<DOC>
[107 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:83683.wais]
S. Hrg.107-994
CLEAN AIR ACT: RISKS FROM GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASING
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
__________
MARCH 13, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
_____
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
one hundred seventh congress
second session
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
HARRY REID, Nevada JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BOB GRAHAM, Florida JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
BARBARA BOXER, California GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
RON WYDEN, Oregon MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
Ken Connolly, Majority Staff Director
Dave Conover, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
MARCH 13, 2002
OPENING STATEMENTS
Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from the State of
Colorado....................................................... 44
Chafee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island 29
Corzine, Hon. Jon S., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey.. 32
Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.. 1
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph, U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 43
Smith, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire.... 6
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio... 4
WITNESSES
Baliunas, Sallie, astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for
Astrophysics, Cambridge, MA.................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 154
Report, Climate Research, Vol. 18:259-275, 2001, Modeling
climatic effects of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions:
unknown uncertainties.....................................162-178
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Campbell......................................... 183
Senator Jeffords......................................... 179
Senator Smith............................................ 179
Senator Voinovich........................................ 181
Cogen, Jack D., president, Natsource, New York, NY............... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 195
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Smith............................................ 196
Senator Voinovich........................................ 197
Legates, David R., director, Center for Climatic Research,
University of Delaware, Newark, DE............................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 101
Report, A Layman's Guide to the General Circulation Models
Used in the National Assessment...........................106-125
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Campbell......................................... 132
Senator Jeffords......................................... 126
Senator Smith............................................ 126
Senator Voinovich........................................ 129
Summary, Addendum #1, Theoretical and Applied
Climatology, 41, 11-21 (1990), by Springer-Verlag, Mean
Seasonal and Spatial Variability in Global Surface Air
Temperature...........................................134-145
Markham, Adam, executive director, Clean Air-Cool Planet,
Portsmouth, NH................................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 146
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Campbell......................................... 154
Senator Jeffords......................................... 151
Senator Smith............................................ 152
Senator Voinovich........................................ 153
Pielke, Roger A., Jr., associate professor, Center for Science
and Technology Policy Research, University of Colorado/
Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences,
Boulder, CO.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 87
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Campbell......................................... 100
Senator Jeffords......................................... 94
Senator Smith............................................ 98
Senator Voinovich........................................ 99
Rowland, Sherwood F., Donald Bren research professor of chemistry
and earth science, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Report, Climate Change Science, An Analysis of Some Key
Questions, National Academy Press.......................... 47-82
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Jeffords......................................... 83
Senator Smith............................................ 84
Senator Voinovich........................................ 86
Whittaker, Martin, managing director, Innovest, Richmond Hill,
Ontario, Canada................................................ 20
Prepared statement........................................... 183
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Jeffords......................................... 188
Senator Smith............................................ 191
Senator Voinovich........................................ 193
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Charts:
Alaska's Temperature History................................. 207
A Sun-Climate Link........................................... 161
Forecast Amount of Averted Global Warming.................... 157
Global Temperature........................................... 159
Global Tropospheric Temperature.............................. 160
Surface Temperature.......................................... 158
Letter, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI........................... 208
Report, ``Swiss Re''............................................199-206
CLEAN AIR ACT: RISKS FROM GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Jeffords (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Jeffords, Voinovich, Smith, Chafee, and
Corzine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Jeffords. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order.
Today we will hear testimony on the economic and
environmental risk of increasing greenhouse gas emissions. It
is important to note that the hearing is not a debate about
whether manmade emissions are causing warming. For the time
being, that question has been settled by the National Academy
of Sciences. An Academy report from June 2001 said,``Greenhouse
gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of
human activities, causing surface air temperatures and sub-
surface ocean temperatures to rise, and human-induced warming
and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through
the 21st century.''
We are fortunate to have today a witness here who has
worked on that report.
What the committee will review is the magnitude of the
possible injuries or losses that may be caused by this warming.
I urge the witnesses to stay on that topic and help us assess
the risk related to increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
One year ago today, the President formally notified the
world and the Senate of his decision to unilaterally abandon
the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, he also abandoned his
campaign promise to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, or the
fourth ``P'' from powerplants. That was a serious blow to a
sensible, market-based approach to reducing carbon emissions.
As a result, the country has no actual policy in place to
achieve a real emissions reduction target, so emissions will
continue unabated. This is happening despite our international
commitment in the Rio Agreement to reduce U.S. emissions to
1990 levels. Voluntary measures are no substitute and have
failed to do more than slightly slow the rate of growth.
This situation concerns me and it should concern all of my
colleagues. Unconstrained emissions will increase atmospheric
concentrations. These will lead to greater global warming and
provoke even greater climate changes.
Some of my concern is parochial. In Vermont, we rely on
predictability of the seasons for our economic well-being and
our quality of life. In the spring, maple syrup production is
important. In the fall and summer, it is tourism. In the
winter, it is skiing, snowboarding, and other outdoor
recreation. It is safe to say that most Vermonters aren't
interested in moving Hudson Bay to maintain their way of life.
Elsewhere in the country, my colleagues should be concerned
about the potential impacts of climate change on public health,
infrastructure, agriculture, and wildlife.
Sea-level rise should be of particular concern to my
friends who represent coastal States, especially with growing
areas. As Senator Stevens has noted, Alaska villages have
already started to experience some of these effects. However,
these gradual impacts may pale in comparison to what might
happen with a sudden or abrupt change.
In December 2001, the National Academy said, ``Greenhouse
warming and other human alterations of the Earth's system may
increase the possibility of large, abrupt, and unwelcome
regional or global climactic changes.'' This should be a
sobering statement that encourages action; instead, the debate
often seems to be focused on the trees rather than the forest.
But that information is not essential for Congress to act.
The potential calamity that awaits us through inaction is
too serious for Congress to ignore. We acted on lead in
gasoline and on ozone-depleting substances, even though we did
not have perfect information. We made the right choice.
The science on climate change is sound enough to proceed
with reductions now. Many carbon-intensive businesses have
already begun to take action. They see a duty to their
shareholders and to the public to start reducing these carbon
risks.
Major insurance companies are increasingly concerned about
the uncertainty of a changing climate in their financial
exposure. Several markets are developing for the trading of
greenhouse gas reduction credits, even in the United States.
It seems that there must be some level of economic or
environmental risk associated with these emissions; otherwise,
how could the credits have value, and why would anyone trade
them? But they are being traded at $1 to $9 per ton.
Congress is often slow to act on complex problems like
climate, especially without vigorous leadership from the White
House. In this situation, the private sector may have to lead
us in the right direction.
Unfortunately, in the meantime it seems to be business as
usual on emissions. They will continue to grow, and we may
reach atmospheric concentrations that haven't existed for
hundreds of thousands of years. We need to know and be prepared
for what that means for our committee, our plans, and our
Nation.
I look forward to the panel's testimony. It will help us
discover and better understand the risks that are posed by
continuing to increase greenhouse gas emissions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator from the State of
Vermont
Today we'll hear testimony on the economic and environmental risks
of increasing greenhouse gas emissions. It's important to note that
this hearing is not a debate about whether manmade emissions are
causing warming. For the time being, that question has been settled by
the National Academy of Sciences.
An Academy report from June 2001 said, ``Greenhouse gases are
accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities,
causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to
rise'' . . . and . . . ``Human-induced warming and associated sea level
rises are expected to continue through the 21st century.'' We're
fortunate to have a witness here today who worked on that report.
What the committee will review is the magnitude of the possible
injuries or losses that may be caused by this warming. I urge the
witnesses to stay on that topic and help us assess the risks related to
increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
One year ago today, the President formally notified the world and
the Senate of his decision to unilaterally abandon the Kyoto Protocol.
At the same time, he also abandoned his campaign promise to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions, or the fourth ``P,'' from power plants. That
was a serious blow to a sensible, market-based approach to reducing
carbon emissions.
As a result, the country has no actual policy in place to achieve a
real emissions reductions target. So, emissions will continue unabated.
This is happening despite our international commitment in the Rio
Agreement to reduce U.S. emissions to 1990 levels. Voluntary measures
are no substitute and have failed to do more than slightly slow the
rate of growth.
This situation concerns me and it should concern all of my
colleagues. Unconstrained emissions will increase atmospheric
concentrations. These will lead to greater global warming and provoke
even greater climate changes.
Some of my concern is parochial. In Vermont, we rely on the
predictability of the seasons for our economic well-being and our
quality of life.
In the spring, maple syrup production is important. In the fall and
summer, it's tourism. In the winter, it's skiing, snowboarding and
other outdoor recreation. It's safe to say that most Vermonters aren't
interested in moving to Hudson Bay to maintain their way of life.
Elsewhere in the country, my colleagues should be concerned about
the potential impacts of climate change on public health,
infrastructure, agriculture and wildlife. Sea-level rise should be of
particular concern to my friends who represent coastal states,
especially with growing areas.
As Senator Stevens has noted, Alaskan villages have already started
to experience some of these effects.
However, these gradual impacts may pale in comparison to what might
happen with a sudden or abrupt change. In December 2001, the National
Academy said, ``greenhouse warming and other human alterations of the
Earth system may increase the possibility of large, abrupt and
unwelcome regional or global climatic events.''
That should be a sobering statement that encourages action.
Instead, the debate often seems to be focused on the trees rather than
the forest.
There are even some people who think we should stop our efforts to
assess the possible impact of global warming on our economy or our
environment. They want to wait for perfect information. That seems
unwise and irresponsible.
We must redouble our efforts to understand how global warming may
affect us. We should continue working diligently to reduce the
uncertainties of predictions.
I am hopeful that the President will soon send up the detailed
global change budget, as required by the Global Change Research Act of
1990. That budget must keep the national assessment moving without
delay or censorship.
But, that information is not essential for Congress to begin
acting. The potential calamity that awaits us through inaction is too
serious for Congress to ignore.
We acted on lead in gasoline and on ozone-depleting substances even
though we did not have perfect information. We made the right choice.
The science on climate change is sound enough to proceed with
reductions now.
Many carbon intensive businesses have already begun to take action.
They see a duty to their shareholders and to the public to start
reducing their carbon risks. Major insurance companies are increasingly
concerned about the uncertainty of changing climate and their financial
exposure. Several markets are developing for the trading of greenhouse
gas reduction credits, even in the United States. It seems that there
must be some level of economic or environmental risk associated with
these emissions. Otherwise, how could the credits have value and why
would anyone trade them? But, they are being traded at $1-$9 per ton.
Congress is often slow to act on complex problems like climate,
especially without vigorous leadership from the White House. In this
situation, the private sector may have to lead us in the right
direction.
Unfortunately, in the meantime, it seems to be business as usual on
emissions. They will continue to grow and we may reach atmospheric
concentrations that haven't existed for hundreds of thousands of years.
We need to know and be prepared for what that means for our
communities, our plans, and our nation.
I look forward to the panel's testimony. It will help us discover
and better understand the risks that are posed by continuing to
increase greenhouse gas emissions.
Senator Jeffords. Our first witness is Dr. Rowland.
Senator Voinovich, I note your arrival. If you have an
opening statement, now is the time.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome the panel.
I want to thank you for holding this hearing today on the
economic and environmental risks associated with increasing
greenhouse gas emissions. I think it is always important to try
and understand the risks associated with the various policy
decisions that we grapple with here in the Senate; however, Mr.
Chairman, I want to make sure we don't rush past the underlying
assumptions on the science of greenhouse gases and climate
change and jump immediately to the worst case scenario effects.
In courtroom terms, we are in danger here, I think, of passing
a sentence before we have fully deliberated on the evidence.
Over the last year, I have chaired one hearing on climate
change. I have now attended, including today, three others.
There is no question in my mind that there is a real difference
of opinion between the scientific experts on climate change.
It is amazing to me how certain groups have bought into the
idea that everything is settled and they close their mind to
conflicting evidence. I get letters from constituents and
friends about climate change, and it appears that they just
look at one set of information and have made a conclusion about
it. Then what I do is, I send them the testimony that I've had
at hearings and said, ``Here, read all of it, and then you tell
me what you think after reading both sides of this.'' There is
a difference of opinion.
Greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change debate are
real issues which deserve our attention and the attention of
the best and brightest scientists in our country and the world.
There are a number of issues which need to be addressed before
we plan what to do about the worst case scenario, such as: what
do the models tell us about past changes and climate patterns,
and how well-suited are they to predict future changes? What do
we know about the predicted range of climate temperatures due
to manmade emissions over the next 50 to 100 years? If
something needs to be done today, what are the available
technology options and what would the cost be to society to
implement those options? Finally, if we were to implement
changes, what would the impact be?
I am told that if we were to implement the Kyoto Treaty
completely, we would only avert the expected temperature change
of .06 C--that's .06 C, which is substantially less than 1
F. That's a .01 C. To me that hardly seems significant, and
maybe some of our witnesses will comment on that.
I'd also like to say a brief word about the President's
climate change initiative. I know today's hearing was planned
for the anniversary of the President's announcement on Kyoto--
very good, Mr. Chairman. Instead of dwelling on Kyoto, which
was a failed treaty and would never have passed the Senate and
still would never pass the Senate, we should look at the
President's initiative. To me, it seems to be a very reasonable
approach and it is the only credible alternative proposed to
date. By the way, it is one that's gaining support by many of
our allies who would like to go forward and get something done
on this issue and not have it be a long debate of the
international community with nothing getting done. It provides
the necessary funding for both the science and the
technological research. It encourages companies to register
their CO<INF>2</INF> emissions. It sets a national goal to
reduce our carbon intensity, which is the best way to protect
our economy and begin to address the issue.
Finally, in terms of the multi-emission strategy, as I've
said repeatedly, I would support addressing CO<INF>2</INF>, Mr.
Chairman, in a voluntary way which encourages new technologies
and practices such as carbon sequestration or anything else
that's out there that we can look at, but I will not support a
mandatory CO<INF>2</INF> reduction cap.
I think it is important that we do not let the
CO<INF>2</INF> issue stand in the way of meaningful reductions
of SO<INF>2</INF>, NOx, and mercury. There are many people out
there that want something done about those three emissions,
many of them who live in your part of the country. We can sit
here and have a chowder society and debate. I'd like to get on
with dealing with those three so that we can improve the
environment and at the same time, create an environment where
we have reasonable energy costs for the people of this country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
Statement of Hon. George Voinovich, U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on the
economic and environmental risks associated with increasing greenhouse
gas emissions. I think it is always important to try and understand the
risks associated with the various policy decisions we grapple with here
in the Senate.
However, I want to make sure we don't rush past the underlying
assumptions on the science of greenhouse gases and climate change and
jump immediately to the worst-case scenario effects. In courtroom terms
we are in danger here today of passing a sentence before we have fully
deliberated the evidence.
Over the last year I have chaired one Hearing on Climate Change and
have now attended three others. There is no question in my mind that
there is a real difference of opinion between the scientific experts on
climate change. It is amazing to me how certain groups have bought into
the idea that everything is settled and they close their mind to
conflicting evidence.
Greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change debate are real
issues which deserve our attention and the attention of the best and
brightest scientists in our country and the world. There are a number
of issues which need to be addressed before we plan what to do about
the worst-case scenarios such as:
<bullet> What do the models tell us about the past changes in
climate patterns and how well suited are they to predict future
changes?
<bullet> What do we know about the predicted range of climate
temperatures due to man-made emissions over the next 50 to 100 years?
<bullet> If something needs to be done today, what are the
available technology options and what would the cost be to society to
implement them?
<bullet> Finally, if we were to implement changes, what would the
impact be. I am told if we were to implement the Kyoto Treaty
completely, we would only avert the expected temperature change by .06
degrees Celsius over the next 50 years. That hardly seems significant.
I would also like to say a brief word about the President's Climate
Change Initiative. I know today's hearing was planned for the
anniversary of the President's announcement on Kyoto. Instead of
dwelling on Kyoto, which was a failed Treaty and would never have
passed the Senate, we should look at his Initiative. To me it seems to
be a very reasonable approach and it is the only credible alternative
proposed to date.
<bullet> It provides the necessary funding for both the science and
the technology research.
<bullet> It encourages companies to register their CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions.
<bullet> It sets a national goal to reduce our carbon intensity,
which is the best way to protect our economy and begin to address the
issue.
Finally, in terms of the Multi-Emissions Strategy I have said
repeatedly that I would support addressing CO<INF>2</INF> in a
voluntary way which encourages new technologies and practices such as
carbon sequestration. I will not support a mandatory CO<INF>2</INF>
reduction cap. I think it is important that we do not let the
CO<INF>2</INF> issue stand in the way of meaningful reduction of
SO<INF>2</INF>, NOx, and mercury.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Smith.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just pick up on the Senator from Ohio comments. I
want to compliment him for working together with this Senator.
We have a number of issues which easily could put our States
against each other, but it has been a cooperative effort. I
agree with your comments regarding the technology that's out
there that is bringing dramatic reductions in NOx,
SO<INF>2</INF>, and mercury. We have a partnership between a
company in New Hampshire, Power Span, working with a company,
working with a utility in Ohio. We're getting good results on
that, and I think that's the kind of thing that brings us
together to reach compromise and solutions, and I am very
grateful for your cooperation on these issues.
We are this morning talking about economic and
environmental risks associated with climate change, and
certainly want to welcome all the witnesses, but specifically,
Adam Markham from Portsmouth, NH. It is good to see you here.
Mr. Markham will be discussing a recent report coordinated by
the University of New Hampshire that describes much of the
potential environmental and economic impact of climate change
in New England--impact on industries, which is where we make
money, skiing and--we don't have any sugar maple subsidies. We
have peanut subsidies and tobacco subsidies, but no sugar maple
subsidies. I'm not advocating any, either.
This study underscores concerns that I've shared with
members of this committee about small, family-owned businesses
that are at risk as a result of what we may or may not do.
These are just a few of the risks that New Hampshire would
face with a potential change in climate. There are many more
aspects to the question of risks posed by climate change than
we could even get into today. But when we talk about risk, I
think it is worth looking to those whose entire business is
based on putting a price on risk, translating environmental
risk into economic terms, and obviously that is the insurance
industry. Insurance companies are motivated to seek the
clearest risk information available on the subject of anything,
and certainly climate change, as well. This motivation is not
clouded by politics or agendas, but focused squarely on the
bottom line.
I have had my share of disagreements with insurance
companies on some of these issues, but accuracy in this kind of
work is not a luxury. It's a necessity. If they don't estimate
risks accurately, then somebody is going to go bankrupt--they
will.
I would like to reference a document that's found on the
website of one of the largest reinsurance companies in the
world. It's called ``Swiss Re.'' I would ask unanimous consent
that this document be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Without objection.
Senator Smith. The document has a very interesting title,
``Climate Research Does Not Remove the Uncertainty: Coping with
the Risks of Climate Change.'' The title I think sums up our
hearing today. The primary point of the paper is that climate
change is happening and it poses financial risks. We're still
unclear on how much of the change is natural and how much of it
is human induced.
I have been to Woods Hole, MA. We've talked about these
issues with a number of scientists. That's what I hear over and
over again--is the change natural? How much of it is natural?
How much of it is human induced? But there is change taking
place. If you go back to the insurance industry and their
customers, causes are of secondary importance in the face of
weather-related losses.
So as we examine the risk question--and that's why I bring
the insurance analogy up here--as we consider the entirety of
the climate change debate, we should focus more attention on
economic risk posed by any climate change, natural or human
induced.
The study points out that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing. This is because in a global
economy, local weather can have international consequences. As
an example, Swiss Re points to the flooding of the Far East
Computer Chip Factory, causing supply bottlenecks through the
entire technology sector. The paper points out that climate
change is not needed for that example to occur.
But evidence does show, though, that human interference in
the climate system exacerbates the problem caused by natural
climate change, so the difference between natural variation in
the climate and natural variation coupled with human influences
may be small. We don't know yet. The scientists will continue
to try to answer that question.
There are differences between forces that can cause either
negligible damage or catastrophic loss. These are the
intelligent thoughts of experienced businessmen and woman and
people not driven by any political agenda. Their jobs are to
accurately assess the economic risks posed by climate
conditions, and they provide an excellent perspective for us to
consider.
Let me just share one quote from the paper. ``The climate
problem cannot be ignored, nor will it be solved merely by
calls for optimum climate protection. We need to find ways of
implementing the necessary climate protection measures in a
manner which is both socially and economically acceptable.''
That's reasonable counsel. Although I might doubt the authors
ever intended it for this committee, I would urge that we
listen to their advice.
Given the potential risk, we have to begin to explore
reasonable ways of mitigating the potential economic damage,
regardless of the cause of climate change.
I've strongly advocated a system based on incentives for
innovative measures to reduce greenhouse gas. That's what
Senator Voinovich was just talking about. We are working with
the chairman on this. We have some differences. Hopefully they
will be differences that we can bridge, but we do have
differences. But I believe that capitalizing on innovation in
the free market will meet whatever challenges are presented. We
need to think out of the box.
Maybe technology will move a lot quicker in this area than
the regulation that we propose. Maybe we won't need to worry
about Kyoto because the technology that we are producing will
export to the Third World countries and as they develop, they
won't be making the same mistakes that we made. Just maybe that
might work. It doesn't seem to me to make a lot of sense to try
to get people involved in a treaty who won't abide by the
treaty or can't abide by the treaty and don't have the means to
abide by a treaty.
I don't think it is necessary to regulate through command
and control carbon, for example, at powerplants to cut
atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases. Let's get the
technology working out there so people can make money and
reduce carbon while we're doing it. We don't have to create
economic damage as a means to avoid economic and environmental
risk. There are other ways. We shouldn't be in the business of
choosing winners and losers.
Regardless of whatever the policy answer is, one thing is
for certain: absent a bipartisan approach to the resolution of
this issue, we will achieve nothing, nothing at all. I've
learned that as the chairman of this committee the hard way,
frankly. We had two major issues when I was chairman of the
committee. One was the Everglades and one was brownfields, and
they have been lollygagging around here in the Senate for
years. I had some strong views on both and couldn't get them
passed, and we were able to work together, come up with a
bipartisan solution, and found myself voting against amendments
that I supported in order to stick with that solution as we
move forward, and both of those pieces of legislation are now
law. It is tough to deal with this. It is frustrating when you
have people who differ with you on issues but you know in your
heart you're going to have to compromise before you can get it
done.
So, regardless of whatever the policy is, we will need to
be bipartisan. We can't allow politics to trump reason and
success. You know, good politics isn't always necessarily the
right thing for the environment. I think we ought to let the
chips fall where they may. But we do have a long tradition of
bipartisanship in this committee, Mr. Chairman, as you well
know, and I think it will continue. There's a tremendous
diversity of opinion in this room on how to address these
issues, but I'm confident that that diversity is both valuable
and a challenge, and I look forward to meeting that challenge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Statement of Hon. Bob Smith, U.S. Senator from the State of New
Hampshire
Good morning. Today we are here to talk about the economic and
environmental risks associated with climate change.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses, and a special welcome to
Adam Markham who has come down from New Hampshire. Mr. Markham will be
discussing a recent report coordinated by the University of New
Hampshire that describes much of the potential environmental and
economic impact of climate change in New England--impact on industries
such as skiing and sugar maple.
This study underscores concerns I have shared with members of this
committee. Small, family-owned businesses are at risk. These are just a
few of risks that New Hampshire would face--associated with the
potential change in climate.
There are many more aspects to the question of risks posed by
climate change than we could list today. When we talk about risk, I
think it is worth looking to those whose entire business is based on
putting a price on risk--translating environmental risk into economic
terms--the insurance industry. Insurance companies are motivated to
seek the clearest risk information available on subject of climate
change.
This motivation is not clouded by politics or agendas, but focused
squarely on the bottom line where accuracy is not a luxury. It is a
necessity. If they do not estimate risks accurately, they will soon go
bankrupt.
I would like reference a document that can be found on the web site
of one of largest reinsurance companies in the world--Swiss Re. I would
ask unanimous consent that this document be part of the record. The
document bears the title ``Climate Research Does Not Remove the
Uncertainty: Coping With The Risks of Climate Change.'' The title
pretty well sums up our hearing topic today.
The primary point of this paper is that climate change is happening
and it poses financial risks. We still are unclear on how much of that
change is natural and how much is human-induced. But for the insurance
industry and their customers, CAUSES are of secondary importance in the
face of weather-related losses.
As we examine the risk question, and as we consider the entirety of
the climate change debate, we should focus more attention on economic
risk posed by any climate change--natural or human induced. The study
points out that our ``vulnerability to extreme weather conditions is
increasing.'' This is because in a global economy, local weather can
have international consequences.
An example Swiss Re points to is the flooding of a Far East
computer chip factory, causing supply bottlenecks for the entire
technology sector.
The paper points out that climate change is not needed for that
example to occur. But, evidence shows that human interference in the
climate system exacerbates the problem already caused by natural
climate change. The difference between natural variation in the
climate, and natural variation coupled with human influences may be
small. We don't know yet--the scientists will continue to try to answer
that question.
There are small differences between forces that can cause either
negligible damage or catastrophic loss. These are the intelligent
thoughts of experienced businessmen and women--people not driven by any
political agenda. Their jobs are to ACCURATELY assess the economic
risks posed by climate conditions--and they provide an excellent
perspective for us to consider. I would like to share one last quote
from the paper,
``The climate problem cannot be ignored, nor will it be
solved merely by calls for optimum climate protection. We need
to find ways of implementing the necessary climate protection
measures in a manner which is both socially and economically
acceptable.''
I believe that is reasonable counsel and even though I doubt the
authors ever intended it for this committee, I would urge that we heed
their advice.
Given the potential risks, we must begin to explore reasonable ways
of mitigating the potential economic damages--regardless of the causes
of the climate change. I have strongly advocated a system based on
incentives for innovative measures to reduce greenhouse gases.
I believe that capitalizing on innovation and the free market will
meet whatever challenges are presented--we should think ``out of the
box.''
I don't believe that it is necessary to regulate--through command-
and-control--carbon at power plants to cut atmospheric levels of
greenhouse gases. We don't have to create economic damage as means to
avoid economic and environmental risks. There are other ways.
And we shouldn't be in the business of choosing winners and losers.
Regardless of whatever the policy answer is--one thing is for
certain: absent a bipartisan approach, we will achieve nothing. We
cannot allow politics to trump reason and success.
Fortunately, this committee has a long tradition of bipartisanship.
I can assure you this--if a partisan approach is followed on this
committee with this, or any other issue, the only thing that will be
achieved is failure--what a terrible legacy that would be. There is
tremendous diversity of opinion in this room on how to address these
issues. That diversity is both valuable and a challenge.
But, this isn't the first time this committee has been faced with
such a challenge. When people put political agendas aside and are
willing to work toward a constructive solution, we ultimately find
common ground. I have done my best to work on all environmental
legislation applying the principles of cooperation, partnership, and
bipartisanship.
It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will continue to work together
and find a good solution.
Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Our first witness is Dr. F. Sherwood
Rowland, the Donald Bren Research professor of chemistry and
earth system science, the University of California.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF F. SHERWOOD ROWLAND, DONALD BREN RESEARCH
PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND EARTH SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA IRVINE, IRVINE, CA
Mr. Rowland. I'm pleased to be here to testify to your
committee, Senator Jeffords.
To Senator Voinovich, I will just say that I grew up in
Ohio and my undergraduate education was at Ohio Wesleyan
University.
I am here really as a member of a committee that was
appointed by the National Academy of Sciences and made a report
to the White House last June. I am an atmospheric scientist,
and I will tell you something about that report.
A natural greenhouse effect has existed in Earth's
atmosphere for thousands of years, warming the Earth's surface
by a global average of 57 F. During the 20th century, the
atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.
Our current concern is not whether there is a greenhouse
effect, because there is one, but rather how large will be the
enhanced greenhouse effect from the additional accumulation in
the atmosphere of these greenhouse gases.
Daily, the Earth intercepts energy from the sun, much of it
in the visible wavelengths corresponding to the spectrum of
colors from red to violet and the rest in ultraviolet and
nearby infrared wavelengths. An equal amount of energy must
escape from the Earth daily to maintain a balance, but this
energy emission is controlled by the much cooler average
surface temperature of the Earth and occurs in wavelengths in
what is called the ``far infrared.''
If all of this terrestrially emitted infrared radiation
were able to escape directly to space, then the required
average temperature of the Earth would be 0 F. However, the
greenhouse gases--carbon dioxide, CO<INF>2</INF>, methane,
nitrous oxide, and others--selectively intercept some of this
far infrared radiation, preventing its escape. A warmer Earth
emits more infrared radiation and Earth with an average surface
temperature of 57 F was able to make up the shortfall from
greenhouse gas absorption. However, at first slowly during the
19th century and then more rapidly during the 20th century, the
atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse gases increased,
often because of the activities of mankind.
Other greenhouse gases have also been added, such as the
chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, and tropospheric ozone. With more
of these gases present in the atmosphere, more infrared will be
intercepted and a further temperature increase will be required
to maintain the energy balance.
Carbon dioxide is released by the combustion of fossil
fuels--coal, oil, and natural gas--and its atmospheric
concentration has increased from about 280 ppm as the 19th
century began to 315 ppm in 1958 and 370 ppm now.
Water is actually the most significant greenhouse gas in
absorbing infrared radiation, but the amount of gaseous water
is controlled by the temperature of the world's oceans and
lakes.
Methane has a natural source from swamps, but is also
released during agricultural activities--for example, from rice
paddies while flooded and from cows and other ruminant animals
and by other processes--and has increased from about 0.7 ppm in
the early 1800's to 1.5 ppm around 1978 and 1.77 ppm currently.
Nitrous oxide concentrations grew from 0.27 to 0.31 ppm
during the 20th century, formed by microbial action in soils
and waters on nitrogen-containing compounds, including
nitrogen-containing fertilizers.
The chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs were not a natural part of
the atmosphere but were first synthesized in 1928 and were then
applied to a variety of uses--propellant gases for aerosol
sprays, refrigerants in home refrigerators and automobile air
conditioners, industrial solvents, manufacture of plastic
foams, etc.
The CFC concentrations started from zero concentration in
the 1920's and rose rapidly during the latter part of the 20th
century until the early 1990's. They are no longer increasing
because of the Montreal Protocol, an international ban on their
further manufacture.
Tropospheric ozone is a globally important compound formed
by photochemical reactions as a part of urban smog in hundreds
of cities. Other potential influences on temperature changes
for which the global average data are still very sparse include
the concentrations of particulate matter, such as sulfate and
black carbon aerosols.
Measurements of surface temperatures only became
sufficiently broad in geographical coverage about 1860 to
permit global averaging, with improved coverage as the years
passed. The globally averaged surface temperature increased
about 1.1 F during the 20th century, with about half of this
change occurring during the last 25 years. The year 1998 was
the warmest year globally in the entire 140-year record, and
the 1990's were the warmest decade.
Fluctuations in solar activity have been directly observed
since the invention of the telescope 400 years ago, but
accurate, direct measurements of total solar energy output have
only been possible with the advent of satellite measurements in
the late 1970's. These satellite data exhibit a small but
definite cyclic variation over the last two decades,
paralleling the 11-year solar sun spot cycle, but with little
long-term difference in solar energy output contemporary with
the rising global temperatures of the past two decades.
Predictions of future temperature responses require
atmospheric model calculations which effectively simulate the
past and then are extrapolated into the future with appropriate
estimates of the future changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations. These models calculate the direct temperature
increases that additional greenhouse gases will cause and the
further feedbacks induced by these temperature changes. One of
the most prominent of these feedbacks is the change in albedo,
or surface reflectivity, in the polar north. When melting ice
is replaced by open water, or melting snow replaced by bare
ground, less solar radiation is reflected back to space and
more remains at the surface, causing a further temperature
increase.
The models also assume that more water will remain in the
atmosphere in response to the temperature increases, providing
another positive feedback.
There is an additional possible feedback from the changes
in clouds--amount, composition, altitude. In present models,
the cloud feedback is assumed to be small, but data for better
evaluation are very difficult to obtain.
Extrapolations for 50 or 100 years in the future
necessarily include hypotheses about future societal
developments, including population growth, economic activity,
etc. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC,
developed a large set of scenarios about the possible course of
these events over the next century, with resulting model
calculations of globally averaged temperature increases for the
year 2100 relative to 1990, ranging from 2.5 F to 10.4 F, or
1.4 C to 5.8 C. These results were only a small part of the
three IPCC reports issued during the year 2001 about climate
change. Volume I of the IPCC reports treated the scientific
bases; Volume II covered impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability; and Volume III, mitigation.
The National Academy of Sciences, in response to a May
2001, request from the White House and following discussions
between the Administration and the Academy over some questions
raised by the former, convened an 11-member scientific panel,
which issued in June a 24-page report, ``Climate Change
Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions,'' from a select
committee of atmospheric scientists. I quote the first few
sentences of this report and have appended the entire represent
to this testimony. Many of these words were repeated by Senator
Jeffords.
``Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere
as a result of human activities, causing surface air
temperatures and sub-surface ocean temperatures to rise.
Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes observed over
the last several decades are likely mostly due to human
activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant part
of these changes is also a reflection of natural variability.''
The increasing global temperatures will have many
consequences, often adverse in the long run. Because many of
the causes of this temperature increase have their origin in
the activities of mankind, actions can and should now be taken
which will slow this rate of increase. I should say the last
words are mine and not the Academy report. I think that we need
to start taking actions that will ameliorate the problems of
the greenhouse gases.
Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much, Dr. Rowland.
I think we will go through all of the witnesses first
before questions.
Our second witness is Roger A. Pielke, Jr., associate
professor, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at
the University of Colorado/Cooperative Institute for Research
in Environmental Sciences in Boulder.
Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CENTER
FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO/COOPERATIVE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCES, BOULDER, CO
Mr. Pielke. Thank you. I'd like to thank Chairman Jeffords
and the committee for the opportunity to offer testimony this
morning.
My name is Roger Pielke, Jr., and I am from the University
of Colorado. On page 7 of my testimony, you'll find more
details on my background.
In the time I have available, I would like to highlight the
take-home points from my testimony. These are developed in
greater detail in the written testimony and also in the peer-
reviewed scientific papers on which they are based.
Before I proceed, I want to say that everything I'll
present today is consistent with the NRC report that Dr.
Rowland referred to and the IPCC, so it is starting with those
scientific background documents as a starting point. There is
no need--I agree with some of the statements made earlier--no
need to question the level of science in those reports;
however, as you will hear from me momentarily, it does lead to
a range of different interpretations for policy.
The take-home points:
First, weather and climate have increasing impacts on
economies and people around the world. Data is scattered, hard
to come by, but the picture we are able to put together,
largely based on economic data, is that the impacts are
growing. I think the Swiss Re report you referred to and the
insurance industry would back that up.
The primary cause for that growth in impacts is the
increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to
climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se.
This is not to say that climate does not change or has not
changed or will not continue to change. This is only to say
that when we look at the sensitivity of impacts to the various
factors that lead to impacts, it takes both a climate event and
an exposed society or exposed environment to lead to impacts.
This is shown dramatically on page 3, figure 3, of my
testimony, where I show a picture of Miami Beach from 1926 and
a picture of Miami Beach from near the present, near 2000. Not
only does climate change, but society changes.
Taking the assumptions of the IPCC figure 6 on page 4, we
compare the relative sensitivities of economic losses to
tropical cyclones to society factors versus climate factors and
find societal factors under the assumptions of the IPCC range
from the 22-to-1 to a 60-to-1 increased, larger sensitivity
than the climate impacts.
Again, not to discount the possibility of climate change,
but to say to understand climate change we have to put it into
the context of societal change.
To address increasing vulnerability and the growing impacts
that result would require a broader conception of climate
policy than now dominates the debate. We could do a whole lot
to energy policy and not do very much to address the growing
risk of climate change, climate variability to economies,
people, and the environment around the world.
Therefore, we must begin to consider adaptation to climate
to be as important as matters of energy policy when we talk
about response options. Present discussion all but completely
neglects adaptation to climate. Increased attention to
adaptation would not mean that we should ignore energy policies
or reduce the intensity which we want to improve energy
policies, but instead it would be a recognition of the fact
that changes in energy policy are insufficient to address the
primary reasons underlying the trends and the societal impacts
of weather and climate.
Again, another point to emphasize is my testimony is
focused on the societal and economic impacts today. It is not
focused on the environmental or ecological impacts of climate.
The Nation's investments in research, which I should say
are considerable in the area of climate change, in my opinion
could more efficiently focused on producing usable information
for decisionmakers seeking to reduce vulnerabilities to
climate.
Specifically, the present research agenda is focused, in my
view, improperly on prediction of the distant climate future.
We can spend a lot of money on research and argue for a long
time what the climate future will be 50 to 100 years from now.
The real test of what the climate future will be is when we
actually experience the climate of that time.
Instead, I would suggest we are neglecting what are
traditionally called ``no regrets adaptation and mitigation
opportunities.'' Instead of arguing about global warming, yes
or no, the degree of risk in the far-distant future, we might
be better served by addressing things like the present drought
that is developing in the Northeast, for which, again, energy
policy will not do much to mitigate.
