade controls of the convention, as well as
maintaining records of trade in specimens in the Appendices. The
Scientific Authority is responsible for making scientific findings on
whether trade will be detrimental to the survival of a species and for
monitoring the export permits granted against the actual level of trade
for a species. CITES also requires law enforcement capability to
enforce the CITES provisions and penalize illegal trade.
With respect to implementation, the U.S. implements CITES primarily
through regulations developed under the Endangered Species Act as well
as enforces it through other existing laws such as the Lacey Act. The
United States ensures compliance through extensive regulatory systems;
Washington based policy, scientific and permitting offices; and
enforcement personnel at designated CITES ports. These are administered
by the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior and/or the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agriculture.
The United States is proud of its record in implementing its CITES
obligations. We are at the forefront of CITES parties in fulfilling
these obligations. CITES studies have recognized these accomplishments.
For example, one determined that the United States has effective
national legislation implementing CITES obligations, and another found
that the United States was effectively controlling the trade in tigers
and tiger parts. A strong and professional staff at the Fish and
Wildlife Service, together with good coordination with the State
Department, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other
agencies, have made this notable success possible.
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Negotiations that led to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) began in Chantilly, Virginia, in February 1991 at the
invitation of President George H.W. Bush. The negotiations concluded on
May 9, 1992, in New York where the convention was adopted. It was
subsequently opened for signature at the June 1992 U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED). The UNFCCC entered into force on
March 21, 1994, after ratification by 50 Parties. The United States
ratified the UNFCCC on October 15, 1992, becoming the first
industrialized Nation and the fourth Nation overall to do so. As of
July 2002, the UNFCCC has 186 Parties.
The UNFCCC creates a broad global framework for addressing the
challenge of climate change. It establishes an objective, commitments
for different groups of countries, and a set of institutions to enable
governments to consider and adopt appropriate actions and to monitor
the Convention's implementation. The Convention groups countries into
two annexes. Annex I lists most members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) plus the states of Central
and Eastern Europe as well as several states of the Former Soviet
Union. Prior to the year 2000, Annex I Parties were to adopt policies
and measures aimed at returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels. Annex II lists a smaller subset of Annex I Parties who agreed
to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in
implementing their Convention commitments.
The ultimate objective of the Convention is to achieve
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced]
interference with the climate system. The Convention's objective
further provides that: ``Such a level should be achieved within a time-
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.''
All Parties to the Convention are committed to respond to climate
change and to cooperate in various ways toward this end. In particular,
each Party is required to prepare and submit a national inventory of
its emissions by sources and removals by sinks (forests and other
natural systems that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere) of
greenhouse gases. Each party is also required to prepare a national
communication describing the steps it is taking to implement the
Convention. The United States submitted its Third National
Communication (the U.S. Climate Action Report) to the Convention's
secretariat in May 2002.
In addition, the Convention requires that all Parties:
<bullet> Formulate national or regional programs containing
measures to mitigate climate change;
<bullet> Promote the development and diffusion of technologies
that control, reduce or prevent greenhouse gas emissions;
<bullet> Promote sustainable management and conservation of sinks
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;
<bullet> Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of
climate change;
<bullet> Take climate change considerations into account to
minimize adverse effects of steps taken to mitigate or adapt to climate
change on the economy, on public health, and on the quality of the
environment by carefully considering climate change actions;
<bullet> Promote and cooperate in research, systematic observation
and the development of data archives related to the climate system so
as to further understanding and reduce uncertainties about the causes,
effects, magnitude and timing of climate change and the consequences of
response strategies;
<bullet> Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt
exchange of scientific and other information related to the climate
system and the consequences of response strategies, and
<bullet> Promote and cooperate in education, training and public
awareness related to climate change.
Annex I Parties have more extensive requirements under the
Convention to report on the steps they are taking to address climate
change and, as noted, prior to the year 2000 they were to aim to return
their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels. Annex II Parties
have certain additional requirements under the Convention. They agreed
to provide financial assistance to developing country Parties to help
them meet their Convention commitments, and they agreed to assist
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation to
those adverse effects. Annex II Parties also agreed to assist other
Parties, particularly developing country Parties, with technology
transfer and access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how.
The Global Environment Facility serves as an operating entity of
the Convention's financial mechanism. All Annex II Parties contribute
to the Global Environment Facility, including the United States. In
addition, however, developed country Parties may also provide financial
resources related to the implementation of the Convention through
bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. The U.S. Climate
Action Report contains detailed information both with respect to U.S.
contributions to the GEF as well as with respect to the other means
through which the United States is meeting its obligations under the
Convention.
The work of the Convention takes place in two subsidiary bodies--
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation--which meet normally twice a year to
prepare for an annual meeting of the Conference of the Parties, the
supreme body under the Convention. The subsidiary bodies held their
most recent session from June 3-14 in Bonn, Germany, the seat of the
Convention's secretariat. The 8th Conference of the Parties will take
place from October 23 to November 1, 2002, in New Delhi.
Negotiations to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties began
in 1995, following a decision--the so-called ``Berlin Mandate''--taken
at the first session of the Conference of the Parties. In July 1997,
the Senate adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of 95-0 urging
the administration to sign no agreement that would harm the U.S.
economy or that did not contain specific scheduled quantified
commitments for developing countries. In December 1997, Parties to the
Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol at their third session. The
United States signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998. The
previous administration never subsequently sent the Protocol to the
Senate for advice and consent, maintaining that the Kyoto Protocol was
a ``work in progress'' and that key developing countries would need to
agree to ``meaningful participation'' for the United States to ratify
it.
After taking office in 2001, President Bush announced that the
United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it would harm
the U.S. economy and it contained no commitments for 80 percent of the
world. At the same time, the President indicated that each Nation must
decide whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol based on an assessment of
its national interest and that the United States would not interfere
with the decisions of other nations in this regard. As of July 2002, 74
nations and one regional economic integration organization (the
European Union) had ratified or acceded to the Kyoto Protocol.
Collectively, these countries represent 36 percent of the 1990 carbon
dioxide emissions of the Convention's Annex I Parties. Under its terms,
the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force once 55 Parties to the
Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted
for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990
of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
President Bush has made two major announcements of U.S. policy
regarding global climate change--on June 11, 2001, and on February 14,
2002. Both of these announcements call for intensified efforts with
other nations to address the challenge of climate change. Toward this
end, the United States has initiated a series of bilateral climate
change relationships with important partners, including: Australia,
Central America (CONCAUSA), the European Union, Canada, China, India,
Italy and Japan. Discussions toward additional climate change
relationships have begun or are contemplated also with: Brazil, Mexico,
the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa and
Ukraine.
These bilateral climate change relationships range from those
devoted largely to undertaking cooperative science and technology
projects to those that may focus more on the exchange of information
and views related to climate change policy. Along this continuum--from
S&T projects at one end to policy at the other--each relationship
usually involves a particular mix of the two. In the case of Japan, for
example, we have three working groups focused on: (1) S&T cooperation;
(2) developing countries; and (3) market mechanisms.
Both with our continued, active participation under the UNFCCC and
in our bilateral relationships that complement and enhance our
multilateral cooperation, we are seeking to build relationships that
will enable us and others to address the long term challenge of climate
change on a balanced and measured basis, consistent with the need to
ensure the continued economic prosperity for our citizens and our
Nation.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
commonly referred to as the NAFTA environmental side agreement, serves
as an important framework for cooperation among the three North
American governments on a wide range of environmental affairs. Among
other things, the NAAEC established the Commission on Environmental
Cooperation (CEC), which coordinates such cooperation. The United
States remains committed to the agreement, which has been in force
since 1994, and to the North American environmental cooperation that
takes place under it.
The Commission established by the agreement is composed of a
Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. The
Council is the governing body, and is composed of representatives of
the governments. The three environment ministers represent their
governments on the Council. The EPA Administrator is the designated
U.S. representative on the Council and EPA has lead responsibility for
managing the interagency process that develops U.S. positions and
guides our participation in the CEC. The Department of State works
closely with EPA and maintains responsibility on all questions
regarding the interpretation of the agreement. We play an active role
in implementation of the NAAEC and in developing work through the CEC.
The NAAEC is notable for a high degree of citizen participation. A
trilateral Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) participates in CEC
deliberations, including direct interaction with the Council. The
governments each appoint five members to the JPAC, who represent a wide
array of stakeholders from industry, academia, and nongovernmental
organizations. Each country also maintains governmental and/or non-
governmental domestic advisory bodies. The structure of the CEC has
produced fluid communication among our countries that has enhanced
significantly our broader relationships.
The NAAEC also contains a public submission process in which
citizens may submit claims to the Secretariat regarding the failure of
a government to enforce its environmental laws and the Council may
direct the development and release of a ``factual record'' concerning
the claim in response.
The NAAEC has promoted strong cooperation among the three countries
on a number of important environmental issues, achieved primarily
through implementation of the CEC work program funded at US$9 million
annually with equal contributions by the Parties. These include
promotion of enforcement of and compliance with environmental laws,
protecting children's environmental health, protecting animal species
that migrate throughout North America, and minimizing the use of
certain persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT. Trilateral cooperation
under the NAAEC has provided an impetus for the development of certain
types of environmental legislation, particularly the new mandatory
Pollutant Release and Transfer Register in Mexico.
The United States has fully complied with our obligations under the
NAAEC. Unlike some other environmental agreements that call for very
specific actions or the achievement of specific targets in a designated
timeframe, the NAAEC sets up a general framework for cooperation, which
is then developed and implemented over time through the CEC. This has
proven to be an effective framework for promoting environmental
cooperation within North America.
The U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification
The U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) arose out of
the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro at which African countries
argued that the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Convention on Biological Diversity did not address their major
concern--desertification. Desertification--the degradation of dry
lands--is not limited to Africa: it affects millions of people
inhabiting one quarter of the world's land area from the American west,
to the Aral Sea in Russia, to Argentina and the islands of the
Caribbean, Indonesia and the Mediterranean.
The United States played a key role in negotiating the UNCCD--a
role which is a natural outgrowth of the United States' experience
during the Dust Bowl of the 1930's and our long-standing concern about
desertification in developing countries, particularly in Africa.
Negotiations on the CCD concluded in June 1994 and the Convention
entered into force in December 1996.
The purpose of the Convention is to combat desertification and
mitigate the effects of drought on arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid
lands through effective local, national, regional and global action,
particularly in Africa. The Convention's central objective is to
promote the sustainable use of drylands worldwide, but especially in
Africa, and to make more efficient use of aid resources, thereby
helping to solve Africa's and other affected regions' chronic hunger
problems. The CCD employs a unique grass-roots approach, emphasizing a
``bottom-up'' approach with strong local participation in
decisionmaking.
Under the Convention, the United States, with approximately 40
percent of our landmass considered arid, semi-arid or dry sub-humid and
therefore susceptible to the processes of desertification, is an
affected Party. As an affected Party, the United States is required to
have strategies to address desertification. Given our extensive system
of land management strategies, practices and programs, no changes were
or are required in our domestic policies or programs for the U.S. to
meet this obligation under the Convention. (The Convention acknowledges
that Parties may implement their obligations through ``existing or
prospective'' arrangements). Many of the principles used successfully
in the U.S. over the past 70 years have been incorporated in the
language of the Convention. All Parties are required to submit reports
to the Secretariat of the CCD on activities undertaken in support of
the CCD, on a timetable determined by the Conference of the Parties.
The first U.S. Report on Activities Undertaken in Support of the U.N.
Convention to Combat Desertification was officially submitted July 3,
2002.
The United States is also required to provide support for
developing country efforts to combat desertification, including by
providing financial resources, although the Convention does not impose
a specific amount or timing with respect to this requirement.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead
U. S. government agency implementing the CCD overseas. The Department
of the Interior (Bureau of Land Management) and the Department of
Agriculture also carry out program activities in support of the
implementation of the Convention. Bilaterally and regionally, the
United States works with affected developing country Parties, local and
international non-governmental organizations, and multilateral
development banks on anti-desertification program activities, including
education, community development, and capacity building, with the goal
of empowering local people to combat desertification by identifying
needs and solving problems themselves. An important aspect of CCD
implementation is the dissemination of technology and scientific and
technical information. The U.S. has made and will continue to make an
important contribution in this area, given our 70 years of experience
combating desertification in the American West.
Looking Ahead
While significant progress in protecting the environment has been
made, enormous challenges lie ahead. The upcoming World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa, provides
the United States with a unique opportunity to take stock of our past
accomplishments and to build on them in helping to advance economic and
social growth and environmental stewardship. We have learned a great
deal since the Rio Earth Summit. WSSD gives us a chance to create a new
paradigm that stresses sound economic policies, national capacity for
good governance, anti-corruption, transparency and the role of science.
The Bush Administration is committed to its success.
______
Responses of James F. Turner to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. Please provide a complete list of the status of all
environmental treaties that the United States has signed and ratified
(or only signed) since 1945, including all dates of signature and
ratification. Please note the environmental treaties since 1945 that
the United States has neither ratified nor signed.
Response. The State Department does not maintain a separate data
base of environmental treaties, and is in the process of compiling the
requested information from the official records.
Question 2. What is the best way for the public to determine
whether the United States is complying with its international
environmental agreements?
Response. One useful method is to review the obligations contained
in the agreements and consider what steps the United States has taken
with respect to each such obligation. In some cases the latter will
involve considering a wide range of U.S. Government programs and
activities.
Question 3. Your boss, Ms. Dobriansky, and others in the
Administration have been quoted as saying ``Sustainable Development
begins at home.'' What exactly does that mean and how is it measured?
Response. The Administration uses the phrase ``sustainable
development begins at home'' to describe a provision in the agreement
reached at the U.N. Conference on Financing for Development in
Monterrey, Mexico in March this year, specifically, ``Each country has
primary responsibility for its own economic and social development . .
.'' We advocate that development be sustainable, and that to achieve
this sustainable development, nations must practice good domestic
governance. Good domestic governance is characterized by robust
democratic institutions (including a popularly elected legislature and
an independent judiciary); effective measures to combat corruption;
adherence to the rule of law (i.e., fair and consistent application of
law); public participation in decisionmaking; and the use of sound
science to guide those government decisions to the extent possible. A
country that is not committed to these goals, including being good
stewards of its natural resources, cannot expect development to occur
optimally, because the full range of development resources, both
domestic and foreign, will not be mobilized and effectively used to
foster economic and social development and environmental protection.
International cooperation and development assistance will continue to
play an important support role. However, the commitment to sustainable
development, and to establish the needed framework to promote such
development must begin domestically.
Question 4. One of the purposes of the World Summit is to re-
energize efforts at the national level in regard to sustainable
development and the implementation of Agenda 21. What domestic actions
is the Administration considering as followup to Johannesburg?
Response. The Administration plans to continue efforts to implement
Agenda 21 through a number of mechanisms including innovative public-
private partnerships. The Council on Environmental Quality, the
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, Department
of Commerce, Department of Agriculture and other government agencies
are actively working with the public and private sectors to ensure that
sustainable development is a priority? at the national level.
Question 5. Could you please provide a list for the record of the
U.S. delegation representatives that will be attending, and the list of
U.S. delegation representatives that attended the Rio Earth Summit?
Response. We have attached a provisional list of the U.S.
delegation to the World Summit on Sustainable Development and a list of
the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
united states delegation to the world summit on sustainable
development, johannesburg, august 26--september 4, 2002
Ex Officio Head of Delegation
The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State
Representatives
The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky
Under Secretary for Global Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable John F. Turner
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Alternate Representatives
The Honorable Claude A. Allen
Deputy Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services
The Honorable Robert G. Card
Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment
Department of Energy
The Honorable James L. Connaughton
Chairman
Council on Environmental Quality
Executive Office of the President
The Honorable Linda J. Fisher
Deputy Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
The Honorable Cameron R. Hume
United States Ambassador
Pretoria
The Honorable Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Commerce
Jonathan A. Margolis
Director
Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Richard T. Miller
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable James R. Moseley
Deputy Secretary
Department of Agriculture
The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios
Administrator
Agency for International Development
Anthony F. Rock
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State
The Honorable Sichan Siv
Ambassador
United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council
United States Mission to the United Nations
The Honorable Peter S. Watson
President and Chief Executive Officer Overseas Private Investment
Corporation
The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman
Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
Senior Advisers
Alan Hecht
Council on Environmental Quality
National Security Council
Executive Office of the President
Donald K. Steinberg
Deputy Director
Office of the Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Advisers
Kate Almquist
Special Assistant
Office of the Administrator
Agency for International Development
Christo Artusio
Office of Global Change
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Deborah M. Atwood
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
Department of Agriculture
The Honorable Judith E. Ayres
Assistant Administrator for International Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
Adela Backiel
Director of Sustainable Development
Department of Agriculture
Janice F. Bay
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Department of State
John Beale
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
Karin Berry
Senior Policy Analyst
Department of Energy
Robert Blair
Office of International Health Affairs
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Evan T. Bloom
Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Office of the Legal Adviser
Department of State
The Honorable Richard A. Boucher
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Department Spokesman
Department of State
Marcel Bouquet
Interpreter
Office of Language Services
Department of State
Sarah K. Brandel
Office of Ocean Affairs Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State
William J. Brennan
Deputy Assistant Secretary
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Department of
Commerce
Gayleatha Brown
Counselor for Political Affairs
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Lori Brutten
Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Steven Buckler
Counselor for Administrative Affairs
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Jeffry Burnam
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Stephanie Childs
Senior Adviser
Office of the Under Secretary for International Trade
International Trade Administration Department of Commerce
Brent Christensen
Economic Officer
United States Embassy Beijing
Cynthia Church
Deputy Press Secretary
Department of State
Karen Clark
Department of the Interior
Lawrence E. Clark
Associate Chief
Natural Resource Conservation Service
Department of Agriculture
Gerald Clifford
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Office of International Activities
Environmental Protection Agency
Sally D. Collins
Associate Chief
United States Forest Service
Department of Agriculture
William E. Craft
Director
Office of Multilateral Trade Affairs
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Department of State
Jonathan Crock
Office of the Ambassador-at-Large For War Crime Issues
Department of State
The Honorable Patrick M. Cronin
Assistant Administrator
Agency for International Development
Wayne D'Angelo
Advance Director
Environmental Protection Agency
John Davison
Deputy United States Representative to the Economic and Social
Council
United States Mission to the United Nations
Jill Derderian
Environment, Science and Technology Officer
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Stewart Devine
Advance Line Officer
Executive Secretariat
Department of State
Joseph Martin Dieu
Coordinator for the World Summit on Sustainable Development
Office of International Activities Environmental Protection Agency
Dirk Dijkerman
United States Agency for International Development Director
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Larisa Dobrianaky
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Department of Energy
James R. Dunlap
Executive Assistant
Bureau of African Affairs
Department of State
Dennie Ege
Office of International Conferences
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Department of State
Virginia L. Farris
Public Affairs Officer
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Joseph Ferrante
Assistant to the Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
Cory A. Firestone
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental, and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable Emil Frankel
Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy
Department of Transportation
The Honorable Jendayi E. Frazer
Special Assistant to the President And Senior Director for African
Affairs
National Security Council
Executive Office of the President
Joseph Freedman
Associate General Counsel
Environmental Protection Agency
William M. Frej
Director for Development Issues
National Security Council
Executive Office of the President
William R. Gaines
Coordinator for International Affairs
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Executive Office of the President
The Honorable David Garman
Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Department of Energy
Isabel N. Gates
Office of the Executive Director
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Joanne B. Giordano
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs
Agency for International Development
Virginia Green
Vice President
Investment Policy
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Jeff J. Grieco
Chief
Multimedia Communications Division ``Bureau for Legislativeand Public
Affairs
Agency for International Development
Joseph B. Ham
Trade Specialist
Department of Agriculture
Robert K. Harris
Attorney Adviser
Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Office of the Legal Adviser
Department of State
John J. Hartley, II
Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Jennifer A. Haverkamp
Assistant United States Trade Representative for Environment and
Natural Resources
Office of the United States Trade Representative Executive Office of
the President
Richard Helm
Counselor for Agricultural Affairs
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Leonard A. Hirsch
Adviser
Smithsonian Institution
Teresa D. Hobgood
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Ronald Neil Hoffer
Environmental Protection Agency
The Honorable Jeffrey Holmstead
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation
Environmental Protection Agency
Heather Hopkins
Legislative Program Specialist
Congressional Liaison Division
Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs
Agency for International Development
Robert P. Hopkins
Director
External Affairs
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Commerce
Chase M. Huntley
Analyst
Natural Resources and Environment
General Accounting Office
Kelly A. Johnson
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Environment and Natural Resources Division
Department of Justice
The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Department of State
Roy S. Katayaina
Adviser
Agency for International Development
Craig Kelly
Executive Assistant
Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Carol Kramer-LeBlanc
Adviser on Food Security
Foreign Agricultural Service
Department of Agriculture
Luisa Joy G. Labez
Senior International Affairs Analyst
General Accounting Office
Washington, DC.
Karen T. Levine
United States Representative to the United Nations Environment
Program
United States Embassy
Nairobi
Herbert Levitan
National Science Foundation
Frances C. Li
National Science Foundation
Clay Lowery
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Debt, Development and
Quantitative Policy Analysis
Department of the Treasury
James A. Mahoney
Vice President
Engineering and Environment
Export-Import Bank of the United States
Joe Martyak
Associate Administrator for Communications, Education and Media
Environmental Protection Agency
Jan L. McAlpine
Office of Ecology and Terrestrial Conservation
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
John McCutcheon
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Department of Energy
Elizabeth McLanahan
International Affairs Specialist
Department of Commerce
Thomas K. McNeil, Jr.
Personal Assistant to the Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
James Metzger
Military Adviser to the Secretary of State and
Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gillian Milovanovic
Deputy Chief of Mission
United States Embassy
Pretoria
Linda V. Moodie
Chief
Application and Information Services Branch
International and Interagency Affairs Office
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Commerce
Franklin Moore
Director
Global Center for the Environment
Agency for International Development
Melinda Moore
Deputy Director
Office of Global Health Affairs
Department of Health and Human Services
Sahar Moridani
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable Everett L. Mosley
Inspector General
Agency for International Development
Jacob Moss
Special Assistant
Environmental Protection Agency
The Honorable Constance Berry Newman
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
Agency for International Development
Rachel Nugent
National Institutes of Health
Department of Health and Human Services
Elisha Nyman
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs
Department of State
Jennifer M. O'Connor
Adviser
Department of Agriculture
Richard Parker
Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services
The Honorable Elizabeth Anne Peterson
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Global Health
Agency for International Development
C. Anne Pence
Executive Assistant
Office-of the Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural
Affairs
Department of State
Brett Pomainville
Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Susan Povenmire
Office of Public Diplomacy
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State
The Honorable Pierre Prosper
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime Issues
Department of State
Scott C. Rayder
Chief of Staff
Office of the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Department of
Commerce
Henry David Reese
Environmental Protection Specialist
Department of Transportation
Daniel Rochberg
Office of Policy Coordination and.Initiatives
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State
Peter Roussopoulos
Adviser on Sustainable Development
United States Forest Service
Department of Agriculture
James W. Rubin
Assistant Chief
Policy, Legislation and Special Litigation
Department of Justice
Aaron Salzberg
Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State
Brenda Scarborough
Advance Communications
Executive Secretariat
Department of State
Walter Gary Sharp
Congressional Relations Adviser
Bureau of Legislative Affairs
Department of State
Betsi Shays
Adviser
Peace Corps
Marysue Shore
Senior Adviser to the President and Director of, African Affairs
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
The Honorable Eimny B. Simmons
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade
Agency for International Development
Daniel Smith
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of State
Dean Thompson
Advance Line Officer
Executive Secretariat
Department of State
Griffin M. Thompson
Director
Office of Energy, Environment and Technology
Center for the Environment
Agency for International Development
Eileen Ramira Travoto
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
Michael C. Trulson
Office of Environmental Policy
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State
David J. van Hoogstraten
Office of Environmental Policy
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Darci L. Vetter
Office of the United States Trade Representative
Executive Office of the President
Harlan Watson
Office of Global Change
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs
Department of State
Eric B. Wilson
Senior Program Analyst
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Department of the Interior
William Stanley Wilson
Senior Scientist
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Commerce
Whitney Witteman
Office of International Conferences
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Department of State
Private Sector Advisers
Geraldine Barrows
Special Assistant
Office of the Mayor
Hempstead, New York
Manley A. Begay
Director
Native Nations Institute
Navajo Tribe
Tucson, Arizona
George D. Carpenter
Director of Corporate Sustainable Development
Procter and Gamble Company
Cincinnati, Ohio
Richard Coombe
Chair and Chief Executive Officer
Watershed Agricultural Council
Walton, New York
Dianne Dillon Ridgely
Director
The Center for a New American Dream
Iowa City, Iowa
Daniel Esty
Director
Yale Center on Environmental Law and Policy
Yale Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
The Honorable James A. Garner
Mayor
Hempstead, New York
Hank Habicht
Chief Executive Officer
Global Environment and Technology Foundation
Annandale, Virginia
Lauren Inouye
Stanford Institute for International Studies
Center for Environmental Science and Policy
Washington, DC.
John Klink
Montecito, California
F. Sherwood Rowland
National Academy of Sciences
Irvine, California
Chris Tucker
Actor and Comedian
Los Angeles, California
UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE WORLD SUMMIT ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT JOHANNESBURG, AUGUST 26--SEPTEMBER 4, 2002
Members of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Thomas H. Allen
House of Representatives
The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
House of Representatives
The Honorable James C. Greenwood
House of Representatives
The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich
House of Representatives
The Honorable George Miller
House of Representatives
The Honorable Christopher Shays
House of Representatives
Congressional Staff
Sara Elizabeth Barth
Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Barbara Boxer
U.S. Senate
Janine Benner
Legislative Assistant
Office of Congressman Earl Blumenauer
House of Representatives
Floyd DesChamps
Senior Professional Staff Member
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
U.S. Senate
Greg Dotson
Counsel
Committee on Government Reform and
Office of Congressman Henry A. Waxman
House of Representatives
Deb Fiddelke
Press Director
Office of Senator Chuck Hagel
U.S. Senate
Kenneth W. Flanz
Deputy Legislative Director
Office of Senator Michael D. Crapo
U.S. Senate
Amy A. Fraenkel
Counsel
Committee On Commerce, Science and Transportation
U.S. Senate
Richard Frandsen
Senior Counsel
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Stephen E. Moody
Legislative Assistant
Office of Congressman George Miller
House of Representatives
Maurice A. Perkins
Professional Staff member
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate
Eric Pfuehler
Administrative Assistant
Office of Congressman David Bonior House of Representatives
Johanna F. Polsenberg
Legislative Fellow
Office of Congressman Sam Farr
House of Representatives
Tiffany Anne Prather
Legislative Fellow
Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. Senate
Paul L. Oostburg Sanz
Deputy Chief Counsel
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Dallas Scholes
Counsel/Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Michael Enzi
U.S. Senate
Alison Leigh Taylor
Chief Counsel
Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. Senate
The following Congressional Staff spouse will accompany the
delegation: Jacqueline Kae DesChamps.
Question 6. What measures should we look at to determine whether
U.S. programs and resources are achieving the goals of Agenda 21?
Response. There are a number of measures that could be considered
to evaluate our progress in achieving the goals of Agenda 21. The body
of international environmental agreements to which the United States is
a party provides one important measure. Beyond U.S. participation in
and implementation of treaties and conventions, however, is an
important body of domestic activities undertaken by both the U.S.
Government and the private sector to advance sustainable development
objectives. Examples of government activities include enactment and
implementation of Brownfields legislation (to promote cleanup and reuse
of contaminated land) and TEA-21 (which, among other things, promotes
sustainable transportation) and voluntary policy initiatives such as
the U.S.-led International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), the U.N.
Forest Forum (which is developing a set of indicators for the
sustainable management of the world's most endangered forest
resources), and the Arctic Council (which has identified and
implemented voluntary measures to reduce toxic chemicals that pose a
particular bioaccumulation risk in animals and humans in polar
regions). Voluntary measures implemented by the private sector in the
United States, such as the Energy Star program for energy efficient
appliances and the adoption of clean production technologies and
methods, have also contributed significantly to achievement of the
goals of Agenda 21.
Question 7. The Administration has strongly promoted the concept of
concrete ``partnerships,'' or Type II initiatives, including ones on
sustainable energy and clean water. What is the status of these efforts
and does the Administration plan to provide new financial resources for
such partnerships? How will the Administration guarantee that voluntary
partnerships will deliver real progress for sustainable development,
especially if they are not designed to implement specific international
agreements with targets and timetables? How can the Administration
guarantee that any partnerships that involve corporations are carried
out in a responsible manner if there is no independent oversight
framework?
Response. The United States is proposing four ``signature''
partnerships that have been created as a result of preparations for
WSSD. These are in the fields of energy, water, hunger and forests.
These partnerships are ``coalitions of the willing'', voluntary in
nature and open to those governments, NGO's, private sector entities,
and civil society groups who wish to participate. In other words, they
do not require the negotiation of an international treaty, but rather
are invitations to cooperate to achieve a shared goal. We would expect
that each partnership would identify its goals and periodically provide
a report on its progress. Such reports should be accessible and open to
the public. The Commission on Sustainable Development could be used as
the forum in which partnerships provide their reports, further
increasing transparency and thereby accountability. The Administration
plans to finance these partnerships through existing resources.
Question 8. The Administration has (rightly) been very strong on
the importance of ``good governance'' to sustainable development. The
President announced in a speech at the Inter-American Development Bank
on March 14 that the United States will increase its core development
assistance by 50 percent over the next 3 years, resulting in a $5
billion annual increase over current levels. These additional funds
will go to a new Millennium Challenge Account that will fund
initiatives to help developing nations improve their economies and
standards of living. The Millennium Challenge Account will set criteria
for how the additional $5 billion the United States has pledged will be
allocated. But ``good governance'' does not come cheap. How does the
Administration propose to assist countries to bring about ``good
governance,'' as opposed to rewarding countries exhibiting it? How much
of U.S. aid is currently spent on ``good governance''?
The Federal Government currently funds many programs that promote
good governance across in almost every developing country of the world.
U.S. assistance for governance programs was over $1.5 billion in fiscal
year 02 for programs supporting, among other things; policy training
for civil servants and elected officials, government information
management, promotion of civil society groups, election monitoring,
anti-corruption, judicial and prosecutorial. capacity-building, women's
and workers' rights, public-private partnerships, and food security.
These programs, among many others, will continue within the framework
of existing development assistance.
Tbe MCA will be a new account that will supplement, not replace,
existing programs. The MCA will assist countries that have made a
commitment to ruling justly, investing in people, and promoting
economic freedom. MCA funds will be distributed in flexible and
innovative ways so that they can have a maximum impact on economic
growth and poverty reduction. Country ownership is a critical component
of the MCA. The uses of the funds will be determined by full engagement
with recipient countries. We will partner with, not dictate to, MCA
countries.
Competition for the MCA will inspire non-recipient countries to
improve their performance on governance. Countries that do improve
their performance will be in a position to compete for MCA funding in
the future. Existing U.S. Government programs can help those countries
that are willing to engage in serious policy reform.
Question 9. What are the criteria for the Millennium Challenge
Account? Why is it proposed to announce these after WSSD? What will be'
the role of environmental measures in the criteria? What environmental
criteria will apply to expenditure of the funds?
Response. The Administration is still evaluating criteria to
determine how funds from the Millennium Challenge Account would be
disbursed. We are consulting with development partners in developed
countries as well as with potential developing country recipients as we
develop these criteria. This thorough process, which began immediately
after the Financing for Development Summit in Monterrey in March, is
independent of the timetable for WSSD.
Question 10. What effect has the U.S. farm bill had on U.S.
negotiating capacity and leverage, particularly with respect to the
issue of reducing environmentally harmful subsidies? How has this
affected U.S. credibility?
Response. The United States is strongly committed to an ambitious
outcome reducing global trade distortions in agriculture through the
WTO. As Ambassador Zoellick has made clear, our strategy in pursuing
this goal rests on a three-legged stool consisting of the new U.S.
proposal for the Doha WTO negotiations to reduce agricultural
subsidies, the U.S. Farm Bill, and trade promotion authority.
Many, particularly in the international community, have exaggerated
the provisions in the U.S. Farm Bill and claimed it throws into
question our true interest in seeking reduced agricultural subsidies.
But the bottom line is that domestic support under the farm bill is
entirely consistent with WTO obligations. Under WTO rules, the United
States is allowed to provide up to $19.1 billion annually in ``trade-
distorting'' support. The Farm Bill, for the first time, was
consciously drafted with these limits in mind. Not only did Congress
consider how support under the farm programs would be counted against
the U.S.-allowed support level, but also it included an unprecedented
``circuit breaker'' mandating the Secretary of Agriculture to modify
programs to ensure compliance with U.S. international obligations.
If other countries agree with the U.S. Government that world
agricultural tariffs and subsidies are too high, we urge them to join
us at the negotiating table. Congress has just renewed the President's
trade promotion authority, and we believe a successful conclusion to
the WTO negotiations will ensure congressional support for necessary
modifications to our domestic agricultural programs required under any
new WTO commitments.
Regarding environmentally harmful subsidies, it is worth noting
that the farm bill pays directly for conservation programs that are
important to the Americanpublic. This reflects our consistent stand
that it is important for governments to support farmers and rural
communities in ways that are targeted, transparent, and non-trade
distorting. By setting these examples, the farm bill, if anything,
strengthens the Administration's ability to work toward the
environmental objectives laid out in the Trade Promotion Authority act.
Question 11. Please list all the new ``Type I'' commitments--the
more conventional negotiated declarations and action plans--that the
United States intends to enter into at WSSD.
Response. The text is still under negotiation. The final outcomes
will be determined in Johannesburg. We will supply you with the final
Johannesburg Plan of Action and political declaration after the Summit
has ended. We note that any Type I outcomes will not be ``commitments''
in a legal sense because the WSSD outcomes. will all be non-binding.
Question 12. Explain the linkage between the Type I and Type II
initiatives. Aren't strong Type II partnerships connected to having
some type of concrete framework?
Response. The international community has already agreed to a large
number of goals, targets and timetables. For example, the United States
strongly supports the internationally agreed Millennium Declaration
goals. In our view, partnerships are clearly linked to such goals in
that partnerships are one of the main mechanisms through which to
implement such goals.
Question 13. How many Type II partnerships is the United States
proposing for WSSD? Where is the full list? What government agencies
and private companies are to be involved?
Response. While the major Type II partnerships under development
for WSSD are still under active review, they are outlined in the
response to question 7. Broad inter-agency teams composed of relevant
U.S.G agencies are working on these efforts. We welcome the broad
participation of business, NGO's, and other major groups in such
partnerships. We plan to continue building partnerships well after the
Johannesburg Summit has finished: this is not a process that ends with
the Summit.
Please see the attached list of our Type II partnerships.
united states delegation to the united nations conference on
environment and development (unced) rio de janeiro, june 3-14, 1992
Representative
The Honorable William K. Reilly
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Alternate Representatives
The Honorable Curtis Bohien
Assistant Secretary for Oceans'and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable J. Michael Davis
Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable Energy
Department of Energy
The Honorable Michael R. Deland
Chairman
Council on Environmental Quality
Executive Office of the President
The Honorable Robert Grady
Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy and Science
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Office of the President
The Honorable Richard H. Melton
Ambassador
United States Embassy
Brasilia
The Honorable Edward J. Perkins
Ambassador
Permanent, Representative of the United States to the United Nations
New York
The Honorable Ronald W. Roskens
Administrator
Agency for International Development
The Honorable Robert J. Ryan, Jr.
Coordinator for United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development Preparations
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable Michael K. Young
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Department of State
Advisers
Meredith Attwell
Office of Legislative Management
Bureau of Legislative Affairs
Department of State
Maureen Bannon, Lieutenant Commander, USN
Office of the Representative for Oceans Policy Affairs
Office of the Secretary
Department of Defense
Susan Biniaz
Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans,
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Office of the Legal
Adviser
Department of State
Patricia Bliss-Guest
Associate Director for International Law and Policy
Council on Environmental Quality
Executive Office of the President
Thomas A. Campbell
General Counsel
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Commerce
Nancy O'Neal Carter
Coordinator for Population Affairs
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Ed Cassidy
Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy
Office of Policy, Management and Budget Department of the Interior
Stephanie J. Caswell
Office of Ecology, Health and Conservation
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Melinda Chandler
Attorney-Adviser
Office of Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Office of the Legal Adviser
Department of State
David Cottingham
Director
Office of Ecology and Conservation
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Commerce
Anthony A. Das
Director
Office of Public Communications
Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State
Christine L. Dawson
Special Adviser for Environmental Issues
Office of the Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Department of State
Michael S. Delello
Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary
Department of Energy
Susan F. Drake
Office of Environmental Protection
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Milton K. Drucker
Office of International Commodities
Energy, Resources and Food Policy,
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Department of State
L. Val Giddings
Office of Biotechnology Biologics and Environmental Protection
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Department of Agriculture
Alan D. Hecht
Deputy Assistant Administrator for International Activities
Environmental Protection Agency
Matthew P. Hennesey
Director
Office of Multilateral Development Banking
Department of the Treasury
Twig Johnson
Director
Office of Environment and Natural Resources
Bureau of Research and Development
Agency for International Development
Gerald L. Kamens
Office of Policy Analysis and Resources
Directorate for Policy
Agency for International Development
Mark P. Kindall
Office of International Activities
Environmental Protection Agency
Stephen Klein
U.S. UNCED Coordination Center
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs.
Department of State
Jeffrey D. Kovar
Attorney-Adviser
Office of Legal Adviser
Department of State
William Lake
Consultant to the Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
Gary L. Larsen
International Forestry
Forest Service
Department of Agriculture
The Honorable Thomas E. Lovejoy
Assistant Secretary for External Affairs
Smithsonian Institution
Washington, DC.
John P. McGuinness
Office of Technical Specialized Agencies
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable Jonathan Moore
Ambassador
United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations
New York
Carol Ann Petsonk
Director
Office of Environmental Affairs
Office of the United States Trade Representative
Executive Office of the President
Eleanor W. Savage
Director
Office of Ecology, Health and Conservation
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
John P. Schmitz
Deputy Counsel to the President
Executive Office of the President
R. Tucker Scully
Director
Office of Ocean Affairs
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Jeff N. Sirmon
Deputy Chief for International Forestry
United States Forest Service
Department of Agriculture
Zell Steever
U.S. UNCED Coordination Center
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Linda Strachan
Special Assistant for Congressional Relations
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Scott B. Styles
Office of Legislative Management
Bureau of Legislative Affairs
Department of State
Neal A. Walidrop III
Office of Global Change
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Harlan Watson
Acting Assistant Secretary for Water and Science and Science Adviser to
the Secretary
Department of the Interior
Dr. Frank E. Young
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health (Science and Environment)
Public Health Service
Department of Health and Human Services
______
subject: congressional delegation to the united nations conference on
environment and development (unced) rio de janeiro, june 3-14, 1992
1. The following individuals comprise the United States
Congressional Delegation to UNCED:
A. Members of the Senate
The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr. (Chairman of the Senate Delegation)
U.S. Senate
The Honorable John N. Chafee (Vice Chairman of the Senate Delegation)
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Max Baucus
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Bob Graham
U.S. Senate
The Honorable John Kerry
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Frank H. Lautenberg
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Claiborne Pell
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Larry Pressler
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Steve Symms
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Paul Wellstone
U.S. Senate
The Honorable Timothy B. Wirth
U.S. Senate
b. members of the house of representatives
The Honorable George Miller (Chairman of the House Delegation)
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Anthony C. Beilenson
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Ben C. Blaz
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Cardiss Collins
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Robert W. Davis
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Edward F. Feighan
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Bill Green
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Dennis N. Hertel
U.S. House OF Representatives
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable James H. Scheuer
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Gerry Sikorski
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Robert C. Torricelli
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Jolene Unsoeld
U.S. House of Representatives
1
c. congressional staff supporting the paragraphs 1 and 2 above:
Unclassified
Daniel P. Beard
Staff Director
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Nancy M. Carman
Staff Consultant
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Carol Doherty
Senior Staff Assistant
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Susan Fagan
Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Symms
U.S. Senate
David B. Finnegan
Majority Counsel
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Susan R. Fletcher
Specialist, Environmental Policy
Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division
Congressional Research Service
Library of Congress
Gamier Jaszczaks, Colonel, USAF
Air Force Liaison Office
U.S. House of Representatives
Roy Kienitz
Professional Staff
Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. Senate
Jessica Laverty
Minority Counsel
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
John A. Lawrence
Administrative Assistant
Office of Congressman Miller
U.S. House of Representatives
Eileen Lee
Staff Director
Subcommittee on Environment
Committee on Science, Space and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
Kathleen McGinty
Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Gore
U.S. Senate
Thomas O. Melius
Professional Staff for Fish and Wildlife
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
U.S. House of Representatives
Julia Moffett
Professional Staff
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Charly Moore
Counsel
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
U.S. House of Representatives
Frank Norton, Colonel, USA
Army Liaison Office
U.S. Senate
John Robert Nunnally, Major, USAF
Air Force Liaison Office
U.S. House of Representatives
Joseph C. Pallone, Major, USA
Army Liaison Office
U.S. Senate
Jan Paulk
Director
Office of Interparliamentary Services
Office of the Secretary of the Senate
U.S. Senate
Steven N. Polansky
Professional Staff
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate
Marl A. Ronash
Press Secretary
Office of Senator Gore
U.S. Senate
Joan Teague Rose
Staff Assistant
Committee on Agriculture
U.S. House of Representatives
Dr. Artie L. Shelton, Colonel, USA
Army Liaison Office
U.S. Senate
Steven J. Shimberg
Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. Senate
Russell J. Wilson
Minority Staff Consultant
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Daniel Weiss
Director for Public Affairs
Committee on Interior and Public Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
2. Following Congressional spouses will accompany the delegation:
Tipper Gore, Virginia Chafee, Nuala Pell, Harriett Pressler, Loretta
Symms, Wren Wirth, Adele Graham, Ann Blaz, Nadine Feighan, Paul Pelosi
and Emily Scheuer.
Question 14. How and what is the United States commitment to WEHAB
(Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture, and Biodiversity)? What specific
actions will we take in these areas?
Response. WEHAB refers to the acronym that Secretary General Kofi
Annan proposed as priority areas for the Johannesburg Summit. We
support all five of the areas identified: water, energy, health,
agriculture, and biodiversity. The development assistance programs run
by USAID, USDA, EPA and other Federal agencies clearly reflect an
emphasis in these areas, as a survey prepared by USAID with input from
over 15 U.S. agencies indicates. Please see the attached document,
``Working for a Sustainable World: Government Initiatives to Promote
Sustainable Development.''
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Question 15. The United States, with other nations, has subscribed
to the UN's Millennium Development Goals on the alleviation of poverty,
access to safe drinking water, health and education, etc. But in the
preparatory meetings leading up to WSSD, the United States has been
isolated in remaining resolutely opposed to international efforts to
set out how these Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved. Why
is there a gap. between rhetoric and reality?
Response. The United States strongly supports efforts to implement
the internationally agreed Millennium Development goals. In our view,
based on our 60 years of development experience, partnerships are the
most effective way to implement those goals. The United States has
taken the lead in pursuing partnerships and pushing this effort
forward. We hope that other countries will join us in focusing on the
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. We have prepared a
compendium of success stories in water and energy, for example, which
details how partnerships in these sectors has led to concrete, on-the-
ground results improving the lives of individuals. (Please see the
attachment referred to in question 14). We have emphasized this view
throughout the preparatory process leading up to WSS]J.
Question 16. To what extent, financially or otherwise, will the
U.S. Government support President Mbeki's New Economic Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD)?
Response. NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, was
adopted by African heads of State in October 2001. The United States
and others have welcomed NEPAD for its African origins and emphasis on
good economic and political governance, including peer review and
monitoring. The real test of NEPAD will be whether the bold rhetoric is
reflected in concrete action and change. The objectives set out in
NEPAD are consistent with the President's Compact for Development
initiative, which emphasizes aid effectiveness through performance-
based development assistance, accountability, measurable results, and
local ownership.
In response to NEPAD, the United States and its G-8 partners
developed an Action Plan for Africa in which we committed to enter into
enhanced partnership, including providing additional resources, with
countries whose performance reflects the NEPAD commitments.
Specifically, our efforts will focus on countries that demonstrate a
commitment to good governance and the rule of law, investing in their
people, and pursuing policies that promote democracy, spur economic
growth, and alleviate poverty.
Question 17. How effective has the NAFTA environmental side
agreement the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC)--been at protecting the environment? Where could it be
improved?
Response. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) has proven to be a useful tool for protecting the environment.
Pursuant to the NAAEC, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC) was established and has evolved into an effective international
environmental institution. The CEC consistently demonstrates the
benefits of continental cooperation in addressing the environmental
components of liberalized trade, serving as a complement to the NAFTA.
The implementation of the NAAEC has led to environmental
achievements' including:
<bullet> The phase-out and reduction of toxic chemicals in North
America, including DDT;
<bullet> The protection of biodiversity through the North American
Bird Conservation Initiative, Species of Common Conservation Concern,
North American Marine Protected Areas Network, and the bilateral U.S.-
Mexico Wildlife Without Borders program; the sharing of environmental
management information through the North American Biodiversity
Information Network; and
<bullet> The development of micro-financing partnerships to
promote pollution prevention for small and medium-sized businesses; the
promotion of sustainable agricultural practices for small scale
producers; and the establishment by Mexico of a Pollutant Release and
Transfer Register.
The NAAEC provides members of the public with avenues for input
through several advisory bodies and a public submission process. As a
result, the CEC has become an important forum for cooperation,
including public dialog and participation.
Over time, the CEC's cooperative work program has significantly
expanded and, gained momentum in addressing a wide array of
environmental issues of continental concern. At the same time, the
CEC's resource base has remained constant since its inception in 1995
at $3 million from each country annually. As such, the effectiveness of
this unique international environmental institution might be vastly
improved by increased funding and/or more focused work on priority
activities. In another area, the parties are working to strengthen
communication and cooperation between trade and environment officials
as envisioned in NAAEC Article 10(6), which calls for cooperation
between the CEC and the NAFTA Free Trade Commission ``to achieve the
environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA. . . .''.
Question 18. The United States has a good record with respect to
promoting the Export Credit Agencies in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Where do things stand on ECAs?
Response. The United States has led the effort to strengthen
environmental guidelines for official Export Credit Agencies (ECA5),
both at the G-8 and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Working Party on Export Credits and Credit
Guarantees (ECG).
We have made progress, but the current OECD proposal, ``Common
Approaches to the Environment'', falls short of our objectives of
securing a clear commitment on the part of ECAs to adhere to a minimum
set of common environmental standards and credible transparency
provisions, modeled on current World Bank standards. While our Export-
Import Bank has had environmental guidelines since 1995, only a few of
our competitors have standards that even approach the quality of Em-Im
Bank's. Others in the OECD insist that ECAs focus now on implementing
the ``Common Approaches'' that some Members said they would implement
on a voluntary basis at the November 2001 meeting, and then review our
respective experiences in 2003. Although we see the 2003 review as an
important opportunity to apply lessons learned to strengthening and
standardizing guidelines for ECAs, we do not intend to let this matter
rest, and will continue to take every opportunity to make progress.
Question 19. National laws are not able to address the striking
decline in the world's fishing stocks and the overall biomass of the
world's oceans in that portion of the earth's surface beyond any
national jurisdiction. What commitments are you prepared to make
regarding the creation and enforcement of international standards to
prcitect this area of the high seas from unsustainable mining
activities and fishing practices, such as bottom trawling and unwanted
by-catch problems that cause massive destruction of marine life?
Response. Under this Administration, the Department of State is
taking a lead role in efforts to strengthen both the rules governing
the conservation and management of living marine resources in areas
beyond national jurisdiction, and the enforcement of those rules.
In recent years, a new international framework has been established
to accomplish this goal. Much of this work has focussed on global
instruments such as the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance
A9reement and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing.
Together, these and other recent agreements provide an effective
toolbox for addressing issues such as overfishing, bycatch of non-
target species, excess capacity of fishing fleets, lack of enforcement
of existing rules and other problem areas.
It is now up to the United States and other countries that support
the principles embodied in these agreements to work for their effective
implementation at the regional and sub-regional levels through existing
and newly created regional fisheries management organizations. This is
not an easy task. Most international fisheries organizations operate by
consensus, giving great weight to those who oppose serious efforts to
effect necessary changes. However, we are committed to making every
possible effort to promote sustainable fishing practices on fish stocks
in areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction.
One area where much work needs to be done is the area of bycatch
and discards of small fish as well as other non-target fish species and
other species including sea turtles and sea birds. Bycatch of sea birds
and sea turtles in commercial longline fisheries, in particular, are
issues that require more international attention. Again, this is
difficult in that affected fleets may oppose conservation efforts that
could adversely impact their operations. Because we have limited market
leverage or other ways to compel action, we must work with other
nations and their fishing industries to convince rather than coerce.
Industry involvement and cooperation will be vital if we are to
identify and introduce the technological solutions that will be
necessary to address these issues.
As part of this process, the Western Pacific Regional Fisheries
Management Council, based in Honolulu, will convene this November the
Second International Fishers Forum (IFF2). The conference will bring
together representatives from the fishing industry, governments and the
environmental and academic communities to address these and other
issues. We strongly support this effort and will look carefully at the
results of that meeting to identify possible next steps by Governments
to mitigate sea bird and sea turtle bycatch in longline fisheries.
As to mining activities on seabed areas beyond the jurisdiction of
any nation, the United States participates as an observer in the
International Seabed Authority (ISA). The ISA is a body created by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the United
States is not yet a party. The ISA has completed Regulations on
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules, which include
measures to protect the marine environment from mining activities.
Through its role as observer, the United States has worked hard to
develop measures that are consistent with U.S. interests.
Question 20. One of the significant outcomes of the Rio Earth
Summit was the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which
President George Herbert Walker Bush signed and which the U.S. Senate
subsequently ratified unanimously in a voice vote.' The Kyoto Protocol
gives effect to the objectives agreed to in the Climate Convention, and
it is likely to enter into force sometime this year, perhaps at WSSD.
The current Administration has said it does not support the Kyoto
Protocol'. Nevertheless, the United States is still a Party to the
Climate Convention. At the hearing, Mr. Connaughton admitted that the
United States has not fulfilled its commitments to report to the United
Nations on policies and measures to achieve 1990 levels of emissions.
What steps will the Administration take to rectify this noncompliance?
Response. The United States is in compliance with its commitments
to report on its policies and measures under Article 4 of the
Convention. The United States has submitted detailed information on our
policies and measures, in accordance with the procedures under the
Convention. Most recently, policies and measures are' detailed in the
U.S. Climate Action Report, the third National Communication from. the
United States to the Convention, submitted in May 2002. Concerning the
non-binding ``aim'' of returning emissions to their 1990 levels, this
aim refers to the year 2000, not the time period beyond 2000.
Question 21. Please explain how the Administration's policies on
climate change are consistent with our commitments under and the spirit
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Response. The Framework Convention's commitments relate principally
to:
<bullet> Support for research and systematic observation;
<bullet> Promotion of education, training, and public awareness;
<bullet> Various forms of cooperation among Parties;
<bullet> For Annex I Parties (which includes the United States),
adoption of policies and measures on the mitigation of climate change,
as well as reporting on such policies and measures;
<bullet> For Annex II Parties (which includes the United States),
support for developing countries in terms of financial resources and
environmentally sound technologies.
The Administration's policies implement all applicable commitments
under the Convention. Most recently, the U.S. national communication,
submitted in May 2002, detailed U.S. policies and measures to address
climate change.
The Administration's climate change policies involve extensive
cooperation with other Convention Parties, are consistent with U.S.
commitments under the Convention, and are designed to be economically
sustainable. They represent a significant contribution to the global
effort to address climate change both under the UNFCCC and elsewhere.
<bullet> The Administration's greenhouse gas intensity goal and
the measures we will be taking over the next 10 years is both ambitious
and reasonable, and is in line with past administration forecasts of
the domestic reductions likely to be achieved under the Kyoto Protocol,
and forecasts of other countries' efforts with respect to climate
change policies.
<bullet> The Administration's commitment to climate change-related
research and development is unmatched in the world, and represents what
is truly a unique contribution toward a longterm climate change
approach that is consistent with sustainable development. The
President's National climate Change Technology Initiative confirms
America as the leader in technology and innovation within the climate
change area. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget proposal dedicates
nearly $1.8 billion to fund basic scientific research on climate change
and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and carbon
sequestration technologies. The Administration has substantially
increased funding for climate-related technical assistance to
developing countries.
Overall, the President's fiscal year 2003 budget seeks $4.5 billion
in total climate spending--an increase of nearly $700 million. To the
extent that there could be said to be a ``spirit'' of the Convention,
the Administration's efforts are fully compatible with that spirit.
Question 22. In view of the recent EPA study that substantiated the
fact' that global warming is occurring, and the even more recent study
by Alaskan scientists published in the Washington Post on Friday, July
19, 2002 that the Alaskan glaciers are melting at over twice the rate
previously supposed, and the very real national security interest that
the United States has in ceasing its dependence on foreign oil, will
this Administration commit at the WSSD to increase its international
cooperation to reduce the generation of greenhouse gases?
Response. The Secretary General of the United Nations has outlined
five priority areas for the Summit: water and sanitation, energy,
health, agriculture, and biodiversity. The United States is actively
pursuing concrete initiatives to the Summit that are in line with these
priorities, namely on water, agriculture, health, energy, oceans and
forests. Climate change is not one of the Summit's priority areas,
because the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change serves as the
internationally agreed forum for addressing climate change. The
Administration is pursuing ambitious steps to address climate change
domestically, and is actively engaging in cooperative activities with
countries around the world. For example, the President's plan seeks to
continue the process of developing new technologies while nurturing the
growth' of the economy. To this end, the President is creating the
National Climate Change Technology Initiative, which will confirm
America as the leader in technology and innovation within the climate
change area. Furthermore, the President's fiscal year 2003 budget
proposal dedicates $1.7 billion to fund basic scientific research on
climate change and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and
sequestration technologies. Overall, the President's fiscal year 2003
budget seeks $4.5 billion in total climate spending--an increase of
nearly $700 million. This level of commitment is unmatched in the
world.
Question 23. Has the United States or its representatives,
officially or unofficially, discouraged countries from bringing climate
change initiatives or issues to the World Summit for consideration?
Response. The United States has not discouraged countries from
bringing climate change initiatives or issues to the World Summit on
Sustainable Development. The United States delegation has engaged
constructively on a substantial amount of text on a variety of climate
change issues occurring in the Plan of Implementation. Most of the
climate change-related text in the draft Plan of Implementation has
been agreed.
Several delegations have put forward textual proposals that have
the effect of asking the United States to endorse the Kyoto Protocol,
or to take on new climate-related commitments in the WSSD. The United
States does not support the Kyoto Protocol', and we have indicated to
those delegations that we cannot support text that is contrary to our
national position. The United States also has not agreed to additional
climate change commitments at WSSD because the internationally agreed
forum for negotiating climate change commitments is the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change. The Eighth Conference of the Parties to
the Convention (COP-8) will take place in October 23--November 1, 2002.
Question 24. Throughout the process, many governments have
complained that the United States has turned a blind ear/eye to Rio.
The Secretary General thinks that recognition of the Rio Principles
will be key for successful implementation in Johannesburg. How will we
recognize and implement the ``spirit of'' the Rio Principles?
Response. We strongly support the principles of Rio, and would like
to see these principles reaffirmed within the Johannesburg Plan of
Action.
Question 25. What is the Administration's position on the Corporate
Accountability Convention that many non-governmental organizations have
called for?
Response. We strongly support efforts to promote corporate
responsibility.
We believe such efforts are best accomplished at the national level
through a combination of government regulations and oversight along
with voluntary corporate standards and practices implemented by the
public sector, elected officials, and the private sectors in respective
countries, not by a new multilateral treaty negotiation.
Question 26. The President has announced that he will ask Congress
for an extra $5 billion in overseas aid. Right now., the United States
spends about 0.1 percent of its GDP on aid--the lowest percentage of
any industrial country and below the average of 0.39 percent. Even with
the increase, we'll still be the lowest in the world. Why is that?
Response. Excluding the Administration's new commitment of $5
billion for the Millennium Challenge Account, Official Development
Assistance is being increased by 10 percent in fiscal year 2002. If the
Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget request is approved, funding
for HIV/AIDS over the past 2 years will have increased by 73 percent,
funding for education will have increased by 65 percent and funds
focused on Sub-Saharan Africa will have increased by 30 percent,
reaching $1 billion for the first time. In our view, how funds are
spent is more important than increased funding, which represents only
part of solution to address sustainable development. The Administration
believes that' assistance is most effective when it reinforces peace
and stability, domestic governance, investments in people through
health and education and private sector development.
______
Investing in Health: Fighting Infectious Disease for Sustainable
Development
key action
The Bush Administration is building upon recent announcements of
efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.
<bullet> In June, President Bush announced a new $500 million
Mother-and-Child HIV Prevention Initiative for Africa and the
Caribbean,
<bullet> The U.S. pledge of $500 million to the Global Fund to
Fight HW/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria represents approximately one-
fourth of all commitments to date.
Goal: To have, by 2015, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of
HP//AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict
humanity. (United Nations Millennium Declaration)
Description: This multi-year initiative will:
<bullet> Enhance technical assistance for Global Fund application
development and project implementation.
<bullet> Strengthen surveillance and monitoring, research,
prevention, and care activities.
<bullet> Expand efforts to combat mother-to-child transmission of
HIV/AIDS.
<bullet> Pursue global partnerships and increased investment in
fighting HP//AIDS, TB, and Malaria.
Resources
U.S. resources for international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, including meeting the President's pledge to the Global Fund
are:
<bullet> $1.1 billion committed in fiscal year 2002
?<bullet> $1.2 billion requested for fiscal year 2003
Partners
The United States works with a wide array of partners including
governments, international organizations, private corporations,
foundations, faith-based groups and non-governmental organizations.
South Africa Housing Initiative
key action
?The United States will commit $15 million in support of the
construction of 90,000 homes in South Africa over the next 5 years.
This initiative, announced by the United States Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), builds on a 10-year legacy of
strengthening housing finance for South Africa's poor begun by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Home ownership and community building are inextricably linked.
According to the National Department of Housing of South Africa, one of
the factors contributing to the deficit in construction of low-income
housing is insufficient sources of construction financing, particularly
for middle-to low-income wage earners.
Under the South Africa Housing Initiative, construction financing
will be made available for contractors constructing homes for middle-to
low-income families. Under this Initiative, a for-profit U.S. sponsor
will work with a South African Bank which, in turn, will be able to
lend the equivalent of $20 million to the NTJRCHA Equity Services
(NES), a for-profit entity operating under the National Urban Housing
Association (NURCHA) of South Africa.
The South Africa Housing Initiative is expected to stimulate South
Africa's construction sector through loans to for-profit builders,
contractors, and sub-contractors, and to efficiently expand employment,
skills, and training in an essential sector of the economy of South
Africa.
Over the past 10 years, USAID has underwritten $90 million in
private sector loans to enable South African banks to make available
$250 million in housing loans to benefit 110,000 needy households.
USAID has also financed considerable urban infrastructure (water,
sewers, and roads) to enable the construction of new neighborhoods. The
new OPIC initiative broadens this support for the transition of middle-
to low-income households to homeownership and so contributes to long-
term sustainable development for South Africa. Moreover, the delivery
of potable water through the construction of new homes and the
establishment of new housing communities for 90,000 households and
almost 500,000 South Africans will contribute to improved health and
achievement of Millennium Declaration goals.
Resources
<bullet> The United States will commit $15 million in support of
this important initiative.
Oceans
White Water to Blue Water. This initiative, involving U.S.
Government agencies, the UK, France, and Spain, Caribbean governments,
the Caribbean Environment Program, other international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, emphasizes a
cross-sectoral approach to ecosystem management beginning with upstream
sectors (watersheds, inland forests, agricultural areas, and population
centers) and extending through wetlands, mangrove swamps and coral
reefs into the ocean. The initiative aims to improve capabilities of
coastal States to manage coastal-marine ecosystems and to promote
regional coordination among the partners to make best use of resources.
The initial focus will be on the Wider Caribbean region.
Geographic Information and Learning
<bullet> Geographic Information for Sustainable Development. This
initiative brings together U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental
organizations, the private sector, and academia to improve the quality
and availability of data needed to understand better and monitor the
environment. Recent applications of data from satellite earth
observation systems, the Global Positioning System, Geographic
Information Systems, and data base management can help decisionmakers
address sustainable development problems in Africa, including food
security, sustainable' agriculture, natural resource management,
disaster mitigation, and poverty alleviation. More than 100 GISD-
related projects are currently underway In Africa. The initiative
already has funded 15 projects in the areas of Upper Niger, East
African Great Lakes, Kenya-Tanzania coast, and the Limpopo-Zambezi
Basin.
<bullet> My Community, Our Earth. This partnership involves
partners such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National
Geographic Society, the Association of American Geographers, the
Environmental Systems Research Institute (a geographic information
system and mapping company), and the U.N. Environmental Programme. The
partnership is using maps, images, and graphs to help secondary,
college, and university students worldwide learn about sustainable
development issues such as biodiversity, deforestation, pollution, food
production, fresh water supply, health, rural development, and
urbanization. It aims to increase awareness about the value of
geographic information systems technology, especially satellite images.
Nearly 500 volunteer mentors have registered to help over 2000 students
from more than 90 countries develop projects.
Biodiversity
<bullet> Shade Coffee. This partnership helps small-to medium-
scale coffee producers produce more profitable, high-quality coffees
(organic, shade-grown, or ``Bird Friendly'' coffees), thereby promoting
conservation while meeting rural development needs. The Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, which is supported by the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, is facilitating establishment of a North American
sustainable agriculture debt facility that would make strategic credit
guarantees/interventions to enhance the ability of small-scale
producers groups, conservation groups, and private investors to
collaborate more effectively at the local and international levels.
Shade Coffee partners include the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, the Smithsonian Institution's Migratory Bird Center,
Conservation International, Rainforest Alliance, Specialty Coffee
Association of America, and Starbucks Coffee.
<bullet> Invasive Alien Species. This initiative aims to
understand the vectors and processes by which invasive alien species
are introduced and to develop mechanisms for detection, rapid response,
and mitigation. Partners include the governments of Australia, New
Zealand, Norway, and South Africa; the Global Invasive Species Program;
the U.S. Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and State; the
Environmental Protection Agency; USAID; the Smithsonian. Institution;
many U.S. universities; State and local management authorities; and
non-governmental organizations.
<bullet> Biological Diversity Informatics. This partnership seeks
to develop and expand availability of user-friendly, internet-based
access data that will allow users to link, integrate, analyze, and
visualize existing data and ongoing research pertaining to species
distribution. Partners include the U.S. National Invasive Species
Council, Global Diversity Information Facility, Inter-American
Biodiversity Information Network, North American Biodiversity
Information Network, U.S. Department of the Interior, Smithsonian
Institution, the Universities of California and Kansas, Conservation
International, and the International Union for the Conservation of?
Nature and Natural Resources.
Agriculture and Natural Resources
<bullet> Building-a Partnership for Global Exchange of
Conservation Stewardship Practices. This partnership seeks to build
capacity in agriculture and natural resource conservation and
stewardship practices for sustainable agriculture and forest and
watershed management. A worldwide network will facilitate global peer-
to-peer learning and exchanges for short-term, on-the-ground,
community-and watershed-based activities, such as integrated land,
water and coastal management; land restoration and rehabilitation;
individual and community capacity building; and enterprise development.
This public/private partnership, initiated by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, will increase the application of agriculture and natural
resource conservation practices, exchange of integrated resource
management approaches, and community participation in local
decisionmaking.
Principles of Sound Science in Decision-Making
<bullet> Strengthening Science-Based Decision-Making. This
partnership brings together the Environmental Protection Agency, the
U.S. National Academies of Science, the American Chemistry Council, and
others in an effort to develop and strengthen linkages between science
and decisionmakers in developing countries so that policy decisions can
be based on the best available knowledge and so that research
priorities can take into account the needs of decisionmakers.
Health
<bullet> Netmark: A Public-Private Partnership for Sustainable
Malaria Prevention. This partnership, involving USAIr, works with
country governments and the commercial private sector to promote
effective use of insecticide-treated bednets for the prevention of
malaria. At the heart of Netmark is an innovative use of public-sector
funds to reduce and eliminate the barriers to expanded commercial
investment in the manufacture and distribution of insecticide-treated
bednets. Netmark activities are underway in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal,
and Zambia and there are plans to expand the partnership to other
countries in Africa and elsewhere.
<bullet> Controlling Tuberculosis in High HIV Prevalence
Populations. Under the new WHO/ Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS
strategic framework to decrease the burden of the intersecting
epidemics of tuberculosis and HP//AIDS, the Uni?ed States and the
government of Japan will work with partners to improve coordination on
TB prevention and control (intensified case-finding and cure) and
interventions against HIV (and therefore indirectly against
tuberculosis).
<bullet> Universal Flour Fortification. This public-private
partnership seeks to replicate a successful iodized salt fortification
model and address selected major remaining micronutrient deficiencies
through fortification of flour with iron, folic acid, and other
appropriate micronutrients. The partnership involves the U.S.
Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture; the
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Wheat Boards; the North American Millers'
Association; the North American Grain Exports Association; and others.
<bullet> Health Promotores. This partnership will share
experiences and best models related to community health outreach and
education using lay community members in underserved areas. The
promotores concept derived from Mexico and Latin American countries and
is currently being pursued in U.S.-Mexico border communities. Partners
include the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Health
Resources and Services Administration, Environmental Protection Agency,
the government of Mexico, and the University of Arizona.
<bullet> Children's Environmental Health Indicators. This
initiative proposes the creation of an international forum of
governments, U.N. agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations, the private sector, and communities to advance a global
effort to create children's environmental health indicators. This may
involve proposing modifications to the existing data collection surveys
in the U.N. system to incorporate children's environmental health,
which may include developing, testing, and promoting the use of
indicators.
Education
<bullet> Africa Education Initiative. This Presidential
initiative, which was announced in June 2002, will provide $200 million
over the next 5 years to train more than 160,000 new teachers and
provide in-service training for more than 260,000 existing teachers in
Africa, partner with historically black colleges and universities in
America to provide 4.5 million more textbooks and other learning tools
for children in Africa, provide 250,000 scholarships for African girls,
and increase the role of parents in their children's education by
working to make school systems more transparent and open to reforms
from parents.
<bullet> Global Food for Education. This multilateral school
feeding pilot program may help as many as seven million school
children, especially girls. The 2002 Farm Bill provides $100 million in
fiscal year 2003 to continue the pilot program. The United States is
reviewing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the program in
meeting its educational and food aid objectives.
Sustainable Tourism
<bullet> Vilanculos Coastal Wildlife Sanctuary. The Overseas
Private Investment Corporation is helping to finance this $10 million
coastal and wildlife eco-tourism project in Mozambique's Bazaruto
Archipelago. Backed by the Global Environmental Facility, the
International Finance Corporation, and the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the Sanctuary has
followed world standards with regard to social and environmental
issues. The project will provide economic development from tourism and
job creation, and community development, including a health clinic,
school, and housing.
Transport
<bullet> Nacala Port and Railway Network. The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation will provide financial assistance up to $35
million to a U.S. project sponsor to develop and rehabilitate the
railway corridor through Malawi and Mozambique and to refurbish the
exiting port at Nacala. This will provide a less expensive alternative
to Durban, South Africa, for moving goods to and from landlocked
countries and enhance agricultural productivity and exports by reducing
transport costs.
__________
Statement of James L. Connaughton, Chairman, White House Council on
Environmental Quality
Mr. Chairmen, Senator Smith, Senator Lugar and Members of the
Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
today to discuss the Bush Administration's strategy to address the
important, long-term, and highly complex challenge of global climate
change. I am pleased to share this panel with my colleague Mr. Turner.
President Bush has committed the Nation to ambitious, focused and
meaningful goals, programs and initiatives that provide a sensible and
constructive path forward. The President's strategy is predicated on
ensuring the strength and growth of the American economy, building on
our nation's tremendous and demonstrated record of leadership in
science and the promise of continued American technological innovation.
As the President stated over a year ago: ``We will act, learn, and act
again, adjusting our approaches as science advances and technology
evolves.'' He elaborated on this point this past February: ``[G]lobal
climate change presents a different set of challenges and requires a
different strategy [from policies designed to reduce air pollution].
The science is more complex, the answers are less certain, and the
technology is less developed. So we need a flexible approach that can
adjust to new information and new technology.'' The flexible path
toward long term progress that I will outline for you today sharply
contrasts with the view of some that the only acceptable policy
approach is near term, legislated restrictions that will needlessly
hurt our economy and cost American jobs.
The President committed the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing
America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy
by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This will set America on a path to
slow the growth of our greenhouse gas emissions and, if science
justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions. I would
emphasize that achieving this ambitious, yet realistic, national goal
will require a sustained commitment and significant investment and
effort from our nation's farmers, small businesses, workers,
industries, and citizens that rivals the hard gains in efficiency and
productivity we have earned over the last several decades.
To achieve this goal, the Administration is actively engaged and
moving forward on many fronts, looking at every sector of our economy,
with the recognition that meaningful progress depends on the
development and deployment of new technology. With the continued
support of Congress, we are advancing climate science, developing and
promoting energy efficiency, conservation, and sequestration
technologies and practices, pursuing near term greenhouse gas
mitigation programs and expanding international cooperation.
The President has reaffirmed America's commitment to the goal of
stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that
will prevent dangerous interference with the climate. At the same time,
the President noted that given current scientific uncertainties, no one
knows what that level is. This underscores the importance of the
President's focus on science and technology.
The President has called for nearly $700 million in additional
funding for the Federal Government's commitment to climate change in
Fiscal Year 1903--a 17 percent increase from last year--to support a
$4.5 billion program of research on climate science and energy
technology, mitigation incentives and programs, and international
technology transfer and outreach. This commitment is unmatched in the
world. The President's recent Report to Congress on Federal Climate
Change Expenditures details the numerous programs that this funding
will support. And there is a Cabinet-level effort to bring more
effective, high level management and focus to this significant
investment of public resources.
Importantly, the President's request includes $555 million in clean
energy tax incentives, the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over
the next 5 years, reaching $7.1 billion over the next 10 years. These
incentives will spur investments in and purchases of renewable energy--
including solar, wind, and biomass--as well as advanced hybrid and fuel
cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. We also are
promoting clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power--which
produces no greenhouse gas emissions--and are working to safely improve
fuel economy for our cars and trucks. And we are advancing the prospect
of breakthrough technologies, such as the promise of zero-emission fuel
cell vehicles through the Department of Energy's Freedom Car
Initiative.
Under the recently enacted Farm bill and existing authorizations,
we will invest up to $47 billion in the next decade for conservation on
our farms and forest lands. Not only will this partnership with farmers
and small land owners help protect the water and air, and secure and
enhance habitat for wildlife, it will also provide opportunities to
store significant quantities of carbon in trees and the soil, and
promote other activities to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
We also are making substantial progress on the effort to create
world-class standards for measuring and registering greenhouse gas
emissions reductions, with organizations receiving transferable credits
for the reductions in emissions they secure. At the same time, we are
making progress on the President's challenge to businesses to further
reduce their emissions. EPA's Climate Leaders Program is well underway.
We look forward to seeing new commitments and even greater reductions.
These are simply a few significant examples of more than 60 Federal
programs--some mandatory, some incentive-based, some voluntary--that
will help to slow the growth in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over the
next decade and beyond.
The President's strategy has also created a new framework for
expanding international cooperation. We are investing $25 million in
climate observation systems in developing countries, increasing funding
for tropical forest conservation to $50 million, and providing $178
million for the Global Environmental Facility next year, which includes
a substantial $70 million payment for arrears incurred during the prior
administration. The President's fiscal yea4r 2003 budget also requests
$156 million in funding for USAID climate change programs. And in the
past year alone, the Administration has entered into bilateral
agreements with Japan, Australia, Canada, Italy, the European Union,
CONCAUSA, China and India on climate change science, energy and
sequestration technology, and policy approaches.
The President's climate change strategy is the product of an
ongoing, combined working group of the National Security Council, the
Domestic Policy Council and the National Economic Council. Our actions
have been and will continue to be guided by the six principles that the
President outlined last June:
1. Consistency with the long-term goal of stabilizing
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that
will prevent dangerous interference with the climate system,
recognizing that we currently do not know what that level is;
2. Measured actions, as we learn more from science and build on it;
3. Flexibility to adjust to new information and take advantage of
new technology;
4. Ensuring continued economic growth and prosperity for the United
States and the world;
5. Pursuing market-based incentives and spurring technological
innovation; and
6. Global participation, including developing countries.
The Bush Administration's strategy for action and progress--a solid
policy framework, a meaningful national emissions reduction goal, and a
suite of policies to achieve that goal--is calibrated to the actual
state of scientific knowledge and guards against costly and misdirected
policy errors. Commentary that continues to equate action on climate
change with acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol ignores the bipartisan
record of opposition to its approach. The Kyoto Protocol would have
cost our economy up to $400 billion and caused the loss of up to 4.9
million jobs, risking the welfare of the American people and American
workers. And without the participation of the world's developing
countries, many of which will experience rapid growth in coming
decades, it represented an ineffective policy response to this global
challenge.
President Bush's philosophy--which ties our benchmark for progress
with economic growth--represents a careful balancing that promises
significant emissions reductions over the course of the next decade,
while preserving the strength of the American economy. Only sustained
economic growth, both here and abroad, will allow for the significant
new investments in energy and sequestration technologies that will be
needed to address this long term challenge.
Again, thank you for inviting me today. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you may have and ask that the written
material accompanying my testimony be entered into the record.
Appendices
1. statement of president george bush (june 11, 2001)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release June 11, 2001
president bush discusses global climate change
The Rose Garden
11:10 A.M. EDT
President George W. Bush. Good morning. I've just met with senior
members of my administration who are working to develop an effective
and science-based approach to addressing the important issues of global
climate change.
This is an issue that I know is very important to the nations of
Europe, which I will be visiting for the first time as President. The
earth's well-being is also an issue important to America. And it's an
issue that should be important to every Nation in every part of our
world.
The issue of climate change respects no border. Its effects cannot
be reined in by an army nor advanced by any ideology. Climate change,
with its potential to impact every corner of the world, is an issue
that must be addressed by the world.
The Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways. But the
process used to bring nations together to discuss our joint response to
climate change is an important one. That is why I am today committing
the United States of America to work within the United Nations
framework and elsewhere to develop with our friends and allies and
nations throughout the world an effective and science-based response to
the issue of global warming.
My Cabinet-level working group has met regularly for the last 10
weeks to review the most recent, most accurate, and most comprehensive
science. They have heard from scientists offering a wide spectrum of
views. They have reviewed the facts, and they have listened to many
theories and suppositions. The working group asked the highly respected
National Academy of Sciences to provide us the most up-to-date
information about what is known and about what is not known on the
science of climate change.
First, we know the surface temperature of the earth is warming. It
has risen by .6 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years. There was a
warming trend from the 1890's to the 1940's. Cooling from the 1940's to
the 1970's. And then sharply rising temperatures from the 1970's to
today.
There is a natural greenhouse effect that contributes to warming.
Greenhouse gases trap heat, and thus warm the earth because they
prevent a significant proportion of infrared radiation from escaping
into space. Concentration of greenhouse gases, especially
CO<INF>2</INF>, have increased substantially since the beginning of the
industrial revolution. And the National Academy of Sciences indicate
that the increase is due in large part to human activity.
Yet, the Academy's report tells us that we do not know how much
effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We do
not know how much our climate could, or will change in the future. We
do not know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions
could impact it.
For example, our useful efforts to reduce sulfur emissions may have
actually increased warming, because sulfate particles reflect sunlight,
bouncing it back into space. And, finally, no one can say with any
certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore
what level must be avoided.
The policy challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given
the limits of our knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we
can begin now to address the factors that contribute to climate change.
There are only two ways to stabilize concentration of greenhouse
gases. One is to avoid emitting them in the first place; the other is
to try to capture them after they're created. And there are problems
with both approaches. We're making great progress through technology,
but have not yet developed cost-effective ways to capture carbon
emissions at their source; although there is some promising work that
is being done.
And a growing population requires more energy to heat and cool our
homes, more gas to drive our cars. Even though we're making progress on
conservation and energy efficiency and have significantly reduced the
amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP.
Our country, the United States is the world's largest emitter of
manmade greenhouse gases. We account for almost 20 percent of the
world's man-made greenhouse emissions. We also account for about one-
quarter of the world's economic output. We recognize the responsibility
to reduce our emissions. We also recognize the other part of the
story--that the rest of the world emits 80 percent of all greenhouse
gases. And many of those emissions come from developing countries.
This is a challenge that requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and
the rest of the world's. The world's second-largest emitter of
greenhouse gases is China. Yet, China was entirely exempted from the
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.
India and Germany are among the top emitters. Yet, India was also
exempt from Kyoto. These and other developing countries that are
experiencing rapid growth face challenges in reducing their emissions
without harming their economies. We want to work cooperatively with
these countries in their efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions and
maintain economic growth.
Kyoto also failed to address two major pollutants that have an
impact on warming: black soot and tropospheric ozone. Both are proven
health hazards. Reducing both would not only address climate change,
but also dramatically improve people's health.
Kyoto is, in many ways, unrealistic. Many countries cannot meet
their Kyoto targets. The targets themselves were arbitrary and not
based upon science. For America, complying with those mandates would
have a negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price
increases for consumers. And when you evaluate all these flaws, most
reasonable people will understand that it's not sound public policy.
That's why 95 members of the U.S. Senate expressed a reluctance to
endorse such an approach. Yet, America's unwillingness to embrace a
flawed treaty should not be read by our friends and allies as any
abdication of responsibility. To the contrary, my administration is
committed to a leadership role on the issue of climate change.
We recognize our responsibility and will meet it--at home, in our
hemisphere, and in the world. My Cabinet-level working group on climate
change is recommending a number of initial steps, and will continue to
work on additional ideas. The working group proposes the United States
help lead the way by advancing the science on climate change, advancing
the technology to monitor and reduce greenhouse gases, and creating
partnerships within our hemisphere and beyond to monitor and measure
and mitigate emissions.
I also call on Congress to work with my administration to achieve
the significant emission reductions made possible by implementing the
clean energy technologies proposed in our energy plan. Our working
group study has made it clear that we need to know a lot more.
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change commences to
stabilizing concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous human
interference with the climate; but no one knows what that level is. The
United States has spent $18 billion on climate research since 1990--
three times as much as any other country, and more than Japan and all
15 nations of the EU combined.
Today, I make our investment in science even greater. My
administration will establish the U.S. Climate Change Research
Initiative to study areas of uncertainty and identify priority areas
where investments can make a difference.
I'm directing my Secretary of Commerce, working with other
agencies, to set priorities for additional investments in climate
change research, review such investments, and to improve coordination
amongst Federal agencies. We will fully fund high-priority areas for
climate change science over the next 5 years. We'll also provide
resources to build climate observation systems in developing countries
and encourage other developed nations to match our American commitment.
And we propose a joint venture with the EU, Japan and others to
develop state-of-the-art climate modeling that will help us better
understand the causes and impacts of climate change. America's the
leader in technology and innovation. We all believe technology offers
great promise to significantly reduce emissions--especially carbon
capture, storage and sequestration technologies.
So we're creating the National Climate Change Technology Initiative
to strengthen research at universities and national labs, to enhance
partnerships in applied research, to develop improved technology for
measuring and monitoring gross and net greenhouse gas emissions, and to
fund demonstration projects for cutting-edge technologies, such as
bioreactors and fuel cells.
Even with the best science, even with the best technology, we all
know the United States cannot solve this global problem alone. We're
building partnerships within the Western Hemisphere and with other
like-minded countries. Last week, Secretary Powell signed a new
CONCAUSA Declaration with the countries of Central America, calling for
cooperative efforts on science research, monitoring and measuring of
emissions, technology development, and investment in forest
conservation.
We will work with the Inter-American Institute for Global Change
Research and other institutions to better understand regional impacts
of climate change. We will establish a partnership to monitor and
mitigate emissions. And at home, I call on Congress to work with my
administration on the initiatives to enhance conservation and energy
efficiency outlined in my energy plan, to implement the increased use
of renewables, natural gas and hydropower that are outlined in the
plan, and to increase the generation of safe and clean nuclear power.
By increasing conservation and energy efficiency and aggressively
using these clean energy technologies, we can reduce our greenhouse gas
emissions by significant amounts in the coming years. We can make great
progress in reducing emissions, and we will. Yet, even that isn't
enough.
I've asked my advisors to consider approaches to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, including those that tap the power of markets, help
realize the promise of technology and ensure the widest-possible global
participation. As we analyze the possibilities, we will be guided by
several basic principles. Our approach must be consistent with the
long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere. Our actions should be measured as we learn more from
science and build on it.
Our approach must be flexible to adjust to new information and take
advantage of new technology. We must always act to ensure continued
economic growth and prosperity for our citizens and for citizens
throughout the world. We should pursue market-based incentives and spur
technological innovation.
And, finally, our approach must be based on global participation,
including that of developing countries whose net greenhouse gas
emissions now exceed those in the developed countries.
I've asked Secretary Powell and Administrator Whitman to ensure
they actively work with friends and allies to explore common approaches
to climate change consistent with these principles. Each step we take
will increase our knowledge. We will act, learn, and act again,
adjusting our approaches as science advances and technology evolves.
Our administration will be creative. We're committed to protecting
our environment and improving our economy, to acting at home and
working in concert with the world. This is an administration that will
make commitments we can keep, and keep the commitments that we make.
I look forward to continued discussions with our friends and allies
about this important issue.
Thank you for coming.
______
2. policy book accompanying presidential statement (june 11, 2001)
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3. statement of president george bush (february 14, 2002)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release February 14, 2002
remarks by the president on climate change and clean air
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Silver Spring, Maryland
2:05 P.M. EST
The President: Thank you very much for that warm welcome. It's an
honor to join you all today to talk about our environment and about the
prospect of dramatic progress to improve it.
Today, I'm announcing a new environmental approach that will clean
our skies, bring greater health to our citizens and encourage
environmentally responsible development in America and around the
world.
Particularly, it's an honor to address this topic at NOAA, whose
research is providing us with the answers to critical questions about
our environment. And so I want to thank Connie for his hospitality and
I want to thank you for yours, as well. Connie said he felt kind of
like Sasha Cohen--I thought for a minute he was going to ask me to talk
to his mother on his cell phone.
I also want to tell you one of my favorite moments was to go down
to Crawford and turn on my NOAA radio to get the weather. I don't know
whether my guy is a computer or a person. But the forecast is always
accurate, and I appreciate that. I also want to thank you for your hard
work, on behalf of the American people.
I appreciate my friend, Don Evans's leadership. I've known him for
a long time. You're working for a good fellow, if you're working at the
Commerce Department, or at NOAA. And I want to thank Spence Abraham and
Christie Todd Whitman for their service to the country, as well. I've
assembled a fabulous Cabinet, people who love their country and work
hard. And these are three of some of the finest Cabinet officials I've
got.
I want to thank Jim Connaughton, who is the Chairman of the Council
on Environmental Quality. He's done a fabulous job of putting this
policy together, a policy that I'm about to explain. But before I do, I
also want to thank some Members of Congress who have worked with us on
this initiative. I want to thank Bob Smith and George Voinovich, two
United States senators, for their leadership in pursuing multi-
pollutant legislation; as well as Congressmen Billy Tauzin and Joe
Barton. And I want to thank Senator Chuck Hagel and Larry Craig for
their work on climate issues. These Members of Congress have had an
impact on the policies I am just about to announce.
America and the world share this common goal: we must foster
economic growth in ways that protect our environment. We must encourage
growth that will provide a better life for citizens, while protecting
the land, the water, and the air that sustain life.
In pursuit of this goal, my government has set two priorities: we
must clean our air, and we must address the issue of global climate
change. We must also act in a serious and responsible way, given the
scientific uncertainties. While these uncertainties remain, we can
begin now to address the human factors that contribute to climate
change. Wise action now is an insurance policy against future risks.
I have been working with my Cabinet to meet these challenges with
forward and creative thinking. I said, if need be, let's challenge the
status quo. But let's always remember, let's do what is in the interest
of the American people.
Today, I'm confident that the environmental path that I announce
will benefit the entire world. This new approach is based on this
common-sense idea: that economic growth is key to environmental
progress, because it is growth that provides the resources for
investment in clean technologies.
This new approach will harness the power of markets, the creativity
of entrepreneurs, and draw upon the best scientific research. And it
will make possible a new partnership with the developing world to meet
our common environmental and economic goals.
We will apply this approach first to the challenge of cleaning the
air that Americans breathe. Today, I call for new Clean Skies
legislation that sets tough new standards to dramatically reduce the
three most significant forms of pollution from power plants, sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury.
We will cut sulfur dioxide emissions by 73 percent from current
levels. We will cut nitrogen oxide emissions by 67 percent. And, for
the first time ever, we will cap emissions of mercury, cutting them by
69 percent. These cuts will be completed over two measured phases, with
one set of emission limits for 2010 and for the other for 2018.
This legislation will constitute the most significant step America
has ever taken--has ever taken--to cut power plant emissions that
contribute to urban smog, acid rain and numerous health problems for
our citizens.
Clean Skies legislation will not only protect our environment, it
will prolong the lives of thousands of Americans with asthma and other
respiratory illnesses, as well as with those with heart disease. And it
will reduce the risk to children exposed to mercury during a mother's
pregnancy.
The Clean Skies legislation will reach our ambitious air quality
goals through a market-based cap-and-trade approach that rewards
innovation, reduces cost and guarantees results. Instead of the
government telling utilities where and how to cut pollution, we will
tell them when and how much to cut. We will give them a firm deadline
and let them find the most innovative ways to meet it.
We will do this by requiring each facility to have a permit for
each ton of pollution it emits. By making the permits tradable, this
system makes it financially worthwhile for companies to pollute less,
giving them an incentive to make early and cost effective reductions.
This approach enjoys widespread support, with both Democrats and
Republicans, because we know it works. You see, since 1995 we have used
a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide pollution. It has cut more
air pollution, this system has reduced more air pollution in the last
decade than all other programs under the 1990 Clean Air Act combined.
And by even more than the law required. Compliance has been virtually
100 percent. It takes only a handful of employees to administer this
program. And no one had to enter a courtroom to make sure the
reductions happened.
Because the system gives businesses an incentive to create and
install innovative technologies, these reductions have cost about 80
percent less than expected. It helps to keep energy prices affordable
for our consumers. And we made this progress during a decade when our
economy, and our demand for energy, was growing.
The Clean Skies legislation I propose is structured on this
approach because it works. It will replace a confusing, ineffective
maze of regulations for power plants that has created an endless cycle
of litigation. Today, hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on
lawyers, rather than on environmental protection. The result is
painfully slow, uncertain and expensive programs on clean air.
Instead, Clean Skies legislation will put less money into paying
lawyers and regulators, and money directly into programs to reduce
pollution, to meet our national goal. This approach, I'm absolutely
confident, will bring better and faster results in cleaning up our air.
Now, global climate change presents a different set of challenges
and requires a different strategy. The science is more complex, the
answers are less certain, and the technology is less developed. So we
need a flexible approach that can adjust to new information and new
technology.
I reaffirm America's commitment to the United Nations Framework
Convention and its central goal, to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous human
interference with the climate. Our immediate goal is to reduce
America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy.
My administration is committed to cutting our nation's greenhouse
gas intensity--how much we emit per unit of economic activity--by 18
percent over the next 10 years. This will set America on a path to slow
the growth of our greenhouse gas emissions and, as science justifies,
to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions.
This is the common sense way to measure progress. Our Nation must
have economic growth--growth to create opportunity; growth to create a
higher quality of life for our citizens. Growth is also what pays for
investments in clean technologies, increased conservation, and energy
efficiency. Meeting our commitment to reduce our greenhouse gas
intensity by 18 percent by the year 2012 will prevent over 500 million
metric tons of greenhouse gases from going into the atmosphere over the
course of the decade. And that is the equivalent of taking 70 million
cars off the road.
To achieve this goal, our Nation must move forward on many fronts,
looking at every sector of our economy. We will challenge American
businesses to further reduce emissions. Already, agreements with the
semiconductor and aluminum industries and others have dramatically cut
emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build on
these successes with new agreements and greater reductions.
Our government will also move forward immediately to create world-
class standards for measuring and registering emission reductions. And
we will give transferable credits to companies that can show real
emission reductions.
We will promote renewable energy production and clean coal
technology, as well as nuclear power, which produces no greenhouse gas
emissions. And we will work to safely improve fuel economy for our cars
and our trucks.
Overall, my budget devotes $4.5 billion to addressing climate
change--more than any other nation's commitment in the entire world.
This is an increase of more than $700 million over last year's budget.
Our Nation will continue to lead the world in basic climate and science
research to address gaps in our knowledge that are important to
decisionmakers.
When we make decisions, we want to make sure we do so on sound
science; not what sounds good, but what is real. And the United States
leads the world in providing that kind of research. We'll devote $588
million toward the research and development of energy conservation
technologies. We must and we will conserve more in the United States.
And we will spend $408 million toward research and development on
renewables, on renewable energy.
This funding includes $150 million for an initiative that Spence
Abraham laid out the other day, $150 million for the Freedom Car
Initiative, which will advance the prospect of breakthrough zero-
emission fuel cell technologies.
My comprehensive energy plan, the first energy plan that any
administration has put out in a long period of time, provides $4.6
billion over the next 5 years in clean energy tax incentives to
encourage purchases of hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, to promote
residential solar energy, and to reward investments in wind, solar and
biomass energy production. And we will look for ways to increase the
amount of carbon stored by America's farms and forests through a strong
conservation title in the farm bill. I have asked Secretary Veneman to
recommend new targeted incentives for landowners to increase carbon
storage.
By doing all these things, by giving companies incentives to cut
emissions, by diversifying our energy supply to include cleaner fuels,
by increasing conservation, by increasing research and development and
tax incentives for energy efficiency and clean technologies, and by
increasing carbon storage, I am absolutely confident that America will
reach the goal that I have set.
If, however, by 2012, our progress is not sufficient and sound
science justifies further action, the United States will respond with
additional measures that may include broad-based market programs as
well as additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to
accelerate technology development and deployment.
Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort
over many generations. My approach recognizes that economic growth is
the solution, not the problem. Because a Nation that grows its economy
is a Nation that can afford investments and new technologies.
The approach taken under the Kyoto protocol would have required the
United States to make deep and immediate cuts in our economy to meet an
arbitrary target. It would have cost our economy up to $400 billion and
we would have lost 4.9 million jobs.
As President of the United States, charged with safeguarding the
welfare of the American people and American workers, I will not commit
our Nation to an unsound international treaty that will throw millions
of our citizens out of work. Yet, we recognize our international
responsibilities. So in addition to acting here at home, the United
States will actively help developing nations grow along a more
efficient, more environmentally responsible path.
The hope of growth and opportunity and prosperity is universal.
It's the dream and right of every society on our globe. The United
States wants to foster economic growth in the developing world,
including the world's poorest nations. We want to help them realize
their potential, and bring the benefits of growth to their peoples,
including better health, and better schools and a cleaner environment.
It would be unfair--indeed, counterproductive--to condemn
developing nations to slow growth or no growth by insisting that they
take on impractical and unrealistic greenhouse gas targets. Yet,
developing nations such as China and India already account for a
majority of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, and it would be
irresponsible to absolve them from shouldering some of the shared
obligations.
The greenhouse gas intensity approach I put forward today gives
developing countries a yardstick for progress on climate change that
recognizes their right to economic development. I look forward to
discussing this new approach next week, when I go to China and Japan
and South Korea. The United States will not interfere with the plans of
any Nation that chooses to ratify the Kyoto protocol. But I will intend
to work with nations, especially the poor and developing nations, to
show the world that there is a better approach, that we can build our
future prosperity along a cleaner and better path.
My budget includes over $220 million for the U.S. Agency for
International Development and a global environmental facility to help
developing countries better measure, reduce emissions, and to help them
invest in clean and renewable energy technologies. Many of these
technologies, which we take for granted in our own country, are not
being used in the developing world. We can help ensure that the
benefits of these technologies are more broadly shared. Such efforts
have helped bring solar energy to Bangladesh, hydroelectric energy to
the Philippines, geothermal electricity to Kenya. These projects are
bringing jobs and environmental benefits to these nations, and we will
build on these successes.
The new budget also provides $40 million under the Tropical Forest
Conservation Act to help countries redirect debt payments toward
protecting tropical forests, forests that store millions of tons of
carbon. And I've also ordered the Secretary of State to develop a new
initiative to help developing countries stop illegal logging, a
practice that destroys biodiversity and releases millions of tons of
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.
And, finally, my government is following through on our commitment
to provide $25 million for climate observation systems in developing
countries that will help scientists understand the dynamics of climate
change.
To clean the air, and to address climate change, we need to
recognize that economic growth and environmental protection go hand in
hand. Affluent societies are the ones that demand, and can therefore
afford, the most environmental protection. Prosperity is what allows us
to commit more and more resources to environmental protection. And in
the coming decades, the world needs to develop and deploy billions of
dollars of technologies that generate energy in cleaner ways. And we
need strong economic growth to make that possible.
Americans are among the most creative people in our history. We
have used radio waves to peer into the deepest reaches of space. We
cracked life's genetic code. We have made our air and land and water
significantly cleaner, even as we have built the world's strongest
economy.
When I see what Americans have done, I know what we can do. We can
tap the power of economic growth to further protect our environment for
generations that follow. And that's what we're going to do.
Thank you.
4. policy book accompanying presidential statement (february 14, 2002)
executive summary
``Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort,
over many generations. My approach recognizes that sustained economic
growth is the solution, not the problem--because a Nation that grows
its economy is a Nation that can afford investments in efficiency, new
technologies, and a cleaner environment.''
President George W. Bush.
The President announced a new approach to the challenge of global
climate change. This approach is designed to harness the power of
markets and technological innovation. It holds the promise of a new
partnership with the developing world. And it recognizes that climate
change is a complex, long-term challenge that will require a sustained
effort over many generations. As the President has said, ``The policy
challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the limits of
our knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we can begin now
to address the factors that contribute to climate change.''
While investments today in science will increase our understanding
of this challenge, our investments in advanced energy and sequestration
technologies will provide the breakthroughs we need to dramatically
reduce our emissions in the longer term. In the near term, we will
vigorously pursue emissions reductions even in the absence of complete
knowledge. Our approach recognizes that sustained economic growth is an
essential part of the solution, not the problem. Economic growth will
make possible the needed investment in research, development, and
deployment of advanced technologies. This strategy is one that should
offer developing countries the incentive and means to join with us in
tackling this challenge together. Significantly, the President's plan
will:
<bullet> Reduce the Greenhouse Gas Intensity of the U.S. Economy
by 18 Percent in the Next Ten Years. Greenhouse gas intensity measures
the ratio of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to economic output. This
new approach focuses on reducing the growth of GHG emissions, while
sustaining the economic growth needed to finance investment in new,
clean energy technologies. It sets America on a path to slow the growth
of greenhouse gas emissions, and--as the science justifies--to stop and
then reverse that growth:
<bullet> In efficiency terms, the 183 metric tons of emissions per
million dollars GDP that we emit today will be lowered to 151 metric
tons per million dollars GDP in 2012.
<bullet> Existing trends and efforts in technology improvement
will play a significant role. Beyond that, the President's commitment
will achieve 100 million metric tons of reduced emissions in 2012
alone, with more than 500 million metric tons in cumulative savings
over the entire decade.
<bullet> This goal is comparable to the average progress that
nations participating in the Kyoto Protocol are required to achieve.
<bullet> Substantially Improve the Emission Reduction Registry.
The President directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with
the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to propose
improvements to the current voluntary emission reduction registration
program under section 1605(b) of the 1992 Energy Policy Act within 120
days. These improvements will enhance measurement accuracy, reliability
and verifiability, working with and taking into account emerging
domestic and international approaches.
<bullet> Protect and Provide Transferable Credits for Emissions
Reduction. The President directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend
reforms to ensure that businesses and individuals that register
reductions are not penalized under a future climate policy, and to give
transferable credits to companies that can show real emissions
reductions.
<bullet> Review Progress Toward Goal and Take Additional Action if
Necessary. If, in 2012, we find that we are not on track toward meeting
our goal, and sound science justifies further policy action, the United
States will respond with additional measures that may include a broad,
market-based program as well as additional incentives and voluntary
measures designed to accelerate technology development and deployment.
<bullet> Increase Funding for America's Commitment to Climate
Change. The President's fiscal year 1903 budget seeks $4.5 billion in
total climate spending--an increase of $700 million. This commitment is
unmatched in the world, and is particularly notable given America's
focus on international and homeland security and domestic economic
issues in the President's fiscal year 1903 budget proposal.
<bullet> Take Action on the Science and Technology Review. The
Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy have completed their
review of the Federal Government's science and technology research
portfolios and recommended a path forward. As a result of their review,
the President has established a new management structure to advance and
coordinate climate change science and technology research.
<bullet> The President has established a Cabinet-level Committee
on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration to oversee this
effort. The Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy will lead the
effort, in close coordination with the President's Science Advisor. The
research effort will continue to be coordinated through the National
Science and Technology Council in accordance with the Global Change
Research Act of 1990.
<bullet> The President's fiscal year 1903 budget proposal
dedicates $1.7 billion to fund basic scientific research on climate
change and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and
sequestration technologies.
<bullet> This includes $80 million in new funding dedicated to
implementation of the Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and the
National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI) announced last
June. This funding will be used to address major gaps in our current
understanding of the natural carbon cycle and the role of black soot
emissions in climate change. It will also be used to promote the
development of the most promising ``breakthrough'' technologies for
clean energy generation and carbon sequestration.
<bullet> Implement a Comprehensive Range of New and Expanded
Domestic Policies, Including:
<bullet> Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, Cogeneration, and
New Technology. The President's fiscal year 1903 budget seeks $555
million in clean energy tax incentives, as the first part of a $4.6
billion commitment over the next 5 years ($7.1 billion over the next 10
years). These tax credits will spur investments in renewable energy
(solar, wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles,
cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. Consistent with the National
Energy Policy, the President has directed the Secretary of the Treasury
to work with Congress to extend and expand the production tax credit
for electricity generation from wind and biomass, to develop a new
residential solar energy tax credit, and to encourage cogeneration
projects through investment tax credits.
<bullet> Business Challenges. The President has challenged
American businesses to make specific commitments to improving the
greenhouse gas intensity of their operations and to reduce emissions.
Recent agreements with the semi-conductor and aluminum industries and
industries that emit methane already have significantly reduced
emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build
upon these successes with new agreements, producing greater reductions.
<bullet> Transportation Programs. The Administration is promoting
the development of fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks,
researching options for producing cleaner fuels, and implementing
programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is committed to
expanding Federal research partnerships with industry, providing
market-based incentives and updating current regulatory programs that
advance our progress in this important area. This commitment includes
expanding fuel cell research, in particular through the ``FreedomCAR''
initiative. The President's fiscal year 1903 budget seeks more than $3
billion in tax credits over 11 years for consumers to purchase fuel
cell and hybrid vehicles. The Secretary of Transportation has asked the
congressional leadership to work with him on legislation that would
authorize the Department of Transportation to reform the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, fully considering the recent
National Academy Sciences report, so that we can safely improve fuel
economy for cars and trucks.
<bullet> Carbon Sequestration. The President's fiscal year 1903
budget requests over $3 billion--a $1 billion increase above the
baseline--as the first part of a 10-year (2002-2011) commitment to
implement and improve the conservation title of the Farm Bill, which
will significantly enhance the natural storage of carbon. The President
also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide recommendations
for further, targeted incentives aimed at forest and agricultural
sequestration of greenhouse gases. The President further directed the
Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Energy, to develop accounting
rules and guidelines for crediting sequestration projects, taking into
account emerging domestic and international approaches.
<bullet> Promote New and Expanded International Policies to
Complement Our Domestic Program. The President's approach seeks to
expand cooperation internationally to meet the challenge of climate
change, including:
<bullet> Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in
Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences'
recommendation for better observation systems, the President has
allocated $25 million and challenged other developed nations to match
the U.S. commitment.
<bullet> Tripling Funding for ``Debt-for-Nature'' Forest
Conservation Programs. Building upon recent Tropical Forest
Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements with Belize, El Salvador, and
Bangladesh, the President's fiscal year 1903 budget request of $40
million to fund ``debt for nature'' agreements with developing
countries nearly triples funding for this successful program. Under
TFCA, developing countries agree to protect their tropical forests from
logging, avoiding emissions and preserving the substantial carbon
sequestration services they provide. The President also announced a new
agreement with the Government of Thailand, which will preserve
important mangrove forest in Northeastern Thailand in exchange for debt
relief worth $11.4 million.
<bullet> Fully Funding the Global Environmental Facility. The
Administration's fiscal year 1903 budget request of $178 million for
the GEF is more than $77 million above this year's funding and includes
a substantial $70 million payment for arrears incurred during the prior
administration. The GEF is the primary international institution for
transferring energy and sequestration technologies to the developing
world under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).
<bullet> Dedicating Significant Funds to the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID). The President's fiscal year 2003
budget requests $155 million in funding for USAID climate change
programs. USAID serves as a critical vehicle for transferring American
energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries to
promote sustainable development and minimize their GHG emissions
growth.
<bullet> Pursue Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan
continue their High-Level Consultations on climate change issues. Later
this month, a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese
counterparts to discuss specific projects within the various areas of
climate science and technology, to identify the highest priorities for
collaborative research.
<bullet> Pursue Joint Research with Italy. Following up on a
pledge of President Bush and Prime Minister Berlusconi to undertake
joint research on climate change, the U.S. and Italy convened a Joint
Climate Change Research Meeting in January 2002. The delegations for
the two countries identified more than 20 joint climate change research
activities for immediate implementation, including global and regional
modeling.
<bullet> Pursue Joint Research with Central America. The United
States and Central American Heads of Government signed the Central
American-United States of America Joint Accord (CONCAUSA) on December
10, 1994. The original agreement covered cooperation under action plans
in four major areas: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy,
environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development. On
June 7, 2001, the United States and its Central American partners
signed an expanded and renewed CONCAUSA Declaration, adding disaster
relief and climate change as new areas for cooperation. The new
CONCAUSA Declaration calls for intensified cooperative efforts to
address climate change through scientific research, estimating and
monitoring greenhouse gases, investing in forestry conservation,
enhancing energy efficiency, and utilizing new environmental
technologies.
NATIONAL GOAL
The President set a national goal to reduce the greenhouse gas
intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 percent over the next 10 years.
Rather than pitting economic growth against the environment, the
President has established an approach that promises real progress on
climate change by tapping the power of sustained economic growth.
<bullet> The President's Yardstick--Greenhouse Gas Intensity--is a
Better Way to Measure Progress Without Hurting Growth. A goal expressed
in terms of declining greenhouse gas intensity, measuring greenhouse
gas emissions relative to economic activity, quantifies our effort to
reduce emissions through conservation, adoption of cleaner, more
efficient, and emission-reducing technologies, and sequestration. At
the same time, an intensity goal accommodates economic growth.
<bullet> Reducing Greenhouse Gas Intensity by 18 Percent Over the
Next Ten Years is Ambitious but Achievable. The United States will
reduce the 183 metric tons of emissions per million dollars GDP that we
emit today to 151 metric tons per million dollars GDP in 2012. We
expect existing trends and efforts in technology improvement to play a
significant role. Beyond that, our commitment will achieve 100 million
metric tons of reduced emissions in 2012 alone, with more than 500
million metric tons in cumulative savings over the entire decade.
<bullet> Focusing on Greenhouse Gas Intensity Sets America on a
Path to Slow the Growth of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and--as the
Science Justifies--to Stop and Then Reverse That Growth. As we learn
more about the science of climate change and develop new technologies
to mitigate emissions, this annual decline can be accelerated. When the
annual decline in intensity equals the economic growth rate (currently,
about 3 percent per year), emission growth will have stopped. When the
annual decline in intensity exceeds the economic growth rate, emission
growth will reverse. Reversing emission growth will eventually
stabilize atmospheric concentrations as emissions decline.
<bullet> As We Advance Science and Develop Technology to
Substantially Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Long Term, We Do
Not Want to Risk Harming the Economy in the Short Term. Over the past
20 years, greenhouse gas emissions have risen with economic growth, as
our economy benefited from inexpensive, fossil-fuel based--and
greenhouse gas emitting--energy. While new technologies promise to
break this emission-economy link, a rapid reduction in emissions would
be costly and threaten economic growth. Sustained economic growth is
essential for any long-term solution: Prosperity is what allows us to
dedicate more resources to solving environmental problems. History
shows that wealthier societies demand--and can afford--more
environmental protection.
<bullet> The Intensity Based Approach Promotes Near-Term
Opportunities to Conserve Fossil Fuel Use, Recover Methane, and
Sequester Carbon. Until we develop and adopt breakthrough technologies
that provide safe and reliable energy to fuel our economy without
emitting greenhouse gases, we need to promote more rapid adoption of
existing, improved energy efficiency and renewable resources that
provide cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions. Profitable
methane recovery from landfills, coal mines and gas pipelines offers
another opportunity--estimated by the EPA at about 30 million tons of
carbon equivalent emissions. Finally, carbon sequestration in soils and
forests can provide tens of millions of tons of emission reductions at
very low costs.
<bullet> The Intensity Based Approach Advances a Serious, but
Measured Mitigation Response. The President recognizes America's
responsibility to reduce emissions. At the same time, any long-term
solution--one that stabilizes atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases at safe levels--will require the development and deployment of
new technologies that are not yet cost-effective. The President's
policy balances the desire for immediate reductions with the need to
protect the economy and to take advantage of developing science and
technology.
The President's Goal is Ambitious and Responsible
<bullet> Reducing Greenhouse Gas Intensity by 18 Percent Over the
Next Ten Years is Comparable to the Average Progress that Nations
Participating in the Kyoto Protocol are Required to Achieve. Our goal
translates into a 4.5 percent reduction beyond forecasts of the
progress that America is expected to make based on existing programs
and private activity. Forecasts of the average reductions required by
nations implementing the Kyoto Protocol range from zero to 7 percent.
<bullet> While Producing Results Similar to What the Kyoto
Protocol Participants Are Required to Achieve on Average, the
President's Approach Protects the Economy and Develops Institutions for
a Long-Term Solution. The focus on greenhouse gas intensity separates
the goal of reducing emissions from the potential economic harm
associated with a rigid emission cap. By measuring greenhouse gas
emissions relative to economic activity, we have a solid yardstick
against which we can measure progress as we pursue a range of programs
to reduce emissions. As we develop technologies to produce more goods
with fewer greenhouse gas emissions, this yardstick does not penalize
economic growth.
<bullet> Greenhouse Gas Intensity Is a More Practical Way to
Discuss Goals with Developing Countries. The close connection between
economic growth, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions implies that
fixed appropriate emission limits are hard to identify when economic
growth is uncertain and carbon-free, breakthrough energy technologies
are not yet in place. Such targets are also hard to identify for
developing countries where the future rate of emissions is even more
uncertain. Given its neutrality with regard to economic growth,
greenhouse gas intensity solves or substantially reduces many of these
problems.
Enhanced National Registry for Voluntary Emissions Reductions
The Administration will improve the current Federal GHG Reduction
and Sequestration Registry that recognizes greenhouse gas reductions by
non-governmental organizations, businesses, farmers, and the Federal,
State and local governments. Registry participants and the public will
have a high level of confidence in the reductions recognized by this
Registry, through capture and sequestration projects, mitigation
projects that increase energy efficiency and/or switch fuels, and
process changes to reduce emissions of potent greenhouse gases, such as
methane. An enhanced registry will promote the identification and
expansion of innovative and effective ways to reduce greenhouse gases.
The enhanced registry will encourage participation by removing the risk
that these actions will be penalized--or inaction rewarded--by future
climate policy.
<bullet> Improve the Quality of the Current Program. A registry is
a tool for companies to publicly record their progress in reducing
emissions, providing public recognition of a company's accomplishments,
and a record of mitigation efforts for future policy design. This tool
goes hand-in-hand with voluntary business challenges, described below,
by providing a standardized, credible vehicle for reporting and
recognizing progress.
<bullet> Although businesses can already register emission
reductions under section 1605(b) of the 1995 Energy Policy Act,
participation has been limited.
<bullet> The President directed the Secretary of Energy, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Agriculture,
and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to
propose improvements to the current voluntary emissions reduction
registration program within 120 days.
<bullet> These improvements will enhance measurement accuracy,
reliability and verifiability, working with and taking into account
emerging domestic and international approaches.
<bullet> Protect and Provide Transferable Credits for Emissions
Reduction. The President directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend
reforms to ensure that businesses and individuals that register
reductions are not penalized under a future climate policy, and to give
transferable credits to companies that can show real emissions
reductions. These protections will encourage businesses and individuals
to pursue innovative strategies to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas
emissions, without the risk that future climate policy will
disadvantage them.
<bullet> Background on Current Registry Program. The Energy Policy
Act of 1992 directed the Department of Energy (with EIA as the
implementing agency) to develop a program to document voluntary actions
that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases or remove greenhouse gases
from the atmosphere.
<bullet> Under the Energy Policy Act, EIA was directed to issue
``procedures for the accurate reporting of information on annual
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon fixation achieved
through any measures, including fuel switching, forest management
practices, tree planting, use of renewable energy, manufacture or use
of vehicles with reduced greenhouse gas emissions, appliance
efficiency, methane recovery, cogeneration, chlorofluorocarbon capture
and replacement, and power plant heat rate improvement.''
<bullet> In 1999, 207 companies and other organizations,
representing 24 different industries or services, reported on 1,722
projects that achieved 226 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent reductions--equal to 3.4 percent of national emissions.
Participating companies included Clairol, AT&T, Dow Chemical, Johnson &
Johnson, IBM, Motorola, Pharmacia, Upjohn, Sunoco, Southern, General
Motors and DuPont.
<bullet> EIA released a February 2002 report demonstrating that
this program continues to expand. In 2000, 222 companies had undertaken
1,882 projects to reduce or sequester greenhouse gases. These achieved
269 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent reductions--equal
to 3.9 percent of national emissions.
<bullet> A number of proposals to reform the existing registry--or
create a new registry--have appeared in energy and/or climate policy
bills introduced in the past year. The Administration will fully
explore the extent to which the existing authority under the Energy
Policy Act is adequate to achieve these reforms.
Progress Check in 2012
The domestic programs proposed by the President allow consumers and
businesses to make flexible decisions about emission reductions rather
than mandating particular control options or rigid targets. If,
however, by 2012, our progress is not sufficient, and sound science
justifies further action, the United States will respond with
additional measures that may include a broad, market-based program, as
well as additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to
accelerate technology development and deployment.
domestic initiatives
Summary
Key domestic initiatives to contribute to achieving our goal:
<bullet> Tax Incentives for Renewables and Cogeneration. The
Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget proposal seeks $4.6 billion in
clean energy tax incentives over the next 5 years. These tax credits
will spur investments in renewable energy (solar, wind, and biomass),
hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas. As
directed in the National Energy Policy, the Secretary of the Treasury
will work with Congress to extend and expand the production tax credit
for electricity generation from wind and biomass, to develop a new
residential solar energy tax credit, and to encourage cogeneration
projects through investment tax credits.
<bullet> Business Challenges. The President challenges American
businesses and industries to reduce emissions. Already, agreements with
the semi-conductor and aluminum industries, and industries that emit
methane, have dramatically reduced emissions of some of the most potent
greenhouse gases. We will build on these successes, with broader
agreements and greater reductions.
<bullet> Transportation Programs. The Administration is promoting
the development of fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks,
researching options for producing cleaner fuels, and implementing
programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is committed to
expanding Federal research partnerships with industry, market-based
incentives and updating current regulatory programs that advance our
progress in this important area. The Administration has expanded fuel
cell research, such as the ``FreedomCAR'' initiative, and the
President's 1903 budget seeks more than $3 billion in tax credits over
11 years for consumers to purchase fuel cells and hybrid vehicles. The
Secretary of Transportation has asked the congressional leadership to
work with him on legislation that would authorize the Department of
Transportation to reform the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
program, fully considering the recent National Academy Sciences report,
so that we can safely improve fuel economy for cars and trucks.
<bullet> Carbon Sequestration. The President's fiscal year 1903
budget requests over $3 billion--a $1 billion increase above the
baseline--as the first part of a 10-year (2002-2011) commitment to
implement and improve the conservation title of the Farm Bill, which
will significantly enhance the natural storage of carbon. The President
also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide recommendations
on further, targeted incentives for forest and agricultural
sequestration of greenhouse gases. The President further directed the
Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Energy, to develop accounting
rules and guidelines for crediting sequestration projects, taking into
account emerging domestic and international approaches.
Incentives and Programs for Renewables and Industrial Cogeneration
The President's fiscal year 1903 budget proposes providing $4.6
billion in clean energy tax incentives over the next 5 years ($7.1
billion over 10 years) for investments in renewable energy (solar,
wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, co-generation,
landfill gas conversion, and ethanol. These incentives are important to
meeting the nation's long-term energy supply and security needs, and
reducing pollution and projected greenhouse gas emissions. These clean
energy tax incentives include:
<bullet> New 10 Percent Tax Credit for Co-Generation (Combined
Heat and Power Systems). The President has proposed a new 10 percent
tax credit for investments in combined heat and power systems between
2002 and 2006. The credit will encourage investments in highly
efficient CHP projects and spur innovation in improved CHP
technologies. No income tax credits are currently available for
investment in CHP property.
<bullet> Cogeneration. Combined heat and power (CHP), also known
as ``co-generation'', is a highly efficient form of electric generation
that recycles heat which is normally lost under traditional power
combustion methods. CHP captures the heat left over from industrial
use, providing a source of residential and industrial heating and air
conditioning in the local area around the power plant. CHP systems
achieve a greater level of overall energy efficiency, thereby reducing
energy consumption, costs, and carbon emissions.
<bullet> EPA Combined Heat and Power Partnership. The new tax
credit would enhance efforts underway by the Environmental Protection
Agency to streamline the permitting process for cogeneration plants,
promote their location in brownfields and other industrial sites, and
clarify how companies can use cogeneration to stay in compliance with
Clean Air Act pollution standards. On October 5, 2001, in partnership
with 17 Fortune 500 companies, city and State governments and
nonprofits, EPA announced the Combined Heat and Power Partnership.
Current CHP projects of the founding partners represent more then 5,800
megawatts of power generating capacity, an amount capable of serving
almost 6 million households. The projects annually reduce carbon
dioxide by more than 8 million tons; the annual energy savings equal 19
million barrels of oil. A similar program by the Department of Energy
challenges the heat and power industry to double usage of cogeneration
in the United States by 2010.
<bullet> First-Ever Tax Credit for Residential Solar Energy
Systems. The President has proposed a new 15 percent tax credit for
individuals who purchase photovoltaic equipment or solar water heating
systems used in a residence, up to a maximum credit of $2,000 for each
type of equipment. Currently, no credit is available for non-commercial
purchases of solar energy equipment. The credit would be available for
photovoltaic equipment purchased between 2002 and 2007, and for solar
water heating equipment purchased between 2002 and 2005. This credit
will encourage businesses and homeowners to invest in solar power
systems.
<bullet> Expanded Tax Credit for Electricity Produced from Wind or
Biomass. The President has proposed extending and modifying the tax
credit for electricity produced from wind or biomass. Currently, wind
energy accounts for 6 percent of renewable electricity generation and
0.1 percent of total electricity supply. Advances have helped cut costs
by more than 80 percent during the last 20 years. This proposal would
help make electricity produced from wind and biomass competitive with
other sources of electricity supply. The proposal would:
<bullet> Extend for 3 years (2002-2004) the present 1.7 cent-per-
kilowatt hour credit for electricity produced from wind and closed-loop
biomass (plants grown exclusively to produce electricity); and
<bullet> Expand eligible biomass sources to include certain
biomass from forest-related resources, agricultural and other sources.
For existing biomass facilities, the credit for electricity produced
from new sources is 1.0 cent-per-kilowatt hour for 3 years (2002-2004)
of production. For coal fired facilities, electricity produced from co-
firing biomass from new sources is 0.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour for 3
years of production (2002-2004).
<bullet> Tax Credit for New Methane Landfill Projects. The
President has proposed encouraging the development of a new alternative
source of energy by providing tax credits for energy produced from
landfill gas. The credit would be approximately 1.0 cent-per-kilowatt
hour (or the equivalent in dollars per million metric BTU) for energy
produced from methane from landfills regulated by the EPA to collect
and flare methane, and 1.5 cents-per-kilowatt hour for unregulated
landfills. The credit would be available for energy produced from new
facilities through 2010.
<bullet> New Tax Credit for New Hybrid or Fuel-Cell Vehicles. The
President has proposed a new temporary tax credit of up to $4,000 for
the purchase of new hybrid vehicles and up to $8,000 for the purchase
of fuel cell vehicles between 2002 and 2007. These credits would be
available for all qualifying light vehicles, including cars, minivans,
sport utility vehicles, and light trucks. The tax credits will
encourage the purchase of highly fuel-efficient vehicles that
incorporate advanced automotive technologies and will help to move
hybrid and fuel cell vehicles from the laboratory to the highway.
<bullet> Increased Funding for Geothermal Energy. The President's
2003 budget proposal for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) supports
alternative, non-fossil fuel energy development. The budget includes an
increase for USGS to investigate the nature and extent of geothermal
systems and produce updated assessments of available geothermal energy
resources in selected regions of the United States. The near-term focus
of this effort will be in the Great Basin region, where most of the
public land available for geothermal leasing lies. This region
encompasses most of Nevada and large portions of California, Oregon,
Idaho, and Utah. Available data indicate the presence of a substantial
undeveloped geothermal energy resource that could be tapped to help
provide for the growing energy requirements of the western United
States.
<bullet> Increased Funding for Renewable Energy Resources on
Public Lands. The President's 1903 budget proposal calls for a major
effort by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to increase its renewable
energy activities in support of the President's National Energy Policy.
In 2003, BLM will encourage the study, exploration, and development of
renewable energy resources from public lands. Emphasis will be directed
to advancing the use of geothermal, hydropower, wind, solar, and
biomass resources.
Business Challenges
The President challenged American businesses and industries to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Already, agreements with the semi-
conductor and aluminum industries, and with industries that emit
methane, are dramatically reducing emissions of the most potent
greenhouse gases. The President's plan will build on these successes,
with broader agreements and greater reductions.
Company Challenges
<bullet> EPA's ``Climate Leaders'' Initiative: EPA will launch a
new, voluntary Climate Leaders program with a group of major companies
including: Florida Power and Light, GM, Lockheed Martin, Miller Brewing
Company, Bethlehem Steel, Interface Inc., SC Johnson and Holcimus Inc.
These companies have agreed to test new greenhouse gas reporting
guidelines as the basis for agreeing to targets in the future. Each
participant will establish an individual goal for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, and will voluntarily report those emissions. The Climate
Leaders program provides a significant opportunity to achieve the
greenhouse gas intensity reductions set forth in this policy through a
voluntary approach. In the coming months, the Administration will
aggressively pursue additional corporate partners representing a wider
spectrum of the U.S. economy.
Sector Challenges
<bullet> Semiconductors: On March 13, 2001, EPA and the
Semiconductor Industry Association signed a new voluntary agreement,
the PFC Reduction Climate Partnership. Under this partnership, the
industry agreed to reduce emissions of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) by 10
percent from 1995 levels by the end of 2010. The expected reduction of
13.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2010 alone is
comparable to taking 12 million cars off the road. PFCs have, on
average, 10,000 times the potency of carbon dioxide over 100 years, and
persist in the atmosphere 2,000 to 50,000 years.
<bullet> Aluminum: Twelve of the 13 U.S. primary aluminum
producers, representing 96 percent of the U.S. primary aluminum
production capacity, have joined EPA's Voluntary Aluminum Industrial
Partnership. Companies participating in this program have committed to
make reductions in two potent PFCs, tetrafluoromethane (CF4) and
hexafluoroethane (C2F6). The program met its 2000 goal to reduce PFC
emissions from U.S. primary aluminum smelting by 45 percent--equivalent
to 1.8 million metric tons of carbon--using cost-effective approaches
that make economic and environmental sense for the partners.
<bullet> Methane: Because of the potency of methane relative to
carbon dioxide, a ``methane-first'' strategy for greenhouse gas
mitigation is cost-effective. A variety of U.S. industry and government
partnerships have reduced methane emissions, and they are expected to
hold emissions at or below 1990 levels through and beyond 2010.
Partners in EPA's methane programs are projected to maintain emissions
below 1990 levels through 2010.
<bullet> EPA's Natural Gas STAR program includes companies
representing 40 percent of the U.S. natural gas production, 72 percent
of transmission company pipeline miles, 49 percent of distribution
company service connections, and 23 percent of processing throughput.
This partnership has achieved significant reductions. In 2000, EPA
estimates a reduction in methane emissions of 4 million metric tons of
carbon equivalent, and projects for 2010 a reduction of 6 million
metric tons of carbon equivalent.
<bullet> EPA's Coalbed Methane Outreach Program (CMOP) encourages
industry to reduce methane emissions from underground coal mines. The
program provides technical assistance to mining companies on
technologies for recovered methane. EPA estimates that CMOP reduced 2
million metric tons carbon equivalent in 2000.
<bullet> In the agriculture sector, USDA and EPA have partnered on
the Ag-STAR program and the Ruminant Livestock Efficiency Program
(RLEP), which focus on reducing methane emissions. The overall impact
of these two programs on greenhouse gas emissions has been small on a
national scale, but program stakeholders in the agricultural community
have demonstrated that the practices can reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and increase productivity.
Improving Fuel Economy
Developing new technologies to improve the energy efficiency of
transportation in the United States will be a key element in achieving
future reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Cars, trucks, aircraft
and other parts of the nation's transportation system are responsible
for about one-third of the carbon dioxide emissions in the United
States. The Administration is currently promoting the development of
fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks, researching options for
producing cleaner fuels, and implementing programs to improve energy
efficiency. The President is committed to the expansion and improvement
of Federal research partnerships with industry, market-based
incentives, and reforming current regulatory programs that advance our
progress in this important area.
<bullet> The ``FreedomCAR''--Advancing Hydrogen-Based Fuel Cells.
On January 9, 2002, Energy Secretary Abraham, with the heads of General
Motors, Ford Motor Co. and the Chrysler arm of DaimlerChrysler,
announced a new partnership, FreedomCAR (Cooperative Automotive
Research), to promote the development of hydrogen as the primary fuel
for cars and trucks. The ``FreedomCAR'' program embraces the long-term
strategic goal of developing a new breakthrough technology--the
hydrogen-powered fuel cell--with a vision of ultimately eliminating our
reliance on foreign oil.
<bullet> The Department Of Energy's Public-Private Projects for
Low-Cost, Breakthrough Fuel Cell Technology. In August 2002, Energy
Secretary Abraham announced new partnerships, totaling $500 million,
with Honeywell, Siemens, Westinghouse Power Corporation, Delphi
Automotive Systems, Battelle, Cummins Power Generation, and McDermott
Technologies. The partnerships build upon President Bush's commitment
to fuel cell research and cutting edge technologies. The goal of this
initiative is to cut the costs of fuel cells to as low as one-tenth the
cost of currently marketed systems and to one-third the cost of the
more advanced concepts now beginning to reach commercial readiness.
<bullet> Tax Credits for New Hybrid or Fuel Cell Vehicles. The
President has proposed a new temporary tax credit of up to $4,000 for
the purchase of new hybrid vehicles and up to $8,000 for the purchase
of fuel-cell vehicles between 2002 and 2007. These credits would be
available for all qualifying light vehicles, including cars, minivans,
sport utility vehicles, and light trucks. The tax credits will
encourage the purchase of highly fuel-efficient vehicles that
incorporate advanced automotive technologies and will help to move
hybrid and fuel cell vehicles from the laboratory to the highway.
<bullet> Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE). A key
recommendation of the President's National Energy Policy directed the
Secretary of Transportation to review and provide recommendations on
establishing updated CAFE standards, with due consideration of the July
2001 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report. The NAS report included
several recommendations pertaining to options for structuring the CAFE
system, including permitting manufacturers to trade fuel economy
credits.
<bullet> The Administration supports increasing automobile fuel
economy and encouraging new technologies that reduce our dependence on
imported oil, while protecting passenger safety and jobs.
<bullet> On February 1, 2002, Transportation Secretary Mineta
asked the congressional leadership to ``work . . . on legislation that
would authorize the Department of Transportation to reform the CAFE
program, fully considering the NAS report. Possible reforms include:
(1) adopting fuel economy targets that are dependent on vehicles
attributes, such as vehicles weight, that inherently influence fuel use
and have minimal adverse safety consequences; (2) utilizing market-
based incentives, such as trading of fuel economy credits, to obtain
fuel savings at the lowest possible cost to consumer while providing
continuous incentives for additional fuel economy enhancement; (3)
encouraging development and implement of new technologies; and (4)
establishing realistic, long-term targets and deadlines to increase
economy safely while providing greater long-term product planning for
vehicles manufacturers.''
<bullet> On July 10, 2001, Transportation Secretary Mineta urged
Congress to lift the appropriations ban on new rulemaking of CAFE
standards by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA) ``to improve vehicle fuel efficiency standards.'' In December
2001, Congress responded by lifting the ban, and last week NHTSA
initiated a public review process for safely improving the fuel economy
of new light truck standards for model year 2005 through 2010, and for
reforming the CAFE program.
<bullet> Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS). The Department
of Transportation's National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA) will finalize this year a rule requiring the
installation of tire pressure monitoring systems (TPMSs) in all new
cars and light trucks. Properly inflated tires improve fuel efficiency
and reduce maintenance costs. NHTSA estimates that the annualized
benefits range from $120-480 million in fuel savings and $75-165
million in reduced tread wear. NHTSA predicts TPMS will save between
.31 and 1.27 million metric tons of carbon equivalent per year when
applied to the entire on-road fleet. That reflects between 128 and 528
million gallons of gasoline per year.
<bullet> First-Ever EPA Agreement with Ford to Develop High-
Efficiency Auto Technology. In September 2001, EPA agreed to license to
the Ford Motor Company a unique, high-efficiency ``hydraulic hybrid''
technology that has the long-term potential to reduce energy
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. The first application of this
technology, planned for model year 2005, will result in a minimum 30
percent improvement in vehicle fuel economy; the second phase, planned
for as early as year 2009, should double the fuel economy of selected
new vehicles. This is the first-ever licensing agreement between EPA
and an automobile company involving vehicle powertrain technology.
Promoting Domestic Carbon Sequestration
In the agriculture sector, activities including fertilizer use,
animal waste management and on-farm fuel use account for 148 million
metric tons of carbon equivalent emissions, about 8 percent of total
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget
requests $3 billion above the base-line over 10 years (2002-2011) for a
new, conservation-focused Farm Bill that will enhance the natural
storage of carbon dioxide.
Increased Funding for USDA's Conservation Programs:
<bullet> The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) assists farm
owners and operators to conserve and improve soil, water, air and
wildlife resources by removing environmentally sensitive land from
agricultural production and keeping it under long-term resource-
conserving cover. Currently, USDA estimates that the CRP removes nearly
34 million acres of environmentally sensitive cropland from production,
which generates long-term environmental benefits, including the annual
savings of about 15 million metric tons of carbon emissions per year.
The CRP would expand to 40 million acres, saving roughly 19 million
metric tons of carbon per year. The Administration's fiscal year 1903
budget proposes an increase of $89 million over the fiscal year 1902
enacted level.
<bullet> The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) helps
producers make beneficial and cost-effective changes to cropping and
grazing systems; improve manure, nutrient and pest management, and
implement conservation measures to improve soil, water, and related
natural resources. USDA estimates that the EQIP program (in combination
with conservation technical assistance) provides assistance to farmers
for planning and implementing soil and water conservation practices and
removes roughly 12 million metric tons of carbon per year. The
Administration's fiscal year 2003 proposes an increase of $800 million
over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.
<bullet> The Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) has enrolled just over
1 million acres to date. Under current authority, the program is capped
at 1,075,000 acres, and has already reached that level this year.
Estimated soil carbon sequestration resulting from conversion of
cropland on wetland soils to grassland or forest by 1997 (1.4 million
acres) has resulted in carbon sequestration rates of over 2 million
metric tons of carbon per year. The Administration has supported a
version of the Farm Bill that would expand the WRP to 2.225 million
acres, saving roughly 4 million metric tons of carbon per year. The
Administration's fiscal year 1903 proposes an increase of $176 million
over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.