In closing, I would like to leave you with the thought that
climate change is much too important a topic to equate solely
with energy policy. The last figure in my testimony, figure 7
on page 6, illustrates schematically how we might think about
energy policy and climate policy, which do, indeed, have
important overlaps but are not the same topic.
Thank you very much.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Doctor.
Our next witness is David Legates, a Ph.D. and C.C.M.,
director of the Center for Climatic Research, the University of
Delaware, Newark, DE.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DAVID R. LEGATES, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CLIMATIC
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, NEWARK, DE
Mr. Legates. I would like to thank Senator Jeffords and the
committee for inviting my commentary on this important topic.
My basic background in research has been in precipitation, so
you'll probably guess that I'm going to focus primarily on
precipitation, and precipitation variability. With rain
outside, it is probably a good topic to bring up today.
In my written testimony, I discuss some of the problems
associated with determining climate change from both climate
models and observations. In my limited presentation here, I'm
going to examine an issue, which I feel focuses on an important
environmental risk that we face--human-induced changes in
climatic extremes--droughts, floods, and storminess.
Do climate models well represent the Earth's climate? Well,
on three separate occasions, I have reviewed the ability of
state-of-the-art climate models to simulate regional scale
precipitation. The models poorly reproduce the observed
precipitation, and that character of the models had not
substantially changed over time. But, more importantly, climate
models simply do not exhibit the observed variability. Both air
temperature and precipitation exhibit little year-to-year
fluctuation, which is quite unlike what we presently
experience. This is crucial, because climatic extremes and not
their mean values have the largest economic and environmental
impacts.
Simply put, climate models cannot address issues associated
with changes in the frequency of extreme events because they
fail to simulate storm scale systems or to exhibit the observed
variability. Moreover, many extreme weather events are so
uncommon that we simply cannot determine their statistical
frequency from the observed record, let alone determine how
that frequency has changed over time. Determining anthropogenic
changes in extreme weather events, either from modeling or
observational standpoints, therefore, is nearly impossible.
Furthermore, it is unclear how much should be attributed to
anthropogenic increases in atmospheric trace gases and how much
will be simply a result of natural variability or measurement
biases.
So I ask: is there a cause for concern that anthropogenic
warming will lead to more occurrences of floods, droughts, and
storminess? I point to the latest Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, which
states that, ``Global warming is likely to lead to greater
extremes of drying and heavy rainfall and increase the risk of
droughts and floods.''
The mainstream media has frequently echoed this enhanced
hydrologic cycle scenario; however, if one carefully reads the
IPCC Technical Summary, you will find an admission that,
``There is no compelling evidence to indicate that the
characteristics of tropical and extra-tropical storms have
changed. Recent analysis of changes in severe local weather do
not provide compelling evidence to suggest long-term changes.
In general, trends in severe weather events are notoriously
difficult to detect because of their relatively rare occurrence
and large spatial variability.''
The IPCC further goes on to state that areas experiencing
severe drought to severe wetness increased only to a small
degree over the entire 20th century. Tom Karl and Richard
Knight have concluded that as the climate has warmed,
precipitation variability actually has decreased across much of
the Northern hemisphere's mid-latitudes. Bruce Hayden, writing
for the Water Sector of U.S. National Assessment, argues that
little can or should be said about change in storminess in
carbon-dioxide-enriched years.
Sinclair and Watterson recently noted that increased levels
of atmospheric trace gases generally leads to a marked decrease
in the occurrence of intense mid-latitude storms.
Clearly, claims that a warmer world will lead to more
occurrences of droughts, floods, and storms are exaggerated.
So what should we do? I feel first we must continue to
develop and preserve efforts at climate monitoring and climate
change detection. Efforts to establish new global climate
observing systems are useful, but we must preserve the stations
that we presently have. There simply is no surrogate for a
long-term climate record taken with the same instrumentation
and located in essentially the same environmental conditions.
However, given that oceans cover nearly three-quarters of
the Earth's surface, we must further develop satellite methods
for monitoring the Earth's climate. We also need to better
utilize a national network of WSR-88D, Nexrad weather radars to
monitor precipitation and its variability.
But foremost we must focus on developing methods and policy
that can directly save lives and can mitigate the economic
devastation that often is associated with specific weather-
related events.
Climate change discussions usually focus on increases in
mean air temperatures or percentage changes in mean
precipitation, but it is not changes in the mean fields on
which we need to place our efforts. Loss of life and adverse
economic and environmental impact occurs not when conditions
are normal, but rather they occur as a result of extreme
climatic events--floods, droughts, storms at all spatial
scales. One thing I can guarantee is that, regardless of what
impact anthropogenic increases in atmospheric trace gases will
have, extreme weather events will continue to be a part of our
life and they will continue to cause the most weather-related
deaths and have the largest weather-related economic impacts.
Thus, we must focus on providing real-time monitoring of
environmental conditions, which will yield to important
benefits. First, it will provide immediate data to allow
decisionmakers to make informed choices to protect citizens
faced with these extreme weather events, and, if installed and
maintained properly, it will assist with our long-term climate
monitoring goals.
For example, the State of Delaware has undertaken a project
to develop the most-comprehensive, highest-resolution, State-
wide weather monitoring system available anywhere using our
high-resolution weather data system technology.
So I conclude, therefore, that, regardless of what the
future holds, employing real-time systems with a firm
commitment to supporting and maintaining long-term climate
monitoring goals is our best opportunity to reduce the risk of
weather-related events on human activities.
I again thank the committee for inviting my commentary.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Our next witness is Mr. Adam Markham, executive director of
the Clean Air-Cool Planet, Portsmouth, NH.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADAM MARKHAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CLEAN AIR-COOL
PLANET, PORTSMOUTH, NH
Mr. Markham. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. Thank you for inviting me here today. My name is
Adam Markham. I am the executive director of Clean Air-Cool
Planet.
There is compelling evidence and sound science to suggest
that there are significant and severe risks to continued
greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere. Future warming
scenarios described in the New England Regional Assessment that
Senator Smith just referenced give a 6 F to 10 F range for
warming over the next century for New England. Such a change
would result in Boston getting the climate of Richmond, VA, in
the best case, and that of Atlanta, GA, in the worst case.
Risks identified in the regional assessment include a major
threat to the maple syrup industry that Senator Jeffords
mentioned. According to the most credible forest models, the
sugar maple is one of the most sensitive trees to warming
temperatures. Business-as-usual emission scenarios are almost
certain to eventually drive the sugar maple northwards out of
New England, entirely. For Vermont, alone, maple syrup is a
more than $100 million industry, with over 2,000 mainly family-
owned sugar producers.
A change in climate may also have severe repercussions for
New England's winter tourism economy. A recent study of the
past 19 years of weather data for the two most ski-dependent
economies in New England, Vermont and New Hampshire, showed an
average of 700,000 fewer ski visits in the years with the worst
snow conditions. In New Hampshire, the industry generated $566
million in visitor spending in the year 2000, and it creates
more than 10 percent of the State's winter jobs.
The indications are not good. There has been a 15 percent
decrease in snowfall in northern New England since 1953.
Climate models also suggest that in the longer term global
warming will transform the conifer forests of northern New
England into the type of forests now found further south. The
conditions that currently support northern hardwood forests,
their habitats, and their wildlife will shift up to 300 miles
north during the next 100 years, potentially causing the loss
of these forests or their transformation into other types of
forests over much of the landscape. More than 300,000 people in
New England and New York are employed in the forest sector and
would likely be affected by these sorts of changes.
Public health, too, is at risk. For example, 60,000 hikers
a year visit Mt. Washington and the major peaks of the White
Mountains. On hot summer days, air pollution poses a threat to
hikers, especially at elevations above 3,000 feet. According to
the regional assessment, there is a striking correlation
between hot days--that's warmer than 90 F--and high levels of
ozone pollution.
Lyme disease is also a risk for people outdoors, and is on
the increase in New York and parts of New England. Research on
ticks suggests that warmer winters could increase the instance
of Lyme disease and push its range further into northern New
England.
Heat waves kill more people in the United States than
hurricanes, flooding, or tornadoes. Heat-related deaths in the
summer time could double under likely U.S. global warming
scenarios. The poor, elderly populations are at particular
risk, and northern cities may also be more at risk because
people are less adapted to high temperatures.
The cost of climate impact in the coastal zones may be
particularly large. Sea levels are currently rising at about a
foot per century. This rate is increasing. The State of New
Hampshire recently calculated that this will significantly
increase the area of sea coast vulnerable to flooding and could
turn 100-year storms into 10-year storms, or the damage from
10-year storms.
On the positive side, the Northeast States have long been
leaders in reducing air pollution. New York's green building
law, New Hampshire's greenhouse gas registry, and
Massachusetts' full pollutant regulation were all firsts.
Connecticut is at the forefront of efforts to support the
development of commercial fuel cell technologies, and
Efficiency Vermont is the Nation's first public energy
efficiency utility. A first in the Nation bipartisan full
pollutant bill recently passed strongly in the New Hampshire
House.
In August 2001, the New England Governors and eastern
Canadian premiers signed a climate change action plan with the
ambitious, long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gases by 75 to
85 percent from current levels. Thirty-five cities and counties
in the region have passed resolutions pledging to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and implement local climate action
plans, and many businesses in the Northeast are convincingly
demonstrating that common-sense investments in energy saving
can pay off handsomely.
All over New England and the Northeast individuals,
institutions, and corporations are inventing, exploring, and
implementing innovative solutions to climate change, but this
is not enough. Without effective national legislation, regional
efforts such as those in the northeast will founder and may
ultimately fail.
Energy efficiency and alternative fuels may be the real
roots to energy security. If we are serious about reducing our
reliance on foreign oil and about competing in world markets,
we must produce more-efficient automobiles. If we want energy
security and more jobs, we should aim to be producing 20
percent of our electricity from renewable resources by 2020.
Federal controls on CO<INF>2</INF> I believe are essential and
urgently needed.
If greenhouse gases are not curbed, climate change will
likely transform the character of many of the things in New
England that those of us who live there hold dear. The loss of
sugar maples, changes in the northern forests, warmer winters,
more frequent heat waves, and the distribution of coastal
wetlands may eventually deliver a body blow to much of the
region's character and economy.
Thank you for inviting me here today.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Mr. Markham.
Our next witness is Sallie Baliunas, astrophysicist from
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics.
Thank you for coming, and please proceed.
STATEMENT OF SALLIE BALIUNAS, ASTROPHYSICIST, HARVARD-
SMITHSONIAN CENTER FOR ASTROPHYSICS, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Ms. Baliunas. Thank you, Senator, and committee members for
inviting me here. I've worked for 25 years studying the changes
in the sun and the impact on life and climate of Earth.
The human effect on global warming remains a very serious
scientific matter. A simulation that looks at the effect of the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is included in my
testimony. This is the Hadley Center's simulation for
temperature change in the next 50 years, calling for a 1 C
rise in temperature. Implementing a Kyoto-type cut would avert
the temperature rise by the year 2050 by only .06 C. That
shows that if the human concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere are a major problem, then much more steeper cuts
than outline din the Kyoto Protocol are warranted, yet the
Kyoto Protocol, itself, runs costs in most analysis of $100 to
$400 billion a year, not insignificant.
That means that science remains critical to helping address
this issue, and one key scientific question is: What has been
the response of climate thus far to the small amount of energy
that has been added by humans from greenhouse gases in the air?
Now, there has been substantial new Federal investment made
very wisely, especially in space-based instrumentation, to
address this key issue. The two capital tests that I talk about
in my testimony are comparing the record of the surface
temperature, which has warmed over the past 20 years, and the
record of the lowest layer of air from about 5,000 to 28,000
feet.
The surface temperature has warmed in the 20th century, but
there are three phases to the surface temperature record. There
was a warming early in the 20th century, before most of the
greenhouse gases were put into the air, peaking around 1940,
followed by a cooling until the late 1970's, and then a recent
warming.
Now, the recent surface warming may, indeed, have a human
component, but the recent surface warming is about .1 C per
decade, and that would set an upper limit to what the human
effect would be. Accumulated over a century, that suggests 1 C
warming.
Now, the computer simulations estimate more warming than
that, but, in fact, that warming, seen from the surface, may
not be primarily human at all. The computer simulations insist,
or science insists, that not only the surface layer but the
layer of air just above it must warm. Both must warm, and, in
fact, the layer of air in the lower troposphere must warm
faster and greater and much more steeply than the surface
layer.
Those records have been brought before this committee
before by John Christy. The NASA microwave sounder unit
experiments aboard satellites now go back 21 years and cover
essentially most of the Earth. Professor Christy's latest
charts are shown in my testimony. The striking thing about the
lower layer of air is that there are significant variations in
temperature. On short time scales, for example, the very large
El Nino warming pulse of 1997-98, but there is no long-term
warming trend that is very significant, as forecast by the
computer models. It is much smaller. The most warming that can
be seen in the data of the lowest troposphere are .04 C per
decade.
Those satellite results, as you know from Professor
Christy's previous testimonies, are validated by independent
records made by radio sounds aboard balloons. Those records go
back to 1957, which is a period that includes the recent rapid
rise in the air's greenhouse gas concentration.
The balloon radio sound records and the satellite records
both agree that there is no significant warming that can be
attributed to human activities in the last 20 years or the last
40 years.
There is a very strong warming pulse called the ``Great
Pacific Climate Shift'' apparent in the radio sound record in
1976-77, but so far no one can attribute that to human causes
because it is something that the Pacific Ocean has been
observed to do every 20 or 30 years prior to the great increase
in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Now, this is all good news. It means that the human global
warming effect, if it is small--the best and most reliable data
says that its amplitude is small and slow to develop, so that
is creating a window of time and opportunity to continue to
improve the observations of the computer simulations and to
make better measurements of climate characteristics that are
needed to address this issue. These remain essential to the
problem of what to do.
Proposals like the Kyoto agreement to sharply cut
greenhouse gas emissions are not enough, atmospherically
speaking, yet temperature speaking the impacts have not shown
up at the degree to which the models say that they should.
These cost estimates are severe, and these costs would fall
disproportionately on America's poor and the world's elderly
and poor, besides America's. So the window of opportunity is to
continue the observations in order to better define the human
magnitude of global warming, but our best and most reliable
evidence says that it is quite small and slow to grow to date.
Senator Jeffords. Our next witness is Dr. Martin Whittaker,
managing director of Innovest, Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada.
Please proceed and welcome here.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN WHITTAKER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INNOVEST,
RICHMOND HILL, ONTARIO, CANADA
Mr. Whittaker. Thank you and good morning. We are very
pleased and honored to be here, especially pleased because we
think we have a story to tell that creates a positive link
between corporate environmental performance and financial
performance.
We are a pure research investment house. Our business is to
provide impartial research to Wall Street on corporate,
environmental, and social performance as it affects financial
performance and shareholder value.
Climate change is an issue which cuts across all our
research and one that seems to be of rising importance to the
companies and to investors, alike. It is also an issue where
the financial industry can play a positive leadership role, and
I draw the committee's attention to the World Economic Forum
held in Davos in February 2000, ``The greatest challenge facing
the world at the beginning of the 21st century is climate
change. Not only is climate change the world's most pressing
problem, it is also the issue where business could most
effectively adopt a leadership role.''
We see climate change as a source of business risk and
opportunity--risk to both exposure to weather extremes, for
example, in the insurance business, where each year now brings
about 5.5 times as many weather-related natural disasters as 40
years ago, resulting in 13.6 times the insurance losses--that's
according to Munich Re--but also risks to government policies
to constrain greenhouse gas emissions, for example, in heavy
greenhouse-gas-emitting industries, but also the opportunities
through energy efficiency where companies can gain tangible
financial benefits from energy efficiency measures, which also
lower emissions, and also, of course, in the growing clean
energy markets.
California, alone, has almost, I think, about $1 billion in
export sales now in clean technologies, and that market will
grow if we shift gradually toward a cleaner technology base.
This yin-yang risk opportunity image provides fiduciaries
and companies with an opportunity not only to hedge emissions,
hedge their exposures, but also to potentially increase their
risks through a compounded effect. I'll explain that in a
second.
I want to pick out five key combinations of trends from the
submission that I made, which really explain why I think
business attention is being more squarely focused on this
climate change issue.
Growing sophistication in the understanding of the
scientific impacts, as we've heard today, and a need really to
see beyond Kyoto insofar as the wider sustainability context
affects future greenhouse gas emissions. We think Kyoto is a
critical first step toward that in focusing attention, but also
the idea that economic win/win situations do exist and are
there. We don't have time to go into them today, but we can
certainly draw the committee's attention to examples of that.
Second, new thinking on the breadth of sectoral impacts.
Risks are not just faced by greenhouse-gas-intensive heavy
industries, but, as you've heard today, also tourism,
agriculture, real estate, building materials, and, of course,
finance, which is the sector we serve, but also, as regards the
company impacts, we are seeing increasing differentials between
companies, and so company strategy here can translate into
future final performance, we think.
A third trend is really an evolution of the term
``fiduciary responsibility'' and the need to incorporate
environmental and social issues into investment decisionmaking
because they affect financial performance. This has been driven
by the evolution of socially responsible investing, but it is
now entering the mainstream, and the formation of the carbon
disclosure project, which is a coalition of institutional
investors now over $2 trillion in assets under management, are
now engaged with, I think, 500 of the world's largest companies
as shareholders to say, ``This is a business risk issue. What
are you doing?''
I think also this year we are going to see both the city of
New York and the State of Connecticut will be filing
shareholder resolutions on climate change in an effort to
encourage greater transparency on that issue.
The fourth trend set is regulatory momentum both here and
abroad. U.S. companies working in the United Kingdom, for
example, in Europe, will be abiding by the regulations in those
regions. That, I think, is a key reason why corporate attention
is being focused on this issue, even though domestic support of
Kyoto has waned, to say the least.
Last, the growing importance of disclosure, in general, to
investors on hidden liabilities. Climate change liabilities may
well fall under this rubric. The market is jittery over
perceived corporate environmental performance and
transgressions, and climate change liabilities may well be
included there.
So I'd just like to wrap up with two recommendations, I
suppose. We are a great believer in the power of the markets
and creating a virtual circle whereby corporate environmental
performance can be encouraged by financial institutions seeking
that from their investee companies.
The effect of light regulatory action in the United Kingdom
on requiring institutional investors to disclose their
possession on social and environmental issues has had a
tremendous effect in focusing business attention on these
issues, and similar requirement on climate change in the spirit
of the carbon disclosure project that I mentioned may well
encourage investee company leadership on this issue and
encourage the creation of carbon risk screening tools within
the financial community.
I think we need to also finally educate the marketplace,
the investment community certainly, but also companies and
small- or medium-sized enterprises to encourage them to become
more climate literate. The financial services industry can play
a key role in that, and I think that if there is a message here
it is: If we can get the political and investment communities
working together to finance solutions, we would be on the right
track, instead of getting bogged down in the nuances of the
Kyoto Protocol.
Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Mr. Whittaker.
Our next and last witness is Jack D. Cogen, president of
Natsource, New York, NY.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JACK D. COGEN, PRESIDENT, NATSOURCE, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Cogen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify.
My name is Jack Cogen. I am president of Natsource, LLC, an
energy and environmental commodity broker headquartered in New
York City with offices in Washington, DC., Europe, Japan,
Canada, and Australia.
My testimony will address the financial risk associated
with climate change policy.
At the outset, I want to acknowledge that there are
legitimate differences of opinion as to what should be the
nature, degree, and timing of policy responses to the risk
associated with climate change, itself. However, the role of
Natsource is to work with clients who decide it is in their
best interest to evaluate the extent of their financial
exposure under possible greenhouse gas policies. Our clients
make the threshold decision that they are at risk financially.
After that, the next step for them is to analyze the extent
of their financial risk and develop strategies that make sense
for mitigating that risk. Natsource contributes its policy and
market expertise to helping clients assess and manage risk.
The client base of Natsource includes multi-national
corporations, as well as foreign and domestic firms. Natsource
assists them in quantifying their financial exposure under
different policies that might be adopted to limit greenhouse
gas emissions.
Our experience indicates that companies consider a variety
of factors when they weigh the degree of risk they face and
what to do about it. The primary factors are, No. 1, the
probability they will be subject to emission limitation
policies; and, No. 2, the potential direct and indirect costs
of those policies to the company.
Natsource provides analysis, strategic advice, and market
intelligence once a company decides to undertake a
comprehensive risk assessment. Generally, we help clients
assess their financial exposure by identifying policies that
might be adopted, assigning probabilities to those policies--in
other words, we're handicapping the committee--quantifying the
net emissions shortfall or surplus the company faces under each
policy, and estimating potential compliance cost based on the
company's emissions profile, internal reduction opportunities,
and our knowledge of various commodities available in the
greenhouse gas emission markets.
Multi-national companies face an especially complicated
risk, because they operate across multiple jurisdictions with
different policies. In addition, many of these companies must
evaluate the effect of climate change policies on the market
demand for their products in different countries.
If potential compliance costs are substantial and the
probability of emission limitations is significant enough, the
next step for many companies is to develop a cost-effective
risk management strategy. This involves assembling an optimal
mix of measures for reducing of offsetting emissions. These
include internal and external emission reduction projects,
internal emission trading programs, and the use of external
trading markets.
Companies choose to undertake emission reduction measures
in spite of or because of policy uncertainty for a variety of
reasons, including to reduce future compliance cost, gain
experience in the greenhouse gas markets, maintain or enhance
their environmental image, and place a value on internal
reduction opportunities.
Greenhouse gas markets are evolving and will continue to
evolve over the next several years. In the future, these
markets will function more smoothly and with lower transaction
costs as greenhouse gas policies become clearer and markets
become more liquid.
Even now, more-sophisticated financial instruments such as
call options are being used as a hedge against risk. Natsource
recently complete the first comprehensive analysis of the
greenhouse gas trading market for the World Bank. The analysis
identified approximately 60 greenhouse gas transactions
involving some 55 million tons of emissions. These numbers
actually under-estimate the total number of transactions,
because they do not include internal only transactions and
small volume transactions.
Current market prices for greenhouse gas commodities range
from less than $1 to over $9 per ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent, depending on the type of commodity and vintage. I
will add that the United Kingdom just over the past 2 days
completed their auction for emission allowances in the direct
sector there. The price has not yet been released, but the
after market is already saying that you can buy a U.K.
emissions allowance for 7 pounds per metric ton. You will find,
by the way, that that will turn out to be much lower than the
price that the U.K. government paid for them.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, a small but growing number of
companies are beginning to more carefully analyze their
financial risk under possible greenhouse gas policies. For a
variety of reasons, some companies have decided to take steps
now to reduce emissions, even though final policy decisions in
most cases are still pending. As a consequence, these companies
are able to take advantage of cost-effective opportunities
provided by the market to reduce their financial exposure.
As the acid rate allowance system has demonstrated,
emissions trading provides flexibility that can significantly
lower the cost of emission reductions.
That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to
answer any questions you or other members of the committee may
have.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Thank all of the witnesses for very excellent and
stimulating testimony.
Now it comes our time to have a chance to have a little
dialog, and perhaps pursue our own specific desires, but, more
hopefully and more importantly, further allow our understanding
of what is going on.
Dr. Rowland, the Academy's 2001 report, which you helped
write, was stunningly clear. It confirmed the seriousness of
human-induced climate change, and it contains a real sense of
urgency about the problem.
What should be done to reduce the risks that the report
outlines and to clear up related scientific uncertainties?
Mr. Rowland. The Academy report, of course, did not go
beyond basically the IPCC Volume I, the scientific bases. It
did not go into adaptation and mitigation. Those have been the
subjects of extensive discussion under IPCC with Volumes II and
III, each of which are roughly 1,000 pages long, so that there
is a very extensive literature on what the possibilities are.
I think that the recognition is always there, that carbon
dioxide is spread throughout the world in energy use by
everybody, more intensively in the United States than other
places, but definitely there in India and China and every
country, because, by and large, the development of civilization
has paralleled the more-intensive use of energy, and that has
been true in every country.
The problem that we face in the future is how to reduce the
strict dependency that more energy is required to have a better
standard of living, and that means we have to look at all
aspects of the civilization.
I don't think there is any silver bullet that one can give
that says, ``If we did this, then everything would be taken
care of.'' It means energy conservation, it means looking for
alternative energy sources, it means more research on how to
put carbon dioxide some place other than the atmosphere--that
is, sequestration.
It has always been very inexpensive to release carbon
dioxide to the atmosphere, and putting it anywhere else--
trapping it at a power plant and putting it some place other
than the atmosphere is clearly more expensive than just
releasing it. So that's not a problem that is going to be
easily solved, nor will it be a problem that can be solved
without cost, but it is something that needs to be very, very
intensively investigated.
I think that we have been in a situation in which we have,
for the last 10 or 20 years, ignored the fact that carbon
dioxide is accumulating, that there is a long-term problem, and
it is going to require a solution that takes decades to bring
about a society in which the energy dependence is not
escalating as it is presently.
I don't have any good solutions other than all of those
things which have been discussed before in a ``no regrets''
strategy. If you have energy conservation, then that is an
improvement. If you have an alternative source that doesn't
require releasing CO<INF>2</INF>, that is an improvement.
I think in many countries, probably, there will be reliance
on nuclear energy, which has a different problem, but it
doesn't release carbon dioxide.
Senator Jeffords. The Academy's report says that,
``National policy decisions made now will influence the extent
of any damage suffered by vulnerable human populations and
ecosystems later in the century.'' The Administration's new
policy decision appears to be business as usual. How will this
policy affect the future?
Mr. Rowland. I think that what one has observed over the
last 50 years, if you put carbon dioxide emissions and GNP and
say carbon dioxide emissions per GNP, that that is a number
which has been going down. That is, as you multiply GNP, you do
not necessarily take up the carbon dioxide emissions at the
same rate, and over a period of time, there have been
efficiencies that have occurred. But that, alone, is not going
to solve the problem, because GNP is going to go up steadily in
the future.
I'll give you just one example that illustrates the problem
of just doing dollars per GNP, and that is if you compare an
SUV versus a high-mileage automobile. One uses much more gas,
but they have to pay for that gas, and so the carbon dioxide
emission per GNP unit is the same as far as the gasoline use of
those two. What we really need to do is to have policies that
get things done without as much expenditure of carbon dioxide
for whatever that activity is. That means looking very much at
the energy conservation side.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you. Is it generally safe to say
that increasing greenhouse gas emissions is likely to increase
the probability and the magnitude of negative impact on humans
and ecosystems?
Mr. Rowland. As far as humans are concerned, the
infrastructure that they live in has been built for the present
climate, and if that climate starts to change, then that
infrastructure is not necessarily the right one for the new
climate.
The faster that that change occurs, the more the
infrastructure gets out of whack, no longer the right one for
that location, so that slowing climate change is almost as
important as controlling greenhouse gas emissions totally.
There is no way that the world is going to stop emitting
carbon dioxide without coming very close to doubling the amount
that is in the atmosphere, and that means that some time over
the next century or two we're going to have a very different
climate. We don't know how much difference that is going to be,
but we need to slow down the rate at which we approach that
and, as the other Academy report says, ``We have to worry about
whether climate change may occur on a very short time scale.''
The kind of question that is running around the climate
community is whether climate is a dial where the warming just
gradually changes, or whether it is a switch and you quickly go
to a new climate. That's not something that we have any way of
predicting, but it doesn't--just because we are changing slowly
at a particular time does not mean that we will not yet come to
some new position where the climate is just different than what
it was.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rowland----
Senator Jeffords. I'm going to pick a witness, and you can
pick your witness or go after the same one I did.
Senator Voinovich. I'm going to go after all of them.
Dr. Rowland, I'm interested in your opinions. In your
written testimony you said that increased greenhouse gas
concentrations are often because of the activities of mankind,
and in your oral comments just now you said they were mostly
caused by the activities of man. As I listened to the
testimony, there is marked differences of opinion about the
causality and the temperature of manmade activity and natural
activity.
Mr. Markham, you talked about 6 increase in temp, Dr.
Baliunas--who is from Ohio, very nice to see you again. I saw
you at our energy meeting about 6 months ago--you talk about
.06 C increase in temperature. By the way, Dr. Markham, I'm
going to get a hold of my sugar maple people to see if they
feel the same way as you do about things, because I refer to
our sugar maple industry as ``Ohio gold.'' But, you know, there
is a difference of opinion here.
For example, I'll get to one specific question. Dr.
Legates, in his testimony, Mr. Markham discusses the potential
effects of rising temperatures in the Northeast. The question
is: Can the climate models predict with any accuracy whether
manmade emissions will cause these effects? I mean, Mr.
Markham, you had the most dire predictions that we had of
anybody here at the table. It's, like, ``It's the end in terms
of your part of the world unless something is done.''
The issue is: What's the basis of it? How do you get those
results?
Dr. Legates, I'd like to have you comment on what he had to
say. I'd like to know could you believe, Dr. Legates, that the
climate models predict with any accuracy whether manmade
emissions will cause the effects that we just heard from Mr.
Markham.
Mr. Legates. I think there's a serious problem with climate
models in that, like I say, they are designed to produce only
the mean field, not its variability. What we're interested in
with climate models is to try to see how the mean changes. The
problem is that on very small spatial scales we get quite a bit
different characteristics than we normally see in the
environment.
For example, one of the things I've found that is
characteristic of models from when I started looking at them in
1990 to just a couple years ago when I did another analysis is
that in the southern Great Plains of the United States, almost
every model has Colorado being much wetter than northeast
Louisiana. I needn't tell you that that's not the way the real
world works.
The issue with that then is, if we start to look at
regional scale fluctuations, we can look at fluctuations on the
mean field. But if that mean field is specified wrong, we know
it is biased in this case in completely the wrong direction
from the way precipitation variability exists, the question
then becomes: if the model changes in a field, is that change a
result of what would really happen, or is that change a result
simply because our initial specification of the model is wrong;
and hence the results are going to be entirely different from
what might really happen?
So, to come back to sort of what he's saying, I have
concerns when we simply average out the mean conditions and
only look at changes in the mean, because when we look closer
at climate models they don't reproduce the smaller scale
spatial variability that really is important to climate.
Climate is not just a global phenomenon. Global climate is a
net result of regional scale fluctuations.
There are areas where we normally expect a lot of moisture,
areas where we expect little moisture, and we have to maintain
that fidelity in the climate system. By just averaging out and
focusing on large-scale features, which is what climate models
do, a lot of these subtle things get missed.
Senator Voinovich. Does anybody else want to comment on
models?
Mr. Markham?
Mr. Markham. Yes. I think the figures that I were giving
you came from the New England regional assessment, and those
were scenarios that were developed to give a broad range of
potential changes in the New England region. I think it is
certainly true that, as you take global models and look at what
they will mean for a particular region or a particular place,
then the accuracy of those potential predictions is less;
nevertheless, what it shows is that there is very significant
risk. This is also backed up by actual observed changes, so the
New England regional assessment looks at an average of about
0.7 F increase in temperature over the last century in New
England.
Again, as you go more local you can see that there have
been much greater increases in temperature over the century in
southern New England, and precipitation various across the
region, so the more local we go the more difficult it is to
make predictions. Nevertheless, the general trend is toward
observation of warming and likely increased warming.
Senator Voinovich. The real issue is that, in terms of
public policy, that you have general trends and people grab a
hold of the worst numbers, and then they say with these numbers
you have to do this because if you don't do it the world is
going to come to an end, you know, or we're in bad shape.
Somewhere through this we need to try to get a balance of how
we work things out.
Mr. Cogen, you talked about some of the businesses, I
guess, over in England that are doing some things. Are they
doing these things because of command and control, or are they
doing it because they feel it is in their best interest to look
at reducing carbon dioxide and have found it to be a good
investment overall in terms of efficiency and just good
citizenship?
Mr. Cogen. In the United Kingdom it is a mixture of both.
The United Kingdom has put a carbon levy, which is a tax on
carbon intensity, and then they have designed a trading program
underneath it to give companies flexibility and the ability to
reduce their tax by 80 percent, so it is a combination of the
two.
Having said all that, many of the multi-nationals who are
operating in the United Kingdom look at this as much from the
sales side of their products and what the public expects of
them, not just under the United Kingdom. Yesterday, in fact,
the chairman of British Petroleum announced--I'm reading from
``Air Daily,'' which is an industry publication--that they cut
their greenhouse gas emissions by more than 9 million tons 8
years ahead of schedule. To quote the chairman, ``I believe
that the American people expect a company like BP to offer
answers and not excuses.''
That's clearly the positioning of a multi-national that
this is an issue that they think their customer base cares
about. It's not just something that the Government is doing
from a command and control. So it is a market-driven force that
is making BP do this internationally, as well as government
incentives and requirements in the United Kingdom.
Senator Voinovich. I'm familiar with BP. I know Sir John
Brown. They had great presence in Cleveland for a number of
years. I think their colors even advanced their issue of trying
to be good corporate citizens in climate.
The only comment I'm going to make is that the issue
becomes, from a public policy point of view, in terms of
command and control and that you must do this, and so forth,
and my experience in Ohio when I was Governor is that we got
involved in this 35/50 reduction in the 17 worst toxins and
basically went to the companies and said, you know, ``We think
you ought to do this, and we're not going to demand that you do
it, but we're going to suggest that you ought to look at
this.'' It amazed me the number of companies that signed up and
the impact that had in terms of reducing the 17 worse toxins in
the State.
You've got a situation where you want to do something about
a problem. There's a disagreement about what man is doing in
regard to that, but there is no question that man has something
to do with it. Then the issue is: what is the public policy
response to that that will get at it, and at the same time not
put you in a position where you are non-competitive or, in the
alternative, have a dramatic impact on the economy and the
well-being of the citizens that live in your respective
communities.
Mr. Chairman, that's a real problem here, because, in terms
of regionalism, we have a different economy in my part of the
country than they have in the Northeast. It is a manufacturing
based economy. Reasonable cost energy has been the basis of
that economy. In the Northeast they have a different kind of
economy. Our economy is impacting on their economy.
That's our challenge is how do we reconcile all of these
things to the extent that we move ahead and get something done,
rather than end up in a debating society or in multiple
lawsuits that clog up the courts and don't do anything for
improving the environment or dealing with the energy needs that
we have in the country. You folks are the experts.
My time is up, but maybe the next time around you can maybe
comment on that.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Chafee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the
witnesses for their testimony.
I guess, to followup on Senator Voinovich, some countries,
as Dr. Whittaker testified, are already implementing policy
changes to comply with Kyoto, and Dr. Whittaker said that the
European Union has already committed itself to a legally
binding timetable for Kyoto implementation, and that Japan, the
United Kingdom, and Canada have signaled their attempt to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol during the coming weeks, so the other
countries are doing it.
I guess my question is, Dr. Rowland said, ``Unfortunately,
that means a lot of them are turning to nuclear.'' Dr.
Whittaker, is that what you're finding in the international
community? Is that the sad reality? Is that the option?
Mr. Whittaker. That's not what we're finding. No. The
benefits are really coming from greater efficiency, I would
say, through the kind of mix of command and control and
economic incentives that Jack talked about.
Senator Chafee. Do you want to repeat that again?
Mr. Whittaker. Yes. The mix of economic incentive and
command and control is really what is helping businesses in
those countries move toward solutions. I'll give an example of
NTT, which is a Japanese telecoms company. I think it is
Japan's largest electricity consumer. Over the next 10 years,
it proposes to save about 100 billion yen through the adoption
of clean energy technologies. Those types of actions are not
coming from any legislation or from the Japanese government
yet, although the Japanese government hasn't announced its
intention to ratify. It may be a preemptive strike, sort of in
anticipation of regulation, but still there are tangible
benefits for NTT shareholders. I think that's the message that
we're seeing time and time again in different parts of the
world.
Senator Chafee. In your home country of Canada, how are
they planning to comply with Kyoto? Is it more reliance on
nuclear or the Hydro Quebec Power taking a slice out of the
emissions of carbon dioxide? How is Canada going to comply?
It's such a similar economy to our own.
Mr. Whittaker. If I knew the answer to that question, I
would be very popular in Canada. They haven't decided yet.
There is a tremendous amount of concern in Alberta, which is,
of course, oil rich, and particularly the oil sands, which are
extremely greenhouse gas intensive, to produce.
The role of emissions trading is going to be crucial in
helping Canada achieve its targets, so it will be looking
internationally to achieve credits, to buy credits to help
offset its emissions in order to meet its targets.
It is also going to be encouraging its renewables and clean
energy sector, and there are various efforts underway to
expedite that already.
Again, it is a combination of approaches, but certainly the
answer is not clear yet.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
Senator Jeffords and Senator Lieberman have introduced a
bill which would reduce the carbon dioxide emissions to the
1990 levels, probably the most aggressive bill in the Senate, I
would say. I don't know if I can run down the panel and get a
30-second opinion on that bill before my time runs up.
Dr. Rowland.
Senator Jeffords. Well, you can take extra time for that.