<bullet> The Forest Stewardship Program provides technical and
financial assistance to nonindustrial, private forest owners. About 147
million hectares of U.S. forests are nonindustrial, private forestlands
and provide many ecological and economic benefits and values. These
forests provide about 60 percent of our nation's timber supply, with
increases expected in the future. The acceleration of tree planting on
nonindustrial, private forestlands and marginal agricultural lands can
help meet resource needs and provide important ancillary benefits that
improve environmental quality, such as wildlife habitat, soil
conservation, water quality protection and improvement, and recreation.
Additionally, tree planting and forest management increases uptake of
carbon dioxide and the storage of carbon in living biomass, soils,
litter, and long-life wood products. The Forest Service, in cooperation
with State forestry agencies, manages both programs, and estimates that
these programs provide 700,000 metric tons of carbon reductions per
year. The Administration's fiscal year 1903 budget proposes an increase
of $16 million over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.
promote new and expanded international policies
Summary
The President's approach will actively pursue the integration of
our domestic goals and policies with those of other nations. The
President has submitted provisions in the fiscal year 1903 budget
includes:
<bullet> Tripling Funding for ``Debt-For-Nature'' Programs.
Building upon recent Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements
with Belize, El Salvador, and Bangladesh, the President's fiscal year
1903 budget request of $40 million to fund ``debt for nature''
agreements with developing countries nearly triples funding for this
highly successful program. The President also announced a new deal with
the Government of Thailand, which will preserve important mangrove
forest in Northeastern Thailand in exchange for debt relief worth $11.4
million.
<bullet> Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in
Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences'
recommendation for better observation systems, the President has
allocated $25 million and challenged other developed nations to match
the U.S. commitment.
<bullet> Expanding Technology Transfer and Capacity Building in
the Developing World:
<bullet> Fully Funding the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
President's fiscal year 1903 budget requests $178 million for the GEF,
a $77 million increase, which includes a substantial $70 million
payment for arrears incurred during the prior Administration. These
funds will support transfer of advanced energy and sequestration
technologies to the developing world.
<bullet> Dedicating Significant Funds to the United States
Administration on International Development. The President's 1903
budget requests $155 million in funding for USAID climate change
programs. USAID serves as a primary vehicle for transferring American
energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries to
promote sustainable development and minimize their GHG emissions
growth.
<bullet> Building on International Cooperative Agreements:
<bullet> Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue
their High-Level Consultations on climate change issues. Later this
month, a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese
counterparts to discuss specific projects within the various areas of
climate science and technology, to identify the highest priorities for
collaborative research.
<bullet> Joint Research with Italy. The U.S. and Italy have
identified more than 20 joint climate change research activities for
immediate implementation and more topics for further development in
critical areas of global and regional climate modeling, atmospheric
studies related to climate, carbon cycle research, low-carbon
technologies and other related areas.
Increased Funding for Tropical Forest Conservation
The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) reflects America's
commitment to preserving tropical forests worldwide. Created in 1998
and reauthorized in 2001 with broad bipartisan support, the program
offers eligible countries the opportunity to reduce their debt to the
United States while preserving their tropical forests. TFCA encourages
and empowers local communities and nongovernmental organizations to
develop and implement grassroots solutions to conservation problems.
Grants from the local fund can be used to support a wide range of
activities, such as training programs to increase the capacity of
individuals and organizations involved in forest conservation areas;
restoration of forested areas; and the protection of parks and other
protected areas. The President's 2003 budget proposal seeks $50 million
in funding for tropical forestry conservation, of which $40 million may
be used for TFCA.
Estimates of the carbon sequestration value of tropical forests
suggest a wide range of values. The World Resources Institute estimates
that carbon sequestration value ranges from 6 to 72 tons per acre of
rainforest. The 1995 IPCC report further analyzed the global potential
for carbon storage. Slowing tropical deforestation on 700 million
hectares (nearly the size of the US, but only 17 percent of the global
forest area) could store 60 to87 million gigatons of carbon in 55
years. Annual carbon storage could be over two gigatons by 2050, about
14 percent of projected emissions.
<bullet> Agreements During the Bush Administration. TFCA
agreements have been negotiated with Belize, El Salvador, and Thailand
during this administration.
<bullet> Leverage. The four TFCA agreements to date--Bangladesh,
Belize, El Salvador, and Thailand--generate approximately $40 million
in forest conservation funding at a cost of $19.2 million.
<bullet> Bangladesh. Debt reduction agreement signed September 12,
2000; saves Bangladesh $10 million in hard currency payments and will
generate $8.5 million in local currency interest payments for tropical
forest conservation of Sundarban mangrove forests, which shields the
coastline from typhoons and provides habitat for the last genetically
viable population of Royal Bengal tigers.
<bullet> Belize. In August, 2001, the U.S. and Belize concluded a
``debt-for-nature'' agreement to protect 23,000 acres of tropical
forests. The agreement leveraged $1.3 million in private finds raised
by The Nature Conservancy.
<bullet> El Salvador. Debt reduction agreement signed July 12,
2001; Tropical Forestry Agreement signed September 14, 2001. Reduced
country's official debt to the U.S. by $3 million, generating $14.3
million for tropical forest conservation in local currency interest
payments. Initial target of TFCA funds will be reforestation of
hillsides.
<bullet> Thailand. Debt reduction agreement signed September 19,
2001; agreement was approved by the Thai Cabinet on February 12, 2002.
Debt agreement saves Thailand's $11.4 million in hard currency payments
and will generate $9.5 million for conservation activities. Initial
targets for TFCA funds include reforestation projects in northeastern
Thailand, protection of mangrove forests.
Expanding Technology Transfer and Capacity Building in Developing
Countries
The President' fiscal year 1903 budget significantly expands
funding for current programs that transfer advanced energy and
sequestration technologies to developing countries, and provide
technical assistance and training to their citizens. Eighty-one percent
of the growth in global carbon emissions from fossil fuel use in 1990-
2010 is expected to come from developing countries, according to
projections by the Energy Information Administration. Reducing this
projected, exponential growth of emissions in developing countries
therefore must be a critical element of any rational policy to address
global climate change. First, the ``breakthrough'' technological
advances achieved under the President's National Climate Change
Technology Initiative will benefit all nations, and will not be
confined to applications in the United States. Second, America will
increase its commitment to helping the developing world gain access to
advanced energy efficiency and sequestration technologies, by
reinvigorating and expanding support for existing technology transfer
programs.
<bullet> Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in
Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences'
recommendation for better observation systems, the President has
allocated $25 million and challenged other developed nations to match
the U.S. commitment.
<bullet> Fully Funding the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
U.S. contribution to the GEF and leading a robust, multinational 5-year
replenishment commitment.
<bullet> The Administration's Fiscal Year 1903 budget requested
$178 million in funding for the GEF, a 77 percent increase over the
fiscal year 1902 enacted level of $100.5 million. It includes $107.5
million to fully fund the first installment of the U.S. pledge of $430
million to the GEF's ``Third Replenishment'' (GEF-3) for 2003-2006. The
fiscal year 1903 budget also includes $70 million to clear one-third of
the $211 million arrears balances incurred by the United States during
the last Administration.
<bullet> The GEF fulfills a critical role in improving the
environment globally, particularly in financing developing countries'
ability to address environmental issues relating to climate change,
biodiversity conservation, and land degradation. The GEF, operating as
the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change's primary
``financial mechanism,'' funds the extra costs (over normal development
costs) of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in energy and other
projects. The GEF's project portfolio has demonstrated a wide range of
approaches to promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy, often
through initiatives in partnership with the private sector. GEF grant
projects are implemented at the country level through the World Bank,
U.N. Development Program, U.N. Environment Program and regional
development banks.
<bullet> Since beginning regular operations in 1994, the GEF has
designed and implemented over 800 projects in 160 countries. The GEF
has committed $3.2 billion to date, leveraging well over $8 billion
from other sources. Co-financiers include the developing countries
themselves, bilateral aid agencies and other multilateral financial
institutions, NGO's and the private sector. Leveraging for clean energy
projects is often as high as $5 from other sources for every GEF
dollar. U.S. companies are the largest beneficiaries of contracts
extended for GEF projects, securing 30 percent of all contracts.
<bullet> Recent examples of highly successful GEF projects
include:
<bullet> Mexico. The Mexico High Efficiency Lighting Project under
which Mexican consumers and businesses have installed almost 40 percent
more efficient lights than originally projected;
<bullet> India. The India Alternate Energy Project promoting
investment in 41 megawatts of wind power through the provision of low-
market loans, stimulating massive followup investment with wind power
now supplying 850 megawatts of energy in India;
<bullet> Brazil. The Brazil Biomass Power Commercial Demonstration
Project promotes the use of high-efficiency agricultural byproducts as
fuel for electric power and agro-industry process heat;
<bullet> China. The Chinese Coalbed Methane Project demonstrates
technologies in Chinese coal mines for capturing clean-burning methane
as fuel;
<bullet> Latvia. The Latvia Solid Waste Management and Landfill
Gas Recovery project ($25 million total, with $5 million from GEF) will
harness landfill gas for electricity production and facilitate
separation of recyclable materials;
<bullet> Philippines. The project supports the connection of a
grid-connected power plant on Mindanao which combines solar and
hydroelectric power;
<bullet> Bangladesh. The Rural Electrification and Renewable
Energy Development project promotes solar energy in rural areas
implemented by established Bangladeshi institutions and is expected to
provide solar power to as many as 130,000 additional rural households;
<bullet> Ecuador. The Renewable Energy for Electricity Generation,
Renewable Electrification of the Galapagos Islands project is aimed at
reducing Ecuador's energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by
introducing solar and wind energy to the Galapagos Archipelago, and is
expected to provide wind and solar re-powering of village mini-grids on
three islands serving more than 5,000 people; and
<bullet> Kenya. The Ormat Olkaria III Geothermal Power Development
project will provide GEF financing for the first private sector
financed and managed geothermal electric project in Africa and among
the first private power projects in Kenya and East Africa.
<bullet> Dedicating Significant Funds to United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). The President has maintained a
strong commitment to technology transfer and capacity building in
developing countries by requesting $155 million dedicated to climate
change in the USAID fiscal year 1903 budget.
<bullet> Following up on the recently concluded Technology
Cooperation Agreement Pilot Project (TCAPP), USAID is working with
partners in Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines, and Southern Africa
to implement projects and activities designed to encourage the
accelerated adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy
technologies and practices in several key sectors.
<bullet> Brazil. Technology cooperation efforts are focused on the
development of new sustainable, energy efficient and renewable energy
technologies to meet the development needs in the Northeast region.
This effort provided startup financing for rural energy entrepreneurs
through a combination of enterprise development services and startup
financing.
<bullet> Philippines. Technology cooperation efforts are
supporting national goals to expand rural electrification by using
renewable energy sources such as, wind power.
<bullet> Southern Africa. USAID is supporting activities designed
to promote the widespread use of solar water heaters in selected areas.
Program-wide efforts also include a focus on the development and
dissemination of outreach and communication tools in an effort to
encourage information sharing.
<bullet> The Cairo Air Improvement Project (CAIP) is a $60 million
USAID program that is designed to reduce vehicular emissions, such as
particulates and lead. The CAIP is reducing air pollution by:
<bullet> operating a vehicle emission testing, tune-up, and
certification program and promoting the conversion of diesel-fueled,
public sector, municipal bus fleets to compressed natural gas; and
<bullet> reducing the concentration of air pollution from
smelters.
<bullet> Building on International Cooperative Agreements:
<bullet> Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue
their High-Level Consultations on climate change issues. Later this
month a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese counterparts
to discuss specific projects within the various areas of climate
science and technology to identify which of the highest priority
opportunities to pursue.
<bullet> Joint Research with Italy. The United States and Italy
convened a ``Joint Climate Change Research Meeting'' in Rome on January
22-23, 2002, following upon a pledge of President Bush and Prime
Minister Berlusconi to undertake joint research on climate change. This
pledge recognized the need to draw on sound science and the power of
technology to reduce the uncertainty associated with future global
climate and environmental challenges. The two sides identified more
than 20 joint climate change research activities for immediate
implementation and more topics for further development in critical
areas of global and regional climate modeling, atmospheric studies
related to climate, carbon cycle research, low-carbon technologies and
other related areas. The climate science research activities for
immediate implementation will improve the capability to understand,
monitor and predict climatic variations and their impacts. In addition,
the technology research activities for immediate implementation will
contribute to the development of advanced low carbon technologies to
limit net emissions of greenhouse gases.
<bullet> Pursue Joint Research with Central America. The United
States and Central American Heads of Government signed the Central
American-United States of America Joint Accord (CONCAUSA) on December
10, 1994. The original agreement covered cooperation under action plans
in four major areas: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy,
environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development. On
June 7, 2001, the United States and its Central American partners
signed an expanded and renewed CONCAUSA Declaration, adding disaster
relief and climate change as new areas for cooperation. The new
CONCAUSA Declaration calls for intensified cooperative efforts to
address climate change through scientific research, estimating and
monitoring greenhouse gases, investing in forestry conservation,
enhancing energy efficiency, and utilizing new environmental
technologies.
enhanced science and technology
Summary
The President's policy builds on his June 11 commitments to global
climate science and technology: 1) fully fund high-priority areas for
climate change science over the next 5 years; and 2) strengthen
technology research at universities and national labs, to enhance
partnerships in applied research, develop improved technology for
measuring and monitoring gross and net greenhouse gas emissions, and
fund demonstration projects for cutting-edge technologies, such as
bioreactors and fuel cells.
<bullet> Increase Support for America's Commitment to Climate
Science and Technology Initiatives. The Administrations fiscal year
2003 budget seeks an additional $700 million for climate change
programs, bringing total climate spending up to $4.5 billion per year.
This commitment to climate change research and development is unmatched
in the world, and is particularly notable given America's focus on
domestic and international security issues in the fiscal year 1903
budget. A key element of this effort is dedicated to funding for the
Climate Change Research Initiative and the National Climate Change
Technology Initiative. These initiatives are core components of the
President's 1903 budget. They are designed to fund high-priority
research to address major gaps in our current understanding of climate
science and to promote the development of the most promising
``breakthrough'' technologies for clean energy generation and carbon
sequestration.
<bullet> The Climate Change Research Initiative. The U.S. will
spend $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2003 for basic research on climate
change, $40 million of which is dedicated to leverage other funding to
address major gaps in understanding the carbon cycle and the role of
black soot.
<bullet> The National Climate Change Technology Initiative. The
U.S. will spend $1.3 billion on climate change technologies, of which
$40 million will be spent on development and deployment of advanced
energy and sequestration technologies critical to long-term emission
reduction.
<bullet> The President Has Established a New High-Level Committee
on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration (CCCSTI). This
Committee consists of the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, State,
Agriculture, Interior, Health and Human Services, Defense, and
Transportation, EPA Administrator, OMB Director, NEC Director, NASA
Administrator, NSF Director and CEQ Chairman. The Executive Director of
the committee will be the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy. The functions of the CCCSTI include but are not
limited to: 1) providing recommendations concerning climate science and
technology to the President; 2) recommending the movement of funding
and programs across agency boundaries; and 3) coordination with the
Office of Management and Budget on the Committee's recommendations. The
Chair of CCCSTI is responsible for the final review of recommendations
to the Climate Change Panel. Research will continue to be coordinated
through the Nation Science and Technology Council in accordance with
the Global Change Research Act of 1990.
Climate Change Research Initiative
On June 11, 2001, the President announced a new commitment to
developing a science-based climate change policy, and a new commitment
to funding research on ``breakthrough technologies'' that will help
meet the long-run climate change challenge. To study areas of
scientific uncertainty and identify priority areas where investments
can make a difference, the President created the Climate Change
Research Initiative (CCRI). The CCRI promotes a vision focused on the
effective use of scientific knowledge in policy and management
decisions, and continued evaluation of management strategies and
choices.
The President's fiscal year 1903 budget requested $40 million for
CCRI to be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NSF, NASA, DOE, and USDA).
This investment will focus on answering key questions recently
identified by the National Academy of Sciences in its 2001 report,
``Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions.'' The CCRI
will improve the integration of scientific knowledge, including
measures of uncertainty, into effective decision support systems and
will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products useful to
policymakers in a short timeframe (2-5 years).
Specific priorities identified for fiscal year 2003 include:
<bullet> Understanding the North American Carbon Cycle. An
intensive research effort will be focused on understanding North
American terrestrial and oceanic carbon sources and sinks, to improve
monitoring techniques, reconcile approaches for quantifying carbon
storage, and elucidate key controlling processes and land management
practices regulating carbon fluxes between the atmosphere, land, and
the ocean. This effort will develop automated carbon dioxide and
methane sensors, and improve ground-based measurements and inventories
of forest and agricultural lands.
<bullet> Developing Reliable Representation of the Global and
Regional Climatic Forcing by Atmospheric Aerosols. Aerosols and
tropospheric ozone play unique but poorly quantified roles in the
atmospheric radiation budget. CCRI investments will implement plans
developed by the interagency National Aerosol-Climate Interactions
Program to define and evaluate the role of aerosols that absorb solar
radiation, such as black carbon and mineral dust. Proposed activities
include field campaigns (including aircraft fly overs), in situ
monitoring stations, and improved modeling and satellite data algorithm
development.
<bullet> Investing in Computer Modeling. The continued development
and refinement of computer models that can simulate the past and future
conditions of the Earth's climate system is important for providing
more accurate projections of future climate change. NOAA will establish
a Climate Modeling Center within the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
Laboratory (GFDL) at Princeton, New Jersey, to focus on model product
generation research, assessment, and policy applications.
<bullet> Ensuring High-Quality, Long-Term Climate Data Records.
This is a long-term effort to develop high fidelity climate data
records from satellite observing systems. Initial work will target
calibration and validation of instruments planned for the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System (NPOESS) to
ensure a smooth transition and guarantee climate-quality data.
National Climate Change Technology Initiative
On June 11, 2001, the President announced a new commitment to
developing a science-based climate change policy, and a new commitment
to funding research on ``breakthrough technologies'' that will help
meet the long-run climate change challenge. To advance and bring focus
to technologies that offer great promise to significantly reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, the President created the National Climate
Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI). The President charged the
Secretaries of Commerce and Energy, working with other agencies, to:
<bullet> Evaluate the State of U.S. Climate Change Technology
Research and Development and Make Recommendations for Improvement. The
U.S. Government funds many different technologies that can help
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Some are designed to improve energy
efficiency or create opportunities to switch to fuels, products, and
processes that emit lower amounts of greenhouse gases. Others enhance
carbon removal or storage in terrestrial, ocean, and geological sinks,
or explore innovative concepts and breakthrough technologies.
<bullet> Provide Guidance on Strengthening Basic Research at
Universities and National Laboratories, Including the Development of
Advanced Mitigation Technologies that Offer the Greatest Promise for
Low-Cost Reductions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. There are many
scientific and technological challenges regarding costs, environmental
impacts, and public acceptability that must be resolved before climate
change mitigation technologies can reach their full potential. Federal
research efforts can help meet these challenges.
<bullet> Develop Opportunities to Enhance Private-Public
Partnerships in Applied Research and Development to Expedite Innovative
and Cost-Effective Approaches to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions. The
U.S. Government has established partnerships with the private sector to
advance technologies that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. It is
critical to enhance this role and ensure that partnerships with
industry are directed toward the most mutually beneficial outcomes.
<bullet> Make Recommendations for Funding Demonstration Projects
for Cutting-Edge Technologies. Cutting-edge technologies hold the
promise of significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
<bullet> Evaluate Improved Technologies for Measuring and
Monitoring Gross and Net Terrestrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Private
sector investors are reluctant to participate in projects without
reliable and credible quantification of the uncertainties associated
with different land management practices. Cost-effective measurement
systems will not only increase the attractiveness of agricultural
greenhouse gas projects to investors, but can also provide valuable
information to individual farmers and ranchers optimizing the use of
fuel, fertilizers, and other substances.
The President's fiscal year 1903 Budget requests $40 million within
the Department of Energy to begin work on NCCTI. Specific research
areas are being identified through an interagency review process. The
NCCTI will build on an existing base of research and development in
climate change technologies, primarily at the Department of Energy, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. A
complete report on the findings and recommendations of the NCCTI will
be issued soon.
addendum to the global climate change policy book
The Global Climate Change Policy Book distributed with the
President's February 14th speech on Clear Skies and Global Climate
Change included several calculated statistics:
<bullet> 2002 emission intensity: 183 metric tons of carbon
equivalent emissions per million dollars GDP
<bullet> 2012 emissions intensity: 158 metric tons of carbon
equivalent emissions per million dollars GDP
<bullet> 2002-2012 decline in emission intensity based on current
forecasts with existing policies and efforts: 14 percent
<bullet> Expected emission reductions in 2012 resulting from the
President's commitment to reduce intensity by 18 percent: more than 100
million metric tons carbon equivalent
This document and accompanying spreadsheet describes the data used
to produce these numbers.
Three primary forecasts underlie these intensity and emission
reduction estimates: real GDP, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions,
and other carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions. The sources of
these forecasts are described below, followed by an explanation of the
calculated intensities and emission reductions.
Real GDP forecasts (spreadsheet row 28) are based on the Annual
Energy Outlook 2002, published by the Energy Information Administration
in December 2001. In turn, these are based on the DRI-WEFA July 2001
Trend Growth scenario. Although these forecasts were made before
September 11 and before the exact nature of last year's recession was
clear, the forecast growth of 38 percent over 2002-2012 matches the
recent forecasts published in the 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government.
Real GDP forecasts are converted from 1996 dollars to 2001 dollars
(spreadsheet row 29) using the implicit GDP deflator, published in the
National Income and Product Accounts.
Forecasts of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (spreadsheet
row 25) are also based on the Annual Energy Outlook 2002. These
emissions are derived from the use of fossil fuels forecast by the
National Energy Modeling System developed by the Energy Information
Administration, incorporating the economic growth assumptions described
above.
Forecasts of other carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions
(spreadsheet row 26) are based on two sources. The projections begin
with 1999 inventories reported in Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the
United States 1999, published by the Energy Information Administration.
Future emission levels are estimated using growth rates derived from
reports published by the Environmental Protection Agency: Addendum to
the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990-2020: Inventories, Projections and
Opportunities for Reductions, Climate Action Report 2001, U.S. High GWP
Gas Emissions 1990-2010: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities
for Reductions.
There are two alternative forecasts provided on the accompanying
spreadsheet. The first (spreadsheet row 39) is based on similar growth
rates, but using inventories published in Draft Inventory of U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2000. The second (spreadsheet
row 44) is based on inventories and projections in the Climate Action
Report 2001 and uses growth rates estimated to include existing
policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gases.
Greenhouse gas intensity is computed as the ratio of total
greenhouse gas emissions (spreadsheet rows 27, 40 and 45) to real GDP
(spreadsheet row 29). This is multiplied by 1000 to convert to units of
metric tons carbon equivalent (mtce) per million dollars of GDP.
The intensity decline is measured as one minus the ratio of 2012
greenhouse gas intensity to 2002 greenhouse gas intensity. For example,
in the reference case intensity declines from 183 to 158 mtce/$million.
14 percent = 1--158/183.
Emission reductions from business as usual are computed by first
determining the emissions implied by the President's goal.
Specifically, forecast GDP in 2012, multiplied by (1--18 percent),
multiplied by intensity in 2002, and divided by 1000 (the latter
converts from thousands to millions of tons). In the reference case,
this works out to 14,459 x 0.82 x 183.3 / 1000 = 2173 million metric
tons of carbon. This is then subtracted from forecast emissions in
2012, 2279, to yield the reported estimate of 106 million tons of
reductions.
Note that the exact intensity goal in 2012 will not be known until
accurate inventory data for 2002 is available as a basis for the 18
percent decline. The exact emission goal will then depend on the
eventual GDP level in 2012.
References
Annual Energy Outlook 2002. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1999. http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg00rpt/
Climate Action Report 2001. http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/
publications/car/index.html
Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2000.
http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/emissions/
us2002/index.html
Addendum to the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990-2020: Inventories,
Projections and Opportunities for Reductions. http://
www.epa.gov/ghginfo/pdfs/final--addendum2.pdf
U.S. High GWP Gas Emissions 1990-2010: Inventories, Projections, and
Opportunities for Reductions. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo/
reports/index.htm
Table A20.
Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2002, page 13.
Table S-14.
Table A19.
Table 1.
Table 5-2.
Exhibit 1.4
______
[July 9, 2002]
report to congress on federal climate change expenditures
``The challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the
limits of our knowledge.''
President George W. Bush, June 11, 2001.
Introduction
The following is a detailed account of Federal spending and
performance goals for climate change programs and activities, both
domestic and international, as included in the President's fiscal year
2003 Budget. This report is being provided in response to Section
559(b) of Public Law 107-115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002.
On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced a new national goal
to reduce the ``greenhouse gas intensity'' of the American economy by
18 percent during the next decade. Achieving this goal will require an
enhanced and sustained national effort to develop and deploy advanced
energy and sequestration technologies, while maintaining a strong
American economy. As reflected in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to which the United States is a
party, global climate change represents a serious, long-term challenge
for all of the nations of the world. The Administration has proposed a
comprehensive plan for achieving meaningful progress in tackling this
challenge. Progress will be achieved by relying on a range of
significant investments in reducing the fundamental scientific
uncertainties associated with anthropogenic climate change, advancing
the development and introduction of energy-efficient and renewable
technologies, and incentivizing emissions reductions throughout our
economy. The budget information presented in this Report reflects the
Administration's intensified focus and prioritization of meeting our
international commitments under the UNFCCC and responsibility to the
American people for preserving a strong American economy.
The President's fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $4,475 million.
This figure is $653 million, or 17 percent, higher than fiscal year
2002 enacted for spending programs and tax policies related to or
associated with climate change. The Budget request for climate change
programs is the highest level ever, though some programs were reduced
to eliminate unrequested earmarks or certain projects approaching
commercialization that are more properly now funded by the private
sector. Other higher priority programs were increased. At this level,
the United States leads the world in climate change research, and has
invested nearly $20 billion in such research over the past decade.
However, in its June 2001 Report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis
of Some Key Questions, the National Research Council concluded that
major challenges still remain to meaningfully improve our current
understanding of the science of global climate change:
``Making progress in reducing the large uncertainties in
projections of future climate will require addressing a number of
fundamental scientific questions relating to the buildup of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere and the behavior of the climate system. Issues
that need to be addressed include: a) the future usage of fossil fuels;
b) the future emissions of methane; c) the fraction of the future
fossil-fuel carbon that will remain in the atmosphere and provide
radiative forcing versus exchange with the oceans or net exchange with
the land biosphere; d) the feedbacks in the climate system that
determine both the magnitude of the change and the rate of energy
uptake by the oceans, which together determine the magnitude of and
time history of the temperature increases for a given radiative
forcing; e) details of the regional and local climate change consequent
to an overall level of global climate change; f) the nature and the
causes of the natural variability of climate and its interactions with
forced changes; and g) the direct and indirect effects of the changing
distributions of aerosols. Maintaining a vigorous, ongoing program of
basic research, funded and managed independently of the climate
assessment activity, will be crucial for narrowing those
uncertainties.''
``Because there is considerable uncertainty in our current
understanding of how the climate system varies naturally and reacts to
emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols, current estimates of the
magnitude of future warming should be regarded as tentative and subject
to future adjustments (either upward or downward).''
And recently, the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002 to the United
Nations stressed:
``One of the weakest links in our knowledge is the connection
between global and regional predictions of climate change. The National
Research Council's response to the President's request for a review of
climate change policy specifically noted that fundamental scientific
questions remain regarding the specifics of regional and local
projections (NRC 2001). Predicting the potential impacts of climate
change is compounded by a lack of understanding of the sensitivity of
many environmental systems and resources B both managed and unmanaged B
to climate change.''
The Report notes the ``considerable uncertainty'' about the science
of global climate change, including the uncertainty regarding natural
climate variability and the role of aerosols, and ``recognize[s] that
definitive prediction of potential outcomes is not yet feasible.'' The
Report does not identify new risks, but rather provides a complete
review of the numerous, often conflicting ``what if'' scenarios of
potential impacts of climate change, both dire and beneficial. This
Report makes clear that models, such as those used by the prior
Administration's 2000 National Assessment, cannot yet be relied upon to
make Aaccurate predictions of the specific changes in climate that will
occur over the next hundred years.''
The Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget request to Congress
includes the initial response to President Bush's direction last June
for a Climate Change Research Initiative (``CCRI'') to address many of
these major gaps in our current understanding of global climate change.
Specific CCRI priorities will focus on improving our understanding of
the North American carbon cycle and the role of aerosols and
tropospheric ozone in climate change, enhancing computer modeling of
climate and developing high quality, long term climate observation
data. The Administration will continue to determine where financial
resources in the climate change portfolio can be redirected from lower
priority work to higher priority projects that address specific areas
of research identified by the National Research Council.
Additionally although not included in this Report, the recently
enacted Farm Bill will significantly expand conservation programs on
farm and forest lands, accompanied by expanded carbon sequestration
services. See Addendum B.
In addition to describing our investments in global climate
science, the programs and tax policies in this report represent one way
to inventory a set of programs and tax policies associated with energy
use, carbon sequestration and climate change. Funding generally falls
into four major program areas.
U.S. Global Change Research Program. The United States Global
Change Research Program (USGCRP) seeks to provide a sound scientific
understanding of both the human and natural forces that influence the
Earth's climate system. The information produced by USGCRP's scientists
is used by national and international policymakers to inform decisions
on global change issues. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $1,714
million for the USGCRP, an increase of $44 million over fiscal year
2002 enacted. See Table 2 for detailed information about the USGCRP.
In addition to the USGCRP, the fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $40
million for the new Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI), which
was created by the President to advance and bring focus to and leverage
climate change research spending. The CCRI complements the existing
USGCRP. CCRI funding will be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NASA,
NSF, USDA, DOE), and the program will adopt performance metrics and
deliverable products useful to policymakers in a short timeframe (2 to
5 years). It will enhance observation and monitoring systems and
improve the integration of scientific knowledge, including measures of
uncertainty, into effective decision support systems. See Table 3 for
information about the CCRI.
Technology Research, Development and Deployment. The programs in
this category have the effect of stimulating the development and use of
renewable energy technologies and energy efficient products that can
help improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The
fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $1,757 million in discretionary
spending and tax incentives, an increase of $539 million over fiscal
year 2002 enacted. In addition to programs administered by the
Department of Energy (DOE), this category also includes programs within
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of
Agriculture (USDA). See Tables 4-5 for detailed information about the
programs and tax proposals in this category.
In June, 2001, the President committed the United States to work
within the United Nation's framework to develop an effective and
science-based response to the issue of global climate change. He noted
that the United States is a leader in innovation and technology and
that technology offers great promise to address this issue. As part of
this commitment, he created a National Climate Change Technology
Initiative. The National Climate Change Technology Initiative
integrates a number of interdependent facets of the technological
component of this approach to the global climate change issue: applied
research and development; supporting basic research carried out by
universities and national laboratories; partnering with industry and
others, including international partners, in order to move technologies
into the marketplace; promoting cutting-edge technologies through
demonstration projects; and measuring and monitoring greenhouse gas
emissions, inventories and flows. This Initiative will provide a
framework for guiding the technology component of climate change
related Federal R&D.
International Assistance. International assistance programs support
developing country efforts to address climate change through
improvements in energy efficiency, renewable energy, land use changes
and forestry practices. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $211
million, an increase of $32 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
climate change programs administered by the U.S. Agency for
International Development and to support the Secretariat of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. See Table 6 for information on international
assistance programs related to climate change, and Appendix A for
obligations and expenditures by country and activity for the Agency for
International Development as requested in Section 559 (b)(2) of Public
Law 107-115.
Other Climate-Related Programs. There are several programs that
have multiple environmental benefits including their contribution to
improving energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
programs identified in this category include: DOE's Weatherization and
State Energy Grants; DOE programs that promote cleaner coal and natural
gas combustion, and nuclear energy R&D; and; U.S. contributions to the
Global Environment Facility (GEF). GEF funding helps address trans-
border environmental problems like international water pollution,
biological diversity conservation, and climate change. The GEF's
climate change projects are related to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, not the Kyoto Protocol. The fiscal year 2003 Budget
proposes $807 million, an increase of $20 million over fiscal year 2002
enacted, for the programs in this category. See Table 7 for more
details on these programs.
summary of federal climate change expenditures
Table 1. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change--FY 2003 Budget
(Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directly Related Programs & Policies:.......................
U.S. Global Change Research Program..................... 1,728 1,670 1,714 +44
Climate Change Research Initiative...................... -- -- 40 +40
Technology Research, Development and Deployment:........
Spending Programs................................... 1,176 1,218 1,202 -16
Tax Incentives \1\.................................. -- -- 555 +555
National Climate Change Technology Initiative\2\.... -- -- -- --
International Assistance................................ 177 179 211 +32
Other Climate-Related Programs:.............................
DOE--Weatherization & State Energy Grants............... 191 275 316 +41
DOE--Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal & natural gas)..... 274 442 398 -44
DOE--Nuclear Energy R&D (NERI).......................... 34 32 25 -7
Treasury B Global Environment Facility \3\.............. 41 38 68 +30
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL \4\........................................... 3,603 3,822 4,475 +653
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The cost of the five energy tax incentives related to climate change included in the President's fiscal year
2003 Budget is $4.6 billion over 5 years; $7.1 billion over 10 years.
\2\ The National Climate Change Technology (NCCTI) will build on an existing base of research and development in
climate change technology, primarily at DOE, EPA, and USDA. The President's fiscal year 2003 Budget requests
$40 million for NCCTI within the DOE budget. Specific research areas are being identified through an
interagency review process.
\3\ The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million.
Approximately 38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g.
expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also provides funding for other
global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type.
\4\ Total may not add due to rounding. Total adjusted to eliminate double counts.
u.s. global change research program
Table 2. By Agency/Appropriation Account--FY 2003 Budget
(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Health and Human Service:.....................
National Institutes of Health........................... 54 60 68 +8
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:..............
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology.................... 1,176 1,090 1,109 +19
Department of Energy:.......................................
Science (Biological & Environmental Research)........... 116 120 126 +6
National Science Foundation:................................
Research and Related Activities......................... 181 188 188 0
Department of Agriculture:..................................
Agricultural Research Service........................... 29 30 30 0
Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension 4 9 17 +8
Services...............................................
Research and Education.............................. 4 9 17 +8
Economic Research Service............................... 1 1 1 0
Forest Service..........................................
Forest and Rangeland Research....................... 17 17 17 0
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--USDA...................................... 51 57 65 +8
Department of Commerce:.....................................
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 93 100 100 0
Operations, Research, and Facilities...................
Department of the Interior:.................................
U.S. Geological Survey Surveys, Investigations, and 27 28 28 -2
Research...............................................
Environmental Protection Agency:............................
Science and Technology.................................. 23 21 22 +
Smithsonian Institution:....................................
Salaries and Expenses................................... 7 7 7 0
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL\1\............................................ 1,728 1,670 1,714 +44
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Total may not add due to rounding.
climate change research initiative
Table 3. By Agency/Appropriation Account--FY 2003 Budget
(Discretionary budget authority; dollars in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Commerce:.....................................
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration -- -- 18 +18
Operations, Research, and Facilities...................
National Science Foundation:................................
Research and Related Activities......................... -- -- 15 +15
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:..............
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology.................... -- -- 3 +3
Department of Energy:.......................................
Science (Biological & Environmental Research)........... -- -- 3 +3
Department of Agriculture:..................................
Forest Service/Natural Resources Conservation Service\1\ -- -- 1 +1
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................................... -- -- 40 +40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on $500,000 for the Forest Service and $500,000 for the Natural Resources Conservation Service.
U.S. Global Change Research Program. Much of the U.S. investment in
research on climate and other global environmental changes is
coordinated through the U.S. Global Change Research program (USGCRP).
The USGCRP has existed for more than a decade, and provides funding at
nine different agencies for fundamental research on natural and human-
induced changes in the global environment, with the goal of attaining a
more complete understanding of global climate change to better respond
to the challenges it presents. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes
$1,714 million for the USGCRP, an increase of $44 million over the
fiscal year 2002 enacted level.
Climate Change Research Initiative. In addition to the USGCRP, the
fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $40 million for the new Climate Change
Research Initiative (CCRI), which was created by the President to
advance and bring focus to climate change research. The CCRI
complements the existing USGCRP. CCRI funding in fiscal year 2003 will
be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NASA, NSF, USDA, DOE), and the
program will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products useful
to policymakers in a short timeframe (2 to 5 years). It will enhance
observation and monitoring systems as well as improve the integration
of scientific
knowledge, including measures of uncertainty, into effective
decision support systems. CCRI funding in 2003 will focus on two main
areas: reducing the uncertainties in climate science, and supporting
policy and management decisions. In the first category, specific
priorities include understanding the North American carbon cycle,
developing reliable representation of global and regional climatic
forcing by atmospheric aerosols, and investing in computer modeling. In
the second category, specific priorities include developing tools for
risk management under uncertainty and ensuring high-quality, long-term
climate data records.
energy policy proposals
Table 4. Tax Incentives--FY 2003 Budget
(Revenue effect in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2003-
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homes.............................
Provide tax credit for -6 -7 -8 -17 -24 -62
residential solar energy
systems......................
Renewable Energy..................
Extend the tax credit for -227 -303 -212 -143 -146 -1031
electricity produced from
wind and biomass for 3 years;
expand eligible biomass
sources to include certain
biomass produced from forest-
related resources,
agricultural sources, and
other specified sources......
Transportation....................
Provide tax credit for -80 -181 -349 -530 -763 -1903
purchase of certain hybrid
and fuel cell vehicles.......
Industry..........................
Provide tax credit for energy -34 -59 -86 -120 -140 -439
produced from landfill gas...
Provide tax credit for -208 -235 -238 -296 -139 -1116
combined heat and power
property.....................
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL\1\...................... -555 -785 -893 -1106 -1212 -4551
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Total may not add due to rounding.
Energy Policy Proposals B Tax Incentives. The President is
proposing $4,551 million in clean energy tax credits over 5 years ($7.1
billion over 10 years) for investments in renewable energy (solar,
wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, co-generation, and
landfill gas conversion. (see Table 2). These incentives are important
to meeting the nation's long-term energy supply and security needs,
reducing pollution, and projected greenhouse gas emissions. The
following is an explanation of the clean energy tax incentives proposed
in the fiscal year 2003 Budget.
Homes
<bullet> Tax credit for residential solar energy systems. Current
law provides a 10-percent investment tax credit to businesses for
qualifying equipment that uses solar energy to generate electricity; to
heat, cool or provide hot water for use in a structure; or to provide
solar process heat. No credit is available for nonbusiness purchases of
solar energy equipment. The Administration proposes a new tax credit
for individuals who purchase photovoltaic equipment and solar water
heating systems for use in a dwelling unit that the individual uses as
a residence. Equipment would qualify for the credit only if used
exclusively for purposes other than heating swimming pools. An
individual would be allowed a cumulative maximum credit of $2,000 per
residence for photovoltaic equipment and $2,000 per residence for solar
water heating systems. The credit for solar water heating equipment
would apply only if placed in service after December 31, 2001 and
before January 1, 2006, and to photovoltaic systems placed in service
after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008.
Renewable Energy
<bullet> Tax credit for electricity produced from wind or biomass.
Current law provides taxpayers a 1.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour tax credit
(adjusted for inflation after 1992) for electricity produced from wind,
``closed-loop'' biomass, and poultry waste. Biomass refers to trees,
crops and agricultural wastes used to produce power, fuels or
chemicals. The electricity must be sold to an unrelated third party and
the credit applies to the first 10 years of production. The current tax
credit covers facilities placed in service before January 1, 2002,
after which it expires. The new proposal would:
<bullet> Extend current biomass credit. This proposal would extend
for 3 years the 1.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour biomass credit for
facilities placed in service before January 1, 2005.
<bullet> Expand definition of eligible biomass. This proposal
expands the definition of eligible biomass to include certain forest-
related resources and agricultural and other sources for facilities
placed in service before January 1, 2002. Electricity produced at such
facilities from newly eligible sources would be eligible for the credit
only from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004. The credit for
such electricity would be computed at a rate equal to 60 percent of the
generally applicable rate. Electricity produced from newly eligible
biomass co-fired in coal plants would be eligible for the credit only
from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004.
Transportation
<bullet> Tax credit for hybrid and fuel cell vehicles. Currently,
a 10 percent tax credit up to $4,000 is provided for the cost of a
qualified electric vehicle. A qualified electric vehicle is a motor
vehicle that is powered primarily by an electric motor drawing current
from rechargeable batteries, fuel cells, or other portable sources of
electric current. Electric and hybrid vehicles have the potential to
increase energy efficiency as well as reduce air pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions. To encourage the purchase of such vehicles
the Administration is proposing the following tax credits:
<bullet> A credit of up to $4,000 for qualified hybrid vehicles
purchased after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008. The
amount of the credit would depend on the percentage of maximum
available power provided by the rechargeable energy storage system and
the amount by which the vehicle's fuel economy exceeds the 2000 model
year city fuel economy.
<bullet> A credit of up to $8,000 for new qualified fuel cell
vehicles purchased after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008.
A minimum credit of $4,000 would be provided, which would increase as
the vehicle's fuel efficiency exceeded the 2000 model year city fuel
economy, reaching a maximum credit of $8,000 if the vehicle achieved at
least 300 percent of the 2000 model year city fuel economy.
Industry
<bullet> Tax credit for energy produced from landfill gas.
Taxpayers that produce gas from biomass are eligible for a credit equal
to $3 per barrel-of-oil equivalent. To qualify, the gas must be
produced domestically from a facility placed in service before July 1,
1998 and sold to an unrelated person before January 1, 2008. The new
proposal would extend the credit to fuel produced from landfill methane
produced from a facility in service after December 31, 2001 and before
January 1, 2011. The credit for fuel produced at landfills subject to
EPA's 1996 New Source Performance Standards/Emissions Guidelines would
be limited to two-thirds of the otherwise applicable amount if any
portion of the facility for producing fuel at the landfill was placed
in service before July 1, 1998, and beginning on January 1, 2002, in
all other cases.
<bullet> Tax credit for combined heat and power property. Combined
heat and power (CHP), also known as co-generation, is a highly
efficient form of electric generation that recycles heat which is
normally lost under traditional power combustion methods. CHP captures
the heat left over from industrial use, providing a source of
residential and industrial heating and air conditioning in the local
area around the power plant. CHP systems achieve a greater level of
overall energy efficiency, thereby reducing energy consumption, costs,
and carbon emissions. No income tax credit is available for investment
in CHP property. The Administration is proposing a new 10 percent
investment credit for qualified CHP systems placed in service after
December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2007.
technology research, development and deployment
Table 5. Program Details by Agency/Account--FY 2003 Budget
(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Energy (DOE)..................................
Energy Supply........................................... 375 393 408 +15
Renewable Energy Resources R&D...................... (370) (386) (408) (+22)
Nuclear Energy...................................... (5) (7) (0) (-7)
Energy Conservation R&D................................. 619 640 588 -52
Fossil Energy R&D (sequestration R&D)................... 18 32 588 -52
Science................................................. 35 35 35 0
Energy Information Administration....................... 3 3 3 0
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--DOE........................................... 1,050 1,103 1,088 -15
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).......................
Environmental Programs & Management..................... 96 89 91 +2
Science and Technology.................................. 27 26 17 -9
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--EPA........................................... 123 115 108 -7
Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
Forest Service.......................................... 3 0 1 +1
Forest and Rangeland Research Agricultural Research 0 0 5 +5
Service................................................
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--USDA.......................................... 3 0 6 +6
TOTAL \1\........................................... 1,176 1,218 1,202 -16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Total may not add due to rounding.
Technology Research, Development and Deployment. The fiscal year
2003 Budget proposes $1,202 million in discretionary funding, a
decrease of $16 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for research,
development, and deployment of renewable energy technologies and energy
efficient products that help reduce the use of fossil fuels and U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions. Better methods to measure and monitor carbon
dioxide in soils and from forests are also funded. Table 5 provides a
detailed accounting by agency of the technology programs in this report
related to energy efficiency, conservation, renewable energy, and
carbon sequestration. The reduction in funding reflects a decrease in
conservation R&D for technologies that can be picked up by the private
sector and a shift of conservation funds to weatherization grants. The
following sections highlight selected agency programs.
1. Buildings
The buildings sector is responsible for about 33 percent of U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions.
Most of the emissions result from the electricity needed to run
appliances and equipment in buildings, such as heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment. The budget includes programs
within DOE and EPA designed to develop highly efficient new appliances
and HVAC systems, and to more rapidly deploy energy efficient products
for buildings and homes throughout the marketplace. The following is a
summary of the major activities by agency in the buildings sector:
<bullet> DOE Building Technology Program. The budget includes $93
million for DOE's building technology and related activities, a
decrease of $12 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted. DOE has been
working with industry to define technology ``roadmaps'' toward more
efficient buildings, and is using that process to guide its R&D
programs.
One major component is the Building America program, which creates
partnerships with traditional housing developers and manufacturers of
industrialized housing to demonstrate how new technologies can be
integrated into homes cost-effectively and to disseminate that
knowledge to other builders. DOE works with States to encourage them to
voluntarily upgrade their commercial and residential building energy
codes to require greater energy efficiency in all new construction.
DOE's Rebuild America program is the centerpiece of a newly
consolidated Community Energy Program--community partners in Rebuild
America have committed to improving the energy efficiency of building
space.
DOE also funds significant research on more efficient building
equipment and appliances, such as advanced lighting, heat pumps,
chillers, and commercial refrigeration. DOE develops and promulgates
energy efficiency standards for many categories of appliances and also
develops testing methodologies used to set standards and to provide
efficiency rating labels. (DOE's rating and labeling programs are
performed in partnership with the Federal Trade Commission.) Standards
and test procedure development will continue for a variety of
appliances and will continue to support the joint EPA-DOE Energy Star
program.
<bullet> EPA Buildings Programs. The budget proposes $50 million,
an increase of $1 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for EPA's
ENERGY STAR partnerships (including ENERGY STAR Labeling and the ENERGY
STAR Buildings Program). EPA will work toward the goal of offsetting
about 24 percent of the growth in greenhouse gas emissions above 1990
levels expected by 2010 in this sector.
EPA will actively promote its new buildings benchmark tool and work
with building owners and mangers to benchmark a total of 29,000
buildings nationwide. EPA will expand its public sector work to
increase the number of partnerships with schools and universities and
State and local governments to over 1,200. EPA will also continue to
actively recruit new small businesses and organizations into ENERGY
STAR with the goal of reaching over 7,000 participants in 2003. EPA
will continue to play a key role in advancing the efficiency of the
Federal Government by enhancing the ability of agencies to procure
energy efficient products as well as assist agencies in benchmarking
and labeling their high-performing buildings.
2. Transportation
Cars, trucks, aircraft, and other parts of the Nation's
transportation system emit about one third of the total anthropogenic
U.S. greenhouse gases. A range of new technologies should make it
possible for Americans to continue to enjoy the best personal
transportation in the world while significantly reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Furthermore, many communities are developing innovative ways
to reduce congestion and transportation energy needs by improving
highway designs and urban planning, and by encouraging mass transit.
<bullet> DOE Transportation Technology Programs. The budget
proposes $223 million, a decrease of $30 million from fiscal year 2002
enacted (excludes $53 million in biofuels R&D funded in Renewable
Energy Resources and included in the electricity sector below). DOE's
Office of Transportation Technologies (OTT) funds research,
development, and deployment of technologies that can significantly
alter current trends in oil consumption. Commercialization of
innovative vehicle technologies and alternative fuels presents an
opportunity for reducing reliance on oil. These advanced technologies
could also result in dramatic reductions in criteria pollutants and
greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. DOE funds
research and development for advanced power-train technology (direct-
injection) engines, hybrid-electric drive systems, advanced batteries,
fuel cells, and light weight materials and for alternative fuels
(including ethanol from biomass, natural gas, methanol, electricity,
and biodiesel). About half of OTT's R&D funding supports FreedomCAR, a
new partnership with the auto industry that builds on the technical
successes of its predecessor (Partnership for a New Generation of
Vehicles or PNGV), and improves on management and focus.
DOE also funds research to improve the engine efficiency of heavy-
duty truck engines while reducing oxides of nitrogen emissions to near-
zero levels. This research includes both fuel injection/combustion
research and exhaust after-treatment for particulates and nitrogen
oxide. This research will be complemented by R&D to reduce parasitic
loses from aerodynamic drag and rolling resistance (including computer
aerodynamic modeling of new truck body designs); and to make greater
use of lower-weight, high-strength materials for all classes of trucks.
<bullet> EPA Transportation Programs. The budget proposes $22
million, a decrease of $9 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
EPA's clean automotive technology initiative and activities that
promote partnerships with State and local governments and
transportation authorities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air
pollution. The reduction in EPA funding reflects a shift in emphasis
from PNGV to the new Freedom CAR program managed by DOE. The funding
requested will enable EPA to continue its work under Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with the automotive
industry covering both SUVs and urban delivery vehicles. The successful
technology development patented by EPA, the hydraulic hybrid vehicle
technology, will help to lay the foundation for cost-effective
commercialization of high fuel economy, low emission vehicles for
delivery to market between 2005 and 2010.
Funding will also continue EPA's work with companies and State and
local governments on transportation improvements that reduce vehicle
emissions and congestion. Additionally, EPA will develop projects to
reduce diesel idling time at truck stops and along highways. EPA will
partner with States and manufacturers of idling control devices to help
install idle control technologies on trucks and at truck stops that
could save one gallon of diesel fuel for each hour a vehicle idles.
3. Industry
Programs in the industry sector support Federal research efforts to
develop innovative technologies and production methods which can help
businesses achieve productivity gains and prosper in a competitive
marketplace while leading to major reductions in emissions of
greenhouse gases. Many technologies can help reduce emissions.
<bullet> DOE Industry Technology Program. The budget proposes $138
million, a decrease of $11 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
DOE's industrial research and related programs. Key DOE industry
programs include:
<bullet> Industries of the Future. This DOE program works
cooperatively with the nation's most energy-intensive industries--such
as aluminum, glass, chemicals, forest products, mining, and steel--on
developing technologies that increase energy and resource efficiency.
Promising collaborative efforts include improvements in the process of
making steel, pulp and paper, and other energy-intensive products that
could dramatically increase efficiency, lower greenhouse gas emissions,
and improve competitiveness.
The Industries of the Future/Crosscutting program supports work
that has benefits across many industry sectors. The Integrated
Materials program supports development of a range of other advanced
materials with special properties, such as intermetallic compounds,
metal-matrix composites, and inorganic membranes. Assistance to
innovative industries will continue with expanded NICE3 and Inventions
and Innovations programs that support the development of energy-
efficiency and pollution/waste control technologies. The Industrial
Assessment Centers will continue to perform energy and waste-management
audits at small and medium sized businesses. The Best Practices
programs provide technical expertise and information products to
businesses of all sizes on how to use motors, compressed air and steam
in an integrated system context. The program also provides plant-wide
energy assessments, documented energy savings case studies, and helps
to accelerate the adoption by industry of the best available and
emerging technologies and best practices.
<bullet> EPA Industry Programs. The budget proposes $26 million,
an increase of less than $1 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
EPA's programs in the industrial sector focusing on reducing carbon
dioxide emissions and continuing the successful initiatives to reduce
methane emissions and emissions of the high global-warming potential
gases. EPA's goals for these efforts are to: 1) greatly enhance the
rate of energy and resource efficiency improvements in industry between
now and 2010 (working with DOE); 2) cost-effectively return emissions
of methane to 1990 levels or below by 2010; 3) cost-effectively limit
emissions of the more potent greenhouse gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6); and 4)
facilitate the use of clean energy technologies and purchases of
renewable energy.
<bullet> Stewardship Programs for the Reduction of Potent
Greenhouse Gases. EPA will continue its programs to reduce the more
potent greenhouse gases, including methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). EPA will expand
partnerships with the magnesium industry and with the electric power
industry to reduce emissions of SF6 and will work with the
semiconductor, aluminum, and chemical industries to reduce HFC and PFC
emissions.
<bullet> Methane Programs. EPA will continue its programs to
reduce emissions of methane, a gas with more than 20 times the heat
trapping capability as carbon dioxide. EPA will work with the natural
gas industry, the coal mining industry, the waste management industry,
and the agricultural industry to promote cost-effective reductions of
methane emissions resulting in a return of methane emissions to 1990
levels or below by 2010. This program has significant potential to
achieve cost-effective and meaningful greenhouse gas emission
reductions in the American economy.
<bullet> ENERGY STAR for Industry. EPA's ENERGY STAR for Industry
(formerly Climate Wise) program will continue to work with individual
partnership companies. EPA will enhance and expand the ENERGY STAR
program for industry by developing energy and related productivity
benchmarks of industrial plant performance for five U.S. industries.
<bullet> Combined Heat and Power. EPA's Combined Heat and Power
(CHP) program is currently funded at about $1 million per year and will
continue to promote efficient systems that generate heat and
electricity simultaneously at greatly improved conversion efficiencies
over single purpose units. This program, unveiled in the fall of 2001
with 18 partners, currently has more than 50 partners and is expected
to grow to 100 partners by the end of 2003. This program is expected to
facilitate about 20 CHP projects in 2001 across the industrial and
commercial sector yielding about 450 MW of power and to facilitate an
additional 35 projects in 2003 yielding about 850 MW. This effort could
double the capacity of U.S. combined heat and power systems employed by
commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings, and in communities
throughout the Nation. EPA will work to identify and eliminate the
regulatory and institutional barriers that are currently preventing
more rapid dissemination of this important technology.
4. Electricity
The generation of electricity in the U.S. is responsible for more
than a third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The budget funds
programs in renewable energy technologies. The key DOE programs in this
sector are:
<bullet> DOE Renewable Energy Resources Programs. The budget
proposes $408 million, an increase of $22 million over fiscal year 2002
enacted, for DOE's renewable programs. These include varieties of solar
energy (generating electricity either through concentrated heat or
photovoltaics), biomass power, wind energy, geothermal power,
hydropower, and hydrogen production and storage.
<bullet> Solar Energy. Over the past 20 years, Federal R&D has
resulted in a 80 percent cost reduction in solar photovoltaics. DOE
will maintain R&D of the next generation photovoltaic cells;
manufacturing R&D; research in buildings-integrated applications; and
fund efforts to develop new, unconventional technologies.
<bullet> Biopower. Biomass represents a tremendous renewable
resource whose use can help strengthen our energy security, protect the
environment, and enhance our rural economy. DOE is testing and
demonstrating biomass co-firing with coal; developing advanced
technologies for biomass gasification; developing and demonstrating
small modular systems; and conducting R&D to help develop
``biorefineries'' of the future.
<bullet> Wind. Use of wind energy is growing very fast.
Technologies under development by DOE and its partners can enable a
twentyfold or more expansion of usable wind resources, and make wind
energy economically viable without the need for Federal incentives.
Wind R&D will now focus on advancing the technology so it can be used
in low wind speed areas, greatly enhancing the potential use of this
renewable energy source.
<bullet> Geothermal. Geothermal represents a huge renewable
resource which could provide 25,000-50,000 megawatts of generating
capacity from currently identified hydrothermal resources if technology
existed to develop these resources at a reasonable cost. DOE's R&D
program focuses on exploration and drilling to enable industry to
locate and characterize new geothermal fields at reduced risk, and to
access deeper resources with lower drilling costs. DOE also supports
advanced technology in heat conversion and power systems for
application to a broad range of geothermal resources. Researchers work
in partnership with U.S. industry to establish geothermal energy as an
economically competitive contributor to the U.S. energy supply. DOE's
R&D program and activities to reduce barriers to development will allow
geothermal energy to supply electrical power and heat to homes and
businesses across the country.
<bullet> Hydropower. DOE is funding the development of a new
generation of hydropower turbines that will kill far fewer fish than
current designs do, and will also maintain higher levels of dissolved
oxygen in the water, which keeps river ecosystems healthier. Hydropower
is an important form of zero-carbon electricity generation for the
Nation.
<bullet> Hydrogen. DOE will continue to fund its research on low-
cost hydrogen production and storage, prerequisites to the widespread
use of hydrogen as a fuel. The program now looks toward the Proton-
Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells being developed for hybrid vehicles
and for cogeneration in buildings as the first significant markets for
hydrogen, which will be ready within 5 years. More than half of the
hydrogen budget supports the new FreedomCAR public-private partnership.
The program funds R&D on thermal (steam and advanced auto-thermal
reforming) production on hydrogen from both natural gas and biomass,
and on methods to use either algae and bacteria or photocatalytic
techniques to produce hydrogen. The hydrogen storage research program
is exploring a number of novel adsorption mechanisms, including carbon
nanotubes and improved metal hydrides. DOE's Technology Validation
effort is funding demonstrations of prototype fuel cells, a fueling
station for vehicles, and onsite storage systems for solar production
of hydrogen. The latter includes a reversible electrolyzer/fuel cell
that can produce hydrogen from electricity while the sun is shining,
and electricity from hydrogen when it is dark.
<bullet> Deployment. DOE funds the Renewable Energy Production
Incentive (REPI), which provides payments to public and non-profit
utilities in lieu of renewable energy tax credits. Public and non-
profit utilities are not eligible for these tax credits because they
pay no taxes. DOE's International Renewable Energy program provides
technical assistance to developing countries and U.S. industries to
help them put together climate change projects. The program also funds
market and trade development activities and works with other agencies
to incorporate solar and renewable energy into disaster-relief
programs.
<bullet> Transmission and Distribution. DOE funds development of
advanced storage systems to supply ultra-high power quality to
sensitive loads, smooth the power output form distributed generation
sources including intermittent renewable sources, and enhance the
reliability of the transmission and distribution systems. DOE also
addresses power grid reliability, and efficient electricity market
operation issues by developing real-time measurement and control
systems for electric grid management. This work also investigates the
use of load management techniques to mitigate emergency power shortages
and price spikes. In order to promote and facilitate the integration of
distributed sources into the grid, DOE funds development of uniform
interconnection standards for distributed power generation, and funds
studies to identify barriers to the wider use of distributed
generation.
<bullet> High Temperature Superconductivity. DOE supports
industry-led projects to capitalize on recent breakthroughs in
superconducting wire technology, aimed at developing devices such as
advanced motors, power cables, and transformers. These technologies
would allow more electricity to reach the consumer without an increase
in fossil fuel input.
<bullet> Distributed Energy Resources. DOE has combined the
development of Distributed Energy Resources (distributed generation,
energy storage and load management) into one office to lead the
seamless integration of these technologies into the distribution
system, the power grid, competitive markets, and the individual
customer site. The office is supporting work to increase the
efficiency, and reduce the cost and emissions of advanced natural gas-
driven microturbines, fuel cells, and reciprocating engines, and
developing advanced high temperature materials to improve their
performance. High system efficiencies are achieved from these sources
by linking them into building combined heat and power systems with
advanced absorption heat pumps, chillers and desiccant systems that are
also being developed in the program.
5. Carbon Sequestration
Carbon dioxide can be sequestered (stored) through changes in both
forestry and agricultural practices. These programs focus on methods to
capture and store carbon dioxide, measure and monitor carbon in soils
and from agricultural practices, and to improve estimates of carbon
fluxes from forests.
<bullet> DOE Carbon Sequestration Science Programs. The budget
proposes $35 million, the same level as fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
DOE carbon removal programs in the Office of Science. DOE's programs
include research into the feasibility of capturing and storing carbon
dioxide in underground geological structures and in the deep ocean.
<bullet> DOE Fossil Energy Carbon Sequestration Programs. The
budget proposes $54 million, an increase of $22 million over fiscal
year 2002 enacted, for DOE fossil energy carbon sequestration programs.
Carbon sequestration is potentially one of the lowest cost approaches
for significantly reducing or perhaps virtually offsetting greenhouse
gas emissions. The purpose of the fossil energy program is to develop
and demonstrate technically, economically, and ecologically sound
methods to capture and reuse, store or permanently isolate carbon
dioxide from the environment. The program goal is to make available
sequestration options starting in 2015 at a cost of no more than $10
per ton of carbon (or about two tenths of a cent in the cost of
electricity). When linked with new advanced clean coal power
technologies now under development, the program will enable the
deployment of clean coal power plants with essentially zero emissions.
The principal thrust of the carbon sequestration program is to
develop the applied science and new technologies for addressing the
cost-effective management/sequestration of carbon emissions from the
production and use of fossil fuels. The program primarily selects
research topics and projects through competitive solicitations
involving industry, university, and national laboratory performers.
Close collaborations with other DOE, government, industry, and
international organizations are maintained providing an integrated
approach to advancing the science and technology of carbon
sequestration.
<bullet> EPA Carbon Removal Programs. The budget proposes $2
million, about the same level as fiscal year 2002 enacted, to allow EPA
to enhance efforts to better quantify the associated environmental co-
benefits that result from carbon sequestration. These benefits include
improving soil quality, reducing soil erosion, improving water quality,
providing wildlife habitat, and enhancing other environmental and
conservation goals. EPA will continue to collaborate with USDA to
address the misperceptions regarding carbon sequestration and to ensure
that this important mitigation option is developed in an
environmentally sound and economically efficient way. EPA and USDA will
identify and develop specific opportunities to sequester carbon in
agricultural soils, forests, other vegetation and commercial products.
<bullet> USDA Technology Research. The budget proposes
approximately $6 million to strengthen basic climate change technology
research and to develop methods for measuring carbon in soils. USDA's
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) will develop methods to manage
crops, soils, and grazing systems to achieve the best balance of
agricultural productivity, resource conservation, and carbon
sequestration. Work will also focus on methods for managing livestock
to minimize methane emissions. The Forest Service will support the
development of measuring tools and monitoring technologies to improve
estimates of carbon fluxes from forests.
international assistance
Table 6. International Climate Change Assistance
(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency for International Development:.......................
Development Assistance (DA)............................. 112 110 109 -1
Economic Support Fund (ESF)............................. -- 12 6 -6
Assistance for the Independent States of the Former 31 32 27 -5
Soviet Union (FSA).....................................
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States 13 10 8 -2
(AEEB).................................................
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)................. -- 4 5 +1
Development Credit Authority (DCA)...................... 1 -- -- --
Tropical Forest Conservation\1\......................... -- -- 50 +50
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--AID....................................... 157 167 205 +38
Department of Treasury......................................
Debt Restructuring Tropical Forest Conservation\2\...... 13 5 -- -5
Department of State.........................................
International Organizations and Programs................ 7 7 6 -1
---------------------------------------------------
Total\3\............................................ 177 179 211 +32
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Prior to the fiscal year 2003 Presidents Budget request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act
(TFCA) was appropriated to the Treasury Department.
\2\ In fiscal year 2002, an additional $20 million in existing balances may be used.
\3\ Total may not add due to rounding.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The budget
proposes $205 million, an increase of $38 million over fiscal year 2002
enacted, for USAID's climate change programs and for tropical forest
conservation. The goal of USAID's climate change programs are to
promote development that minimizes the associated growth in greenhouse
gas emissions and reduces vulnerability to climate change. To
accomplish this goal, USAID works in developing and transition
countries to implement ``win-win'' solutions that provide climate-
related benefits while also meeting development objectives in the
energy sector, urban areas, forest conservation, agriculture, and
disaster assistance. These solutions include activities that: 1)
promote the transfer of clean energy technologies; 2) measure
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; 3) promote carbon capture
through improved land use; 4) support countries to participate more
effectively in the U.S. Framework Convention on Climate Change; and 5)
assess vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and increase
adaptive capacity. Although USAID works on climate change issues in
more than 40 countries, the Agency has focused its climate change
activities in three sub-regions: Central Africa, Central America and
Central Asia, and eight countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine.
The President's fiscal year 2003 budget proposal seeks $50 million
in funding for tropical forest conservation, of which $40 million may
be used for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA). One purpose of
this initiative is to enable developing countries to play an increased
role in addressing the world's climate change problem through storing
carbon in forests. The main elements of the initiative will be: (1)
remote sensing and developing capacity to monitor deforestation and
enable local governments to better control illegal and destructive
logging in their countries; (2) addressing the problem of illegal and
destructive logging practices, working with governments, non-
governmental organizations and private industry; and (3) addressing
deforestation through the use of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act
as well as other innovative funding mechanisms such as commercial debt
for nature swaps under the Foreign Assistance Act Title I, Chapter 7
authority and new partnerships with U.S. industries and non-
governmental organizations (NGO's).