Mr. Rowland. Reducing to the 1990 level of emissions would
require substantial cutback, and the question of how much
economic dislocation it would do would surely depend upon the
rate at which that was done, but we are well above the--we have
increased since 1997, continued to increase our CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions, and so the 1990 goal has been receding from where we
have been as a country.
It means that we really haven't taken hold of trying to cut
back on a voluntary basis. As Senator Voinovich says, clearly
Ohio is different from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and it's
different from California, and the solutions in each of those
places for becoming more energy efficient may not be the same,
and they require somebody who is there and who knows their
particular conditions that can do that, but we have not
adopted, as a country, that energy conservation is a major goal
in order to minimize carbon dioxide emissions.
Mr. Pielke. Let me say what may be, I guess, an unpopular
truth here. I'm not familiar with this bill, but if we assume
in a thought experiment full and comprehensive implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol around the world, it is safe to say it's
not going to do much at all to address the environmental and
economic risks associated with climate change.
I should point out that the framework convention on climate
change that the United States signed onto in the last decade
makes a distinction in the term ``climate change.'' It defines
climate change as only those impacts that are the result of
greenhouse gas impacts. Any other climate impact is not covered
by the framework convention. So whether it is maple syrup
growers or people worried about hurricanes or human life in
developing countries, it doesn't make much sense from a policy
perspective to try to separate out human climate impacts from
non-human climate impacts. I would say it is a broader issue.
Mr. Legates. I'm also not familiar with the legislation,
but I do recall in 1997 that American Viewpoint conducted a
survey of State and regional climatologists, and one of the
questions they did ask was: if we rolled back to 1990 levels,
would it have a significant impact. I believe I remember
somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of the respondents
indicated that it would have little or no impact.
I don't think it would have much of an impact, either. My
concern is that a lot of the variability, particularly a lot of
the loss of life that we see is going to be as a result of the
extreme events, and these extreme events are going to continue
to occur. So we need to take into account, to some extent, how
we alert the people, how we deal with growth along coasts, for
example, and things like that. These issues would be impacted
by climate change, but also in this case I think, while cutting
back would be beneficial for some other reasons, I don't think
it presently is necessary from a pure ``global warming''
standpoint.
Mr. Markham. If you accept the science that greenhouse gas
emissions are increasing the risk of climate change, then it
seems to make sense to reduce CO<INF>2</INF> emissions, and
this bill would do that.
I think that the target of 1990 is a good first-step
target. It is an aggressive target, but it still won't take us
back to the levels that are probably required.
Although it takes a long time to bring down the
CO<INF>2</INF> level, CO<INF>2</INF> can stay up in the
atmosphere for more than 100 years. We need to be acting now to
protect future generations. I think that's why maple syrup is a
good example, because people planted those trees for their
children and grandchildren, usually. They can't harvest them
for 40 or 50 years or so. So we need to be looking down the
road and thinking about future generations, and we need to, I
believe, be acting now to start reducing CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions, and this bill would take us a long way in that
direction.
Ms. Baliunas. Assuming the climate projections are
accurate, then reducing to 1990 levels for the United States
would mean about a 20 percent cutback in carbon-based energy
use or carbon dioxide emissions. Replacing that--I agree with
Dr. Rowland--is going to be extremely difficult to do, and yet
climactically, temperature-wise, assuming the models are
accurate, this averts, off the top of my head, less than .05 C
of the warming by the year 2050. So it is, on the one hand,
extremely costly, and on the other hand ineffective. That's why
it is important to realize that a policy like this is only a
scant first step. There has to be much more done much more
dramatically if one accepts the models. That's why the science
is still very critical in this debate.
Mr. Whittaker. I guess the question is where would the
emissions come from? If you look at the key source categories,
the stationary--essentially, the power production sector, coal
combustion sector, is the No. 1 by a country mile.
We've done some financial modeling around this issue and
looked at what would happen if the top U.S. utilities all had
to reduce their emissions to their own 1990 levels to 1998
levels and played around with different scenarios there. A
softened Kyoto, which essentially is leveling at 1998 levels,
corresponds to, according to our analysis, roughly 11 percent
of the current total market capitalization of some of the most
coal intensive utilities, so the financial cost of doing that,
if that's what you wanted to do, would need to be taken into
account.
Mr. Cogen. In discussions with our customers about Senator
Jeffords' bill, the impact of it has been slightly different.
It's not the details of the bill or whether it will pass or not
pass, it's raising the conversation to a level that has to be
taken seriously, and combined with a movement overseas to
ratify Kyoto with the United Kingdom or Danish programs, with
many regional or State programs here, it is forcing
corporations--especially that have long-term assets planning
cycles, whether it is 40 years for maple trees or 30 years on a
power plant--to take this into consideration that we may be in
a carbon strait in the future and what the effects of that
would be. So I think it is galvanizing the conversation and
forcing companies who have fiduciary responsibilities to make
decisions to decide for themselves not so much on the science,
but on the policy and what investigation decisions they will
make under different policy regimes.
Senator Jeffords' bill is forcing them to take it seriously
now, which is a good thing.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Corzine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON S. CORZINE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Senator Corzine. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your holding
the hearing. I had a formal statement I'll put in the record.
I feel like I am an interloper coming in at the end, and so
I will pass, but I do want to emphasize how strongly I feel
that we need to fully understand in the terms of science these
risks that are associated with climate change.
I would just mention that there are studies that show the
127-mile shoreline in New Jersey is potentially at risk to
complete erosion, something in a foot rise over the next 50
years. For a $40 billion industry, for enormous amounts of
property, this is an issue that concerns the citizens of New
Jersey, concerns me, and I think it should anyone.
I apologize for being late. We had three hearings at one
time. But there is nothing more important, long-run, for my
community and the people I represent than this issue.
[The prepared statement of Senator Corzine follows:]
Statement of Hon. Jon S. Corzine, U.S. Senator from the State of New
Jersey
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this
hearing today on the economic and environmental risks of
increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
I want to make just a few points before we begin to hear
testimony from the panel.
The Science Warrants Action. First, I think that the
science warrants a hard look at risks and potential impacts.
Last year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recently released its Third Assessment Report. The report as I
read it indicated that the science is increasingly clear and
alarming.
The report indicated that human activities, primarily
fossil fuel combustion, have raised the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide to the highest levels in the
last 420,000 years.
The report further indicated that the planet is warming,
and that the balance of the scientific evidence suggests that
most of the recent warming can be attributed to increased
atmospheric greenhouse gas levels. Mr. Chairman, these IPCC
findings were validated later in the year by the National
Academy of Sciences.
Mr. Chairman, we also know that without concerted action by
the United States and other countries, greenhouse gases
emissions and concentrations will continue to increase. Climate
models currently predict warming under all scenarios that have
been considered. Even the smallest warming predicted by current
models--2.5 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century--would
represent the greatest rate of increase in global mean surface
temperature in the last 10,000 years.
So while scientific uncertainty remains, I think the trend
is clear. As a result, we need to focus on risks.
New Jersey and Other Coastal States Will be Impacted by
Climate Change. For my State of New Jersey, Mr. Chairman, the
threat of continued sea-level rise is one of the risks that I
am most concerned about. With the exception of the 50-mile
northern border with New York, New Jersey is surrounded by
water. The state's Atlantic coastline stretches 27 miles.
Fourteen of 21 counties have estuarine or marine shorelines.
Rising sea level is already having impacts, by exacerbating
coastal erosion, and causing inundation, flooding, and saline
intrusions into ground water. The N.J. coastal area also
supports one of New Jersey's largest industries--tourism.
Sea level is rising more rapidly along the U.S. coast than
worldwide. Studies by EPA and others have estimated that along
the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, a one-foot rise in the sea level
is likely by 2050 and could occur as soon as 2025. In the next
century, a two-foot rise is most likely but a four-foot rise is
possible. So I'm concerned about this risk to my home state.
We Need to Take Steps to Reduce Risks. Given the state of
the science and the risks we face, I think we need to take
steps to reduce risks. The president's plan, which represents
only an incremental step over business as usual, is simply not
enough in my judgment.
At the state level, New Jersey is already taking aggressive
steps to reduce emissions. The state has a plan to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to 3.5 percent below 1990 levels by
2005. Specifically, the plan would achieve a 6.2 million ton
reduction through energy conservation initiatives in
residential, commercial and industrial buildings, another 6.3
million ton reduction through innovative technologies in
residential, commercial and industrial buildings, a 2.2 million
ton reduction through energy conservation and innovative
technologies in the transportation sector, a 4.5 million ton
reduction through waste management improvements, and a half
million ton reduction through natural resource conservation.
So I think what New Jersey is doing--under a plan that
Governor Whitman got underway--shows that we can and should do
much better than what the president proposed.
Support the Climate Titles in the Energy Bill. Finally, Mr.
Chairman, I want to urge my colleagues to support the climate
change titles in the energy bill. In particular, I want to urge
my colleagues to support the registry provisions in Title XI of
the bill. These provisions will require the largest emitters to
report greenhouse gas emissions--as utilities are already
required to do. These provisions also enable companies that
undertake emissions reductions to register them, so that they
will receive credit for their actions if reductions are
required at any point in the future.
Taken together, Mr. Chairman, I believe that these
greenhouse gas registry provisions will provide a powerful
incentive for companies to take actions to reduce emissions. I
know you agree, as you are a cosponsor of S. 1870, a bill
containing similar provisions that I introduced in December.
The energy bill registry provisions represent a compromise
between S. 1870 and related legislation in the Energy and
Commerce committees, and I urge my colleagues to support them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Dr. Rowland.
Mr. Rowland. So far all of the discussion has been on
controlling carbon dioxide, and there are other greenhouse
gases. The one that I would draw particular attention to is
tropospheric ozone--that is, one of the components of smog is
ozone formed by the interactions of nitrogen oxides and
unburned hydrocarbons and light, and that mostly takes place in
cities, although we have run into it experimentally in burning
forests especially in the Southern hemisphere.
The failure to burn gasoline completely in an automobile
results in the formation of ozone, which is a greenhouse gas.
Then the hydrocarbons eventually become carbon dioxide, anyway,
but on the way it produces another greenhouse gas that adds to
the total interception of infrared radiation.
This is happening in hundreds of cities all over the world.
It would be to our advantage and to the globe's advantage if
the pollution problems of these cities, with respect to ozone,
could be reduced, and that's something that is a problem in
China; it's a problem in India; it is a problem in the United
States and everywhere.
We know how to do it. In places like Los Angeles, the smog
has been reduced by adopting certain policies. And, to the
extent that we can get those policies in place in cities all
over the world, then that reduces the amount of tropospheric
ozone and is the equivalent of cutting back on some carbon
dioxide because it is a greenhouse contributor.
So it doesn't get rid of the fact that the automobile
eventually puts the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, but on
the way it also produces another problem, and if we could just
go to clean-burning in an automobile, helping in reducing
tropospheric ozone, and that helps because it is a greenhouse
gas. So it is a policy that would be useful on our part to
encourage and assist, if we can, in the cities that have these
problems.
Senator Jeffords. You mentioned India. I have been to the
places--India, China, and other places in that area--which have
extensive coal burning, as you well know, and the problems
there are much greater than we have here. Internationally, what
should we be doing to try to assist in those countries having
the capacity to reduce their pollution?
Mr. Rowland. In the cases of both India and China, they
have very high ash coal, and much of their pollution in the
cities comes about by having particles in the atmosphere coming
about by burning coal that has material in it that's not going
to burn. City pollution problems can be sort of divided in two
categories. One has to do with producing particles, and that
has a lot of bad things happening, particularly when you
breathe them in. In addition, there are the photochemical
problems that come from the chemical interactions that take
place.
What I was talking about earlier would be trying to reduce
the photochemical problems by adopting the kinds of procedures
that have been put into place by the Southern California Air
Quality District.
The question of getting the particles out of the air in
Beijing and Delhi is a matter of people in China and India
deciding on some way of using cleaner fuel to begin with. How
they treat their coal in order to get rid of the particles
before they burn it would be a very complicated problem. That's
one that I don't know exactly how they would do it.
Senator Jeffords. Senator Voinovich?
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I would like to ask the witnesses:
how many of you are familiar with President Bush's climate
change initiative?
[Show of hands.]
Senator Voinovich. Senator Chafee asked you your opinion
about Senator Jeffords' bill, and I have: Rowland, question
mark; Pielke, question mark; no, Legates; yes, Milburn [sic];
no, Whittaker. I mean, no one really came out and said yes/no.
You kind of all waffled to a degree except Mr. Markham.
Senator Jeffords. That shouldn't surprise you.
Senator Voinovich. Right.
Senator Jeffords. We do the same thing though.
Senator Voinovich. The way I summarize it, it provides the
necessary funding for both the science and technology research,
encourages companies to register their CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions, sets a national goal to reduce our carbon intensity,
which is the best way to protect our economy and begin to
address the issue.
Anyhow, the No. 1 issue is: What do you think of that
policy? No. 2, what other things should we be doing? We get
into this whole issue of the technology and where we are in the
models and the rest of that and where should we be investing
our money in that regard. I'll make a comment before you answer
the questions, but, Dr. Rowland, you're talking about coal in
China and the ash problem. Whether we like it or not,
regardless of what happens to Kyoto, a lot of these newly
emerging economies are going to burn coal. Coal produces about
55 percent of our energy here in the United States, and my
State is about 85 percent.
It seems to me that one of the greatest things that we
could do as a matter of public policy, Mr. Chairman, would be
to really put some money into clean coal technology and also
provide some incentives so that we could go ahead and really do
a job with that technology that could be exported around the
world that would help deal with the problem that these
countries are dealing with now.
If that's not what we're going to do, and faced with what
the real world is, then we have to go to some other alternative
source of energy. We talked about nuclear is what many others
have said. Then what's left is gas, hydro, and then some of the
renewables that we have, but most of us recognize that
renewables produce about 1/10th of 1 percent of the energy in
this country, so that's the real world we're dealing with.
I guess the issue is: how do you deal with the real world?
In the remainder of my time, what do you think of the Bush
policy? We'll start off with that.
Dr. Rowland.
Mr. Rowland. I'll make a response to your question about
clean coal technology. Yes, there's no question that India and
China are going to depend for the next decades very heavily on
coal, and they both, unfortunately, have very poor coal, so if
they could have technology available--that is, clean coal
technology--then it would help them quite substantially with
their own local environmental problems. Still, you end up with
carbon dioxide from burning the coal. But we might be able, as
part of the cleanup of their cities, to persuade them also to
take care of the other aspects of air pollution that they have
in the urban areas. But I'm sure that clean coal technology in
India and China would be very beneficial to them and to the
atmosphere, generally.
Mr. Pielke. Let me say, from the standpoint of climate
risk, the choice between, let's say, the Kyoto Protocol and the
Bush plan, there is a distinction without a difference there.
There are really no differences in risk because neither
addresses the underlying causes of risk, which are the
increasing vulnerability of society and the environment to
climate events.
Clearly, there are economic, political, and symbolic----
Senator Voinovich. Can I?
Mr. Pielke. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. That's really interesting. You're
saying--and I want to make sure I understand. You're saying
that, in your opinion, we're seeing, if you look at history, a
much greater vulnerability to changes in natural climate types
of things? In other words, is that--am I understanding that
right?
Mr. Pielke. Yes. What I'm saying is that, even in the
context--forgetting about the natural versus human cause of
climate change--climate has changed. I mean, it is clear in
different locations over different time periods. But if you
take a look, for example, at hurricanes, for which we have very
good data, the same storm which would have caused $100 million
inflation-adjusted in 1926 Miami, today would cause about $90
billion. That has nothing to do with the changing frequency or
nature of storms, only that Miami Beach and associated property
develop is much different than it was the beginning of the last
century.
So when we're looking at risk and we're worried about
impacts of climate, you can't just say, ``We have more
precipitation. Will the temperature be warmer,'' and so on. We
also have to look at how the economy changes, how society
changes, and so on.
When you put those two things together, by far the largest
signal--and, again, this is talking about humans and not the
environment--by far the largest signal are the changes we make
every day, how we develop, how much more wealth we accumulate,
where we live, and so on. Those are the determining factors in
risk.
The insurance company insures against property damage. It
doesn't ensure against number of storms.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So, again, I want to understand
this. It's like Senator Corzine was talking about the
coastline. In my State, the water level is way down, and I
suspect it will go way up, and I haven't figured out what it
is. Some people say that if somebody turns a spigot on it turns
it up, but we know that isn't the case. But the question we
have, like, for instance, when I was Governor, we did coastal
plain. We advised people not to build in certain places. We
required, when people buy a home now, that they've got to be
given information about the erosion and some other things.
Those are the kinds of things you're talking about that we'd
better start thinking about in terms of our overall policies?
Mr. Pielke. Yes. There's a disconnect here. I think Senator
Corzine is properly concerned about erosion on the coast. But
let's not kid ourselves. Let's not think that the choices we
have before us on energy policy are going to make any
difference whatsoever on what happens on the coast. Many other
decisions that you folks will face will affect that, such as
development, replenishment of beaches, and so on--the decisions
that are made every day that go, I guess, underneath the radar
screen of energy policy. But I think there is a policy
disconnect here. If we are talking about energy policy and
justifying changes in terms of beach erosion or water tables
and so on, it is not in concert with how we understand how
climate and people interact.
From that standpoint, I would say Bush versus Kyoto, you're
talking to the wrong experts here. It may make sense from the
standpoint of keeping our allies happy with respect to
international relations or showing environmental symbolism, but
it is not at all going to address these issues of risk.
I think it is time that the debate moved on to acknowledge
that.
Senator Jeffords. Dr. Rowland.
Mr. Rowland. I'd comment about climate models and weather.
The climate models are not designed to reproduce weather, and
most of what Roger Pielke is talking about and also what Mr.
Legates talked about are weather-related questions of how much
precipitation there is very locally. When you live locally,
then that's very important to you. It is what happens right
there.
If you build on the barrier beach in Florida, then
eventually you're going to get hit by a hurricane, and that's
why he's saying that the beach damages weren't there in 1926.
The beaches were there in 1926 and the hurricanes went over
them, but people weren't there. If you build on them, then at
some time it is going to hit you. That's the weather-related
aspect.
The climate-related aspects have to do with 50 or 100
years, and there the question of the storms--the climate models
don't reproduce storms. Storms happen, are created and produced
on a much smaller spatial scale than the climate models can do.
If I give you an example for myself, I live on the coast in
southern California. My office is about 4 miles inland. The
weather is different there because there is a low hill, low
hills in between, and 50 miles away there is a 12,000-foot
mountain with snow on top of it.
If you have a climate model that has a box that is 100
miles by 100 miles, then the beach and the desert and the
mountain are all in the same box. You can't predict any kind of
weather out of that. For that you need a very much smaller-
scale model, and if you build a smaller-scale model that only
does the weather, then it does pretty well. They do pretty well
on precipitation. But you can't expect a climate model to do
that because the scales are so different. Climate modeling is
really looking 50 to 100 years in the future and under
conditions when the hydrological cycle would be three, four or
five times as severely changed as now, and that's when they
start worrying about the storms, but they can't predict them
because that is much too fine a scale for their model.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Markham, go ahead. I was going to ask
you.
Mr. Markham. Yes. I just wanted to respond to Senator
Voinovich's question about the President's climate policy.
I think the simple answer to that is that that is a
business as usual policy which will allow carbon emissions to
increase over the next decade at roughly the same rate at which
they've increased over the last decade, so, by tying the issue
to carbon intensity rather than to overall CO<INF>2</INF>
emissions, that policy is not a policy for reduction, it is a
policy for continued increase. For that reason, I don't think
that it will help us if our objective is to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.
I would also like to just say that I think it doesn't help
to try and totally separate energy policy from response to
climate change. We are almost certainly locked into a certain
amount of climate change, to which we will have to adapt, but
at the same time, by having a secure and sensible energy
policy, we can reduce the potential future impacts. Climate
change doesn't happen on its own, it happens in a context of
social change. Wildlife habitats are unable to adapt to rapidly
changing climate. The coasts--we are spending tens of millions
of dollars on armoring the eastern coasts at the moment. As sea
level accelerates over the next century, then that will be an
increased cost, so we shouldn't always just talk about the cost
of reducing emissions, we should also talk about the cost of
not reducing emissions. I think the coastal zone is one of the
areas where we need to look at that more closely.
Senator Voinovich. Dr. Baliunas.
Ms. Baliunas. The reason I abstained on the vote on the
earlier bill is because I hadn't seen the full bill. I like
Bush's bill because, for some reason, one is it focuses on the
science, and the science is clearly the driver of the issue
here. The models need improvement. They need improvement in the
major greenhouse effect, which are 02 water vapor and the
effect of clouds. Those are poorly to improperly modeled at
present in all climate models. All climate models assume them
to be, especially water vapor, strong positive feedback that
amplifies any warming that would be there from, say, doubling
carbon dioxide concentrations in the air. That is wrong. That
has been demonstrated incorrect from the satellite data and the
balloon data that we have. Those models are incorrect based on
the surface data measurements. They are exaggerating the
warming.
So anything that affords science to progress in those areas
will give us a better definition of the risk, the amount, the
amplitude of climate change from manmade sources. This has to
be weighed against the cost.
Talking about cutting energy use in this country, carbon
dioxide emissions, by 20 percent on a time scale of a decade is
extremely costly. There is no way around it. One can only look
at what Senator Chafee called the sad reality of nuclear to
replace these. Renewables won't do it. Hydro is not going to
expand in this country. Solar is not going to add on that
scale. Wind towers are not going to add on that scale. So we're
going to end up shutting down coal, adding a lot more natural
gas, and adding nuclear. I just don't see how it is possible to
do that.
But, in any case, the science says that the manmade
emissions that are present are having a very small climate
effect.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Mr. Whittaker. I would only add that, from a business
standpoint, certainly the policy encourages technology
development, and if I was with a cogeneration or with a
combined heat and power company right now, I would be quite
pleased. I think my business is going to improve over the next
few years.
We ask about how can we encourage China and India to
embrace these new technologies. Well, there is a mechanism
under the Kyoto Protocol called ``a clean development
mechanism,'' which is designed precisely to do that and to
credit U.S. companies for doing so.
I would have liked to have seen mandatory reporting. I
think disclosure on issues brings consistency, and the
consistency of information is very valuable for those wishing
to estimate companies, certainly in the financial services
industry, which brings me on to my final point.
I would like to see more of a dialog with Wall Street and
with the investment community. I think institutional investors
are increasingly invested in the equities markets and have
tremendous sway over companies, and the slightest level of
concern expressed by investors would be a powerful catalyst, I
think, for companies to look at this issue more seriously.
Senator Jeffords. Dr. Rowland.
Mr. Rowland. I should register dissent to what Dr. Baliunas
said about the modeling of the clouds and the modeling of water
vapor. In the consensus discussion of the Academy scientists
that were involved, they agree that there are some
uncertainties involved in any of that, but at the present
modeling, assuming that the relative humidity would be the same
and handling clouds as they are is as good as you can do at the
present time for doing the modeling. It is not introducing a
bias one way or the other.
Ms. Baliunas. I want to register dissent to the dissent,
and that is they may be the best we can do today, but they are
insufficient for making projections 50 to 100 years in the
future. We cannot even explain the lower troposphere
temperature of the last 20 to 40 years, where we've gone almost
halfway to a doubling of carbon dioxide, equivalent carbon
dioxide in the air--that is, summing all the greenhouse gases
in the air.
The models make an error of a factor of at least five in
projecting the warming. That error has to be due to the largest
feedback, the largest gain, which is water vapor. It is a
distribution of water vapor in the air. We don't have good
measurements for it, the vertical distribution of it, and we
don't know how it interacts with the rest of the climate
system. Ditto for clouds.
Mr. Pielke. I could. This dialog is exactly what's wrong
with the climate change debate. This country spends an enormous
amount of money--about $20 billion over the last 10 or 12
years--on climate change research, and, while we have a much
better understanding and much better sense that yes, people can
affect the climate, esteemed scientists such as these will be
debating these issues far into the future. That's how science
progresses.
But what hasn't come out of the Nation's $20 billion
investment in research are more alternatives, more choices. The
choices that we face today are essentially the same that were
discussed in 1982, in 1985. It's, ``Do we reduce
CO<INF>2</INF>? Yes or no?''
There are thousands, if not millions, of decisions made
about climate every single day in each of your States, in my
State, around the world. I think it is fair to ask if the
scientific community is providing information that leads to a
greater range of choices with respect to mitigation and
adaptation to climate change. There's clearly a lot of reasons
to change energy policy independent of climate and a lot of
reasons to better adapt a climate independent of change.
It seems to me that the research that we're funding as a
country is not leading to those choices, meaning that all of
the science we get is fed into the same very narrow range that
we'll be talking about in 10 years. So I think maybe it is time
to think a little bit more broadly about the problem, because
this hearing and the debate among scientists, if you look in
1985 or even 1982, when Representative Al Gore held hearings,
is very similar, and yet our choices remain the same.
I would encourage you to do what you can to expand the
choices available.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Cogen.
Mr. Cogen. Thank you, Senator.
In responding to President Bush's proposals, I will take
the same approach I took to Senator Jeffords' bill, which is
not actually have an opinion, but I will say that we represent
a lot of very large emitters, a lot of industrial companies are
typically the companies that hire us--many, in fact, in the
State of Ohio. There's three things that they're looking for in
a bill, and I think maybe that's what I'd like to point out and
focus.
One is flexibility. Universally they support market-based
mechanisms for dealing with the problem as far as their
solutions.
The second, which is the hardest to get under any
environment, is some sort of regulatory certainty.
Senator Voinovich. Is what?
Mr. Cogen. Regulatory certainty. It is very hard to make
investment decisions for long-term assets when you think the
law might change in 5 or 6 years and you're talking about a 30-
year asset.
Another issue, which goes to the issue of the voluntary
nature of programs, is protection of baselines. That is, a
number of companies have witnessed this, and certainly there
has been talk over the years of credit for early action. I
think that gets to the heart of it.
It is very hard to take a voluntary action now as a
corporation for all of the good corporate citizens reasons and
find out years later that you are now established at a lower
baseline from which you must reduce because of a mandatory
program, where if that is the case the best economic solution
is, in fact, put as much carbon out as you can now so that you
have a higher baseline that you have to reduce 10 percent off
of.
That's the situation that we are actually seeing,
especially under the trading program proposed in the European
Union, that right now, for example, some chemical firms have
taken great efforts and expense in reducing their nitrous oxide
output, and we're finding that, in fact, the chemical industry
is not under the trading program at all. Then there's talk, as
a secondary, ``Well, we'll put them in and then we'll establish
the baseline pretty much on basic level, as they're doing
now,'' when some of them have spent 10 years actually reducing
their CO<INF>2</INF> equivalent out put. It might just all go
away for them.
That, to me, is maybe the key issue that can be addressed
is: if you're going to have any sort of voluntary program, how
do you protect it? What assurances can be given that it is
going to count later?
Senator Jeffords. Anyone--Dr. Rowland.
Mr. Rowland. I have just a comment about satellite
measurements of temperature. We all know how thermometers work.
We've all used them. A satellite can't do what a thermometer
does, and that is contact the material directly. So if a
satellite wants to measure temperature, it has to measure some
kind of emission that gives radiation that travels 500 miles to
the satellite. It doesn't get it just from the place that you
want to measure it. It gets it from all through the atmosphere,
so you have to have an algorithm that calculates it.
The history of the satellite measurements of temperature in
the troposphere have been that the algorithm was shown that
existed for quite a period of time, 5 or 10 years, had some
problems in it. The same satellite doesn't stay there. There
have been 9 or 10 of these satellites, and their orbits decay,
and then you have to pass it from one to the next. So it is not
just sticking your thermometer in and measuring it, which that
at least we know how to do. It is a very--it often takes
adjustment of the algorithm 5 or 10 times, and it is not clear
to me that we've got the final algorithm for measuring
tropospheric temperatures by satellite.
In the end, satellites always give you the global coverage
that is needed, but interpretation of the measurement that
actually reaches the satellite is a complicated thing, which is
very valuable if more than one research group--if there are
several research groups and they repeat and they can come
together on it, and I don't think we're in that position on the
tropospheric temperatures.
Senator Jeffords. Yes.
Mr. Legates. I agree, and that's one of the things I point
out in my statement is that we need more work on satellite
measurements. But I disagree strongly that a thermometer is a
perfect measurement. A thermometer can measure temperature at a
given point. The problem with that is a thermometer is good for
measuring a temperature here but not for across the room, so we
have a single thermometer located at, say, a National Weather
Service observing site. It is representative only of that site,
not of the larger region.
Now, the problem is that things change on that site over
time. We've moved a lot of the stations around, for example, in
the 1940's, early 1950's. We decided we really didn't need the
Weather Services offices downtown, it was better to have them
out at the airports, so we moved our thermometers out to the
airports, which created discontinuity.
Well, what's happened over time? We've had urbanization. So
the thermometers, which originally were in land outside of the
cities, and now with a growing metropolis a lot of cases, these
thermometers now are associated with urbanization right around
the site. That is, the growth of cities leads to more asphalt
and warmer conditions so we have the effect of urbanization
biasing our measurement with the thermometers.
We also have changes in thermometers over time. We don't
necessarily use the same type of thermometer in 1930 that we do
now, so there is a discontinuity in instrumentation.
Most importantly, we only put thermometers over land
surfaces. We have most of our observations associated with
locations that are over land, that are at lower altitudes, that
are generally in wetter conditions and in more economically
developed countries.
So thermometer-based measurements are good only for a
single point, but they don't give you a good indication as to
what the actual background change has been, because there is a
lot of variability and bias associated with taking a
thermometer measurement.
Ms. Baliunas. I want to add that the lower troposphere
measurements by satellite have been independently validated by
balloons that are launched daily and make measurements in situ,
and there are at least four sets of balloon measurements that
are made independently across the world, groups that analyze
it, and they agree with a high degree of correlation with the
tropospheric data from satellites.
So the argument is that the lower troposphere data are
probably on a very good footing. They cover almost essentially
all the globe, as opposed to between 10 and 20 percent for the
ground-based thermometer measurement data that have, as Dr.
Legates has pointed out, have changed substantially over time
and have many corrections made to their algorithms, as well.
Mr. Pielke. Yes. I'd like to suggest that there's really no
solution to the problem of climate change, but we can do
better. I'd like to go on record as saying I'm a big supporter
of using less energy, being cleaner in our energy use, and so
on, but we don't need better thermometers, better satellites,
or any of that to start making progress. There's a lot of so-
called ``low-hanging fruit.'' National security, alone,
provides a compelling reason to be more efficient in our energy
use.
It seems to me that in tackling the greenhouse gas
emissions of 6 billion people focused on understanding the
science 100 years in the future, we couldn't have created a
problem that could be more easily gridlocked.
There's a lot of relatively easy, by comparison, steps--no
regrets adaptation and no regrets mitigation--for which the
debate over the science, while important, shouldn't stand in
our way. We ought to be being better with our energy use and
reduce our vulnerability to climate in any case, and we should
start taking those steps. We should have taken them before, but
we should start now instead of trying to wait for science to
resolve itself.
Senator Jeffords. I'll give you all a last shot here. Dr.
Rowland.
Mr. Rowland. I have no more.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Legates.
Mr. Legates. [Shaking head negatively.]
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Markham.
Mr. Markham. Just to say that I think the risks from
greenhouse gas emissions are very great. The science--we have
good, sound science. It's getting stronger every day. We know a
lot more than we did 5, 10, or 15 years ago. As. Dr. Pielke
says, there are many low-cost actions we can take now, which
include both voluntary and hopefully regulatory actions like
your bill.
Ms. Baliunas. The science has gotten extraordinarily
better. The models still cannot be used to make reliable,
credible predictions in the future. They fail validation by
scientific testing. We should not hold this to energy policy.
Mr. Whittaker. Only to say that this is very definitely a
business issue. It is a business risk and it is a business
opportunity, and it will intensify in the coming years.
Mr. Cogen. Yes. I'll agree with that. From the business
point of view, people are looking to the Senate for leadership.
Businesses are taking actions and they want to see some
regulatory framework for it.
Senator Jeffords. Let me ask this last question. Do any of
you believe that it is safe to continue increasing manmade
greenhouse gas emissions without any limit?
[All witnesses indicate in the negative.]
Senator Jeffords. No one says yes, and so that must be no,
and we'll see you later. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Hon. Joseph Lieberman, U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut
I thank Chairman Jeffords for calling this important hearing on the
economic and environmental risks associated with increasing greenhouse
gas emissions, and thank him for his leadership on this issue. The
issues are timely, they are important, and the witnesses are
impressive. I am sorry that I could not personally attend; I had a
conflicting duty to chair a hearing of the Governmental Affairs
Committee. I want to leave no doubt about the importance of this
hearing.
The causes and potential effects of global warming have been well
documented through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an
international process that is engaged in by over 2,000 scientists from
around the world. The potential effects are serious and far-reaching.
Global warming is a global problem that requires a global solution.
The international community has come together under the auspices of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to address the
problem. The original 1992 agreement, signed by then-President Bush and
unanimously ratified by the U.S. Senate, contained no mandatory targets
or timetables for greenhouse gas emissions. It was important, however,
for recognizing the problem and committing the countries of the world
to an ongoing multilateral process to seek ways to reduce the threat of
global warming. In 1997, the international community negotiated the
Kyoto Protocol, which included binding targets and timetables for
industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a little
over 5 percent by 2008-2012, as a first step in reducing global
emissions of greenhouse gases. The United States committed to a 7
percent reduction. Other countries, including the European Union and
Japan, are moving toward ratification of this agreement. The current
administration has rejected the Kyoto Protocol and offered us what can
best be described as a tepid response to what even the President
describes is a very serious issue.
The United States has a large stake in the climate change debate;
among other things, we have a very large land mass, with thousands of
miles of coastline, and a very large population, magnifying the health
threats associated with climate change. We also emit about 25 percent
of the entire world's emissions of carbon dioxide, the most prevalent
greenhouse gas, even though we have less than 5 percent of the world's
population. We have a responsibility to ourselves as well as the world
community to take action to reduce greenhouse gases. We led the
international effort to protect the stratospheric ozone layer, and
found a way to bridge differences between developed and developing
countries. That system is working and we should be proud of the
leadership the United States exhibited.
I fear we have now abdicated our leadership role. In 1989, then-
President Bush, talking to Congress about the issue of acid rain
declared that the ``time for study alone is over . . . the time for
action is now.'' The President then went on to work with the Congress
to establish a market-based cap and trade program that significantly
reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide, the main ingredient of acid rain.
I would suggest that the current administration follow this example for
carbon dioxide. I have been working with Chairman Jeffords and other
progressive-minded Senators to move toward passage of S. 556, the Clean
Power Act of 2001, which would set limits on carbon dioxide emissions
from electric power plants, which are responsible for about 40 percent
of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. We have been working with colleagues
from the other side of the aisle on this important first step on
greenhouse gas emissions, and hope that we can reach an agreement to
move forward. I am also working with Senator McCain to develop an
economy wide cap and trade proposal for greenhouse gas emissions as one
more step in re-establishing U.S. leadership in this critical area. As
our distinguished witness Dr. Rowland, a Nobel laureate wrote in his
testimony: ``The increasing global temperatures will have many
consequences, often adverse in the long run. Because of the many causes
of this temperature increase have their origins in the activities of
mankind, actions can and should now be taken which will slow this rate
of increase.''
Thank you Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement.
__________
Statement of Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, U.S. Senator from the State
of Colorado
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome all of the
witnesses, especially Professor Roger Pielke of the University of
Colorado.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony and hope that we can use
your collective knowledge to reach a better understanding of the
economic and environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on
global climate change.
Climate change or global warming has become one of the most talked
about environmental issues for the last several years. The United
States and other nations have spent millions of dollars to study
climate change. It seems that the more we spend and study, the more we
realize that we don't know.
Our studying climate change for the last 10 years has led us to two
conclusions:
First, human activity has had an impact on the global climate. In
announcing his global climate change strategy, President Bush
acknowledged this fact.
However, our years of careful study have made, for policymakers, an
even more important conclusion: that we have inadequate evidence to
demonstrate humanity's affect on climate change. Since our science is
unable to tell us the level of causation, science can't tell us what
mitigation strategies we, in Congress, should pursue.
Throughout my career of public service I have tried to base my
decisions on the best available information, particularly when those
decisions have dramatic consequences on the lives of Coloradans.
Unfortunately, in the case of global climate change, we are seeking to
craft a policy with profound implications on completely inadequate and
speculative information.
In his book, The Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjorn Lomborg (Bee-
Yorn Lom-Borg) simply asked, ``Do we want to handle global warming in
the most efficient way or do we use global warming as a stepping stone
to other political projects.''
Even Mr. Lomborg, a Danish statistician, noted the political
salience of the climate change debate. Unfortunately, this important
issue has become so politicized that many people look past the facts
and, instead, focus on doomsday scenarios.
In noting our lack of understanding of the Earth's climate system,
one of our very own witnesses made an equally important point. In her
testimony today, Doctor Sallies Baliunas stated, ``A value judgment is
prerequisite to evaluating the need for human mitigation of adverse
consequences of climate change.''
Again, ``a value judgment is prerequisite.'' In short, since we
don't have enough information, some suggest that we just assume that
humans can mitigate adverse consequences of climate change.
Well, this Senator is not ready to make that assumption when making
that leap of faith could result in the loss of countless U.S. jobs.
I am happy that the President has chosen to look at the facts in
rejecting the Kyoto Protocol. He properly noted that greenhouse gas
emissions is directly attributable to U.S. production and economic
growth. In my state of Colorado, implementing Kyoto would have
translated in the loss of 47,400 jobs and $2 billion in tax revenue by
2010.
I am not ready to make decisions with such consequences without
adequate information.
We all make ``value judgments'' in policymaking. I would ask my
friends to ask themselves what it is they value.
In making that ``value judgment'' I would ask them to consider the
words of John Adams when he said: ``Facts are stubborn things; and
whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our
passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.''
I look forward to the distinguished panel's testimony, and ask that
my testimony be reported in the Record.
Thank you.
__________
Statement of Dr. F. Sherwood Rowland, Bren Professor of Chemistry and
Earth System Science, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA
A natural greenhouse effect has existed in Earth's atmosphere for
thousands of years, warming the Earth's surface for a global average of
57 F. During the 20th Century, the atmospheric concentrations of a
number of ``greenhouse gases'' have increased, mostly because of the
actions of mankind. Our current concern is not whether there is a
greenhouse effect, because there is one, but rather how large will be
the enhanced greenhouse effect from the additional accumulation in the
atmosphere of these greenhouse gases.
The Earth intercepts daily energy from the sun, much of it in the
visible wavelengths corresponding to the spectrum of colors from red to
violet, and the rest in ultraviolet and nearby infrared wavelengths. An
equal amount of energy must escape from the Earth daily to maintain a
balance, but this energy emission is controlled by the much cooler
average surface temperature of the Earth, and occurs in wavelengths in
the Afar infrared''. If all of this terrestrially emitted infrared
radiation were able to escape directly to space, then the required
average temperature of Earth would be 0 F. However, the greenhouse
gases--carbon dioxide (CO<INF>2</INF>), methane (CH<INF>4</INF>),
nitrous oxide (N<INF>2</INF>O), and others--selectively intercept some
of this far infrared radiation, preventing its escape. A warmer Earth
emits more infrared radiation, and Earth with an average surface
temperature of 57 +F was able to make up the shortfall from greenhouse
gas absorption. However, at Exist slowly during the 19th century and
then more rapidly throughout the 20th century, the atmospheric
concentrations of these greenhouse gases increased, often because of
the activities of mankind. Other greenhouse gases have also been added,
such as the chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs, (CCl<INF>2</INF>F<INF>2</INF>,
CCl<INF>3</INF>F, etc.) and tropospheric ozone (O<INF>3</INF>). With
more of these gases present in the atmosphere, more infrared will be
intercepted, and a further temperature increase will be required to
maintain the energy balance.
Carbon dioxide is released by the combustion of fossil fuels--coal,
oil and natural gas--and its atmospheric concentration has increased
from about 280 ppm as the 19th century began to 315 ppm in 1958 and 370
ppm now. Water (H<INF>2</INF>O) is actually the most significant
greenhouse gas in absorbing infrared radiation, but the amount of
gaseous water is controlled by the temperature of the world's oceans
and lakes. Methane has a natural source from swamps, but is also
released during agricultural activities--for example, from rice paddies
while flooded, and from cows and other ruminant animals--and by other
processes, increasing from about 0.70 ppm in the early 1800's to 1.52
ppm around 1978 and 1.77 ppm currently. Nitrous oxide concentrations
grew from 0.27 to 0.31 ppm during the 20th century, formed by microbial
action in soils and waters on nitrogen-containing compounds including
fertilizers. The chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were not a natural part of
the atmosphere, but were first synthesized in 1928, and were then,
applied to a variety of uses--propellant gases for aerosol sprays,
refrigerants in home refrigerators and automobile air conditioners,
industrial solvents, manufacture of plastic foams, etc. The CFC
concentrations started from zero concentration in the 1920's, and rose
rapidly during the latter part of the 20th century until the early
1990's. They are no longer increasing because of the Montreal Protocol,
an international ban on their further manufacture. Tropospheric ozone
is a globally important compound formed by photochemical reactions as a
part of urban smog in hundreds of cities. Other potential influences on
temperature changes for which the globally averaged data are still very
sparse include the concentrations of particulate matter such as sulfate
and black carbon aerosols.
Measurements of surface temperatures only became sufficiently broad
in geographical coverage about 1860 to permit global averaging with
improved coverage as the years passed. The globally averaged surface
temperature increased about 1.1 F during the 20th century, with about
half of this change occurring during the past 25 years. 1998 was the
warmest year globally in the entire 140-year record, and the 1990's
were the warmest decade. Fluctuations in solar activity have been
directly observed wince the invention of the telescope 400 years ago,
but accurate, direct measurements of total solar energy output have
only been possible with the advent of satellite measurements in the
late 1970's. These satellite data exhibit a small but definite cyclic
variation over the last two decades, paralleling the 11-year solar
sunspot cycle, but with little long term difference in solar energy
output contemporary with the rising global temperatures of the past two
decades.
Predictions of future temperature responses require atmospheric
model calculations that effectively simulate the past, and then are
extrapolated into the future with appropriate estimates of the future
changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. These models
calculate the direct temperature increases that additional greenhouse
gases will cause, and the further feedbacks induced by these
temperature changes. One of the most prominent of these is the change
in albedo (surface reflectivity) in the polar north--when melting ice
is replaced by open water (or melting snow replaced by bare ground),
less solar radiation is reflected back to space, and more remains at
the surface causing a further temperature increase. The models also
assume that more water will remain in the atmosphere inn response to
the temperature increases, providing another positive feedback. There
is an additional possible feedback from the changes in clouds--amount,
composition, and altitude. In present models, the cloud feedback is
assumed to be small, but data for better evaluation are very difficult
to obtain.
Extrapolations for 50 or 100 years in the future necessarily
include hypotheses about future societal developments, including
population growth, economic activity, etc. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) developed a large set of scenarios about the
possible course of these events over the next century, with resulting
model calculations of globally averaged temperature increases for the
year 2100 relative to 1990 ranging from 2.5 to 10.4 F (1.4-5.8 C).
These results were only a small part of the three IPCC reports issued
during 2001 about Climate change. Volume I of the IPCC reports treated
the ``Scientific Basis'', Volume II covered ``Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability'', and Volume III ``Mitigation''.
The National Academy of Sciences, in response to a May 2001 request
from the White douse, and following discussions between the
administration and the Academy over some questions raised by the
former, convened an 11-member scientific panel, which issued in June a
24-page report ``Climate Change Science. An Analysis of Some Key
Questions'' from a select committee of atmospheric scientists. I quote
the first few sentences of this report, and have appended the entire
report to this testimony: ``Greenhouse gases are accumulating in
Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures
are, in fact, rising. The changes observed over the last several
decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule
out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of
natural variability.''
The increasing global temperatures will have many consequences,
often adverse in the long run. Because many of the causes of this
temperature increase have their origin in the activities of mankind,
actions can and should now be taken which will slow this rate of
increase.
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Responses of Sherwood Rowland to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. The Academy's 2001 report, which you helped write, was
stunningly clear. It confirmed the seriousness of human-induced climate
change. And, it contains a real sense of urgency about the problem.
Beyond the comments you made at the hearing, are there other things
that the U.S. Government should do to reduce the risks that the report
outlines and to clear up related scientific uncertainties?
Response. I believe that it is important to begin carrying out
diverse policies which will have an ameliorating effect on climate
change. For too many years, the world has operated with little regard
to the long term effects of increasing population, increasing energy
use per capita, and rather indiscriminate discharge of waste materials
into the environment. The global system is so immense and so
complicated that a very large set of policy changes are needed. What we
need is the establishment of a mind-set that recognizes these problems,
and begins to take steps toward solutions. Once the general direction
begins to change, more and more opportunities will appear which can
accelerate the progress.
Question 2. The Academy's report says that ``national policy
decisions made now . . . will influence the extent of any damage
suffered by vulnerable human populations and ecosystems later in this
century.'' The Administration's new policy decision appears to be
business as usual. How will this policy affect the future, in terms of
greenhouse gas concentrations?
Response. The history of the past two centuries is a period in
which most of the advances in standard of living have been accompanied
by the progressive substitution of animal power for human power and
then machine power for animal power. These changes have been
accompanied, of course, by the increasing use of energy to supply the
machine power--first steam from wood burning, then coal, oil and
natural gas combustion as power sources. We urgently need to develop
policies by which the major industrial powers can maintain sustainable
prosperity, while the developing countries seek sustainable
development. These changes will surely need to be accompanied by more
careful disposal of the waste products from energy production.
Question 3. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not
safe to continue increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit.
What needs to be done to assure that we can avert the point of no
return or ``dangerous levels'' of ``greenhouse gas concentrations?
Response. We are unlikely to know enough because of the extreme
complexity of the global system and its interconnections to permit
identification of ``points of no return'' or to know a precise value of
a ``dangerous level'' until we have passed the first, or exceeded the
latter. Under the circumstances, this argues for doing what we can to
slow the rate of change in the hope that we can recognize the dangers
before we have passed the choke point.
Question 4. The NAS report advocates, ``Maintaining a vigorous,
ongoing program of basic research, funded and managed independently of
the climate assessment activity, will be crucial for narrowing . . .
uncertainties . . . In addition, the research enterprise dealing with
environmental change and the interactions of human society with the
environment must be enhanced.'' `What are your views of current
Federal-level research programs' direction and budgets for achieving
these ends?
Response. The need for separation of research versus assessment is
the difference between exploring and judging. Assessment involves
judging the adequacy of the present understanding of the system by, for
example, its ability to reproduce the observations in that system.
Exploring will often mean the postulation of a different possible
explanation, devising an appropriate test, and then discarding the
explanation if it fails the test--but carrying out a continuing series
of postulates and tests.
Question 5. To date, much of the research regarding the
environmental, human health, or economic impacts of climate change has
been limited to projections for the next 100-150 years, or assuming a
doubling of atmospheric CO<INF>2</INF>. What are the risks of climate
change on a longer timeframe, or those associated with a tripling or
quadrupling of atmospheric CO<INF>2</INF>? Does the NAS plan to update
its 2001 report?
Response. Answering the second question first, the main purpose of
the NAS report of 2001 was evaluation of the state of understanding of
the Earth's climate system, for which the IPCC 2001 report, and
particularly in its Volume 1 on the ``Scientific Base'', was the latest
and most complete compilation. This NAS report was prepared in about 5
weeks by a group of 11 scientists quite familiar with the content and
preparation of the IPCC report, while the IPCC report itself was the
product of 5 years of work by about 3,000 scientists. Until the next
IPCC report is ready in 2006 or 2007, another NAS report is quite
unlikely. Reports on specific, limited aspects can certainly be
anticipated, as that need rises.
The further out in the future the projection, the greater the
uncertainty. Probably the ultimate worry is captured by the phrase
``runaway greenhouse'', as applied to our sister planet Venus, which
has an atmospheric much thicker than ours, composed mostly of carbon
dioxide, and surface temperatures which will not permit biological
life, at least in the forms existing on Earth. Of course, no one knows
the history of the Venusian atmosphere, so that the phrase might be
totally misleading.
Question 6. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30-
50 years, of continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas
emissions? And, what is the most feasible way to reduce or eliminate
that risk?
Response. My experience with the atmospheric problem of
``stratospheric ozone depletion'' makes me answer this question with
the reply ``some problem that has not yet been identified, some
surprise.'' In 1984, the scientific community was quite aware that
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were reaching the stratosphere and
decomposing there with the release of chlorine atoms, which could then
react with the molecules of ozone in the stratosphere. What only a few
scientists knew then was that were particles, polar stratospheric
clouds, present in the very cold stratosphere over Antarctica. What
only a few other scientists knew then--none of them in the first group,
who likewise were ignorant of this other development--was that some
chemical reactions between two types of chlorine containing molecules,
hydrogen chloride and chlorine nitrate, could occur on the surfaces of
particles, thereby facilitating the removal of ozone. Then, the
``Antarctic ozone hole'' was discovered, and reported in 1985 by the
British scientist Joe Farman, and suddenly the 1984 view that ozone
loss would occur slowly over a period of several decades was replaced
by the knowledge that ozone loss could occur extremely rapidly, and
that major losses were already happening every spring in the Antarctic.
What would be the surprise? Probably the unexpected collapse of
some ecosystem. I won't provide an example of an unexpected collapse,
because then it would probably be said that I, or scientists in
general, expected it. The basic point is that the climate system is
still very much under study, and when and how it goes about changing an
area under active investigation.
__________
Responses of Sherwood Rowland to Additional Questions from Senator
Smith
Question 1. Dr. Pielke testified that ``the primary cause for . . .
growth in impact is the increasing vulnerability of human and
environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in
climate, per se.'' Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?
Response. The first 75 years of the 20th century were a time of
great population growth, and relatively little change in climate.
During the last 25 years, the global temperature has risen steadily,
and signs of climate change are beginning to be seen in many locations.
Over the whole century then, climate change should not be expected to
have caused a great change in impacts. The questions for the future
include a mixture of the consequences from increasing global population
coupled with the extra impositions from temperature rise. The larger
the temperature increase the larger the role this climatic fluctuation
will play in impacts on civilization.
Question 2. Dr. Pielke also stated that ``the present research
agenda is focused . . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate
future'' and that ``instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no
. . . we might be better served by addressing things like the present
drought. . . .'' Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why not?
Response. The arguments in most of the scientific world are not
about global warming, yes or no, but rather about the nuances of the
global warming which is occurring. There are always the simultaneous
needs for putting out the present fire, and also developing a long term
strategy to use non-combustible materials and install sprinkler
systems.
Question 3. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. I wrote in the summer of 2000 the following (see ``U.S.
Policy and the Global Environment'', Donald Kennedy and John Riggs,
editors) ``None of the currently available remedial responses, such as
the Kyoto Protocol, provide a solution to the problems brought about by
climate change. Rather they are directed toward slowing the pace of
change, amelioration, and adaptation rather than cure. Consequently,
the climate change problem will be much more serious by the year 2050
and even more so by 2100.''
The development of an adequate response to the climate change
problem will surely require many different approaches, strengthening
and altering possible control efforts over time. The Kyoto Protocol is
one possible initial step, and the only one that is seriously on the
table at the present time. It has some built-in weaknesses, such as the
basic rule built into the future negotiations during the 1992 Rio de
Janeiro conference that excluded India and China and other developing
countries from any control efforts in Kyoto. By now, too, the choice of
1990 as the base comparison year might well be replaced by some year
nearer to the present. However, the most important need is a signal to
the world that global warming is a problem about which many different
groups should be thinking and acting in efforts to slow it down-and if
Kyoto is not the signal, then another process should be proposed that
would also provide a start toward the control of emissions of
greenhouse gases.
Question 4. Since the hearing there has been much press attention
paid to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-
billion ton iceberg known as ``Larsen B,'' that has been attributed to
climate change. What scientific evidence is there that climate change
is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence
that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. The temperatures in Antarctica seem to be simultaneously
warming on the low altitude fringes and cooling in the central ice
plateau. The breakup of the Ice Sheet occurs at sea level, and the
warming there may facilitate the breakup. There are also quite
plausible scientific suggestions that link central-cooling/peripheral-
warming observations to the lesser amounts of ozone now found in the
Antarctic stratosphere, and the consequent lesser conversion of
ultraviolet light to heat in the absence of ozone in the central core
of the polar vortex. But sole cause? Almost all geoscientific events
occur under circumstances in which there are a mixture of causes,
although sometimes these second and third contributing causes are
minor.
Question 5a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled, ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty; Coping with the risks of climate change''.
Please explain why you agree or disagree with the following assertions
or conclusions from that report: ``There is not one problem but two:
natural climate variability and the influence of human activity on the
climate system.''
Response. Certainly. Any changes induced by man's activities are
superimposed on a system which has its own inherent variability to
begin with.
Question 5b. It is essential that new or at least wider-ranging
concepts of protection are developed. These must take into account the
fact that maximum strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions
at a given location cannot be predicted.
Response. I am not in the insurance business. If there are really
no parametric limits to the maximum strength and frequency of extreme
weather conditions at a given location, then it is hard for an outsider
to see how the company would set their insurance rates. I would think
the largest problem an insurance company encounters in considering
climate change is that the statistically observed probability of
disasters over the previous 100 or 200 years may no longer be
applicable to the new, warmer climate.
Question 5c. Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the
case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears
which-if they are not confirmed will in time turn to carefree relief;
and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons of short-term
expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that
today's generations take responsible measure to counter a threat of
this kind.
Response. These are straw-man arguments-''collapse of the climate
system'' versus ``short-term expediency''
Question 6. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. I can't give a why/why-not answer to this question.
Vulnerability is a function of the strength of the precautions taken.
When processes for strengthening are developed, people allow this
improvement to push into areas that were formerly thought to be
vulnerable.
Responses of Sherwood Rowland to Additional Questions from Senator
Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. I have not devoted any scientific time to emission
estimates for 100 years from now. The largest present question for me
is the future demand for nuclear power. I can imagine either limit
might turn out to be the world situation 50 years from now--either that
nuclear power will be essentially banned worldwide by 2050, or that
nuclear power will be the dominant global energy source by 2050,
furnishing more electricity than coal, oil and natural gas combined.
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis?
Response. I would certainly assume that the conclusions about the
economic impact of carbon dioxide reductions would be drastically
dependent upon the global acceptance of nuclear power at that point in
the future.
Question 2. Where do we need to concentrate research to better
understand climate modeling and the scientific uncertainties?
Response. A constant tension exists between the demand for a more
finely gridded atmospheric model in order to look for the regional
effects of climate change, and the need for a more elaborate data set
with which to compare the model calculations. Higher powered computers
are needed for more detailed calculations; measurements are needed to
furnish the ``ground truth'' which can validate the models.
Question 3. What technologies offer the most realistic opportunity
to reduce man-made emissions with the least detrimental impact to the
economy?
Response. Nuclear power is the obvious answer here, but whether the
country will accept nuclear power as a replacement for coal, oil and
gas remains to be seen. One doesn't read much about the French
experience with their heavy reliance on nuclear power. Every energy
source has its associated environmental problem(s) but nuclear power
plants are not a source of greenhouse gas emissions.
Question 4. What are the effects of removing black soot from the
atmosphere?
Response. From a theoretical point of view, black soot serves to
absorb solar energy into the soot particle, rather than reflecting the
radiation back to space. From a quantitative point of view, the
contribution of black soot is an enormous question mark. The material
does not last long in the atmosphere before dropping out, and is quite
variable in time and space. Measurements of the global effects of black
soot would require detailed daily measurements all over the world in
order to have an appropriate average for the world. Such data do not
exist.
Question 5. What are the benefits of using U.S. clean coal
technology in countries like China and India in terms of removing black
soot?
Response. To the locals, obviously cleaner air. On a global warming
basis, highly uncertain in the absence of the global daily coverage
mentioned above.
Question 6. Who wrote the Summary of the NRC's June 2001 ``Climate
Change Science'' report? Can you document the uncertainties reflected
in the underlying report?
Response. The first conference call led to agreement among the
committee members about the general nature and the individual
components of the report, and then to multiple assignments to create
drafts on particular topics. As the report took shape, the chairman
began drawing out the essence of each and circulating that for comment
and discussion. Basically, the report and its summary were written by
the committee members with the chair a very active participant in
almost all of the individual discussions.
The decision was made early not to provide individual documentation
and references for this report because of the time constraints. Almost
all of the uncertainties mentioned in the ``Climate Change Science''
report are discussed in the IPCC reports, both the Summary for Policy
Makers, and Volume One, ``The Scientific Base'', but are not
individually referenced.
Question 7. Please provide the documentation of how the NRC report
addressed the satellite, weather balloon and surface temperature
measurements.
Response. This question had been addressed separately by another
NRC committee, with a report issued in 1999. The chairman of that
committee was a member of the Climate Change Science committee.
Question 8. Who wrote the IPCC summary for policymakers?
Response. I was not part of the IPCC process, and know only
anecdotally that the listed authors appear to have worked much like the
Climate Change Science committee, except that their interactions were
stretched out over months and years.
Question 9. Which uncertainties in the underlying IPCC Working
Group reports were also reflected in the NRC (June 2001) report?
Response. I think that the same general sets of uncertainties were
involved in both, but the IPCC Working Group reports cover more than
2500 pages as published and obviously can discuss uncertainties on a
more micro scale.
Question 10. In your written testimony you said that increased
greenhouse gas concentrations are ``often because of the activities of
mankind.'' Yet in you oral comments you said they were ``mostly caused
by the activities of man.'' There is a significant difference between
``often'' and ``mostly.'' Many people attach much meaning to the
individual words of the IPCC Reports and other Climate Reports. Could
you explain what you meant in your two different testimonies?
Response. The two terms ``often'' and ``mostly'' are complementary,
and both are different from ``always'' because some of the emission
sources for some of the greenhouse gases are of natural origin. For
those molecules with both natural sources and releases by the
activities of mankind, the source is no longer distinguishable when the
molecule is in the atmosphere, but the increase in the atmospheric
concentration is then usually caused by the addition of the
anthropogenic source rather than by a change in the non-human
processes. There are many different greenhouse gases and many different
ways in which mankind causes them to be put into the atmosphere. Thirty
years ago discussions about global warming might be alternately
described as ``the carbon dioxide problem''. Then, in the 1970's a
succession of measurements showed increasing concentrations in the
atmosphere of methane, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons (CFC-
11, CFC-12 and CFC-113, and the alternate description became ``the
greenhouse gas problem''. The only important greenhouse gas not listed
as such is water vapor, for which the atmospheric concentration is
controlled by the temperature of the ocean through evaporation. With
further research, the greenhouse gas list was expanded to include
sulfur hexafluoride, the perfluorocarbons (such as CF<INF>4</INF> and
C<INF>2</INF>F<INF>6</INF>) and the hydrofluorocarbons (such as
CH<INF>2</INF>FCF<INF>3</INF>, now the common refrigerant 134A in
automobile air conditioners.). Volume One of the IPCC 2001 report lists
64 greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have
been components of the atmosphere for hundreds of thousands of years,
and have always had natural sources. However, for each of three
molecules, there now exist substantial sources of emissions under the
control of mankind, and most of the increase, in their concentrations
arises from these widely varying activities of mankind: burning of
coal, gas and oil for carbon dioxide, release from rice paddies and
cattle for methane, microbial action on fertilizers for nitrous oxide.
For the other 60+ molecules, no natural sources are known and their
presence in the atmosphere results from chemical synthesis by man, and
then release to the atmosphere unchanged. These compounds are used in a
very wide variety of human activities, with the common characteristic
that release to the atmosphere unchanged is the usual occurrence. When
it comes to evaluation of the cumulative greenhouse effect of all of
these gases, then carbon dioxide is the most important, accounting for
roughly half of the total, with methane and nitrous oxide having
significant roles. The incremental changes in the total greenhouse gas
effect are mostly the product of some activity of mankind.
__________
Statement of Dr. Roger A. Pielke, Jr., University of Colorado, Boulder,
CO
I thank the chairman and the committee for the opportunity to offer
testimony this morning on the economic and environmental risks
associated with increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
My name is Roger Pielke, Jr. and I am an Associate Professor of
Environmental Studies at the University of Colorado where I also direct
the CIRES Center for Science and Technology Policy Research. My
research focuses on the connections of science and decisionmaking. A
short biography can be found at the end of my written testimony.
In my oral testimony I'd like to highlight six ``take home
points,'' which are developed in greater detail in my written testimony
and in the various peer-reviewed scientific papers cited therein.
take home points
<bullet> Weather and climate have growing impacts on economies and
people around the world.\1\
<bullet> The primary cause for the growth in impacts is the
increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate
variability and change, not changes in climate per se.\2\
<bullet> To address increasing vulnerability, and the growing
impacts that result, requires a broader conception of ``climate
policy'' than now dominates debate.\3\
<bullet> We must begin to consider adaptation to climate to be as
important as matters of energy policy in discussion of response
options. Present discussion all but completely neglects adaptation.\4\
<bullet> Increased attention to adaptation would not mean that we
should ignore energy policies, but instead is a recognition that
changes in energy policy are insufficient to address the primary
reasons underlying trends in the societal impacts of weather and
climate.\5\
<bullet> The nation's investments in research could be more
efficiently focused on producing usable information for decisionmakers
seeking to reduce vulnerabilities to climate. Specifically, the present
research agenda is improperly focused on prediction of the distant
climate future.\6\
The remainder of this document develops these points through a case
study focused on tropical cyclones. Considerably more detail can be
found in the set of peer-reviewed articles cited in support of the
arguments presented here.
Policy debate and advocacy on the issue of climate change
frequently focus on the potential future impacts of climate on society,
usually expressed as economic damage or other human outcomes. Today I
would like to emphasize that societal impacts of climate are a joint
result of climate phenomena (e.g., hurricanes, floods, and other
extremes) and societal vulnerability to those phenomena. The paper
concludes that policies focused on reducing societal vulnerability to
the impacts of climate have important and under-appreciated dimensions
that are independent of energy policy.
In the climate change debate, people often point to possible
increases in extreme weather events (e.g., hurricanes, floods, and
winter storms) as a potentially serious consequence of climate change
for humans around the world. For instance, the January 22, 1998 issue
of Newsweek carried the following headline: ``THE HOT ZONE: Blizzards,
Floods, and Hurricanes, Blame Global Warming.'' In this testimony I use
the case of hurricanes to illustrate the interrelated climate-society
dimensions of climate impacts. Research indicates that societal
vulnerability is the single most important factor in the growing damage
related to extreme events. An implication of this research for policy
is that decisionmaking at local levels (such as related to land use,
insurance, building codes, warning and evacuation, etc.) can have a
profound effect on the magnitude and significance of future damage.\7\
Figure 1 shows economic damage (adjusted for inflation) related to
hurricane landfalls in the United States, 1900-1998.\8\ Because damage
is growing in both frequency and intensity, one possible interpretation
of this figure is that hurricanes have become more frequent and
possibly stronger in recent decades. However, while hurricane
frequencies have varied a great deal over the past 100+ years, they
have not increased in recent decades (Figure 2, provided courtesy of C.
Landsea, NOAA).\9\ To the contrary, although damage increased during
the 1970's and 1980's, hurricane activity was considerably lower than
in previous decades.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
To explain the increase in damage it is necessary to consider
factors other than climate. In particular, society has changed
enormously during the period covered by Figure 2. Figures 3a and b show
this dramatically. Figure 4a shows a stretch of Miami Beach in 1926.
Figure 3b shows another perspective of Miami Beach from recent years.
The reason for increasing damages is apparent from the changes easily
observable in these figures: today there is more potential for economic
damage than in the past due to population growth and increased wealth
(e.g., personal property).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Figure 4b shows the increase in population along the Gulf and
Atlantic coasts for 168 coastal counties from Texas through Maine
(Figure 4a). In 1990, the population of Miami and Ft. Lauderdale (2
counties) exceeded the combined population of 107 counties from Texas
to Virginia.\10\ Clearly, societal changes such as coastal population
growth have had a profound effect on the frequency and magnitude of
impacts from weather events such as hurricanes.\11\
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
One way to present a more accurate perspective on trends in
hurricane-related impacts is to consider how past storms would affect
present society. A 1998 paper presented a methodology for
``normalizing'' past hurricane damage to present day values (using
wealth, population and inflation). Figure 5 shows the historical losses
of Figure 1 normalized to 2000 values.\12\
The normalized record shows that the impacts of Hurricane Andrew,
at close to $40 billion (2000 values), would have been far surpassed by
the Great Miami Hurricane of 1926, which would cause an estimated $90
billion damage had it occurred in 2000. We can have confidence that the
normalized loss record accounts for societal changes because the
adjusted data contains climatological information, such as the signal
of El Nino and La Nina.\13\
The normalization methodology provides an opportunity to perform a
sensitivity analysis of the relative contributions of climate changes
and societal changes, as projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), to future topical cyclone damages. Figure 6
shows the results of this analysis.\14\ The three blue bars show three
different calculations (named for their respective authors) used by
IPCC in its Second Assessment Report for the increase in tropical
cyclone-related damage in 2050 (relative to 2000) resulting from
changes in the climate, independent of any changes in society. The four
green bars show the sensitivity of tropical cyclone-related damage in
2050 (relative to 2000) resulting from changes in society based on four
different IPCC population and wealth scenarios used in its Third
Assessment Report. These changes are independent of any changes in
climate.
Figure 6 illustrates dramatically the profound sensitivity of
future climate impacts to societal change, even in the context of
climate changes projected by the IPCC. The relative sensitivity of
societal change to climate change ranges from 22 to 1 (i.e., smallest
societal sensitivity and largest climate sensitivity) to 60 to 1 (i.e.,
largest societal sensitivity and smallest climate sensitivity). This
indicates that insofar as tropical cyclones are concerned, steps taken
to modulate the future climate (e.g., via greenhouse gas emissions or
other energy policies) would only address a very small portion of the
increasing damages caused by tropical cyclones. Similar results have
been found for tropical cyclone impacts in developing countries,\15\
flooding,\16\ other extremes,\17\ and water resources.\18\
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
The perspective offered in this discussion paper raises the
possibility that the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
has a critical, but largely unrecognized flaw with profound
implications for policy. Under the FCCC the term ``climate change'' is
defined as ``a change of climate which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability over
comparable time periods.'' This definition stands in stark contrast to
the broader definition used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) which states that climate change is ``any change in
climate over time whether due to natural variability or as a result of
human activity.''
As a consequence of the FCCC definition, ``adaptation'' refers to
actions in response to climate changes attributable solely to
greenhouse gas emissions. It does not refer to efforts to improve
societal responses to ``natural'' climate variability. Consequently,
adaptation has only ``costs'' because adaptive responses would by
definition be unnecessary if climate change could be prevented. Hence,
it is logical for many conclude that preventative action is a better
policy alternative and recommend adaptive responses only to the extent
that proposed mitigation strategies will be unable to prevent changes
in climate in the near future. But this overlooks the fact that even if
energy policy could be used intentionally to modulate future climate,
other factors will play a much larger role in creating future impacts
and are arguably more amenable to policy change.
Based on these results implicit in the work of the IPCC and shown
in Figure 6, an increased focus on ``adaptation'' makes sense under any
climate scenario. But the Framework Convention is structured to deal
only with the growth in impacts related to the greenhouse gas impacts
on the climate (the blue bars) and not the profound societal
vulnerability (green bars) that will dominate future climate impacts
under any climate change scenario.
Consider that the International Red Cross estimates that in the
1990's around the world, weather and climate events were directly
related to more than 300,000 deaths and more than U.S. $700 billion in
damages.\19\ Many of these human losses are preventable and economic
losses are manageable with today's knowledge and technologies.\20\
Simple steps taken to reduce societal vulnerability to weather and
climate could also make society more resilient to future variability
and change. Seen from this perspective, costs of adaptation could
easily be exceeded by the benefits of better dealing with the impacts
of climate, irrespective of future changes in climate and their causes.
The Framework Convention's definitional gerrymandering of ``climate
change'' according to attribution prejudices policy and advocacy
against such common sense activities.
An implication of this work is that policy related to societal
impacts of climate has important and under-appreciated dimensions that
are independent of energy policy. It would be a misinterpretation of
this work to imply that it supports either business-as-usual energy
policies, or is contrary to climate mitigation. It does suggest that if
a policy goal is to reduce the future impacts of climate on society,
then energy policies are insufficient, and perhaps largely irrelevant,
to achieving that goal. Of course, this does not preclude other
sensible reasons for energy policy action related to climate (such as
ecological impacts) and energy policy action independent of climate
change (such as national security, air pollution reduction and energy
efficiency).\21\ It does suggest that reduction of human impacts
related to weather and climate are not among those reasons, and
arguments and advocacy to the contrary are not in concert with research
in this area.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
The arguments presented in this testimony highlight a need to
distinguish ``climate policy'' from ``energy policy'' (Figure 7).
``Climate policy'' refers to the actions that organizations and
individuals take to reduce their vulnerability to (or enhance
opportunities afforded by) climate variability and change.\22\ From
this perspective governments and businesses are already heavily
invested in climate policy. In the context of hurricanes and floods,
climate policies might focus on land use, insurance, engineering,
warnings and forecasts, risk assessments, and so on. These are the
policies that will make the most difference in reducing the future
impacts of climate on society.
The conventional view is that climate policy is energy policy.
However, much of the debate and discussion on climate change revolves
around energy policy and ignores the fact that such policies,
irrespective of their merit, can do little to address growing societal
vulnerabilities to climate around the world. In all contexts, improving
policies targeted on the societal impacts of climate depends on a wide
range of factors other than energy policy. Consequently, in light of
the analyses presented here, a common interest objective of climate
policy would be to improve societal and environmental resilience to
climate variability and change, and to reduce the level of
vulnerability. Climate policy should be viewed as a complement, not an
alternative, to energy policies.
figure captions
Figure 1. U.S. hurricane damage 1900-1998, adjusted for inflation
to 1998 values.
Figure 2. U.S. hurricane landfalls, 1851-1998, figure courtesy of
C. Landsea.
Figure 3a. Miami Beach, 1926. Photo from the Wendler Collection,
Florida State Archives.
Figure 3b. Miami Beach, recent decades. Undated photo from the NOAA
Arcive.
Figure 4a. Map of 168 coastal counties from Texas through Maine.
Figure 4b. Population of the 168 coastal counties from Texas
through Maine for 1930 and 1990 based on U.S. Census data.
Figure 5. Historical losses from hurricanes adjusted to 2000 values
based on inflation, population, and wealth. The graph suggests the
damage that would have occurred had storms of past years made landfall
with the societal conditions of 2000.
Figure 6. A sensitivity analysis of the impacts of tropical
cyclones in 2050 based on the assumptions of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. The green bars show sensitivity of future
impacts to societal changes and the blue bars show sensitivity to
climate changes. Societal changes are the overwhelmingly dominant
factor.
Figure 7. How our perspective on ``global warming'' might change.
Rather than defining climate policy as energy policy, we might instead
more clearly distinguish the two with implications for research and
policy.
Endnotes
\1\For a review, see Kunkel, K., R. A. Pielke, Jr., S. A. Changnon,
1999: Temporal Fluctuations in Weather and Climate Extremes That Cause
Economic and Human Health Impacts: A Review, Bulletin of the American
Meteorological Society, 80:1077-1098, online at http://
sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp--roger/pdf/bams8006.pdf
\2\For documentation of this assertion, see Pielke and Landsea
(1997), Kunkel et al. (1999), Pielke et al. (2000), Pielke and Downton
(2000), Downton and Pielke (2001), cited in the endnotes below.
\3\For an in depth presentation of this perspective, see Sarewitz,
D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock. The
Atlantic Monthly, July:55-64, online at
http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/2000/07/sarewitz.htm
\4\For discussion, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., 1998: Rethinking the
role of adaptation in climate policy. Global Environmental Change,
8:159-170, online at
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp--roger/pdf/1998.13.pdf
\5\See Pielke, Jr., R. A., R. Klein, and D. Sarewitz, 2000: Turning
the Big Knob: An Evaluation of the Use of Energy Policy to Modulate
Future Climate Impacts, Energy and Environment, 11:255-276, online at
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/knob/index.html
\6\On the use of predictions in decisionmaking see Sarewitz, D., R.
A. Pielke, Jr., and R. Byerly, (eds.), 2000: Prediction: Science,
Decision-Making and the Future of Nature. Island Press: Washington, DC.
On the history and performance of the U.S. global Change Research
program, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2000. Policy History of the U.S.
Global Change Research Program: Part I, Administrative Development.
Global Environmental Change, 10:9-25. Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2000: Policy
History of the U.S. Global Change Research Program: Part II,
Legislative Process. Global Environmental Change, 10:133-144. Pielke
Jr., R. A., 1995. Usable Information for Policy: An Appraisal of the
U.S. Global Change Research Program. Policy Sciences, 38:39-77, online
at: http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp--roger/pdf/1995.07.pdf
\7\See Sarewitz and Pielke 2000, op. cit.
\8\For discussion, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., and C. W. Landsea, 1998:
Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-1995. Weather
and Forecasting, 13:351-361, online at http://
sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp--roger/pdf/wf13.pdf
\9\See Landsea, C. L., R. A. Pielke, Jr., A. Mestas-Nunez, and J.
Knaff, 1999: Atlantic Basin Hurricanes:
Indicies of Climate Changes, Climatic Change, 42:89-129, online at
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/atlantic/index.html
See also Landsea, C. W., C. Anderson, N. Charles, G. Clark, J.
Partagas, P. Hungerford, C. Neumann and M. Zimmer, 2001: The Atlantic
Hurricane Data base Re-analysis Project: Documentation for the 1851-
1885 Addition to the HURDAT Data base. Chapter for the Risk Prediction
Initiative book, R. Murnane and K. Liu, Editors. Online: http://
www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/index.html
\10\Pielke, Jr., R. A., and R. A. Pielke, Sr., 1997: Hurricanes:
Their Nature and Impacts on Society.