Department of State. The budget includes $6 million to support the
work carried out by the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). The Secretariat is responsible for work
related to the Convention and oversees the consideration of
communications submitted by countries. The Panel's assessment efforts
provide information on the scientific and technical underpinnings of
domestic and international policies to combat the threat of global
climate change, and its findings influence policy options available
within and between countries.
other climate-related programs
Table 7. Other Climate Change-Related Programs--FY 2003 Budget
(Budget authority; in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Energy........................................
Energy Conservation R&D Weatherization & State Energy 191 272 316 +41
Grants.................................................
Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal/natural gas)............ 274 442 398 -44
Energy Supply:..........................................
Nuclear Energy R&D (NERI)........................... 34 32 25 -7
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--DOE....................................... 499 749 739 -10
Department of the Treasury..................................
International Development Assistance Global Environment 41 38 68 +30
Facility\1\............................................
---------------------------------------------------
Total\2\............................................ 540 787 807 +20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million. Approximately
38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g. expanding clean
energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also provides funding for other global
environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type.
\2\ Total may not add due to rounding.
Other Climate-Change Related Programs. The fiscal year 2003 budget
includes $807 million, an increase of $20 million over fiscal year 2002
enacted, for several programs in which there is, or can be, significant
greenhouse gas co-benefits. These include programs that have multiple
environmental benefits, including reducing fossil fuel use or improving
energy efficiency. The programs in this category include:
<bullet> DOE--Low Income Weatherization and State Energy Grants.
The budget proposes $316 million, an increase of $41 million over
fiscal year 2002 enacted, for programs that facilitate energy
efficiency investments at the State and local level. These programs
provide energy conservation services, such as insulation, to low-income
Americans, reducing energy costs for consumers, improving health and
safety, and reducing carbon emissions. The State Energy Program
provides grants that enable States to tailor energy efficiency programs
to local needs and leverage non-Federal resources.
<bullet> DOE--Cleaner Coal and Natural Gas Efficiencies. The
budget includes $398 million, a decrease of $44 million from fiscal
year 2002 enacted, to support DOE's R&D effort to help industry develop
advanced technologies to produce and use coal, and gas resources more
efficiently and cleanly. federally funded development of clean, highly
efficient gas-fired and coal-fired generating systems aims to reduce
gas emission rates, while reducing electricity costs compared to
currently available technologies. Programs also include efforts to
discover effective, efficient, and economical means of sequestering
carbon dioxide.
<bullet> DOE B Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI). The
budget proposes $25 million, a decrease of $7 million from fiscal year
2002 enacted, to continue investigator-initiated research and
development at universities, national laboratories, and industry to
advance nuclear power technology. NERI research and development focuses
on proliferation-resistant reactor and fuel technologies, high
performance/efficient reactor technology, advanced nuclear fuels, and
new technologies for the minimization and management of nuclear waste.
<bullet> Department of the Treasury B Global Environment Facility
(GEF). See Addendum A.
detailed accounting of federal climate change expenditures
Table 8. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change--By Appropriation Account/Line Item--FY 2003 Budget
(Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 Change 2002-
Actual Estimate Proposed 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Programs and Tax Policies Directly Related to Climate Change
U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)................
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)...............
National Institutes of Health (NIH).....................
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences..... 9 10 11 +1
National Eye Institute.................................. 14 17 18 +1
National Cancer Institute............................... 31 34 39 +5
National Institute of Arthritis & Musculoskeletal & Skin * * * *
Diseases...............................................
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--HHS/NIH\1\................................ 54 60 68 +8
National Aeronautics and Space Administration...............
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology.................... 1,176 1,090 1,109 +19
Department of Energy........................................
Science (Biological & Environmental Research)........... 116 120 126 +6
National Science Foundation.................................
Research and Related Activities......................... 181 188 188 0
Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
Agricultural Research Service........................... 29 30 30 0
Cooperative State Research, Education, & Extension
Services...............................................
Research and Education.................................. 4 9 17 +8
Economic Research Service............................... 1 1 1 0
Forest Service..........................................
Forest and Rangeland Research........................... 17 17 17 0
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--USDA...................................... 51 57 65 +8
Department of Commerce......................................
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 93 100 100 0
Operations, Research, and Facilities...................
Department of the Interior..................................
U.S. Geological Survey Surveys, Investigations, and 27 28 28 0
Research...............................................
Environmental Protection Agency.............................
Science and Technology.................................. 23 21 22 +1
Smithsonian Institution.....................................
Salaries and Expenses................................... 7 7 7 0
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--USGCRP\2\................................. 1,728 1,670 1,714 +44
================================================================================================================
Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI)
Department of Commerce......................................
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 0 0 18 +18
Operations, Research, and Facilities...................
National Science Foundation.................................
Research and Related Activities......................... 0 0 15 +15
National Aeronautics and Space Administration...............
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology.................... 0 0 3 +3
Department of Energy........................................
Science (Biological & Environmental Research)........... 0 0 3 +3
Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
Forest Service..........................................
Forest and Rangeland Research........................... 0 0 1 +1
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--CCRI...................................... 0 0 40 +40
================================================================================================================
Technology Research, Development and Deployment
Department of Energy (DOE)..................................
Energy Supply...........................................
Renewable Energy Resources R&D...................... 375 393 408 +15
Nuclear Energy...................................... (5) (7) (0) (-7)
Energy Conservation R&D................................. 619 649 588 -52
Fossil Energy R&D (sequestration R&D)................... 18 32 54 +22
Science (Basic Science)................................. 35 35 35 0
Energy Information Administration....................... 3 3 3 0
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--DOE....................................... 1,050 1,103 1,088 -15
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).......................
Environmental Programs and Management................... 96 89 91 +2
Science and Technology.................................. 27 26 17 -9
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--EPA....................................... 123 115 108 -7
Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
Forest Service..........................................
Forest and Rangeland Research........................... 3 0 1 +1
Agricultural Research Service........................... 0 0 5 +5
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--USDA...................................... 3 0 6 +6
===================================================
Subtotal--Technology Research, Development and 1,176 1,218 1,202 -16
Deployment\3\......................................
Revenue Effect of Tax Proposals............................. 0 0 555 +555
================================================================================================================
International Assistance
Agency for International Development (AID)..................
Development Assistance (DA)............................. 112 110 109 -1
Economic Support Fund (ESF)............................. -- 12 6 -6
Assistance for the Independent States of the Former 31 32 27 -5
Soviet Union (FSA).....................................
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States 13 10 8 -2
(AEEB).................................................
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)................. -- 4 D5 +1
Development Credit Authority (DCA)...................... 1 -- -- --
Tropical Forest Conservation\4\......................... -- -- 50 +50
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--AID\5\.................................... 157 167 205 +38
Department of Treasury......................................
Debt Restructuring......................................
Tropical Forest Conservation\6\......................... 13 5 -- -5
Department of State.........................................
International Organizations and Programs................ 7 7 6 -1
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--International Assistance\7\............... 177 179 211 +32
Other Climate Change-Related Programs
Department of Energy........................................
Energy Conservation R&D................................. 191 275 316 +41
Weatherization & State Energy Grants.................... 274 442 398 -44
Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal & natural gas)..........
Energy Supply...........................................
Nuclear Energy R&D (Nuclear Energy Research 499 749 739 -10
Initiative (NERI)).................................
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--DOE....................................... 499 749 739 -10
Department of the Treasury..................................
International Development Assistance, Multilateral 41 38 68 +30
Assistance, International Financial Institutions--
Global Environment Facility\8\.........................
---------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--Other Climate Change Programs\9\.......... 540 787 807 +20
===================================================
Total--All Programs and Tax Policies\10\............ 3,603 3,822 4,475 +653
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8 is a detailed listing of Federal climate change expenditures by agency with account level information as
provided in the President's fiscal year 2003 Budget Appendix. All numbers represent budget authority unless
otherwise noted. The line items in the Program and Financing schedule in the Budget Appendix use obligations,
not budget authority, so the numbers may not be comparable.
* less than $500,000
\1\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
\2\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
\3\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
\4\ Prior to the fiscal year 2003 Budget request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) was
appropriated to the Treasury Department.
\5\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
\6\ In fiscal year 2002, an additional $20 million in existing balances may be used.
\7\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
\8\ The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million.
Approximately 38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g.
expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also provides funding for other
global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type.
\9\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
\10\ Total may not add due to rounding. Total adjusted to eliminate double counts.
Addendum A
global environment facility (gef)--fy 2003 budget request
The fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $107.5 million for the GEF for
the first of four annual payments under the third GEF replenishment
(GEF-3) and $70.3 million to clear one-third of the U.S. arrears to
GEF-2. The clean energy portion of the GEF portfolio B its climate
change focal area B accounts for about 38 percent of its financial
commitments, which is about $68 million for climate-related activities
in fiscal year 2003.
Background on the Organization
The GEF was created in 1991, before any climate convention or
protocol existed, to specialize in trans-border environment problems,
of which climate is only one. In addition to climate change, GEF
funding is focused on international water pollution and overfishing;
better forestry, wildlife management, and biological diversity
conservation; and phasing out use of ozone-depleting chemicals (in
Eastern Europe, to complement Montreal Protocol Fund work in developing
countries).
The 1992 Climate Convention (the ``1992 Convention'') provided that
there should be a ``financial mechanism'' to: (1) help developing
countries evaluate, quantify, and report publicly on their greenhouse
gas emissions; and (2) make investments in cleaner development in
developing countries. In 1994, more than 3 years before conclusion of
the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. and other countries chose the GEF as the
institution to run the financial mechanism of the Climate Convention,
in part to avoid creating new institutions. The GEF was by far the best
existing institution for the job.
By 1995, donors had concluded a first GEF replenishment that
extensively restructured the GEF and improved its operational
effectiveness. This restructuring also cemented a governance structure
in which donors exercise much more power than in the 1992 Convention or
in any standard ``UN-configured'' institution.
GEF Operations
The GEF focuses on innovative, cost-effective and generally small
projects that can be duplicated elsewhere with financing from non-GEF
sources. Since beginning regular operations in 1994, the GEF has
designed and initiated over 1,047 investment and capacity building
projects in over 161 countries that are now being implemented by
developing countries with the help of three agencies--the World Bank,
the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. Environment Program. GEF has
committed about $3.7 billion to date, leveraging over $15 billion from
other sources. Cofinanciers include the developing countries
themselves, bilateral aid agencies, the GEF's three implementing
agencies and other multilateral financial institutions, and, in some
cases, private sector investors and non-governmental organizations.
Leveraging for clean energy projects is significant: $799 million in
cofinancing was leveraged in association with $86 million in GEF grants
in fiscal year 2002. GEF operations take two forms: (1) technical
assistance to help developing countries frame more environmentally
sound policies in key sectors such as energy production and land
management; and (2) direct investments to demonstrate innovative
technology projects, such as rural solar power, that countries then can
copy on a larger scale.
No Projects That Are Kyoto-Specific
The GEF predates both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 1992
Convention, and the Protocol places no new obligations on the GEF as
the Convention's financial mechanism. With regard to development
finance, the Protocol is related to the GEF through the Protocol's
umbrella, the 1992 Convention, since the GEF acts as the financial
mechanism for the Convention; it simply underscores existing 1992
Convention agreements on financial assistance for developing countries:
<bullet> Supporting developing country reporting requirements
under the 1992 Convention; and
<bullet> Providing the extra cost over normal development costs of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in energy or other projects. For
example, the GEF covers only the incremental cost of a clean wind power
plant relative to a regular oil-fired plant of identical capacity.
GEF Climate Change-Related Clean Energy Activities
The GEF supports five categories of climate-change related
projects, all but one focused on the energy sector. The first category
is small activities (generally costing about $350,000) to assist
countries in preparing reports required under the 1992 Convention.
These reports provide detailed inventories of countries' greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and sources (power plants, etc.), their GHG ``sinks''
(forests,etc.), and policies and programs that affect GHG emissions
(energy pricing policies, etc.).
The four other categories, briefly illustrated with project
examples below, all support clean energy development, usually combined
with capacity-building for good policies and effective institutions.
These programs make sense on their own terms and are all initiatives
the U.S. has been pursuing domestically for years. None of them is
directed by the Protocol.
The GEF already undertakes systematic annual portfolio performance
evaluation. Criteria include quality of overall project management,
financial management, policy impacts, country capacity development,
civil society engagement, and pollution abatement. For example, for
energy efficiency projects, evaluators compare investments in efficient
equipment following the GEF intervention to a baseline scenario of
efficiency investments. An extensive effort to update and improve
measurement criteria at both project and program levels for climate
change activities has been concluded. These measurements are now being
used to ensure projects and programs achieve their objectives.
Promoting Energy Efficiency and Conservation
The GEF's Mexico High Efficiency Lighting Project aimed to reduce
energy waste and power plant pollution by proving the commercial
viability of energy efficient lighting. $10 million from GEF leveraged
over $13 million in initial cofinancing. Since the project's
completion, its long-term impacts have outstripped all expectations.
Mexican consumers and businesses have installed almost 40 percent more
efficient lights than the GEF's most optimistic projections. The
project's success also convinced Mexico to expand dramatically energy
efficiency programs in other locations and sectors.
Promoting Renewable Energy
In Sri Lanka, a GEF project has succeeded in supplying electricity
by employing renewable technologies and demonstrating the advantages of
such technologies to rural households and the country in general. This
$5.9 million GEF grant has leveraged $49.4 million in cofinancing,
including $24.2 million from the World Bank. Approximately 30 megawatts
of mini-hydropower has been added to the grid through private
developers, and a total of 8,800 households have been provided with
electricity through village hydropower and solar photovoltaic power.
The aim is to provide for the replication of such renewable energy
schemes by private businesses in Sri Lanka and many other countries.
Lowering the Long-Term Cost of Advanced Clean Energy Technologies
The Brazil Biomass Power Commercial Demonstration Project uses
high-efficiency technology to use agricultural byproducts as fuel for
electric power and agro-industry process heat. A $40.5 million GEF
investment leverages $82 million, mostly from Brazilian public and
private sources. The project should help increase economies of scale
for this promising technology and thus help it become commercially
viable. By conservative estimates, biomass power could supply clean
electricity to 100 million rural people, particularly needed in Africa
and South Asia.
Clean Fossil-Fuel Combustion and Other Short-Term Measures
The GEF's $10 million Coal Bed Methane Project demonstrated at
three sites a wide variety of techniques and technologies that Chinese
coal mines can employ to reduce methane emissions and capture clean-
burning methane as a fuel. It also spawned landmark policy and
institutional reforms, including the creation of the China United Coal
Bed Methane Corporation, that support replication of coal-bed methane
recovery. The Chinese Ministry of Coal has since negotiated agreements
with BP-Amoco and other companies for coal-bed methane projects. Based
on the GEF's early work, the Asian Development Bank, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, and the China United Coal Bed Methane Corporation
are all working to expand coal-bed methane development in China.
Addendum B
highlights of the 2002 farm bill
Over the next 10 year we will invest $47.2 billion for conservation
on our farms and forest lands, partnering with farmers and small land
owners to protect the water and air, provide habitat for wildlife, and
storing carbon in trees and the soil. The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorizes
and increases funding for most USDA conservation programs. These
programs will provide a range of environmental benefits, including
improved air, soil, and water quality and wildlife habitat. Activities
implemented through a number of USDA conservation programs can result
in positive greenhouse gas benefits by reducing emissions and enhancing
terrestrial carbon sequestration.
For example, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
program is expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by providing
incentives that encourage the voluntary adoption of conservation
practices on working lands and waste management systems for livestock
operations such as methane capturing technologies. A new provision of
EQIP, the Conservation Innovations Grant Program, could be used to
promote carbon sequestration practices by leveraging private and public
sector investments. In addition, reserve programs, such as the
Conservation Reserve Program, are expected to have sizable greenhouse
gas benefits, by sequestering carbon through vegetation growth and
improved soil conditions.
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) provides technical
assistance, cost-sharing, and incentive payments for conservation
practices on working lands. The 2002 Farm Bill increased funding for
EQIP and increased the flexibility of the program by allowing
exceptions to the maximum cost-share amount of 75 percent, removing
restrictions on eligibility based on operation size, and expanding
options for contract lengths.
While both crop and livestock producers are eligible, funding is
prioritized for livestock producers with 60 percent of program funding
targeted for conservation practices on livestock operations (up from 50
percent in the 1996-2001 Farm Bill).
The Conservation Innovation Grants program is a new provision under
EQIP that allows the Secretary to make grants to governmental and non-
governmental entities, as well as persons, to leverage investment in
conservation activities. Projects funded through this program may
include market-based pollution credit trading, adoption of best
management practices, or carbon sequestration.
The 2002 Farm Bill provides for direct spending for regular EQIP
activities and the Conservation Innovation Grants program of $5.8
billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funding for fiscal years
2002-2007. Funding is scheduled to increase steadily starting at $400
million in 2002 and $700 million in 2003, increasing each year to a
maximum of $1.3 billion annually by fiscal year 2007. This represents a
substantial increase from the 1996 Farm bill authorization of $200
million per year. Additional CCC funding is provided for a new EQIP
provision targeting ground and surface water conservation at $310
million over fiscal year 2002-2007 and an additional $50 million is
provided for water conservation activities in the Klamath Basin as soon
as possible.
Reserve Programs compensate landowners for taking environmentally
sensitive land out of production.
<bullet> Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a voluntary program
where the government offers annual rental payments and cost-share
assistance to farmers in exchange for taking land out of production and
establishing an approved vegetation cover. The 1996 Farm Bill
authorized a maximum enrollment of 36.4 million acres in the CRP. The
2002 Farm Bill reauthorizes the program and increases the enrollment
cap to 39.2 million acres. Additional provisions allow for automatic
extension of expiring contracts. In addition, 2002 Farm Bill provisions
permit some management practices to continue on CRP lands (i.e., haying
and grazing, and placement of wind turbines). Spending for this program
is estimated to increase by $1.5 billion over 10 years.
<bullet> Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) is
authorized under the CRP but is administered through a State-Federal
partnership and targets State-specific as well as National agricultural
environmental problems. Because the CREP is authorized under the CRP,
acres enrolled under CREP count toward the CRP enrollment cap. The
estimated costs of the CREP are incorporated in the estimate above.
<bullet> Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) provides easements or
restoration cost-share agreements to producers who agree to restore
wetlands on agricultural lands. The 1996 Farm Bill authorizes a maximum
area of 1.075 million acres. The 2002 Farm Bill increases the total
enrollment acreage to 2.275 million acres, with a maximum annual
enrollment set at 250,000 acres per year. Spending for this program is
estimated to increase by $1.5 billion over 10 years.
appendix a
u.s. agency for international development
Global Climate Change Funding (GCC)
(Dollars in thousands)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE Reporting FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
BUREAU/COUNTRY NAME Category Obligations Estimate Proposed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa (AFR).........................
Guinea........................... Increased use of 3 1,000 2,000 2,000
Sustainable Natural
Resources Mgmt
Practices.
Madagascar Biologically Diverse 3 2,500 2,500 2,500
Ecosystems Conserved.
Malawi Sustainable Use, 3 2,000 1,000 1,000
Conservation, & Mgmt
of Renewable Natural
Resources.
Mali Increased Value-Added 3 1,000 1,500 --
of Specific Economic
Sectors.
Accelerated Economic 3 -- -- 1,500
Growth.
Mozambique Increased Rural 3 2,000 2,000 2,000
Household Incomes.
Senegal More effective 3 -- 1,000 1,000
Management of Services
& Resources.
South Africa......................... Improved Capacity to 1 500 -- --
Implement Economic
Policy.
Housing and Municipal 1 2,500 3,000 3,000
Services.
Uganda Expanded Opportunities 3 3,500 2,500 2,500
for Rural Sector
Growth.
AFR/Regional/SD Central Africa Regional 3 3,000 3,000 3,000
Program for
Environment (CARPE).
(CARPE) Climate 5 -- -- 500
Monitoring & Observing.
FEWS Climate Monitoring 5 1,000 6,000 6,000
and Observing.
Western Africa Regional Program...... Food Security, ENV and 3 1,000 -- --
Natural Resource Mgmt
Strengthened.
Climate Monitoring and 5 -- -- 500
Observing.
Initiative for Southern Africa....... Increased Regional 3 -- 500 500
Cooperation in Natural
Resource Mgmt.
Climate Monitoring and 5 -- -- 500
Observing.
Regional Economic Dev. Service Office Climate Monitoring and 5 -- -- 500
(REDSO/E). Observing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL AFR........................ 20,000 25,000 27,000
Asia and the Near East (ANE)
Afghanistan.......................... Climate Monitoring and 5 -- -- 1,000
Observing.
Bangladesh........................... Improved Performance of 1 1,000 3,470 3,470
the Energy Sector.
Improved Performance of 1 -- 1,500 1,500
the Energy Sector.
Egypt................................ Mgt. of Env. and 1 -- 7,280 1,155
Natural Resources in
Targeted Sectors
Improved.
India................................ Increased Environmental 1 2,843 6,050 6,050
Protection in Energy,
Industry, & Cities.
Increased Environmental 1 -- 3,000 3,000
Protection in Energy,
Industry, & Cities.
Indonesia............................ Energy Sector 1 3,823 3,130 3,130
Governance
Strengthened.
Nepal................................ Increased Private 1 2,000 2,200 2,200
Sector Participation &
Investment in
Hydropower.
Philippines.......................... Protection of 1 2,997 3,000 3,000
Productive Life
Sustaining Natural
Resources.
USAEP................................ U.S. Asia Environmental 1 4,100 2,000 3,100
Partnership.
SARI/E............................... South Asia Regional 1 3,900 2,900 2,900
Initiative--Energy
Program.
ANE/Regional......................... Program Development & 1 -- 150 150
Learning.
Climate Monitoring and 5 -- -- 1,000
Observing.
TOTAL ANE........................ 20,663 34,680 30,655
Latin American and the Caribbean
(LAC)
Bolivia.............................. Sustainable Forest 3 4,527 4,550 5,764
Management and Parks.
Brazil............................... Env & Socioeconomically 3 2,500 1,465 2,840
Sustainable
Alternatives for Sound
Land Use.
Clean and Efficient 1 2,368 1,000 1,000
Energy Production and
Use.
Dominican Republic................... Sustainable Forestry... 3 1,492 1,500 1,500
Ecuador.............................. Conserving Ecuador's 3 3,688 3,057 850
Forests.
Guatemala............................ Conserving and 3 570 600 450
Sustainable Using
Forests.
G-CAP (Central America).............. Improved Management in 3 510 415 595
the Mesoamerican
Biological Corridor.
Improved Management in 1 1,300 230 230
the Mesoamerican
Biological Corridor.
Improved Management in 5 1,050 180 580
the Mesoamerican
Biological Corridor.
Honduras............................. Protecting Honduran 3 3,691 2,600 4,800
Forests.
LAC Regional......................... Improved Conservation 3 964 4,636 2,800
of the Region's
Biological Resources.
Mexico............................... Protecting Tropical 3 4,164 3,365 4,765
Forest.
Renewable Energy, 5 600 400 500
Energy Efficiency.
Fires.................. 1 1,421 1,750 1,500
Nicaragua............................ Improving Park 3 4,970 4,723 1,129
Management.
Panama............................... Conserving Forests..... 3 240 -- --
Paraguay............................. Conserving Paraguay's 3 1,000 1,000 1,000
Sub-Tropical Forests.
Peru................................. Improved Environmental 3 1,621 -- --
Management.
Strengthen 3 -- 1,227 1,500
Environmental
Management.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL LAC........................ 36,676 32,697 31,803
Europe and Eurasia (E&E)
Albania.............................. Growth in Number of 1 1,500 750 500
Self-Sustaining
Private Enterprises.
Bulgaria............................. Special Initiatives.... 3 1,200 500 500
Accelerated Development 1 -- 400 450
& Growth of the
Private Sector.
Croatia.............................. Growth of a Dynamic and 1 -- 500 --
Competitive Private
Sector.
Romania.............................. Economically 1 1,100 1,900 1,500
Sustainable and
Environmentally Sound
Energy Sector.
CEE Regional......................... Economically 1 7,576 5,726 4,901
Sustainable and
Environmentally Sound
Energy Sector.
Increased Environmental 3 932 -- 215
Mgmt Capacity to Sppt
Sustainable Ec Growth.
Increased Environmental 1 214 -- 87
Mgmt Capacity to Sppt
Sustainable Ec Growth.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-total Europe................. 12,522 9,776 8,153
Armenia.............................. Economically 1 4,750 590 5,100
Sustainable and
Environmentally Sound
Energy Sector.
More Sustainable Water 1 -- 300 500
Management for
Enhanced Env Quality.
Georgia.............................. Economically 1 6,860 14,500 6,400
Sustainable and
Environmentally Sound
Energy Sector.
Kazakhstan........................... Improved Management of 1 2,000 1,000 500
Critical Natural
Resources, including
Energy.
Kyrgyzstan........................... Improved Management of 1 750 650 1,500
Critical Natural
Resources, including
Energy.
Moldova.............................. Private Enterprise 1 4,575 4,575 5,150
Growth Creates Jobs
and Generates Income.
Russia............................... Accelerated Development 1 400 883 718
and Growth of Private
Enterprises.
Cross-Cutting Programs. 3 1,600 2,717 2,282
Tajikistan........................... Improved Management of 1 -- 20 30
Critical Natural
Resources, including
Energy.
Turkmenistan......................... Improved Management of 1 10 200 200
Critical Natural
Resources, including
Energy.
Ukraine.............................. Economically 1 8,284 3,475 3,275
Sustainable and
Environmentally Sound
Energy Sector.
Increased Env Mgmt 1 1,645 460
Capacity to Support
Sustainable
Development.
NIS Regional......................... Economically 1 1,060 935 935
Sustainable and
Environmentally Sound
Energy Sector.
Increased Environmental 1 940 340 340
Mgmt Capacity to Spt
Sustainable Ec Growth.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-total Eurasia................ 31,229 31,830 27,390
==========================================================================
TOTAL E&E.................... 43,751 41,606 35,543
Economic Growth, Agriculture & Trade
(EGAT).
EGAT/ENV............................. Office of Environment 3 8,324 7,626 7,626
and Natural Resources.
EGAT/ENV............................. Office of Environment 1 -- -- --
and Natural Resources.
EGAT/ENV............................. Office of Environment, 1 16,000 12,000 10,000
Energy and Technology.
EGAT/ENV............................. Global Climate Change.. 1 3,000 2,575 1,000
EGAT/ENV............................. Global Climate Change.. 5 -- 900 750
EGAT/ENV............................. Global Climate Change.. 3 3,000 500 325
EGAT/EGAD............................ AFS.................... 3 2,022 2,775 2,775
EGAT/EGAD............................ AFS.................... 3 3,000 3,000 3,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL EGAT....................... 35,346 29,376 25,476
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance (DCHA)
DCHA/OFDA............................ Worldwide Climate -- 4,000 5,000
Monitoring and
Observing 5.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL DCHA....................... 4,000 5,000
Tropical Forest Conservation (A)..... [13,000] [5,000] 50,000
Development Credit Authority (DCA)...
Bulgaria (B)......................... 1...................... 625 -- --
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL DCA........................ 625 -- --
TOTAL USAID.................. 157,061 167,359 205,477
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) Before the fiscal year 2003 Request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act was appropriated to
the Treasury Department. In fiscal year 2002, up to an additional $20 million in existing Treasury Department
balances may be used. The bracketed amounts are not included in AID's totals.
(B) Development Credit Authority is a competitive program funded by transfer authority. The fiscal year 2001
level is the subsidy amount obligated. The leveraged amount through fiscal year 2000 is $22.3 million.
FY 2002 Legislative Reporting Categories
1) Activities that promote the transfer and deployment of United States clean energy technologies: Under USAID's
Climate Change Program, technology transfer is promoted to assist developing countries to achieve sustainable
growth and development but is not tracked as an individual goal within the program. USAID's energy-related
climate change programs demonstrate U.S. technologies and/or work to address the policy, legal and regulatory
barriers that limit clean technology deployment.
2) Activities to assist in the measurement, monitoring, reporting, verification, and reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions: USAID does not currently separate measuring, monitoring, reporting and verification of GHG
emissions from the energy and land use sector activities in which these occur. All of the activities that
assist with technology transfer and carbon capture promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
3) Activities/programs to promote carbon capture and sequestration measures
4) Activities/programs to help meet such countries' responsibilities under the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: The spending for this category has not been formally tracked under USAID's Climate Change Program. It
has been tracked as a performance indicator of program results and information concerning results through
fiscal year 2000 and can be provided upon request.
5) Activities to develop assessments of the vulnerability to impacts of climate change and response strategies
______
Responses of James Connaughton to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. What measures should we look at to determine whether
U.S. programs and resources are achieving the goals of Agenda 21?
Response. One measure of accomplishment is the ratification and
implementation of new multilateral environmental agreements. The Bush
Administration has submitted the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants (POPs) and implementing legislation is to the Senate
for its advice and consent. This convention seeks the ultimate
worldwide elimination of certain persistent organic pollutants.
Implementing legislation on two related international agreements have
also be sent to the Congress: 1) The Protocol to the Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, an earlier agreement similar to POPs which covers a
slightly different set of chemicals already controlled in the U.S., and
therefore applies only to the U.S., Europe and Canada; and 2) The
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PlC) Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
which requires exporters to obtain the prior informed consent of
importing countries and to provide safety information on health effects
of hazardous substances and pesticides. Another important treaty
concluded and ratified by the United States since Rio is the Deserts
Convention (which deals with dry land management and desertification).
The international community has also developed a number of programs
and other implementation measures to be undertaken by governments, the
private sector and NGO's. These include the U.S.-led international
Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), which now has a large number of
participating countries, the U.N. Forum on Forests, which has made
significant progress in developing a set of criteria and indicators for
the sustainable management of the world's most endangered forest
resources, and the Arctic Council, which as a group has identified and
implemented measures to reduce toxic chemicals which pose a particular
bioaccumulation risk in animals and humans in polar regions.
Programs implemented by U.S. industry often in partnership with
government and NGO's, such as the Energy Star program for energy
efficient appliances and the adoption of clean production technologies
and methods have also contributed significantly toward achieving the
goals set out in Agenda 21.
Sustainable development criteria related to Agenda 21 are being
utilized in the reporting of program performance by U.S. Government
departments and agencies. Goals for particular programs are drawn from
specific chapters and sections of Agenda 21. An example is the goal of
USAID's protected area work in Latin America, which addresses Section
15.5g of Agenda 21 by seeking to preserve biological diversity. Agenda
21 will continue to provide a broad framework as the U.S. executes
targeted results-oriented programs that are designed to address local
situations.
Question 2. We understand that earlier this year 41 American
environmental leaders, including the heads of almost all of the major
U.S. environmental groups, wrote to President Bush urging him to commit
to attending the Johannesburg Summit and to reasserting American
leadership on a range of critical global environmental issues. Their
letter sets out a number of recommended actions. Has the Administration
considered these recommendations and taken concrete actions on any of
them?
Response. The Bush Administration greatly appreciates having heard
from this group. I have, met with many of the NGO leaders who signed
the letter to discuss these and other issues. The Administration is
also working with many NGO's in preparing our deliverables for the
World Summit. We have taken actions on implementing several
international environmental agreements (as described above) At the
recently completed talks for replenishment of the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF) the U.S. pledged a significant increase in funding to
help developing countries mitigate environmental problems with
potential global impact. The United States pledged $500 million over
the next 4 years for the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
commitment is a 16 percent increase over its contribution to the
previous replenishment. This in turn will help leverage about $2.2
billion in total new donor contributions. My office and other agencies
discussed the importance of this funding with several groups who I
understand are complimentary of our ultimate decision and leadership.
Question 3. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change commits the United States to working to achieve stabilization of
greenhouse gases at concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system. Please provide the Administration's definition of what
phenomena would indicate or constitute ``dangerous anthropogenic
interference.'' (For example, does that mean more frequent and more
destructive hurricanes, excessive wildfires, anomalous droughts, etc.?)
Response. The objective of the Framework Convention, set out in
Article 2, does not impose commitments on Parties. It does provide that
the long term stabilization level ``should be achieved within a
timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.''
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes in its Third
Assessment Report that the question of what would constitute dangerous
anthropogenic interference is one that it cannot answer, because danger
is a function of the degree to which effects are negative and the
degree to which those effects are unacceptable. The latter, as noted in
the Third Assessment Report, is a value judgment. (IPCC Working Group
II Third Assessment Report, page 917).
At this point, it not possible to make such a judgment. There
remain substantial uncertainties in critical areas with respect to
climate behavior, as well as natural and socio-economic impacts. These
include, among other things:
<bullet> feedbacks in the climate system that determine the
magnitude and rate of future increases; future usage of fossil fuels
and future emissions of methane;
<bullet> how much carbon is sequestered by oceans and other sinks
and how much remains in the atmosphere;
<bullet> the details of regional climate change resulting from
global climate change;
<bullet> the nature and causes of the natural variability of
climate, its interactions with forced changes, and the direct and
indirect effects of aerosols;
<bullet> the ability of humans and ecosystems to adapt to changing
climate conditions.
The Administration is taking measured and serious steps to respond
to the challenge of climate change, by taking significant short-term
measures to reduce the projected growth in global emissions, both
through enhanced domestic policies and technology transfer to
developing countries, and by substantially increasing our nation's
investment in science and technology. By so doing, we can both reduce
remaining uncertainties and prepare ourselves to address climate change
in a manner that also ensures our continuing prosperity. We believe
that these steps are fully consistent with the United States'
commitments under the Framework Convention.
The President committed the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing
America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy
by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This will set America on a path to
slow the growth of our greenhouse gas emissions and, if. science
justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions. To achieve
this goal, the Administration is actively engaged and moving forward on
many fronts, looking at every sector of our economy, with the
recognition that meaningful progress depends on the development and
deployment of new technology. With the continued support of Congress,
we are advancing climate science, developing and promoting energy
efficiency, conservation, and sequestration technologies and practices,
pursuing near term greenhouse gas mitigation programs and expanding
international cooperation.
The President has called for nearly $700 million in additional
funding for the Federal Government's commitment to climate change in
Fiscal Year 1903--a 17 percent increase from last year--to support a
$4.5 billion program of research on climate science and energy
technology, mitigation incentives and programs, and international
technology transfer and outreach. This commitment is unmatched in the
world. The President's recent Report to Congress on Federal Climate
Change Expenditures details the numerous programs that this funding
will support.
Importantly, the President's request includes $555 million in clean
energy tax incentives, the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over
the next 5 years, reaching $7.1 billion over the next 10 years. These
incentives will spur investments in and purchases of renewable energy--
including solar, wind, and biomass--as well as advanced hybrid and fuel
cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. We also are
promoting clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power--which
produces no greenhouse gas emissions--and are working to safely improve
fuel economy for our cars and trucks.
Question 4. Please identify the early warning system that the
Administration supports domestically and internationally that is
designed to detect when ``dangerous anthropogenic interference'' (as
defined in response to the previous question) has begun to occur.
Response. The United States is involved in a variety of research
activities designed to enhance our understanding of the climate system.
Together, these will help reduce the significant remaining
uncertainties identified last year by the National Academy of Science's
in Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, and
provide better understanding of potential impacts associated with
greenhouse gas emissions.
The Administration has requested $1.7 billion in basic scientific
research, under the U.S Global Change Research Program and the
President's Climate Change Research Initiative in fiscal year 2203,
which is roughly half of the world's research budget, and more than
Japan and the 15 member states of the European Union combined. This
includes funding for the Climate Change Research Initiative, which is
designed to focus on information that can be developed within 2 to 5
years to assist the nation's evaluation of optimal strategies to
address global change risks.
In addition, the Administration is leading the way in the
revitalization of a comprehensive global observation system, which is
critical to understanding climate change. This includes greater
emphasis on climate observation and monitoring systems here and abroad.
As part of his climate change policy, the President committed $25
million to improve observing and monitoring capability in developing
countries. These investments will help to better understand current
conditions as well as improve future projections at the global level.
Question 5. The Framework Convention commits the United States and
all the parties to reporting ``detailed information on its policies and
measures . . . with the aim of returning individually or jointly to
their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases.'' When will the United States comply with that
commitment?
Response. The United States submitted detailed information on our
policies and measures, in accordance with the procedures under the
Convention. Most recently, policies and measures are detailed in the
Climate Action Report submitted as the third National Communication
from the United States to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, submitted in May 2002.
You mention as a ``commitment'' the Framework Convention's aim of
returning to 1990 levels by the end of the last decade. This is not an
obligation under the Convention, but rather is stated as a general
objective. The last Administration ultimately found this general aim
unachievable, as did virtually all of the developed country parties of
the Convention. Article 4 of the Convention does, however, contain a
number of specific commitments, with which the United States has fully
complied. This includes the requirement for us to develop methodologies
for assessing our greenhouse gas emissions and making that information
publicly available. It includes the adoption of policies specifically
aimed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to develop programs to
adapt to climate change that may occur, whether natural or human
influenced. It commits us to develop and disseminate new technologies
to reduce or prevent emissions, looking at all sectors. It commits us
to promote the effective management and conservation of sinks in the
agricultural and forestry sectors. It commits developed nations to
provide assistance to developing nations to help them comply with their
own obligations under the Convention. Finally, it commits all nations
to report periodically to the United Nations on their compliance with
these obligations, which the Bush Administration did recently through
its Climate Action Report.
Question 6. Has the United States or any of its representatives,
officially or unofficially discouraged countries from bringing climate
change initiatives or issues to the World Summit for consideration?
Response. No. The United States delegation has engaged
constructively on a substantial amount of text on a variety of climate
change issues occurring in the Johannesburg Plan of Action. Most of the
climate change-related text in the draft Johannesburg Plan of Action
has been agreed upon. In addition the partnerships the U.S. will
discuss in the areas of energy, agriculture and forests will also be
quite consequential to the issue of greenhouse gas mitigation, even as
they are directed at near-term poverty reduction and human health
imperatives.
Several delegations have put forward textual proposals that have
the effect of asking the United States to endorse the Kyoto Protocol,
or to take on new climate-related commitments in the WSSD. The United
States will not be a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, and we have indicated
to those delegations that we cannot support text that is contrary to
our national position. The United States does not intend to agree to
additional climate change commitments at WSSD. The internationally
agreed forum for negotiating climate change commitments is the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Eighth Conference of the
Parties to the Convention (COP-8) will take place October 23-November
1, 2002, in New Delhi, India.
Question 7. The Canadian government has put forward a Type I
partnership entitled ``Health and Environment: Moving from Knowledge
and Experience to Action.'' The purpose of this initiative is to
synthesize existing information on environmental health linkages and
build on the capacity of developing countries to apply this knowledge,
in a manner consistent with local conditions, to planning and
policymaking at the national level. Will the U.S. support the Canadian
initiative and if so, what resources is the U.S. planning to offer to
ensure its success?
Response. The United States is currently considering the Canadian
proposal. In general, the proposal parallels work that is supported by
the Health and Environment Ministerial of the Americas, which was
agreed to by the United States and all the governments of the Western
Hemisphere. Further, the Canadian proposal supports the data sharing
initiatives underway through the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation.
One key issue that remains to be resolved is whether this should be
categorized as a Type I or Type II initiative. As a Type II initiative,
the United States may support the initiative. Type II partnership does
not require the consensus of each Nation participating in the WSSD. If
the Canadian proposal were to become a Type II partnership, current
U.S. Government funding levels could support this activity. The United
States will continue to work with the Canadian Government with a goal
to coming to agreement in support of the proposal.
Question 8. I have heard that EPA and other agencies are in the
process of developing a number of Type II partnership proposals that
the U.S. delegation in Johannesburg will announce. Specifically, I
understand that EPA is developing initiatives on drinking water/
sanitation, clean air, and children's environmental health. What can
you tell us about the status of these proposals? Will new financial
resources be earmarked in future budgets to ensure that these
initiatives add value to existing development assistance and make a
meaningful and lasting contribution to the WSSD process?
Response. We are in the final stages of designing partnerships
proposals which we will announce in Johannesburg and discussed with
prospective additional partners. All the partnerships will be based on
current appropriated funding and are within the budget targets for
fiscal year 04. The Administration will brief appropriators in Congress
on the proposals before the World Summit. EPA and other agencies have
participated in preparing the partnerships, especially in water.
Specifically regarding children's health, EPA is exploring with USAID
and the Department of Health and Human Services to develop a proposal
for children's environmental health indicators. EPA is also consulting
with the World Health Organization on possible collaboration.
Question 9. Given that EPA is a lead agency on a number of
initiatives and proposals, will EPA Administrator Whitman participate
personally in the WSSD and if so, what will her role be?
Response. EPA Administrator Whitman is scheduled to participate in
the WSSD. She and several other high-level delegates from her agency
will actively engage with their counterparts, work to forge lasting
partnerships on U.S. development priorities, and identify opportunities
for collaboration beyond the WSSD.
Question 10. How is the United States affected by the fact that we
don't have a true environment minister?
Response. The Bush Administration has accorded Cabinet Rank status
to the Administrator of the EPA. The U.S. EPA Administrator is
recognized as a peer among her international ministerial colleagues.
__________
Statement of Maurice F. Strong, Chairman, Earth Council Foundation
Distinguished Chairman, Honorable Senators, ladies and gentlemen.
First let me say what a privilege it is for me to have the opportunity
of testifying before these two important committees of the U.S. Senate
as you consider issues which are at the center of my own life interests
and concerns. It is particularly encouraging to know that you are
addressing these issues at a time when the position of the United
States of America in respect of them has never been more important to
the human future.
We face an ominous paradox as the evidence of our destructive
impacts on the earth's environment and life-support systems has become
more compelling while there has been a serious loss of momentum in the
political will to deal with them. The United States is at the center of
this dilemma. Thanks largely to the leadership of the United States the
world community has made impressive progress in its understanding of
environment issues and their inextricable relationship with the
economic development processes to which they give since the first
global conference on the human environment convened by the United
Nations in Stockholm in 1972 put the environmental issue on the
international agenda. The world has looked to the United States for
leadership in its national policies and legislation and in development
of the system of international cooperation, conventions and agreements
through which governments have sought to cooperate in managing issues
that even the greatest nations cannot manage alone.
The recent retreat by the United States from its long standing role
as the leading driver of these issues, as particularly evidenced by its
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol of the Climate Change Convention,
threatens the progress that has been made in collaborative management
of our environmental problems in the past 30 years and the prospects
for the further progress that is so essential to our common future.
This has cast a cloud over prospects for the World Summit on
Sustainable Development which will convene next month in Johannesburg,
South Africa and the unique opportunity it provides to give new impetus
and momentum to the processes of international cooperation which the
effective management of these issues requires. Thus your hearings are
especially timely and important.
If I now speak candidly of some of the concerns I share with many
others as to the position of the United States on the issues you are
now addressing I do so not as a critic but as a long standing and
committed friend of the United States with a deep affinity and
admiration for the values and qualities that have made this such a
great nation. Sharing these concerns as to the unilateral withdrawal by
the United States of its support for international agreements and
negotiating processes in which it has been such an active and
influential participant, is not in any way to question its right to do
so. Indeed it is understandable that with a new Administration and
Congress the United States would take a new look at and bring new
perspectives to bear on these issues, also that in its preoccupation
with the war on terrorism and other urgent issues it is taking your
Government some time to develop its position on these matters.
I have great confidence in the sound instincts and values of the
American people which in poll after poll affirm the continuing priority
they accord to the environment issue and that through the processes of
American democracy this will ultimately be reflected in the actions and
policies of their Government. At the same time I must confess my deep
concern as to the signals that have emerged thus far of the nature and
the direction of the changes that are now in process.
It is particularly germane that this hearing is focusing on the
international agreements and negotiating processes to which the United
States is a party. These are perhaps the best indicators of the current
State of political will toward international environmental cooperation
and the prospects of revitalizing and strengthening it.
Let me review briefly the larger context in which I view the
importance of your consideration of these issues.
At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm in 1972, the first global intergovernmental environmental
conference, we lost our innocence. We recognized that much of what we
had been doing in pursuit of our economic goals had, however
inadvertently, been producing environmental damage and social
dichotomies, which were undermining our quality of life and prospects
for the future. The eyes of the more developed countries were opened to
the very different perspectives and priorities of the majority of the
world's people living in developing countries where the daily struggle
for relief from poverty and progress toward a better life through
development are the overriding priorities. As Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi in her memorable statement to the Conference stated, in
developing countries ``poverty is the greatest polluter''.
The Declaration and Plan of Action agreed following intense
negotiations at Stockholm recognized in a number of important respects
the need to create a positive synthesis between the environment and
economic development.
It is, after all, through our economic behavior and practices that
we have our impacts on the environment and these impacts affect our
social as well as our physical environment. From this insight has
emerged the concept of sustainable development, the process by which we
bring the economic, environmental and social dimensions of the
development process into appositive synthesis. Sustainable development
should therefore be seen as the means by which our security, prosperity
and well being can become secure and sustainable rather than as an end
in itself.
Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair said recently, ``you don't have
to be an expert to realize that sustainable development is going to
become the greatest challenge we face this century''.
The Stockholm Conference gave rise to a proliferation of
initiatives--establishment in virtually all countries of environmental
agencies, policies and regulations; a broad range of international
treaties and agreements and an explosion in the number of environmental
non-governmental organizations and citizen movements as well as a major
expansion of the environmental programs of international organizations.
The United Nations General Assembly in December 1972, based on the
Conference's recommendation, established the United Nations Environment
Program as the centerpiece of the emerging global network of
environmental actors to lead the process of following up and
implementing its results.
Since 1972 we have learned a great deal more about the nature and
the causes of our environmental dilemma and have made notable progress
in developing the technologies, the tools and the capacities to manage
these problems successfully. Indeed there have been many individual
success stories which demonstrate that it is possible to bring our
economic life into a positive balance with our environmental and social
systems through the transition to a sustainable development pathway.
By the mid-1980's some of the momentum generated by Stockholm had
subsided. Progress toward achieving the environmental objectives set
there was lagging. In response the United Nations General Assembly
decided to establish a World Commission on Environment and Development
headed by Norway's former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The
Commission's report in 1987, Our Common Future, made a compelling case
for sustainable development as ``the only secure and viable pathway to
the future of the human community''. With the political impetus
generated by the Brundtland Commission, the U.N. General Assembly
decided to convene on the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference
in 1992 a Conference on Environment and Development and accepted the
invitation of Brazil to host it.
Now known as the ``Earth Summit'' the Conference held in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 brought together more heads of government that had ever
before assembled as well as an unprecedented number and range of civil
society actors and media representatives. The Earth Summit agreed on a
Declaration of Principles building on the Stockholm Declaration, a
comprehensive program of action--``Agenda 21''--to give effect to these
principles and Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity which
provided the framework for continuing negotiations following Rio. It
also mandated a negotiating process that led to the completion since
then of the Convention to Combat Desertification.
As you know the United States has ratified the Climate Change
Convention and the Desertification Convention and in spite its
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol it is still bound by its adherence
to the Climate Change Convention to reduce its green house gas
emissions. Although it has now opted to do this outside of the Kyoto
Protocol the world community continues to look to the United States for
the kind of parallel actions that will correspond to and hopefully
exceed, the targets and timetables provided for by Kyoto.
While the results of the Earth Summit inevitably fell short in some
important respects of the ambitious expectations that we had for it,
the agreements it produced nevertheless provided the basic foundations
and guidelines for the transition of the world community to a
sustainable development pathway. And the fact that there were agreed by
virtually all world governments, most of them at the level of their
leader, gave them a high degree of political authority. Nevertheless,
as I cautioned in my closing remarks to the Conference, it did not
guarantee their implementation. Unfortunately, this proved all too
prophetic.
Agenda 21 provides a comprehensive road-map for the transition to a
sustainable development pathway. Although it does not carry the force
of law the fact that it was agreed by all the governments of the United
Nations, most of them at the level of their heads of State or
Government, gives it a high degree of political authority. While its
implementation has thus far been and on the whole disappointing, it has
nevertheless served as a basis for the adoption of their national
Agenda 21 by a number of governments of which China was one of the
first. It has also inspired the establishment of local Agendas 21 by
more than 3000 cities and towns throughout the world and such important
industries as the tourism and travel and the road transport industries.
It is particularly important that at Johannesburg governments re-affirm
their commitment to Agenda 21 and to strengthening and building on it
in those areas in which it is still inadequate or incomplete.
The risks to the future of the earth's environment and life-support
systems identified in Stockholm and elaborated in Rio de Janeiro
remain, while the forces driving them persist--increased population
concentrated in those countries least able to support it, and even
greater increases in the scale and intensity of the economic activities
which impact on the environment. These have reached a point in which we
are literally the agents of our own future; what we do or fail to do,
will in the first decades of this new millennium in all probability,
determine the future course of human life on earth. It is an awesome
responsibility the implications of which we have not yet recognized.
Certainly they have not yet been reflected in our policies and
priorities.
As an optimist I continue to believe that the necessary change of
course is possible. But as a realist I am deeply concerned that despite
all the knowledge we have gained and progress we have made we have
still not demonstrated the degree of political will or sense of
priority that such a transition requires.
The transition to a sustainable development pathway is, I submit,
as essential to the future of the human community today as it was
before the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, on New
York and Washington. The preoccupation with the ominous consequences of
these horrendous acts is understandable and, indeed, necessary. But we
must not allow this to sidetrack or undermine our efforts to achieve
economic, environmental and social sustainability and security.
The tragic events of September 11th dramatically brought home to us
that the phenomena we now refer to as globalization, which has opened
up so many new and exciting opportunities, has also united us in facing
a new generation of risks, imbalances and vulnerabilities. Risks to our
personal security, the security of our homes, offices and communities
and, more fundamentally, risks to the earth's' life-support systems on
which the survival and well being of the entire human family depends.
These risks and vulnerabilities are inextricably linked through the
complex, systemic processes of globalization by which human activities
are shaping our common future. They cannot be understood or dealt with
in isolation. Nor can they be managed alone by any nation, however
powerful. Indeed, they require a degree of cooperation beyond anything
we seem yet prepared to accept.
Stockholm, in its historic Declaration stated that ``to defend and
improve the human environment for present and future generations has
become an imperative goal for mankind--a goal to be pursued together
with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of
peace and of worldwide economic and social development''. It thus
pointed up the systemic linkages between the environment and the issues
of peace and security, economic and social development through which
human activities are shaping our common future.
In a 1973 Foreign Affairs article I stressed that the principal
insight arising from the Stockholm Conference was the need for a
ecological, systemic approach to the management of the issues through
which we are impacting on our own future. This is essential to our
understanding and management of the broader complex of issues and
processes that we now generally refer to as globalization.
The September 11th, 2001 tragedy demonstrated dramatically the
vulnerabilities of even the most advanced and powerful of societies to
destructive attacks, however misguided, by relatively small groups of
alienated people. This underscores the need for international
cooperation, not only to conduct the war against terrorism, but also to
deal with the whole complex of issues integral to the globalization
process. These include eradication of poverty, environmental
protection, notably the risk of climate change, meeting the development
and security needs of developing countries, and redressing the gross
and growing imbalances that divide rich and poor and nourish the
enmities and frustrations that are the seedbeds of conflict.
Peace and security are an indispensable pre condition to
sustainability and overcoming poverty. War and violent conflict produce
devastating damage to the environment. And the human costs of such wars
and conflicts go far beyond the immediate deaths and suffering that
result from them in destroying and undermining the resources on which
even larger numbers of people depend for their livelihoods. This
essential link between peace and sustainable development is the reason
that United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook to
revitalize the University for Peace headquartered in San Jose, Costa
Rica, and that it has established a strategic partnership with the
Earth Council to re-enforce its capacities in the field of
environmental security.
International cooperation is as indispensable to the effective
management of the other elements of the globalization process as it is
to the prevention of terrorism. But cooperation based on coercion will
not long be effective. Sustainable cooperation requires a true sharing
in the decisionmaking and in responsibilities on the part of the
majority of nations which can only be achieved if the major nations of
the world take the lead. We regret the retreat from multi-lateral
cooperation on these issues on the part of the United States which has
performed such immensely valuable service to the world community in
leading it so effectively through most of the period since World War
II. No individual Nation in the position to replace the United States
in this role and while we continue to hope for and expect the return to
leadership on the part of the United States, we cannot afford at this
critical time to allow a leadership vacuum to prevail which would put
at risk the very future of life on earth as we know it. There are some
encouraging first signs of the emergence of a new configuration of
leadership in the ratification by the European Union, and Japan of the
Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention despite its repudiation
by the United States. I look to my own country, Canada, to do so too.
The need for new and revitalized leadership is reinforced by the
sobering realization that much of what has been agreed in the past has
not been implemented and there is a disturbing tendency even to back-
track on past agreements. It is important to be reminded that Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration in affirming the right of States to
develop their own resources in accordance with their own environmental
policies, have the ``responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond their limits of national
jurisdiction''. Implementation of this principle would in itself
require those States which are contributing disproportionately to the
deterioration of the global environment, as for example in continuing
to produce more than their share of green house gas emissions, to take
the measures required to reduce their impacts. This responsibility is
at the very heart of the challenge to the new generation of leadership
which must be faced at Johannesburg.
The power and the influence of the United States in today's world
is unrivaled and indeed without precedent in history. This gives the
United States a freedom of action not enjoyed by other nations. Other
nations are not in a position to hold the United States accountable for
the performance of its obligations under international law.
Nevertheless when it does act unilaterally it inevitably pays a cost in
terms of the resentment and reluctance of others to cooperate on other
issues of importance to the United States. It is important to note that
already there is clear evidence that even traditional friends of the
United States have not followed it in opting out such important
international agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Land Mines
Convention and the International Criminal Court. This is a departure
from their longstanding practice of following the U.S. lead even in
instances where they are not entirely comfortable with it.
The unprecedented power of the United States carries with it
unprecedented responsibility, particularly at a time when the human
future depends on the actions we take or fail to take in this
generation. When the United States acts selectively to carry out its
international obligations or to force other nations to carry out theirs
it serves to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of
international law which is the indispensable foundation for world
peace, security and order. As the principal architect of the system of
international treaties, conventions and agreements which constitute the
current imperfect but indispensable international legal regime and the
only Nation capable of insisting on enforcement, what the United States
does or fails to do is an immense and often decisive influence on the
behavior of other nations. The world community must be grateful to the
United States for having for most part exercised its responsibility
admirably. But in those instances in which it has not done so or has
insisted only selectively on enforcement by others of their
international obligations, this is an understandable cause of concern,
even dismay, on the part of other nations for its weakening effect on
the entire process of international law and prospects of its equitable
enforcement.
In drawing the lessons of our experience in the last 30 years, it
is clear that we have made a great deal of progress, notably in
improving but by no means resolving, the more immediate and visible
environmental conditions in the more industrialized countries.
Impressive improvements have been effected in the environmental
performance of industry and in development of technologies which
promise solutions to most problems as, for example, the prospect of
emission-free motor vehicles and the transition to a hydrogen-based
energy economy. At the same time, developing countries have become more
aware of and concerned with the environmental problems which inhibit
their own development. These problems exact immense human and economic
costs, produce deteriorating conditions in their cities, and
destructive exploitation of the natural resources on which future
development depends. They undermine the immense challenge of meeting
their growing needs for water and ensuring its quality, prevention and
care of destructive and debilitating diseases, and most of all their
primary need to lift their people out of the quagmire of poverty. Yet
developing countries which are custodians of most of the world's
precious biodiversity resources are expected to care for them with only
sporadic and limited support from industrialized countries. As their
economies grow they will contribute increasingly to the more remote and
less visible global problems for which the industrialized countries are
largely responsible, notably the risk of climate change which affects
the interests and the future of all nations.
Despite progress on many fronts, the environmental health of the
earth which was first diagnosed at Stockholm has deteriorated overall
since then while the forces driving it persist-increased population,
primarily concentrated in developing countries, and even greater growth
of the world economy. The benefits have been largely concentrated in
industrialized countries, even as newly developing countries, notably
China, are now accounting for an increasingly large share of the global
economy.
As their economies grow, developing countries are finding that the
environmental impacts of their development are undermining the purposes
of development and exacting a heavy cost in terms of impacts on their
natural resources, human health and productivity. At the Stockholm
Conference developing countries made clear their willingness to
participate in international environmental cooperation insisted that
they required ``new and additional resources'' to enable them to do so.
This has been a constant refrain in all international fora in which
these issues are discussed and negotiated since then.
One of the most disappointing trends since the Earth Summit in 1992
has been the lack of response by OECD countries to the needs of
developing countries for the additional financial resources which all
governments at Rio agreed were required to enable them to make their
transition to a sustainable development pathway and to implement
international agreements. What has been particularly discouraging is
that progress toward meeting with these needs has been further set back
since Rio as a number of donors have reduced their Official Development
Assistance. Thus the commitment by the United States and others at a
recent United Nations Conference in Monterrey to increase their
assistance is a welcome signal. This should not be seen as charity but
as a necessary investment in our own environmental security. An
especially urgent priority is to complete agreement on replenishment of
the Global Environment Facility, the only new source of funding the
environmental needs of developing countries to result from the Earth
Summit.
With the reductions in Official Development Assistance we must be
more innovative in motivating private capital--now the principal source
of financial flows to developing countries-to contribute more to
meeting their environmental and sustainable development needs.
We have for the first time in history the capacity to meet these
monumental challenges. Indeed, on a global basis we are the wealthiest
civilization ever and have the capacity to produce wealth at an
unprecedented rate. It is clearly a question of how we set our
priorities for the use of our wealth. Business leaders at Rio made the
point that our current approach to setting those priorities is not
sustainable-that we must ``change course''. And I am convinced that if
we do not make this change of course in the first years of this new
millennium the prospects for the world's future will be ominous indeed.
Much of what we must do to meet these formidable challenges has
already been articulated and agreed at Stockholm, Rio and various other
international for a and affirmed in a variety of international
agreements. But implementation depends on motivation and this is at the
heart of our current dilemma. Most of the changes we must make are in
our economic life. The system of taxes, subsidies, regulations and
policies through which governments motivate the behavior of individuals
and corporation continues to incent unsustainable behavior.
At the deepest level, all people and societies are motivated by
their moral, ethical and spiritual values. To build on these a set of
basic moral and ethical principles which are broadly acceptable is
certainly not easy. But a process that has taken several years and
involved millions of people around the world has succeeded in producing
a ``peoples'' Earth Charter as a major contribution to establishing the
moral and ethical foundations for sustainable development.
I am pleased to say the United States has been deeply involved in
the Earth Charter movement. The distinguished, American Professor
Steven Rockefeller, chaired the committee which drafted the Charter in
cooperation with people of different faiths and beliefs throughout the
world. Some 500 organizations in the United States have joined with
thousands around the world which have contributed to and/or endorsed
the Earth Charter. These include the Humane Society of the United
States, the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation,
the Orion Society, the Sierra Club, the World Resource Institute, the
Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and the
United States Conference of Mayors as well as dozens of individual
cities and towns.
The environmental movement has its roots in the concerns and
initiatives of people well before it moved on to the agendas of
governments. Today the primary impetus to environmental action and
responsibility comes from civil society, with the support of scientists
and the increasingly constructive engagement of industry. The alarm
bells being sounded by some sectors of industry as to the high costs to
economy of environmental measures, notably the reductions in greenhouse
gas emission called for under the Kyoto Protocol, are countered by the
increasing in evidence that such measures open up more new
opportunities for industry than they negate.
Surely we must accept that the benefits of environmental security
and sustainability are well worth and indeed less expensive that the
ultimate costs of inaction. The United States has long accepted the
high costs of maintaining its military strength and indeed this has
produced an important economic spin-offs as for example in driving
United States leadership in development and application of new
technologies. I am convinced that in applying the same approach, the
costs of environmental security would produce even more opportunities
and benefits to the economy.
What, then, can be expected from the Johannesburg Summit? First and
foremost there must be no retreat from the agreements reached at
Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro and other international fora and the many
legal instruments to which they gave rise. Indeed it is important that
there be a strong re-affirmation by governments in Johannesburg of
their commitments to these past agreements and to implementing and
building on them in the post-Johannesburg period. In this respect, the
position of the United States will be pivotal.
An a priori requirement for this is the successful completion of
agreements on the issues that were left on resolved in the final
preparatory meeting in Bali, Indonesia. It is now too late in the
process to seek consensus on new initiatives but not too late to place
new initiatives on the table in Johannesburg. These could include:
<bullet> A commitment to strong support for United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan in strengthening the capacities and
coordination of the organizations, programs and agencies of the United
Nations which deal with the environment, poverty alleviation, and
sustainable development.
<bullet> A call for the establishment of a Consultative Group on
Clean Energy (CGCE), or similar entity, drawing on the successful
experience of the Consultative Group on International Agriculture
Research (CGIAR). Its purpose would be to provide an international
consultative mechanism, not a new organization, to facilitate private-
partnerships in identifying priorities for research and development of
sustainable energy technologies, particularly those most relevant to
the needs and interests of developing countries. It would also help
mobilize and deploy the financial and technological assistance required
to ensure their availability to developing countries under conditions
conducive to their adoption and use.
<bullet> A call for governments to undertake a review of the
system of fiscal, tax and other incentives, regulations and policies
through which they motivate the behavior of individuals and
corporations to provide positive incentives for environmentally and
socially sound and sustainable development.
<bullet> Recognition of the Earth Charter as an important
expression of the commitment by civil society of the world and ethical
basis for sustainable development.
The convening of this hearing by your two extremely important and
influential committees demonstrates your deep sense of the interest in
and responsibility of the United States for its position on these
issues. Recognizing that their fundamental nature does not lend itself
to quick or easy solutions, there are none-the-less some very practical
measures which you could undertake to make an important contribution to
resolving them. You are, I understand, about to receive a report by the
General Accounting Office of the current status of existing
international agreements and their implementation. These could provide
the basis for mandating a continuing process of monitoring, adherence
to and performance under such agreements by the United States and
others. The results could be incorporated in periodic reports very much
like the reports that the State Department issues in respect of human
rights. Such a monitoring and reporting system would provide an
important stimulus to implementation of both the letter and the spirit
of these agreements.
Developing countries face very special constraints both in
negotiating and implementing international agreements because of their
lack of sufficient financial resources to support the professional and
technical expertise that this requires. Yet their active participation
in and adherence to these agreements is essential to their
effectiveness. A very modest investment by the United States in
supporting the strengthening by developing countries of their own
capacities to negotiate and service, these agreements would represent
an important contribution to alleviating one of the main obstacles to
negotiating and implementing them effectively. It would also require
only a very modest investment to increase support for the international
secretariats which are responsible for the servicing of such
agreements. Of course, others would follow the U.S. lead if it were to
take such initiatives. This could be a small but important step toward
the revitalization of U.S. leadership.
If the United States were to take a lead in presenting or
supporting such initiatives it would have an immense impact on
prospects for success at Johannesburg.
This threats face in common from the mounting dangers to the
environment, resource life-support systems on which all life on Earth
depends are as great or greater than the risks we face of conflicts
with each other. The revitalization of the system of international
cooperation of which the United States was the primary architect is the
only feasible basis on which we can manage the risks and realize the
immense potential for progress and fulfillment for the entire human
family which is within our reach.
All people and nations have in the past been willing to accord high
priority to the measures required for their own security. We must give
the same kind of priority to civilizational security and
sustainability. This will take a major shift in the current political
mind-set. If this seems unrealistic in today's political context we
should recall that history demonstrates that what seems unrealistic
today becomes inevitable tomorrow. Necessity will compel this shift
eventually the question is can we really afford the costs and the risks
of waiting. Most of all we need the renewed leadership of this great
nation. I commend you for this encouraging manifestation that this
renewal is well under way.
Supplemental Testimony Provided by Maurice Strong, Earth Council
Institute
the integration of animal protection and rights into our environmental
concerns
It is important that the United States provide leadership and
support to binding international agreements that protect animals and
their environment. Fundamental principles such as transparency, binding
dispute resolution, enforcement measures, and the precautionary
approach should always be supported and advanced by the United States
when such principles are absent from multi-lateral environmental
agreements.
Moreover, where there is evidence of the pernicious and ever-
growing practice of ``vote-buying'', one country providing foreign aid
to developing countries in exchange for favorable votes, the United
States is in the best position to put an end to such egregious
practices. For nothing more quickly undermines a treaty and erodes
international cooperation than when one country exacts another's
allegiance in return for financial aid.
While progress in protecting animals has been made--and the United
States should be congratulated for its contribution to this--enormous
challenges still lie ahead. There are several key agreements that the
United States has yet to ratify and others where it and others need to
work harder in order to prevent the weakening of significant gains
already achieved.
International Whaling Commission (IWC)
There has been subtle erosion of The United States' strong anti-
whaling position over the last several years. It is imperative that the
United States become a leader once again in the fight to protect whales
from an inhumane commercial slaughter. The U.S. Delegation to the IWC
should continue to make all efforts to prevent the lifting of the
commercial whaling moratorium and institute tough measures against
those countries that continue to kill whales and undermine the
agreement. Further, I would strongly urge the United States to advocate
a global whale sanctuary, as it is the only way to ensure that whales
will be a part of our future.
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
In 1997, despite opposition from a large coalition of animal and
environmental protection organizations, U.S. Legislation was passed
that weakened the definition of the well-known and trusted dolphin-safe
label. The new label, if implemented, will allow the chasing, harassing
and encircling of dolphins with nets as a method of catching tuna and
still be labeled as dolphin-safe. As a result, dolphins will get caught
in these nets and drown. If the label is weakened, consumers will feel
betrayed when they learn that the dolphin-safe label no longer means
what is stated on the can. The United States should not, I submit, be
promoting a weakened dolphin-safe label to appease the fishing industry
of another country. Rather the U.S. Delegation to the IATTC should be
protecting dolphins and U.S. consumer concerns by arguing for the non-
encirclement of dolphins by all countries participating in the
Convention and fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES)
The United States has continued to take a leadership role in
implementation of the CITES treaty, both domestically and abroad. The
next Conference of the Parties, scheduled for 315 November 2002, will
consider several proposals submitted by the United States, that, if
passed, will enhance protection from international commercial trade for
species ranging from turtles to seahorses to cacti. The United States
is expected to oppose proposals to allow international commercial trade
in the meat and blubber of minke and Bryde's whales (proposed by Japan)
and hawksbill sea turtle shells (proposed by Cuba).
However, there is deep concern that United States may waiver from
its long-standing position in opposition to the international elephant
ivory trade. With United States support, CITES banned the international
ivory trade in 1.989 after a decade of widespread poaching reduced wild
African elephant herds from 1.2 million to about 600,000. The ban
succeeded in stopping the precipitous population decline. However,
renewed poaching and illegal trade have taken a toll on elephant
populations. In 1997, CITES allowed Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to
sell, as a one-time experiment, almost 50 metric tons of ivory to
Japan. Subsequently, some countries noted an increase in poaching and
illegal trade. Between 1 January 2000 and 21 May 2002, a minimum of
11.9 tons of ivory, 2542 tusks, and 14,648 pieces of ivory were seized
worldwide, representing over two thousand dead elephants. During. the
same period of time, a minimum of 965 African elephants and 39 Asian
elephants were poached. Clearly, more control over elephant poaching
and illegal ivory trade is needed instead of a renewal of the legal
ivory trade. That is why Kenya and India have submitted a proposal, to
be considered at the upcoming CITES meeting, to stop all international
commercial trade in elephants and their parts and products. In
contrast, five southern African countries (Zimbabwe, South Africa,
Namibia, Zambia and Botswana) have proposed that CITES allow them to
sell 87 metric tons of elephant ivory in the international
marketplace--the tusks of approximately 11 thousand dead elephants.
Four of these countries have also asked to be allowed to sell an
additional 13,000 metric tons of ivory in the international marketplace
each year. Finally, two of these countries have also asked to trade in
ivory for non-commercial purposes, such as ivory souvenirs.
It is important that the United States, which has led opposition to
the international ivory trade since 1989, oppose the proposals of
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana to sell ivory in
the international marketplace and support the proposal of Kenya and
India to halt elephant trade. A return to a legalized international
ivory trade would spell doom for elephants.
Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW)
The SPAW protocol protects ecosystems, habitats, and endangered and
threatened species residing in the Wider Caribbean region. SPAW is an
international Agreement which paves the way for the greater
coordination and protection of animals and their habitat. It is of deep
concern that the United States has not ratified the Agreement. SPAW was
adopted in 1990 and came into force in 2000, and though the United
States has signed the Protocol, it has not ratified. The United States
must ratify the Protocol and participate in its evolution to ensure
that it offers the highest possible protection for animals and their
habitats.
Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals (also known as CMS or the Bonn Convention) aims to conserve
terrestrial, marine and avian migratory species throughout their range.
It is a small number of intergovernmental treaties concerned with the
conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats on a global scale. Since
the Convention's entry into force in November 1983, its membership has
grown steadily to include 80 Parties from Africa, Central and South
America, Asia, Europe and Oceania. Parties to CMS work together to
conserve migratory species and their habitats by providing strict
protection for the endangered migratory species listed in Appendix I of
the Convention; by concluding multilateral Agreements for the
conservation and management of migratory species listed in Appendix II;
and by undertaking co-operative research activities.
There is great potential for cooperative international conservation
in the CMS. However, the problem is that the United States is not a
member. There is much work that needs to be done to protect migratory
species and unless the United States ratifies the CMS this country will
be missing out on--a valuable opportunity to fully utilize this
Agreement to protect such a wide range of species.
Trade and the Environment
United States leadership in international trade and economic issues
as they relate to animal welfare and the environment is essential.
Unquestionably, these issues are intertwined with international trade
and economic issues. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in the midst
of negotiations concerning the overlap between multilateral
environmental agreements and international trade rules. These
negotiations are important and must be given the necessary attention
and resources to ensure a successful outcome. Members of the WTO are
also engaged in serious negotiations concerning agricultural reform and
increased market access for agricultural products. In the context of
these negotiations the European Union proposed that animal welfare be
addressed. I understand that the United States has yet to give its full
support to this proposal. I strongly urge Members of Congress to engage
the Administration on this issue and work toward the shared goal of
including animal welfare in the agricultural negotiations.
__________
Statement of John C. Dehrnbach, Professor of Law, Widener University
Committee Chairmen Jeffords and Biden, Subcommittee Chairman
Sarbanes, and members of the Committees: good morning. Thank you for
the opportunity to discuss U.S. adherence to its sustainable
development commitments, particularly those made at the Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
I am the editor of a 32-chapter book on U.S. sustainable
development efforts in the 10 years since the Earth Summit, entitled
Stumbling Toward Sustainability. The book is being published this week
by the Environmental Law Institute. The book's 42 contributors come
from universities and law schools, nongovernmental organizations, the
private sector, and State government. They are respected experts in
their fields.
A list of chapters and authors is attached to this statement. The
book's synthesis, which pulls together the major themes of the book and
summarizes each of the chapters, is also attached.
Ten-Year Assessment: U.S. Made Little Progress
The U.S. has unquestionably begun to take some steps toward
sustainable development, largely because of our environmental and
conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from
being a sustainable society, and in many respects is farther away than
it was at the time of the Earth Summit in 1992. Unlike many other
developed countries, the United States has not used a strategic process
to move the country toward a sustainable future and has not educated
the American people about the opportunities and challenges of
sustainable development.
With 5 percent of the world's population, the United States was at
the time of the Earth Summit responsible for about 24 percent of the
world's energy consumption and almost 30 percent of the world's raw
materials consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials use has
increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased 21
percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have increased by
13 percent. Over and over, increases in materials and energy
efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution controls for
individual sources, were outweighed by increases in consumption.
Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in the past
decade, for example, the U.S. generation and disposal of municipal
solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996. According to
Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, ``four more planet Earths'' would
be needed for ``every person in the world to reach present U.S. levels
of consumption with existing technology.'' Yet the U.S. standard of
living-equated with high levels of consumption and ``the good life''--
is widely envied and emulated throughout the world.
The United States has not exercised the kind of international
leadership necessary to encourage or support sustainable development
around the world. U.S. law and policy continue to encourage
unsustainable development in a variety of ways, including subsidies and
fragmented local decisionmaking that encourages sprawl. As a whole, the
condition of America's natural resources and ecosystems has not
improved, and appears to have deteriorated slightly, over the past
decade. Our infrastructure and social support systems continue to cause
environmental degradation and underserve the poor.
National Sustainable Development Strategy is Needed
The Federal Government should adopt and implement a national
strategy for sustainable development, with specified goals and
priorities, to harness all sectors of society to achieve our economic,
social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy would lead to a
stronger, more prosperous America with higher quality of life because
we would be pursuing these goals in ways that support each other in
greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermining each
other. The strategy could be modeled on that of the European Union or
States such as Oregon and New Jersey, and specifically address climate
change, biodiversity, international trade, and other major issues.
The President could get the process started with an appropriate
executive order to Federal agencies under the Government Performance
and Results Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. An
executive-level entity would be needed to coordinate and assist in the
implementation of the strategy. A counterpart entity in Congress would
also be helpful. A set of indicators to measure progress in achieving
goals would make the strategy more effective and meaningful.
In addition, the U.S. needs to recognize that its substantial
consumption levels, coupled with domestic population growth, have
serious environmental, social, and economic impacts. Americans also
need to understand that human well-being can be maintained and enhanced
by more efficient and effective use of materials and energy. A shift in
taxes from labor and income, on one hand, to materials and energy
consumption, on the other, would encourage both greater efficiency and
reduced negative environmental impacts. A variety of other legal and
policy tools that have successfully been used at the State level to
reduce environmental effects of consumption and for other purposes are
also available, including renewable energy portfolio standards and
smart growth legislation.
The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive leadership
role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad range of
issues related to sustainable development. Congress should repeal or
modify laws, policies, and subsidies that encourage unsustainable
development. Protection of natural resources and the environment must
focus more holistically on the resources to be protected, and on
understanding those resources. Transportation, public health, and other
social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and operated
to further economic, environmental, and social goals at the same time.
In virtually every area of American life, a few people and
organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. The United
States would take a large and decisive step toward sustainability if
individuals, businesses, educational institutions, local and State
governments, Federal agencies and others would simply adopt and build
on the leading sustainability practices of their counterparts. A
properly conceived and implemented strategy would lead to that result.
These and other recommendations are set out in detail in the book.
They provide an issue-by-issue roadmap for sustainability in the United
States.
Toward a Brighter Future for Our Children and Grandchildren
We now face growing environmental degradation around the world and
a growing gap between rich and poor. These are related problems, and
they hinder or undermine everything else we care about--security,
economic development, social well-being, and even effective governance.
Put differently, poverty and environmental degradation are deeply
destabilizing because they stifle or reduce opportunities and quality
of life for many, many people.
In the next 50 years, global population is projected to increase by
three billion people, and the global economy is likely to grow by four
or five times. As difficult as things now are, environmental
degradation and the gap between rich and poor are likely to get much
worse if continue business as usual. Should that be our legacy for our
children and grandchildren?
We know what we need to do to move toward sustainability, and we
also know why. As Americans, we are called to face these challenges,
and to seize this opportunity.
Attachment 1
(Environmental Law Institute 2002)
stumbling toward sustainability
(John C. Dernbach, Editor)
introduction
Synthesis
I. Who Cares?
1. Sustainable Development: Now More Than Ever, John C. Dernbach,
Professor of Law, Widener University
II. Consumption and Population
2. Production and Consumption of Materials
Amit Kapur, Doctor of Forestry and Environmental Studies Candidate,
Center for Industrial Ecology, School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, Yale University
Thomas E. Graedel, Clifton R. Musser Professor of Industrial Ecology
and Director, Center for Industrial Ecology, School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University
3. Production and Consumption of Energy
Lynn Price, Deputy Group Leader, International Energy Studies Group,
Environmental Energy Technologies Division, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory
Mark D. Levine, Division Director, Environmental Energy Technologies
Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
4. Population
Anne H. Ehrlich, Policy Coordinator, Center for Conservation Biology,
Stanford University
James Salzman, Professor of Law, American University, Washington
College of Law
III. International Trade, Finance, and Development Assistance
5. International Trade
Sanford E. Gaines, Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center
6. Official Development Assistance
Royal C. Gardner, Professor of Law and Director of Graduate and
International Studies, Stetson University College of Law
7. Development Assistance and Poverty
James Gustave Speth, Dean and Professor of Environmental Policy and
Sustainable Development, School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, Yale University
8. Private Finance
Frances Seymour, Director, Institutions and Governance Program, World
Resources Institute
Lisa Dreier, Graduate Student, University of California, Berkeley
Lily Donge, Social Research Analyst, Calvert Asset Management Company
IV. Conservation and Management of Natural Resources
9. Fresh Water
Robert W. Adler, Professor of Law, Wallace Stegner Center for Law,
Resources and the Environment, University of Utah College
of Law
10. Oceans and Estuaries
Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University
School of Law
11. Air Pollution
David M. Driesen, Professor of Law, Center for Global Law and Practice,
Syracuse University College of Law
12. Climate Change
Donald A. Brown, Director, Pennsylvania Consortium for
Interdisciplinary Environmental Policy
13. Biodiversity and Endangered Species
A. Dan Tarlock, Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of
Law
14. Forestry
Robert L. Fischman, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington
15. Agriculture
John H. Davidson, Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School
of Law
16. Land Use
Patricia E. Salkin, Professor of Government Law, Associate Dean, and
Director, Government Law Center, Albany Law School
V. Waste and Toxic Chemicals
17. Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides
Lynn R. Goldman, Professor of Environmental Health Sciences, Bloomberg
School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University
18. Lead
K.W. James Rochow, Project Director, Alliance to End Childhood Lead
Poisoning
19. Hazardous Waste and Superfund
Joel A. Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law
Center
20. Brownfields Redevelopment
Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law and Director, Robert P. Merhige Jr.,
Center of Environmental Law, University of Richmond Law
School
21. Municipal Solid Waste
Marian R. Chertow, Director, Industrial Environmental Management
Program, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale
University
22. Radioactive Waste
James D. Werner, Director, Reprocessing Policy Project, and Senior
Policy Advisor, Missouri Department of Natural Resources
VI. Nongovernmental Actors
23. Public access to information, participation, and justice
Frances Irwin, Fellow, World Resources Institute
Carl Bruch, Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute
24. Business and Industry
William L. Thomas, Senior Attorney, Pillsbury Winthrop, LLP
25. Sustainability as a Religious and Ethical Concern
Dieter T. Hessel, Director, Program on Ecology, Justice, and Faith
VII. Education
26. Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade
Carmela M. Federico, Associate Director, Sustainability Education
Center
Jaimie P. Cloud, President, Sustainability Education Center
Jack Byrne, Project Director, Center for a Sustainable Future
Keith Wheeler, Director, Center for a Sustainable Future
27. Higher Education
Wynn Calder, Associate Director, University Leaders for a Sustainable
Future and the Center for Respect of Life and Environment
Richard M. Clugston, Executive Director, University Leaders for a
Sustainable Future, Center for Respect of Life and
Environment, and Earth Charter USA Campaign
VIII. Institutions and Infrastructure
28. Transportation
F. Kaid Benfield, Senior Attorney and Director of Smart Growth and
Transportation Policy, Natural Resources Defense Council
Michael Replogle, Transportation Director, Environmental Defense
29. Medical and Public Health Services
Edward P. Richards III, Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
School of Law
IX. Governance
30. Local Governance
Jonathan D. Weiss, Professorial Lecturer in Law and Executive Director,
Center on Sustainability and Regional Growth, George
Washington University Law School
31. State Governance
John A. Pendergrass, Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute
32. National Governance
John C. Dernbach, Professor of Law, Widener University
__________
Statement of Christopher C. Horner, Senior Fellow, Competitive
Enterprise Institute
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this
joint panel on a topic of great importance. The scope of today's
hearing is broad, so I focus my testimony upon the propriety of the
U.S. agreeing to amend the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC, or Rio Treaty), by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
For whatever specific reasons (economic growth, failure to foresee
the energy requirements of the ``new economy'', or other), the U.S.,
like many nations, failed to meet its voluntary Rio targets.
Now some advocates assert, ``Because the U.S. has not met its Rio
goal, we must commit to even greater mandatory reductions (Kyoto)''.
Attempting instead to comply with the initial treaty seems the more
appropriate response, for several reasons.
Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not
request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing
Rio, which was not an inherently self-executing treaty. Authority and
precedent make clear that responsibility for proposing such programs
lies with the White House. If our ``non-binding'' Rio obligations in
fact ``bound'' the U.S. to achieve specific reductions--contrary to
contemporary Senate and Executive assertions of U.S. intent--then the
Executive interpretation of Rio Article 4 throughout the 1990's was
actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending question is
apparently: does the U.S. respond by attempting to meet such Rio
promises, or by making further, even deeper, binding promises?
Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.' Rio promises, in favor of
Kyoto's binding commitments even greater than those we've failed to
attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this of course is that,
precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it
recognized was an unacceptable drift away from the U.S. Rio stance
adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing what was
developing, asserted its ``Advice'' pursuant to Article II, Section 2
of the U.S. Constitution, passing S. Res. 98.
Subsequent to and despite this Advice, U.S. negotiators clearly
disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did not
require developing countries to share our commitments, and even the
Clinton White House economic advisors have recanted their refutations
of the Kyoto cost estimates.
Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not
still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that
very few Senators have amended their position against a treaty causing
``serious economic harm.'' However, Clinton Administration officials
did admit that they began working on the plan for binding commitments
within 1 year after Rio went into effect.
Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ``treaty
hopping'' campaign: even the models on which it is based predict an
undetectable climatic impact--at a cost to the U.S. of up to $400
billion annually--but instead may be 1/30th of what its proponents
seek. Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but purport ``the same
ultimate objective.'' The U.N. IPCC has said this means reducing GHG
emissions by as much as 60-80 percent, which wildly exceeds Kyoto's
specified ambitions.
As such the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying
any further agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the actual
``ultimate goal'', but that it is committed to its practical
requirements, in this case up to ``30 Kyotos''.
Such ``treaty hopping'' agendas illustrate the importance of Senate
treaty ``reservations'', or the Senate's second bite at the ``Advice''
apple. This comes of course during the ``Consent'' function, which
function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately eviscerated. After agreeing
to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted
Kyoto's prohibition on reservations, or the Senate's ability to specify
the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S. commitment. This
despite the Senate also having forewarned the administration about this
in advance of Kyoto.
In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of
having ``rejected'' Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to
that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal Court. In
the absence of that act, the White House must at minimum assist
resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto by requesting the Senate
disapprove of the treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate should
recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the ``presentment''
clause, regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any constitutional
prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a signed treaty. Certainly
given the imperative rhetoric surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush
insists on continuing the U.S.' ambiguous role the Senate should take
matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of this agreement.
That resolution should by definition be rejection of Kyoto.
Otherwise, by accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and
prohibiting reservations, this body would condone Executive
circumvention of the Senate's constitutional treaty role.
As part of my testimony for the record, I include an article I have
prepared for the Federalist Society, though still in draft form,
addressing relevant issues surrounding the propriety of ratifying
Kyoto, and recommending courses for withdrawal or otherwise pursuing
clarification of the U.S.' ambiguous treaty status. Thank you again for
the opportunity to appear.
In Rio in 1992 the U.S. made, and the Senate unanimously ratified,
various commitments regarding reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
both thematic and with a specific emission target (1990 levels).
See, e.g., http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf. The EU,
which under Kyoto has negotiated a ``bubble'' such that it could pool
its increases and ``reductions'', announced in May that it met its Rio
target. It said it had reduced greenhouse gases by 3.5 percent below
1990 levels in 2000. This is commonly attributed to the ending of coal
subsidies in Great Britain in their push to replace coal with gas,
shutting down East German industry and that Europe did not match the
U.S.' decade-long economic expansion. Russia, e.g., met its target by
regressing economically.
As the party charged with ``making'' treaties the Executive is
responsible for meeting, or at minimum proposing legislation to affect,
treaty commitments. President Clinton proposed a Btu tax, though not
expressly in pursuit of Rio. It failed once and did not emerge again.
He instituted his Climate Action Plan, which with minor recent
modifications continues to this day with more than 50 voluntary
programs, though a quick search of Thomas revealed no implementing
legislation. Congress did appropriate money in response to proposals by
the Executive. See, e.g., ``Treaties and Other International
Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', S. Rpt. 106-71, p.4.
``Implementation The executive branch has the primary
responsibility for carrying out treaties and ascertaining that other
parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other
international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire
Congress share in the following phases.'' ``Treaties and Other
International Agreements'', p. 12. ``A question that may be raised
under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty to implement a
treaty which is in force internationally, but which requires additional
legislation or implementation or an appropriation of funds to give
effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States.
When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an
appropriation of funds, only the Congress can provide them.'' Id. at
pp. 166-67.
The FRC Report continues, ``The extent of congressional obligation
to implement a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in
principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority, Congress has
generally responded to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-
makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President
(especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to
make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .''' Id.
at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States
Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205-206. The referenced FN 61 says in
pertinent part, ``[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected
treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the
United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12,
1976, by Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in
U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
1976. 1977, p. 221.'' This begs the question: ``to precisely what
extent was the ``non-binding'' Rio binding?
Addressing the question, above (FN 5), prior to ratification,
``[t]he [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other
words, its view that ``[t]he final framework convention contains no
legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . . .''
While these statements may not be as legally binding as a formal
condition to the Senate's ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed:
reservations were prohibited by Rio's terms], it is doubtful that any
administration could ignore them.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected
Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol'', p. 4. CRS Report for
Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7,
1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).
To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 (105th Cong., 1st
Sess., adopted at 143 CONG. REC.S. 8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)), the
Senate ``stated the view that any agreement which would require Senate
advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its
economic impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to
implement the agreement.'' See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.
``In mid-1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate
passed S. Res. 98 [ed.: ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105-
54 July 21, 1997)], which stated that the Senate would not approve any
agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not
include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/
industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S.
economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to
the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to
date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding
their greenhouse gas emissions.'' ``Treaties and Other International
Agreements'', p. 276.
The operative language is as follows: ``Resolved, That it is the
sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
or thereafter, which would--
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States''.
``Economists from the Clinton White House now concede that
complying with Kyoto's mandatory reductions in greenhouse gases would
be difficult--and more expensive to American consumers than they
thought when they were in charge.'' USA Today, 12 June 2001.
In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance
asserted that ``the administration has been working on this policy for
more than a year'', quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.
See, Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, at http://www.techcentralstation.com/
1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-031302C.
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. ``Impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic Activity.'' Washington,
DC. October 1998.
``Yet the climate simulations lead to the conclusion that the Kyoto
reductions will have little effect in the twenty-first century (15),
and `30 Kyotos' may be needed to reduce warming to an acceptable
level.'' James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis, and
Valdar Oinas, ``Global warming in the twenty-first century: An
alternative scenario,'' Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences,
August 29, 2000.
Hansen was citing Malakoff, D. (1997) Science 278, 2048.
``[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.'' See, e.g., Rio Article 2.
See ``Treaties and Other International Agreements,'' at 274.
The President manifested that this is how the United States makes
``its intention clear to not become a party to the treaty,'' as
required by ``customary'' law and the Vienna Convention Article 18.
``[S]ignature by the U.S. does impose an obligation on the U.S. under
international law to refrain from actions that would undermine the
Protocol's object and purpose. That obligation continues to apply until
such time as the U.S. ratifies the Protocol or makes clear its intent
not to do so.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about
the Kyoto Protocol'', CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).
Though it has not yet done so, precedent indicates the Senate can
also effect this outcome by passing a Sense of the Senate expressing
disapproval of a signed, not ratified treaty. See, ``Withdrawal,'' in
attached article.
______
[Prepared for the Federalist Society July 2002]
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TREATY PROCESS
recent developments regarding advice and consent, withdrawal, and the
growing role of nongovernmental organizations in international
agreements with particular examination of the 1997 kyoto protocol
(By Christopher C. Horner, Esq., Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise
Institute; Tyler Dunman, Research Assistant]
introduction to the treaty process\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This paper attempts to clarify common misunderstandings about
the treaty process, particularly as involve the United States and
ambiguities arising from inconsistent treatment of various treaty
commitments. Certain assertions made herein, for example regarding the
history of Kyoto and specifically certain negotiating developments, are
not formally documented but based upon the author's observations
attending these negotiations, both as an attorney representing a
nongovernmental organization, and writing on the proceedings for
various publications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treaties are agreements between nations, or States. They range from
bilateral agreements to multilateral pacts including each of the 189
member states of the United Nations. Throughout history treaties have
addressed all manner of international discourse, from rules of military
engagement to mutual defense and termination of hostilities, creating a
U.N. and a European Union, international border delineation, liability
in international transportation, establishing trade terms and
intellectual property protections.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See various definitions, FN 53, infra. Treaty topics even range
to taxation of foreign motor vehicles and unification of road signals.
For the compendium of ``[e]very treaty and every international
agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations'', see
http://untreaty.un.org/. For a selection of treaties signed, though not
necessarily ratified by the United States, see http://usinfo.state.gov/
usa/infousa/laws/ tradeagr.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As such treaties, or ``conventions'' with amendments thereto called
``rounds'', protocols, etc. which are typically discrete treaty
agreements requiring independent ratification, are the manner by which
states formalize codes for their relationships, both civil and
criminal.\3\ Depending on their nature treaties are therefore properly
viewed either as contracts, in that they establish civil procedures, or
as establishing the equivalent of laws applicable to the parties.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The latter actually involves sanction by a supranational body
of private entities and individuals acting on behalf of a state. For
such matters agreements have created ad hoc bodies, for example the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (see http://
www.un.org/icty/index.html), and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (see http://www.ictr.org/), both under auspices of the U.N.
Security Council.
\4\ For a compendium of treaties addressing ``Penal Matters,'' see
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/chapterXVIII.asp.
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In modern practice states have increasingly turned to treaties to
address matters not clearly involving international discourse such as
trade or conduct on the high seas but establishing norms of purely
domestic behavior. States, which under the Constitution have no treaty
power,\5\ have nonetheless waded into areas which are the subject of
modern treaties, negotiating international agreements addressing topics
such as the theory of ``man-made global warming''.\6\
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\5\ U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 10: ``No State shall
enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation . . . No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . .''
\6\ For discussion of a recent example, see ``New England Governors
Pledge to Implement Kyoto, Violate Constitution'', Jon Reisman,
Downeast, Coastal Press, July 16, 2002. Reisman is an associate
professor of economics and public policy at the University of Maine at
Machias.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, also addressing that theory of man-made
global warming is exemplar of efforts addressing (principally) domestic
activities.\7\ It does claim a purported global phenomenon as its basis
and the bulk of the world's recognized states as parties, but
selectively commits certain developed nations to reduce domestic energy
use emissions. Given current technology, for the foreseeable future
Kyoto thereby effectively rations and redistributes particular domestic
economic activity by instituting this selective cap, in perpetuity and
not indexed for economic or population growth. As such, Kyoto is
arguably in truth an economic instrument by which foreign competitors
hope to mitigate U.S. competitive advantages.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Kyoto also imputes emissions to covered states from activities
in international airspace and waters, even national security and
international peacekeeping missions despite an initial U.S. effort to
exclude the latter.
\8\ ``This is about international relations, this is about economy
about trying to create a level playing field for big businesses
throughout the world. You have to understand what is at stake and that
is why it is serious.'' European Union Commissioner for the Environment
Margot Wallstrom, quoted by The Independent (London), March 19, 2002,
p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cornell University Professor of Law Jeremy Rabkin writes:
``In 1929 Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court--who had
already served as a justice on the Permanent Court of International
Justice--reaffirmed the doctrine that the treaty power cannot be
invoked as a mere pretext for altering domestic policies:
``[T]he treaty making power was intended for the purpose of having
treaties made relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the
people of the United States in their internal concerns through the
exercise of the asserted treaty-making power.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Rabkin, ``Why Sovereignty Matters,'' (1998 AEI Press), p. 22,
citing Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, vol.
23 (1929), pp. 194-6.
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Nonetheless, agreements such as Kyoto now proliferate. In this
context, it seems fair to paraphrase Clausewitz on war: treaties are
the extension of politics by organized state lobbying.
Treaties purporting to involve binding commitments are enforceable
against parties to the agreement.\10\ Disputes over compliance or
implementation of the bulk of treaties, best characterized as civil
agreements, are heard before the International Court of Justice.\11\
``The Court has two functions: to render judgments on disputes
submitted to it by States and to furnish advisory opinions on questions
referred to it by authorized bodies.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Not all treaties purport binding commitments. The parent
agreement of the principal case study cited herein (Kyoto), is the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The
UNFCCC was typical of treaties merely expressing mutual goals, or
``promises'' of voluntary undertakings (in this case, voluntary
commitments to attempt to reduce man-made ``greenhouse gases'', or
GHGs).
\11\ ``The Court, in existence since 1946, serves as the successor
to the Permanent Court of International Justice established by the
League of Nations and derives its mandate from a Statute which forms an
integral part of the Charter of the United Nations.'' http://
www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm#icj. For text, see http://
www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html.
\12\ Id. The Permanent International Court of Justice was
established with the chartering of the United Nations (http://
www.un.org/aboutun/charter/). The United States withdrew its August
1946 accession to this court in October 1985 in response to an
unfavorable verdict in an action brought against it by Nicaragua. For
the text of the declaration see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. l,
p. 9. That does not resolve the matter but actually leaves the U.S.
status regarding this treaty as rather ambiguous, also. The
implications of this move, regarding proper venue for pursuit of
actions by (or against) the United States is a topic more appropriate
for a separate paper.
Recently, sufficient signatory nations submitted ratification
instruments of the Rome Treaty to bring into effect a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC)(http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm), and questions persist over the potential application of
its terms not merely against ratifying nations but others--specifically
the U.S.--whose, e.g., troops assigned to U.N. peacekeeping duty may be
deemed by parties to Rome to have transgressed to the detriment of
ratifying nations. The United States signed the Rome Treaty, but
rescinded its signature, as detailed, infra.
For the panoply of international legal bodies see http://
www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally, the Framers conceived of treaties not as the creation
of laws, but more contracts between states bearing the force of
law.\13\ Time and intervening ``criminal'' agreements, of course, have
further clouded this assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Still, this apparent view of a discipline not properly in the
exclusive realm of the executive or legislative realm was a factor in
bifurcating the roles in treaty accession. See esp. Hamilton in
Federalist No. 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A body of international common or ``customary'' law evolved to
assist in treaty interpretation. This body of law was purportedly
codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\14\ In
the pursuit of enforcing such agreements, canons of statutory and
contractual construction recognized domestically by an individual state
may offer insight and even guidance as to what a party intended, but do
not strictly apply.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``The United States views most of the Vienna Convention as
codifying customary international law.''
``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto
Protocol'', p. 3, FN 9. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001). See
also, e.g., http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/international.html. For
text, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. See FN 76
infra for a discussion regarding who accedes to Vienna's terms. See
also http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp, for signatories and ratifications,
reservations, and related details.
\15\ Vienna Articles 31 and 32 open the door for such
considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Individual agreements obtain their popular name, typically, from
the site of some meaningful level of agreement, e.g., Ghent, Vienna,
Rome, Kyoto.\16\ Occasionally a treaty is popularly characterized by
its formal name, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (or
GATT, agreed to in 1947, subsequently the subject of further rounds,
e.g., its 8-year ``Uruguay Round,'' etc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ For a listing of such popular names, see http://
untreaty.un.org/English/sample/SimpleSample.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agreed-to language emerging from organic treaty negotiations
can, though does not universally, rise to the level of an enforceable
treaty. That is, it can but does not always include sufficient detail
to make it a ``meeting of the minds''. Even treaties open for
ratification are not necessarily completed to the point of offering
sufficient detail for coherent, uniform understanding and compliance.
Indeed, states have ratified treaties including Kyoto despite numerous
negotiations remaining to define what was actually agreed. The obvious
problems associated with this phenomenon are discussed briefly, in
``Ratification'', infra. Regardless of whether the treaty terms declare
the document open for ratification, such language is occasionally
merely a starting point, or near thereto.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ For a roadmap of how the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty
Section, views the various stages of the treaty process, see http://
untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm. Specifically,
see Kyoto, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/treaties/
l07a01.pdf), the basic treaty structure agreed to at the ``Third
Conference of the Parties'' to the UNFCCC, or COP-3, the details of
which were to be worked out at subsequent COPs. Since Kyoto, five COPs
have taken place with another scheduled for October 2002, narrowing the
treaty's broad assertions each time (with one exception; see discussion
November 2000 Hague discussions in ``Ratification'', infra). The treaty
was open for signature between March 1998 and March 1999. Kyoto has
been open for ratification since March 1999. It goes into effect when
ratification instruments are submitted by covered, or ``Annex I''
countries (of which there are 36), representing 55 percent of 1990 GHG
emissions.
By the end of July 2002, 75 countries had submitted ratification
instruments representing 35.8 percent of the covered 1990 GHG
emissions, despite the necessity of negotiations to craft a document
with sufficient detail to be enforceable. 55 of the 75 ratifying states
are among the 140 states bearing no emission reduction obligations
(whose tanks include large industrial players China, Mexico, Brazil,
India, South Korea, Indonesia). This does leave Kyoto 19.2 percent shy
of the 55 percent threshold to come into force, leaving solely Russia
(17.4 percent) or the United States (36.1 percent) as determinative of
Kyoto's fate.
It is logical that countries with actual obligations proceed more
deliberately given the undefined terms threaten real impact on them.
Further, with treaty effectiveness at hand, recent COP negotiations
indicate that remaining covered non-ratifying signatories are driving
hard bargains to minimize the initial economic harm--or maximize
initial economic gain, as the case may be. For example, due to its
unique circumstances Russia stands to make quite a large sum from
Kyoto. Upon becoming indispensable to Kyoto's fate, Russia secured
larger allowances for sale of valuable ``sinks'' (see FN112, infra),
and recently added debt forgiveness to their list of requirements in
return for their determinative ratification.
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The initial level of agreement is typically manifested by
publication of the terms agreed, and listing the agreeing parties.\18\
This is an at best a symbolic practice. That is, a state not
``agreeing'' to a document at its inception does not impede it from
subsequently following the treaty's terms toward accession. Indeed,
numerous countries not even signing, for example the Kyoto Protocol,
ratified it nonetheless.\19\ It is theoretically possible, though not
in the case of the United States, for a treaty to impose legally
enforceable obligations at the ``agreement'' stage, given that some
states' constitution permits such commitment by executive signature
alone.\20\
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\18\ See Decision1/CP.3 of the Conference of the State Parties to
the Convention at its third session (UNEP, UNFCCC). The U.S. State
Department asserts that it agreed to Kyoto (``Treaty Actions'' page).
``Environment--Climate Change Amendments to Annex I of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change of May 9, 1992. Adopted at Kyoto Dec. 11,
1997. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1998. (http://www.state.gov/www/
global/legal--affairs/treaty--actions.html).
The Vienna Convention speaks to the process issue in Article 9,
``Adoption of the text'':
``1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the
consent of all the States participating in its drawing up except as
provided in paragraph 2.
2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international
conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States present
and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a
different rule.''
\19\ ``Parties that have not yet signed the Kyoto Protocol may
accede to it at any time.'' http://unfccc.int/ resource/convkp.html#kp.
For examples of non-signatory ratifications, see http://
untreaty.un.org/. Curiously, however, in response to a June 2002
inquiry by the author as to the U.S. status under Kyoto given the
ambiguity between President Bush's verbal ``rejection'' and the absence
of a withdrawal, the Secretary General of the UNFCCC asserted the
following: ``Simple signature does not affect entry into force which
depends entirely on ratifications/accessions. Signature qualifies the
signatory State to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval.''
This belies that several nations ratified Kyoto without signing the
document. Further, the author's follow-up request as to whether this
indicates the UNFCCC does not recognize the Vienna Convention has gone
unanswered to date.
\20\ See Vienna Article 12, ``Consent to be bound by a treaty
expressed by signature'':
``1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
the signature of its representative when:
(a) the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were
agreed that signature should have that effect; or
(c) the intention of the State to give that effect to the signature
appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed
during the negotiation.''
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The U.S. Constitution is more typical in that it requires a level
of legislative concurrence with an executive treaty commitment for the
treaty to be binding.\21\ The U.S. Constitution requires Senate
``advice and consent'' to any treaty prior to it coming into effect
against the U.S., both the language and application of which having
created tensions between our Constitution and international law. Treaty
commitments inherently cede some level of sovereignty by transferring
accountability to a supranational authority without the safeguards of
our system, developing binding policy without the U.S. Constitution's
checks and balances.\22\ Therefore these agreements, the permissibility
of which was authorized by the Constitution, also inherently create
tensions with its framework.\23\
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\21\ U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. Vienna acknowledges
such requirements, recognizing exchange of instruments, ratification
(also called acceptance or approval), accession, and deposit of
instruments. See Vienna Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 respectively.
\22\ For example, ``the current version of [the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)] allows private litigants to challenge certain
U.S. trade measures before a supranational panel, the decisions of
which cannot be reviewed but must still be enforced by U.S. domestic
courts.'' Rabkin at 4, citing NAFTA reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
Art. 1904. Further, ``the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and its
successor, NAFTA, already provide for appeals by private parties from
U.S. administrative proceedings to supranational tribunals''. Rabkin at
18. This latter reality clearly conflicts with Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1: ``The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the Untied States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority''.
Modern legal scholarship on the treaty power is thus reasonably
analogized to the shift of authority away from states to the Federal
Government that began with the New Deal in the 1930's. See Rabkin for a
discussion of the comparison of diminution of constitutional limits on
Federal power, and the treaty power.
\23\ For example, the Constitution not only recognized ``a law of
nations'' (in granting Congress the power to remedy offenses against
same, Article I Section 8). The Framers provided treaties parity with
the ``supreme law of the land'' (Article VI), or Federal statutes,
despite that treaty bodies to which the U.S. accedes clearly may assume
authorities and create rules in conflict with domestic law (not to
mention the Constitution)(see Jay in Federalist No. 64).
Vienna Article 27 offers the provocative assertion: ``Internal law
and observance of treaties: A party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
This rule is without prejudice to article 46.'' The latter provision
tempers the friction somewhat, enabling a U.S. constitutional defense:
`` Invalidity of Treaties, Article 46, Provisions of internal law
regarding competence to conclude treaties:
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by
a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal
law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its
internal law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to
any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal
practice and in good faith.''
This paper does not explore such tensions and what areas treaties
may permissibly seek to resolve, instead restricting its discussion to
the treaty process. For a detailed discussion on this and limitations
on the treaty power, see Rabkin.
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Treaty negotiations formally involve only participant states,
although in multilateral negotiations a (not quite) quasi-formal role
exists for interested--and U.N. approved--third parties. These
nongovernmental organizations, or NGO's, if approved obtain credentials
and participate in the summits in an informal capacity.\24\ They are
provided access to negotiators, attendance in plenary and subsidiary
body sessions, and briefings denied the public but have no voting or
formal negotiating role. NGO's are, in short, lobbying organizations.
The UN's system is akin to a more controlled (i.e., subjectively
selective) version of the pre-1995 U.S. Congressional practice of
issuing special passes allowing special access.\25\
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\24\ Controversy has arisen in recent years over the reluctance of
particular U.N. bodies to accommodate or even recognize groups less
inclined to support particular treaty efforts. Such groups are
typically fairly characterized as ``conservative'' advocacy groups. See
FN 34, infra.
\25\ See http://www.ngo.org/. The UN-sponsored NGO interface is the
NGO Network, which happens to be sponsored by the U.N. It asserts the
goal of NGO's is to ``more effectively partner with the United Nations
and each other to create a more peaceful, just, equitable and
sustainable world for this and future generations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are four necessary stages prior to a treaty taking binding
effect against the United States. This is typical of most systems, with
minor exceptions. These stages are, in this order: agreement;
signature--a discrete window for which is provided by each treaty;
ratification--also provided for in each treaty;\26\ and submission of
ratification instruments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ International law and individual treaties recognize
differential requirements, from unilateral power of binding commitment
in an executive to some version of legislative approval. See Vienna,
e.g., Article 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also relevant are post-ratification requirements--is a treaty self-
implementing, or does it require implementing legislation?--and
withdrawal--at what point is a commitment real enough that withdrawal
is required, and how is it effected at various relevant stages?
This paper examines this process and certain implications arising
from the stages of treaty agreement. It particularly explores unsettled
questions regarding modern application of ``advice and consent'',
including the scenario where an executive eschews ``advice'', what
requirements exist of the U.S. post-signature but prior to Senate
``consent'', must a president transmit a treaty to the Senate before
the Senate may attempt ``consent'', and which branch of government may
withdraw us at what stage, and how? It also examines the burgeoning
role of NGO's in the treaty process.
Thus discussion occurs principally in the context of the Kyoto
Protocol. That unique agreement is signed, but not ratified.\27\
President Bush assures Americans that by his being unhappy with the
U.S. signature on the document the U.S. has ``rejected'' it, yet the
signature remains unmolested. Compare this with the Rome Treaty, the
Administration's rhetorical ``rejection'' of which was identical yet
followed by formal expression of this position to the U.N. consistent
with Vienna Article 18.\28\ Also, the Bush State Department has in fact
actually rejected a request to submit an instrument to the same effect.
Kyoto's highly charged politics, and the treaty-status limbo those
political pressures have yielded begs so many questions that it
provides an excellent vehicle to study the relative commitments
accompanying each step.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ One need not look beyond the ``environmental'' context to find
numerous such agreements, e.g., various individual Protocols to the
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and so on. The relevant inquiry,
as discussed herein in the Kyoto and Rome contexts, is what risk does
an ambiguous status regarding a particular instrument pose.
\28\ See letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
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role of nongovernmental ngo's in the treaty process\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ For a comprehensive assessment of NGO participation, see
Sheehan, ``Global Greens'' (Capital Research Center, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treaty negotiations occur at formal summits, as well as intervening
subsidiary body and preparatory sessions, all of which when conducted
under the auspices of the United Nations do not limit participation to
potential signatory states. Nongovernmental organizations, representing
any conceivable interest group so long as approved by the United
Nations, are permitted a quasi-formal role.\30\ According to the U.N.
Department of Public Information (DPI), NGO Section:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Generally, and the DPI disclaimer, supra, notwithstanding,
members of accredited NGO's are accorded preferred access and
privileges not available to the public, to facilitate interaction with
U.N. operations, which interaction can vary based on the subject matter
discipline involved. See http://www.ngo.org/ index2.htm, link to ``NGO
Access to UNHQ''. Indeed, UNDPI/NGO asserts: ``The Department of Public
Information and NGO's cooperate regularly. NGO's associated with DPI
disseminate information about the U.N. to their membership, thereby
building knowledge of and support for the Organization at the
grassroots level. This dissemination includes: Publicizing U.N.
activities around the world on such issues as peace and security,
economic and social development, human rights, humanitarian affairs and
international law; Promoting U.N. observances and international years
established by the General Assembly to focus world attention on
important issues facing humanity.'' See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm,
link to ``applications for associative status with DPI''. The general
public is not permitted access to functions. A state's delegation,
however, may include parties who do not have negotiating authority and
who need not even hold some governmental post, though they are afforded
full access, and limited participation. Senator Al Gore was a member of
the United States delegation to Rio, from which perch he vocally
criticized the delegation. Also, NGO participation is feasible, for
example, in bilateral negotiations, if the parties agree.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``A non-governmental organization is any non-profit, voluntary
citizens' group which is organized on a local, national or
international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common
interest, NGO's perform a variety of services and humanitarian
functions, bring citizens' concerns to Governments, monitor policies
and encourage political participation at the community level. They
provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and
help monitor and implement international agreements. Some are organized
around specific issues, such as human rights, the environment or
health. Their relationship with offices and agencies of the United
Nations System differs depending on their goals, their venue and their
mandate.
Over 1,500 NGO's with strong information programmes on issues of
concern to the United Nations are associated with the Department of
Public Information (DPI), giving the United Nations valuable links to
people around the world. DPI helps those NGO's gain access to and
disseminate information about the range of issues in which the United
Nations is involved, to enable the public to understand better the aims
and objectives of the world Organization.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link to ``applications for
associative status with DPI''. This dynamic began, according to UNDPI,
``The importance of working with and through NGO's as an integral part
of United Nations information activities was recognized when the
Department of Public Information was first established in 1946. The
General Assembly, in its resolution 13 (I), instructed DPI and its
branch offices to ``' . . . actively assist and encourage national
information services, educational institutions and other governmental
and non-governmental organizations of all kinds interested in spreading
information about the United Nations. For this and other purposes, it
should operate a fully equipped reference service, brief or supply
lecturers, and make available its publications, documentary films, film
strips, posters and other exhibits for use by these agencies and
organizations.' In 1968, the Economic and Social Council, by Resolution
1297 (XLIV) of 27 May, called on DPI to associate NGO's, bearing in
mind the letter and spirit of its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May
1968, which stated that an NGO``. . . shall undertake to support the
work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles
and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes and the
nature and scope of its competence and activities''. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process for becoming an accredited NGO is subjective, offering
the United Nations discretion in who or what group it allows for what
purpose(s). Recently, on an ad hoc basis, the relevant accrediting body
has requested information on financial donors and required proof of an
international presence as conditions precedent of selective (and, to
the author's knowledge, exclusively ``conservative'') NGO's.
UNDPI criteria for NGO's to become associated with DPI are as
follow:
``Organizations eligible for association with DPI are those which:
<bullet> Share the ideals of the U.N. Charter;
<bullet> Operate solely on a not-for-profit basis;
<bullet> Have a demonstrated interest in United Nations issues and
proven ability to reach large or specialized audiences, such as
educators, media representatives, policymakers and the business
community;
<bullet> Have the commitment and means to conduct effective
information programmes about U.N. activities by publishing newsletters,
bulletins, and pamphlets; organizing conferences, seminars and round
tables; and enlisting the cooperation of the media.''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, ``applications for
associative status with DPI''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNDPI describes the procedure to become an associated NGO as
follows:
``An NGO that meets the established criteria should send an
official letter from its headquarters to the Chief of the NGO Section,
Department of Public Information, expressing interest in association
with DPI. The letter should state the reasons why the organization
seeks such association and should briefly describe its information
programmes. This letter should be accompanied by at least six samples
of recent information materials produced by the applying organization.
Letters of reference from U.N. Departments, U.N. Programmes and
Specialized Agencies, and/or U.N. Information Centres and Services
(UNICs and UNISs) will greatly enhance consideration of the
application.
Once the application process is completed, the DPI Committee on
Non-Governmental Organizations will review applications at its
scheduled sessions. Applicants are notified immediately of the results
of the Committee's deliberations. Associated NGO's are then invited to
designate their main and alternate representatives to the Department of
Public Information.
Please note: Association of NGO's with DPI does not constitute
their incorporation into the United Nations system, nor does it entitle
associated organizations or their staff to any kind of privileges,
immunities or special status.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Id. See FN 30, supra, re: disclaimer/privileges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clearly, the application process is subjective and, arguably,
institutionally biased toward participation by a preponderance of
groups considered sympathetic to the relevant summit's cause (that is,
against dissent).\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link to ``applications for
associative status with DPI''. The UN's NGO home page offers a feel for
the type of organizations it seeks to include, the description of which
rings of the U.N. endorsement of its typical endeavors, with which the
NGO's are to have input: ``Its aim is to help promote collaborations
between NGO's throughout the world, so that together we can more
effectively partner with the United Nations and each other to create a
more peaceful, just, equitable and sustainable world for this and
future generations.'' That is, organizations whose application
reference materials demonstrate opposition to UN-sponsored initiatives
face an adversarial review of their application. For a report on bias
in the selection process, see, e.g., http://www.washtimes.com/national/
20020511-32784532. htm, in the context of the 2002 U.N child Summit
(UNICEF).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For an example of NGO participation, consider the 1992 the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or ``Earth Summit'')
in Rio de Janeiro, likely the largest treaty summit in recent memory,
though soon to be eclipsed by ``Rio-plus-10'' the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, August 2002. Rio is commonly
recognized as ushering in the boom era of mass NGO participation. Rio
has the added relevance for these purposes as being the session that
produced, inter alia, the UNFCCC,\35\ that the Kyoto Protocol amends by
making its universal voluntary ``commitments'' mandatory for certain
among the world's economic powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/treaties/
conv.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the summer of 1992, as the United States Presidential and
general elections prepared to launch, nations of the world convened in
Rio for the UNCED under the guise of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), which is under the direction of the U.N. General
Assembly.\36\ Numerous non-binding, in effect, position papers were
generated with great effort, though disagreement tended to be more
fairly characterized as disputes over whose priority was granted
highest esteem.\37\ Several other documents emerged from the fortnight-
long diplomacy, the binding nature of which are arguable given a great
degree of voluntariness but which nonetheless rose to the level of
``treaty''.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html.
\37\ Among the international ``agreements'' being developed were
the Rio Declaration, and the similar if much more exhaustive (600
pages) Agenda 21. These were enormous if non-binding documents
containing a lot of ``shoulds'', but as accurately characterized by the
Cato Institute's P.J. O'Rourke, each ``having the same approximate
force in law as a note passed in study hall.'' (All the Troubles in the
World, p. 214, 1994).
\38\ See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, actually
finalized in Rio. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1760, p. 79; and
depositary notification C.N.329.1996.TREATIES-2 of 18 March 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Participants at Rio included delegations from all recognized
national governments including scores of heads of state. 95 NGO's plus
numerous among their subsidiaries were accredited representing
national, regional and international common interests or agendas. These
interests ranged from scientific and even architectural and various
other professional societies, industry and laborers, gender and
environmentalist pressure groups and/or their legal arms, spiritual to
indigenous peoples.\39\ These were condensed in practice at the summit
under the ``Global Forum,'' to centralize their presence, and voice.
The latter act presumes NGO support for the summit undertakings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See UNFCCC NGO roster, at http://unfccc.int/sessions/97feb/
ngo.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NGO activities ranged from the informal--media availabilities,
pamphlet and newsletter distribution--to quasi-formal--presentation of
the product of petition drives before the plenary and subsidiary body
sessions.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ For the schedule of Johannesburg NGO events, see http://
www.worldsummit.org.za/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though NGO's have no formal vote or role at negotiations, efforts
have been underway for some time to find paying roles for NGO's in
implementing and monitoring compliance with treaty agreements.
Specifically, for example, environmentalist advocates seek a formal
paying role as an independent auditing and verification monitors of
company and country GHG emissions/reductions.\41\ Indeed, domestically,
NGO's have already received literally millions of taxpayer dollars to
advocate Kyoto.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Under Kyoto this would be pursuant to Article 17: ``The
Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles,
modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification,
reporting and accountability for emissions trading. ``
\42\ See, e.g., ``Cashing in on Global Warming'', http://
www.cei.org/gencon/005,01248.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many agreements, be they addressing environment or human rights,
offer the potential for such business opportunities. That is one way
the NGO's elevate their ``negotiating'' presence. They do have
potential interests at stake to pursue, just as they possess an
impressive media presence and potentially valuable approval to grant to
or withhold from parties.
Representatives of groups directly impacted by potential
commitments--industry and labor--were fairly limited in Rio
(approximately 20 percent of the accredited NGO's) and fairly split
between those standing to lose economic activity--anti-energy-
suppression interests such as the coal industry, energy users, mine
workers--and those seeking ``rents'' through GHG restrictions with
mechanisms such as credit-trading schemes.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ For example, an immediate post-negotiation internal Enron
memo, dated December 12 1997 and written by the Enron Corp. 's
representative attending Kyoto, excitedly described Kyoto as
``precisely what [Enron has] been lobbying for,'' cited numerous
``wins'', and concluded: ``This agreement will be good for Enron
stock!!'' The reasons for Enron's advocacy are numerous, and similar to
various other business NGO participants'. Enron held positions as owner
of the world's largest wind turbine manufacturer and half owner of the
world's largest solar energy venture, both of which would have faced
tremendously increased markets under Kyoto's effective requirement of
dramatically lowered fossil fuel use (particularly coal) among
developed countries. For similar reasons, Enron faced tremendous
earnings prospects from its large natural gas holdings and its gas
pipeline network, the world's largest outside of Gazprom. For
disclosure, the author briefly worked for Enron, during which time this
effort was a source of disagreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By the time of the July 2002 ``COP 6.5'' in Bonn, Germany,
sufficient ``industry'' NGO's, falsely presumed as a matter of practice
to be ``anti-Kyoto'', attended that the U.S. State Department had
informally begun addressing two discrete constituencies in separate,
restricted briefings. This did not accurately bifurcate the ideological
or substantive positions of the groups, but rather manifest a common
predisposition--that State representatives simply had to know was
false--that Kyoto, and environmental agreements generally, created a
clash of ``industry vs. environmentalists.'' In fact, industry groups
are among the most aggressive ``direct'' pro-treaty lobbying forces at
treaty negotiations and elsewhere, and aggressive in their indirect
advocacy (funding green and business advocacy groups).\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Re: the former, see, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, ``An Enron Tale
of Strange Bedfellows,'' Los Angeles Times (December 28, 2001). The
latter is manifested by the ``Business Council for a Sustainable Energy
Future'' and its European counterpart, constituted by (at the time)
Enron and like-minded interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, while State deemed a separation of ideologies as
appropriate it did so such that pro-Kyoto NGO's constituted one group,
while the other advocacy section supposedly competing for State's ear
consisted of a deeply split ``Industry'' cadre, despite pro-Kyoto
industry being at least equally represented as Kyoto opponents. This
skews the NGO input at least so far as concerns the U.S. delegation,
offering pro-Kyoto NGO advocates a de facto greater advocacy role.\45\
This matters because, as discussed, infra, the U.S. has not withdrawn
from Kyoto but retains its signature and continues to send a full
delegation to negotiations, even if they curiously assume a reduced
role.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ For NGO claims of influence see ``Greens' Success at Kyoto'',
http://www.cei.org/gencon/014,02873.cfm
\46\ See FN 123, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, treaty negotiations take place among delegates,
though NGO's serve as welcome pressure groups, with a limited formal
role but a select membership chosen by proponents of the agreement on
the table.
the treaty power under the united states constitution
In the United States, treaty power is governed by Article II
Section 2 of the Constitution, stating ``[The President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur''.
Therefore, the Executive may negotiate agreements, the terms of which
do not, pursuant to our own Constitution, become effective against the
U.S. until and unless the Senate ratifies the agreement by two-thirds
of those voting.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ This clearly does not require 67 votes as is often asserted.
``Although the number of Senators who must be present is not specified,
the Senate's practice with respect to major treaties is to conduct the
final treaty vote at a time when most Senators are available.'' See,
``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S.
Senate'', p. 11, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname= 106--cong--senate--print&docid=f:66922.pdf. Compare
this ``present'' requirement with other ``two thirds'' requirements,
Article I, Section 5, regarding House impeachments; Article I Section 7
re: veto override; and Article V re: proposing amendments to the
Constitution.
Hamilton addressed the deliberation over two-thirds of those
``present'', vs. of the body as constituted, in Federalist No. 75.
There, he identified the fear about ``as constituted'', that a minority
of Senators could impede ratification through simple, convenient
absences. See ``Consent'', infra, for further discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It does not seem there was any doubt during its formulation that
the Constitution would permit treaties, which, to the extent they
transfer any authority outside of the system the Constitution
established, potentially threaten the very document authorizing such
agreements. Discussion of the treaty power among the Framers appears
principally confined to the necessity to concentrate it at the Federal
level, so as to not be ``liable to the infractions of 13 different
legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction,
acting under the authority of those legislatures'', and thus ``protect
the faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole union.''\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See Hamilton, Federalist No. 22, sentiments repeated by
Madison in Federalist No. 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Federalist No. 64 Jay addressed an apparent, similar multiple
actor problem but through vesting the treaty power in a dynamic,
impressionable ``popular assembly'', advocating instead housing
principal authority in the executive. In Federalist No. 69 Hamilton
weighed the merits of vesting the power solely in the executive, musing
over what he later described as ``the trite topic of the intermixture
of powers,'' albeit one addressed amongst the Framers ``with no small
degree of vehemence.''\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Federalist No. 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arguably, modern conflicts arising from signed-but-not ratified
treaties are a problem easily avoided, or at least mitigated, were the
treaty power fixed solely within one branch (certainly, if with the
Executive). Still, the practical, political problems discussed herein,
borne of the simple bifurcation of authority, do not seem to have
registered discussion by the Framers. One can safely presume this is
because the Framers did not envision ``permanent alliances'' becoming
so profuse that hundreds of modern instruments would emerge to the
extent even of addressing unification of road signals.
Pertinent to this discussion, the Framers likely also could not
envision commission to a treaty such as Kyoto: international agreements
to curb domestic behavior to retard what is inarguably a marginal
contribution to a hypothetical risk--man-made climate change--even in
advance of science advancing the hypothesis some appreciable degree
toward knowledge. Similarly, it is difficult to fathom the Framers
envisioning administration of their creation such that scores of
treaties would receive an executive signature yet never face Senate
consideration. Times change, and with them perspectives. As Rabkin
plainly asserts ``[l]egal scholars no longer take the constitutional
strictures of earlier times so seriously.''\50\ Now, ``in the view of
legal scholars, anything might be the proper subject of a treaty.''\51\
This, in an undeniable spiral of cheapening the seriousness of
``permanent alliances'' against which President Washington warned in
his Farewell Address.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ ``Sovereignty'' at 18. The same can be said for policymakers,
be they elected, appointed or career. See Chief Justice Hughes'
admonition, supra.
\51\ Id. at 22.
\52\ Farewell Address, delivered on September 17, 1796. Washington
similarly urged that the US must ``Act for ourselves and not for
others,'' by forming an ``American character wholly free of foreign
attachments.'' See http://www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2002/tst041502.htm.
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One constitutional ambiguity arises in the question of which
agreements rise to the level of a ``treaty'' requiring Senate
ratification?\53\ Further, notwithstanding the ratification
requirement, the treaty process inherently requires executive
commitment of a sort. What are the other implications of such a
commitment, now that we have seen that this practice does not in fact
even serve the protocol function of a qualifying a state for
ratification?\54\ Can an Executive validly agree to treaty language
circumventing constitutional requirements?\55\ These questions and
their answers, to the extent they exist, are exemplar of the murky
nature of this field of law, driven in practice less by established
legal rules than protocol. This curiosity extends to U.S. practice,
whereby both the executive branch and Senate operate on the presumption
that the Senate may not consider a treaty until a President transmits
it to the Senate, though such requirement is found neither in the
Constitution nor U.S. laws.\56\
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\53\ This issue arises from other powers found in Article II of the
Constitution, specifically the Executive Power Clause (Section I), the
Commander-in-Chief Clause (Section 2) and, most interesting, the duty
to take Care that the laws are ``faithfully executed'', which concludes
Section 3. ``Where the powers of the President are exclusive--as the
Commander in Chief power--the President may make an international
agreement solely on his own. Such agreements are often called sole
executive agreements.'' National Treaty Law and Practice (Austria,
Chile, Columbia, Netherlands, U.S.) eds. Monroe Leigh, Merritt R.
Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington. Washington, DC, American Society
of International Law 1999, Chapter 6, National Treaty Law and Practice:
United States (Robert E. Dalton), ``Section G, Legal Bases for
Agreements Not Formally Approved By the Legislature''. See http://
www.asil.org/ dalton.pdf. This document offers an extensive discussion
of this issue, including a discussion of United States v. Belmont (301
U.S. 324 (1937)), involving an intermingling in one document of
assignment of funds and U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. There,
the Court asserted as regards the particular agreement at issue, ``[A]n
international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty that
requires the participation of the Senate,'' but in this case an
exercise of the President's power to enter executive agreement pursuant
to his independent authority. Id. at 330.
The Court asserted limits to the reach of this duty to ``take
Care'', in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
The Court determined that President Truman usurped the lawmaking power
of Congress by his claim of independent constitutional authority to
take control of and operate the nation's steel mills during the Korean
War on the basis of on an ``inherent'' power to protect the well-being
and safety of the Nation as well as his Article II exclusive powers as
Commander-in-Chief and executive.
Finally, see also ``Treaties and Other International Agreements:
The Role of the U.S. Senate'', pp. 25-26, at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--cong--senate--
print &docid=f:66922.pdf.
The State Department defines ``treaty'' as follows: ``International
agreements (regardless of their title, designation, or form) whose
entry into force with respect to the United States takes place only
after the Senate has given its advice and consent''. See ``Department
of State Circular 175, Procedures on Treaties'', Foreign Affairs
Manual, 11 FAM 700, Treaties and Other International Agreements,
TL:POL-36, Revised February 25, 1985, Sec. 11 FAM 721.2
``Constitutional Requirements''.
The Vienna Convention, Article 2, defines ``treaty'' for its
purposes as: ``an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
its particular designation''.
\54\ See ``Signature'' discussion, infra.
\55\ A simple answer might seem to be that the Constitution cannot
be read to permit commitments in violation of its terms, which terms
may only be amended by the prescribed amendment process. Things are not
that simple, however, such that this question is beyond the scope of
this paper. See Rabkin, pp. 10-22. Commitments raising this tension are
nonetheless made. Consider the Vienna Convention, a document that
claims to bind parties to such documents, to some degree, by mere
signature. Does that signature in fact violate the Constitution? Can a
signatory state plausibly claim they are not bound to any degree by a
treaty that acknowledges signature as imputing a level of pre-
ratification commitment?
\56\ See discussion of ``Submission,'' infra. Senate rules indicate
it has indirectly established ``transmission'' as a condition
precedent. These rules do not, however, make clear that the Foreign
Relations Committee can refuse to consider a treaty on the basis that
it was never transmitted--an unlikely controversy. A more likely battle
would pit a White House opposed to ratification objecting to FRC
consideration of a treaty on the basis that there was never a
transmittal. The prospect of such a conflict, though facially bizarre
prospect given a president apparently retains the right to effectively
withdraw the U.S. signature until some point in the pre-ratification
stage (pre-transmittal, or pre-vote, or post-defeat but returned to
Committee as pending matter). See, e.g., http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2002/9968.htm.
These prospects further warrant consideration not merely because
the signature by an executive poses some level of commitment to a
treaty's objectives, if not its specific terms. Consider also a Senate
and White House deeply divided, rhetorically at least, over a signed-
but-not-ratified treaty as they appear to be over Kyoto, and the
potential showdown over ``advice and consent'' which that conflict
poses.
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Congress has formalized this delegation power, for certain
Presidential authorities regarding the conduct of foreign affairs, in
the State Department's authorizing statute.\57\ In practice this
delegation includes signing (and withdrawing from) treaties.\58\
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\57\ ``22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656.--Management of foreign affairs. The
Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from time to time
be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President relative to
correspondences, commissions, or instructions to or with public
ministers or consuls from the United States, or to negotiations with
public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or
other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners,
or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of
the United States shall assign to the Department, and he shall conduct
the business of the Department in such manner as the President shall
direct.'' It is certainly this general authority that State exercised
in notifying the U.N. that the US has no intention to be bound by the
Rome Treaty (its 6 May 2002 letter to U.N. Secretary General Annan (see
text at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm).
\58\ See e.g. Kyoto, signed by USA's functioning U.N. Ambassador,
Peter Burleigh. See http://www.bellona. no/en/b3/air/climate/buenos--
aires/10952.html.
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The requirement of Senate ``Advice'' is not as straightforward as a
plain reading of Article II intimates. Here, Kyoto also offers an
interesting case study, as a treaty entered in spite of formal if non-
binding (and unsolicited) Senate advice.\59\ An Executive eschewing
Senate advice does not as a matter of law doom a treaty as failing to
meet constitutional muster. An Executive subsequently nullifying the
U.S. signature, or a Senate vote on ratification, should be the final
word on that though, again matters in practice have not developed quite
so simply.\60\
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\59\ ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105-54, 1997). The
operative language is as follows: ``Resolved, That it is the sense of
the Senate that----
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
or thereafter, which would----
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States''.
Kyoto nonetheless emerged, clearly not satisfying Byrd-Hagel
condition (1)(A), by differentiating not only between 36 ``covered''
countries, but by differentiating the commitments among those
countries. Regarding condition (1)(B), among prominent economic
analysts only the Clinton White House's Council of Economic Advisors,
contended that no ``serious economic harm''. President Clinton never
submitted the treaty to the Senate over the course of the remaining 27
months of his presidency. Upon leaving office the relevant CEA
professionals publicly amended their assertions regarding Kyoto's
economic impact. (See USA Today, June 12, 2001). See discussion of
``Advice, infra.