John Wiley and Sons Press: London.
\11\See Kunkel et al. 1999, op. cit.
\12\After Pielke and Landsea, 1998, op. cit.
\13\Pielke, Jr., R.A., and C.W. Landsea, 1999: La Nina, El Nino,
and Atlantic Hurricane Damages in the United States. Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society, 80:2027-2033, online at http://
sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp--roger/pdf/bams8010.pdf
\14\Details on this sensitivity analysis can be found in Pielke et
al. 2000, op. cit.
\15\Pielke, Jr., R. A., J. Rubiera, C. Landsea, M. Molina, and R.
Klein, 2001: Hurricane Vulnerability in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Natural Hazards Review, (in review).
\16\Pielke, Jr., R.A., and M.W. Downton, 2000: Precipitation and
damaging floods: Trends in the United States, 1932-1997. Journal of
Climate, 13:3625-3637, online at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/
pielke/hp--roger/pdf/jc1320.pdf and, Downton, M. and R. Pielke, Jr.,
2001. Discretion Without Accountability: Climate, Flood Damage and
Presidential Politics, Natural Hazards Review, 2:157-166, online at
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp--roger/pdf/
downtonpielke2001.pdf
\17\See Kunkel et al. 1999, op. cit.
\18\C. J. Vorosmarty, P. Green, J. Salisbury, and R. B. Lammers,
2000. Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and
Population Growth, Science 289: 284-288. D.P. Lettenmaier, A.W. Wood,
R.N. Palmer, E.F. Wood, and E.Z. Stakhiv, 1999, Water Resources
Implications of Global Warming: A U.S. Regional Perspective, Climatic
Change, 43:537-579.
\19\International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), 2000.World Disasters Report, www.ifrc.org.
\20\See, e.g., D. Mileti, 2000. Second Assessment of Natural
Hazards, (Joseph Henry Press).
\21\See, e.g., F. Laird 2001, Just say no to emissions reductions
targets, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, online: http://
www.nap.edu/issues/17.2/laird.htm R. Brunner 2001. Science and the
Climate Change Regime, Policy Sciences 34:1-33.
\22\Note that here I use the broad definition of ``climate change''
used by the IPCC: ``. . . related to any source'' rather than the more
restricted definition of the FCCC which defines climate change only in
terms of those changes directly or indirectly attributable ``to human
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere . . . ''
For discussion, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., 1998, op. cit.
______
Responses of Dr. Roger A. Pielke, Jr. to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. In your testimony, you provided some estimates of the
costs of adapting our communities and infrastructure to a changing
climate. Obviously, we need to do a much better job of discouraging
development in vulnerable areas. How do your cost projections take into
account the risks associated with abrupt climate changes described in
the Academy's December 2001 report?
Response. The sensitivity analyses reported in my testimony (based
on Pielke et al. 2000) rely on the assumptions of the Second Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for both
changes in climate and changes in society. Because the IPCC did not
consider abrupt climate changes for the particular impacts we
evaluated, neither does our analysis.
I served as a member of the Academy committee that prepared the
Abrupt Climate Change report. We discussed at great length the topic of
economic and ecological impacts associated with abrupt climate change,
and Chapter 5 of our report focused on that topic. The committee's main
recommendation that focused on reducing risk associated with abrupt
climate change is entirely consistent with the approach recommended in
my testimony. I reproduce that particular recommendation (number 5 in
the report, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises, National
Research Council, 2002, pp. 164-165) in its entirety here:
Recommendation 5. Research should be undertaken to identify ``no-
regrets'' measures to reduce vulnerabilities and increase adaptive
capacity at little or no cost. No-regrets measures may include low-cost
steps to: slow climate change; improve climate forecasting; slow
biodiversity loss; improve water, land, and air quality; and develop
institutions that are more robust to major disruptions. Technological
changes may increase the adaptability and resiliency of market and
ecological systems faced by the prospect of damaging abrupt climate
change. Research is particularly needed to assist poor countries, which
lack both scientific resources and economic infrastructure to reduce
the vulnerabilities to potential abrupt climate changes.''
Reference: Pielke, Jr., R. A., R. Klein, and D. Sarewitz, 2000:
Turning the Big Knob: An Evaluation of the Use of Energy Policy to
Modulate Future Climate Impacts. Energy and Environment, 11, 255-276.
Question 2. How do those cost projections consider the impacts on
intangible assets, such as cultural heritage, scenery, and other
quality of life-related matters?
Response. The sensitivity analysis presented in my testimony was
based on three different analyses used by the IPCC for projecting
tropical cyclone damage in 2050. Pielke et al. 2000 summarizes these
projections as follows:
<bullet> Cline (1992) relied on Emanuel's (1987) estimate that the
destructive potential of tropical cyclones could rise by 40-50 percent
under a doubling of greenhouse gases. The study assumed U.S. annual
average hurricane losses of $1.5 billion and that damage would rise
linearly with increased intensity. Cline thus multiplied $1.5 billion
by 50 percent to project an increase in annual U.S. hurricane-caused
damages of $750 million. Cline assumed that increased damage from
global warming would be more than linear in relation to rising
temperatures and estimated that annual hurricane-related damages from a
10 <SUP>+</SUP>C warming could be as high as $6.4 billion (Cline 1992).
<bullet> Fankhauser (1995) assumed worldwide annual average
tropical cyclone damages of $1.5 billion and loss of 15,000-23,000
lives. This study also relied on Emanuel's estimate of a 40-50 percent
increase in tropical cyclone intensity resulting from a 4.2
<SUP>+</SUP>C warming. It adjusted this to 28 percent for a 2.5
<SUP>+</SUP>C warming and assumed storm damages increase exponentially
with intensity. Thus, the study multiplied 28 percent by 1.5 by $1.5
billion to arrive at an estimate of $630 million in additional
worldwide annual average hurricane-related damages due to a 2.5
<SUP>+</SUP>C warming. It also estimated that an additional 8,000
deaths would occur, which were valued at $2.1 billion, bringing total
additional tropical cyclone-related worldwide losses to $2.7 billion.
Fankhauser estimated that the U.S. share of these damages would be $223
million ($115 million from destruction, $108 million from lost lives).
<bullet> Tol (1995) assumed that tropical cyclone intensity will
increase 50 percent due to a 2.5 <SUP>+</SUP>C warming, and that a
fraction of the damages are related quadratically to an increase in
intensity. This study estimated that additional tropical cyclone-
related damages from a doubling of greenhouse gases in 1988 dollars
will be $.3 billion in the United States and Canada and $1.4 billion
worldwide, but did not describe the baseline damage estimates.
Reference and source for references cited above: Pielke, Jr., R.
A., R. Klein, and D. Sarewitz, 2000: Turning the Big Knob: An
Evaluation of the Use of Energy Policy to Modulate Future Climate
Impacts. Energy and Environment, 11:255-276.
Question 3. As you know, this committee is very interested in the
effects of disasters on public infrastructure. We have jurisdiction
over FEMA, water supplies, highways, etc. What work is being done to
quantify the costs of investments that could be made now to reduce the
impacts of disasters and climate change on human-made and natural
systems?
Response. I suggested in my testimony ``the possibility that the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) has a critical, but
largely unrecognized flaw with profound implications for policy. Under
the FCCC the term ``climate change'' is defined as ``a change of
climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in
addition to natural climate variability over comparable time periods.''
This definition stands in stark contrast to the broader definition used
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which states
that climate change is ``any change in climate over time whether due to
natural variability or as a result of human activity.'' As a
consequence of the FCCC definition, ``adaptation'' refers to actions in
response to climate changes attributable solely to greenhouse gas
emissions. It does not refer to efforts to improve societal responses
to ``natural'' climate variability. Consequently, adaptation has only
``costs'' because adaptive responses would by definition be unnecessary
if climate change could be prevented. Hence, it is logical for many to
conclude that preventative action is a better policy alternative and
recommend adaptive responses only to the extent that proposed
mitigation strategies will be unable prevent changes in climate in the
near future. But this overlooks the fact that even if energy policy
could be used intentionally to modulate future climate, other factors
will play a much larger role in creating future impacts and are
arguably more amenable to policy change.''
As a consequence, very little work (both in an absolute and
relative sense) has been done to evaluate adaptation alternatives. In
1996 the IPCC wrote that adaptation offers a ``very powerful option''
for responding to climate change and ought to be viewed as a
``complement'' to mitigation efforts (IPCC 1996, 187-188). Yet, the
IPCC also wrote ``little attention has been paid to any possible
tradeoff between both types of options.'' (IPCC 1996, 250). These
conclusions, in my view, remain current today.
Reference: Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1996.
Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change,
J. P. Bruce et al. (eds.), Cambridge University Press.
Question 4. You mention in your testimony that ``decisionmaking at
local levels . . . can have a profound effect on the magnitude and
significance of future damage.'' Are local governments beginning to
make the connection between urban and land use planning and
vulnerabilities to climate change? Do you know of any efforts to
disseminate academic research findings and recommendations regarding
climate change adaptation techniques to local governments and
communities?
Response. If local governments are beginning to make the connection
between urban and land use planning and vulnerabilities to climate
change, they are doing so on an ad hoc and unsystematic basis. A
considerable effort in government, academia and the private sector
exists in the United States (and globally) to improve decisionmaking
with respect to ``hazards.'' However, this effort is largely separate
in both research and action from the climate change community. In 1997
I wrote of this in an editorial (http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/
zine/archives/1-29/5.html):
``The concept of ``mitigation'' is central to the natural disaster
policy in the United States. At the same time, the concept of
``mitigation'' is also central to ongoing debate about global climate
change. But as used by the natural disaster community and the climate
change community, the term ``mitigation'' takes on almost exactly
opposite meanings. Natural hazard mitigation is defined by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as ``a sustained action taken to
reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to people and property from
natural hazards and their effects.'' A recent FEMA report on Costs and
Benefits of Natural Hazard Mitigation provides examples of mitigation,
which include business interruption insurance, wind shutters, building
codes, and community relocation. Climate change mitigation is defined
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as ``actions
that prevent or retard the increase of atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations by limiting current and future emissions from sources of
greenhouses gases and enhancing potential sinks.'' What the natural
hazards community calls mitigation, the climate change community calls
``adaptation'' which the IPCC defines as ``any adjustment--whether
passive, reactive, or anticipatory--that can respond to anticipated or
actual consequences associated with climate change.'' The different use
of terminology creates a situation that is potentially confusing for
policymakers and other practitioners. While academics often work in
communities that are relatively isolated from one another, policymakers
typically do not. And since natural hazards are one of the threats
being associated with climate change, it is probably worth paying
attention to the words used in this regard. At a minimum, the
conflicting terminology is symptomatic of the general lack of
interaction between the hazards and climate change communities. In the
climate change world, there is a tension between those who seek to
prevent climate change through energy policies (i.e., climate change
mitigation) and those who emphasize adaptation (i.e., natural hazards
mitigation). To date, the advocates of prevention have dominated the
debate. This creates a disincentive for the natural hazards community
to play a significant role in the development of climate policy, which
is unfortunate, as without a doubt the knowledge gained by the hazards
community has an important role to play in the climate policies of the
future.''
Question 5. You also state, ``Many . . . human losses are
preventable and economic losses are manageable with today's knowledge
and techniques . . . . [C]osts of adaptation could easily be exceeded
by the benefits of better dealing with the impacts of climate,
irrespective of future changes in climate and their causes.'' What are
some specific examples of adaptation strategies or investments that you
recommend vulnerable coastal communities implement today that could
prove to be cost-effective in the long-term?
Response. There is a considerable list of activities that might be
considered under the label ``adaptation'' for reducing vulnerability to
climate impacts along the coasts, including improving land use,
insurance, evacuation, ecosystem management, and other policies. A
starting point for understanding the breadth of such activities is the
NOAA Coastal Services Center, http://www.csc.noaa.gov/. In
collaboration with the H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics,
and the Environment, the NOAA CSC contributed to the publication of a
book that discusses a wide range of efforts that would address coastal
vulnerability:
The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards: Implications for Risk
Assessment and Mitigation. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000. 220 pp.
ISBN 1-55963-756-0 (paper).
Question 6. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not
safe to continue increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit.
What needs to be done to assure that we can avert the point of no
return or ``dangerous levels'' of greenhouse gas concentrations?
Response. I reject the premise underlying this question. As I
stated in my testimony, any policy designed to reduce risks and
vulnerabilities to climate impacts on environment and society is
necessarily incomplete if focused exclusively on energy policies.
Consequently, any energy policy including instantaneous, magical
abatement of emissions would be insufficient to address growing risks
and vulnerability to future climate impacts. As I concluded in my
testimony:
``It would be a misinterpretation of this work to imply that it
supports either business-as-usual energy policies, or is contrary to
climate mitigation. It does suggest that if a policy goal is to reduce
the future impacts of climate on society, then energy policies are
insufficient, and perhaps largely irrelevant, to achieving that goal.
Of course, this does not preclude other sensible reasons for energy
policy action related to climate (such as ecological impacts) and
energy policy action independent of climate change (such as national
security, air pollution reduction and energy efficiency). It does
suggest that reduction of human impacts related to weather and climate
are not among those reasons, and arguments and advocacy to the contrary
are not in concert with research in this area.''
Question 7. In an answer to a question from Senator Chafee
regarding your opinion on achieving the 1990 level of emissions, our
UNFCC target, by the date (2007) set in the Clean Power Act, you said
that ``. . . full and comprehensive implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol around the world . . . is not going to do much at all to
address the environment and economic risks associated with climate
change.'' Does that mean you believe that the potential social,
economic, and environmental costs associated with long-term global
warming cannot or will not be reduced by reducing anthropogenic
emissions? If so, how does that comport with the statement in question
5?
Response. This question focuses on the issue raised in the
sensitivity analysis presented in my testimony. Climate impacts are a
joint result of climate events and the vulnerability to such impacts of
human or natural systems. Both climate and human and natural systems
are subject to change. The assertion presented in my testimony was,
``The primary cause for the growth in impacts is the increasing
vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability
and change, not changes in climate per se.'' This is borne out by a
growing body of research. If impacts are indeed the result of changes
in climate and vulnerability, it would only make sense that policies
designed to address climate-related risks would focus on both changes
in climate and vulnerability. This is the essence of my proposal to
recognize that climate policy has important and under-appreciated
dimensions that are independent of energy policy. Such dimensions would
include the sorts of adaptation strategies referred to in Question 5
above. Further, because there are important reasons to improve the
nation's energy policies other than climate change (e.g., for reasons
of national security, human health, and economic efficiency), it may
make pragmatic sense to expand national discussion of energy policy
beyond a narrow focus on global warming to the exclusion of other,
perhaps more compelling, reasons for improving national energy
policies. The bottom line is that even if the Kyoto Protocol were fully
and successfully implemented, it would do little to address ``social,
economic, and environmental costs associated with long-term global
warming'' and additional steps would be needed. Thus, whatever one's
perspective on the Kyoto Protocol, whether viewing it as a ``first
step'' or a ``dead end,'' there is no controversy that additional
efforts are needed.
Question 8. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30-
50 years, of continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas
emissions? And, what is the most feasible way to reduce or eliminate
that risk?
Response. I see two risks. First, when humans alter the Earth
system, there are risks of unforeseen, unintended effects on that
system. A second risk, which has largely gone unnoticed, is that in
focusing primarily on the potential risks to the Earth system resulting
in changes to that system, we neglect to observe that (a) environmental
and societal impacts associated with human-climate interactions can in
many cases be addressed through a focus on reducing vulnerability to
those impacts, and (b) that there are many ``no-regrets'' energy policy
actions that make immediate sense irrespective of climate change. Both
the science and policy communities appear to be neglecting the second
type of risk and as a consequence there is a large opportunity cost in
actions not taken to improve climate policies and energy policies. The
most feasible way to address both types of risk is to follow a ``no-
regrets'' strategy of reducing vulnerability to climate variability and
change (i.e., to improve adaptation) and as well to improve the
nation's energy policies with respect to national security, human
health, and economic efficiency.
On this, see:
Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming
Gridlock. The Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55-64. http://
www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/2000/07/sarewitz.htm
______
Responses of Dr. Roger A. Pielke, Jr. to Additional Questions from
Senator Smith
Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ``during the 20th Century,
the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.'' Do you agree
with that statement? Why or why not?
Response. I agree with the IPCC conclusions.
Question 2. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. See my answer to Question 7 from Senator Jeffords. There
is no controversy that if the goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce
the risks of future climate impacts on the environment and society,
even if fully implemented, it cannot meet this goal, for reasons
discussed at length in my testimony. Consequently, whether or not Kyoto
is fully implemented, considerable additional policy action will be
needed to address climate impacts on society and the environment.
However, as I noted in the question and answer period of the hearing,
there are other reasons to implement the Kyoto Protocol, such as
considerations of international relations, national security,
environmental symbolism, etc. It may well be that such considerations
lead to support for full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol,
completely independent of risk associated with climate impacts. My
testimony and this answer focus on the role of the Kyoto Protocol in
reducing risk of climate impacts.
Question 3. Since the hearing there has been much press attention
paid to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-
billion ton iceberg known as ``Larsen B,'' that has been attributed to
climate change. What specific evidence is there that climate change is
the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence
that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this
subject.
Question 4a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty; Coping with the risks of climate change'' (copy
attached). Please explain why you agree or disagree with the following
assertions or conclusions from that report: ``There is not one problem
but two: natural climate variability and the influence of human
activity on the climate system.''
Response. I would frame the problem a bit differently. There are
changes in climate, caused by many reasons, including human activity.
There are also changes in society and caused by society to the
environment that result in increased vulnerability to climate impacts.
This definition of the problem underlies the recommendations presented
in my testimony.
See Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-
Warming Gridlock. The Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55-64. http://
www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/2000/07/sarewitz.htm
Question 4b. It is essential that new or at least wider-ranging
concepts of protection are developed. These must take into account the
fact that the maximum strength and frequency of extreme weather
conditions at a given location cannot be predicted.
Response. Agreed. Along with colleagues we have examined the role
of prediction in decisionmaking and arrive at substantially similar
conclusions.
See: Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., and R. Byerly, (eds.), 2000:
Prediction: Science, Decision-Making and the Future of Nature. Island
Press: Washington, DC.
Question 4c. Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the
case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears
which--if they are not confirmed--will in time turn to carefree relief;
and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons of short-term
expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that
today's generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of
this kind.
Response. Agreed and I point you to my answer to Question 1 from
Senator Jeffords for elaboration.
Question 5. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. Vulnerability to extreme weather has increased as
populations and wealth have grown and more people have located in
exposed locations. This perspective is now well documented in the peer-
reviewed literature. A 1999 review (Kunkel et al. 1999) concluded, ``.
. . increasing losses are primarily due to increasing vulnerability
arising from a variety of societal changes, including a growing
population in higher risk coastal areas and large cities, more property
subject to damage, and lifestyle and demographic changes subjecting
lives and property to greater exposure.'' Numerous other references
supporting this conclusion are provided in my testimony.
Reference: Kunkel, K., R. A. Pielke Jr., S. A. Changnon, 1999:
Temporal Fluctuations in Weather and Climate Extremes That Cause
Economic and Human Health Impacts: A Review. Bulletin of the American
Meteorological Society, 80:1077-1098.
______
Responses of Dr. Roger A. Pielke, Jr. to Additional Questions from
Senator Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this
subject.
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis.
Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this
subject.
Question 2. Please provide an assessment of the approaches of
various States to address normal beach erosion?
Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this
subject.
Question 3. How significant are the effects of land use changes
versus other input to climate models?
Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this
subject.
Question 4. If the estimates that Kyoto would cost the United
States between $100 and $400 billion per year to implement are true and
the results would just be a change of 0.06 degrees Celsius; would money
be better spent on programs like Project Impact (a program at FEMA
which helps communities mitigate against future natural disasters by
encouraging different building techniques in disaster-prone areas)? Are
Kyoto-like reductions cost effective? Please explain.
Response. The answer to this question is predicated upon the answer
to a prior question, ``Cost effective with respect to what criteria and
outcomes?'' If the goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce future
climate impacts, then it is clearly insufficient, and perhaps even
irrelevant. However, there are other reasons why implementation of the
Protocol might make sense, which would lead to different conclusions as
to its cost effectiveness. See my answer to Question 2 from Senator
Smith for discussion.
See Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-
Warming Gridlock. The Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55-64. http://
www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/2000/07/sarewitz.htm
______
Response of Dr. Roger A. Pielke, Jr. to an Additional Question from
Senator Campbell
Question. You mentioned in your testimony that, ``The present
research agenda is improperly focused on prediction of the distant
climate future.'' I am inclined to agree. What sorts of research, in
your expert opinion, would be of immediate benefit in relation to
adaptation to climate change?
Response. To answer this question I point you to the testimony at
an April 17, 2002, House Science Committee hearing of my colleague
Radford Byerly, who was asked by the committee:
``How could a climate initiative yield information of greater
relevance to end-users, people who make decisions related to climate?''
Dr. Byerly's response is worth quoting at length.
``To assure that a research program generates information of great
relevance to end-uses, the users must be involved in planning and
evaluating the research. That is, they must have a say in what research
is done and in what counts as a success. Users must be able to ensure
that research addresses their problems, and delivers usable results.
In the present program climate scientists typically develop
information they want to develop, i.e., answers to scientific
questions, and then try to get bewildered users to use it (the users
may never have heard of the scientific question). Research results
become a solution looking for a problem.
Sound research programs dedicated to problem solving typically have
three phases: A beginning--planning, a middle--the research, and an
end--application and evaluation. The present program is almost all in
the middle phase, that is, it is scientific research on scientific
questions.
A better program, i.e., a program that would do more toward solving
identified problems, would be conducted as follows: Research would be
preceded by a planning phase in which users and scientists would
identify and define specific problems to be attacked, as well as
specific questions and information needs, and would look ahead to the
application of the results. At this planning stage the primary sources
of information about the problems are future users, the owners of the
problems, not climate scientists. This planning process can be thought
of as the researchers taking joint ownership of the problem with the
users. The researchers do not relieve the users of responsibility, but
together they take responsibility for solving the problem. Then in the
middle the research is done, and new information is obtained and
published. This second phase is often erroneously considered the entire
project. Finally, in the third phase the results are applied in the
field by the users on their problem and the research is evaluated in
terms of how it helps solve the problems.
We hope that users will eagerly, fruitfully use the information,
since they participated in planning the research. But such planning is
hard and unfamiliar. Users may not express their needs clearly, or
researchers may not hear them, and not every project will succeed. This
is why the projects must be evaluated based on success in the field.
Research projects unsuccessful in addressing the problem are terminated
and successful ones are continued or replicated in a new context, as
appropriate. That is, you correct and iterate.
Of course provision is made for projects that are making good
progress in a demonstrably practical direction. In this way a program
of projects solving real problems is grown. Along the way good science
of a different kind is done.''
Dr. Byerly's testimony can be view in its entirety at:
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/homepages/rbverly/house testimony
apr 2002/index.html
Statement of David R. Legates, Director, Center for Climatic Research,
University of Delaware
I would like to thank the committee for inviting my commentary on
the important topic of the economic and environmental risks associated
with increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
As a matter of introduction, my background in global change
research has focused primarily on precipitation measurement and an
examination of precipitation variability. My Ph.D. dissertation
resulted in the compilation of the most reliable, highest resolution,
digital air temperature and precipitation climatology available to
date. Today, these fields still are being used to evaluate general
circulation model (GCM) simulations of present-day climate and to serve
as input fields for hydrological and climatological analyses. In
particular, my research has focused on the accuracy of and biases
associated with precipitation measurement and on the attempt to use
existing climatological time-series to determine long-term fluctuations
in climate. I also was a member of the United States delegation at the
joint USA/USSR Working Meeting on Development of Data Sets for
Detecting Climate Change held in Obninsk, Russia on September 11-14,
1989 where a joint protocol for data exchange was signed.
Indeed, an answer to the question, ``Do we have the capability to
determine whether we are changing our climate'' is of obvious concern
to both scientists and policymakers. I agree strongly that we need to
enact sensible environmental policy--one that is based on scientific
fact with foreseeable outcomes that can reasonably be expected to have
beneficial results. As a scientist, I choose here to focus my comments
on the scientific basis of climate change and the capabilities of the
climate models, as that is my area of expertise. In the past, we have
recognized a need for cleaner air and cleaner water, demonstrated the
problems associated with detrimental human influences, and developed
policy that has resulted in our air and water becoming markedly cleaner
than they were just 30 years ago. I urge that this issue be treated
with the same common-sense approach.
problems with the observational record leaves questions unanswered
In light of my research on climatological observations,
particularly precipitation, I have come to realize that looking for
long-term trends in climate data is a very difficult undertaking.
Precipitation data, for example, exhibit many spurious trends resulting
from, in part, biases associated with the process of measuring
precipitation. Indeed, attempts to measure snowfall using automatic
methods have proven to be largely useless and, given the biases
associated with measuring snowfall by traditional human-observed rain
gages, our estimates of snowfall can be underestimates by almost a
factor of two. Urban development of the environment surrounding the
rain gage and, in particular, changes in rain gage design and the
location of rain gages over time has adversely affected our ability to
ascertain climatic trends in precipitation. Even a cursory examination
of our most reliable records of precipitation shows that we frequently
move meteorological stations, change instrumentation, and even the
environment surrounding the site changes over time, which undermines
attempts to answer the question ``Is the climate changing?''
Furthermore, precipitation is a highly variable field so, from a purely
statistical standpoint, it is difficult to ascertain a small climate
change signal from this high year-to-year variability. Air temperature
measurements also are subject to these same measurement difficulties;
in fact, the IPCC agrees that--as much as one-fifth of the observed
rise in air temperature may be attributable to urbanization effects. As
some of this change may be a direct result of natural climatic
fluctuations, attributing a cause to any detected changes also is an
extremely difficult undertaking. Indeed, as has been argued, ``the data
are dirty''!
Moreover, nearly all of our surface-based observations are taken
from land-based meteorological stations, leaving the nearly 70 percent
of the Earth's surface covered by oceans largely unobserved. In
particular, location of these land-based stations is biased toward
midlatitudes, low elevations, wetter climates, and technologically
developed nations. Efforts to use sea surface temperatures over the
oceans as a surrogate for air temperature measurements are largely
invalid as the two temperatures are not often commensurate. This
``land'' bias, in my view, is one of the main limiting factors in using
the observational record to infer global trends.
Satellite observations of air temperature and precipitation have
proven very useful in addressing the climate change question in that
they provide a complete coverage of the Earth's surface and are not
subject to the biases associated with meteorological observing sites on
the ground. Spencer and Christy's analysis of air temperature changes
over the lower portion of the troposphere for the last 20 years
exhibits no significant climate change signal as does an analysis using
regularly launched weather balloorigi,--This is in stark contrast to
the observed surface air temperature rise of 0.6 0.2 C that has
occurred over the entire twentieth century. A blue-ribbon panel
convened to address this apparent discrepancy concluded that the
temperature of the lower atmosphere might have remained relatively
constant while an increase in near surface air temperature was
observed. Some have argued that the surface warming is a delayed
response to warming that had earlier occurred in the troposphere,
although the abrupt warming of the troposphere is not consistent with
expected scenarios of anthropogenic warming. The National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) concluded that the difference between surface air
temperatures and those of the troposphere was real but inconsistent
with anthropogenic warming scenarios. In particular, the NAS only
considered whether the satellite and surface records could both be
correct and yet contradictory; they never addressed the issue of
whether the surface records could, in fact, be biased.
Another problem in tying the observed increases in air temperature
to an anthropogenic cause is timing. Most of the warming in the
observed record occurred during two periods: 1910 to 1945 and 1970 to
present. Much of the warming actually predates the rise in
anthropogenic trace gas emissions, which makes it difficult to ascribe
anthropogenic causes to the entire record. Indeed, we know that our
observed record began in the late 1800's when air temperature
measurements were sparse and more prone to bias. This timing also
coincides with the demise of the Little Ice Age--a period of cooler-
than-normal conditions that lasted from the middle portion of the last
millennium to about the mid-1800's. Thus, it is unclear how much of the
observed warming should be attributed to anthropogenic increases in
atmospheric trace gases and how much of it is simply natural
variability or measurement bias.
modeling the complex climatic system is an extremely difficult task
In theory, therefore, climate models should be our best ability to
study climate change. With models, we are not constrained by biased and
limited observing systems or by contamination by other signals; but
rather, we can alter the simulated climate and see ``what if' while
holding everything else constant. Such models, however, are predicated
on their ability to replicate the real climate--after all, if climate
models cannot replicate what we observe today, how can their
prognostications of climate change possibly be expected to be
transferable to the real world? Although I am not a climate modeler,
much of my research has focused on comparing observations with climate
model simulations of present-day conditions. Thus, I am very familiar
with what climate models can and cannot do.
I am dismayed by the fact that much of the rather limited success
in simulating average conditions by most climate models is achieved at
the expense of changing some parameters to highly unrealistic values.
For example, some models drastically change the energy coming from the
sun to levels that are well beyond those that solar physicists have
observed. Many models employ what are called ``flux adjustments'',
which can only be described as finagling factors to make the average,
present-day surface air temperatures look reasonable. One has to
question why such overt deviations from reality are necessary if, in
fact, the models are able to realistically represent our climate
system.
In defense of climate modelers, I will say that they have a very
difficult and daunting task. The climate system is extremely complex.
Clouds, land surface processes, the cryosphere (ice and snow),
precipitation forming mechanisms, the biosphere, and atmospheric
circulation, just to name a few, are complex components of the global
climate system that are not well understood or modeled appropriately at
the scale employed by general circulation models. In essence, the
climate change response can be directly affected by our
parameterizations of many of these components. For example, an
important question that now is being asked is ``Why is the warming
exhibited by transient climate models not being seen in the observed
record?'' There has been much discussion on the impacts of aerosols,
black soot, high altitude clouds, and other so-called ``wild cards'' in
the climate system--are they masking the climate change signal or
should they be adding to it? How climate modelers treat these unknown
processes in their models can affect dramatically the model
simulations. Indeed, there are likely additional issues that we have
not yet encountered.
climate models cannot reproduce a key climatic variable: precipitation
Despite these issues, do climate models well represent the Earth's
climate? On three separate occasions--in 1990, 1996, and again in
2000--I have reviewed the ability of state-of-the-art climate models to
simulate regional-scale precipitation. In general, the models poorly
reproduce the observed precipitation and that characteristic of the
models has not substantially changed over time. One area where the
models have been in continued agreement has been in the Southern Great
Plains of the United States. In all three studies, the varied models I
have examined agree that northeastern Colorado receives substantially
more precipitation than northwestern Louisiana! That is in marked
contrast with reality where Louisiana is obviously wetter than
Colorado. But the important ramification of this is that if
precipitation is badly simulated in a climate model, then that will
adversely affect virtually every other aspect of the model simulation.
Precipitation affects the energy, moisture, and momentum balances of
the atmosphere and directly affects the modeling of the, atmosphere,
the hydrosphere, the biosphere, and the cryosphere. In turn, a bad
representation of these components will again adversely impact the
precipitation simulation. In short, anything done wrong in a climate
model is likely to be exhibited in the model simulation of
precipitation and, in turn, errors in simulating precipitation are
likely to adversely affect the simulation of other components of the
climate system. Given its integrative characteristic, therefore,
precipitation is a good diagnostic for determining how well the model
actually simulates reality, especially since simple ``tuning''
adjustments cannot mask limitations in the simulation, as is the case
with air temperature.
If we examine climate model output a bit further, we uncover
another disturbing fact--climate models simply do not exhibit the same
year-to-year or even within-season variability that we observe.
Precipitation in a climate model does not arise from organized systems
that develop, move across the Earth's surface, and dissipate. Instead,
modeled precipitation can best be described as ``popcorn-like'', with
little if any spatial coherency. On a year-to-year basis, both air
temperatures and precipitation exhibit little fluctuation, quite unlike
what we experience. This is particularly important because it is the
climatic extremes and not their means that have the biggest adverse
impacts. Simply put, climate models cannot begin to address issues
associated with changes in the frequency of extreme events because they
fail to exhibit the observed variability in the climate system.
I attach a piece I wrote regarding the climate models used in the
National Assessment and their evaluation with my climatology, which
further highlights our uncertainties in climate models. In fact, the
National Assessment itself recognized that both the Canadian Global
Coupled Model and the Hadley Climate Model from Great Britain used by
the, Assessment provide more extreme climate change scenarios than
other models that were available and that had been developed in the
United States. Neither model is reasonably able to simulate the
presentday climate conditions.
our observational capabilities are in jeopardy
Given that our observational record is inconclusive and that model
simulations are fraught with problems, on what can we agree? In my
view, there are two main courses of action that we should undertake.
First, we need to continue to develop and preserve efforts at climate
monitoring and climate change detection. Efforts to establish new
global climate observing systems are useful, but we need to preserve
the stations that we presently have. There is no surrogate for a long-
term climate record taken with the same instrumentation and located in
essentially the same environmental conditions. Modernization efforts of
the National Weather Service to some extent are undermining our
monitoring of climatic conditions by moving and replacing observing
sites, thereby further introducing inhomogeneities into these climate
records. Some nations of the world have resorted to selling their data,
which has adversely impacted our assessments of climate change.
However, given that oceans cover nearly three-quarters of the Earth's
surface, we need to exploit and further develop satellite-derived
methods for monitoring the Earth's climate. We also need to better
utilize the national network of WSR88D weather radars to monitor
precipitation.
But foremost, we need to focus on developing methods and policy
that can directly save lives and mitigates the economic devastation
that often is associated with specific weather-related events. Climate
change discussions tend to focus on increases in mean air temperatures
or percentage changes in mean precipitation. But it is not changes in
the mean fields on which we need to place our efforts. It would be
rather easy to accommodate even moderately large changes in mean air
temperature, for example, if there were no year-to-year variability.
Loss of life and adverse economic impact resulting from the weather
occurs not when conditions are ``normal''; but rather, as a result of
extreme climatic events: heat waves, cold outbreaks, floods, droughts,
and storms both at small (tornado, thunderstorm, high winds, hail,
lightning) and large scales (hurricanes, tropical storms, nor'easters).
The one thing that I can guarantee is that regardless of what impact
anthropogenic increases in atmospheric trace gases will have, extreme
weather events will continue to be a part of our life and they will
continue to be associated with the most weather-related deaths and the
largest economic impact resulting from the weather.
Ascertaining anthropogenic changes to these extreme weather events
is nearly impossible. Climate models cannot even begin to simulate
storm-scale systems, let alone model the full range of year-to-year
variability. Many of these events are extremely uncommon so that we
cannot determine their statistical frequency of occurrence from the
observed record, let alone determine how that frequency may have been
changing over time. While we need to continue to examine existing
climate records for insights and to develop reliable theory to explain
plausible scenarios of change, the concern is whether we can enact
policy now that will make a difference in the future.
However, is there cause for concern that anthropogenic warming will
lead to an enhanced hydrologic cycle; that is, will there be more
variability in precipitation resulting in more occurrences of floods
and droughts? The IPCC Summary for Policy Makers states:
Global warming is likely to lead to greater extremes of
drying and heavy rainfall and increase the risk of droughts and
floods that occur with El Nino events in many different
regions.
However, if one reads the technical summary of Working Group I, we
find that:
There is no compelling evidence to indicate that the
characteristics of tropical and extratropical storms have
changed. Owing to incomplete data and limited and conflicting
analyses, it is uncertain as to whether there have been any
long-term and large-scale increases in the intensity and
frequency of extra-tropical cyclones in the Northern
Hemisphere. Recent analyses of changes in severe local weather
(e.g., tornadoes, thunderstorm days, and hail) in a few
selected regions do not provide compelling evidence to suggest
long-term changes. In general, trends in severe weather events
are notoriously difficult to detect because of their relatively
rare occurrence and large spatial variability.
The IPCC goes on to further state ``there were relatively small
increases in global land areas experiencing severe droughts or severe
wetness over the 20th century''. Karl and Knight, who conducted a
detailed study on precipitation variability across the United States,
concluded that as the climate has warmed, variability actually has
decreased across much of the Northern Hemisphere's midlatitudes, a
finding they agree is corroborated by some computer models. Hayden,
writing for the Water Sector of the U.S. National Assessment, agrees
that no trend in storminess or storm frequency variability has been
observed over the last century and that ``little can or should be said
about change in variability of storminess in future, carbon dioxide
enriched years.'' Soden concluded, ``even the extreme models exhibit
markedly less precipitation variability than observed.'' In addition,
Sinclair and Watterson have noted that, in fact, climate models tend to
indicate that increased levels of atmospheric trace gases leads to a
``marked decrease in the occurrence of intense storms'' outside the
tropics and they argue that claims of enhanced storminess from model
simulations are more the result of models that fail to conserve mass.
Clearly, claims that anthropogenic global warming will lead to more
occurrences of droughts, floods, and storms are wildly exaggerated.
Thus, I believe it stands to reason that we need to focus on
providing real-time monitoring of environmental conditions. This will
have two benefits: it will provide immediate data to allow
decisionmakers to make informed choices to protect citizens faced with
these extreme weather events and, if installed and maintained properly,
it will assist with our long-term climate monitoring goals. Such
efforts are presently being developed by forward-looking states. For
example, I am involved with a project, initiated by the State of
Delaware in cooperation with FEMA, the National Weather Service, and
Computational Geosciences Inc. of Norman, Oklahoma, to develop the most
comprehensive, highest resolution, statewide weather monitoring system
available anywhere. Louisiana and Texas also have expressed interests
in using our High-Resolution Weather Data System technology for real-
time statewide weather monitoring. Regardless then of what the future
holds, employing real-time monitoring systems, with a firm commitment
to supporting and maintaining long-term climate monitoring goals,
proves to be our best opportunity to minimize the impact of weather on
human activities.
final thoughts: the science is not yet in
In 1997, I had the pleasure to chair a panel session at the Houston
Forum that included seven of the most prominent climate change
scientists in the country. At the close of that session, I asked each
panelist the question, ``In 2002, given 5 more years of observations, 5
more years of model development, and 5 more years of technological
advances and knowledge about the climate system, will we have an answer
to the question of whether our climate is changing as a result of
anthropogenic increases in trace gas emissions?'' The panel, which
consisted of both advocates and skeptics, agreed that we would have a
definitive answer probably not by 2002, but certainly by 2007. I
disagreed then and I continue to disagree today. I fear that the issue
has become so politically charged that the political process will
always cloud the true search for scientific truth. But more than that,
I feel the climate system is far more complex than we ever imagined--so
much so that we still will not have a definitive answer by 2007.
I again thank the committee for inviting my commentary on this
important topic.
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Responses of Dr. David R. Legates, to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not
safe to continue increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit.
What needs to be done to assure that we can avert the point of no
return or ``dangerous levels'' of green house gas concentrations?
Response. In response to your question, I would ask, ``What are
`dangerous levels' or the `point of no return'?'' I do not think there
is a definition of dangerous levels of carbon dioxide in this context--
we are not anywhere near levels of carbon dioxide that would inhibit
our ability to extract sufficient oxygen from the atmosphere. Given too
that many actions to reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas production are
concomitant with additional problems, I do not see that I can define a
level beyond which we cannot pass.
My suggestion would be that we should seek to reduce the production
of greenhouse gases where there clearly is another benefit to the
reduction. For example, less reliance on foreign sources of fossil
fuels would be beneficial to our national security and if they could be
replaced by conservation, enhanced efficiency, and/or `cleaner'
sources, then less greenhouse gases would be produced. Thus, I am in
favor of technology that reduces emissions of greenhouse gases as a by-
product; but I strongly argue that reduction of greenhouse gases for
reduction sake is not cost effective or, in many cases, even
potentially beneficial.
Question 2. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30-
50 years, of continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas
emissions? And, what is the most feasible way to reduce or eliminate
that risk?
Response. To be able to define risk, one must be able to ascertain
solid evidence of the effect of our actions. At present, we can neither
determine the effects of anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases
nor guarantee that all effects will be detrimental. Most arguments in
favor of reducing emissions are that if there is an impact, it must be
detrimental because change is always bad. Over the last 1,000 years, we
have seen climate change dramatically--from the Medieval Warm Period to
the Little Ice Age to the warmer period we now enjoy. During those
periods, civilization has adapted to that change and I do not see why
adaptation to a globally warmed world cannot be considered. Moreover, I
remain unconvinced that (1) global climate change will be detrimental
to either humans or ecosystems as a whole or (2) that it will be as
significant as climate models purport that change will be.
Personally, I feel that the greatest risk we face in the next 30-50
years as a result of the atmosphere will come from extreme weather
events. Floods, droughts, heat waves, cold spells, and storms from
hurricanes to nor'easters to flash flooding to lightning and high winds
to tornados will take the most lives and cause the most economic
damage. We will still be forced to face these extreme weather events
regardless of what climate change scenario plays out. Thus, in keeping
with my earlier Senate testimony, the most feasible way to reduce our
risk from climate change is to develop strategies to mitigate the
effects of extreme weather events. Forward-looking efforts such as the
Delaware Environmental Observing System (DEOS) that is supported by the
State of Delaware will yield benefits now and in the future--especially
if global warming results in an increase in the frequency and intensity
of these extreme weather events (a scenario that is not supported by
current research, however). I would argue that money spent toward
disaster mitigation (education, evacuation, and minimization of the
impact) would be much better utilized than money spent toward the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
______
Responses of Dr. David R. Legates, to Additional Questions from Senator
Smith
Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ``during the 20th Century,
the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.'' Do you agree
with that statement? Why or why not?
I do not think this statement is debatable. We know that many
industrialized activities emit carbon dioxide, methane, and other
greenhouse gases either as a direct result (e.g., burning fossil fuels)
or an indirect result (e.g., cattle feedlots which increase methane
production) of human activities. Virtually all long-term measurements
of greenhouse gases (most notably in Hawaii and Antarctica) have
exhibited an increase in these gases as industrialization has occurred.
Thus, the rise in concentrations of these gases is well documented and
we have explicit anthropogenic sources for the rise in their
concentrations.
Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ``the primary cause for . . .
growth in impact is the increasing vulnerability of human and
environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in
climate, per se. `` Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?
Response. Whether climate change occurs or not is largely
irrelevant, what is relevant is the impact climate change is likely to
have on ecosystems and human activities. In some sense, to state that
we are increasingly vulnerable to climate variability and change is to
recognize that an increasing population base is more likely to be
vulnerable to a change of any kind. Thus my answer is a qualified ``I
agree'', with a caveat that a definition of ``increasing
vulnerability'' must be provided. I do not agree that all climate
change must necessarily be bad, nor do I agree that human and
environmental systems cannot adjust to climate change.
Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ``the present research
agenda is focused . . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate
future'' and that ``instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no
. . . we might be better served by addressing things like the present
drought . . . `` Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why not?
Response. In my testimony, I argued that both human and
environmental systems are most vulnerable to climate extremes--floods,
droughts, heat waves, cold outbreaks, and severe weather. Debating
whether the temperature will rise 1.5<SUP>+</SUP>C or 4 <SUP>+</SUP>C
is academic; what will claim the most lives and provide the greatest
economical damage are the extreme events. That is why in my testimony I
focused on whether research indicates climate extremes are likely to
change. Since we cannot state with any certainty that a future, warmed
world is likely to exhibit any higher frequencies of extreme weather
events, our focus therefore is better placed on efforts to prepare and
warn our citizens for these extreme events. That was essentially a
conclusion of my testimony.
As for a discussion of the present drought, a quest for the cause
for the drought is an academic exercise. Regardless of the cause, I can
guarantee that we will have droughts again in the future. Thus, we
would be better served by addressing how we can better manage our
existing water resources in the future, than in focusing on whether
drought frequency is likely to change in the future.
Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. As it exists, I would agree that the Kyoto Protocol
should not be ratified by the United States. In ignoring obvious
sources of greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries and in
focusing on a system of ``credits'', it appears to be more of a
political ``we're doing something'' statement rather than an attempt to
address the true issue. In my testimony, I cited an American Viewpoint
survey of State and regional climatologists who agreed by nearly a 2-
to-1 margin that going back to 1990 emission levels (a more stringent
approach than Kyoto) would have little or no impact on global warming.
I agree with the majority of these climatologists and note that such
measures are likely to have dire economic consequences for virtually no
return on the climate change issue. Thus, I would argue that a better
approach would be one that reduces emissions where other benefits
outweigh the climate change concern and one that allows us to cope with
extreme weather events.
I also do not agree with a modified Kyoto Protocol where
restrictions in greenhouse gas emissions are relaxed in times of an
economic downturn. All this would do is ignore climate change when the
economy is bad and enact restrictions to squelch a booming economy. The
Kyoto Protocol, in my view, is bad for the United States economy while
doing virtually nothing to the climate. It is a system that should be
abandoned and not tweaked.
Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention
paid to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-
billion ton iceberg known as ``Larsen B, `` that has been attributed to
climate change. What scientific evidence is there that climate change
is the sole cause for the phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence
that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. There is no scientific evidence that climate change is
the sole cause for the phenomenon. The hydrology of Antarctica is one
of mass balance. In most of the United States, it snows and the snow
melts, eventually. But the temperature of Antarctica is so cold that it
does not melt, and subsequent yearly snowfall is added to the snow that
already exists. This snowpack becomes compressed and forms ice, which
slowly migrates out to the ice shelves over the oceans. Due to the
topography, ice breaks off rather frequently forming the traditional
icebergs that we find in the North Atlantic, for example. But in
Antarctica, the ice extends over water until it becomes fragile and
breaks off. Thus, calving (breaking off) of icebergs is a relatively
common event.
Before satellites, we did not have frequent observations of
Antarctica. Thus, we do not know how frequent icebergs of this size
form. With satellites, we are able to see them when they occur but our
limited observational period precludes an assessment of the frequency
of occurrence. Given though that it is a natural process, I cannot
agree that climatic change is the sole cause. However, winds over the
Southern Ocean during El Nino events are diverted southward over the
Antarctic Peninsula. Researchers have noted that sea ice decreases
during this time, which allows winds to pound surf against the ice
sheet resulting in weakening of the structure. This may be a reason why
large breakups of the Larsen Ice Sheet has occurred during major El
Nino events.
Prescribing anthropogenic assistance to the breakup of Larsen B is
extremely difficult. How is it possible to know whether anthropogenic
influences provided any assistance in the breakup of Larsen B? Although
I am not a supporter of them, we could turn to climate models for
assistance. Assuming that climate models provide our best assessment of
climate change effects, I note that in the latest analysis of the
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) model (Dai et al.,
Journal of Climate, February 2001) that near the Antarctic Peninsula
(where Larsen B is located), a change of less than 1 <SUP>+</SUP>C is
shown for the climate of 2100. This value is the least amount of any
change anywhere over the Southern Ocean. So, I think it would be fair
to say that climate models indicate little climate change for this
region, which leads me to conclude that little scientific evidence
exists that anthropogenic influences played a substantial role in the
breakup of Larsen B.
Question 6a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty; Coping with the risks of climate change'' (copy
attached). Please explain why you agree or disagree with the following
assertions or conclusions from that report: There is not one problem
but two; natural climate variability and the influence of human
activity on the climate system.
I would agree that there are two issues that must be considered
when trying to assess causes for climate change--natural climate
variability and anthropogenic effects. In that sense, I would agree.
However, the article postulates that we need to avert anthropogenic
influences on the climate (problem #1), while simultaneously preparing
for unexpected extreme weather occurrences (problem #2). I agree
wholeheartedly with arguments to offset the second proposed problem.
However, science has not determined the extent, either in magnitude or
in effect, of the anthropogenic influence. In that light, how can we
determine risk if we do not have solid evidence of the effect of our
actions? Their argument seems to be that if there might be an impact,
it will be detrimental because change is always bad and therefore the
change must be averted. Environmental systems have adapted to change
for eons and the human journey has been to both cause change (usually
for the better) and adapt to changes. Their ``global climate
protection'' is ``to avoid anthropogenic intervention in the natural
climate system when potential consequences cannot be foreseen.'' Since
science cannot ascertain the consequences, we must avert all possible
changes. But taken literally, it is impossible to remove all human
influences on the climate--cities must be eliminated, we must go back
to a pre-industrial revolution age, etc. Good risk strategy is not to
avoid all change at all costs; but rather to assess the effects of such
change and outweigh the bad with the good.
Question 6b. ``. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-
ranging concepts of protection are developed. These must take into
account the fact that the maximum strength and frequency of extreme
weather conditions at a given location cannot be predicted.''
This statement is the crux of my Senate testimony. We need to be
more concerned with protecting ourselves from extreme weather
conditions and be less concerned by the small changes that may occur to
mean global air temperature. We can be sure that this new century will
contain floods, droughts, heat waves, and storms of all kinds and
sizes. And we have no evidence the frequency or magnitude of these
events will change in a globally warmed world. Moreover, we cannot
guarantee that we have seen the worst event that is possible under
current natural conditions. Therefore, I agree with this statement--
natural disasters will not abate in the future, regardless of any
effects of anthropogenic climate change, and we must be poised to deal
with them.
Question 6c. ``Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the
case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears
which--if they are not confirmed--will in time turn to carefree relief,
and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons of short-term
expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that
today's generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of
this kind.''
In essence, this is simply common-sense practice--don't cry wolf
and don't ignore the problem. As for fear mongering, every extreme
weather event is accompanied by ``This could be caused by global
warming!'' or ``We can expect more of these with global warming!'' It
helps drum up support for the cause and when the future is 2100, it
becomes difficult to ever find unconfirmed claims. Moreover if
mitigation is undertaken, then unconfirmed claims are cause for
celebration--``See, we did something about it!''--while the occurrence
of extreme events are a rally for still more action. In the case of
climate change, it seems that fear mongering yields substantial
benefits with little concern for the onset of carefree relief due to
the fact that effects are likely to occur only in the distant future.
As for ignoring the problem for short-term expediency, I would
agree. Ignoring potential problems can have serious ramifications at a
later date. However, with respect to anthropogenic climate change, we
have not ascertained the degree to which humans are changing the
climate nor have we determined the extent to which anthropogenic
climate change poses a hazard. To determine risk, you have to be able
to determine the probability of occurrence. In this debate, we have
neither determined what will occur nor its probability. Thus, it is
irresponsible to simply declare that the change must be bad and it must
be stopped at virtually all costs, particularly when the result of such
actions can have dire consequences themselves.
As a climatologist, I find the phrase ``a collapse of the climate
system'' unintelligible. Economic systems can collapse, infrastructures
can collapse, and buildings can collapse. But the climate system is a
process that continues on. Too much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
will NOT bring an end to climatic processes or the Earth's climate. As
such, the physics of the climate system will not collapse; they will
continue on. In attempting to quantify the ``system collapse'', Swiss
Re postulates that ``small increases in average temperature . . . can
cause low pressure systems to shift from their usual paths and the
frequency of heavy rainfall in a particular region to suddenly increase
significantly''. What this tells me is that the authors of the Swiss Re
piece do not have a good understanding of the climate system or the
issues that are involved. No research of which I am aware indicates
that such changes are likely. Little credible evidence exists to
suggest that a small increase in air temperature will result in a major
shift to precipitation patterns. In fact, precipitation is so poorly
simulated in climate models, that traditional low pressure systems are
not even represented by them.
Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. As per my Senate testimony, I definitely do agree that
our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions is increasing. More
people demanding more water usage will exacerbate droughts when they
occur. Channelization of rivers (e.g., the Mississippi and the
Missouri) will enhance flood peaks and confine river flow, resulting in
flooding of downstream areas that are not protected by levees or
flooding large portions of inhabited areas if a levee break occurs.
Continued building on and urban development of coastal areas will put
larger numbers of people at risk and require more extensive evacuation
procedures during nor'easters and tropical storm/hurricane landfalls.
With more people, the impact of thunderstorms, hailstorms, lightning,
high winds, and tornadoes are bound to increase.
Note that in my testimony, I indicated little evidence points to an
enhancement of extreme weather conditions under a globally warmed
world. The above-mentioned extreme weather conditions presently lead to
the greatest loss of life and the greatest economic impact of weather--
not the increase of mean global air temperature. They will continue to
do so in the future. Thus, I will continue to argue that better warning
systems and preparation for these extreme weather events should be our
primary meteorological concern, not global warming.
__________
Responses of Dr. David R. Legates, to Additional Questions from Senator
Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. My question is ``what is so magical about 550 ppm?'' That
number is as contrived as any other number--there is no way to
guarantee that effects resulting from 550 ppm will not be detrimental
but that effects from, say 575 ppm, will be. As I am not an advocate of
the Kyoto Protocol, I cannot advocate specific CO<INF>2</INF>
concentration targets. Moreover, CO<INF>2</INF> is not the only
greenhouse gas. Note that levels of methane (CH<INF>4</INF>) have
leveled off to rates far below those postulated by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Moreover, water is
the most important greenhouse gas; more important than carbon dioxide
or methane. Thus, defining CO<INF>2</INF> levels is a nice way to
perform bookkeeping but not a good way to conduct science.
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis?
Response. Unfortunately, economics is not my area of expertise, as
I am a climatologist. Thus, I am not aware of any economic analyses of
the effect of such reductions.
Question 2. Please provide your assessment of the surface
temperature measurements including documentation of the location of the
measurement sites on land and at sea.
Response. In my testimony, I indicated that I felt thermometer
measurements were generally good estimates of the temperature record at
that location. Given that the effect of urbanization (growth of cities
around the stations) has been prevalent during the twentieth century,
we would expect that surface air temperature measurements would exhibit
significant air temperature increases. Sites where urbanization has not
been observed usually show little trend. Moreover, weather stations
tend to be moved over time. This is done for a variety of purposes
(e.g., moving stations from downtown to the airports in the 1940's) but
it results in a discontinuity in the station record--the new site is
seldom identical to the old location. Thus, a bias is introduced which
is difficult to distinguish from a climate change signal.
My view is that surface air temperature measurements are too biased
to provide a complete picture of global patterns of air temperature.
First, they tend to be biased toward lower elevations, middle-
latitudes, denser populations, and industrialized countries (see
Addendum #1). Moreover, they only provide coverage of about two-thirds
of the globe with oceanic areas remaining underrepresented. Ship
reports, used by Legates and Willmott (Addendum #2) are useful for
producing climatological averages but not for discerning temporal
trends. Second, they represent the temperature at a height of only
about 5.5 feet. This is well within the atmospheric boundary layer
where urbanization and other biases due to the station location are
prevalent.
Locations of the 17,986 terrestrial air temperature stations that
were used in my global precipitation data base are presented in
Addendum #1. This figure is taken from Legates and Willmott (1990), the
text of which is included as Addendum #2. Note section 2.3, Reliability
Concerns, that discusses the assessment of the surface temperature
measurements.
Question 3. Has there been any comprehensive assessment of the
accuracy of the surface temperature measurements?
Response. I include Addendum #2 that includes a paper describing my
global air temperature climatology. It contains a summary of and
several references to papers that describe the accuracy of air
temperature measurements.
I also would note the National Research Council Report, Reconciling
Observations of Global Temperature Change, chaired by John M. Wallace.
Although many media outlets touted this report as the death-knell for
climate change skeptics, the report does provide an assessment of
surface temperature records (which show substantial warming) relative
to satellite and radiosonde observations (which show little warming).
Moreover, the report concludes that warming is real and that surface
thermometers and satellites and radiosondes are likely measuring
different things, most notably that the thermometers are solely surface
observations (below 10 feet) whereas satellites and radiosondes
(balloon observations) integrate temperature over the lower
troposphere.
Question 4. What are the effects of removing black soot from the
atmosphere?
Response. In February 2001, Stanford scientist Mark Jacobson
published an article in Nature which indicated that the warming effect
from the atmospheric aerosol carbon (black soot) was more than twice
what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has assigned
to it. Black soot also is likely to reduce cloud cover by heating
portions of the atmosphere, thereby evaporating condensed water. This
implies that much of the warming the IPCC projected to occur as a
result of policies to reduce atmospheric aerosols would be offset since
black carbon would also be removed. This has posed a problem since some
have suggested that sulfate aerosols have countered the warming the
climate models indicate should have occurred. Thus, anti-pollution
measures to remove sulfate aerosols would result in a dramatic increase
in the Earth's temperature.
Black soot, however, exerts a warming effect that is exceeded by
emissions only of carbon dioxide and is almost equal to the cooling
caused by sulfate aerosols, Jacobson concluded. What this means is that
the removal of both sulfate aerosols and black soot using electrostatic
precipitators in smokestacks--which occurs since both particles are
about the same size--negates any effect the IPCC suggests should occur
as a result of anti-pollution efforts.
From a health standpoint, it is desirable to reduce the
concentrations of black soot and sulfate aerosols. From a climatic
change standpoint, the removal of black soot would remove a large
contributor to global warming. This would occur with obvious health
benefits. Moreover, anti-pollution measures should have no net effect
on the Earth's temperature since the net effect of sulfate aerosols and
black soot should be near zero.
What this entire argument on black soot and sulfate aerosols should
indicate is that the science of climate change is still highly
uncertain. The effects of both black soot and sulfate aerosols come
with large uncertainties. Removal of black soot would seem to be a
benefit both to atmospheric pollution concerns as well as to those
concerned about anthropogenic warming. But further research might find
that there are other effects--maybe positive, maybe negative--that can
be attributed to the presence of these aerosols. Thus, I reiterate that
it is impossible to determine the extent of our risk when the effects
of atmospheric composition are extremely uncertain.
Question 5. What are the benefits of using U.S. clean coal
technology in countries like China and India in terms of removing black
soot?
Response. Although this is not in my area of expertise, I would
argue that clean coal technology would be beneficial to developing
countries whose economies are still dependent on coal. However, I
always am concerned about exporting technology and how it may be used
in ways that we did not intend. Clean coal technology should decrease
emissions of pollutants (sulfate aerosols and black soot), which are a
particular problem in developing countries. However, by increasing
burning efficiency, more CO<INF>2</INF> will be released as a result.
Question 6. Please provide your assessment of the models used in
the New England Regional Assessment referred to by Mr. Markham. Also,
please comment on the use of these models for driving impact studies.
If available, please provide any alternative assessments for States in
New England.
Response. The U.S. National Assessment prescribed the models used
in the New England Regional Assessment. Thus, the models used were the
Canadian Climate Centre Model and England's Hadley Centre Model. I have
provided an extensive assessment of these models in a manuscript
published by the George C. Marshall Institute. That manuscript was
appended to my Senate testimony.
In summary, these models were out of date at the time the National
Assessment went to press. Moreover, they provided two of the most
extreme climate scenarios of all models the Assessment had from which
to choose. As for driving impact studies, I will note that for current
conditions, both models simulated a wetter climate for eastern Colorado
than for northwestern Louisiana! The ``trick'' that is used is to
simply ignore the current field but look at changes from the present-
day simulation to the doubled CO<INF>2</INF> Simulation. Obviously, if
one is interested in regional-scale impacts, it is important that the
model reproduces the salient features of the regional climate.
Question 7. Please provide an assessment of the models used in the
reports by Swiss RE and Munich RE, including their use to predict local
impacts.
Response. In their discussion, Swiss RE cites only the Switzerland
National Research Programme 31 (NFP 31) as a source for their
information. The Swiss National Research Programme is their equivalent
of our National Science Foundation. In the documentation of NFP 31, I
found the following climate model reference: ``A regional climate model
for the Alpine region,'' by Luthi et al. (1997). Only an abstract is
available but they note, ``The modelling suite employed comprises a
doubly nested system with an outer coarse mesh model (horizontal
resolution 56km) capable of capturing synoptic-scale features and an
embedded fine-mesh model . . . (horizontal resolution 14km) that can
simulate meso-scale flow systems.'' Regional climate models are driven
by General Circulation Models (GCMs) but the report gives no mention as
to the specific model references.
As there are no large-scale modeling groups in Switzerland, my
educated guess would be that their model would not be substantially
different from those cited by the IPCC, and may likely include the
Hadley Centre GCM. I provide an assessment of the climate models used
in the U.S. National Assessment in my manuscript published by the
George C. Marshall Institute and appended to my original Senate
testimony. Many of the same criticisms of these two models hold for
other models as well.
As for the prediction of local impacts, this study appears to use
nested modeling--an approach where higher resolution models are used to
look at local fluctuations. These models are driven by the coarser
resolution GCMs and, as a consequence, inherit their biases and errors.
Thus, the local assessments are only as good as the large-scale forcing
which, for GCMs, is not very accurate.
______
Responses of Dr. David R. Legates, to Additional Questions from Senator
Campbell
Question 1. In your testimony, you expressed concern over what you
termed ``land bias''. That nearly three fourths of the Earth's surface
is covered by water and goes largely unobserved. Therefore, much of our
available data on global warming may not in fact be wholly accurate.
You also mention that some countries actually sell their data to
interested parties, also potentially tainting that information. What
efforts are being made to correct these situations?
Response. Clearly, it is virtually impossible to instrument the
oceans in the same way we have instrumented land areas. We do have ship
reports; however, they tend to be biased in a number of ways. First,
ships, for obvious reasons, tend to avoid storms if at all possible.
This provides a ``fair weather bias'' that affects our estimates.
Second, most ships are moving targets (there are some reports from
fixed-position ships) and provide air temperature estimates that are
integrated over large areas and do not represent a single point. Third,
ships are large metal objects that generate their own heat and have
different characteristics than the open ocean. This problem is akin to
the urbanization effect we see with land-based thermometers.
Thus, our only real source of obtaining a spatially representative
sample of global air temperatures is through remote sensing. Much of
the work by Roy Spencer and John Christy has been based on attempting
to compile a long-term temperature record using satellite remote
sensing. Using their analysis, we see that satellite-derived air
temperature has not exhibited a marked increase as suggested by land-
based thermometers. This lack of a trend has also been observed with
radiosonde data (balloons); traditionally, weather balloons are used
twice daily around the world to sample the vertical profile of the
atmosphere, including air temperature.
As for the fact that countries have been selling their data, Dr.
Mike Hulme of the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East
Anglia relayed this information to me. His unit has been the source of
many of the air temperature and precipitation time-series that have
been displayed. These countries are largely Third World, which see the
data as a potential source of income. Efforts are ongoing to encourage
these countries to participate in the global telecommunication of
weather data, largely through the World Meteorological Organization. In
some cases, financial support has been supplied. I participated in the
first protocol that allowed the U.S. and USSR to exchange data for
climate research (back in 1990); such efforts have now been extended to
an international scope. However, I would conclude that global
cooperation in this area is still lacking.
Question 2. You mention in your testimony that perhaps 20 percent
or less of the observed global increase in temperature may be due to
the activities of mankind. What are other likely causes of global
warming?
Response. I believe my intent was to state that 20 percent or less
of the observed global increase in temperature was due to anthropogenic
increases in greenhouse gases. Variations in solar output are an
obvious source of some of the changes in global temperatures we have
seen. Dr. Sallie Ballunias probably can offer comment that is more up-
to-date on this topic. However, I also would strongly argue that much
of the observed global increase in air temperature is due to the effect
of urbanization. Over time, weather stations that originally were sited
in open, rural settings have become increasingly surrounded by
sprawling urban areas. Several researchers have documented time-series
of air temperature for rural versus urbanized stations and have found
that air temperature increases with urbanization, while little change
occurs with rural observations. This effect is well documented; the
``urban heat island'' occurs due to a decrease in evaporation and an
increase in absorption of solar radiation that results when forests and
grasslands are replaced by cities. While urbanization technically can
be considered as a humaninduced effect, I strongly differentiate
increased temperatures due to urbanization from a rise in air
temperature resulting from increased greenhouse gases. Thus,
urbanization, in my view, is largely responsible for most of the air
temperature rise that we have seen in the observed, land-based air
temperature record.
I would further argue that land surface changes (such as
urbanization, but also including deforestation and desertification)
have probably a bigger effect on the Earth's climate than atmospheric
constituents. Land surface interactions are a big component of the
surface energy balance, although they are not well represented within
climate models. Models are more tuned to study the radiative balance of
the atmosphere, which is probably why the models are very sensitive to
changes in greenhouse gases.
Natural climatic variability is also another likely source of
rising air temperatures. In the late 1800's, we emerged from a
relatively cool period known as the ``Little Ice Age''. It is therefore
not unexpected that air temperatures would rise during the last century
after the end of a period during which colder temperatures were
experienced for 300 to 400 years. Before then, the Medieval Warm Period
exhibited globally warmer air temperatures. I would note that many
civilizations thrived during this period even though they were in a
lesser position than we are to adapt to climate change.
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Statement of Adam Markham, Executive Director, Clean Air-Cool Planet,
Portsmouth, NH
Good morning Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. My name is
Adam Markham and I am the executive director of Clean Air-Cool Planet,
a small non-profit working to achieve reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions in the Northeast. Thank you for inviting me here today to
talk about likely impacts of continued climatic change.
New England is coming to end of what will almost certainly be the
warmest winter on record, and much of the region has been in the grip
of severe or extreme drought for many months. These individual weather
events are not, in themselves, indicators of climate change but they
are providing a taste of what climate change might bring. New Hampshire
is currently experiencing the second worst drought in more than 100
years and Maine's last 12 months were the driest on record. Lake
Winnipesaukee is at its lowest level in a generation, wells are running
dry, and concerns are being raised about hydroelectric power shortages,
fish populations and forest fire risk.
As with the rest of the country, we are experiencing a long-term
warming trend. On average, New England has warmed by 0.7 <SUP>+</SUP>F
since 1895. Winters have warmed more than summers, and the greatest
warming has been in New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island. Annual
precipitation for the region as a whole has increased, especially in
southern New England where the change has been more than 25 percent
over the last century. More rain is falling in intense storms than in
the past.
On the other hand, there has been a significant decrease (15
percent) in snowfall in northern New England since 1953. Snow is lying
on the ground 7 days less than it was 50 years ago and the ice comes
off lakes a few days earlier now than 100 years ago. Other documented
indicators of a shorter winter include progressively earlier flowering
of lilacs and the fact that frogs have advanced their spring calling by
several weeks.
The New England Regional Assessment (NERA), which was carried out
under the auspices of the U.S. Global Change Research Program and
coordinated by Dr. Barrett Rock of the University of New Hampshire, was
published in September 2001. Four years in the making, the report
reviewed some of the risks associated with continued global warming.
The warming scenarios described in the report suggest a likely 6-10 F
warming over the next century. In crude terms, such a change would
result in Boston getting the climate of Richmond, VA in the best case,
and that of Atlanta, GA in the worst case. Either way, the climate of
New England would be irreversibly transformed with far-reaching and
negative, economic and environmental impacts.
sugar maple
Let me start by describing the threat to one of the icons of New
England culture, and one that I know is close to Chairman Jeffords'
heart--the sugar maple. According to all credible forest models, the
sugar maple is one of the tree species most sensitive to warming
temperatures. Business as usual emissions scenarios are almost certain
to eventually drive the sugar maple northwards out of New England
entirely. Even before that happens climate change will start to take a
toll.
New England and New York produce approximately 75 percent of the
maple syrup produced in the U.S. today. U.S. maple syrup production is
worth more than $30 million annually. For Vermont, it is a more than
$100 million industry with over 2,000 mainly family owned sugar
producers. Many of these families have been careful stewards of these
forests for generations and they have a strong interest in the legacy
that is passed to their children and grandchildren. Maple trees take
decades to mature and new stands are planted for the benefit of future
generations. According to NERA this heritage and industry ``may be
irreparably altered under a changing climate''. There are indications
that sugar production tends to be better in colder years, and it is
established that droughts during the growing season adversely affect
production in subsequent years. For example, sugarmakers expect to see
impacts of the current drought, which started last summer, in
production numbers for this current season.
There is a very short time in the year when conditions are right
for sugar production. Sap generally flows during late February and
early March. Sugar bushes need a prolonged period of temperatures below
25 +F to convert starch to sucrose and to get high sugar content in the
sap. A freeze/thaw cycle of cold nights and warm days (above 38-40 +F)
is required to get the sap moving. When the nights no longer freeze the
season is over.
According to Dr. Tim Perkins, Director of the Proctor Maple
Research Center at the University of Vermont, sugarmakers are reporting
that the season is starting earlier and earlier. Traditionally, in much
of Vermont, tapping coincided with Town Meeting Day (the first Tuesday
in March). But this is changing, and during the last decade
approximately a quarter of Vermont's sugar production has occurred
before Town Meeting Day. This year's warm winter triggered one of the
earliest sugaring season starts anyone can remember.
With such a short window of opportunity, the decision on when to
tap the trees is critical to successful production. Tap too early and
you risk ``drying out'' the tree too soon, but tap too late and you may
miss some of the best sap runs. By making the beginning of the season
more unpredictable and increasing temperature fluctuations, global
warming will make the decision on when to tap even more difficult.
There is little data available yet with which to predict more
accurately the likely impacts of climate change on maple trees or its
possible interplay with other threats to the maple industry, including
acid rain, land-use change and pests such as the Asian longhorned
beetle. The Proctor Maple Research Center plans to begin a vigorous
program of research on global warming impacts in the very near future.
High quality field data they have been collecting for a number of years
will enable them to construct a computer model of sap flow in maple
trees under varying conditions. This will then be used to simulate sap
flow under various climate change scenarios to predict the effect on
production.
skiing and winter sports
Winter sports are especially vulnerable to global warming. Because
of the strong relationship between winter skiing conditions, the number
of customers, and subsequent successes or failures in the ski industry,
a changing climate may have severe repercussions for New England's
winter tourism economy. There are 80 ski resorts now operating in the
region.
Although economic analyses for New England have been limited,
studies from Canada suggest that global warming could have major
economic impacts for the ski industry there. For example, one analysis
indicated that an increase of 3.5-3.7 +C could decrease the number of
skier days by 50-70 percent at resorts in Southern Quebec. This could
mean a loss of up to $1.7 billion in revenue for Quebec.
A recent study by Brian Palm, a Dartmouth College alum and post-
graduate student at Oxford University, of the past 19 years of weather
data for Vermont and New Hampshire showed an average of 700,000 fewer
ski visits in the years with the worst snow conditions.
Vermont and New Hampshire have the most ski-dependent economies in
New England. Together, the two states receive approximately 6 million
ski visits annually. Skiers generate some of the highest per capita
spending of any tourists. In New Hampshire the industry generated $566
million in visitor spending in 2000. This spending is critical to the
state government's budget, and in 2000 it accounted for nearly $58
million in tax revenue. The skiing industry also creates more than 10
percent of the winter jobs in New Hampshire.
Capital investment in the region's ski industry is highly
significant and would be at risk from shorter winters and a warmer,
less snowy climate. Recent single-season improvements at Sugarbush (VT)
and Sunapee (NH) cost $28 million and $11 million respectively. Resort
operators have increasingly had to make costly improvements to
snowmaking technology to smooth out inconsistent winters. Vermont and
ski areas increased the area covered by snowmaking by 15 percent in the
last 12 years and resorts in New Hampshire spent $24.2 million to
increase acres covered by snowmaking by 18 percent during the last
decade. At Attitash in New Hampshire, snowmaking costs about $750,000
per year and accounts for approximately 20 percent of total operating
costs.
In 2001, the November temperature for the Northeast averaged 43.6
+F, some 5.3 +F higher than the 107-year average. This was the third
warmest November on record. In 2001, Killington Ski Resort, the largest
area in the east, recorded its latest opening date in more than 15
years.
Downhill skiing is not the only winter recreation to be affected.
This year, some cross-country skiing trails have been devoid of snow,
and ice-skating and snowshoeing opportunities have been unusually few
and far between. Ice fishing has been sparse or non-existent in
southern New England and many snowmobiling trails have been closed for
much of the season.
forest ecosystems
Climate models predict that in the longer term global warming will
eventually transform the conifer forest of northern New England into
the type of forest now found farther south--either the deciduous forest
of the Mid-Atlantic States, or the mixed forests characteristic of
southern New England.
The conditions that currently support northern hardwood forests
will shift up to 300 miles north during the next 100 years, causing the
loss of these forests over much of the landscape. The distributions of
white spruce, black spruce, red spruce, balsam fir and other species of
cool climates will move north and these trees are likely to disappear
from most of their current ranges in the Northeastern United States. If
disturbances such as fire or storms increase as has been predicted by
some scientists, this would hasten the decline and facilitate the
northward spread of southern species like oak and hickory.
More than 300,000 people in New England and New York are employed
in the forestry and forest products sector. Milder winters will likely
increase the vulnerability of commercial forests to insect pests
including eastern spruce budworm, gypsy moth and pear thrips. Any
economic losses are likely to disproportionately affect smaller, non-
industrial private landowners. More than 250,000 private forest
landowners are likely to be affected in New England alone.
Global warming will tend to favor opportunistic, fast-moving and
adaptable species. It is likely to prove to be a boon for many pests
and invasive species that threaten regional biodiversity. Purple
loosestrife, garlic mustard, Tartarian honeysuckle and Morrow
honeysuckle are some of the troublesome non-native species that are
predicted to benefit as others decline or disappear.
Higher summer temperatures and increased pollution from road
traffic will likely contribute to greater ground-level ozone formation
with the effect of reducing forest productivity and harming commercial
tree species like red spruce and white pine. Ozone impacts are expected
to be worst in southern New York and central and southern New England.
Changing temperature and precipitation patterns could harm the
multi-million dollar fall foliage industry by muting autumn colors.
Without sugar maple the autumn experience in New England would be very
different. Fall-foliage tourism accounts for 20-25 percent of total
annual tourism in Vermont and Maine. NERA estimated that a 50 percent
drop in fall foliage tourism could result in approximately 20,000 job
losses.