A fair question is: which is the more constitutionally offensive
practice? 1) Eschewing advice and committing to a treaty yet not
offering the Senate its opportunity to consent or disapprove; or 2)
rescinding the U.S. signature from one ``rejected'', signed-but-never-
submitted treaty, on the express basis that ``even without
ratification, the president's signature conveys standing and a U.S.
obligation to support and not undermine the Treaty'' (see Rumsfeld
comments, p. 27, infra), yet not similarly treating other rhetorically
``rejected'' agreements.
\60\ ``(6) Treaties Reported by the [Foreign Relations] Committee
but neither approved nor formally returned to the President by the
Senate are automatically returned to the Committee calendar at the end
of a Congress; the Committee must report them out again for the Senate
to consider them.'' Therefore, a ``defeated'' treaty is not necessarily
rejected until it is returned to the President. See ``Treaties and
Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', p. 12;
see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov /cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--
cong--senate--print&docid=f:66922.pdf. The Senate may also keep a
``defeated'' treaty alive by adopting or entering a motion to
reconsider. Id. at 3.
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The concerns raised by an Executive ``freelancing'' treaty
commitments without seeking or heeding Senate advice can be further
compounded by a treaty barring the standard practice of a party to set
forth objections and/or reservations.\61\ It is through such objections
and reservations, asserted by the Senate as a condition of
ratification, that makes policy development by supranational bodies
constitutionally tolerable given their lack of checks and balances, and
limited accountability.\62\ Yet the U.S. agreed to and then signed the
Kyoto Protocol despite it having exacerbated the sin of omission of
seeking Senate advice with the rare, express prohibition of
reservations.\63\
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\61\ ``The conditions included by the Senate in its resolutions of
advice and consent to ratification fall into four general categories:
reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos.'' National
Treaty Law and Practice (Austria, Chile, Columbia, Netherlands, U.S.)
eds. Monroe Leigh, Merritt R. Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington.
Washington, DC, American Society of International Law 1999, Chapter 6,
National Treaty Law and Practice: United States (Robert E. Dalton), p.
6.
Vienna Article 2 defines ``reservation'' as: ``a unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that State''. Part Two of Vienna,
Articles 19-23, address reservations exclusively.
\62\ See, e.g., Rabkin, p.ix.
\63\ Kyoto Article 26 asserts, in toto: ``No reservations may be
made to this Protocol.''
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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report serving as the
Senate's most formal statement on these matters outside of Standing
Senate Rules states the following regarding nearly this precise
circumstance, except for the compounding factor of eschewing advice
prior to the ``no reservation'' constraint:
``Some multilateral treaties have contained an article prohibiting
reservations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken the
position that the executive branch negotiators should not agree to this
prohibition. The Senate has given its advice and consent to a few
treaties containing the prohibition, but the committee has stated that
approval of these treaties should not be construed as a precedent for
such clauses in future treaties. It has further stated that the
President's agreement to such a clause could not constrain the Senate's
right and obligation to attach reservations to its advice and
consent.''\64\
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\64\ ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the
U.S. Senate'', p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically addressing the UNFCCC, which the Senate nonetheless
quickly ratified despite its own ``no reservations'' clause, the same
Report cautions ``The Foreign Relations Committee has cautioned the
administration that Senate consent in these cases should not be
construed as a precedent.''\65\ The Report went on to caution against
any attempt to alter the UNFCCC's voluntary scheme by committing to
mandatory reductions, asserting any such commitment would require
ratification.\66\ The Report then recites Senate intervention when the
negotiations appeared to be headed toward not merely binding
commitments requiring subsequent ratification, but differential
commitments among parties with likely serious U.S. economic
impacts.\67\
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\65\ Id. at p. 274.
\66\ Id. at 276.
\67\ ``In mid-1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate
passed S. Res. 98, which stated that the Senate would not approve any
agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not
include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/
industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S.
economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to
the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to
date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding
their greenhouse gas emissions.'' Id.
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Kyoto nonetheless emerged as such a ``take it or leave it''
document but with no ``fast-track'' type authorization or abdication.
Indeed, it is fair to say the opposite vote was registered though non-
binding by necessity given the nature and timing of such a preemptive
strike. NAFTA can therefore hardly be analogized to Kyoto as both
having been similarly foisted upon the Senate, though it is noteworthy
that the composition of Congress can certainly change measurably in the
interim between fast-track approval (or Byrd-Hagel) and the opportunity
to offer consent.
This combination found in Kyoto of not obtaining (ignoring) Senate
advice and restricting permissible consent is constitutionally
indefensible in theory, though it does not impede Senate ratification.
Indeed, it is now accepted practice for Congress to offer advance
approval of suspending the Senate ability to provide objections and/or
reservations when voting on ratification of specific agreements.\68\
``Some scholars have pointed out the constitutional difficulties of
this scheme, but it did not raise any great controversy.''\69\
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\68\ See, e.g., S. 2062 (107th Congress), ``The Comprehensive Trade
Negotiating Authority Act of 2002''. The express logic behind providing
this authority is to provide the President's negotiators the ability to
strike deals not subject to subsequent modification as a condition of
ratification, and their counterparts confidence in U.S. promises. It is
arguable that congressional approval of such authority constitutes
advice, if uninformed advice, still conditioned upon Senate
ratification of the deal itself.
\69\ Rabkin at 18.
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Signature
Individual agreements provide a window during which the document
may be signed. For example, the Kyoto Protocol, agreed to in December
1997, was open for Party signature for a finite period of 1 year. As
discussed, supra, that window and/or failure to sign the document were
meaningless, as non-signatories subsequently ratified the Protocol.
Whether signing the document is meaningless, however, is discussed,
infra. The U.S. signed Kyoto on 12 November 1998.
It is clear from Article II, Section 2 that the Executive has the
power to negotiate agreements if not de jure unilateral power to craft
their content. This power to negotiate treaties doubtless includes the
ability to make various, sub-ratification levels of commitment such as
agreement and signature, so long as the agreement makes no pretense of
abrogating the ratification requirement.\70\ The ``advice'' limitation
on this negotiating power is subject to Senate forgiveness (for the
failure to seek advice), via providing consent nonetheless.
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\70\ See Rabkin pp. 12-16.
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Most treaties provide for a discrete signing function as a
condition precedent to being eligible to accede via ratification.\71\
Signatures may be challenged but barring such challenge are presumed
valid.\72\ Questions arise, certainly in the recent contexts of the
Rome Treaty and Kyoto Protocol, of other signature implications. Like
most individual treaty documents ``customary law'' and its
``codification'' the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties\73\
recognize the requirement of many systems of legislative approval for
an agreement's specific terms to be binding.
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\71\ See FN 19, supra. Kyoto Article 24 states: ``1) . . . This
Protocol shall be open for accession from the day after the date on
which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the
Depositary. 2. Any regional economic integration organization which
becomes a Party to this Protocol without any of its member States being
a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Protocol. In
the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a
Party to this Protocol, the organization and its member States shall
decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of
their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization
and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under
this Protocol concurrently. 3. In their instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration
organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect
to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organizations shall
also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of
any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.''
\72\ Vienna sets forth generally, followed by an illustrative
roster of, who may commit a state: ``Article 7, Full powers: 1. A
person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of
adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of
expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if:
(a) he produces appropriate full powers; or (b) it appears from the
practice of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their
intention was to consider that person as representing the State for
such purposes and to dispense with full powers.'' A state may
subsequently confirm an unauthorized signature (Article 8).
\73\ ``The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention but
this portion likely represents customary international law on the
subject.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the
Kyoto Protocol'', p. 3, FN 9. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principle that a signature cannot be truly meaningless,
developed likely for purposes of ensuring sincere negotiations,
nonetheless was formalized as Vienna Article 18. That provision asserts
international agreement that a pre-ratification commitment, e.g.,
signature, as nonetheless binding a state to certain degree.\74\ Yet
how seriously do states take this testament to the issue of a non-
ratifying signatory state: ``a State is obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,'' until and
unless ``it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty, or it has expressed its consent to be bound by the
treaty''?\75\ It is either ironic, or proof positive that this effort
failed, that the U.S. bears an enormous inventory of signed-but-not-
ratified instruments including many never even ``transmitted'' to the
Senate.
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\74\ Vienna manifests throughout, e.g., Articles 11, 12, 18,
manifest that states operate on the presumption that a signature is the
promise of a binding relationship, presumably through ratification. ``A
paramount principle of international law is pacta sunt servanda-that
treaties must be kept.'' Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``Treaties
and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'',
S.Rpt. 106-71, p. 7; see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov /cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--cong--senate--print& docid=f:66922.pdf. What of
the documents that a country signs, but does not ratify? That question
and the ambiguous answers, to the extent they exist, prompted President
Bush to withdraw from the unratified Rome Treaty. Specifically, the
U.S. sought to avert legitimate concerns that its signature would
impute some form of acquiescence with Rome.
However, many treaties are signed but not ratified, particularly by
the US. The same ambiguities underlie the concerns over Kyoto
discussed, herein. As with Rome, the President voiced his disagreement
with his predecessor's signature. As regards Kyoto, however, he has not
manifested this rhetoric with action. Consider that the President then
offers and formally proceeds with a proposal clearly running counter to
Kyoto's goals and objectives, as he did with his pending proposal to
address U.S. GHG emissions. This proposal envisions emissions
increasing, clearly in violation of Kyoto's objective of massive
reductions. Certainly, mere proposals likely do not run hard afoul of
Vienna. But what if the proposal is enacted?
\75\ See ``Withdrawal'', infra.
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Defending a claim that the U.S. somehow violates Vienna Article 18
via, e.g., Kyoto, the U.S. would likely posit the argument that it
never ratified Vienna. Particularly as regards Article 18, this
argument is sophisticated. It requires a state to argue that it is not
bound by signing a treaty that purports to govern the interpretation of
treaties, the terms of which establish that signing a treaty in the
absence of ratification still binds the signatory to the treaty's goals
and objectives.\76\
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\76\ Consider a prospective automobile purchaser talking terms then
taking the car off the lot for a spin, though without finalizing any
deal. He parks it in his garage, and otherwise treats the offer of sale
as a deal he accepted, for some period of time. Now consider the U.S.
signing a treaty, though never formalizing the deal, yet also acting as
if it had ``bought'' the agreement for 30 years through various and
sundry diplomatic and administrative actions, or merely on the basis
that it waited three decades before testing its strictures?
It is likely that such a doctrine of constructive acceptance exists
in the law of international agreements. Vienna Article 11, ``Means of
expressing consent to be bound by a treaty,'' does not offer much
guidance, asserting ``The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty
may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a
treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any
other means if so agreed.'' However, Part 5, ``Invalidity, Termination
and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties'' makes the case more
plainly: ``Article 45 Loss of a right to invoke a ground for
invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation
of a treaty: A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating,
terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty
under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware
of the facts:
(a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or
remains in force or continues in operation, as the case may be; or
(b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having
acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force
or in operation, as the case may be.''
Media reports indicated that President Bush intended to withdraw
from Vienna concurrent with his Rome withdrawal, though this did not
occur. This would (or will) occur after having satisfied Vienna's
Article 18 test for ``withdrawal'' of the unratified ICC. Clearly,
therefore, such a move would be intended to impact the status of other
signed-but-not-ratified agreements. Presuming this was successful (see
FN 76, supra), particular implications of such a move as regards Kyoto
include that the U.S. would be free of the Vienna Article 18 argument
of commitment to Kyoto's object and purpose (if not residual
``customary'' doctrine, if any exists). The U.S. position would be that
it is ``out'' of Kyoto solely on the basis that one executive verbally
claimed that to be the case, with no formalization of that position.
That is, the signed document remains available for ``re-entry'' by a
subsequent executive solely on the basis that he verbally asserts that
this is the U.S. position. To pursue or even enable such a dynamic is
shortsighted and flies in the face of the bulk of the rationale behind
treaties.
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It was presumably in recognition of the perils of feel-good treaty
signature when a state has no intention of ratifying leading the Bush
Administration to formally disavow its signature on the Rome Treaty.
Consider the following statements by Cabinet officers:
``Since we have no intention of ratifying it, it is appropriate for
us, because we have such serious problems with the ICC, to notify the .
. . secretary-general that we do not intend to ratify it and therefore
we are no longer bound in any was to its purpose and objective''
Secretary of State Colin Powell, CNN.com, May 5, 2002
``Even without ratification, the president's signature conveys
standing and a U.S. obligation to support and not undermine the
Treaty''. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, State Department Info,
Jan. 11, 2001
Now, of course, the Administration faces the unavoidable question
of why does it refuse to disavow the U.S. signature on Kyoto? That is,
should it desire to avoid having, e.g., its proposed ``Climate Action
Plan'' challenged as violative of Vienna, via Kyoto.\77\
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\77\ Compare Administration statements on Kyoto remarkably similar
to its rhetoric establishing why Rome must be ``unsigned'':
President Bush--``I'll tell you one thing I'm not going to do . . .
I'm not going to let the United States carry the burden for cleaning up
the world's air, like the Kyoto treaty would have done.'' ABCNews.com,
March 28, 2001
President Bush--``I do not support the Kyoto Treaty . . . The Kyoto
treaty would severely damage the United States economy and I don't
accept that.'' Washington Times, June 5, 2002
Vice-President Cheney--``We do not support the approach of the
Kyoto treaty.'' MSNBC March 17, 2001
Secretary of State Colin Powell--``The Kyoto Protocol, as far as
the United States is concerned, is a dead letter.'' Interview with Fox
News' Tony Snow, June 17, 2001
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice--to European diplomats,
the ''protocol is totally unacceptable and already dead at the arrival
of the Bush Administration''; also quoted at the same meeting asserting
Kyoto was ``dead on arrival'' in the United States. March 17th, 2001
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice--``It might have been
better to let people know in advance, including our allies, that we
were not going to support the protocol.'' USATODAY.com June 7, 2001
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christie Todd
Whitman--``We have no interest in implementing that treaty.''
Washington Post, March 28, 2001
White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer--``The president has been
unequivocal. He does not support the Kyoto treaty. It is not in the
United States' economic interest.'' CNN.com, March 29, 2001
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These implications of treaty signature and the related quagmire of
``how much sovereignty does (the U.S.) cede at what step?'' is exemplar
of the murky nature of this field of law, driven in practice less by
established legal rules than protocol.
In sum, achieving the signature stage enters a state into an
ambiguous level of commitment; obligations begin to emerge, such that a
notification of intent not to become a party action is required to
truly change a nation's status.
Executive Transmittal of a Treaty
Is there a reverse equivalent to the Constitution's ``presentment''
clause, for treaties?\78\ A plain reading of Article II, Section 2
indicates an Executive's function is complete upon treaty signature, or
at least that the signature reasonably triggers the Senate's ability to
attempt consent though the Executive may not be stripped of authority
to continue relevant treaty functions. Certainly, if a president
transmits a treaty to the Senate with its concomitant request for a
vote, there is no doubt that the Senate may vote upon it. But what
about a treaty signed but not submitted to the Senate?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7: ``Every Bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An authoritative Foreign Relations Committee report asserts the
Senate's most formal position on the matter, outside of its standing
rules which are largely silent or ambiguous:
``Consideration by the Senate
A second phase begins when the President transmits a concluded
treaty to the Senate and the responsibility moves to the Senate.
Following are the main steps during the Senate phase.
(1) Presidential submission.-The Secretary of State formally
submits treaties to the President for transmittal to the Senate. A
considerable time may elapse between signature and submission to the
Senate, and on rare occasions a treaty signed on behalf of the United
States may never be submitted to the Senate at all and thus never enter
into force for the United States. When transmitted to the Senate,
treaties are accompanied by a Presidential message consisting of the
text of the treaty, a letter of transmittal requesting the advice and
consent of the Senate, and the earlier letter of submittal of the
Secretary of State which usually contains a detailed description and
analysis of the treaty.''\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the
U.S. Senate'', S.Rpt.106-71, p. 7.
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The Senate is historically conditioned to wait for executive
transmittal prior to considering an agreement and its rules now
recognize this practice, having in effect manufactured a
``presentment'' equivalent. The FRC Report offers in fact an
explanation of protocol, and nothing more, serving as the principal
impediment to the Senate considering a treaty absent the Executive
transmitting it to them. There is no constitutional bar. Though the
Senate has the constitutional right to set its own rules of
operation,\80\ there exists no express prohibition in the rules,
either.\81\ It is a matter of interpretation. These rules are binding
of course only on the Senate but are a matter of interpretation, and
that is largely irrelevant:
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\80\ ``Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . .
.'' Article I, Section 5.
\81\ With or without transmittal it would be fair for a Member (or
private litigant who can establish standing) to call on the Senate to
vote on the entire spate of modern treaties signed-but-not-ratified
treaties. It seems particularly disrespectful of the Constitution,
however, for the Senate not to at minimum vote on aberrations such as
Kyoto, qualifying for immediate rejection because of the unacceptable
combination of the Executive breaching specific Senate instruction,
then accepting the disavowed terms also with a prohibition on
reservations.
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Yet these Senate rules do not make clear that the Foreign Relations
Committee can refuse an Executive request to consider a treaty on the
basis that it was never transmitted. Such a battle is of course
unlikely: if an Executive desired a treaty vote he would in all
likelihood ``transmit'' a treaty with such a request.\82\ A conflict is
more likely to involve a White House opposed to ratification, objecting
to FRC consideration on the basis that there was never a transmittal.
The prospect of such a conflict is also, however, facially bizarre
given a president apparently retains the right to effectively withdraw
the U.S. signature until some point in the pre-ratification stage (see
``Withdrawal'', infra).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Such a request does not necessarily accompany a transmittal
recommendation. See discussion of President Reagan's transmittal of the
Protocols to the Geneva Convention, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As also discussed, in Kyoto we see a Senate and White House deeply
divided, rhetorically at least, over a particular signed-but-not-
ratified treaty. This merits consideration of the potential showdown
over authority to ultimately commit the U.S. In this instance, we face
a president asserting a position (``rejects'' the treaty) but unwilling
to formalize it. Indeed, this administration actually has rejected the
idea of withdrawal.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ In May 2002, the author formally petitioned the State
Department on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, to
replicate the withdrawal from Rome, re: Kyoto. State responded in June
2002. It elected to not assert which of the two ambiguous U.S. Kyoto
positions--rhetorical vs. submitted--is operative. Its response was
mildly incoherent in attempting to avoid addressing the merits
presented in the request, merely rejecting this request for
clarification of the ambiguity on the simple basis that ``[w]e have
gone to considerable lengths, internationally, over the past year to
make our position with respect to the Kyoto Protocol clear and
unambiguous.'' In short, they're not confused about the position--
whatever it is--so it requires no clarification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether an executive must ``transmit'' a treaty, or whether the
Senate may vote on signed agreements of its own accord, is a question
that has yet to be adjudicated. It has yet to even be legislated other
than Senate internal rules of operation. Congress addressed transmittal
of international agreements other than treaties in the Case-Zablocki
Act.\84\ This Act did not, however, indirectly establish Executive
discretion regarding transmittal of treaties to Congress, as its clear
import was to inform Congress of agreements in which Congress had had
no consultative or approval role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ 1 U.S.C Sections 112a and 112b; as added by act of September
23, 1950, 64 Stat. 980; and added by Public Law 92-403 [Case-Zablocki
Act, S. 596], 86 Stat. 619, approved August 22, 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee possesses exclusive
congressional jurisdiction over treaties (though as was seen regarding
Kyoto, other committees, both House and Senate, may weigh in on various
aspects of the agreement). That is, FRC is the gatekeeper determining
which treaties may be reported for floor consideration:
``rule 1--jurisdiction
(a) Substantive.--In accordance with Senate Rule XXV.1(j), the
jurisdiction of the Committee shall extend to all proposed legislation,
messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the
following subjects: . . .
17. Treaties and executive agreements, except reciprocal trade
agreements. . . .
(b) Oversight.--The Committee also has a responsibility under
Senate Rule XXVI.8, which provides that ' . . . each standing Committee
. . . shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application,
administration, and execution of those laws or parts of laws, the
subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of the Committee.'
(c) `Advice and Consent' Clauses.--The Committee has a special
responsibility to assist the Senate in its constitutional function of
providing 'advice and consent' to all treaties entered into by the
United States and all nominations to the principal executive branch
positions in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy . . .
rule 9--treaties
(a) The Committee is the only Committee of the Senate with
jurisdiction to review and report to the Senate on treaties submitted
by the President for Senate advice and consent. Because the House of
Representatives has no role in the approval of treaties, the Committee
is therefore the only congressional committee with responsibility for
treaties.''
FRC Rule 9 then seemingly creates a transmittal condition precedent
to considering a treaty:
``(b) Once submitted by the President for advice and consent, each
treaty is referred to the Committee and remains on its calendar from
Congress to Congress until the Committee takes action to report it to
the Senate or recommend its return to the President, or until the
Committee is discharged of the treaty by the Senate.''
It does appear a Member is not able to move a treaty toward a floor
vote in the absence of at least FRC consideration, though the relevant
rule does not seem to resolve the question of whether the Senate can
vote absent transmission (that is, take matters into its own hands to,
e.g., clarify an ambiguous U.S. position):
``rule xxx executive session--proceedings on treaties
1. (a) When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for
ratification, it shall be read a first time; and no motion in respect
to it shall be in order, except to refer it to a committee, to print it
in confidence for the use of the Senate, or to remove the injunction of
secrecy . . .
2. Treaties transmitted by the President to the Senate for
ratification shall be resumed at the second or any subsequent session
of the same Congress at the stage in which they were left at the final
adjournment of the session at which they were transmitted; but all
proceedings on treaties shall terminate with the Congress, and they
shall be resumed at the commencement of the next Congress as if no
proceedings had previously been had thereon.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Found at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule30.htm
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So, the Senate seemingly manufactures a ``requirement'' of
presentment. This does not make that requirement law but likely
demonstrates that a court might well defer a legal challenge to an
ambiguous U.S. treaty posture under the ``political question''
doctrine. Such a challenge, for example, could seek formal withdrawal
from Kyoto as a necessary step given the Executive's avowed rejection
of a signed treaty. The State Department manifested the position, in
the context of its communication to the U.N. regarding Rome, that
withdrawal from such a document requires this transmission pursuant to
the delegation of certain ``Management of foreign affairs'' in 22
U.S.C. Sec. 2656.\86\ This because by that act the Bush Administration
formally recognized the legal implications to signing a treaty,
seemingly giving merit to such an effort to compel other withdrawals to
resolve similar ambiguities and potential risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ See FN 57, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Still, this language raises an interesting debating point as to
whether there is the equivalent of a ``presentment'' requirement. That
is, the Senate arguably hereby distinguishes between ``Treaties
transmitted by the President to the Senate for ratification'', and,
``When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for ratification'',
that is, of the accord of one of its Members.
There clearly is no constitutional prohibition to the Senate taking
a signed treaty upon itself to consider, only a Senate rule possibly
indicating they have decided otherwise. The Senate has the right to
establish its rules of operation under Article I, Section 5, but that
language offers no prohibition and indeed is ambiguous at best as to
this matter. Certainly given the rhetoric of potential natural
catastrophe surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing
the U.S.' ambiguous role in Kyoto the Senate should take matters into
its own hands, and decide the fate of this agreement.
Regarding the transmittal itself, by practice, this communication
is considered formally as part of the Senate Treaty Document sent by
the White House.\87\ Clearly, a transmittal message need not request
ratification, but an Executive certainly may ask the Senate to reject a
treaty. Similarly, though not identical, is that in practice a
transmittal letter does not require ``transmission'' of the particular
treaty language for a vote, but can include a mere request that the
Senate express its sense that the treaty is not acceptable. This likely
satisfies the Vienna test for manifesting a state's intention to not be
bound by a treaty, if it does not equate with rejection. President
Reagan's transmittal of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention
offers an example of what may be considered ``risk-free transmittal'',
that is, asking for disapproval while not risking present or future
ratification of the actual agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ See, e.g., ``The President's Transmittal Message'', H.Doc.
107-20; http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgibin/
useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=td007.pdf&directory=/diskb/
wais/data/107--cong--documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After transmitting and asking for ratification of Protocol II,
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 concluded at
Geneva on June 10, 1977, President Reagan requested the Senate express
its sense of disapproval of Protocol I, which he did not transmit.
Addressing in part a topic very timely to a current debate,
specifically the status of certain combatants, President Reagan wrote:
``While I recommend that the Senate grant advice and consent to
this agreement [Protocol II], I have at the same time concluded that
the United States cannot ratify a second agreement on the law of armed
conflict negotiated during the same period. I am referring to Protocol
I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would revise the
rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all other
efforts associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross,
this agreement has certain meritorious elements.''\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ United States: Message From the President Transmitting
Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, January 29,
1987 (http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/ABARespID.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calling Protocol I ``fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed'',
Reagan described its flaws in principle and with some specific
examples, then shifted the burden to the Senate without actually
transmitting the Protocol with a recommendation to reject, stating in
relevant part:
``These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot
be remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to
submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would invite an
expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this view.''\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The deviation from form--sending treaty language for ratification--
extended to the request--mere disapproval of non-transmitted language.
Yet Reagan described his desired outcome as if it were a mere, standard
``rejection'':
``It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have
preferred to ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain
sound elements. But we cannot allow other nations of the world, however
numerous, to impose upon us and our allies and friends an unacceptable
and thoroughly distasteful price for joining a convention drawn to
advance the laws of war . . . The repudiation of Protocol I is one
additional step, at the ideological level so important to terrorist
organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as international actors.
Therefore, I request that the Senate act promptly to give advice and
consent to the ratification of the agreement I am transmitting today,
subject to the understandings and reservations that are described more
fully in the attached report. I would also invite an expression of the
sense of the Senate that it shares the view that the United States
should not ratify Protocol I, thereby reaffirming its support for
traditional humanitarian law, and its opposition to the politicization
of that law by groups that employ terrorist practices.''\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This quasi-transmittal offers a model for Executive request of the
Senate regarding other commitments through which the U.S. presents an
ambiguous posture. It does not, however, guarantee clarification: The
Senate elected to vote on neither Protocol, adding them to the heap of
literally dozens of treaties signed but not ratified, not to mention
those of which never were the subject of a ``transmittal'' to the
Senate.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ See http://www.icrc.org/eng/party--gc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This does offer authority for the proposition that the Senate need
wait for neither a Presidential transmission of language, nor a request
to ratify a treaty in order to speak to the issue of whether it accepts
the commitment. In the case of Kyoto, Byrd-Hagel has no relevant
``consent'' impact--though potentially great influence as ``advice''
eschewed--Kyoto not having been agreed at the time this (inherently)
non-binding resolution passed.
Another question involves the implications of ``transmitting'' a
treaty to Senate. Upon such communication, has the President ceded his
ability to withdraw, as President Bush withdrew from Rome? If so, is it
for a reasonable period for the Senate to act, say, the term of one
Congress, which ability is revived by the absence of Senate action over
another reasonable period of time?
Such resolution seems unnecessarily complex and, presuming no
presentment requirement exists for treaties, two outcomes appear
equally possible. The courts could determine some form of ``mutual
jurisdiction'' during a post-transmittal, pre-vote stage, during which
either branch may decide or at least advance the fate of an agreement.
Alternatively, the courts could determine that such an Executive
function should not be undertaken lightly. In such instance, they might
reason, given that even post-transmission--whatever the request--the
President retains the ability to formally request Senate rejection
decide that upon transmission the Senate obtains sole jurisdiction.
Finally, the courts may determine that there is indeed a
presentment requirement for treaties. In such case, it would be
reasonable to rule that, just as the President has the right to sit on
a treaty until presentment, the senate has the same right after
presentment. Of course, even President Bush's recent withdrawal from
Rome appears unprecedented, if precisely what longstanding
international policy held to be appropriate behavior. Thus, despite
that all of this remains conjecture, the increased possibility of
challenge to these questionable modern practices merits inquiry.
role of congress in the treaty process--advice and consent
What obligations and impediments arise from the constitutional
requirement of ``advice and consent'', particularly in the unique
circumstances offered by development of Kyoto? Further, what role does
the Senate play in possible withdrawal in such unique circumstances?
Finally, if a ratified agreement is amended, is it subject to further
advice and consent?
Advice: Kyoto Example
We have already examined the nontraditional role the Senate played
in offering advice to the Executive regarding the Kyoto Protocol,
development of which began soon after--and, arguably, partially as a
consequence of--the inauguration of a new U.S. administration. As
discussed, this process toward binding international commitments
regarding domestic energy use emissions not declared, for the most
part, ``pollutants'' by any nation in the world, came almost
immediately on the heels of agreeing in Rio to the UNFCCC's voluntary
campaign.\92\ This, certain domestic efforts,\93\ and a lack of
administration solicitation of advice alarmed many within the Senate.
As negotiations advanced, Senators took it upon themselves to register
advice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Per Kyoto's Preamble, it developed, de jure, ``Being guided by
Article 3 of the Convention,'' (Principles), which was the omnibus
``protect the planet'' provision. This rationalization emerged, de
facto, however directly pursuant to the new U.S. administration's
assertion of ``changed circumstances''. The next step, of actually
drafting a binding document, came ``Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate
adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention at its first session,'' as also set forth in Kyoto's
preamble.
\93\ Specifically, in 1993, the new Clinton-Gore Administration
created a State Department slot for former Senator Tim Wirth,
Undersecretary of State of Global Affairs, including in its portfolio
``environment''. Wirth was famous for his statement in 1990 as a
Democratic Senator from Colorado, ``We've got to ride the global
warming issue. Even if the theory of global warming is wrong, we will
be doing the right thing in terms of economic and environmental
policy.'' Cited in ``Global Warming: Just a Lot of Hot Air?'', The
Actuarial Review, August 1998 (Fred Kilbourne) (see http://
www.casact.org/pubs/actrev/aug98/gwfredk. htm). Rio, in hindsight, soon
began to look like an agreement whose authors had no sincere intent of
determining its effectiveness when it was almost immediately used as a
springboard to obtain mandatory, reduction commitments. In 1996, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance asserted that ``the
administration has been working on this policy for more than a year'',
quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate, seeing what was developing, unanimously passed a non-
binding, ``Sense of the Senate Resolution'':
``Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that----
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
or thereafter, which would----
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States.''\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105-54 July 21,
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent to this advice, and upon other nations of the world
resisting U.S. positions, Vice President Al Gore arranged to fly to
Kyoto, where he encouraged U.S. negotiators to show ``increased
negotiating flexibility.'' Kyoto emerged, clearly not satisfying Byrd-
Hagel condition (1)(A) by differentiating between 38 ``covered''
countries. Opponents were also angry over the agreement to
differentiate various commitments among those countries.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Specifically, parties committed to varying percentages of
reduction from 1990 levels of GHG emissions. Some were permitted to
increase emissions (e.g., Australia, by 8 percent), others permitted to
pool their emission increases/reductions under a bubble (the EU), while
the U.S. committed to reduce GHG emissions by 7 percent below 1990, or
19 percent below today's emission levels according to the Department of
Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding condition (1)(B), among prominent economic analysts only
the Clinton White House's Council of Economic Advisors, contended that
no ``serious economic harm'' would result.\96\ President Clinton never
submitted the treaty to the Senate over the course of the remaining 25
months of his presidency. Upon leaving office the relevant CEA
professionals publicly amended their assertions regarding Kyoto's
economic impact.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ EIA, e.g., estimated Kyoto's economic impact upon the U.S.
economy at $400 billion annually. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Admin., Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting.
Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic
Activity. Washington, DC. October 1998.
\97\ See USA Today, June 12, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration disregard for Senate advice was exacerbated when the
White House soon adopted a mantra of seeking ``meaningful participation
by key developing countries,'' a rhetorical sleight of hand to
facilitate ratification. Still, this received no widespread
condemnation, despite the administration's ploy being an apparent,
significant diminution of the Senate's most prominent ``Advice''.
The composition of the Senate can change appreciably over a short
time and, so long as the U.S. remains a signatory, it may feasibly
ratify Kyoto.\98\ All past sins of omission, and commission regarding
the Article II ``Advice'' requirement are absolvable through a
ratification vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ True, as described, supra, several non-signatory nations
ratified Kyoto nonetheless. These nations share neither our
Constitution, nor our adherence to protocol, and it seems implausible
that the U.S. Senate should ever reverse an Executive having rejected a
signed, unratified treaty that the Senate has made no move to consider.
It seems an open question whether Article II prohibits such an act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Consent'', or Ratification
As noted, it is clear from Article II Section 2 that the executive
has the power to negotiate agreements, and principal role therein. This
typically involves at minimum one signature stage, at minimum as a
protocol, formalizing'' the signatory's eligibility for
ratification.\99\ However, it is also clear pursuant to Article II the
terms of any agreement negotiated by the executive do not become
effective against the U.S. until and unless the Senate ratifies the
agreement by two-thirds of those voting.\100\ This presumably intimates
a limitation on the treaty power of an executive not being able to
validly enter agreements circumventing the constitutional ratification
requirement.\101\ Further, this raises the possible issue of what rises
to the level of a treaty requiring Senate ratification?\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Some systems, as recognized by individual treaties and the
Vienna Convention, allow for binding treaty commitments to arise from
this signature, equivalent with, e.g., U.S. Senate ratification.
\100\ See FN 47, supra.
\101\ See FN 55, supra.
\102\ See FN 53, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treaties typically recognize that a significant number of countries
do not permit the ``Executive'' to formally bind his nation through a
signature, but that it is a fairly common requirement that one or more
legislative bodies approve of the document. To the extent a particular
document does not address this issue, the Vienna Convention codifies
the ``customary'' recognition of this practice. Treaties also typically
provide a window for ratification. We have already seen, supra, the
ambiguities surrounding whether the Senate may of its own accord
consider a treaty for ratification.
The ``Consent'' function offers the Senate a second bite as the
``Advice'' apple. That is, with the rare exception found in Kyoto,
treaties typically allow reservations and/or objections to particular
provisions.\103\ The executive may make suggestions regarding such
objections, as it at issue in the current debate regarding Senate
ratification of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POPs Treaty).\104\ Domestic U.S. parties whose products or
businesses would be covered by this agreement's restrictions seek
ratification, but conditional upon one of two options in the treaty
language over the addition of new chemicals to the list of covered
substances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ See the UN's Model Instrument of Reservation at http://
untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/ annex6.htm.
\104\ See EPA statement on POPs Treaty at http://www.epa.gov/
oppfead1/cb/csb--page/updates/popsleg.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, these parties seek a reservation to the effect that
each addition to the list of covered chemicals requires discrete
ratification by countries recognizing this addition. This raises
another relevant ``Consent'' issue: whether treaty amendments require
individual ratification. The treaty itself typically addresses this
matter.\105\ To the extent an agreement does not address this matter,
Vienna offers ambiguous guidance as to what rule governs.\106\ This
contributes to the reality in practice that Senate ratification clearly
can be made contingent upon any modifications to the particular treaty
being subject to ratification prior to being binding on the U.S.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ See, e.g., Kyoto Article 20.
\106\ See Articles 41, 42.
\107\ In consenting to the Genocide Convention, the Senate added a
reservation that the U.S. must first specifically consent to IJC
jurisdiction before submitting any dispute to which the United States
was a party. ``Treaties and other International Agreements'', p. 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kyoto's amendment mechanism is set forth through various Articles.
First, specifically discussing ``non-compliance'' and consequences,''
Article 18 reads, in pertinent part, ``Any procedures and mechanisms
under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by
means of an amendment to this Protocol.'' Such amendment occurs as set
forth in Article 20:
``1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol.
2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary
session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol.
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any
proposed amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at
consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment
shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of
the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment
shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall
circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.'' (emphasis added)
Kyoto then proceeds to indicate that Senate ratification of Kyoto
even in its current, incomplete form and without a specific reservation
to this effect, nonetheless permits the U.S. to claim it is not bound
by any subsequent narrowing of Kyoto's terms without separate
ratification:
``4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be
deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with
paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having
accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the
Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of
the Parties to this Protocol.''
This is reassuring to some degree given that Kyoto permits all
nations to vote on binding consequences applicable only to those 36
countries actually covered by Kyoto's restrictions. Reassuring as this
``out'' may be, it remains foreseeable that the requisite three-fourths
of, e.g., all 178 parties to Kyoto should they ultimately ratify, can
occur if that large universe of countries facing all benefit, no pain
under Kyoto merely coalesce. The incentive to ``stick it'' to
particular countries, for example the U.S., is enormous, given the
amounts of money involved under a fully implemented rationing structure
that is Kyoto. Given international pressures to proceed ``with the
flow'' should the U.S. actually ratify Kyoto, this presents alarming
opportunities for other nations to extract even more benefits out of
the U.S. in this context than Kyoto's generous ``capacity building''
and ``development'' funds already envision.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ In response to this very practice of treaties moving far
along in the development stage that it takes political capital, often
not spent, to extricate from even that level of agreement, the Bush
Administration has initiated an informal policy group to look down the
road at potential such entanglements particularly in the environmental
context. This would seem to be a lesson learned from Rio and Kyoto.
Participants are drawn, inter alia, from the State Department, Council
on Environmental Quality, and National Security Council.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate ratification cannot constitutionally be abrogated by the
Executive,\109\ though as we have seen Congress can anticipatorily
abdicate the Senate's ability to modify an agreement's language, and
thus its ability to offer substantive objections or reservations
(though not to reject a treaty).\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ See Rabkin, pp. 12-16.
\110\ See discussion of NAFTA, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consideration of treaties must begin in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Again, and contrary to that reality that scores of
treaties formally transmitted to the Senate lie dormant, Senate FRC
Rule 9 calls for swift initiation of the consideration process:
d) Insofar as possible, the Committee should conduct a public
hearing on each treaty as soon as possible after its submission by the
President. Except in extraordinary circumstances, treaties reported to
the Senate shall be accompanied by a written report.
As also discussed in ``Transmittal'', Senate Standing Rule XXX
governs Senate treaty procedure.
The Constitution requires two-thirds of those ``present,'' or
voting. As mentioned, Alexander Hamilton foresaw possible political
gamesmanship in the ratification process, detailed in Federalist No.
75. Hamilton argued that requiring two-thirds of those ``present''
would mitigate these opportunities. Hamilton's fears were prescient,
though the resolved language suffers a similar soft underbelly for
political hijinks.
Imagine one party seeing great political gain in voting for a
politically charged treaty so long as it failed, and great peril--
political and otherwise--if enacted. This describes the dynamic between
many Senators and Kyoto. Extensive polling data show, for example, that
the concept of ``doing something'' about ``global warming'' enjoys
popular support so long as it remains a proposal potentially warding
off future catastrophe. The actual requirements of massive energy use
reductions, and how to attain them, are not quite so popular.
Consider a height of media and trade competitor outrage about a
U.S. President having informally ``rejected'' a treaty, say after one
World or Kyoto summit. The savvy Majority Leader might schedule a
treaty vote (see debate over ``Transmittal,'' supra). The intent would
be the near-certain, near-unanimous support of one party and a nicely
contrasting party bloc voting nearly unanimously against. Two-thirds
would not be achieved. Whispers to the Majority party's business
supporters could issue that the treaty stands no chance, so do not
become alarmed. This display would provide one party an opportunity to
declare their concern and support for a document that is politically
advantageous among certain constituencies, while casting its opposition
as heartlessly standing in the way. That party would carry a powerful
rhetorical weapon into the next elections.
This scenario collapses should most, e.g., Republicans simply not
be ``present'' come vote time. In such case, it seems highly likely the
attempted ploy would severely backfire, to great fanfare and political
heat from the other party's own ``green'' base. Members would rush to
the well to change their vote, and/or the treaty would ultimately be
pulled from consideration, naturally amid claims of the opposition's
irresponsibility. The alternative to this retreat would be a party
single-handedly responsible for the U.S. committing itself to a treaty
wildly unpopular even in theory among most labor and energy consuming
interests. For this reason, the required Senate vote remains subject to
gamesmanship.
Further, and as referenced, supra, in theory problems can arise
with agreements open for ratification though they are subject to
further negotiations, and indeed may require significant narrowing of
the meaning of its various provisions before offering sufficient detail
to be enforceable or even considered a meeting of the minds. Kyoto is a
sterling example of such problems.
Kyoto's express window for ratification was already open by, e.g.,
the November 2000 COP-6 in The Hague, and numerous countries had
already ratified the agreement such that it could go into effect
against them should it gain sufficient ratifications.\111\ The Hague
negotiations collapsed with no alteration or narrowing of the terms
after the EU and U.S. avowed wildly divergent opinions on the meaning
of several terms key to the agreement's financial impact on the
U.S.\112\ The parties immediately called ``COP-6.5'', held in Marrakech
in September 2001, to resume negotiations. By that time, President Bush
had taken office and repeated his campaign opposition to Kyoto,
solidifying the rhetorical, if not de facto, ``rejection'' by the U.S.
initiated at The Hague collapse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Of course, these ratifying nations were not those facing
actual emission reduction obligations under Kyoto, but among the 140
``exempt'' nations, who were principally made eligible to receive
wealth transfers under the treaty's auspices.
\112\ These negotiations occurred after the U.S. Presidential
election but prior to its resolution. There, the EU negotiators, likely
sensing desperation on the part of Clinton Administration negotiators
aware an administration opposed to Kyoto might well be inaugurated
soon, refused to take ``yes'' for an answer on key issues on the table.
Specifically, they held to a unique assertion regarding the significant
limitation upon sinks (credits for land use practices which actually
remove GHGs from the atmosphere), simply not visible to the naked eye
when reading the relevant Kyoto title (Article 3). The EU implausibly
insisted that parties intended the language that sinks ``shall be used
to meet the commitments under this article'' really only intended
allowance for insignificant sink credits. Given the U.S. intended to
meet a major portion of its Kyoto commitment through sinks, this
initiated the beginning of the (temporary?) ``end'' of full-fledged
U.S. participation in Kyoto talks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, Kyoto actually collapsed, so far as U.S. participation
is concerned, under the prior administration. The more relevant lesson
is that treaties open for ratification can, and often do, present
little in the way of an actual meeting of the minds permitting
implementation and compliance. Ratification should always be undertaken
warily, but, as this shows, should not even be considered when the
treaty remains subject to determining what it is that parties actually
agreed.
Deposit of Ratification Instrument
Despite the Clinton Administration negotiating Kyoto, for example,
over the course of 25 months it never ``communicated'' the treaty to
the Senate for a ratification vote.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ See ``Submission'', supra, for discussion of the necessity of
communicating a treaty to the Senate, or whether the Executive's
signature is sufficient justification for the Court to assert the
Senate's ability to ratify the document
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Still, though a ratification vote would create a stronger argument
of commitment, under Vienna Article 18, than would mere signature, it
does not formalize ``consent to be bound by the treaty'', pursuant to
the terms of most pacts. Even after agreement, signature, and a
ratification vote a country is not formally bound to the terms of a
treaty until it submits its instrument of ratification.\114\
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\114\ See the UN's ``Model Instrument for Ratification'', at http:/
/untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/ annex4.htm.
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Post-Ratification
Treaties can either require parties to enact implementing
legislation, or be ``self-implementing'', that is, needing no new
authority to implement its terms.\115\ Clearly, of course, as
authorities vary by state, a self-implementing treaty to one party may
require implementing legislation by another. Typically, however, self-
implementing treaties provide reporting and accounting functions
generally available to any relevant regulatory or administrative body.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ ``Implementation The executive branch has the primary
responsibility for carrying out treaties and ascertaining that other
parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other
international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire
Congress share in the following phases.'' ``Treaties and Other
International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', p. 12. ``A
question that may be raised under U.S. law is whether or not Congress
has a duty to implement a treaty which is in force internationally, but
which requires additional legislation or implementation or an
appropriation of funds to give effect to obligations assumed
internationally by the United States. When implementation of a treaty
requires domestic legislation or an appropriation of funds, only the
Congress can provide them.'' Id. at pp. 166-67. Despite no specific
implementing legislation, however, the Senate has indeed appropriated
funds in pursuit of administrative programs seeking to advance Rio's
objectives.
The FRC Report continues, ``The extent of congressional obligation
to implement a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in
principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority, Congress has
generally responded 'to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-
makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President
(especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to
make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .''' Id.
at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States
Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205-206. The referenced FN 61 says in
pertinent part, ``[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected
treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the
United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12,
1976, by Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in
U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
1976. 1977, p. 221.'' This begs the question: ``to precisely what
extent was the ``non-binding'' Rio binding?''
Addressing this question prior to ratification, ``[t]he [Senate
Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other words, its view that
'[t]he final framework convention contains no legally binding
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' . . . While these
statements may not be as legally binding as a formal condition to the
Senate's ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed: reservations were
prohibited by Rio's terms], it is doubtful that any administration
could ignore them.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions
about the Kyoto Protocol'', p. 4. CRS Report for Congress (March 29,
2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7, 1992)(statement of
Sen. McConnell).
To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 the Senate ``stated
the view that any agreement which would require Senate advice and
consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its economic
impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to implement
the agreement.'' See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An example of a self-ratifying treaty is the Rasmar Convention, or
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitats.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ I.L.M. 11:963-976; September 1972. This Convention entered
force on December 21, 1975, after the required signatures of seven
countries. The U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the Convention
on October 9, 1986, and the President signed instruments of
ratification on November 10, 1986.
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The Convention requires no implementing legislation as it merely
requires maintenance of a list of wetlands of international importance
and encourages ``wise use'' of wetlands in order to preserve the
ecological characteristics from which wetland values derive. The
required function(s) can be effected under existing regulatory and/or
administrative authority, in this case the task is merely the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service serving as an administrative authority, in
consultation with the Department of State.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ See http://laws.fws.gov/lawsdigest/treaty.html#list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kyoto Protocol, however, is an entirely different story. Even
in theory it is highly suspect that Kyoto could possibly proceed
without implementing legislation. This because for the U.S. to achieve
its obligations realistically requires significant reduction in
emissions from energy use. The former, emissions, are for the most part
not considered ``pollutants'' and therefore not regulated; the latter,
actual energy use, is not regulated in any governmental sense but by
market forces. Kyoto reductions would in fact require a massive series
of initiatives to implement its regime, from emissions limitations and
myriad tax provisions to internal versions of, inter alia, the
international verification and trading infrastructures. That maze is
illustrative of a treaty that is decidedly not self-implementing.
Withdrawal
The U.S. Constitution is silent as to the process for treaty
withdrawal. Treaties provide their own provisions for withdrawal from
their commitments. Kyoto's procedure, for example, is set forth in
Article 27, as follows:
``1. At any time after 3 years from the date on which this Protocol
has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this
Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of 1 year from
the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of
withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the
notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered
as also having withdrawn from this Protocol.''
Clearly, Senate ratification of a treaty that includes a withdrawal
mechanism should resolve the question of the legitimacy of an executive
acting pursuant to such mechanism. Though withdrawal can be politically
contentious, little controversy appears likely over the actual process
of withdrawal from treaties in-effect.\118\
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\118\ Yet this is not the case, be the treaty in effect or
otherwise. ``Domestically, the Constitution does not prescribe a
process for the United States to terminate a treaty, and the process
remains controversial. Treaties have been terminated in a variety of
ways, including by the President following a joint resolution of
Congress, by the President following action by the Senate, by the
President and with subsequent congressional or Senate approval, and by
the President alone.'' ``Treaties and Other International Agreements,''
at 14.
Regarding ABM, controversy exists in that numerous Members of
Congress have filed suit against President Bush's invocation of the
withdrawal provision in the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, signed
with the now-defunct Soviet Union. See also S. 1565 (107th), proposed
Senate resolution of disapproval.
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That focused upon in this paper, however, is the curious, topical
matter of withdrawing from agreements not ratified because of the
possibility of obligations arising from pre-ratification
commitments.\119\ The treaty may merely be signed, and not transmitted
to the Senate. The document may have been transmitted but not yet taken
up. As discussed in ``Submission'', supra, that transmittal may or may
not matter. Finally, a treaty may have been taken up for Senate
consideration, but failed to achieve the requisite two-thirds
vote.\120\
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\119\ There is also little room to dispute that an ``agreed to''
treaty as yet unsigned requires no withdrawal, given that even the
``troublemaking'' provision Vienna 18, is triggered by the signature,
not some even less formal level of ``commitment''. Specifically: ``A
State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval . . .'' The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius
would indicate that ``commitments'' begin with the signature. Also, the
pre-signature, ``agreement'' stage as in the 1997 Kyoto ``agreement''
likely does not rise to the level of ``exchanging documents.'' See the
canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.
\120\ Does the latter circumstance satisfy the Vienna test of
making ``its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty''?
This is a fascinating question given that ``(6) Treaties Reported by
the [Foreign Relations] Committee but neither approved nor formally
returned to the President by the Senate are automatically returned to
the Committee calendar at the end of a Congress; the Committee must
report them out again for the Senate to consider them.'' Therefore, a
``defeated'' treaty is not necessarily rejected until it is returned to
the President. See ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The
Role of the U.S. Senate'', p. 12, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--cong--senate--print&docid=f:66922. pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kyoto's sole relevant provision addresses only a treaty having
entered into force and offers no guidance as to how a state extracts
itself from whatever commitments are incurred through signature.\121\
This is seemingly true with the Vienna Convention's numerous relevant
Articles (54--72), though those seem arguably susceptible to claims
that they translate at minimum in spirit to state efforts to ``[make]
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ For an example of withdrawal from a treaty in effect, see
U.S. termination of recognition of compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice Treaty Series, vol. l, p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The UNFCCC ought to serve as an authority on this issue, but,
curiously, the same UNFCCC correspondence to the author regarding the
U.S. status re: Kyoto, cited in FN 19, supra, also asserted: ``There is
no procedure for the withdrawal of a signature in the [UNFCCC or
Kyoto].'' A follow-up request as to whether this indicates the UNFCCC
does not recognize the Vienna Convention has gone unanswered to date.
We can be confident that, at least in the case of the U.S., the
Vienna Article 18 requirement is not satisfied by senior officers
merely speaking ill of a treaty.\122\
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\122\ Vienna does permit rejection or withdrawal, if not elsewhere
provided otherwise and only under certain conditions, by
``denunciation.'' See, e.g., Articles 42-44, 56, etc. However, that
appears to be a term of art applicable only to executives with
unilateral power to effect a treaty. Clearly, given the discussion
above, that does not by itself seem to exclude the U.S. and its own
system's peculiarities, when a treaty has yet to be ratified. Still,
President Bush's precedent regarding Rome has established how the U.S.
expresses its rejection. Mere badmouthing can reasonably be viewed as a
negotiating ploy for a better offer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As regards the never ratified, never transmitted Kyoto (or Rome),
President Bush's badmouthing of the treaty, though he may clearly still
reject it, would not be considered to constitute rejection by
``denunciation.'' The U.S. continues to send delegations to the
relevant negotiations, though in a strange, voluntarily mitigated role
that is a matter of some controversy.\123\ Kyoto provides for
``observers'' in Article 15: ``2. Parties to the Convention that are
not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in the
proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the
subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol,
decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are
Parties to this Protocol.'' It is this provision the Administration
seems to believe it is invoking by attending negotiations in full
force, but in a somewhat ``backbench'' role.\124\
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\123\ One reason provided by the Bush Administration, publicly if
informally for the U.S. not having submitted any communication to the
UNFCCC indicating its intent to not be bound by Kyoto is that the U.S.
must remain a part of ``the Kyoto process''. There is no ``Kyoto
process,'' however, until the treaty achieves sufficient ratification
to go into effect. Until that time, these negotiations remain part of
the Rio Process (e.g., Kyoto emerged not from COP-1, or a Kyoto
process, but COP-3, of the Rio Process pursuant to Rio Article 7). The
U.S. delegation now assumes a second-class citizen posture,
communicating desires through a proxy nation (typically Canada, one of
the ``umbrella group'' nations; other such groups are the EU, the G-77
and China, etc.). This seems a wasted exercise as until Kyoto goes into
effect, as a ratifying party to Rio the U.S. has every right to
actively participate in the current round of COPs. This is another
example of how protocol, or the desire to not upset other parties,
dominates treaty process more than legal requirements.
\124\ The Administration are likely incorrect. Specifically, the
U.S. is informally spreading the word that because it has not ratified
Kyoto it is not a ``Party'', but thereby eligible for Article 15
``observer'' status. Yet it is clear that ``Party'' status originated
with the agreement to Kyoto's terms at the close of COP-3.
Specifically, Kyoto's own language belies a claim that until Kyoto is
made effective by sufficient ratifications there are no ``Parties'' to
the agreement.
The relevant provisions include, but are in no way limited to, the
following: a) Kyoto's preamble prior to its articles states ``The
Parties to this Protocol . . . Have agreed as follows: [Articles] . .
.'', dated December 1997 and setting forth articles clearly reading in
the present tense, and not as if relevant solely upon ratification; b)
Articles 6.2, 7.4, 16, 18 and 20, among others, all reference
activities which to the extent they have been addressed in the days
since COP-3 manifest that it is ``Parties''--to the Protocol, not the
UNFCCC--who have been deliberating since; c) Article 13.2 makes clear
that any decisions made regarding further narrowing of the Kyoto
language, subsequent to COP-3, were made by Parties to the Protocol;
and d) Article 13.7 appears to set forth the mechanism by which COP-6.5
(Bonn) was called and particularly timed, at the request of a Party to
Kyoto.
In sum, it takes remarkable creativity to contend under the
language of Kyoto that no Parties to Kyoto exist until sufficient
ratifications to bring Kyoto into effect have been submitted to the
Directorate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead, withdrawal from a treaty (in effect) sufficient to satisfy
Vienna is accomplished by communicating this intent to the other
parties to the treaty.\125\ As regards the unratified Rome Treaty,
President Bush doubtless satisfied the relevant requirement by
submitting an instrument rescinding the signature to the same body to
which the signature was communicated. Regarding such treaties, however,
until such communication, any nation is free to pursue an action
seeking to have, for example, either the Bush energy plan calling for
the construction of more coal-fired power plants, or its ``Climate
Action'' proposal allowing increased greenhouse gas emissions, for they
clearly violate Kyoto's ``object and purpose''.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ See Vienna Article 67.
\126\ Further, would the U.S. extending, or even permitting the
continued application of, oil and gas depletion allowances (tax breaks
facilitating lower-priced energy) also constitute a violation of Vienna
via Kyoto? If so, how about recently extended state subsidies for the
German coal industry, a nation which subsequently ratified Kyoto?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, reconsider the Geneva Convention Protocol I. President
Reagan transmitted a statement to the Senate whereby he did not send
the language and ask for an unsuccessful vote on ratification, but
asked for an ``expression of the sense of the Senate'' that it shared
his disapproving view of the agreement. This appears to be a mere
semantic distinction, but by so doing President Reagan performed a
burden shift, establishing by precedent a position on which very few
hard and fast rules govern. This transmittal intimated that the treaty
was purely in the Senate's realm upon Executive signature, when in fact
it is likely in the province of either the Executive or the Senate at
this point to act.
conclusion
The Kyoto Protocol, and its predecessor the Rio Treaty, offer an
excellent example of the distorted modern application of the Treaty
Power. This article intends to expose the impropriety of the U.S.
agreeing to amend the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC, or Rio Treaty), by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
For whatever specific reasons (economic growth, failure to foresee
the energy requirements of the ``new economy'', or other), the U.S.,
like many nations, failed to meet its voluntary Rio targets.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ See, e.g., http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf.
The EU, which under Kyoto has negotiated a ``bubble'' such that it
could pool its increases and ``reductions'', announced in May that it
met its Rio target. It said it had reduced greenhouse gases by 3.5
percent below 1990 levels in 2000. This is commonly attributed to the
ending of coal subsidies in Great Britain in their push to replace coal
with gas, shutting down East German industry and that Europe did not
match the U.S.' decade-long economic expansion. Russia, e.g., met its
target by regressing economically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now some advocates assert, ``Because the U.S. has not met its Rio
goal, we must commit to even greater mandatory reductions (Kyoto)''.
Attempting instead to comply with the initial treaty seems the more
appropriate response, for several reasons.
Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not
request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing
Rio, which was not an inherently self-executing treaty.\128\ Authority
and precedent make clear that responsibility for proposing such
programs lies with the White House.\129\ If our ``non-binding'' Rio
obligations in fact ``bound'' the U.S. to achieve specific
reductions\130\--contrary to contemporary Senate and Executive
assertions of U.S. intent--then the Executive interpretation of Rio
Article 4 throughout the 1990's was actually incorrect, and is
responsible. The pending question is apparently: does the U.S. respond
by attempting to meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even
deeper, binding promises?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ As the party charged with ``making'' treaties the Executive
is responsible for meeting, or at minimum proposing legislation to
affect, treaty commitments. President Clinton proposed a Btu tax,
though not expressly in pursuit of Rio. It failed once and did not
emerge again. He instituted his Climate Action Plan, which with minor
recent modifications continues to this day with more than 50 voluntary
programs, though a quick search of Thomas revealed no implementing
legislation. Congress did appropriate money in response to proposals by
the Executive. See, e.g., ``Treaties and Other International
Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', S. Rpt. 106-71, p.4.
\129\ ``Implementation The executive branch has the primary
responsibility for carrying out treaties and ascertaining that other
parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other
international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire
Congress share in the following phases.'' ``Treaties and Other
International Agreements'', p. 12. ``A question that may be raised
under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty to implement a
treaty which is in force internationally, but which requires additional
legislation or implementation or an appropriation of funds to give
effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States.
When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an
appropriation of funds, only the Congress can provide them.'' Id. at
pp. 166-67.
The FRC Report continues, ``The extent of congressional obligation
to implement a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in
principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority, Congress has
generally responded 'to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-
makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President
(especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to
make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .''' Id.
at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States
Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205-206. The referenced FN 61 says in
pertinent part, ``[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected
treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the
United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12,
1976, by Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in
U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
1976. 1977, p. 221.'' This begs the question: ``to precisely what
extent was the ``non-binding'' Rio binding?
\130\ Addressing the question, above (FN 5), prior to ratification,
``[t]he [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other
words, its view that '[t]he final framework convention contains no
legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' . . .
While these statements may not be as legally binding as a formal
condition to the Senate's ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed:
reservations were prohibited by Rio's terms], it is doubtful that any
administration could ignore them.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected
Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol'', p. 4. CRS Report for
Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7,
1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).
To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 (105th Cong., 1st
Sess., adopted at 143 CONG. REC. S 8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)), the
Senate ``stated the view that any agreement which would require Senate
advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its
economic impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to
implement the agreement.'' See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.' Rio promises, in favor of
Kyoto's binding commitments even greater than those we've failed to
attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this of course is that,
precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it
recognized was an unacceptable drift away from the U.S. Rio stance
adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing what was
developing, asserted its ``Advice'' pursuant to Article II, Section 2
of the U.S. Constitution, passing S. Res. 98.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ ``In mid-1997, as these negotiations were underway, the
Senate passed S. Res. 98 [ed.: ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress
(105-54 July 21, 1997)], which stated that the Senate would not approve
any agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not
include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/
industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S.
economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to
the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to
date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding
their greenhouse gas emissions.'' ``Treaties and Other International
Agreements'', p. 276.
The operative language is as follows: ``Resolved, That it is the
sense of the Senate that----
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
or thereafter, which would----
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent to and despite this Advice, U.S. negotiators clearly
disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did not
require developing countries to share our commitments, and even the
Clinton White House economic advisors have recanted their refutations
of the Kyoto cost estimates.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ ``Economists from the Clinton White House now concede that
complying with Kyoto's mandatory reductions in greenhouse gases would
be difficult--and more expensive to American consumers than they
thought when they were in charge.'' USA Today, 12 June 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not
still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that
very few Senators have amended their position against a treaty causing
``serious economic harm.'' However, Clinton Administration officials
did admit that they began working on the plan for binding commitments
within 1 year after Rio went into effect.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance
asserted that ``the administration has been working on this policy for
more than a year'', quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ``treaty
hopping'' campaign: even the models on which it is based predict an
undetectable climatic impact\134\--at a cost to the U.S. of up to $400
billion annually\135\--yet may be 1/30th of what its proponents
seek.\136\ Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but purport ``the
same ultimate objective.''\137\ The U.N. IPCC has said this means
reducing GHG emissions by as much as 60-80 percent, which wildly
exceeds Kyoto's specified ambitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ See, Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works, at http://www.techcentralstation.com/
1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-031302C.
\135\ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. ``Impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic Activity.'' Washington,
DC. October 1998.
\136\ ``Yet the climate simulations lead to the conclusion that the
Kyoto reductions will have little effect in the twenty-first century
(15), and 1930 Kyotos' may be needed to reduce warming to an acceptable
level.' James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis, and Valdar
Oinas, ``Global warming in the twenty-first century: An alternative
scenario,'' Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences, August 29,
2000.
Hansen was citing Malakoff, D. (1997) Science 278, 2048.
\137\ ``[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.'' See, e.g., Rio Article 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As such the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying
any further agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the actual
``ultimate goal'', but that it is committed to its practical
requirements, in this case up to ``30 Kyotos''.
Such ``treaty hopping'' agendas illustrate the importance of Senate
treaty ``reservations'', or the Senate's second bite at the ``Advice''
apple. This comes of course during the ``Consent'' function, which
function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately eviscerated. After agreeing
to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted
Kyoto's prohibition on reservations, or the Senate's ability to specify
the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S. commitment. This
despite the Senate also having forewarned the administration about this
in advance of Kyoto.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ See ``Treaties and Other International Agreements,'' at 274.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of
having ``rejected'' Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to
that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal
Court.\139\ In the absence of that act, the White House must at minimum
assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto by requesting the
Senate disapprove of the treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate
should recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the
``presentment'' clause\140\, regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any
constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a signed
treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric surrounding Kyoto, if
President Bush insists on continuing the U.S.' ambiguous role the
Senate should take matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of
this agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ The President manifested that this is how the United States
makes ``its intention clear to not become a party to the treaty,'' as
required by ``customary'' law and the Vienna Convention Article 18.
``[S]ignature by the U.S. does impose an obligation on the U.S. under
international law to refrain from actions that would undermine the
Protocol's object and purpose. That obligation continues to apply until
such time as the U.S. ratifies the Protocol or makes clear its intent
not to do so.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about
the Kyoto Protocol'', CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).
\140\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7: ``Every Bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States''.
Though it has not yet done so, precedent indicates the Senate can
also effect this outcome by passing a Sense of the Senate expressing
disapproval of a signed, not ratified treaty. See, ``Withdrawal,'' in
attached article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That resolution should by definition be rejection of Kyoto.
Otherwise, by accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and
prohibiting reservations, this body would condone Executive
circumvention of the Senate's constitutional treaty role.
__________
Statement of Jon Reisman, Associate Professor of Economics and Public
Policy, University of Maine at Machias
I would like to call the attention of the Committees on Foreign
Relations and Environment and Public Works to a troubling development
in New England, where all six New England Governors (NEG) have entered
into an unconstitutional agreement with the Eastern Canadian Premiers
(ECP) to implement the Kyoto Protocol's caps on carbon dioxide
(CO<INF>2</INF>) emissions. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Committee on the Environment and the Northeast International
Committee on Energy of the Conference of New England Governors and
Eastern Canadian Premiers, Climate Change Action Plan 2001. http://
www.scics.gc.ca/pdf/850084011--e.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my view, the NEG/ECP climate change agreement:
<bullet> Violates Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution: ``No
State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation . . . No
State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . .
.'' and
<bullet> Seeks to implement the Kyoto Protocol before the U.S.
Senate has ratified it, and when, in fact, it has been rejected
explicitly by the President and implicitly by the terms of Senate
Resolution No. 98 by a vote of 95-0.
The NEG/ECP climate change agreement is a transparent attempt to
implement the Kyoto Protocol, without reference to the complex terms of
the Protocol itself. It calls for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels by 2010 and to 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. This
level of reduction substantially exceeds the 7 percent reduction target
that the United States would need to meet by 2008-2012 under the Kyoto
agreement.
Action steps under the NEG/ECP climate agreement include:
1) establishing a regional, standardized greenhouse gas emissions
inventory and emissions reduction plan;
2) ``educating'' the public about the ``problem, causes and
solutions'' of global warming;
3) decreasing emissions from the electricity and transportation
sectors, and
4) creating a regional registry and emissions trading mechanism.
The New England Governors are scheduled to travel to Quebec this
August and likely will sign an agreement with the Eastern Canadian
Premiers to begin implementing the unconstitutional pledge they made
last year. \2\ This year, they intend to work out specific goals and
implementation schemes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\News summary of the 2001 meeting at http://www.edie.net/news/
Archive/4632.cfm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is settled precedent supporting the position that the NEG/ECP
climate agreement violates the U.S. Constitution. In Holmes v.