Climate change is a significant threat to the forest and alpine
ecosystems of the most important public lands in the region, including
Acadia National Park, the Allagash Wilderness Waterway, Baxter State
Park, the White Mountains National Forest, and the Mount Washington
State Park.
wildlife impacts
For some animals and plants, climate effects could prove to be
disastrous. Many species characteristic of the northern forest will be
forced to find new habitat as climate changes. Species already living
at the southern edges of their ranges--like martens, fishers and
snowshoe hares--will be among the most affected. Bird species that live
in northern spruce and spruce/fir forests, including the gray jay,
boreal chickadee, spruce grouse and the threatened Bicknell's thrush,
are particularly vulnerable to diminished habitat in New England.
A modeling study published by The World Wildlife Fund and Clean
Air-Cool Planet in 2000, shows the habitats of the Northern Forest of
New England and upstate New York to be especially vulnerable to climate
change. According to this study up to 44 percent of Maine's, and 35
percent of New Hampshire's, existing terrestrial habitats are likely to
be transformed into other ecosystem types under the most credible
climate scenarios. In the most heavily impacted areas, the rates at
which plant and animal species may be required to shift their ranges in
response to global warming in the next 100 years may be as much as ten
times faster than at the end of the last ice age.
According to a recent report by the American Bird Conservancy and
the National Wildlife Federation, a great many species of birds will be
affected by climate change. Birding has become a major recreational
activity in recent decades, with far-reaching economic consequences. In
New England alone, in 1996, people spent more than $ 1.8 billion
feeding and watching birds and other wildlife.
Several species of wood warbler are expected to extend their ranges
northwards, perhaps by hundreds of miles, while disappearing at the
southern edges of their current ranges. Five species, including the
bay-breasted warbler and Cape May warbler are predicted to disappear
from New England entirely. These birds help to keep spruce budworm
outbreaks in check by consuming millions of larvae during the breeding
season. If they are pushed northwards many forests could become much
more vulnerable to insect pests. A study of 35 North American warbler
species showed that 20 percent of them have already shifted their
ranges an average of 65 miles northwards during the last 25 years.
public health
The White Mountains are within a day's drive of 77 million people
and receive more visitors (7-8 million) every year than Yellowstone and
Yosemite national parks combined. Recreational visitors in some of
these areas may suffer increased health risks as a result of global
warming. Sixty thousand hikers a year visit Mount Washington and the
major peaks for the White Mountains. On hot summer days there are often
high levels of ground-level ozone, particulates and acid aerosols. All
of these pose a threat to hikers. According to NERA, there is a
striking correlation between hot days (warmer than 90 F, sunny skies
and high levels of ozone pollution. Because long-distance transport of
air pollutants appears to occur at the boundary between the mixing
layer and the stable layer of the troposphere, at around 3,200 feet,
hiking at these elevations or higher may expose hikers to damaging
concentrations of dangerous air pollutants not experienced lower low
down. According to a study by Harvard Medical School, the Harvard
School of Public Health and the Appalachian Mountain Club, prolonged
exposure to levels of ozone often encountered on trails in the White
Mountains can reduce lung function and is especially damaging to people
with a history of asthma or other respiratory problems.
Also a risk for people outdoors, even on the golf course or in
their backyards is Lyme disease, which is already on the increase in
New York and parts of New England. If undetected, the disease can lead
to permanent neurological disability. Because it is passed along to
humans by ticks, Lyme disease poses a special threat to people who
enjoy outdoor pursuits like hiking, birding and fishing. Swedish
research on ticks suggests that warmer winters could increase the
incidence of the disease and push its potential range further into
northern New England.
Heat waves kill more people in the United States than hurricanes,
flooding or tornadoes. Dr. Laurence Kalkstein, Associate Director of
the Center for Climatic Research at the University of Delaware has
suggested that heat-related deaths in the summertime could double under
likely U.S. global warming scenarios. Northern cities are especially
vulnerable to heat waves because people are not used to, or acclimated
to, high temperatures and humidity. Also building design in the north
is more oriented toward keeping heat in during the winter than letting
it out during the summer. The elderly and low-income households in
urban areas are at highest risk.
coastal communities & fisheries
The costs of climate impacts in the coastal zone may be
particularly large. Sea levels are currently rising at about a foot per
century. This rate is increasing and New England coastal communities
will likely have to deal with sea level rise of around two feet this
century. The State of New Hampshire has calculated that this will
massively increase the area of the Seacoast vulnerable to flooding and
could turn 100-year storms into 10-year storms. According to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a two-foot sea level rise would
inundate about 10,000 square miles of coastline. Costly beach
nourishment and shoreline armoring is already transforming the coast of
New England. A three-foot sea level rise would result in half of our
natural wetlands and beaches being lost and replaced with armored
shores. Coastal development is rapidly closing off the option of
natural retreat for many wetlands.
Coastal marine ecosystems and fisheries are also at risk. Warmer
temperatures are expected to increase the incidence of toxic algal
blooms and help the spread of warm water diseases of shellfish such as
oysters. Winter seawater temperature in Narragansett Bay have already
warmed by more than 5 F since 1960 and winter flounder populations
have been in decline for 25 years. The flounders migrate inshore in the
late fall and spawn in early spring. Winter flounders are adapted for
low water temperatures in which most fish can't survive and warm
winters are hypothesized to be harming populations through reduced
hatching rates and increased predation on larvae.
solutions & leadership in the northeast
The Northeast States have long been leaders in reducing air
pollution. The region also is now beginning to lead the way in
responding to global warming.
<bullet> In 2000, New York was the first state to enact a law
promoting environmentally friendly and energy efficient building
practices through tax incentives
<bullet> In 2001, Massachusetts Governor Jane Swift signed a new
multi-pollutant regulation making the state the first to control
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions from existing power stations.
<bullet> New Hampshire was the first state to create a voluntary
registry for greenhouse gas emissions and a bi-partisan 4-pollutant
bill was recently passed in the House.
<bullet> The Connecticut Clean Energy Fund is at the forefront of
efforts to support the development of commercial fuel cell
technologies.
<bullet> Efficiency Vermont is the Nation's first public utility
dedicated solely to achieving energy efficiency improvements.
In August 2001, the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian
Premiers signed a Climate Change Action Plan with the long-term goal of
reducing greenhouse gases by 75-85 percent from current levels. The
Governors and Premiers concluded that global warming's ``multiple
impacts will have substantial consequences for the cost and quality of
life of the region's citizens''. They noted that U.S. national
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions have been growing more than 1 percent a year
and stated ``Given these increases in the face of doing nothing, this
plan seeks to reverse the trend.''
Northeast leadership is not restricted to the states, however.
Thirty-five cities and counties in the region have joined the Cities
for Climate Protection Program of the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives. These municipalities have all passed
resolutions pledging to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement
local climate action plans. For example, Burlington Vermont has adopted
an ambitious plan--the ``10 percent Challenge''--to reduce the city's
greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent from 1990 levels by 2005.
Colleges and universities throughout the region are doing their
part too. Tufts University has pledged to meet or beat the Kyoto
Target. Clean Air-Cool Planet has worked with the University of New
Hampshire to produce the most detailed greenhouse gas emissions
inventory carried out for any college in the country--the precursor to
a campus-wide climate plan. Similar projects are underway with the
University of Vermont and Bates College in Maine. Students at
Connecticut College have voted with their pocketbooks and signed the
campus up for green electricity.
Many businesses in the Northeast are showing the way for the
corporate sector. IBM (NY) and Johnson and Johnson (NJ) were the first
to set ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets as members of the
Climate Savers program of World Wildlife Fund and the Center for Energy
and Climate Solutions. Pitney Bowes (CT) is a leader in developing
corporate markets for green power and Timberland (NH) has partnered
with Clean Air-Cool Planet and Vermont-based NativeEnergy to invest in
new wind energy and permanently retire the CO<INF>2</INF> credits from
tradable renewable energy certificates (T-RECS). Other companies are
convincingly demonstrating that common sense investments in energy
saving can pay off handsomely.
For example, Massachusetts-based Shaw's Supermarkets has 185 stores
and employs nearly 30,000 people in New England. In 2000, Shaw's
realized $3.7 million from energy savings alone. Typically, a
supermarket would have to sell $150 million worth of groceries to make
that much money.
New York-based Verizon is another important leader in energy
conservation. Its efforts are now producing $20 million a year in net
savings. Verizon's projects range from encouraging employees to turn
off personal computers when not in use (saving approximately $50 in
energy costs for each PC each year), and removing more than 200,000
unnecessary lights, to carrying out energy audits in more than 500
buildings and developing fuel cell systems.
need for federal action to control co<INF>2</INF>
These stories are just the tip of the iceberg. All over New England
and the Northeast, individuals, institutions and corporations are
inventing, exploring and implementing innovative solutions to climate
change. But this is not enough. John Donne famously said ``no man is an
island; entire of itself. Every man is a piece of the continent, a part
of the main''. No individual, no city, no State and not even a region
as big as a middle-sized nation, as the Northeast is, can solve the
problem of climate change on its own. As everyone knows by now, the
United States is the world's largest single emitter of greenhouse
gases. Without action by the United States we cannot hope to stabilize
the world's climate. Without national legislation, regional efforts
such as those in the Northeast will founder and ultimately fail.
A strong national response to climate change and a modern energy
policy are both crucial if we are to continue to grow our economy,
strengthen the country's energy security and act as responsible
stewards of our environment.
Energy efficiency and alternative fuels are the real routes to
energy security, not drilling in pristine wilderness areas. If we are
serious about reducing our reliance on foreign oil and about competing
in world markets we must produce more efficient automobiles. If we want
energy security and more jobs we should aim to be producing 20 percent
of our electricity for renewable resources--wind, solar, biomass and
geothermal--by the year 2020.
Federal controls on CO<INF>2</INF> are essential and urgently
needed. By dealing with all four pollutants at once and promoting
energy conservation the Clean Power Act can save us tens of millions of
dollars in comparison to three pollutant strategies that focus only on
end of pipe solutions and ignore carbon dioxide. Local and regional
leadership such as is commonplace in the Northeast is important and
groundbreaking. But, there can be no substitute for coordinated
national action, and eventually, economy-wide controls on
CO<INF>2</INF>.
Despite the fact that there is considerable uncertainty about the
precise costs of impacts of climate change on New England, there is
very little doubt that it will have a transformative effect on many of
the attributes that make the region unique. The loss of sugar maples,
changes in the northern forest, warmer winters, more frequent heat-
waves and destruction of coastal wetlands will radically diminish the
New England experience and may ultimately deliver a body blow to
elements of the region's economy.
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I would be
happy to try to answer any questions you may have.
______
Responses by Adam Markham to Additional Questions from Senator Jeffords
Question 1. Your testimony illustrated well the potential
environmental and economic impacts facing New England in a warmer
climate, and you also enlightened us about current pro-active business
projects aimed at lowering greenhouse gas emissions. In your
experience, what reasons have these companies given to explain their
motivation for early action on energy conservation and climate change
mitigation?
Response. In my experience, the prime motivation has been a
recognition that by seeking to reduce wasteful energy use, a company
can invariably save significant amounts of money. Bottom-line benefits
translate to increased shareholder value and confidence and often to
increased competitiveness in the market. Other reasons we often hear
include:
<bullet> Wanting to be seen as an environmentally responsible
<bullet> Certain actions, such as increased day-lighting in
buildings help with worker productivity and employee retention
<bullet> Increasing business efficiency
<bullet> Recognition that customers want to buy from
environmentally responsible companies
<bullet> Getting ahead of potential future legislation
<bullet> Taking advantage of available new technologies
Question 2. The findings of the New England Regional Assessment are
very disturbing. The assessment describes a significantly changed
regional environment. What do people in New England think about it?
Response. It is difficult to answer this question with more than
anecdotal information as I know of no recent New England specific
public opinion work on this topic. But on the evidence of newspaper
articles, letters to the editor and many conversations with people in a
variety of sectors, as well as national opinion polls and focus groups,
I would say that people are generally convinced that global warming is
happening, that it is a serious problem and that we ought to do
something about it, sooner rather than later. In New England, there is
growing concern about shorter winters and the potential for increased
drought and worse snow and ice conditions. In southern New Hampshire,
where I live, at least, it is a common topic of conversation that
winters are warmer than they used to be and that summers appear hotter
and drier, with worse air pollution. People are particularly worried
about the threat to coasts, forests and public health. New Englanders
appear to feel that there is a lack of commitment to solving this
problem in Washington, and in common with people in many parts of the
country they lay much of the blame on the oil and auto industries.
Question 3. Has this year's unusual weather and the drought in the
Northeast encouraged people to pay closer attention to climate change
issues?
Response. I don't think there can be any doubt that the current
drought and a series of unusual and extreme weather events over the
last few years have made many people think much more seriously about
the potential consequences of climate change. Of course, no single
weather event can be attributed to global warming, but people see a
pattern of change that is beginning to concern them.
Question 4. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not
safe to continue increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit.
What needs to be done to assure that we can avert the point of no
return or ``dangerous levels'' of greenhouse gas concentrations?
Response. I believe that we need to take immediate action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The current Senate 4-pollutant bill would be
a very important step forward if passed into law. Strengthened CAFE
standards are also an essential element of a strategy to prevent
dangerous levels. We will eventually also need economy-wide measures to
reduce greenhouse gases. In the near future we need to see renewable
portfolio standards and strong appliance efficiency standards as well
as increased incentives for the development and marketing of renewable
energy technologies and building energy efficiency.
Question 5. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30-
50 years, of continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas
emissions? And, what is the most feasible way to reduce or eliminate
that risk?
Response. The greatest risk is that we fail to act urgently and
responsibly to begin reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Failure to act
will lock us into accelerating sea-level rise causing massive economic
losses in the coastal zone and increased loss of habitat and species
extinction. The most feasible way to reduce the risk is to regulate
CO<INF>2</INF> first from power stations and then economy-wide, while
at the same time giving incentives for energy efficiency and the
development and use of renewable technologies and alternate sources of
energy.
______
Responses by Adam Markham to Additional Questions from Senator Smith
Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ``during the 20th Century,
the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.'' Do you agree
with that statement? Why or why not?
Response. I do agree with that statement, based on the conclusions
of the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change and the recent review by the National Academy of
Sciences.
Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ``the primary cause for . . .
growth in impact[] is the increasing vulnerability of human and
environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in
climate, per se.'' Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?
Response. While it is true that human and environmental systems are
increasingly vulnerable to climate change and variability, I do not
believe that this is the primary cause of growth in impacts (except
perhaps in the particular case of fast developing coastal areas). For
example, worldwide glacier recession, melting permafrost and
unprecedented bark beetle infestation in Alaska, earlier Northern
hemisphere spring and changes in species distribution are entirely
independent of human vulnerability.
Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ``the present research
agenda is focused . . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate
future'' and that ``instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no
. . . we might be better served by addressing things like the present
drought. . . .'' Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why not?
Response. In general I do not agree with this statement. However,
it is certainly true that we need to increase and expand our research
efforts to understand the impacts of climate change. Improving the
ability of computer models to simulate future potential climate
scenarios is an essential part of this effort. I do agree that we are
not well served arguing ``yes or no'' about global warming. There is
clear scientific consensus that we are already experiencing human
induced global warming.
Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. Yes, I believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol. As far as I know the 6/100 of a degree figure is not within
the generally accepted range of impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, but I
have not specifically reviewed the paper in question. Nevertheless, it
is generally accepted that the Kyoto Protocol targets are merely first
steps toward reaching the levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations that we need to stabilize at. The Kyoto Protocol
contains review mechanisms to allow policymakers to react to new
scientific findings.
Question 5. In the hearing there has been much press attention paid
to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton
iceberg known as ``Larsen B,'' that has been attributed to climate
change. What scientific evidence is there that climate change is the
sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that
anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. I have no expert knowledge on this question.
Question 6. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty; Coping with the risks of climate change'' (copy
attached). Please explain why you agree or disagree with the following
assertions or conclusions from that report:
Response. ``There is not one problem but two: natural climate
variability and the influence of human activity on the climate
system.''
This statement is undoubtedly true and it is highly significant
that the insurance industry has recognized the addition of the new
threat of human-induced climate change.
``. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts
of protection are developed. These must take into account the fact that
the maximum strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a
given location cannot be predicted.''
I agree that under natural climate variability and in the case of
increased vulnerability due to global warming, it is not possible to
accurately predict the worst case scenario for any individual weather
event in a particular place. We can, however, prepare for the
likelihood of hanges infrequency and intensity of extreme events in
general and should expect to have to deal with worse impacts in the
future. Risk minimization can no longer be assessed in the expectation
of a continuing stable climate.
``Swiss Reconsiders it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a
collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which--if
they are not confirmed--will in time turn to carefree relief, and (2)
to play down the climate problem for reasons of short-term expediency,
since the demand for sustainable development requires that today's
generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of this
kind.''
I agree that we should not over-emphasize worst case scenarios and
I agree strongly that short-term expediency should not lead anyone to
ignore or play down the potential impacts of climate change. We should
provide the best possible information to the public and policymakers
about the full range of potential scenarios and impacts.
Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. Vulnerability to extreme weather seems to be increasing.
This is likely because of changes in demographic patterns and,
particularly, increased development pressures in sensitive ecosystems
and coastal areas.
______
Responses by Adam Markham to Additional Questions from Senator
Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. If such a target was adopted (as I believe it should be
in order to safeguard U.S. ecosystems, communities and economic well-
being) these caps would be the subject of negotiations among the
ratifying parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The United States has given
notice of its intent not to participate in such negotiations, nor abide
by their results.
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis.
Response. I am not personally aware of any recent economic analysis
of this sort.
Question 2. Do your projections of impacts on New England depend on
foreign models?
Response. Some of the research results outlined in my testimony are
based on foreign models, others are not. The New England Regional
Assessment was carried out under the auspices of the U.S. Global Change
Research Program and at the time of it's initiation, the best available
models were Canadian and British. If carried out today, the best
available models would certainly include the newest U.S. versions.
Other studies dealing with Impacts of climate change on sugar maple
forests, sea level rise and ecosystems outlined in the report use both
foreign and U.S. models but rely mainly on U.S. developed climate
models.
Question 3. Do your projections of impacts depend on using models
to project regional and local climate change?
Response. Most projections of potential climate impacts rely on
model scenarios. The computer models provide the best available tools
for creating plausible future climate scenarios in order to undertake
risk and sensitivity analyses. Model scenarios do not provide
predictions of future climate, only potential scenarios, based on best
current knowledge and analytical capability.
Question 4. What happens if the climate effects are lower than the
lowest scenario in the NERA study?
Response. Presumably there would be a different set of impacts from
those analysed in NERA, just as there would be if the climate effects
were higher than the highest scenario. NERA assessed a middle range of
scenarios, not the highest or lowest.
Question 5. Please provide your most recent filings of Form 990's.
Response. Provided separately by fax. (Copy retained in the
committee's file.)
______
Response by Adam Markham to an Additional Question from Senator
Campbell
Question. You have given us multiple examples of the impacts of
climate change in New England and I am sure many of these would apply
to the rest of the country as well. My question to you is this: if we
don't know whether human activity is a direct cause of the global
change in climate, how can we make any determination that a change in
the energy policy of the United States could effectively prevent it
from continuing? Let's assume that we can't. Wouldn't it also be of
great value for us to find ways to reduce our vulnerability to climate
change?
Response. Current scientific consensus is that emissions released
to the atmosphere as a result of human activities are increasing
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and that this is the
most likely cause of observed global warming during the last century.
The primary source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases is the burning of
fossil fuels so it stands to reason that changes in energy policy would
impact global warming.
I believe we should attempt to both reduce the source of the
problem and reduce our vulnerability to its impacts.
__________
Statement of Dr. Sallie Baliunas, Astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian
Center for Astrophysics
Fossil fuels currently provide around 84 percent of energy consumed
in the United States, and roughly 80 percent of the energy produced
worldwide. Those energy resources are key to improving the human
condition and the environment.
Human use of fossil fuels has increased the amount of greenhouse
gases, in particular, carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide
is essential to life on Earth. Moreover, the greenhouse effect is
important to life on Earth in that the greenhouse gases help retain
energy near the surface that would otherwise escape to space. Based on
ideas about how climate works, the small additional energy resulting
from the air's increased carbon dioxide content should warm the planet.
Projections of future energy use, applied to the scientifically
most sophisticated computer simulations of climate, have yielded wide-
ranging forecasts of future temperature increases from a continued
increase of carbon dioxide concentration in the air. These have been
compiled by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The middle range forecast of their estimates of future
warming, based on expected growth in fossil fuel use without any curbs,
is for a 1 degree Celsius increase between now and 2050. A simulation
counting in the effect of the as yet unimplemented Kyoto Protocol,
negotiated in 1997 and calling for a worldwide 5 percent cut in carbon
dioxide emissions from 1990 levels, would reduce that increase to
0.94C--an insignificant 0.06C cut (Figure 1). That means if increased
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are a major problem, then
much steeper cuts than those outlined in the Kyoto Protocol are
warranted.
One key scientific question is: What has been the response of the
climate thus far to the small amount of energy added by humans from
increased greenhouse gases in the air? To prove the reliability of
their future forecasts, computer simulations need verification by
testing past, well-documented temperature fluctuations. New Federal
investment in technology, especially that of space-based
instrumentation, has helped address the issue of observed response of
the climate to the air's increased greenhouse gas concentration. Two
capitol tests of the reliability of the computer simulations are the
past decades of surface temperature and lower troposphere change.
record of surface temperature
In the 20th century the global average surface temperature (Figure
2) rose about 0.5C, after a 500-year cool period called the Little Ice
Age. The uncharacteristic cold had followed a widespread warm interval,
called the Medieval Warm Period (ca. 800--1200 C.E.). The 20th century
warming trend may have a human component attributable to fossil fuel
use, which increased sharply in the 20th century. But a closer look at
the 20th century temperature shows three distinct trends:
First, a strong warming trend of about 0.5C began in the late 19th
century and peaked around 1940. Next, the temperature decreased from
1940 until the late 1970's. Recently, a third trend has emerged--a
modest warming from the late 1970's to the present.
Because about 80 percent of the carbon dioxide from human
activities was added to the air after 1940, the early 20th century
warming trend had to be largely natural. Human effects from increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases amount to at most 0.1C per decade--
the maximum amount of the surface warming trend seen since the late
1970's. This surface warming would suggest a temperature trend of about
1C per century, which is less than that predicted by the computer
simulations of the air's increased human-made greenhouse gas content.
Accumulated over a century, civilization will readily adapt to such a
modest warming trend. However, the recent trend in surface warming may
not be primarily attributable to human-made greenhouse gases.
record of lower troposphere temperature
Computer simulations of climate in which the air's greenhouse gas
concentrations increase owing to human activities predict detectable
warming not only near the surface but also in the layer of air above
the surface, the lower troposphere, which rises in altitude from
roughly two to eight kilometers. Records from NASA's Microwave Sounder
Units aboard satellites extend back 21 years and cover most of the
globe (Figure 3). The satellite-derived record is validated
independently by measurements from NOAA balloon radiosonde instruments,
and those records extend back over 40 years (Figure 4). Those records
show that the temperature of the lower troposphere does vary, e.g., the
strong El Nino warming pulse of 1997-98 is obvious. However, no
meaningful human warming trend, as forecast by the computer
simulations, can be found.
The radiosonde record from balloons confirms the results of the
satellites. Although the radiosonde record lacks the dense spatial
coverage from satellites, the radiosonde record extends back to 1957, a
period that includes the recent rapid rise in the air's carbon dioxide
concentration. The balloon record shows no warming trend in global
average temperature prior to the dramatic shift in 1976-77. That
warming, known as the Great Pacific Climate Shift of 1976--1977, is not
attributable to human causes but is a natural, shift in the Pacific
that occurs every 20 to 30 years, and can affect global average
temperatures.
When compared to the observed response of the climate system, the
computer simulations all have forecast warming trends much steeper over
the last several decades than measured. The forecasts exaggerate to
some degree the warming at the surface, and profoundly in the lower
troposphere.
The complexity of the computer simulations of climate is one reason
the forecasts are unreliable.\1\ The simulations must track over 5
million parameters. To simulate climate change for a period of several
decades is a computational task that requires
10,000,000,000,000,000,000 degrees of freedom. To improve the
forecasts, much better information is required, including accurate
understanding of the two major, natural greenhouse gas effects--water
vapor and clouds.
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\1\ W. Soon, S. Baliunas, S.B. Idso, K. Ya. Kondratyev and E.S.
Posmentier, 2001, ``Modeling climatec effects of anthropogenic carbon
dioxide emissions: unknowns and uncertainties,'' Climate Research,
18:259-275. See attached.
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natural climate variability: the sun's influence
Given the lack of an observed warming trend in the lower
troposphere, the result is that most of the surface warming in recent
decades cannot owe to a human-caused enhanced greenhouse effect. What
might cause the surface warming, especially in the early 20th century
when greenhouse gases from human activities had not significantly
increased in concentration in the atmosphere? The 20th century
temperature pattern shows a strong correlation to energy output of the
sun (Figure 5). Although the causes of the changing sun's particle,
magnetic and energy outputs are uncertain, as are the responses of the
climate to the Sun's various changes, the correlation is pronounced. It
explains especially well the early 20th century warming trend, which
cannot have much human contribution.
Based on the key temperature measurements of the last several
decades, the actual response of the climate to the increased
concentration of carbon dioxide and other human-made greenhouse gases
content in the air has shown no significant man-made global warming
trend. The magnitude of expected human change is especially constrained
by the observed temperature trends of the lower troposphere.
This means that the human global warming effect, if present, is
small and slow to develop. That creates a window of time and
opportunity to continue and improve observations and computer
simulations of climate to better define the magnitude of human-made
warming. Proposals like the Kyoto agreement to sharply cut greenhouse
gas emissions are estimated in most economic studies to have enormous
economic, social and environmental costs. The cost estimates for the
United States alone amount to $100 billion to $400 billion per year.
Those costs would fall disproportionately on America's and the world's
elderly and poor.
figure captions
Figure 1--Forecast of year-to-year temperature rise from years 2000
to 2050 C.E. (thin line) assuming an increase in the air's greenhouse
gas concentration from human activities, based on the Hadley Center's
model (UKMO HADCM3 IS92A version). The upper line (labeled ``Without
Kyoto'') is the linear trend fit to the model's forecast temperature
rise, without implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The lower line is
the estimate of the impact on temperature with the implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol. By the year 2050, around 0.06C global warming is
averted by the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.
Figure 2--Surface temperature changes sampled worldwide and
analyzed by Cambridge Research Unit (CRU) and NASA-Goddard Institute of
Space Studies (GISS). The pattern of 20th century temperature change
has three distinct phases: an early 20th-century warming, a mid-century
cooling, and a late 20th-century warming.
Figure 3--Monthly averaged temperatures sampled nearly globally for
the lower troposophere (roughly 5,000 to 28,000 feet altitude) from
Microwave Sounder Unit (MSU) instruments onboard NASA satellites. The
large spike of warmth resulted from the temporary natural warming of
the Pacific Ocean by the 1997--1998 El Nino event. The linear trend is
+0.04C per decade (data are from http://wwwghcc.msfc.nasa.gov/
temperature/)
Figure 4--The seasonal average temperature anomaly sampled
worldwide for the lower troposphere as measured by radiosonde
instruments carried aboard balloons. Although a linear trend of +0.09C
per decade is present if fitted across the entire period of the record,
that trend is affected by the presence of the abrupt warming that
occurred in 1976-1977, owing to the action of the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation (PDO). The trends before and after the 1976-1977 Great
Pacific Climate Shift indicate no evidence of a significant human-made
warming trend (source of data http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/
temp/angell/glob.dat)
Figure 5--Changes in the sun's magnetism (as evidenced by the
changing length of the 22-year, or Hale Polarity Cycle, dotted line)
and changes in Northern Hemisphere land temperature (solid line) are
closely correlated. The sun's shorter magnetic cycles are more intense,
suggesting periods of a brighter sun, then a fainter sun during longer
cycles. Lags or leads between the two curves that are shorter than 20
years are not significant, owing to the 22-year timeframe of the proxy
for brightness change. The record of reconstructed Northern Hemisphere
land temperature substitutes for global temperature, which is
unavailable back to 1700 (S. Baliunas and W. Soon, 1995, Astrophysical
Journal, 450, 896).
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Responses by Dr. Sallie Baliunas to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. You indicated that a ``Kyoto-type cut would avert the
temperature rise by the year 2050 by only .06 degrees Centrigrade.''
Using the same assumptions that brought you to that conclusion, how
much warming would occur by 2050, if U.S. emissions continue to grow at
the current annual rate (2 percent) until then?
Response. By 2050 one published model (M. Parry et al., 1998,
Nature, 395, 741) forecasts a temperature rise of approximately 1.4C
with continued U.S. emissions growing at the current rate, and no
emission cuts by developing nations.
Question 2. How much warming would be avoided by a ``Kyoto-cut''
in the year 2100, assuming U.S. participation in the Kyoto timeframe?
Response. By the year 2100 the model cited above should forecast
approximately 0.1C of warming averted if the United States implemented
a Kyoto-type cut according to the current Kyoto Protocol timeframe.
Question 3. Balloon radiosonde records confirm satellite results,
according to your testimony. However, the radiosonde record extends
back only to 1957. Why does it make sense to use these records to
determine the absence of a significant warming trend, when competing
and reliable temperature recordings date back to the pre-industrial
era--before humankind began emitting large quantities of greenhouse
gases?
Response. No reliable globally averaged surface temperature records
date back to the preindustrial period. The present surface temperature
record gotten from thermometers that sample locations worldwide reaches
back to the mid-19th century. Some of the thermometer readings are
prone to warming from local urbanization. That uncertainty, plus the
sparse coverage of the surface readings--only about 20 percent of the
surface of the Earth, with especially poor coverage of the Southern
Hemisphere oceans are sampled in the thermometer record, introduce
uncertainty not easily quantified in the surface record. In contrast,
the satellite records cover more than 80 percent of the globe, and are
validated by the independent records from balloon radiosonde
instruments. For a technical discussion, see W. Soon et al., 1999,
Climate Research, 13, 149.
Question 4. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is
not safe to continue increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit.
What needs to be done to assure that we can avert the point of not
return or ``dangerous levels'' of greenhouse gas concentrations?
Response. As a rhetorical question, the statement is
philosophically true. However, it is not possible for science to give a
reliable, quantitative assessment of ``dangerous'' in that context.
Question 5. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30-
50 years, of continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas
emissions? And, what is the most feasible way to reduce or eliminate
that risk?
Response. According to the key measurements of the lower
troposphere, there is little risk of catastrophic global warming risk
in the next 30 to 50 years from the expected profile of the atmospheric
increase in human-made greenhouse gas emissions. To reduce the
uncertainty, an enhanced, targeted program of decisive climate
research--both measurements and theory--should be implemented and
supported for a decade or longer period.
______
Responses by Dr. Sallie Baliunas to Additional Questions from Senator
Smith
Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ``during the 20th century,
the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.'' Do you agree
with that statement? Why or why not?
Response. I agree that during the 20th century the air's content of
certain greenhouse gases, most notably carbon dioxide, have increased
owing to human activities. The key question is what has been the
response of climate to the increased in the air's concentration of
greenhouse gases.
Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ``the primary cause for . . .
growth in impact[] is the increasing vulnerability of human and
environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in
climate, per se.'' Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?
Response. I agree that vulnerability to climate change has
increased in some, but by no means all, situations. For example,
hurricanes are the most costly destructive natural phenomena in the
United States. While hurricane damage and property losses have
increased greatly in the last 100 years, loss of life has acutely
declined. A powerful, unnamed hurricane struck Galveston in 1900,
killing more than 8,000 people. An also powerful hurricane, Andrew,
struck a very densely populated area of south Florida in 1991.
Hurricane Andrew tragically killed around 50 people, yet thousands of
lives were saved by technological advances such as sturdy buildings and
satellite imagery that gave early hurricane strike warning. The
insurable property damage for Hurricane Andrew hit a record tens of
billions of dollars. Expensive development in areas of likely hurricane
strike has made society more vulnerable to hurricanes in terms of
property loss. On the other hand, Hoover Dam built in the 1930's has
reduced environmental, property and human catastrophe that had occurred
with the recurrent but unpredictable flooding of the Colorado River.
Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ``the present research
agenda is focused . . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate
future'' and that ``instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no
. . . we might be better served by addressing things like the present
drought . . .'' Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why not?
Response. I agree that more attention should be paid to predicting,
mitigating and adapting to weather phenomena like hurricanes,
hailstorms, blizzards, streamflow flooding, early frosts and tornadoes.
To the extent that research funding for those ever-present weather
calamities needs to be obtained from study of climate simulations over
distant horizons, that is a policy decision I am unequipped to make.
Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. Implementing the Kyoto Protocol would make no meaningful
difference in the averted temperature rise forecast for the next 50 or
100 years, according to the predictions shown by, e.g., the U.N. IPCC
TAR.
Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention
paid to the breakup of the Anarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion
ton iceberg know as ``Larsen B'' that has been attributed to climate
change. What scientific evidence is there that climate change is the
sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that
anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. No reliable evidence posits the calving of the Larsen B
iceberg to human-made global warming. The peninsula on which the Larsen
Ice Shelf rests has warmed over the last 50 years. However, the climate
simulations say the entire region of Antarctica should have shown a
warming trend over the last several decades; in the last 50 years the
majority of the Antarctic continent has cooled. The calving of the
Larsen B iceberg must therefore be a natural phenomenon, caused in part
by the local, natural temperature rise and also by changes in, e.g.,
sea salinity, orography, wind, and sea currents.
Question 6a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty: Copying with the risks of climate change''
(copy attached). Please explain why you agree or disagree with the
following assertions or conclusions from that report: A. ``There is not
one problem but two natural climate variability and the influence of
human activity on the climate system.''
Response. Because natural climate variability is the backdrop
against which human climate effects must be judged, understanding
natural variability is prerequisite to detecting human climate effects.
The problems are closely interrelated.
Question 6b. ``. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-
ranging concepts of protection are developed. These must take into
account the fact that the maximum strength and frequency of extreme
weather conditions at a given location cannot be predicted.
Response. The statement is tantamount to saying that models have no
regional credibility for predicting weather events, which is
scientifically true.
Question 6c. Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the
case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears
which--if they are not confirmed--will in time turn to carefree relief,
and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons of short-term
expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that
today's generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of
this kind.
Response. The consequence of Swiss Re's statement is that
technology ought to proceed in a timely and sufficiently supported way
to understand natural climate variability, as well as adaptation and
mitigation to dangerous weather events that have, and will continue, to
wreck destruction on humans and the environment.
Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. Some developing nations have become more vulnerable to
extreme weather events, but the events have not been demonstrated to
owe to the air's increased content of human-produced greenhouse gases.
The United States should continue to lead in mitigating weather
vulnerability by committing to elevating those nations from poverty,
starvation and lack of education.
______
Responses by Dr. Sallie Baliunas to Additional Questions from Senator
Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. The United States by the year 2050 would be required to
produce zero emissions of carbon dioxide and other human-made
greenhouse gases. By the year 2100, U.S. emissions would have to be
negative.
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis.
Response. In my estimation, no study adequately addresses the
enormous economic costs to the United States for such a scenario.
Question 2a. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the
various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe:
Satellite.
Response. The satellite Microwave Sounder Unit Measurements,
covering about 85 percent of the globe, are validated by several sets
of independent balloon radiosonde measurements. Where the measurements
overlap, the satellite and balloon records have a nearly perfect
correlation--with a 99 percent correlation coefficient. The satellite
measurements seem precise to 0.01 C.
Question 2b. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the
various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe:
Weather balloon.
Response. The balloon radiosonde measurements are in substantial
agreement with the satellite records where they overlap. Both therefore
give reliable trends of the temperature of the lower troposphere
because they are independent measurements.
Question 2c. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the
various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe:
Surface--land.
Response. It is difficult to estimate the global surface
temperature to within a tenth of a degree C. Land surface measurements
over the United States and parts of Europe are the most reliable going
back about a century. The records have been corrected as best as
possible for, e.g., the urban heat island effect produced by increased
population, urban mechanization, vegetation removal, albedo changes,
etc., but the corrections are uncertain. The sea surface records are
scarce. It is difficult to estimate the uncertainty owing to the lack
of sampling for nearly 80 percent of the globe in the averaged surface
temperature, where vast areas of the Southern Hemisphere oceans were
not sampled.
Question 2d. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the
various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe:
Surface--ocean.
Response. It is difficult to estimate the global surface
temperature to within a tenth of a degree C. Land surface measurements
over the United States and parts of Europe are the most reliable going
back about a century. The records have been corrected as best as
possible for, e.g., the urban heat island effect produced by increased
population, urban mechanization, vegetation removal, albedo changes,
etc., but the corrections are uncertain. The sea surface records are
scarce. It is difficult to estimate the uncertainty owing to the lack
of sampling for nearly 80 percent of the globe in the averaged surface
temperature, where vast areas of the Southern Hemisphere oceans were
not sampled.
Question 3. Can you provide documentation that includes temperature
proxy indications for at least the last 1,000 years covering the
Medieval period?