Jennison, Chief Justice Taney emphasized the broad intent of the
framers underlying Section 10:
``As these words ('agreement or compact') could not have been idly
or superfluously used by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot
be construed to mean the same thing with the word treaty. They
evidently mean something more, and were designed to make the
prohibition more comprehensive. . . . The word `agreement' does not
necessarily import and direct any express stipulation; nor is it
necessary that it should be in writing. . . .
``And the use of all of these terms, `treaty,' `agreement,'
`compact,' show that it was the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that
they anxiously desired to cutoff all connection or communication
between a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that
evident intention, unless we give to the word `agreement' its most
extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement,
written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the
mutual understanding of the parties.'' 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 540, 570-572
(1840).
In addition to these legal concerns, the policy wisdom of
implementing Kyoto may certainly be debated in the face of the National
Academy of Sciences' recent finding that anthropogenic vs. natural
causality is still clouded by considerable uncertainty \3\. Correlation
is not causation, and the atmospheric models that global warming
advocates rely upon predict that the upper atmosphere will warm first,
something that has not happened and is still unexplained. Furthermore,
those same flawed models predict that the reductions in CO<INF>2</INF>
envisioned in Kyoto will essentially have no effect on climate \4\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\National Academy of Sciences. Climate Change Science: An
Analysis of Some Key Questions (2001) http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309075742/html/
\4\Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/
envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-031302C
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee on Foreign Relations should hold a separate inquiry
on the purpose and Constitutional legitimacy of the NEG/ECP climate
change agreement. Allowing six New England States to move forward to
implement the Kyoto Protocol would support the proposition that States
are free to ignore Article 1, Section 10, and are at liberty to
negotiate and implement international agreements without the advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate.
These concerns are far from academic. Suppose, for example, that
Vermont had disagreed with the Senate's rejection of the League of
Nations, and had recognized and joined that entity? Article 1, Section
10 exists precisely to avoid such situations.
If the Environment and Public Works Committee supports the efforts
of New England's Governors, it should introduce legislation to
implement Kyoto's caps on a nationwide basis, and let that legislation
be fully debated on the floor of the Senate. There is absolutely no
defensible environmental or economic rationale for piecemeal regional
implementation of an international agreement that fails, by its terms,
to address future emissions growth by rapidly growing developing
nations such as China and India. Implementing Kyoto targets on a
regional basis would lead only to competitive disadvantage, lost wages
and jobs, and larger State budget deficits at a time of increasing
economic uncertainty.
I hope that the Committees will join me in urging the
Administration to notify the New England Governors that the United
States Constitution still applies in New England, even on environmental
matters. We have not, as yet, dispensed with the formality of having
the President negotiate and the Senate ratify international agreements
before we implement them. States are proscribed from making foreign or
interstate agreements. That Constitutional principle is at risk here.
______
Jon Reisman is an associate professor of economics and public
policy at the University of Maine at Machias, where he teaches a
variety of courses including Environmental Policy and Political
Correctness in American Society. He has a B.A. in economics and
environmental studies from Colby College, an M.A. in economics from
Brown University and an M.A. in public policy and management from the
University of Southern Maine.
Reisman worked for Gov. Angus King in 1995 getting rid of federally
mandated car testing in Maine. Upon returning to rural Downeast Maine,
he led the effort opposing the endangered species listing of Atlantic
salmon. In 1998 he was the GOP nominee in Maine's 2d congressional
district.
Reisman pioneered an innovative course offering, ``Political
Correctness in American Society'' at the University of Maine at
Machias. The course is now offered on the web. Reisman's home page is
http://www.umm.maine.edu/faculty/jreisman/jreisman.html
______
Synthesis
(by John C. Dernbach)
In June 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, the nations of
the world agreed to implement an ambitious plan for sustainable
development. The United States was one of those countries. Has the
United States moved toward or away from sustainable development in the
10-year period since Rio? What should the country do next? The book has
sought to answer both questions.
Sustainable development is ecologically sustainable human
development; it includes but is not limited to economic development.
Sustainable development affirms the basic goals of development since
the end of World War II, but changes them in one key way. Development
is based on peace, economic development, social betterment, and
effective national governance. Its goals are human freedom,
opportunity, and quality of life, and it has succeeded in many ways.
Unfortunately, we now face growing environmental degradation around
the world, and a growing gap between rich and poor. Increasingly, these
problems undermine and hinder traditional methods of economic and
social development. Deforestation and overfishing mean that many people
and businesses can no longer earn a livelihood. Pollution impairs human
health and thus human betterment. Conflicts over water and other
resources lead to violence and civil strife. These and other problems
are profoundly destabilizing because they mean less freedom and
opportunity and lower quality of life.
Sustainable development responds to these problems by adding
environmental protection to the goals of traditional development.
Instead of development at the environment's expense, or environmental
protection at the expense of development, sustainable development would
achieve both traditional development and environmental protection or
restoration at the same time. Sustainable development affirms the
importance of freedom, opportunity, and quality of life, for both
present and future generations.
Sustainable development should matter to the United States because
freedom, opportunity, and quality of life are among our core goals as a
Nation. Providing a better life for those who come after us is also a
basic American value. Sustainable development would lead to a stronger,
more efficient, and more productive America, because this country's
economic, environmental, social, and security goals would support each
other in greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermine
one another. Sustainable development would also both require and
promote effective governance and legal systems, which Americans also
value. By addressing the destabilizing effects of poverty and
environmental degradation around the world, the United States could
help make the world more secure. In addition, U.S. economic and
military power, as well as the ethical and religious foundations for
sustainability, suggest a special obligation to work for sustainable
development.
The United States has, unquestionably, begun to take some steps
toward sustainable development. In fact, those who see sustainable
development as including prior and ongoing efforts, such as
conservation and pollution control, could rightly say that the 1990's
saw a continuation of activities that began before the Earth Summit.
Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from being a sustainable
society, and in many respects is farther away than it was in 1992.
While there is ``good news'' and ``bad news'' to report, the bad
news is told in general trends, broad studies, and for entire economic
sectors or program areas. All too frequently, the good news is limited
to specific examples and particular programs. The United States has not
responded in a way that corresponds to the seriousness of the problems
we face or to the opportunities provided by sustainable development.
Nevertheless, legal and policy tools are available to put the United
States on a direct path to sustainability, to our great advantage and
without major dislocations-if we can muster the will and the vision to
use them.
This synthesis begins with an overview of the book's findings and
recommendations, followed by an explanation of sustainable development
and its importance to the United States. It then summarizes each of the
book's major sections, which concern consumption and population;
international trade, finance, and development assistance; conservation
and management of natural resources; waste and toxic chemicals;
education; institutions and infrastructure; and governance. Throughout,
the synthesis summarizes and often excerpts from individual chapters.
overview
A Little Good News
In virtually every area of American life, a few people and
organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. A small
number of Federal agencies, State governments, local governments,
corporations, universities, and others have taken a leadership role in
moving toward sustainable development over the past decade. Nearly all
of these efforts contain room for improvement. Still, they demonstrate
that it is both possible and desirable to reconcile environmental,
social, and economic goals. For instance:
The Federal Government greatly expanded its use of habitat
conservation plans in the past decade to reconcile conflicts between
economic development and endangered species protection. A few States
have begun to implement strategies for sustainable development and use
indicators for sustainability.
At the community level, some sustainability initiatives have been
undertaken, and are yielding some positive results.
A handful of major corporations are seriously embracing the
``triple bottom line'' of environment, economy, and society or equity
as a way of setting and achieving goals. A small minority of primary
schools, high schools, and higher education institutions are teaching
students to perform the kind of integrated and interdisciplinary
analysis needed to make decisions that simultaneously further social,
economic, and environmental goals.
In a few areas, the United States has played a significant and
constructive international leadership role. These include the
protection of high seas fisheries, the prevention of lead poisoning,
integration of environmental considerations into trade agreements, and
incorporation of environmental impact reviews and public participation
in World Bank projects.
The President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), an
advisory council that existed between 1993 and 1999, developed hundreds
of recommendations that would foster national security, economic
development, job creation, and environmental protection at the same
time. The PCSD and others outlined a policy framework showing that the
United States actually could make significant progress toward
sustainable development.
There is much better information about many environmental problems
now than there was 10 years ago, and generally greater access to it. We
also have a much better idea of the steps needed to achieve sustainable
development, and have made significant progress in creating the policy
and legal tools necessary to do so.
A Lot of Bad News
Energy and materials consumption grew substantially in the past
decade, and reduced or outweighed many specific environmental
achievements. With 5 percent of the world's population, the United
States was at the time of the Earth Summit responsible for about 24
percent of the world's energy consumption and almost 30 percent of the
world's raw materials consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials
use has increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased
21 percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide (CO<INF>2</INF>)
emissions have increased by 13 percent. Over and over, increases in
materials and energy efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution
controls for individual sources, are outweighed by increases in
consumption. Despite a significant increase in municipal waste
recycling in the past decade, for example, the U.S. generation and
disposal of municipal solid waste per capita have been growing since
1996. U.S. population-the number of people consuming resources and
energy-grew by 32.7 million, or 13.2 percent, from 1990 to 2000, the
largest single decade of growth in the nation's history.
Moreover, the United States has not exercised the kind of
international leadership necessary to encourage or support sustainable
development around the world. The United States is not a Party to many
treaties and international agreements that are intended to foster
sustainable development in specific contexts, including the Convention
on Biological Diversity and the Kyoto Protocol. Current patterns of
international trade cause environmental harm and impair sustainable
development in part because U.S. trade policy tends to put short-term
domestic economic goals ahead of sustainable development. U.S. official
development assistance has declined since Rio. Although the United
States was the second largest provider of official development
assistance in 2000, its contribution was the lowest of all
industrialized countries, measured as a percentage of gross domestic
income.
U.S. law and policy continue to encourage unsustainable development
in a variety of ways. These include subsidies, ``grandfather''
provisions for existing and more-polluting facilities and activities in
pollution control laws, and fragmented local decisionmaking that
encourages sprawl. Such laws and policies mean that individuals and
corporations have fewer choices, and less sustainable choices, than
they would otherwise.
The United States has no national strategy for achieving
sustainable development, and no generally accepted indicators to mark
progress along the way. Nor does the United States have a meaningful or
effective strategy to address climate change, biodiversity, and many
other issues. Neither the executive branch nor the U.S. Congress
systematically analyze proposed activities to find ways to make
significant progress on economic, environmental, social, and security
goals at the same time.
As a whole, the condition of America's natural resources and
ecosystems has not improved, and appears to have deteriorated slightly,
over the past decade. There was no discernible improvement in our
rivers, streams, and lakes, and the quality of our ocean coastal waters
appears to have deteriorated. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increased,
and a large number of plant and animal species continue to be at risk
of extinction. U.S. agriculture is less sustainable, and urban sprawl
continues relatively unabated. Air quality improved slightly, but not
enough to fully protect human health.
The social and institutional infrastructure and supports needed for
sustainable development continue to cause environmental degradation and
underserve the poor. The negative environmental impacts of
transportation increased during the past decade, despite significant
legislative changes. The U.S. sanitation system remains vulnerable to
breakdowns, the level of communicable diseases is high when compared to
other developed countries, and there has been no discernible progress
in improving access to medical care.
Recommendations for the Next Decade
The path to sustainability is not an easy one, but it is marked by
basic American values. These include freedom, opportunity, and quality
of life; greater efficiency; more effective and responsive governance;
a desire to make a better world for those who follow us; a willingness
to find and exploit opportunities; a quest for a safer world; and a
sense of calling to play a constructive role in international affairs.
All of these are underscored by our ethical and even religious
obligations toward each other and the environment.
The United States would take a large and decisive step toward
sustainability if individuals, businesses, educational institutions,
local and State governments, Federal agencies and others would simply
adopt and build on the leading sustainability practices of their
counterparts here and in other nations.
A national strategy for sustainable development, with specified
goals and priorities, would harness all sectors of society to achieve
our economic, social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy
could be modeled on that of the European Union (EU) and States such as
New Jersey, and specifically address climate change, biodiversity, and
other major issues. An executive-level entity would be needed to
coordinate and assist in the implementation of the strategy. A
counterpart entity in Congress would also be helpful. The strategy
would more likely be effective if there were a set of indicators to
measure progress in achieving its goals. Comparable State and local
strategies and indicators are also needed.
The United States needs to recognize that its substantial
consumption levels, coupled with domestic population growth, have
serious environmental, social, and economic impacts. Americans also
need to understand that human well-being can be decoupled from high
consumption of materials and energy. A shift in taxes from labor and
income, on one hand, to materials and energy consumption, on the other,
would encourage both greater efficiency and reduced negative
environmental impacts.
Congress should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that
encourage unsustainable development. The elimination of subsidies would
also have positive budgetary impacts. The repeal or modification of
such laws would provide more and better opportunities for individuals
and corporations to act in a more sustainable manner, and would remove
an important set of barriers to sustainability.
Protection of natural resources and the environment must focus more
holistically on the resources to be protected, and on understanding
those resources. Congress and the States need to assure that these
resources are protected from all significant threats, and are protected
from those threats to the same degree. In addition, the type of
substantive goals that exist in the air and water pollution control
programs, as well as supportive implementing mechanisms, should be
applied to biodiversity, climate change, oceans under U.S.
jurisdiction, forests, and other natural resources. The United States
also needs to fund or support the development of more complete and
reliable information about ecosystems as well as about the connections
among its economic, environmental, social, and security goals.
Social infrastructure, institutions, and laws should be designed
and operated to further economic, environmental, and social goals at
the same time. Public health services and, at a minimum, basic medical
services should be available to all. Transportation infrastructure
should be more efficient and diverse, and provide people with more
choices.
The United States needs to take a stronger and more constructive
leadership role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad
range of issues related to sustainable development. The United States
should further increase its official development assistance, while
taking measures to ensure that the money is spent effectively and for
sustainable development. More broadly, U.S. foreign policy, including
trade policy, needs to be more supportive of the development aspect of
sustainable development. The United States should also become a Party
to many of the international treaties that would foster sustainable
development, including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Aarhus Convention on Access to
Information, the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent, the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes.
Some longer term changes are also needed if the United States is to
achieve sustainable development. They include the evolution of judicial
understanding of property to update expectations about the productive
value of ecosystems and the establishment of more inviting avenues for
public participation in and challenge to decisions affecting
sustainability.
What Is Sustainable Development?
Sustainable development is human development that is ecologically
sustainable. Its aims are human freedom, opportunity, and higher
quality of life. It is not another name for economic development,
although it includes economic development.
Because ``sustainable'' modifies ``development,'' it is first
important to understand what development means. Although Americans
understand development to mean the transformation of a field or woodlot
into housing or a mall, development has a different meaning at the
international level. Since the end of World War II, the United States
and most of the world community have successfully sought greater peace
and security, economic development, and social development or human
rights. They have also sought national governance that supports these
goals, even though they recognize that international efforts are also
needed. As understood internationally, these are the four elements of
development. This understanding of development grew out of the
experiences of the last world war and the great depression that
preceded and contributed to it, and a firm desire to ensure that the
conditions that led to them would not occur again. More positively,
development is intended to foster human freedom, opportunity, and
quality of life.
For more than half a century, we have measured progress by the
extent to which we have realized these goals. And there has been a
great deal of progress. The world is more free, there is more
opportunity, and most humans have a higher quality of life now than
they did in 1945.
But until recently, protecting and restoring the environment was
not among these goals. Indeed, progress in achieving these other goals
was considered to outweigh or even justify any environmental
degradation that may have occurred.
As the World Commission on Environment and Development concluded in
1987, progress in the past half century has come with a price we cannot
ignore and can no longer afford-massive and growing environmental
degradation, and a growing number of people in poverty. The commission
concluded that countries should seek sustainable development-
''development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.''
Sustainable development would thus meet human needs over the long term;
the present generation would not benefit at the expense of future
generations. When nations of the world endorsed sustainable development
at the Earth Summit in 1992, they redefined progress to include
environmental protection and restoration.
Sustainable development is based on a sober and realistic appraisal
of how humans need to approach the problems of the next half century or
more. Like traditional development, it is premised on a recognition of
what can happen when freedom, opportunity, and quality of life are
inequitably realized or are diminishing.
Every major international and regional report on the condition of
the environment shows continuing and deteriorating environmental
conditions. The gap between the rich and poor continues to grow.
Poverty and environmental degradation are mutually reinforcing; poor
people live in the most polluted or degraded environments, and this
contributes to their poverty. Although poverty and environmental
degradation are important in their own right, they also can cause or
contribute to wars, starvation, ethnic tensions, and terrorism, which
are more likely to get headlines than their underlying causes. Like
terrorism, poverty and environmental degradation are destabilizing. The
pressures caused by poverty and environmental degradation are likely to
increase in the next half century. Global population is expected to
grow from roughly six to nine billion, or 50 percent, by 2050. The
global economy is likely to grow by a factor of three to five in the
same period. As difficult and challenging as things now appear, they
are likely to become much more difficult and challenging in the decades
ahead.
Sustainable development also has deep ethical and religious roots.
Sustainable development leads to two major shifts in ethical thinking
and action. It recognizes the connections between humanity's social,
ecological, and economic obligations, and it recognizes responsibility
for future as well as present generations. Agenda 21, the blueprint for
sustainable development adopted at the Earth Summit, thus calls for
distributive justice, or a fair sharing of environmental resources by
humans. The distributive justice theme was in response to demands by
developing countries that they have the same right to use natural
resources as developed countries. Agenda 21 also suggests that humans
have a moral responsibility to limit activities that, if not curtailed
or redirected, will severely degrade or even destroy ecosystems.
Because human damage to the environment also hurts other humans,
sustainable development recognizes the relationship between
environmental protection and social justice.
The sacred texts and beliefs underlying the world's religions also
support sustainable development, even if that has not been true of
their practices. These religious traditions support appreciation for
all life; human stewardship of creation; harmony among humans, their
communities, and their environment; and a caring for place. They also
indicate that the natural world is valuable in itself, not simply
insofar as humans may value it. They articulate the importance of deep
respect for creation, both human and nonhuman, and living in a manner
that is ecologically sustainable. These texts and beliefs also indicate
the importance of fair and equitable sharing of resources, which would
mean both ceilings and floors for consumption. Finally, they suggest
that people be given an opportunity to participate in decisions that
will affect their lives and their communities.
To achieve sustainable development, nations at the Earth Summit
endorsed two important but nonbinding texts, Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration. (They also agreed to a separate set of principles for
forestry.) As a global plan of action for sustainable development,
Agenda 21 is intended to be carried out primarily, but not exclusively,
by countries within their own borders. Agenda 21, which contains 40
separate chapters, runs several hundred pages regardless of how it is
printed. These chapters focus on the social and economic dimensions of
sustainable development, e.g., poverty, human health, and population;
conservation and management of natural resources, e.g., atmosphere,
forests, biological diversity, and various wastes and toxic chemicals;
the role of major groups, e.g., children and youth, women, farmers,
workers, and business and industry, in attaining sustainable
development; and means of implementation, e.g., financial resources,
technology transfer, science, education, and public information. Each
chapter identifies specific actions to be taken, explains generally why
these actions are necessary, identifies the persons or institutions who
are to take action, and describes specific means of implementation.
The Rio Declaration is a set of 27 principles for sustainable
development. Key principles include the integration of environment and
development in decisionmaking, sustainable patterns of resource
production and consumption, the polluter-pays principle, the
precautionary approach or principle, developed country leadership,
intergenerational equity, and public participation. The polluter-pays
principle would have polluters bear the costs of preventing and
cleaning up environmental problems rather than impose the costs of
those problems on others. According to the precautionary principle, the
absence of complete scientific certainty about serious problems is not
an excuse for refusing to take action. These principles also are woven
into Agenda 21.
In Rio, the international community also established a process for
reviewing national and international progress toward sustainable
development. Agenda 21 has been, and continues to be, the focal point
of that process.
When countries agreed to Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, they
agreed to implement these agreements, both at home and in their foreign
policy. The United States, under the leadership of President George
H.W. Bush, was one of those countries.
Why Should Sustainable Development Matter to the United States?
Americans should care about sustainable development because its
goals-human freedom, opportunity, and quality of life-are also our
goals. We sought independence for these purposes, established a legal
and economic system premised on their importance, endured a civil war
to protect that system and expand its opportunities to others, and
fought two world wars and numerous other conflicts to protect ourselves
and help make those same opportunities available to others.
Sustainable development, moreover, is not just about us, the
current generation of Americans. It is, in the U.S. Constitution's
words, about ``ourselves and our posterity,'' our children,
grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and others not yet born who will
someday inhabit this country. We pride ourselves on providing our
descendants greater opportunities and a better quality of life.
Sustainable development would do precisely that. Without it, we cannot
assure our children and grandchildren a better life, and are likely to
leave them a poorer one.
Sustainable development would lead to a stronger and more efficient
America because we would be pursuing social, economic, environmental,
and security goals in ways that are more mutually reinforcing or
supportive over time, not contradictory or antagonistic. The result
would be a stronger, more efficient country that provides its citizens
and their descendants increasingly more opportunities in a quality
natural environment. Increased energy efficiency would reduce energy
costs for manufacturers and consumers, and would also mean reduced
pollution. In addition to securing an ongoing supply of timber and
paper products, sustainable forestry matters because we rely on forests
for watershed maintenance, pollution abatement, climate control, jobs,
and recreation. Similarly, a sustainable transportation system would
make it easier, less expensive, and less environmentally damaging for
people of all incomes to travel from home to work and other
destinations. Cleaner production is likely to be less costly and more
efficient, reduce the economic and social burdens created by human
exposure to hazardous wastes and substances, and improve the
occupational health and safety of workers.
Sustainable development would also lead to better and more
responsive governance, which is another basic American value. Ensuring
that our economic, social, environmental, and security goals are
mutually supportive would require that the government does not
subsidize with one hand what it controls on the other. It would also
require more public involvement in many decisionmaking processes
because public input is more likely to ensure that these goals are
harmonized.
Sustainable development would also lead to a safer, more stable and
secure world outside American borders. That would have important and
positive consequences for both ourselves and others, particularly after
September 11, 2001. The world is deeply divided between haves and have-
nots, and the risk of evolution toward an unstable, two-class world,
with a huge global underclass, is quite real. Americans have a large
stake in the prevention or avoidance of humanitarian emergencies,
national and regional conflicts, environmental deterioration,
terrorism, illicit drugs, the spread of diseases, illegal migration,
and other disasters. These threats to our security do not need
passports to cross borders. None of the goals that this country has
pursued around the world-peace and stability, human rights and
democratization, expansion of trade and markets, environmental
protection, or putting an end to hunger and extreme deprivation-can be
accomplished effectively except in the context of sustainable
development. Thus, while sustainable development assistance in
developing countries can be justified on humanitarian grounds, it is
also consistent with the strategic interests of the United States.
Americans have a special role to play in sustainable development.
We have the largest economy and the most powerful military in the
world. Not only do we have enormous capability to bring to bear in the
pursuit of sustainable development, we also bear a significant share of
the responsibility for the global environmental problems that
sustainable development is intended to address. The United States is
the world's largest producer and consumer of materials and energy.
Since the U.S. model of production and consumption is widely emulated
throughout the world, U.S. domestic actions could also have a major
international effect.
It is often said that nations or individuals can lead, follow, or
get out of the way. The United States is in an unparalleled position to
play a key international leadership role on sustainable development.
The United States could instead permit the EU, Japan, and other
developed countries to play the leadership role, and follow their lead.
That would be unpalatable to many, but it would be better than doing
nothing. Because of its dominant role in international affairs,
however, the United States cannot simply get out of the way. If the
United States does not lead or follow, it will be an obstacle to
international efforts to achieve sustainable development.
The ethical and religious justifications for sustainable
development also provide a reason that Americans should care. U.S.
actions do not simply affect us; they affect others as well. Historic
and continuing U.S. emissions of GHGs are likely to adversely affect
others by contributing to rising sea levels and higher temperatures
around the world, for example. Moreover, the texts and beliefs of each
of the world's major religions teach responsibility toward other humans
as well as the environment. Because Americans see themselves as a
religious people, they should respond accordingly.
Finally, our government agreed to Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration
at the Earth Summit. These texts are not legally binding, but a
nation's political commitment is not a trivial thing. Indeed, it is in
the national interest to honor international political commitments.
The decisions we make about sustainable development are defining
decisions for the United States. They will define the values for which
our country stands.
summary
The major sections of this book focus on consumption and
population; international trade, finance, and development assistance;
conservation and management of natural resources; waste and toxic
chemicals; education; institutions and infrastructure; and governance.
What follows is a summary of each section, including a summary or
excerpts from relevant individual chapters. For almost all chapters,
the summary includes a review of efforts over the past decade and
recommendations. While most of the recommendations are directed to the
United States, a few are directed to the international community.
Consumption and Population
``To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life
for all people,'' the Rio Declaration states, governments ``should
reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.'' As Agenda
21 observes, ``the major cause of the continued deterioration of the
global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and
production, particularly in industrialized countries.'' Agenda 21 also
describes world population growth, in combination with unsustainable
consumption patterns, as placing ``increasingly severe stresses on the
life-supporting capacities of our planet.''
A simple model developed in the 1970's describes the relationship
between population and consumption. The model is expressed as a
formula: I = PAT. The formula expresses a community's overall
environmental impact (I) as the product of its population size (P), its
affluence or per capita level of consumption (A), and the technology
and social arrangements that underlay each unit of consumption (T).
While consumption of materials, consumption of energy, and population
are not wholly determinative of environmental impacts, they are
enormously influential.
Materials
Sustainable use of materials or resources can be measured by
answering two questions. First, how is the rate of resource use related
to the overall stock of resources? Second, what portion of resources in
use are lost to the environment? The first question measures
utilization of resources, and the second measures consumption. Put
another way, the first reflects the sustainability of supply, and the
second the sustainability of the receiving ecosystems. Almost all
levels of resource use and many types of environmental impacts in the
United States have increased from levels already generally agreed to be
unsustainable.
At the time of the Earth Summit, the average American was
responsible for the extraction and employment of more than 100 pounds
of material daily, which is more than any other country in world. These
materials include metals, wood products, paper, agricultural products,
construction materials, and fossil fuels. Ten years later, the quantity
has increased by about 10 percent. The biggest increase over the past
decade was for nonrenewable organic materials (including fossil fuels).
The hike in overall materials use is also due in part to increases in
the use of construction materials, such as sand, gravel, and stone,
whose utilization requires large amounts of energy. Iron, steel, and
other heavy metals continue to be used less, while light metals
(particularly aluminum), plastics, and composites are used more. This
latter trend is favorable, because the depletion time for heavier
metals is shorter than that for aluminum.
Environmental impacts of resource consumption in the United States
appear to have increased by about 15 percent over the past decade
because of population growth and an increase in gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita. Americans produce more municipal waste per capita
than any other country, are the leading producer of GHG emissions, and
are probably the world's largest producer of toxic wastes. This
increase in U.S. consumption has occurred despite a movement from more
resource-intensive production to greater use of services.
U.S. Government programs and policies have promoted inefficient
utilization and use of natural resources. These policies include many
types of direct and indirect subsidies for, among other things, timber
cutting, agriculture, hard rock mining, and extraction and use of
fossil fuels. While there are success stories in reduction of materials
use and environmental impacts in the past decade (specific eco-
industrial parks, corporate programs, and even government programs),
these efforts have not changed the overall pattern or result.
To make significant progress toward sustainability, the U.S.
Government should gain a better understanding of what resource
sustainability really means, and should put in place a framework for
achieving specific goals related to sustainability of materials. The
United States should also lead international efforts to discuss and
achieve sustainable production and consumption patterns in this and
other developed countries.
Subsidy reform and restructuring existing taxes are two of the
biggest challenges to sustainable consumption and production.
Environmentally harmful subsidies need to be phased out gradually. In
addition, the United States should begin shifting taxes from labor and
income to materials and energy. This tax shift should result in more
efficient use and reuse of materials and energy. Norway, Sweden, and
other countries have already begun such a tax shift.
Public education is also essential to this effort, and is perhaps
needed more than anything else. The principal cause of unsustainable
resource use is largely a social system that promotes ``conspicuous
consumption'' rather than intelligent, conservative resource use.
Technological innovation can modify this trend somewhat, as can policy
initiatives. But true sustainability will require that we satisfy our
needs, not by increased use of resources, but by more intelligent use.
Laws and policies alone will not lead to that understanding, but they
might result from it.
Energy
Primary energy consumption in the United States increased by
approximately 20 percent between 1992 and 2000, an annual average rate
of 2.4 percent. This growth rate was higher than the 0.8 percent
average annual growth rate of the two prior decades. At the same time,
the average annual GDP increase for 1992 to 2000 was 50 percent higher
than it was between 1972 and 1992, indicating that economic growth
drove energy consumption.
For the production and consumption of energy, the journey toward
sustainability can be measured by progress toward three goals:
increased energy efficiency (or reduced energy intensity), increased
renewable energy use, and reductions in energy-related CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions. For the first goal, progress in the past decade continued at
the same pace as the previous two decades. Energy efficiency, measured
in terms of amount of energy consumed per dollar of GDP, continued to
decline at the same steady pace it has declined since 1972-about 2
percent per year. While the United States is improving energy
efficiency at a faster rate than other industrialized countries, it is
less energy-efficient (or more energy-intensive) than these countries.
For the second and third goals, the United States achieved less since
1992 than it did in the two decades that preceded the Earth Summit, and
appears to be moving away from sustainability. Renewable energy
consumption grew at a slower annual pace since 1992 (1.3 percent) than
in the previous two decades (1.6 percent). In fact, renewable energy's
share of total U.S. energy consumption actually declined from 7.2
percent in 1992 to 6.9 percent in 2000. In addition, energy-related
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions increased by 13 percent since 1992. The annual
rate of increase in CO<INF>2</INF> emissions since 1992 (1.8 percent)
is more than three times the annual increase of the previous two
decades (0.5 percent).
In every major sector, energy use grew over the past decade. Energy
use for residential and commercial buildings increased because of
population growth and the trend toward larger and more energy-consuming
homes as well the proliferation of electricity-using devices. These
trends offset energy efficiency and energy conservation gains for
appliances and home building materials. Energy use for passenger
transportation increased because of the popularity of sport utility
vehicles and light trucks and an increase in vehicle miles traveled.
Energy use for freight transport increased because of rapid growth in
the volume of freight shipped and a shift toward more energy-intensive
trucking. Industrial use of energy increased, despite a shift away from
energy-intensive industry, because of growth in manufacturing.
While the United States had in place numerous energy conservation
and renewable energy laws at the time of the 1992 Earth Summit, the
country has done little to strengthen those laws since then. Many of
these early laws grew out of the Arab oil embargoes of the 1970's.
Among other things, these laws established corporate average fuel
economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles, required the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) to develop mandatory energy efficiency standards for
home appliances, provided tax credits to encourage investments in solar
and wind technologies, and required utilities to make greater use of
renewable energy and energy conservation. A few major changes in law
and policy have occurred since 1992. Federal research and development
funding for energy efficient technologies has increased, and standards
continue to be issued for increasingly more efficient appliances. But
CAFE standards for new vehicles have not been improved, despite
substantial improvements in automotive technology.
Progress in sustainability for production and consumption of energy
in coming decades can be measured in terms of progress in reduction of
energy-related CO<INF>2</INF> emissions. Because reducing such
emissions would require increases in energy efficiency and renewable
energy, a decrease in CO<INF>2</INF> emissions is a useful way of
summarizing progress toward all three goals. Analyses have shown that
vigorous implementation of cost-effective energy efficiency and
renewable energy policies could result in reduction of energy-related
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions in the United States to 1990 levels by 2020 or
earlier, which would be a major step toward energy sustainability
goals. However, U.S. emissions in 2000 were more than 15 percent above
1990 levels, and are projected to continue to increase under business-
as-usual scenarios.
The policies needed to achieve energy production and consumption
sustainability goals are indicative of the seriousness of the needed
effort. They include a carbon fee or charge that begins at a relatively
low level and then increases over time. Money received from this fee or
charge could be returned to the taxpayer in the form of lower income
taxes or used to support sustainable energy programs. An emissions
trading system should be coupled with the fee or charge to enhance its
economic efficiency. Increased spending for Federal research and
development for energy efficiency and renewable energy would likely
lead to the development of more efficient, less costly, and more
reliable technologies. In addition, a variety of policies should be
employed to improve energy efficiency in buildings, industry,
transportation, and electrical generation. Energy efficiency policies
include a mix of tax credits, voluntary programs, increased energy
efficiency standards for motors and appliances, improved fuel economy
standards for motor vehicles, policies to increase use of
telecommuting, and a requirement to increase the percentage of
electricity generated by renewable energy.
U.S. population reached 281.4 million in 2000, an overall increase
of 32.7 million, or 13.2 percent, since 1990. This is the largest
population increase in any 10-year period in U.S. history, surpassing
even the postwar baby boom. U.S. population is growing more rapidly
today than is the Chinese population. One American consumes 17 times as
much energy as the average Indian, and 9 times as much as the average
Chinese. Thus, while the billion-plus populations in China and India
obviously raise serious concerns, at the margin population growth is a
bigger issue in the United States than in China or India. The reason is
simple: an additional American consumes so much more than an additional
Chinese or Indian.
In 2000, the average number of children born per woman in the U.S.
population was 2.1, which is the replacement rate. Population grew
significantly because of the ``population momentum'' caused by the
higher birthrates of previous generations and because of immigration.
Immigration is currently contributing roughly one-half of the annual
population growth.
The sustainability of the current U.S. population can be questioned
on a variety of grounds. The United States depends increasingly on
imports of oil and other natural resources. Americans and other
residents of industrialized countries are also living beyond their
means, depleting vital ecosystems and nonrenewable resource stocks. A
U.S. population with grossly disproportionate consumption patterns
slated to grow by 10 percent or more per decade, while striving to
raise its per capita consumption even further, is not a recipe for
sustainability.
While the United States has no explicit policy regarding population
size or growth, it does have one in practice. The tax code as well as
laws on women's rights, inheritance, and labor all indirectly influence
people's choices regarding family size. The legality and availability
of family planning and abortion services have more direct influences on
family size choices. Immigration laws and policies also play a large
role in determining U.S. population.
The most basic thing the United States can do is simply recognize
that population is a domestic as well as a foreign issue, and that the
domestic and foreign aspects of population are linked. People seek to
immigrate to the United States, for instance, because conditions in
their own countries are not tolerable to them. The United States also
needs to examine seriously its carrying capacity. The United States
cannot claim that it is taking steps toward sustainable development
without first analyzing its environmental resource base. This country
should develop policies to ensure that the population does not exceed
its carrying capacity, including its ability to draw on foreign
resources. Immigration policies should be analyzed and developed in
this context, and not the other way around.
International Trade, Finance, and Development Assistance
For better and for worse, America's domestic activities have a
great influence on domestic activities in other countries. But U.S.
foreign policy also has direct consequences for sustainable
development. As Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration make clear, a
country's sustainable development commitments extend to both its
domestic and foreign policy. This section summarizes U.S. international
efforts regarding trade, official development assistance, and family
planning assistance. It also summarizes U.S. efforts concerning an
issue that has gained importance since the Earth Summit-private
financial flows to developing countries.
International Trade
The United States has played a leading and generally positive role
in steering trade rules in the direction of sustainable development,
with modest success. Yet 10 years after Rio, the discrepancy between
the vision of sustainable development and reality is too obvious to
deny-current patterns of international trade cause environmental harm
and impair sustainable development. By decreasing rather than
increasing its attention to the profound problems of global
underdevelopment and poverty, U.S. policy over the past decade has not
only failed to serve the substantive policy goal of sustainable
development but has also contributed to the polarization of
international diplomacy between rich and poor.
Two major trade agreements were adopted in the past decade, and
provide a context for this analysis. The United States negotiated the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada to
reduce trade barriers among the three countries, and then ratified it.
Several environmental issues were directly addressed in NAFTA, and the
Parties also concluded two separate environmental agreements. In
addition, the United States and other countries concluded the long-
running Uruguay round of trade negotiations, which established the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The Clinton Administration secured
congressional approval of the Uruguay Round results.
The United States has taken significant positive steps over the
past decade to enhance consideration of the environmental and
developmental consequences of its trade policy, and has actively
supported institutions and polices that would promote such procedural
integration of policy in other governments and international
organizations. In 1992, the worlds of trade policy and environmental
policy still knew very little about each other and seldom interacted.
The use of an environmental assessment for NAFTA deepened awareness of
the issues at stake for both government officials and the public. These
and other experiences led President William J. Clinton to issue an
Executive Order in 1999 requiring the preparation of an environmental
review for most major trade agreements. On the other hand, the United
States continues to subsidize and thus protect domestic agricultural
producers and others that perpetuate environmental harms in the United
States.
The United States has also been a pioneer in opening up its
international trade processes to public participation and has been the
leading proponent of participatory reforms in international
institutions. The United States enhanced and structured the access of
environmental interests to trade policy during the 1990's. The United
States has also been the most active and persistent proponent of
increased public participation in dispute settlement procedures under
WTO and NAFTA.
Yet America's substantive trade policies are very uneven in
fostering sustainable development. Promoting the economic interests of
the United States remains the central consideration in trade policy. As
a result, U.S. trade policies often put short-term and purely domestic
goals ahead of a broader sustainable development strategy. The widely
publicized failure of the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle
occurred in large part because developing countries saw the U.S.
position as giving short shrift to their needs.
In a broad sense, too, the structure of international trade still
works against sustainable development. The fault, though, does not lie
exclusively, or even primarily, with tradeofficials and trade policies.
What goods are produced where and what services are provided where are
influenced not by trade policy but by the economic, social, and
geographical conditions of each country and the economic and social
policies of national governments. A major problem has been the
insistence by the United States and other developed countries that
trade should replace aid as the main vehicle for transferring economic
resources to developing countries, without attending in a timely or
adequate manner to other conditions that must also be addressed if the
resource flows of trade are to promote development on a sustainable
basis. These other conditions include debt repayments and deteriorating
environmental conditions in developing countries.
Domestically, the United States needs to deepen and
institutionalize its policy integration. The United States should
establish a sustainable development coordinating entity within the
executive office of the president that would include the U.S. trade
representative. Congressional responsibility for trade policy should
also be reallocated to better incorporate environmental and
developmental considerations. The United States should continue to
advocate in all forums for increased transparency, including public
availability of documents and summaries of confidential deliberations,
enhanced access for the public to key processes, and nongovernmental
organization (NGO) representation on national delegations at every
appropriate international negotiation on trade issues.
To exercise greater international leadership, the United States
needs to observe more faithfully in its domestic policies the policy
prescriptions it advances for international trade and economic
development in other countries, especially by removing barriers to
access to the U.S. market and by eliminating substantial subsidies to
key trade-relevant sectors of the American economy. The United States
also needs to work more actively and constructively with developing
countries to resolve key impediments relevant to international trade
that are restricting their economic development and leading to
continued environmental degradation. Moreover, while the ``trade, not
aid'' mantra has substantial validity, aid continues to be a vital
policy element, substantively and symbolically. As part of its trade
policy, the United States needs to increase its official development
assistance.
Official Development Assistance
U.S. official development assistance (ODA) has declined
significantly since Rio. Developed countries agreed at Rio to provide
ODA to developing countries in an amount equal to 0.7 percent of their
GDP. The provision of this aid was part of the Rio bargain between
developed and developing countries; developing countries were unwilling
to have environmental conditions imposed on their development, but
agreed to integrate environmental considerations and outcomes into
their development process if they received financial help. The United
States specifically declined to accept the 0.7 percent commitment,
however. Part of the developed world's broad responsibility for
sustainable development under Agenda 21 nonetheless includes assisting
developing countries, especially when these countries are asked to
respond to environmental threats that are largely not of their own
making.
More broadly, sustainable development includes the antipoverty
agenda of traditional development. The gap between rich and poor
continues to grow. Among the 4.6 billion people who live in developing
countries, three-fifths live in communities without basic sanitation,
one-third are without safe drinking water, one-quarter lack adequate
housing, and one-fifth are undernourished. One-half of humanity
``survives'' on less than $2 per day. The eradication of poverty is a
worthy goal in itself. But from a strategic perspective, the
eradication of poverty would also help reduce conflicts, social
disruption, and disease. In addition, improved economic conditions may
reduce the pool of the disillusioned and disaffected from which
terrorist campaigns have frequently drawn.
Average annual U.S. ODA disbursements from 1990-1992 (set at 1999
prices) were approximately $12.38 billion; from 1998-2000, U.S.
disbursements averaged approximately $9.27 billion, representing
slightly more than a 25 percent drop in real dollars. The United States
still provides more ODA than any other country except Japan. As a
percentage of gross domestic income, however, U.S. ODA declined from an
average of .22 percent in 1984-1988 to .10 percent in 1998-2000, the
lowest of all industrialized countries.
ODA does not account for all U.S. governmental assistance that
could contribute to sustainable development. For example, it does not
include U.S. aid to former Soviet bloc countries or the peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Nor does ODA include private
financial flows to developing countries. Nevertheless, ODA levels
indicate general trends and help identify the extent to which the
United States is engaged with the rest of the world. ODA also does
things that private financial flows do not; ODA supports peace and
security, alleviates health and environmental crises, encourages
educational improvements, and rewards countries that move toward
democracy and the rule of law. In this way, it can help provide the
infrastructure that will attract or encourage private investment.
Two funds for international environmental assistance were made
permanent after Rio. The U.S. record in fostering sustainable
development under these funds is mixed. The Montreal Protocol's
Multilateral Fund exists to aid developing countries in meeting their
obligations to reduce their production and consumption of substances
that cause depletion of stratospheric ozone. Funds are disbursed for
approved projects that contribute to phasing out ozone-depleting
substances. Over the life of the fund, the United States has
contributed its full assessed share-$327 million, or slightly more than
one-quarter of the entire fund. The Global Environment Facility (GEF)
provides funds to developing countries for specific projects to reduce
GHG emissions and to protect biodiversity, international waters, and
the stratospheric ozone layer. The United States paid its full share
during the GEF's pilot phase, but has paid much less than its share
since then. Because the United States was in arrears, other countries
held off paying some of their commitment.
The United States should increase ODA for sustainable development,
although it needs to ensure that this aid is actually effective.
President George W. Bush's commitment in early 2002 to an additional $5
billion in foreign assistance is a step in the right direction. The
United States would reap benefits from increased aid in the form of a
more stable world and improved environmental conditions. By resolving
questions concerning its financial commitments to multilateral
organizations, the United States would also send a message that it is
engaged in global issues and follows through on its international
obligations. In addition to continuing its aid under the Multilateral
Fund, the United States should clear up its arrears with respect to the
GEF.
Beyond resources, there needs to be a new structure for development
cooperation, not just an architecture for international finance. It
should include not only development assistance but also trade, debt
management, private investment and capital flows, private sector
development, and access to technology. Instead of operating on a
government-to-government basis, development assistance should be
synergistic with private sector development and the strengthening of
civil society as a whole. Development assistance must also be based on
common interests and the complementary needs of the rich and the poor,
defined to some extent by international agreements. In that sense,
development assistance is part of the price we pay to prevent the root
cause of threats to our security. Development assistance should, in
addition, support sustainable human development, and not simply build
economies and dams. Economies exist for people, not vice versa. Growth
should replenish environmental heritage, not replace it. Development
cooperation should also promote democratization and good governance,
and it should be driven by the needs of the receiving country. Finally,
for much of the world, development assistance should be recognized as
an essential building block to a vibrant private sector and successful
financial markets.
The international community should set firm financial and other
commitments for developed countries to help realize the goals set by
the U.N. General Assembly in its 2000 Millennium Declaration. These
include, for example, the goal of reducing by one-half, by the year
2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than $1
a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. The
international community should also ensure adherence to these
commitments. At day's end, the only world that works is one in which
the aspirations for fairness and opportunity by poor people and
developing nations are being realized. Such commitments should, in
addition, help strengthen developing country interest in cooperation on
environmental objectives.
The results of aid matter a great deal. Accordingly, there should
be some type of specific and regular reporting on how aid is used in
developing countries, and what results it is achieving. This aid should
foster sustainable development; it should not support environmentally
harmful activities or be lost to corruption. Such information should
help inform and persuade the public and policymakers in developed
countries about the benefits of international assistance for
sustainable development.
Family Planning Assistance
Since 1992, the United States has provided an average of $430
million annually for family planning programs, and is the largest
single donor to such programs. Still, the world's population is
expected to grow to 9.3 billion by 2050, and nearly all of that growth
will occur in developing countries. In addition to contributing to
increases in poverty, resource consumption, and pollution, population
growth plays a critical role in generating urbanization, migration, and
political instability. At the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and
Development, countries agreed to curb population growth, not by setting
numerical targets and focusing on birth control efforts, but rather by
improving people's (particularly young women's) education, health, and
social standing, on the theory that this would lead to smaller
families. Developed countries agreed to provide one-third of the cost
of implementing the Cairo program ($5.7 billion annually). Developed
countries together, though, are providing only about one-third of what
they promised in Cairo. And twice in the past decade, the United States
has reversed its position on whether this family planning assistance
can go to organizations that perform or actively promote abortion as a
family planning method. The United States needs to be a more generous
and consistent contributor to international family planning.
The international community should also build on the work of the
Cairo Conference on Population and Development, which connected
population growth to women's roles, rights, and reproductive health
issues. Countries should collectively consider the relationships among
population growth, distribution, and mobility; environmental
degradation; and the spread of diseases. Two key sets of connections
involve fresh water and global warming. Population growth is an
exceedingly important factor in increasing demand for fresh water, and
causing environmental degradation that compromises its availability.
Population growth is also related, directly or indirectly, to national
rates of fossil fuel use as well as land clearing and conversion, both
of which are major sources of GHG emissions. It should also be noted
that the populations most vulnerable to global warming and least able
to adapt are among the most rapidly growing ones.
Private Finance
At the time of the Earth Summit, about one-half of the net flow of
capital from developed to developing countries was ODA, and about one-
half was private. By 2000, despite a series of financial crises in the
late 1990's, private investment outstripped public assistance by a
factor of almost seven to one. In 2000, private flows from the United
States constituted 38 percent of total private financial flows to
developing countries (as well as countries in transition to a market
economy, such as Russia and Poland), a much larger portion than any
other country. National-level capacity to promote sustainable
development in many countries has lagged behind the rapid pace of
economic globalization, and many investments affect transboundary or
global ecosystems for which there is no governance infrastructure.
This surge in private finance was not anticipated in Rio. As a
consequence, Agenda 21 provides little explicit guidance regarding the
goals or policies that developed country governments should undertake
to ensure that private North-South flows promote sustainable
development. The Rio Declaration, however, provides some guidance,
stating the importance of integrating sustainability into mainstream
economic decisionmaking and of public participation in those decisions.
Although there are many policy levers for influencing private finance,
the two most significant institutions for influencing the environmental
character of private financial flows to developing countries are
bilateral export and investment promotion agencies and multilateral
financial institutions.
The United States supports two key bilateral export and investment
promotion agencies-the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
an investment promotion agency, and the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank),
an export credit agency. Environmental and social evaluation and
disclosure requirements for OPIC and Eximbank have strengthened over
time, particularly in the past decade. Projects funded by both are
subject to environmental impact statements and detailed environmental
reviews, for example. Some disclosure requirements, in fact, represent
international best practice. But while reforms at OPIC and Eximbank
have provided a basis for challenging environmentally and socially
damaging projects, they fall short of an explicit mandate to promote
sustainable development.
Multilateral development banks (MDBs), particularly the World Bank
Group, also play a significant role in channeling private financial
flows through their direct participation in a variety of private sector
transactions. MDBs have also played a significant indirect role in
influencing North-South financial flows, particularly through their
promotion of the ``Washington consensus.'' The Washington consensus
emphasizes the role of capital market and trade liberalization,
privatization, and removal of other constraints on integration into the
international economy. The United States controls the largest single
share of capital subscription as well as the largest number of votes on
the World Bank Group boards.
Even before Rio, the United States demonstrated significant
international leadership in MDB reform by advocating environmental
impact reviews and public participation in projects, but the United
States has not yet adequately addressed the role of MDBs in leveraging
private finance. For instance, environmental impact statements are
still not required for structural adjustment loans from any of the
MDBs, even though such loans are arguably the most potent vehicle for
leveraging the policy environment in which private investment takes
place. Experience during the 1980's and 1990's, moreover, showed that
the Washington consensus could undermine sustainable development if not
accompanied by strong independent regulatory capacity and other
improvements in governance. In some cases, U.S. policy has promoted the
Washington consensus at the expense of sustainable development.
The United States should work for further progress with both
bilateral agencies and MDBs to move private finance toward sustainable
development. For OPIC and Eximbank, the United States should move
private financial flows to developing countries in a more sustainable
direction by maintaining high environmental and disclosure standards.
It should also promote the upward harmonization of sustainable
development policies and procedures for export credit agencies. The
United States should push harder for the integration of sustainability
objectives into the private sector development activities of MDBs. The
United States should proactively monitor the performance of MDBs in
complying with agreed policies and strategies. Finally, OPIC and
Eximbank, and the private sector arms of MDBs, should go beyond mere
compliance with environmental standards and disclosure requirements,
and shift their portfolios toward investments insustainability.
Conservation and Management of Natural Resources
Our environment provides the basis for our lives and well being,
and also helps give meaning and context to our lives. Fresh water is
essential for human life, for the growing of food and other ``natural
services'' to humans, and for natural communities. Oceans and estuaries
provide food, recreation, and jobs for humans. We need to be able to
breathe healthy air. A stable climate has provided part of the basis
for our civilization, ensuring reasonably consistent temperatures and
precipitation from year to year, and thus providing a predictable basis
for agriculture and other human essentials. Biodiversity can provide
valuable products to humans, but it also has intrinsic value. Forests
and agriculture provide necessary products and food, as well as a
source of human livelihood. The land provides a basis for almost all
human activities, and its proper use can make life easier or harder.
Each of these is addressed here.
Fresh Water
Relatively little change in fresh water quality or the law
governing fresh water has occurred in the decade since Rio. Agenda 21
promotes more sustainable, reliable, and healthy water supplies for
both human consumption and economic uses, while seeking to restore and
sustain the health of aquatic ecosystems. In 1992, the United States
already had in place a detailed set of laws and institutions designed
to protect and manage fresh water resources that implemented the basic
tenets of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. They include the Clean
Water Act (CWA) and other Federal statutes, as well as State laws
governing allocation and protection of water supplies. These measures
laid the framework for sustainable use and protection of fresh water
resources. As a result, most Americans have access to adequate supplies
of fresh water of at least acceptable quality relative to much of the
world, and U.S. agriculture and industry have similar adequate quantity
and quality. These laws and institutions also provide the basis for
integrated decisionmaking in the area of water resources, watershed-
based restoration and protection programs, and aquatic ecosystem
integrity. Legal tools exist to implement the precautionary principle
for some, but not all, sources of water pollution.
The law governing fresh water has changed in only marginal ways
since Rio, partly because legal tools for water resource protection
were relatively sophisticated at the time. The lack of significant
legal change is also due in part to political barriers to further
improvements designed to address issues and problems that have evaded
solutions under existing law. While additional regulations have been
implemented to address more point sources of pollution, a comprehensive
regime to tackle runoff from agriculture, city streets, and other land
uses remains elusive. Moreover, efforts to address the cumulative
impacts of multiple sources of pollution on specific water bodies have
been reinvigorated, but progress has been slow due to legal and
political controversy. Similarly, legal tools to address physical
impairments to U.S. aquatic ecosystems remain fragmented and poorly
implemented. Some of the gaps in national and State programs to protect
water resources have been filled by a wellspring of local and regional
watershed programs around the country designed to promote
collaborative, holistic solutions to problems in individual watersheds.
Little improvement has been realized in actual water quality since
1992. Long-term ambient water quality trends are difficult to evaluate,
but available data suggest that, on a nationwide basis, there has been
no clear trend in water quality over the past decade. Meanwhile,
between 35 percent and 45 percent of the nation's rivers and lakes
remain impaired for at least some beneficial uses. Threats to human
health continue through contamination of swimming waters, fish and
shellfish, and drinking water. Similarly, fresh water aquatic species
and the ecosystems on which they depend remain impaired due to chemical
pollution as well as widespread habitat loss and impairment. Indeed,
fresh water ecosystems are among the most, if not the most, threatened
ecosystems in North America.
The United States could make progress in reducing these problems
through changes and improvements in U.S. freshwater policy. In addition
to continued efforts to control industry and sewage treatment plants,
an analogous comprehensive program to reduce polluted runoff from rural
and urban sources remains imperative if additional water quality
improvements are to be realized. These programs should involve both new
pollution controls and changes in agricultural policy designed to
prevent or to discourage farming of surplus crops on environmentally
sensitive lands. Integrated, holistic watershed protection efforts need
to be strengthened both by encouraging and supporting existing and new
watershed programs, and by strengthening the legal tools in the CWA
designed to address pollution from multiple sources. Aquatic habitat
can be restored by including a broader range of impairments within the
broad definition of ``pollution'' in the CWA. In addition, there should
be improvements in Federal and State programs to protect wetlands,
floodplains, and other habitats; to restore aquatic ecosystems that
have been modified by dams, channelization, and other artificial
structures; and to protect critical minimum-instream-flow regimes.
Oceans and Estuaries
Although the United States has played a leading role in protecting
high seas fisheries, the ocean under its control appears to be in
poorer shape now than it was in 1992. The United States controls more
than four million square miles of ocean, an area larger than the
country's land mass. Agenda 21 identifies four program areas that are
particularly relevant to U.S. responsibilities for this area:
integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas,
controlling marine pollution, protecting marine living resources of the
high seas, and protecting marine living resources under national
jurisdiction.
Coastal Areas
Existing laws have been insufficient to prevent the overall
degradation of the nation's coastal zones or to make significant
progress in restoring degraded areas, particularly degraded wetlands.
Through Agenda 21, nations committed themselves to integrated
management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including the
application of preventive and precautionary measures to protect and
preserve sensitive offshore ecosystems. Even before Rio, the United
States had laws in place to encourage coastal zone management and to
protect its wetlands and estuaries. However, one-half of the U.S.
population lives in a county that has an ocean coastline, and the
coastal population is growing faster than the Nation as a whole. If
current projections are correct, population pressures are likely to
result in further degradation of coastal wetlands, beaches, and waters
and the services they provide, despite fairly extensive State and
Federal regulation. To address these problems, Congress should decide
that (1) preserving viable coastal zones for future generations is a
national priority, and (2) preserving functional nearshore and offshore
ecosystems and the services that they provide for the future requires
buying, restoring, and preserving coastal property now, particularly
functional wetlands and other buffer areas between the land and the
sea.
Marine Pollution
Agenda 21 seeks to halt and reverse degradation of the marine
environment from various sources of pollution. By the time of the Rio
conference, the United States already had a reasonably effective legal
structure in place to control pollutants from identifiable industrial,
municipal and ship-based sources of marine pollution, and from oil
pollution. Runoff, however, is not effectively addressed. Most marine
pollution now comes from sources that are not well regulated under the
CWA-especially urban runoff and agricultural runoff. Congress thus
should require States to have enforceable measures to control runoff,
and should give private citizens a right to sue such polluters when
they impair ocean quality. Congress should also amend the CWA to
require the establishment of water quality standards for the part of
the ocean that is under U.S. control.
Marine Species on High Seas
The United States was a world leader in international conservation
of marine species before Rio, and it maintained that role throughout
the last decade. Agenda 21 encourages sustainable use and conservation
of living resources of the high seas. A number of commercially
important fish species, such as tuna, mackerel, and marlin, as well as
the great whales, spend much of their lives in waters outside any
nation's regulatory jurisdiction. U.S. efforts over the last few years
have included initiating new programs to protect species, such as
sharks, that have only relatively recently become commercial fishing
targets. But basic status of one-half of the fished highly migratory
species is unknown. The United States should thus fund, or help fund,
comprehensive international scientific research to obtain basic
information about international marine living resources, and to reduce,
and encourage other nations to reduce, catch limits for all species
known to be or suspected of being in danger of being overfished.
Marine Species Under U.S. Jurisdiction
Fish stocks under U.S. Federal management are suffering, and there
is insufficient information to determine the status of 65 percent of
U.S. fish stocks. Yet there is reason to believe that Federal fisheries
and fishery management may have improved since 1992. As Agenda 21
explains, although the marine living resources and nearshore fish
existing mostly within a nation's jurisdiction can help meet a nation's
nutritional and social needs, they can do so only if they are not
overfished or overharvested. The 1976 statute governing fisheries was
amended by the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act to incorporate
sustainable thinking and a precautionary approach into U.S. domestic
fisheries management. Still, it may take a decade before we can measure
the true biological effects of legal changes in fisheries management,
and the unintentional catching of nontarget species remains a problem.
To make further progress, the United States needs to fund and support
research to discover the complex interactions of marine living species
and their environment. Without understanding marine ecosystems, truly
sustainable management measures cannot be implemented. To facilitate
comprehensive ecosystem management of its seas, the United States
should also work toward overhauling its current species-by-species,
medium-specific, multistatute, multigovernment, and multiagency legal
regime for the oceans.
More generally, the United States currently lacks two visions of
the ocean necessary to promote sustainable development-visions that it
should articulate in the next few years. First, the United States needs
a philosophical vision of the marine environment as an integrated
ecosystem that should be used with caution. Second, the United States
needs a more concrete vision of what the oceans under its territorial
control should be. The Oceans Act of 2000, which establishes a
commission whose sole function is to make recommendations for a
coordinated and comprehensive ocean policy, offers the Federal
Government a means to identify and articulate these two visions.
In the last years of the decade, and especially since 2000, the
Federal Government has shown decidedly more interest in protecting its
marine resources. This interest appears in the Oceans Act of 2000, in
the Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000, in President Clinton's Marine
Protected Area Executive Order (which the Bush Administration has now
adopted), and in the 2-year-long effort to turn the northern Hawaiian
Islands into a national marine sanctuary. While recovery of ocean
ecosystems can take decades, these recent legislative and executive
efforts to protect the ocean suggest that the issue of sustainable
ocean ecosystems may finally have arrived on the U.S. political agenda.
Air Pollution
Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem
upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and
present generations. The air pollution control activities described in
Agenda 21 are broadly consistent with long-term U.S. law and policy,
particularly the Clean Air Act (CAA). Several Rio Declaration
principles taken together, including the right to a healthy and
productive life in harmony with nature and the elimination of
``unsustainable patterns of production,'' suggest the importance of
focusing on the economic activities and technologies that produce air
pollution. The overwhelming majority of air pollution comes from a
single class of activities-burning fossil fuels. Emissions of most air
pollutants declined somewhat over the past decade. Despite these
improvements, the United States has not achieved the goals of the Rio
Declaration because we have generally failed to do what we need to do-
substitute clean sustainable technologies for the basic dirty ones in
use when the CAA was enacted more than 30 years ago.
Since the Earth Summit, the United States has reduced emissions
contributing to urban air pollution and acid rain, except for nitrogen
oxides. Air pollution levels are still too high, however, to ensure all
human beings have a healthy and productive life. Inspite of strong
economic growth and growing population, carbon monoxide declined by 2
percent, volatile organic compound emissions by 13 percent, particulate
matter by 7 to 13 percent, and hazardous air pollutants by perhaps 39
percent. Still, large sections of the country are not in compliance
with health-based air quality standards. If the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) succeeds in an effort it began several years
ago to strengthen air quality standards, the CAA may deliver further
benefits in the future.
An ambitious program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, created by
the 1990 Amendments to that Act, resulted in an overall reduction of
emissions from all sources by 17 percent between 1992 and 1999. This
program has not stopped transboundary harms, however, and has not fully
protected ecosystems; most lakes and ecosystems remain damaged. By
contrast, the United States has made substantial progress in reducing
pollutants responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion.
The United States has made only very modest progress toward
deployment of sustainable technology. It has made substantial
technological changes in sectors once served by ozone-depleting
chemicals, and some progress with respect to sustainable vehicle
technology (thanks to California's low emission vehicle (LEV) program),
but almost no progress in changing how electricity is generated. New
electric-generating facilities, which are built and operated to meet
increased demand, tend to rely on less polluting fuels, particularly
natural gas. Still, less efficient and more polluting electrical
generating plants that were operating in 1970 continue to do so.
To move toward sustainable development on air quality, the country
must move away from its dependence upon fossil fuels, especially fuels
that produce such large contributions to urban air pollution, acid
rain, and global warming. As a first step, the United States should
phaseout coal-fired power generation, which supplied 51 percent of the
power generated by electric utilities in 1998. The United States should
also expand and strengthen the LEV program in order to replace the
internal combustion engine. Government policy should be used to ensure
that new technologies are continuously more efficient and less
polluting than existing ones, and that existing technologies are
actually retired on a periodic basis rather than allowed to operate
indefinitely. Several legal mechanisms have the potential to create an
economic dynamic favoring such a change. These include increasingly
stringent mass-based limits, pollution taxes, and an ``environmental
competition law.''
Climate Change
In late 1992, the United States became the fourth country in the
world to ratify the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). Five years later, in 1997, the United States agreed to a
protocol in Kyoto, Japan, under which developed countries would reduce
their GHG emissions by about 5 percent from 1990 levels by 2008-2012,
and the United States would reduce its emissions by 7 percent from 1990
levels in the same period. Although President Bush repudiated the Kyoto
Protocol in 2001, the United States is still a Party to the UNFCCC.
While the convention is a framework on which more explicit agreements
are to be based, it nonetheless contains commitments. And these
commitments are different from those in Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration, because they are legally binding. For GHG emissions, the
United States has failed to comply with the spirit, if not the letter,
of the convention.
The United States is the world's single largest producer of GHG
emissions. By 2000, U.S. GHG emissions were 13.6 percent higher than
1990 emissions measured in carbon equivalents. More recently, U.S.
emissions were projected to exceed 1990 levels by more than 46 percent
by 2020. (CO<INF>2</INF>, a principal GHG, is not directly regulated
under the CAA.)
The United States has generally adhered to UNFCCC obligations that
are not related to emissions. Parties agreed to annually report their
national GHG emissions and to develop plans to mitigate climate change.
The United States has done so. In addition, Parties agreed to support
and further develop research on global warming. The United States has
consistently supported scientific research and has shared information
about global warming with other Parties.
Although the UNFCCC contains no ``hard'' or ``numerical'' emission
limitations, it does contain two commitments regarding emissions.
First, developed countries agreed on a short-term goal-to ``aim'' to
reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The United States and
other developed countries thus promised to adopt policies and measures
that had a reasonable expectation of reducing GHG emissions to 1990
levels by 2000. A strong case can be made that the United States has
failed to abide by this promise. President Clinton's proposed energy
tax was rejected in 1993 by Congress. Then the Clinton Administration
initiated a climate change program based on voluntary initiatives, but
emissions continued to increase significantly.
The UNFCCC also contains a long-term goal, and commitments that go
with it. Developed countries agreed to adopt policies and measures
``consistent with the objective of the Convention.'' The convention's
objective is ``stabilization of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.'' However, the U.S. actions described above,
including repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, are inconsistent with
achieving the convention's long-term objective. In early 2001, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international
group of climate scientists organized under the United Nations,
concluded that the earth's average surface temperature could rise by
2.5 to 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit (F) from 1990 to 2100, which is higher
than the IPCC's estimate of 5 years earlier. This report also
strengthened the IPCC's prior conclusion that human-caused global
warming is already happening. A strong case can be made that the IPCC's
projections of future climate change would constitute ``dangerous
interference with the climate system'' even toward the lower end of the
IPCC projection, and that it is already too late to prevent some
atmospheric damage from global warming. The likely effects of global
warming include rising sea levels, more frequent floods and droughts,
and an increase in tropical diseases.
The excuses used by the United States for not acting are also
inconsistent with the convention. Many U.S. decisionmakers have said it
would be unfair to the United States to have to reduce GHG emissions if
developing nations aren't required to do so. But in the UNFCCC,
developed countries agreed to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions
because they are responsible for the largest share of historic and
current emissions, and because they have greater capability to reduce
them. Many decisionmakers also claim that global warming science is too
uncertain to justify programs that might turn out to be an unnecessary
drag on the U.S. economy. Yet the United States and other UNFCCC
Parties specifically agreed to take ``precautionary measures'' to
reduce GHG emissions, and recognized that the ``lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing'' cost-
effective measures. Notably, many such cost-effective measures are
available.
The United States should adopt GHG emission reduction programs that
will reduce U.S. GHG emissions to 1990 levels as soon as technically
feasible. Because the United States is already 13.6 percent above 1990
levels, and because a business-as-usual approach to GHG emissions is
expected to significantly increase this difference in the next 6 years,
the United States will also need to participate in emissions trading
and use carbon sequestration projects, coupled with aggressive policy
responses, to achieve this reduction. In addition, the United States
should commit to make further reductions to achieve the Kyoto target of
7 percent below 1990 levels as soon as possible after achieving the
first goal. This would allow the United States to merge with the
approach taken by the rest of the world pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol
even though it may be technically infeasible for the United States to
comply with the Kyoto goal between 2008 and 2012. The United States
needs to make it clear that it will eventually catch up with
commitments being made by the rest of the world.
The record on voluntary global warming programs has demonstrated
that they alone cannot be relied upon to achieve the type of reductions
required. Therefore, the United States needs to adopt both emissions
caps for various sectors and a mix of financial incentives and
regulatory requirements. Moreover, the United States should take
leadership on getting an international consensus on what atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs will not present a dangerous interference with
the climate system. That would help the international community better
understand what national obligations will be needed to prevent
dangerous interference with the climate system.
Biodiversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity, which seeks to ensure both
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, was opened for
signature in Rio. The convention is a major innovation because it
provides a legal foundation that did not previously exist in the United
States and in most other countries for the conservation of
biodiversity. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the
Convention on Biological Diversity. Agenda 21, which the United States
did agree to, also provides for biodiversity conservation. Both Agenda
21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity would have nations adopt
national strategies for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological resources. Key elements of a national strategy include an
inventory and monitoring of important biodiversity resources, and the
creation of in situ (in place) biodiversity reserves. Ten years after
Rio, the United States has no explicit comprehensive biodiversity
conservation program in place, and a great many species and ecosystems
are at risk.
Biodiversity conservation is still not a generally accepted legal
standard in the United States. At best, it is an objective which may be
considered along with other competing objectives when resource managers
make allocation decisions that promote or impair biodiversity. The
reason is simple. Biodiversity emerged as a concept after the basic
public land and environmental laws were in place, and domestic politics
have prevented ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity
and all efforts to develop a national biodiversity conservation
strategy.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 does not provide a
complete foundation for such a strategy. The ESA imposes a duty on
public and private parties to prevent the extinction of a limited
number of endangered or threatened species-those that are listed under
the Act. In 2000, more than 1,200 species were listed, but an estimated
66,000 were at risk of extinction. The ESA is also a backward approach
to biodiversity because it only indirectly addresses the major cause of
biodiversity loss-habitat destruction-and it does not address other
causes such as the invasion of exotic species and air and water
pollution. Since 1992, however, the ESA has evolved to encourage the
use of large-scale multispecies habitat conservation plans and other
forms of ecosystem management. By the end of 2000, the U.S. Department
of the Interior had approved habitat conservation plans covering 20
million acres. While this suggests that it is possible to move from
individual species to general biodiversity conservation within the
framework of the ESA, the results of this approach have yet to be
tested by time.
Since the Earth Summit, many biodiversity conservation initiatives
have been started in the United States by all levels of government and
by private parties. But they are often ad hoc efforts to solve a single
example of past environmental degradation, such as the restoration of
sheet flows to the Everglades, or efforts to avoid a worst-case
enforcement scenario under the ESA. The U.S. Government has also tried
to manage large blocks of public lands on an ecosystem basis and has
participated in ecosystem restoration experiments on a collaborative
stakeholder basis. These efforts have occurred in national forests,
wilderness areas, national parks, and Bureau of Land Management lands-
areas that in many cases could be turned into public land biodiversity
reserves. These efforts are extremely fragile because they lack a firm
legal foundation, can be modified in response to changed political
conditions, and include no clear performance standards to measure their
success should they endure. Thus, the future of many of the
biodiversity-related conservation initiatives implemented since 1992 is
in doubt.
To implement the Earth Summit's objectives, the United States
should immediately take four steps. First, it should ratify the
Convention on Biological Diversity. Ratification would establish
biodiversity conservation as an overarching legal objective in the
United States and stimulate the development of a comprehensive national
biodiversity conservation strategy. Second, the legal mandates of the
major Federal land management and regulatory agencies should be revised
to require them to conserve biodiversity to the maximum extent
consistent with due process and the sustainable use of natural
resources. This would include clarifying the role of State and local
governments as well as private parties in habitat conservation plans.
Third, the United States should create a Biological Survey, equal in
stature to the U.S. Geological Survey, to inventory the nation's
biodiversity heritage and to provide the necessary scientific support
for the establishment of biodiversity indices and conservation
performance standards. Finally, although biodiversity conservation is
primarily a national responsibility, private land stewardship must be
recognized and supported.
Forestry
The United States made halting steps in law reform and in the
implementation of forest sustainability during the past decade. The
governments meeting in Rio agreed to a separate set of principles for
sustainable development of forests. In general, sustainable forestry is
based on ecosystem integrity, economic viability, and social
responsibility. Other principles relevant to the United States include
opportunity for stakeholder participation in forestry decisions,
``timely, reliable, and accurate'' information, comprehensive
assessment of forest values, integration of forest management with
management of adjacent areas to protect viability or unique ecosystems,
and the incorporation of environmental costs and benefits into market
mechanisms.
Forest ecosystems cover one-third of the land area of the United
States, and two-thirds of that land is productive enough to have value
as commercial timberland. Public forests account for 42.4 percent of
the forest area in the United States; they are owned and managed by the
Federal, State, and local governments; and have contributed
disproportionately to sustainability through demonstration programs and
innovative practices. Private forests account for the rest. The basic
structure of forestry law, firmly established prior to 1992, provides
the background against which to discern recent trends.
The physical area of forests changed little in the past decade.
Data on species diversity, forest structure, water quality, and many
other dimensions of ecological sustainability are not cumulated
nationally for forests in a way that invites evaluation of changes
since 1992. Information on economic viability and social responsibility
is even more elusive.
After the Rio Summit, the U.S. Forest Service began a slow, but
steady, shift toward general sustainable development principles. The
most important legal vehicle for promoting this change is the
Government Performance and Results Act, which was enacted in 1993. The
legislation requires all agencies to set both long-and short-term
measurable performance objectives and to conduct periodic assessments
and revisions. This spurred the Forest Service to employ adaptive
management to monitor and evaluate its activities based on parameters
relating to such sustainability criteria as the health of the land,
quality of water, and user satisfaction. These changes help provide
``timely, reliable, and accurate information'' about forests. The
Forest Service also shifted its emphasis under the ESA from interagency
coordination and prohibitive policy to the broader use of habitat
conservation plans. In 2000, the Forest Service promulgated a new
framework for planning that establishes maintenance and restoration of
ecological sustainability as the first priority for management. The
2000 rule, and a 2001 rule prohibiting logging and road building in
many roadless areas of the national forests, constitute the single most
important positive development in the application of substantive
standards to promote sustainable development of public lands. The Bush
Administration, however, has indicated that it will alter both
regulations.
On private lands, a slight strengthening of State forest practice
laws and increased promotion of best management practices have improved
the legal regime, but these changes tended to be overwhelmed by market
forces. Until water pollution control begins to force abatement and
mitigation of runoff, private forest owners will not face significantly
heightened incentives for sustainable practices. On the other hand, new
certification systems for sustainable practices have arisen in the past
decade; under these programs, third parties such as the Forest
Stewardship Council certify forest products as ``sustainable,'' and
major purchasers confine their purchases to certified products. These
systems have begun to reshape market demand.
In the coming decade, the United States should strengthen its legal
mechanisms for promoting public participation, citizen enforcement,
best forestry management practices, and landscape-level planning. These
recommendations are top priorities for facilitating sustainable
development. Existing property, market, and administrative regimes can
all be deployed in the service of more sustainable forestry by flexibly
demanding that environmental performance indicators be achieved through
mitigation, ecosystem services, and adaptive management. In addition,
the 2000 and 2001 rules should be supported, not altered. These
regulations are important because large-scale, e.g., forestwide,
planning is needed to implement ecosystem management. Federal and State
governments should also throw their purchasing weight behind the Forest
Stewardship Council's certification program.
Agriculture
The United States has a diverse and dynamic system of agriculture.
If it is to be sustainable, it must meet at least three criteria that
are explicit in or logically derived from Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration. Agriculture must become internally sustainable, which
requires that it preserve its resource base; avoid pollution,
salinization, or other degradation of the soil and water; and be able
to respond to plant and animal disease, pests, periodic climate
variation, and changing market conditions. Agriculture must also be
externally sustainable. That is, it must not impose external costs on
nonagricultural society or surrounding natural resources. Finally,
agriculture must exhibit responsive sustainability; it must be
sufficiently dynamic and flexible that it is able to respond to change
and help the Nation respond to crises in other sectors of the economy,
e.g., to participate in global warming remedies through the use of
sequestered carbon.
Internal sustainability is being challenged in the West by
competing demands for irrigation water, although the increased use of
water conservation practices eases this somewhat. From 1992 to 1997,
however, one-quarter of all agricultural land converted to urban uses
was prime farmland.
U.S. agriculture is not externally sustainable. Since 1985, there
has been a gradual and fundamental change unfolding in Federal
agricultural policy. A series of programs (evidenced by the 2002 farm
bill) now encourage farmers to adopt conservation or environmental
protection practices on some of their land. Taken together, these
mostly voluntary agricultural programs represent a vast investment in
conserving practices. Still, farm policy continues to direct farmers
away from sustainability. The system of support payments, which will
grow even larger now that the 2002 farm bill has become law, encourages
farmers to grow commodity crops, which have greater adverse
environmental effects, and drives small, family farms out of business.
There are larger and fewer farms employing ever more intensive
practices, usually in the form of monoculture. There is almost
universal reliance on inorganic fertilizers to replace lost natural
soil nutrients. Chemical pesticides are heavily relied on to deal with
the vulnerability of monocultures to pests. Pollution of both surface
and groundwater from agricultural sources may be the single largest
source of pollution in the Nation. Waterways of all types suffer from
sedimentation.
Responsive sustainability is challenged by several uncertainties,
perhaps the clearest of which is climate change. Rapid changes in
climate, including more frequent droughts and floods, could be
disastrous for agriculture. Another example of uncertainty is the
effect of specialization in the use of genetic stock. Because the
United States operates an agricultural system that is close to
monocultural, future pests, diseases, or human dilemmas could create
large problems unless we preserve the broader genetic stock, or
germplasm, from which current plant varieties are derived. Other
sources of uncertainty are created by the increased use of genetically
modified organisms and by world markets.
Steps needed to move the United States toward sustainable
agriculture include the stabilization of irrigation agriculture through
greater water conservation and protection against salinity. The United
States should also renew its campaign to reduce erosion. Prime
agricultural land must be protected against urban and suburban
development. The nation's larger drainage systems should be re-
engineered to achieve systematic control of polluted runoff. In
addition, affirmative steps should be taken to protect germplasm. More
generally, the internalization of environmental costs should be an
obligation of contemporary agriculture. For the long term, the science
of ecology must be fully integrated into agricultural research.
Land Use
Sprawl continued during the past decade. The ``smart growth''
movement has led to some legislative and policy changes, particularly
at the State level. But there is a wide gap between the talk of reform
and actual reform, and not enough time has elapsed to fairly assess
whether any of the policy changes are making a meaningful difference.
Sustainable land development requires consistent integration of
social, environmental, and economic considerations in decisionmaking to
produce a sound, coordinated, and harmonious built environment. Our
system of land use controls and decisionmaking must be consistent both
horizontally (among and between neighboring jurisdictions) and
vertically (from one level of government to the next). Achieving this
result requires heightened levels of intergovernmental cooperation,
coordination, and support. Effective sustainable land development
policies must minimize sprawl and maximize sound development
opportunities so that the United States may conserve important lands,
preserve the natural environment, protect air and water quality,
promote affordable housing through compact development and urban
renewal, and encourage urban ``infill'' rather than rural development.
Agenda 21 asserts that national governments should delegate
``planning and management responsibilities to the lowest level of
public authority consistent with effective action.'' This is the
lightning rod of land use reform debate in the United States-whether
traditional local land use planning and decisionmaking can achieve
sustainable development.
The smart growth movement is proving to be, at least in rhetoric, a
solution for both the disorganized and inefficient system of land use
controls of the past and a framework for a new future paradigm. In
general, smart growth principles mirror many of the implementation
strategies for sustainable land development under Agenda 21.
At the national level, there has been a lot of talk, some bits and
pieces of reforms, but overall very little action. The Federal
Government has taken notice of allegations of environmental injustice
in the siting of various locally unwanted land uses, and has taken
initial steps to foster greater social equity.
There is a much greater level of activity in many States than at
the national level. While there were some State-level comprehensive
land use planning reforms before 1992, the last decade has witnessed an
unprecedented level of attention and activity at the State level. Some
States have undertaken a comprehensive recodification of State planning
and zoning enabling statutes that provide local governments with tools
to promote sustainable land use. More than one-half the States explored
reform options through task forces or study commissions. Some States
have adopted changes through public referendum initiatives. Yet on
balance States are just starting to make significant statutory changes
that offer the promise of promoting more sustainable land development
practices. It will take even more time for these reforms to translate
into observable and quantifiable changes in our neighborhoods and
communities once States have provided the opportunity for changed
behaviors.
Sustainable land use will require continued leadership for, and
interest in, meaningful land use reforms. States must create a new
culture of cooperative and intergovernmental decisionmaking at the
local level. State and Federal Governments must target spending on
initiatives and programs that promote urban renewal and infill, and
thus revitalize our cities. The Federal Government should also modify
existing programs so that, where State and local participation is
optional, access to Federal money is conditioned on implementation of
sustainable land use plans.
Waste and Toxic Chemicals
According to Agenda 21, the root cause of waste and toxic chemicals
problems is unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. These
patterns are unsustainable because they harm humans and ecosystems,
deplete materials and energy, and, in some cases, may threaten national
security. This section summarizes U.S. efforts concerning toxic
chemicals as well as pesticides. It also summarizes U.S. efforts
concerning three types of waste-hazardous waste (including Superfund),
municipal solid waste, and radioactive waste. In addition, it
summarizes State and Federal legislation facilitating private cleanups
of brownfield sites-sites contaminated with hazardous substances.
Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides
The United States made significant progress in moving toward a more
sustainable approach to chemicals and pesticides over the past decade,
but still has a long way to go. The most relevant sustainable
development principles are the precautionary principle,
intergenerational equity, access to information, integrated
decisionmaking, and control of trade of hazardous chemicals in
international trade. They apply with particular force to chemicals and
pesticides because of incomplete information about their risks, their
potential to cause future harms, and the need for public information
about them.
Little progress was made in reducing the risks of chemicals that
are currently being used in commerce. The 1976 Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) requires manufacturers of new chemicals to submit
information about the environmental and health risks of these chemicals
to EPA before they can be manufactured. Relatively little information
exists concerning the 60,000 or so chemicals already in commerce that
were grandfathered under TSCA, and little progress was made in
assessing their risks over the past decade. Several voluntary
information collection initiatives-one for high production volume
chemicals and another for chemicals to which children are commonly
exposed-are promising, but it remains to be seen whether anything more
than assessments will be conducted.
Similarly, little progress was made concerning the introduction of
new chemicals into commerce. Although premanufacture approval is
required under TSCA for new chemicals, the United States requires
relatively little information before giving that approval. While both
EPA and the EU have concluded that requiring better information would
reduce risks, EPA has not taken steps to do so. The EU runs a premarket
approval program rather than, in the case of the United States, a
premanufacturing approval program. Because only 10 percent of new
chemicals are likely to go to market, the EU program focuses more
intensely on fewer chemicals, and thus permits a more certain hazard
prediction than the system of review used in the United States.
The toxics release inventory (TRI) led to continued reductions in
chemical releases over the past decade. Under TRI, manufacturing
facilities with 10 or more employees report releases and transfers of
several hundred toxic chemicals. Between 1988 and 1999, total releases
of the ``core'' set of chemicals that were reported consistently over
that time declined by 45.5 percent, although total production waste
increased slightly. The TRI was expanded in the 1990's to include
hundreds of new chemicals, Federal facilities, and new industry groups.
These expansions have increased the information available to citizens,
which may lead to further reductions.
Pollution prevention would further many of the goals of sustainable
development because it relies on more efficient processes and practices
to reduce the amount of pollution that is created. Although much
progress was made in the development of pollution prevention tools and
education, it is not clear to what extent pollution prevention has been
adopted in practice.
Use of pesticides in agriculture has leveled off since 1985, and
utilization of the most highly toxic pesticides has declined. But the
most important change in pesticide regulation over the past decade
occurred with the adoption of the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act. The
Act focuses on pesticide residues in food, and requires EPA to assess
the aggregate and cumulative risks of these pesticides, rather than
assessing safety based on one pesticide and one medium at a time. The
Act also requires safety factors, reflecting both the precautionary
principle and intergenerational equity.
The United States made some progress in the regulation of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) under TSCA, but it did not put in
place a framework for regulating the new GMO plants that are being bred
to produce chemicals. Such organisms are increasingly the technology of
choice for the manufacture of chemicals and pesticides.
In the international arena, the United States has been at the table
for negotiations and has been among the world's leaders in developing
and adopting international standards for chemicals, some legally
binding, and some not. However, the United States has not yet ratified
certain recent treaties and protocols. These include the Rotterdam
Convention on Prior Informed Consent (prohibiting the export of
specified chemicals without explicit agreement by the importing
country), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(protecting health and environment from specified pollutants), the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (setting up an international framework
for managing trade of GMOs and seeds), and the Biodiversity Convention
on which the Cartagena Protocol is based.
To make progress, or further progress, toward sustainable
development, Congress should modify TSCA to provide a clearer standard
for health and safety to encourage greater pollution prevention. TSCA
should also be amended to shift the presumption that chemicals are
``innocent until proven guilty'' to a burden on manufacturers to prove
that chemicals are safe as used in the market. In addition, TSCA should
be amended to level the playing field between new and existing
chemicals; the present approach perversely creates disincentives for
bringing new and safer technologies to market. New chemicals should be
reviewed on a premarket, not a premanufacture, basis, and manufacturers
should be required to submit the same kind of information they would to
the EU. EPA also needs to broaden its use of tools for the management
of chemical risks, including labels and hazard classification. As new
chemical hazard information is generated by EPA through voluntary
screening initiatives, TRI listings should be modified accordingly.
The United States should evaluate its pollution prevention efforts
to determine where they have succeeded and failed. The United States
also needs to expand efforts to integrate pollution prevention into
core regulatory efforts for air, water, and waste management. EPA needs
to implement the Food Quality Protection Act on a priority basis, in a
transparent manner, and with full public disclosure. In addition, the
United States needs to revise the regulatory framework for regulation
of biotechnology and assure that it will effectively cover both new and
existing products. Moreover, the United States needs to seriously
consider whether a labeling approach might have a place in enhancing
consumer confidence, if not the safety, of such foods. Finally, the
United States should ratify the agreements described above. In the
longer term, the United States needs to recognize that many of the
major chemical risks do not respect national boundaries.
Lead
In the past 10 years, the United States has used its domestic
efforts on lead poisoning prevention and abatement to help support
efforts in other countries. Lead poisoning remains a serious threat to
health and development, particularly but not exclusively in developing
countries. Because lead poisoning is expensive and difficult if not
impossible to cure, prevention is the best approach. The United States
should maintain and intensify its leadership role on lead poisoning
prevention in an internationalized context by supporting adoption of a
Global Lead Initiative (GLI) and by playing a leadership role in
implementing it thereafter. The GLI should be designed to complete a
worldwide phaseout of leaded gasoline on an expedited basis, and use
the momentum from that success to address the multiple other sources of
lead exposure. The United States should continue to support the global
phaseout of leaded gasoline in all relevant international fora. The
United States should also support such complementary activities as the
development of an international network dedicated to raising public
awareness and exchanging best practices for phaseout and prevention,
including those based on U.S. experience.
In addition to the United States, the international community
should support the establishment and implementation of a GLI to
complete the phaseout of leaded gasoline and then other sources of lead
poisoning. While the conquest of lead poisoning would constitute a
signal victory in itself, its concrete achievement should also serve as
an optimism-engendering model of international cooperation adaptable to
solving other threats to sustainable development.
The project should initially convene a technical advisory group to
work in partnership with identified government focal points, as well as
NGO's and the private sector, to prepare action plans for phaseout that
include milestones and timelines for national action. Mandating, not
merely recommending, the formation of the technical advisory process
and funding, not merely morally encouraging, the GLI as a sustained
project are essential to its success.
Hazardous Waste and Superfund
The basic structure of U.S. domestic laws with respect to hazardous
waste was established in the 1970's and 1980's. The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or the
Superfund Act) created a multifaceted scheme for eliminating dangerous
conditions created by hazardous waste spills and improper disposal of
hazardous substances. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
focused on ``cradle-to-grave'' regulation of ongoing hazardous waste
generation, transportation, and disposal.
Agenda 21 is premised on an ``overall cleaner production
approach,'' with the goal of preventing or minimizing further hazardous
waste generation, which would have the United States go further. Rio
Declaration principles supporting integrated decisionmaking and the
reduction and elimination of unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption provide a foundation for that. Indeed, a zero level of
hazardous waste generation appears to be a worthwhile long-term goal.
In addition, Agenda 21 calls for environmentally effective management
of the waste that is generated. Agenda 21 also urges ratification of
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Waste, which sets forth more effective rules with respect to
the transboundary shipping of hazardous wastes.
Cleanup activity under CERCLA has been completed on about one-half
of all Superfund sites listed on the national priority list, and more
than 6,400 removal actions have been undertaken since 1993 to remove
immediate and direct public health and environmental threats. Although
CERCLA has been very modestly amended in the decade since Rio and
subject to some intermittent administrative ``fine tuning,'' those
legal changes have diminished or, for the most part, left unimproved
the statute's overall environmental effectiveness. While the
legislation was amended in early 2002 to encourage private cleanups at
contaminated or ``brownfield'' sites, the statute still excludes oil-
based wastes at non-brownfield sites, and the exemption for secured
creditors was actually broadened in 1996. Moreover, EPA's tax-based
Superfund trust fund has not been replenished since the special
Superfund taxes expired at the end of 1995, and the fund will run out
of money in 2003 unless significant changes are made.
Similarly, RCRA has never been comprehensively amended with a view
to implementing sustainable development for hazardous waste. While the
statute intensively regulates certain wastes, the legal definition of
hazardous waste creates many regulatory uncertainties, and the statute
excludes ``solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage'' and ``solid
or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows''-two major and
environmentally unsound loopholes. Moreover, the statute lacks any
enforceable provisions directly intended to decrease or eliminate the
generation of hazardous wastes. EPA's biennial hazardous waste reports
reflect relatively little recent progress in decreasing the generation
of hazardous wastes. Nor has the United States ratified the Basel
Convention.
To move toward sustainable development, CERCLA should be amended to
narrow its exemption for secured creditors, to eliminate the statute's
``petroleum exclusion,'' and to provide a stable source of funding for
the Superfund program, at realistic levels, for at least another
decade. RCRA (and CERCLA) should be altered to mandate phased decreases
in the generation of hazardous wastes (by dates certain) at U.S.
industrial facilities, to provide that hazardous wastes in domestic
sewage and irrigation return flows be made subject to RCRA regulation,
and to replace RCRA's current regulatory definition of ``hazardous
waste'' with a consistent, straightforward, and comprehensive
definition. The United States should also ratify the original version
of the Basel Convention and amend domestic hazardous waste laws to
conform with the convention.
Brownfields Redevelopment
The United States has as many as 500,000 brownfield sites,
properties that are underdeveloped or abandoned because of actual or
potential contamination from past industrial or commercial use. Because
of CERCLA and counterpart State laws, ownership or use of these
properties could result in significant liability. In the past decade,
virtually every State has adopted laws to facilitate the reuse of
brownfield sites through voluntary cleanup programs. These laws confer
three principal advantages on private sector actors and others who are
willing to remediate a site-streamlined administrative cleanup
procedures, relaxed cleanup standards, and liability protection.
Brownfields revitalization is widely viewed as successful, as thousands
of sites have been remediated in State programs. In early 2002, similar
provisions under CERCLA were signed into law.
Each decision to remediate and reuse a brownfield site eliminates
environmental health risks while promoting reinvestment, creating jobs,
slowing the acceleration of suburban ``greenfields'' development,
decreasing polarization of communities, and fostering public
involvement in every aspect of redevelopment efforts. Brownfield
redevelopment thus involves integrated decisionmaking, promotion of
sustainable human settlements, and public participation-all central
features of sustainable development. In principle, too, State
leadership in brownfields revitalization fulfills the Agenda 21
recommendation that national governments delegate institutional
responsibility for sustainable development ``to the lowest level of
public authority consistent with effective action.''
States should modify their programs in three ways to make them more
fully consistent with sustainable development, however. First, a higher
level of government oversight is needed to ensure early, simultaneous,
and coordinated consideration of social, environmental, and economic
goals. There is typically no comprehensive review of the project and
little if any supervision of the cleanup process. The assumption is
that redevelopment will result in less contamination, but that is
merely an assumption. States should modify their laws to provide for
State oversight throughout the process.
Second, a shortcoming of virtually every brownfields program is the
relative lack of concern for future generations. State and Federal
programs define success in terms of short-term results based on
specific uses that could change over time or with future ownership.
States should modify their laws to guarantee long-term protection of
sites where remediation has taken place.
Third, there is relatively little opportunity for public
participation in the cleanup process. Public participation is
especially important because many brownfield sites are located in
neighborhoods with higher than average concentrations of persons of
color and other minorities. Public involvement helps ensure equity in
the decisionmaking process and helps ensure consistency between
community plans and developer plans. States should thus require full
and active citizen participation throughout the revitalization process.
Municipal Solid Waste
Solid waste, according to Agenda 21, is all waste that is not
radioactive or legally hazardous. In the United States, the term
encompasses nonhazardous industrial, oil and gas, mining, agricultural,
and municipal solid wastes. While municipal solid waste, also known as
trash or garbage, comprises only a fraction of these wastes, it is
easily the best known and best studied of these types of waste.
Accordingly, this part of the review focuses on municipal solid waste.
Agenda 21's objectives for solid waste are contained in a hierarchy
of (1) minimizing wastes that are produced, (2) maximizing
environmentally sound reuse and recycling of wastes, and (3) the
environmentally sound disposal and treatment of wastes that cannot be
used or reused or recycled. Underlying this hierarchy are estimates of
relative environmental impact and cost. Each successive tier of the
hierarchy involves more materials use and loss. That, in turn, means
more loss of economic value and, generally, more environmental impact
than the previous level.
Based on this hierarchy, the following three indicators or goals
appear to be a useful way of measuring a move toward sustainable waste
management: (1) decreasing per capita generation; (2) decoupling of
waste generation from GDP; and (3) even if waste generation rises,
decreasing per capita waste disposal though increased recycling,
composting, and resource recovery.
A threshold problem in analyzing U.S. efforts in meeting these
three goals is a lack of standardization about what is and should be
counted. Three prominent data sources that should be useful in
analyzing sustainability trends at the national level collect data in
different ways and make different assumptions in accounting. Still, it
is possible to discern basic trends.
First, per capita waste generation in the United States declined
somewhat from 1990 to 1995, but has increased steadily since 1996,
perhaps owing to the strong economy. Second, there does not appear to
be any decoupling of waste generation from GDP; in fact, GDP increases
seem to automatically include commensurately increasing waste
generation rates. A trend toward lighter packaging appears to have been
offset by increases in purchasing and waste. Finally, even after
recycling and composting, the numbers of pounds of waste generated per
capita per day have been increasing since 1996, according to both
California and EPA data.
These three trends are particularly notable, because the past
decade saw large changes in how municipal solid waste is managed. The
trash capacity crisis that the country faced in the late 1980's created
tremendous enthusiasm for recycling and waste reduction programs. These
programs have had a significant and positive effect. EPA reports that,
in 1999, although 230 million tons of municipal solid waste were
generated, 50 million more tons of waste were not created due to waste
prevention programs. The trash capacity crisis also led to the
development of larger, more environmentally protective landfills and
incinerators, as a result of which capacity is no longer a significant
issue. That growth in infrastructure, however, has reduced pressure for
recycling and waste reduction.
To move toward sustainability, the United States should make
progress on all three goals or indicators. To reduce per capita waste
generation, States could follow the lead of an Oregon statute that sets
goals for stabilizing and reducing per capita waste generation. To
decouple waste generation from GDP growth, the United States should
explore examples of where decoupling has already occurred, e.g., yard
waste, and develop programs that are targeted at specific waste
streams. To reduce per-capita waste disposal, more recycling and
composting is needed, coupled with incentives to reduce waste being
disposed. Better and more nationally consistent data is necessary for
all of these recommendations, and for all solid wastes.
Radioactive Waste
Radioactive waste results from nuclear-powered electric generation
and other civilian uses as well as the manufacture and disposal of
nuclear weapons. In addition to its radioactive nature, it differs from
other wastes because it can be highly dangerous for thousands of years
and because some radioactive waste can be used to make new nuclear
weapons. As a result, the control of radioactive waste deeply
implicates the security aspects of sustainable development.
While the cold war ended just before the 1992 Earth Summit, the
full meaning of this change had not yet permeated the nuclear
establishment. Since 1992, an enormous rethinking of the role of
nuclear technology and the management of nuclear waste has begun.
Enormous stockpiles of ``special nuclear materials'' and other
radioactive materials that were painstakingly built up for nuclear
weapons arsenals have been rendered surplus, raising difficult
questions about what to do with them. Moreover, Agenda 21 focused only
on commercial nuclear waste, not on radioactive waste from nuclear
weapons production. Because of greater public awareness and disclosure
about problems related to nuclear weapons production since the Earth
Summit, it is now apparent that the cost of radioactive waste cleanup
at nuclear weapons productionsites far exceeds the costs of civilian
radioactive waste controls.
In the 10 years since Rio, the United States took a number of
actions that move the country closer to sustainability in nuclear waste
control, if measured by the limited recommendations set forth in Agenda
21. Among other things, Agenda 21 calls on countries to minimize
radioactive waste, transfer radioactive waste control technologies, and
support international efforts for radioactive waste control. Private
industry has reduced the amount of low-level commercial waste per unit
of activity. The amount of high-level nuclear waste from nuclear
weapons material production was reduced largely by DOE's lower level of
nuclear weapons production, but not by efficient operations. The United
States has generally supported technology transfer in radioactive waste
control. On the other hand, some technologies promoted for radioactive
waste control may present significant risks of facilitating nuclear
proliferation. The United States provided significant and broad support
for international and regional cooperation and coordination, even
though its efforts were uneven.
When measured against the broader principles in the Rio
Declaration, however, the United States has fallen short of making
significant progress toward sustainability in radioactive waste
controls. U.S. controls on most radioactive waste generally contain
explicit, if imperfect, requirements that intergenerational or long-
term impacts be considered. The issue of intergenerational impacts has
been a focus of debates about the effectiveness of proposed geologic
repositories for such wastes. However, neither a complete understanding
of the implications, nor a mature ability to deal with this issue, have
yet evolved.
Significant progress has been made in opening up radioactive waste
control to public knowledge and participation. Much remains to be done,
however, and some backsliding has already begun. DOE began an
``openness'' initiative to provide the public more information about
radioactive waste control, but that effort has waned, and large amounts
of information that were previously available on websites from the
United States have been eliminated, ostensibly for security purposes.
Since 1992, two events have improved worker safety, but the overall
problem of DOE self-regulation remains intractable. First, DOE has
begun to encourage modern integrated safety management techniques to
involve all workers in safety planning. Second, Congress passed a
landmark worker compensation bill that provides Federal compensation
for cancer, chronic beryllium disease, and silicosis to current and
former nuclear workers and their surviving family members.
Unfortunately, DOE is retreating toward its traditional insular culture
of self-regulation and contractor self-assessments, thus reversing the
momentum toward greater contractor accountability and safety that was
developed in the 1990's.
The polluter-pays principle is particularly problematic in the case
of radioactive waste. The intergenerational nature of radioactive waste
almost guarantees that some of the costs will be borne by future
generations rather than by those who benefited from electric power or
nuclear weapons. A limited trust fund was established for one site, and
there were proposals for other trust funds. To the extent that waste
and liability producing practices fail to internalize the full costs of
doing business, the same practices will continue to produce
environmental problems.
To make progress toward sustainability in radioactive waste
control, the United States will need to rely on existing laws and
institutions more effectively. But new organizations and institutions
will likely be required to operate new facilities for plutonium
disposition and for long-term stewardship of facilities where
radioactive waste has been stabilized or contained, but not removed. A
dedicated trust fund and politically insulated organization will likely
be required to ensure the availability of funds for post-cleanup
stewardship of nuclear facilities. The United States needs to invest in
better science and technology to provide a stronger and more publicly
acceptable basis for decisionmaking. The government needs to
acknowledge the seamless connection between certain aspects of
radioactive waste control and nuclear weapons proliferation. It should
therefore support changes in the International Atomic Energy Agency to
separate its regulatory safety and safeguards functions from its
nuclear promotion activities. Finally, the government should seek to
bridge the gap between current policies and the public's understanding
and support for those policies. A major challenge is whether technical
concerns about the security of radioactive wastes and related nuclear
operations are compatible with open and democratic decisionmaking
processes.
Nongovernmental Actors
As Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration recognize, an informed and
active civil society plays an integral role in realizing sustainable
development. A democratic society can only accomplish the far-reaching
individual and organizational changes required for sustainable
development by making readily available the information that citizens
need to make their own choices and by involving citizens in making
societal choices. More generally, sustainable development is not simply
the responsibility of governments. Every part of civil society has a
role to play, not just in influencing government decisions, but also in
the activities it conducts on a daily basis. Public access to
information and governmental decisionmaking processes is one key aspect
of this issue. Another is the role played by business and industry. A
third is the extent to which sustainable development is understood in
ethical or religious terms.
Public Access to Information, Participation, and Justice
In 1992, the United States already had in place basic laws and
practices to promote transparency, participation, and accountability.
These include the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, and access
provisions in most environmental laws. During the past decade, FOIA was
amended to include electronic as well as written material. Executive
Orders began to build a structure to incorporate the goals of the
environmental justice movement into the Federal Government, and bring
some new voices into decisionmaking.
Yet overall change in the past decade was not measured primarily by
new laws, but rather by practical changes in access to information. The
1990's brought a dramatic growth in access to information through the
Internet. Research on indicators to track sustainable development
flourished. As an alternative to litigation, collaborative
decisionmaking processes became more common, bringing more
perspectives, information, and ideas for finding solutions to the
table. Environmental Defense, an environmental advocacy organization,
developed a web-based scorecard that allows residents to find emissions
from factories or power plants in their community.
Even as new technology greatly increased the public's ability to
share and use data, though, public reporting and analysis of
information and participation in decisions stalled or lost ground in
some respects. It proved difficult to develop a more unified and
integrated information system that would give citizens easier access to
government information. Such efforts often faced bitter political
divisions and an entrenched legacy of fragmented information systems
and structures developed around separate laws and programs of an
earlier era. In a period of declining civic engagement, much of the
country's innovative energy and investment went into technical
developments rather than improving governance structures and norms,
despite efforts to reinvent government to serve citizens. Judicial
action made it more difficult to utilize established citizen suit
provisions. Internationally, the United States sometimes took the lead
but often stood on the sidelines on access issues.
The United States has not taken the basic step of adopting-let
alone using-a set of indicators and institutionalizing a process to
involve the public in decisions aimed at sustainable development. A new
Administration refused to make public the list of companies consulted
in developing its energy plan, constrained access to Presidential
records, and adopted a narrower interpretation and application of FOIA.
The assumptions for expanding access were abruptly reframed
following September 11 as the country struggled to address the
potential use of information by terrorists. After the first, hurried
decisions to remove some information from the Internet, the debate has
begun to be reframed in terms of identifying specific types of data for
which the danger of generalized public availability outweighs the
public's interest in access. Yet this framing also recognizes that
public access is, itself, a way to reduce risk by providing information
that spurs public awareness and action.
In this changed setting, the United States can take seven steps to
put information and participation at the center of action to achieve
sustainability, both at home and internationally. The United States
should develop, adopt, and make regularly available to the public
indicators of sustainable development. The United States should also
develop environmental indicators and use them in preparing and
publishing an annual state of the environment report. More broadly, the
United States needs to adopt a set of principles that reflect the
significant role of information in good governance and in enabling the
public to play its role in sustainable development. The United States
should also make significant investments in developing websites and
web-based tools to tailor information to the needs of individuals and
organizations. In addition, the United States should establish a
national forum to engage citizens and NGO's on sustainable development.
The government should find ways to strengthen public access to justice,
reversing the past decade's general trend toward restricted public
access to the courts. Finally, the United States should play a lead
international role in promoting transparency, public participation, and
accountability. To do so, the United States should, among other things,
ratify the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters.
Business and Industry
Sustainable development can only be accomplished with the support
of business and, as some firms are beginning to discover, there are
profits to be made from sustainability. Agenda 21 charted a course of
action for business and industry in five main areas: (1) global
corporate environmental management; (2) environmentally sound
production and consumption patterns; (3) risk and hazard mitigation;
(4) full cost accounting; and (5) international environmental support
activities. For its part, American business has tended to ignore
sustainable development since Rio. Of the firms that have engaged the
concept, most have concentrated exclusively on its environmental
dimension. That is not to say there has not been meaningful advancement
since Rio, particularly in business' ability to manage the
environmental aspects of operations, goods, and services. In addition,
some American companies are among those pioneers working on the
sustainability frontier. But the journey is in its early stages, and
the U.S. business community is by and large still formulating a case
for, and a plan of action on, sustainable development.
Over the last several years, many large and medium-sized firms, and
to a lesser extent even smaller enterprises, have been continuously
improving techniques to promote compliance with environmental laws.
More recently, and particularly in the last 5 years, leading firms have
begun to focus on nonregulated aspects of operations, and are
experimenting with new methods to reduce their environmental footprint,
increase competitiveness, and capitalize on opportunities created by
next-generation policy initiatives that work with the grain of the
market. Some of these firms can point to significant progress toward
sustainability, especially in areas such as eco-efficiency,
environmental management systems, communications with stakeholders, and
transparency. Changing internal and external perceptions of social
equity, the prospect of cost reductions and market share growth through
innovation, increased shareholder value, positive brand recognition,
and a variety of other factors are gradually but perceptibly prompting
business to adopt strategies founded on sustainability principles. Only
a limited number of companies have endeavored to incorporate
sustainable development into operations and strategy, however, and some
of these firms have been much more active than others.
Building on insights gained in dealing with globalization, and
guided by a sharper perspective of national security and the benefits
of multilateral action in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, government and private enterprise need to come together
to forge a tighter alliance on all three dimensions of sustainable
development: the social, the economic, and the environmental. To make
further progress, government, business, and other interested
stakeholders should consider the following framework. First, business
needs to operationalize the concept of sustainable development in
practical business terms. Second, the Administration, together with
leaders from business and environmental organizations, needs to build a
stronger constituency for sustainable development in the business
community and Congress. Third, the Administration and business both
need to gain a better understanding of the interdependent relationship
between globalization and sustainable development. Fourth, Congress,
the executive branch, and the business community need to work together
to promote and facilitate good governance through national
implementation and international cooperation.
Fifth, business, working with government, financiers, investors,
insurers, consumers, NGO's, and the public needs to develop
sustainability indicators, data, and communication techniques that will
enable informed distinctions among companies, goods, and services.
Sixth, business, working with NGO's, supply chains, and other
stakeholders, needs to significantly expand the web of existing
partnerships and strategic alliances in order to promote new and better
techniques and tools, and to spread best practices more widely.
Seventh, lawmakers and policy decisionmakers (at the Federal, State,
and local levels) need to work with leaders from business, NGO's, the
bar, and the community to achieve consensus on a satisfactory blend of
policy instruments to foster sustainable business practices. Eighth,
changes in the nature of management education are needed so that
graduates emerge from business schools with the ability to incorporate
sustainable development and considerations of corporate social
responsibility as elements of competitive strategy.
Sustainability as a Religious and Ethical Concern
The United States should support, and the U.N. General Assembly
should endorse, the Earth Charter. The Earth Charter, which was
completed in 2000 after a 5-year process that involved extensive
consultations and outreach, articulates the inspirational vision, basic
values, and essential principles needed for a global ethic to support
sustainable development. The Earth Charter contains 16 principles and
61 supporting principles, and has broad resonance among the world's
major religions and ethical systems. Its main purpose is to establish a
sound ethical foundation for the emerging global society, and to help
build a sustainable world based on respect for nature, universal human
rights, economic justice, and a democratic culture of peace. The Earth
Charter is intended to help people of all ages in every walk of life to
better understand the spirit and implement the substance of truly
sustainable development. Besides showing what sustainable living is all
about, it offers a coherent, integrated standard for evaluating
possible responses to particular issues. And, as one of its drafters
stated, the Earth Charter is intended ``to give the emerging global
consciousness the spiritual depth-the soul-needed to build a just and
peaceful world community and to protect the integrity of Earth's
ecological systems.''
Endorsement of the Earth Charter by the U.N. General Assembly would
not, of course, make it legally binding. But it would signal
recognition by the world's leaders that sustainable development has a
compelling ethical and religious foundation. That, in turn, could have
a powerful and positive effect on efforts to move toward sustainable
development, including efforts in the United States.
Education
Aside from the word ``government,'' ``education'' appears more
often than any other term in Agenda 21. Education underlies and has the
potential to reinforce every other priority. Education also provides
future voters and decisionmakers with the intellectual tools needed to
achieve a sustainable society. Government can help educate people by
providing information and ideas. But our educational institutions for
kindergarten through twelfth grade, as well as our institutions for
higher education, also have a crucial role to play.
Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade
Education for sustainability at the primary, middle school, and
high school level builds on environmental education by helping students
understand and address the relationship between natural systems and the
effect of human social and economic activities on those systems. Agenda
21 seeks to reform educational systems and practices accordingly.
Happily, U.S. resources-tangible and intangible, financial and human-
could be instrumental in solving these problems. Kindergarten through
twelfth grade (K-12) education is a major shaper of the truths,
attitudes, ethics, concepts, and behaviors of American society. By
reshaping K-12 education in the United States so that it systematically
and effectively fosters sustainability, we will be able to make greater
progress toward the achievement of a sustainable world.
Groundwork has been laid in the 10 years since Rio for
sustainability education. Some recent changes in educational practices,
e.g., service learning, a focus on literacies and skills, standards
that support interdisciplinary understanding and complex thinking, and
growing recognition of the importance of systems thinking, help to
prepare our youth to understand and implement sustainable development.
Several organizations, and a network for those organizations, now exist
that attempt to define and develop skills and dispositions in youth
that will enable them to create a more sustainable world as future
workers and citizens.
In the past decade, an understanding of what sustainability
education should mean has also been developed in the United States. A
broad consensus can be seen among the goals of sustainability education
theoreticians and practitioners on some key student outcomes and some
essential knowledge, skills, and dispositions. These include ecological
literacy, including human-environment relationships; system dynamics
and ``systems thinking''; the ability to truly value and learn from
others; an understanding of the importance of place; sustainable
economics; citizenship; and creativity and visioning. Each of these is
being taught, to some degree, in some classrooms.
Overall, however, education for sustainability has only a toe-hold
in mainstream K-12 education in the United States. The United States
has not adopted sustainability education as a clearly stated, broadly
applied, national goal. Very few K-12 educators in the United States
have ever heard of sustainability education; few educators have worked
explicitly to implement education for sustainability in their
classrooms. While our educational system works to develop many of the
discrete skills that future problem solvers will need to diagnose and
solve our global problems, as a Nation we lack the systematic
understanding that explains these complex threats to sustainability.
Our educational system, moreover, is often inappropriately focused on
basic literacy and easily testable knowledge, which does not adequately
prepare future voters and decisionmakers to understand current problems
and to craft solutions for them. We do not prepare teachers to create
experiences for students that help them engage with the rich, complex,
interdisciplinary world in which they live. We do not fund the
infrastructure needed to support a sustained and nationwide
implementation of an educational program for sustainability. Only a
single State, Vermont, has educational standards that explicitly
address sustainability. Even environmental education, an important and
well-established component of sustainability education, is increasingly
eclipsed in importance and increasingly slighted in funding.
To make significant progress on sustainability education, schools
of education need to ensure that teachers understand sustainability,
and can apply this knowledge and skill in the work they do with
students. State education organizations should approve standards for
sustainability education. Statewide assessments of student learning
should be modified to reflect this goal. These efforts should also
connect students with work being done in the community to foster
sustainability. While some first-rate work has been done to create and
distribute curriculum units, much remains to be done. Of course, public
and private funding is needed to support this effort. A change in the
knowledge and skills that colleges and universities expect from
entering students could also help move K-12 education for
sustainability forward.
Higher Education
Higher education for sustainability is like environmental education
because it draws on an environmental foundation. But it is different
from much environmental education because it includes the social and
economic dimensions of sustainability, and is designed to help students
think about problems in an integrated manner. Since higher education to
date largely fails to expose students to issues and considerations
outside the narrow confines of their disciplines, it consequently fails
to produce integrated decisionmakers. Higher education for sustainable
development primarily involves teaching students to understand
ecological, social, and economic problems through the many lenses of an
interdisciplinary framework. It assumes that integrated decisionmaking
is not possible without integrated thinking. Effective and rigorous
teaching of integrated thinking-without becoming soft and watering down
the disciplines-is both a powerful intellectual challenge and a
profound necessity.
A genuine commitment to creating a sustainable future would be
evidenced in most of the following seven critical dimensions of
institutional life. These are based on Agenda 21 and various national
and international conferences. Disciplinary, professional, liberal
arts, and general education requirements at the university would
involve interdisciplinary decisionmaking and reflect a fundamental
concern for sustainability. Research at the institution would focus
significantly on sustainable development. Faculty and staff development
rewards would cultivate an understanding of, and contributions to,
sustainable development. Campus operations would be oriented toward
reducing the institution's ``ecological footprint.'' Student
opportunities and engagement on campus would reflect a deep commitment
to sustainability through new student orientation, scholarships,
internships, and job placement counseling. The institution's outreach
and service would support local, regional, and global partnerships to
enhance sustainability. The university's mission, structure, and
planning would communicate and promote sustainability.
Since the Earth Summit, however, education for sustainable
development in the United States has been underfunded and
undersupported, both within and outside the academy. Tensions have
arisen between environmental educators and sustainability educators,
and no consensus has been reached on who or what institutions should
guide higher education for sustainability. The U.S. Government has
shown little interest in pursuing this agenda. For the most part,
pressure on universities and colleges to begin to embrace the challenge
of sustainable development has originated from within. At a small
minority of institutions, highly motivated and committed presidents,
faculty members, staff members, and students have effected change in
significant ways. At a larger minority, there is evidence of increased
eco-efficiency in operations or new offerings in environmental studies.
Colleges and universities in America are increasingly adopting
sustainability initiatives in one or more of these seven critical
dimensions of institutional life. But an authentic institutional
commitment to sustainable development is rare.
A deeper commitment to sustainable development in higher education
requires three broad changes. First, higher education must commit
itself to steady reform in teaching, research, faculty and staff hiring
and development, operations, student opportunities, outreach, and
mission and structure. Second, sustainability must become a priority of
the specialized academic organizations, disciplines, and professions
that influence universities. Third, external stakeholders, including
opinion leaders, alumni, employers and funders, should pressure Federal
and State governments to move the education and research agenda of
higher education toward a greater focus on sustainability. Since the
Federal Government provides more than 90 percent of the funding for
academic research, it influences deeply the priorities for research and
helps shape academic fields.
Institutions and Infrastructure
In a sustainable society, effective governmental and
nongovernmental institutions deliver essential services to people on an
equitable basis. The built infrastructure for necessary public services
in a sustainable society should also be durable, available and
affordable to all, and environmentally protective or restorative. Two
key examples are transportation and medical and public health services.
Transportation
The traditional approach to transportation planning in the United
States has been to maximize roadway capacity, travel speed, and
mobility, generally within the context of large subsidies to motorized
transportation. A sustainable transportation system, by contrast, seeks
to maximize efficiency in overall resource use. In Agenda 21's words,
it is ``more efficient, less polluting and safer.'' Its basic
components include increasing modal diversity, with more emphasis on
public transit, walking, and bicycling; paying more attention to the
pattern of transportation and land use; encouraging use of efficient
transportation modes whenever practical; charging users the true costs
of transportation; and encouraging better connectivity between modes.
American transportation policy has become increasingly cognizant of
these patterns. Just as Agenda 21 was being adopted, the United States
was entering the beginning stage of a fundamental change in Federal
transportation policy. While the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 authorized substantial Federal funding
for highway expansion, its name suggested the beginning of a new
direction-a greater emphasis on all modes of travel, not just highways,
and an emphasis on environmental and economic efficiency. In general,
ISTEA eschewed substantive regulatory requirements in favor of
procedural ones intended to assure the consideration of nationally
important goals, along with appropriate funding mechanisms to enable
regions and States to put efficiency strategies into effect. The
cornerstone of this approach was (and remains) a planning process
established for metropolitan areas and States that is intended to
``minimize transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution.''
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), adopted in
1998, reauthorized the 1991 law with only minor changes to these key
provisions.
Despite some positive trends in the past decade, however, the
environmental impacts of transportation generally increased. From 1995
through 2000, transit use grew 21 percent while driving increased by
just 11 percent. The growth rate in vehicle miles traveled per capita
slowed somewhat from what it had been in the 1980's. On the other hand,
a number of trends all point to increased inefficiency in travel
patterns. The number of vehicle miles traveled grew from 2 to 2.6
trillion miles between 1990 and 1998. Other negative trends include an
increase in average trip length, growth in the number of vehicle trips
taken per person and per household per year, and a decline in average
vehicle occupancy. Transportation is by far the largest consumer of
petroleum products in the United States, accounting for some two-thirds
of our oil consumption. Transportation is also responsible for rising
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions and continuing unhealthy air quality. In some
communities, parking lots now constitute the largest single category of
land use. Increased driving also means increased congestion; Americans
now spend roughly one of every eight waking hours in cars.
The United States is moving toward sustainability in transportation
in some respects; there have been measurable improvements in process,
in mode shifts, and even in some environmental indicators. But with
long-term trends foretelling a dramatically growing population and a
growing economy, mere motion toward the goal is not enough, because the
goal is itself moving farther and farther away, and becoming more
difficult to achieve.
To move the United States to an effective course for sustainability
in transportation, Congress and the Federal agencies must buildupon the
policy reforms of the 1990's through a suite of measures. The first
step is to recognize clearly that travel choices available to most
Americans have been sharply curtailed by past policies, from high
subsidies to housing to tax polices and zoning laws, that have made it
unattractive or impossible to choose more sustainable options such as
walking, cycling, riding transit, living close to our jobs, and driving
smaller, more efficient motor vehicles. Another step is to establish
and work toward specific transportation goals, such as increased energy
efficiency, equal access to jobs, and a safe walking route to school
for each child. The United States should also adopt policy measures
that would reduce demand for motorized transportation; encourage the
use of alternative transportation modes; and reduce the environmental,
social, and economic costs of transportation.
Medical and Public Health Services
The U.S. health system works very well, compared to the developing
world. But the comparison to the remainder of the developed world,
especially to the wealthier European countries, is not as favorable.
The health provisions of Agenda 21 focus not only on environmental
pollution but also on basic medical care, preventive medicine, and
improving mental as well as physical health. Equality in access to
basic goods and services is part of sustainable development, both as an
issue of fairness and because sustained inequalities impede development
and destabilize society. Thus, basic medical and public health services
are critical to a more just and economically sound nation.
While no bright line separates public health services from personal
medical services, medical services are those that treat diseases and
injuries in the individual. Public health is concerned with the
community. Public health services are not a substitute for personal
medical services, but they can prevent the need for medical services,
and they are less expensive and more widely available than medical
services.
The U.S. sanitation system works well, with outbreaks of water and
foodborne illnesses happening infrequently enough to be front page
news. Yet the public health system has suffered from decades of
neglect, a lack of national standards, fragmentation of staffing and
resources among thousands of legal jurisdictions, and a general lack of
public support and funding. As a result, the system is vulnerable to
breakdowns and has a limited ability to cope with new threats,
including terrorism and climate change.
The level of communicable diseases in the United States, especially
human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/
AIDS), is high for a developed country, and affects sustainable
development. Communicable diseases are transmitted by people to other
people, and are thus different from sanitation or environmental
diseases. The poor suffer disproportionately from such diseases, both
because access to medical care services is limited for the poor, and
because environmental factors increase the spread of communicable
diseases among the poor. Ironically, past success in eradicating
smallpox and polio, and in dramatically reducing measles and
tuberculosis, has undermined public support for communicable disease
control spending and programs.
Over the last 10 years, there has been no progress in improving
access to medical care in the United States. Indeed, there are some
indications that the quality of available care has diminished due to
economic pressures. The United States does not guarantee universal
access to medical care. Instead, it relies on a combination of
voluntary, employer-paid health insurance, government entitlement
through Medicare for the elderly, and a limited program for indigent
persons not covered by employer-paid health insurance. Approximately 40
million persons are not covered by any of these plans, and many persons
with some coverage still do not have adequate access to medical care.
Congress has been unwilling to assume the burden of universal access or
of increasing employer mandates, and the States do not have the
economic resources to bridge the gap. This results in a less healthy
work force and distorts economic development because it
disproportionately harms low wage earners.
To move closer to sustainability, the United States should retain
local enforcement for public health, but provide standards, funding,
and oversight at the Federal level. There should be a national civil
service system for public health professionals, especially those who
manage health departments. The United States also needs to fund proper
postmortem examination procedures to diagnose every death from a
communicable disease. In addition, the United States should set
standards on antibiotic usage to identify patterns of disease spread
and to limit the development of antibiotic-resistant organisms.
Universal health insurance would improve individual health and the
health of the population, which would be good for development and might
reduce projected incremental costs as preventive services improve. If
the United States is not prepared to do that, it should at least make
routine care and preventive services universally available. This would
include providing education and support to improve health habits, such
as better nutrition, exercise, and the cessation of dangerous habits
such as smoking. By doing so, the United States would improve health
and productivity, serve distributive justice, and bring the country
closer to sustainability for basic medical services.
Governance
The national government, as well as State and local governments,
needs to play an important role in sustainable development. Perhaps the
most important thing they can do, Agenda 21 says, is integrate their
decisionmaking on environmental, social, economic, and security issues.
National governments are also urged to delegate ``responsibilities to
the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective
action.'' In the past 10 years, no level of government in the United
States has provided strong support for sustainable development. State
and local efforts, though, have been more widespread and effective than
national ones.
Local Governance
Integrated decisionmaking should, at least in principle, be easier
at the local level, because the connections between economic, social,
and environmental issues are easier to understand and most of the
relevant stakeholders live or work nearby. Agenda 21 calls on
localities to consult with key stakeholders to arrive at a consensus on
local strategies for sustainable development, and States that by 1996
most local authorities in each country should have developed ``a local
Agenda 21'' for their community. However, Agenda 21 does not generally
address the reality of multiple municipalities within a specific
metropolitan region. Fragmented decisionmaking among municipalities in
the same region causes sprawling growth patterns that increase traffic,
cause air and water pollution, increase water consumption, and destroy
wetlands. Communities and regions across the country also continue to
be largely divided along economic and racial lines, both physically and
socially.
National policies to foster community sustainability did not change
significantly in the past decade. Significant progress was made in
promoting the redevelopment of brownfields and providing alternatives
to highway transportation, but many Federal laws continue to be
obstacles to local sustainability. The Federal mortgage interest
deduction, for instance, favors wealthier home buyers over those who
are less wealthy, renters, multifamily property owners, and people who
rehabilitate existing structures.
Many States enacted ``smart growth'' laws to control some of the
environmental effects of sprawl. But all too often, these laws leave
untouched a framework of State laws that encourage the creation of
largely autonomous municipalities, and require that these
municipalities raise revenue by property taxes to support services
within their boundaries. Such laws encourage municipalities to compete
for property wealth and exclude less expensive housing, a tactic that
fosters sprawl and impedes intermunicipal cooperation. The lack of laws
requiring coordination in housing, education, regional revenue sharing,
and land use remains a major obstacle to local sustainable development
efforts.
At the local level, a few communities adopted ``local Agenda 21s''
through broad participation, but municipalities in the United States
are beginning to show great creativity and innovation on local
sustainability. Municipal sustainable development efforts-in locations
such as Burlington, Chicago, and Santa Monica-were encouraged by the
PCSD. Those municipalities and others employed techniques such as
inclusionary zoning, providing incentives to developers to use existing
sewer and water infrastructure, and reducing water usage. But most
municipalities have a long way to go. For example, although mixed use
zoning promotes walkable, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, most
municipalities still require single use zoning.
Achieving local sustainability will require more than local
efforts. Congress and the Federal Government should use conditional
funding mechanisms to provide incentives for municipalities to
cooperate and grow smartly. The Federal mortgage interest deduction
should be changed so that it does not encourage single-family housing.
States need to move toward a system that better promotes regional
governance and shares taxes within a region. States should also create
regional planning commissions and empower them to use various
regulatory and fiscal incentives and disincentives to encourage
cooperation among municipalities and channel growth in particular ways.
States, in addition, should modify their zoning laws to encourage more
mixed-use zoning. Municipalities should charge, and be empowered to
charge, fees requiring developers to pay the full cost of new services
and infrastructure. As municipalities move toward a regional approach,
each municipality in a region should also accept its ``fair share'' of
affordable housing units. And at all levels, more must be done to
provide incentives for the establishment of public/private partnerships
and broad-based consensus-building efforts.
State Governance
The goals of sustainable development-simultaneously achieving
economic, social, environmental, and security goals while maintaining
the ability of future generations to attain such goals-are the goals of
State governments. Except for the national security element of the
security goal, States have great responsibility for achieving those
goals in the United States. The decentralized decisionmaking
recommended by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 is also consistent
with the constitutional structure of U.S. governance, which gives
substantial authority to States.
Before the Earth Summit, many States promoted integrated
decisionmaking through laws requiring environmental impact statements
for major projects, constitutional provisions concerning the
environment, planning laws, and statutes encouraging pollution
prevention. They did not necessarily result in the type of integrated
decisionmaking envisioned by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, but
they did substantially increase the level of consideration of
environmental issues in economic development decisions. Many State
constitutional provisions and statutes also contained aspirational
language concerning intergenerational equity. Federal pollution control
statutes adopted in the 1970's and 1980's used a Federal-State
partnership model that strongly encouraged States to improve their
environmental programs and allowed them to continue exercising
authority in areas where there is no Federal regulation.
Since the Earth Summit, a number of States have made substantial
progress in creating and implementing policies aimed at achieving
sustainable development. As a group, States are fulfilling their role
as laboratories for experimenting with programs and are, to an extent,
leading policy development in the United States. Minnesota, New Jersey,
and Oregon have established or expanded planning, decisionmaking, and
goal-setting efforts for sustainable development. Maryland enacted a
series of programs intended to reform land development practices by
encouraging development in existing centers and discouraging
development of greenfields. Many States have undertaken supportive
policy-specific initiatives that are consistent with sustainable
development, including laws and policies to foster smart growth,
recycling, energy efficiency, renewable energy, watershed protection,
pollution prevention, and redevelopment of brownfields. A report by the
Resource Renewal Institute evaluating the ``shifting emphasis toward
sustainability'' in all 50 States, however, shows a substantial gap
between the leading and lagging States.
Devolution, or transferring power to States to deal with
environmental issues, also dominated discussions of environmental law
in the 1990's. The National Environmental Performance Partnership
System (NEPPS) was established in 1995 to provide States the
opportunity to negotiate greater flexibility within the context of
existing Federal pollution control laws.
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have also established
indicators to track progress toward sustainability. Minnesota's
Progress Indicator suggests that the State's gross domestic product may
overstate that State's actual progress toward environmental, economic,
and social goals. In 2000, the State reported that, according to the
Progress Indicator, the State's performance peaked in the mid-1980's,
and had declined to a point where by 1995 the levels were similar to
the indicator's values for the early 1960's.
In the next 5 to 10 years, States need to make sustainable
development an explicit goal. More States need to follow the examples
set by leading jurisdictions and adopt and implement strategies and
policies promoting sustainable development and holding themselves
accountable (through the use of indicators) for achieving
sustainability. Governors must ensure adequate and effective
interagency cooperation by designating a cabinet-level person who will
be responsible for fostering sustainable development, including
sustainable land development. States should also make greater use of
environmental impact assessment, particularly to bring
intergenerational equity into their development and policy decisions.
Finally, States should work with EPA and other Federal agencies to use
NEPPS to improve Federal-State environmental governance for achieving
goals, and for monitoring and reporting progress.
National Governance
In a world of sovereign nations, sustainable development cannot be
achieved unless it is actively supported by national governments. In a
basic sense, the requirements for good governance for sustainable
development are the same as those for good governance in general. These
include effective governmental institutions, national laws, a favorable
investment climate, public access to information, public participation
in governmental decisionmaking, and access to justice. But sustainable
development requires more than that. Most basically, it requires that
national governments integrate the environment into national
decisionmaking in broader and deeper ways over time. Agenda 21
recommends that they do so through national strategies. At the 5-year
review of Earth Summit commitments in 1997, nations agreed to have such
strategies in place by 2002. National strategies would guide
governmental decisionmaking on a range on issues, include priorities
and timetables, change in response to changing conditions, and harness
the energy and creativity of nongovernmental actors, including the
private sector.
The United States has no such strategy. Sustainable development is
not actively supported by the president or congressional leaders. There
is no strategic thinking or action on behalf of the Federal Government.
There is no governmental coordinating or implementing mechanism for a
national strategy, and little public education.
The PCSD (1993-1999), an advisory council established by President
Clinton, might have provided (and, if resurrected, could still provide)
the basis for a national strategy. The PCSD brought together diverse
stakeholders from around the country and fashioned a detailed set of
recommendations for sustainable development in the United States. But
it had no authority to implement its own recommendations, and neither
President Clinton nor Vice President Al Gore showed interest in seeking
implementation. Nor was there much interest in Congress during the same
period.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which until 1995 was
required to issue national reports on the state of the nation's
environment, has not issued such reviews on a regular basis for years.
On the other hand, a 1993 statute, the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA), requires Federal agencies to engage in a strategic
planning process, and some agencies have used sustainable development
to guide that process.
The United States should adopt and implement a national strategy
for sustainable development. It should include meaningful goals,
indicators of progress toward those goals, legal and institutional
mechanisms for achieving them, and public education. The strategy
should be built on existing laws and legal authority, and thus should
ensure wider use of the GPRA to move agency planning toward sustainable
development. It should prioritize those issues that are of greatest
importance. Some executive level entity, perhaps the CEQ, should be
responsible for coordinating its development and implementation. But
CEQ's now-extinguished annual reporting function should be transferred
to an independent and properly funded entity, either in or out of the
Federal Government. That would help ensure that a long-term perspective
is brought to bear in national decisionmaking-one of the most important
prerequisites for sustainable development.
The international community would add significant value to the
national sustainable development strategy process if countries were to
agree that implementation of national sustainable development
strategies should begin no later than 2005. It would also help if
countries would agree that national trends for the degradation and loss
of natural resources should be reversed by 2015. Such goals would give
more specific content to the national strategy process, and would also
incorporate a specific and easily understood goal into the meaning of
sustainable development. This goal would help focus national and
international efforts, and would help galvanize citizens, NGO's, and
corporations in countries around the world.
Looking Ahead
A defining characteristic of a sustainable society is that it can
successfully adapt to new and different conditions. We have grown and
prospered as a Nation because we have been able to take advantage of
opportunities and respond to threats that our founders could not have
imagined. The challenges of growing global environmental degradation,
and the growing gap between rich and poor are quite obvious. But the
opportunity is equally real-to build an ecologically sustainable
framework that provides greater freedom, opportunity, and quality of
life for all. Law and policies are not the only means of achieving a
sustainable society, but they will play an important role.
The essential missing ingredient thus far, and which needs to be
supplied in the coming decade, is commitment-commitment by government
at all levels, educational institutions, business and industry, NGO's,
and individuals. We know what we need to do, and we also know why. As
Americans, we are called to face these challenges, and to seize this
opportunity.
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