Response. A very few of the numerous articles documenting climate
change going back at least 1,000 years include J. Esper et al., 2002,
Science, 295, 2250; J.M. Grove, 2001, Climate Change, 48, 53; C.
Pfister et al. 1998, Holocene, 8, 535; and W.S. Broecker, 2001,
Science, 291, 1497.
Question 4. What are the effects of removing black soot from the
atmosphere? What are the benefits of using U.S. clean coal technology
in countries like China and India in terms of removing black soot?
Response. The effect of removing significant amounts of black soot
from the atmosphere would be to improve substantially the health of
humans and the environment from this pollutant. Efforts should be made
to help severe pollution producers like China and India to prevent
emission of soot from their coal burning facilities.
Question 5. What are the magnitudes of the various inputs to the
climate and what are their contributions (cooling, warming)?
Response. This is the capitol question. The magnitudes of the
inputs, and, critically, the responses of the climate system to those
agents of climate forcing are inaccurately known. For example, all
climate simulations assume water vapor in the upper troposphere
produces a large amplification of the small warming that occurs from
doubling the air's carbon dioxide concentration. Yet satellite
measurements of the amount of water vapor in the upper troposphere
suggest that that layer of air is too dry to support the presumed
amplification mechanism. Moreover, the lower troposphere should have
responded with a significant global warming trend over the last two
decades--but the reliable, verified satellite temperature record shows
little human-made warming trend. Thus, all models make an assumption
that is unsupported by the existing evidence. As Prof. Richard Lindzen
of MIT has said of this assumption, it is likely a ``computational
artifact'' that serves to produce exaggerated trends of human-made
global warming. Second to water vapor in producing the strongest
positive feedback effect is the influence of clouds, whose properties
and interactions with the climate system remain highly uncertain.
Question 6. Can you document the uncertainties reflected in the NRC
June 2001 ``Climate Change Science'' underlying report?
Response. Several of the uncertainties have been previously
discussed, for example, W. Soon et al., 2001, Climate Research, 18,
259, as attached to my original testimony.
Question 7. Please provide the documentation of how the NRC report
(June 2001) addressed the satellite, weather balloon, and surface
temperature measurements.
Response. The report largely did not resolve the discrepancy
between the satellite and surface discrepancy. For a technical
discussion of the underlying issue, please see W. Soon et al., 1999,
Climate Research, 13,149.
Question 8. Given your interpretation of gradual change in climate,
what is the recommended course of action with regard to scientific
modeling?
Response. First, assume that the results of the climate models,
whose global warming trends calculated for the last two decades of
satellite data are roughly a factor of five too high compared to the
validated observations, are, perplexingly, correct. A delay of up to
three decades in implementing sharp greenhouse gas emission cuts should
produce a negligible additional warming by the year 2100 compared to
natural fluctuations in the climate, even in the case of the current
climate models that exaggerate the present global warming trends. And,
if the human global climate trend is much smaller than the models
predict, as the scientific evidence now suggests, then the window of
opportunity for improving climate science is longer than three decades.
In terms of action, one might consider: getting critical measurements
meant improve understanding of natural climate variability, including
the physics of water vapor, clouds and important sunclimate
interactions.
Question 9. Dr. Baliunas, when Dr. Lindzen testified before this
committee last year he made a statement that ``no model explains any
major feature of the climate.'' Could you explain this for me. Are our
models capable of explaining climate phenomena?
Response. As Prof. Lindzen correctly stated, no general circulation
model of global climate change properly simulates any major feature of
the climate. That includes natural phenomena like El Nino Southern
Oscillation (ENSO), sea ice variability, decadal oscillations such as
the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation (PDO), the Quasi-Biennial Oscillation (QBO), circulation of
energy from the equator to the polar regions, clouds, precipitation
patterns and water vapor. The fact that no global model correctly
accounts for any of these features of climate means that no global
model can possibly account for all of those features. Current global
climate simulations cannot yet make reliable forecasts, especially 100
years into the future.
______
Response by Dr. Sallie Baliunas to an Additional Question from Senator
Campbell
Question. In your testimony, you say that it is ``impossible to
have a verified and validated climate model'' due to the variability of
natural systems. It would seem then that predicting climate change
would be like predicting chaos. How accurately are you able to make
sense of the madness?
Response. Technically speaking, chaos is a deterministic
mathematical tool that can yield calculated results that are widely
separated even for only slightly different starting points in the
calculation. The results are repeatable, but may be extremely sensitive
to slightly different starting points. The climate system may be partly
or wholly chaotic, but the information is not yet available to
determine if climate is so. Some research focuses on chaos calculations
in climate simulations. The lack of a reliable global climate forecast
of which I spoke depends on having as an essential starting point a
verified and validated global simulation, which does not yet exist. One
reason why the global simulations lack validity is that the physics of
the major, relevant factors in natural variability are simply not known
with enough certainty at present. In that regard, it is also not useful
to consider as a reliable forecast an average of a suite of forecasts
from different climate simulations, each of which fails validation.
Improving the reliability of forecasts requires significantly reducing
the uncertainty of natural variability--the fluctuations against which
human climate effects must be estimated.
__________
Statement of Dr. Martin Whittaker, Innovest Strategic Value Advisors,
Inc.
``The greatest challenge facing the world at the beginning of the
21st century is climate change . . . Not only is climate change the
world's most pressing problem, it is also the issue where business
could most effectively adopt a leadership role.'' Proceedings of the
World Economic Forum Annual General Meeting, Davos, February 2000.
Climate change is rapidly becoming a major issue for U.S. companies
and fiduciaries. The increasingly global nature of industrial
competition, institutional investment strategies, and legislated
disclosure requirements mean that company directors and other
fiduciaries in North America should see climate change as a major
business risk--and opportunity.
In the private sector, climate change has rapidly developed into a
major strategic--and practical--issue for both industrial corporations
and their investors. The competitive and financial consequences for
individual companies can be huge: Innovest's own research has indicated
that the discounted future costs of meeting even `softened' Kyoto
targets correspond to 11.5 percent of total current market value for
the most carbon-intensive U.S. electric utility to 0.2 percent in the
least; and up to 45 percent of current share value. Increasingly severe
climatic events have the potential to stress P&C insurers and
reinsurers to the point of impaired profitability and even insolvency;
indeed, insurance analysts at one major U.S. investment bank are
already known to have lowered their earnings estimates to account for
`what appears to be a higher-than-normal level of catastrophes' during
early 2001.
By the same token, recent studies give grounds for optimism that
the right blend of market based policies, if skillfully introduced, can
substantially reduce the direct and indirect costs of mitigation and
perhaps even produce a net economic benefit. Indeed, several leading
insurance, fund management and industrial companies are already poised
with risk management programs and innovative new solutions that promote
both GHG emissions reductions and their own bottom lines. Our research
shows that, for a variety of reasons, businesses practicing sound
environmental management also enjoy enhanced competitive advantage and
superior share price performance.
There is therefore an increasingly compelling need for corporate
board members, pension fund trustees, and asset managers to take the
climate change issue far more seriously than they have to date as a
major and legitimate fiduciary responsibility.
A number of major drivers are currently converging to propel
climate change to a much more prominent place on the agendas of company
directors and executives, as well as those of a growing number of
institutional investors:
strengthening scientific consensus
The most recent report by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change) actually strengthened warnings from its earlier work
regarding the rate, extent and consequences of climate change. The
report accelerated climate change time horizons and identified the
possibility that at some unknown threshold, sudden and largely
irreversible shifts in global climate pattern may occur. Developing
countries are predicted to bear the brunt of future climate turbulence.
A new report by the U.S. National Academy of Scientists released in
March 2002 corroborated these findings, adding that exceeding the
threshold limits could precipitate sudden and abrupt changes which are
far more dramatic than anything that preceded them.\1\ Simulation
modeling indicates that the cost of a single extreme hurricane could
reach as much as $100 billion, on the same scale as the accumulated
pollution damage in the USA since industrialization began.
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\1\ U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Abrupt Climate Change:
Inevitable Surprises, March 2002.
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IPCC scientists also believe that North America has already
experienced challenges posed by changing climates and changing patterns
of regional development and will continue to do so. Varying impacts on
ecosystems and human settlements will exacerbate differences across the
continent in climate-sensitive resource production and vulnerability to
extreme events.
growing recognition of the gravity of potential financial impacts from
weather extremes
Over the past 15 years alone, the word has already suffered nearly
$1 trillion in economic losses due to ``natural'' disasters, roughly
three-quarters of which were directly weather-related.\2\
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\2\ U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Insurance Industry Perspectives
on Global Climate Change, February 2001.
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Munich Re, one of the world's largest reinsurers, recently
estimated that climate change will impose costs of several billion
dollars each year unless urgent measures are taken to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. In the year 2000 alone, global damage reached $100
billion, mostly uninsured, and already simulation modelling shows that
the cost a single extreme hurricane could reach $100 billion, on the
same scale as the accumulated pollution damage in the USA since
industrialisation began.
These concerns have now been echoed by other leading mainstream
financial institutions including Swiss Re, Credit Suisse and Deutsche
Bank. The costs of continued inaction are potentially astronomical, yet
there is growing evidence that aggressive mitigation measures need not
cause the economic harm and dislocation initially feared by many
conservative economic commentators.\3\
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\3\ See, for example, the IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001.
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new understanding of the breadth of sectoral impacts
``As we are beginning to appreciate within the reinsurance
industry, the effects of climate change can be devastating . . .'', Kaj
Ahlman, ex-CEO, Employers Re.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the effects of climate change
will be limited to sectors directly associated with the energy value
chain (including oil and gas, natural gas, pipelines and electric
utilities on the downside, and renewable energy) and those industries
consuming large amounts of energy (steel manufacturing, smelting and
such like).
Recent research makes it clear, however, that the business
ramifications relate not just to energy-intensive industries but also
sectors such as telecommunications and high-technology (which influence
societal resource consumption and provide enabling technologies);
forestry (an integral part of the sustainable energy cycle); automotive
(the primary users of petroleum products and leaders in fuel cell
development); electronics, electrical industries and other equipment
suppliers (where fuel cell technologies are already creating whole new
markets); agriculture (where industries ranging from animal farming to
winegrowing face major potential impacts), tourism and other sectors.
new evidence on company-specific impacts
In addition to the massive aggregate risk exposures noted above,
recent evidence on company-level impacts has revealed:
a. That in some high-impact sectors such as energy and
electric utilities, the climate change-driven threat to
shareholder value could represent as much as 30 percent of the
total market capitalization of major companies; and
b. That even within the same industry sector, firm-specific
climate risk can vary by a factor of nearly 60 times.\4\
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\4\ See, for example, Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, Electric
Utilities Industry Sector Report, 2002
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c. Companies are increasingly finding ways of benefiting from
proactive action on tackling greenhouse gases, either through
win-win energy savings activities or the development of new
products and services based around greater energy efficiency or
GHG-reducing technologies\5\.
\5\ Innovest sector research; Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
Corporate GHG Reduction Targets, 2001
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It clearly behooves fiduciaries and investors to know which
industry sectors and companies are exposed to the greatest risks and
opportunities, and what measures if any are being taken to identify and
manage those risks.
the internationalization of pension fund investment
Ten years ago, only 3.3 percent of U.S. pension funds' equity
investments were in non-U.S. company securities. Today, that proportion
has more than tripled to over 11 percent.\6\ A similar
internationalization of pension fund investing is occurring in
virtually every OECD country. What this means for U.S. fiduciaries is
simply this: The competitiveness of their investee companies--and
therefore their fiduciary responsibilities--will not permit them to
ignore or remain isolated from climate change policy and regulatory
developments in other parts of the world.
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\6\ R.A.G. Monks, The New Global Investor, John Wiley, 2001
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legitimization by mainstream investment institutions
Major international investment houses such as AMP Henderson and
Friends Ivory & Sime have developed sophisticated guidelines for
assessing companies' strategic and operational responses to the climate
change threat. What is more, they have begun to communicate the
importance of the issue to their clients. This initiative by a
mainstream investors will go a considerable distance toward
``legitimizing'' climate change to conservative investors.
A broad coalition of global institutional investors is already
forming to press management at the world's largest companies on
shareholder risks associated with climate change via the `Carbon
Disclosure Project' (CDP). The CDP is a non-aligned Special Project
within the Philanthropic Collaborative at the Rockefeller Brothers
Foundation with the sole purpose of providing a better understanding of
risk and opportunities presented to investment portfolios by actions
stemming from the perception of climate change. To date, institutions
representing over $2 trillion in assets have already joined the
initiative.
In the United States, climate change-related shareholder
resolutions are anticipated against ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco, and
Occidental Petroleum during the current (2002) proxy season. Major
institutional investors including the city of New York and the State of
Connecticut are beginning to flex their financial muscles on the
climate change issue.
expanded view of fiduciary responsibilities
Historically, fiduciary responsibilities have been interpreted
rather narrowly in both the United States and Europe. Fiduciaries'
principal obligation was the maximization of risk-adjusted financial
returns for pension plan beneficiaries, investors, and shareholders.
Since environmental performance was widely seen as injurious or at best
irrelevant to financial returns, the prevailing ethos held that they
were of necessity beyond the legitimate purview of fiduciaries. This
ethos has now begun to shift dramatically: A growing body of research
is making it clear that companies' environmental performance may well
affect financial returns, and is therefore a wholly legitimate concern
for fiduciaries. Legislative reforms of pension legislation in a number
of European countries, is codifying this new ethos into law\7\.
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\7\ See, for example, Baker & McKenzie (Virginia L. Gibson, Bonnie
K. Levitt, and Karine H. Cargo), ``Overview of Social Investments and
Fiduciary Responsibility of County Employee Retirement System Board
Members in California,'' Chicago, 2000
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Recent independent back-test evidence indicates that a diversified
portfolio of more ``sustainable'' companies can be expected to out-
perform one comprised of their less efficient competitors by anywhere
from 150 to 240 basis points or more per annum. In particularly high-
risk sectors such as chemicals and petroleum, Innovest's own research
has revealed that this ``out-performance premium'' for top-quintile
companies can be as great as 500 basis points or even more.
As the chart below illustrates, depending on how much emphasis was
given to environmental performance factors, the out-performance margin
ranged from 180-440 basis points (1.8--4.4 percent). None of this out-
performance can be explained by traditional securities analysis; it
appears to be pure ``eco-value''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
new emphasis on intangible value and disclosure
``Reputation is something which, unlike a petrochemical feedstock
plant, can disappear overnight. We are increasingly getting firms which
are conceptual and Enron being a classic case whose value depends on
reputation and trust. And if you breach that, that value goes away very
rapidly.'' Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank,
Speaking at the Senate Enron Inquiry on Capitol Hill, Washington DC.,
January 25, 2002.
As recently as the mid-1980's, financial statements captured at
least 75 percent on average of the true market value of major
corporations; today the figure is closer to only 15 percent\8\. That
leaves roughly 85 percent of a company's true market value which CANNOT
be explained by traditional financial analysis The yawning disconnect
between companies' book value (hard assets) and what they are really
worth--their market capitalization--is at an all-time historical high.
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\8\ Baruch Lev, Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting.
Washington, DC. Brookings Institution, 2001
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This leaves institutional investors and fiduciaries with an
enormous information deficit, as the recent implosion of Enron vividly
demonstrated. Intangible value drivers are now the strongest
determinants of companies' competitiveness and financial performance.
The growing importance of intangibles to company valuations in the
United States was underscored in a March 2002 announcement by the U.S.
Financial Accounting Standards Board that it will be issuing binding
disclosure requirements about companies' intangible assets within the
next 12 months. This will clearly accelerate the integration of
intangibles into mainstream financial analysis. Internationally, the
growing momentum of other major ``transparency initiatives'' such as
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are certain to add climate change
as a significant new source of business and investment risk.
international legislative momentum
The European Union has already committed itself to a legally
binding timetable for Kyoto implementation, including compulsory taxes
on GHG emissions above prescribed limits, starting in 2005. Taxes on
greenhouse emissions are either proposed or already in effect in
Scandinavia, and the Canadian, Australian and Japanese governments are
also in the process of establishing national emissions abatement plans.
Japan, the U.K. and Canada have both signaled their intent to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol within the coming weeks, probably before the
forthcoming Earth Summit in South Africa. The imperatives of global
competition will clearly impact U.S. companies regardless of any tax or
other regulatory measures which may or may not be forthcoming in the
United States.
domestic political momentum
In response to both domestic and international pressure for a
robust response to Kyoto, President Bush announced his new climate
change policy on February 14, 2002. The administration's Clear Skies
Initiative commits the United States to reduce it greenhouse gas
intensity by 18 percent over the next 10 years, and includes
substantial financial incentives for renewables and clean technologies.
The President's proposed budget for fiscal year 2003 increases spending
on climate change mitigation to $4.5 billion per year.
On February 20, 2002, EPA Administrator Christine Whitman launched
one of the key components of the Bush Administration's new climate
policy, the Climate Leaders protocol. That initiative encourages
companies to report on their emissions of the six major GHG's, using a
reporting framework developed by the World Resources Initiative and the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development. In concert with
similar initiatives elsewhere, this should make a significant
contribution to increasing the level of transparency of carbon risk
exposures and, as a result, increase accountability for both corporate
directors and investment fiduciaries.
In the United States, there are a number of bipartisan bills,
resolutions and legislative proposals currently before the 107th
Congress, several of which, among other things, propose significantly
increased company disclosure of carbon risks, measurement of emissions,
and increased research and development.
new insights into the economics of climate change mitigation measures
The economics of climate change has been a source of considerable
uncertainty and controversy. Several high-profile studies have
estimated the costs of mitigation to be extraordinarily high,
particularly in the United States. However, these estimates have
invariably used worst-case assumptions that necessarily imply high
costs, for example, highly limited or none existent emissions trading
activity, a need to meet short term targets, or limited use of non-
carbon fuels.
Recent studies give grounds for optimism that the right blend of
policies, if skillfully introduced, can substantially reduce the direct
and indirect costs of mitigation and perhaps even produce a net
economic benefit\9\.
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\9\ For example, `Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future', Oak Ridge;
Argonne; Pacific North West; Lawrence Berkeley; National Renewable
Energy Labs, for U.S. Department of Energy, 2001
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the need to look beyond the kyoto protocol
Effectively addressing climate change can only be achieved via the
adoption of more sustainable development pathways that simultaneously
attend to interdependent social, economic and environmental challenges.
While the Kyoto Protocol is a crucial first step in managing the
problem, focusing entirely on the agreement would encompass too narrow
a set of interests and divert attention away from some of the more
fundamental social, environmental, technological and economic issues at
stake. The broader sustainability context of climate change simply must
be appreciated if the issue is to be effectively managed.
Taken separately, few of these trends are sudden or radically new.
What is new, however, is their confluence at a single point in time.
Taken together, they form a kind of ``perfect storm'' which has already
begun to redefine the responsibilities of fiduciaries in the early 21st
century. Together, Innovest believes that they are rapidly moving
climate change to a position of growing prominence on both corporate
and institutional investor's agendas.
Providing the right blend of regulatory pressure and market
mechanisms to allow institutions to incorporate climate-related factors
into future underwriting, lending and asset management activities is a
critical step. Directing institutional capital toward supporting
organic development of new clean energy technologies in their investees
is also crucial. The renewables and clean power technology markets are
becoming increasingly compelling in the search for `win-win' outcomes;
the nascent GHG, CAT bonds, weather derivatives and microfinance/
microinsurance markets also hold substantial promise for strategic
finance and insurance companies.
Ultimately, It is Innovest's belief that unleashing the creative
instincts of the private sector is by far the most effective way of
dealing with environmental pressures. Our research shows that
businesses that practice sound environmental management also enjoy
enhanced stakeholder and customer capital, operate with reduced costs
and less risk, are faster to innovate and generally foster a higher
level of management quality. More importantly, our research also shows
that these benefits translate into sustainable competitive advantage
and superior share price performance. This linkage between
environmental and financial performance therefore creates a virtuous
circle, in which proactive firms are rewarded by investors and
encouraged to continue in their endeavors. Less proactive firms are
also provided with a powerful incentive to adopt more positive
responses. In the ensuing battle for best-in-sector leadership, the
only surefire winner is the American public, who benefit from a more
competitive private sector whose interests are better aligned with the
broader tenets of sustainable development, with all the quality-of-life
benefits this brings.
innovest strategic value advisors, inc.
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors is an internationally recognized
investment research firm specializing in environmental finance and
investment opportunities. Founded in 1995 with the mission of
delivering superior investment appreciation by unlocking hidden
shareholder value, the firm currently has over US$1-billion under
direct sub-advisement and provides custom research and portfolio
analysis to leading institutional investors and fund managers
throughout the world. Innovest's current and alumni principals include
senior executives from several of the world's foremost financial
institutions, as well as a former G7 finance minister. The company's
flagship product is the Eco Value 21 platform, which was developed in
conjunction with strategic partners including PricewaterhouseCoopers
and Morgan Stanley Asset Management. Innovest is headquartered in New
York, with offices in London and Toronto.
______
Responses by Dr. Martin Whittaker to Additional Questions from Senator
Jeffords
Question 1. It is clear that, regardless of the remaining
uncertainties concerning exactly when and how climate change will
impact our world, perceptions of climate risk have grown to such an
extent that companies here and abroad are considering changing their
practices to improve their long-term financial stability. How have
investors in this and other countries begun to reorganize their
financial portfolios to favor more climate-friendly businesses?
Response. From a traditional asset management perspective, few
investors have taken steps to adjust investment actions due to climate
change considerations alone. The only segment of the asset management
universe that has adjusted portfolios on account of climate change
issues is the socially responsible investment community (which
constitutes anywhere between 3-8 percent of total assets under
management in the United States). Mainstream asset managers, regardless
of location, have not begun to adjust their portfolios, indeed, our
research indicates that many fund managers or analysts do not even
recognize that climate change is an issue that would prompt them to
consider reorganizing their assets. The overriding feeling on climate
change within the non-SRI institutional investment community is that
the financial implications of climate change (or, more accurately, the
manifestations of climate change on the one hand, and exposure to
regulations limiting GHG emissions on the other) are not proven.
Unfortunately, this belief is not based upon any rigorous financial
analysis of potential impacts to equity or debt valuations. Were such
analyses to be conducted, our research indicates that the financial
community would be a willing listener.
Rather than adjusting portfolios, there is a small but growing
number of pension fund trustees and pension policy professionals
(including, for example, the State of Connecticut Treasurer's
department) that recognizes climate change as an issue of potential
concern, and that is preparing to engage companies to urge them to
manage the issue more proactively on account of fiduciary concerns. The
Carbon Disclosure Project, which now has backing of over $2 trillion in
assets under management, and includes Merrill Lynch Investment
Management, the Credit Suisse Group, and Walden Asset Management, is an
example of this. We expect that the engagement approach, rather than
the asset adjustment approach, will be favored by most pension funds,
and that this approach has the potential to exert major influence over
corporate management strategies on the climate change issue.
Elsewhere within the broader financial services sector, we know of
several commercial banks that are examining whether there is a need to
adjust credit risk calculation due to climate change factors. For
example, in the hotel and leisure sector, there are reports that
financing of winter resorts dependent upon snowy conditions has been
affected; Fitch and Standard and Poor's, the credit rating agencies,
have begun to examine exposure to potential GHG legislation at the
company-specific level in the utilities and power sectors; and private
equity and project finance specialists have steered more money toward
clean, low carbon technologies on account of the market opportunities
being created by actions (regulatory and otherwise) to lower GHG
emissions. Finally, in the insurance industry, climate change is
exacerbating concerns over weak economic conditions within the
insurance industry and forcing companies such as Swiss Re to reexamine
their business mix. The P&C business in particular continues to
experience weak premium pricing power and increased losses, with
catastrophic event (CAT) losses contributing to poor results. The P&C
industry has also been plagued by excess underwriting capacity, the
effect of which has been to depress prices, shift product mixes into
banking and other financial services, and force firms into expanding
into overseas markets where climate-related regional impacts may be
more acute.
I would be happy to elaborate with specific details on any of the
points made above.
Question 2. You work with companies that have started to
internalize the risks of emitting greenhouse gases. Why are some
companies taking this step, while others hang back? What and why should
investors know about a company's carbon risk?
Response. Companies that have taken action to manage climate-change
related risks thus far have done so for one or more of the following
reasons: (i) to comply with current or anticipated regulations
restricting GHG emissions (notably in Europe); (ii) to realize
efficiency gains within their operations (notably through energy
conservation initiatives); (iii) to reinforce a positive environmental
reputation; (iv) to act upon concerns over the effects of future
climatic changes on their business; (v) to gain a perceived competitive
advantage over peers in technological innovation, particularly in
industries with long capital planning cycles (next generation
technologies in most industrial settings often confer GHG emissions
benefits as a side effect); (vi) in response to concerns expressed by
shareholders.
A key determining factor on company stance is its geographic
location. For European firms, the primary drivers appear to be
reputation (they operate in a marketplace more cognizant of
environmental pressures) and regulatory requirements. Companies hang
back in this market either because they do not feel exposed to consumer
sentiment about climate change or because they do not anticipate being
effected by future regulations. In the United States, primary drivers
appear to be international competitiveness and operating excellence.
U.S.-based multinational companies such as Exxon-Mobil have made it
clear that they will act to curtail emissions and internalize risks in
those areas of the world where they are required to do so, which may
result in different strategies by business units within the same
company. In our opinion, U.S. companies hanging back do so primarily
because they do not perceive a need to act, either due to lack of
regulatory compulsion or because their client base does not require
action of them.
At this stage, knowing what we know about potential climate effects
and the impacts of emissions regulation, I think it's prudent for
financial market investors--particularly those with a long-term
investment horizon--to require more information and reliable analysis
on how these risks might affect equity valuations or debt quality, so
that they can then factor such risks into their own preferred
investment style. For investment banking and project finance
specialists, there is a more immediate need to understand how the costs
of reducing GHG emissions might reduce rates of return and influence
capital spending decisions (companies such as BG and Shell are already
calculating the sensitivity of project returns to carbon price
movements, as they would examine sensitivity to oil price fluctuations
or interest rate movement). On the flip side, the World Bank's
Prototype Carbon Fund experiences has shown that the generation and
sale of carbon credits can augment returns to the point by several
percentage points.
In view of on-going post-Enron concerns over off-balance sheet
risks, the possibility that climate change may well be a market risk
capable of inflicting damage to investor returns has taken on a new
significance. The essential point is that company competitiveness and
profitability in a wide range of industrial sectors--automotive,
chemicals, coal, electric power, manufacturing, oil and gas, refining,
water, steel, tourism, food and agriculture, cement--could be seriously
affected by climate change. Moreover, there will be substantial
differentials in company carbon risk exposure within particular
industry segments, differentials that are not currently being picked up
by traditional securities analytics.
Question 3. As you know, I'm a cosponsor of legislation to cap
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, S. 556. If there is no cap
in the near future, what do you think will be the effect on carbon
markets and companies' carbon risk management activities in the United
States and abroad?
Response. My chief concern is that without a cap, carbon is
unlikely to be assigned a value, and without much of a value, the
notion of a carbon market is unlikely to have any legs. Markets
function on the basis that something of value is being exchanged.
Voluntary or uncapped emissions targets, particularly when applied to
the highest emitting sector (and the one most likely to act as buyers
of emissions credits/offsets), will not create the conditions necessary
for a fully functioning marketplace, with the result that emissions
trading is unlikely to prosper except for certain multinational and
transnational companies.
Of course, from an environmental emissions perspective, the absence
of a cap is unlikely to focus the mind of corporate emitters on
mitigation activities. Under an uncapped scenario, carbon risk
management is less likely to come down to the simple objective of
reducing emissions, and more likely to focus on (i) internal efficiency
initiatives, where the prospect of economic gain through enhanced
efficiency is the chief driving force, and, (ii) in the long term,
clean technology development, where economic gain through new product
offerings and process innovation is foremost. These are worthy goals
for any firm to pursue but they may not produce the emissions
reductions required to combat climate change over the time periods
identified by the IPCC.
Question 4. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30-
50 years, of continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas
emissions? And, what is the most feasible way to reduce or eliminate
that risk?
Response. From a global perspective, to my mind the greatest risk
is the potential exacerbation and intensification of poverty-inducing
conditions within the developing world. Less developed countries (LDCs)
stand to bear the brunt of any disruptions to climate shifts and have
less capacity to deal with those disruptions as and when they occur.
Aside from broader moral humanitarian concerns, this may also carry an
economic penalty for OECD countries, in the form of accelerated
immigration from poor regions, lower productivity in basic industries
situated in LDCs, stresses on the public purse (due to, for example,
health costs and disaster relief) in LDCs with attendant currency woes,
requirements for more aid and foreign direct investment from rich
countries, and sizable opportunity costs relating to a failure to
capture inherent entrepreneurial talents and skills of LDC populations
struggling to cope with deteriorating domestic infrastructures.
The most feasible way to reduce that risk is the expedited
development, commercialization and transfer of clean power production
and transportation technologies. Transportation and stationary power
production are the two greatest anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas
emissions; they are also the two areas of civic infrastructure most in
need of advancement within poorer countries, primarily in view of their
catalytic role in general economic development. India and China play an
especially important role in global GHG emissions and international
trade, and both present clear market opportunities for U.S. business.
The Indian electric power sector is the largest consumer of capital in
that country, drawing over one-sixth of all Indian investments. The
United States is the largest supplier of foreign direct investment in
India, much of it in the power sector. As part of efforts to reduce
dependency on coal, India has a significant program to support
renewable power, exemplified by wind power capacity that rose from 41
megawatts in 1992 to 1,025 megawatts in 1999, which should present U.S.
exporters with appreciable opportunities.
Similarly, in China, which reportedly ranks second in the world in
energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, power generating
capacity and power consumption are expected to nearly triple by 2015
from their values in 1995, requiring some $449 billion in total costs.
The China Daily reports that Chinese and U.S. trade ministers agreed in
Beijing in April 2002 to set up a new consultation mechanism under
which U.S. Trade and Development Agency (U.S. TDA) will provide funding
for projects in China in the areas of e-commerce, renewable energy and
solid waste treatment. According to Chinese government officials, wind
power, solar energy, hydropower and other renewable and new energy
resources will account for 0.7 percent of the total annual commercial
energy used in China by the end of 2005, and 2 percent by 2015--again,
major opportunities for U.S. clean power developers.
All of this is to say that the renewables and clean power
technology markets are becoming increasingly attractive for investors
and provide a clear possibility for a `win-win' outcome involving LDCs;
the nascent markets for greenhouse gas emissions credits, `green' power
certificates (based on Renewable Portfolio Standards), catastrophic
event (CAT) bonds, weather derivatives and microfinance/microinsurance
also hold substantial promise for forward-looking finance and insurance
companies. Indeed, commercially viable technologies exist today (such
as combined heat and power, and cogeneration approaches) whose
introduction could go a long way toward reducing GHG emissions in the
short term, while more developmental clean technologies are brought to
the market.
______
Responses by Dr. Martin Whittaker to Additional Questions from Senator
Smith
Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ``during the 20th century,
the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.'' Do you agree
with that statement? Why or why not?
Response. On matters relating to the science of climate change,
including the buildup of GHG concentrations and the potential effects
on global climate conditions, I take my lead from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, which I believe to be an authoritative source
on the subject. To the extent that Dr. Rowland's statement reflects the
opinion of the IPCC, yes, I agree with his statement. A brief point on
the issue of scientific discourse: As a scientist by training I realize
that uncertainty and debate are fundamental to the process of
scientific and technological advancement. While it is clear that
uncertainties remain, and that there are scientists whose opinions
differ from those of the IPCC, it appears that the balance of
probability has shifted toward the view that anthropogenic influences
have accelerated the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere, and that this
buildup is likely to be causing changes in the Earth's climate.
Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ``the primary cause for . . .
growth in impact[] is the increasing vulnerability of human and
environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in
climate, per se.'' Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?
Response. As I recall, Dr. Pielke was trying to point out that the
heightened economic impact of climate variability was due to more to
the increased vulnerability of human systems than to climate change per
se (in other-words, modern day society was more exposed to climate
variability by virtue of the fact that urban centers, coastal
developments, etc., were likely to suffer greater economic impacts from
extreme weather events). I agree that human and environmental systems
are more vulnerable to climate variability than was previously the
case; the recent reports from Swiss Re, Munich Re and the Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory/U.S. DOE strongly support this view. But
the same reports also present compelling evidence that the incidence
and severity of extreme weather conditions is also rising, implying
that it is not just the economic consequences of climate variability
that is worrying, but that the variability is also becoming greater.
Ultimately, however, I am not sure that I recognize a huge
distinction between the two points of view in terms of what it means
for how we go about addressing the problem. If impacts are growing
because of increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems
to climate variability (and if anthropogenic GHG emissions are
increasing climate variability) then it is still prudent to adapt more
effectively to changing climate conditions and deal with anthropogenic
GHG emissions.
Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ``the present research
agenda is focused . . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate
future'' and that ``instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no
. . . we might be better served by addressing things like the present
drought. . .'' Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why not?
Response. I believe that Dr. Pielke is right to stress the
importance of dealing with more immediate climate-related problems
(such as droughts, famines, etc.), which have tended to become
forgotten in terms of the overall global warming debate (although not
within broader development circles). However, given the possible causal
connections that exist between the short-term problems he alludes to
and the longer term issue of global warming, I don't believe that we
can afford to dismiss the need to better understand future climate
conditions altogether. IPCC data presented in the Third Assessment
Report and the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios implies that one
cannot successfully deal with one issue without tackling the other, and
make plain the links between short- and long-term climate issues, and
the critical importance of broader demographic, technological and
political trends in determining future emissions scenarios. The
integrated, interdependent nature of these broader factors, captured
within the image of sustainable development, has been overlooked in my
opinion within the climate change debate (which has focused more on
Kyoto instead). I would certainly concur that less focus on esoteric
matters of perceived scientific relevance and more urgency around
action to improve the lives of ordinary people and the world in which
we live is desirable.
Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. I believe that the Kyoto Protocol is a valuable first
step toward reducing global GHG emissions and that it also has
importance as an expression of collective commitment to addressing the
climate change issue, and a point around which national efforts to can
be coordinated and consolidated. True, as you state in the question,
even if fully implemented, the Kyoto targets would have a negligible
effect on atmospheric GHG concentrations and expected temperatures.
However, I don't believe that this should be used to dismiss the Kyoto
Protocol, rather to point out its importance as the precursor to a more
comprehensive and ambitious emissions reduction process.
That said, the critical questions to my mind are whether
anthropogenic GHG emissions are causing climate variations and, if
society believes that to be so, how can we bring about emissions
reductions in an optimal fashion. Whether this reduction effort is
within the terms of the Kyoto Protocol or not is, in the bigger
picture, of secondary importance. In this sense, I concur with the
implication of the question, i.e., that Kyoto is not necessarily the
answer to the climate problem, and that a longer-term solution needs to
be identified.
Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention
paid to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-
billion ton iceberg known as ``Larsen B,'' that has been attributed to
climate change. What scientific evidence is there that climate change
is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence
that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. I'm afraid I do not feel qualified enough on the Larsen B
issue to offer any insights as to the specific scientific causes. I
would only note that the Larsen B story is the latest in a long line of
reports of changing environmental conditions in polar regions, the
general thrust of which is that global warming is the root cause.
Question 6a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty; Coping with the risks of climate change'' (copy
attached). Please explain why you agree or disagree with the following
assertions or conclusions from that report: ``There is not one problem
but two: natural climate variability and the influence of human
activity on the climate system.''
Response. I agree that distinguishing human-induced climate changes
from natural variations is an important issue the resolution of which
will clearly help to determine the extent to which efforts to curb
climate change through limiting anthropogenic emissions will be
successful.
Question 6b. ``. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-
ranging concepts of protection are developed. These must take into
account the fact that the maximum strength and frequency of extreme
weather conditions at a given location cannot be predicted.''
Response. By protection I assume that Swiss Re is referring to
safeguarding the integrity of global human and environmental
conditions.
Swiss Re's assertion that the characteristics of extreme weather
events at specific locations cannot be predicted with any degree of
accuracy is most worrying to me when set against their belief that
extreme weather events are generally increasing in frequency and
severity (conclusions arrived at from studies of past events). If this
is indeed the case, then yes, provisions must be made to manage extreme
weather risks particularly in those regions where in a general sense
the Capacity to deal with extreme weather is weakest, or the human and
economic effects could be greatest. For example, the use of weather
derivatives, catastrophe bonds, and other insurance tools could help
the industry deal with such varying conditions by improving liquidity
and widening insurance coverage. ,
Question 6c. ``Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the
case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears
which--if they are not confirmed--will in time turn to carefree relief,
and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons of short-term
expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that
today's generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of
this kind.''
Response. I absolutely agree with this call for moderation. Indeed,
within the financial community Innovest serves, the major barriers to
stimulating widespread action to examining climate related risks have
been (i) the predictions of catastrophic and unmanageable climate
disruptions, which tend to turn off many people who might otherwise be
sympathetic, and (ii) a disconnect between short term economic
interests and what is perceived to be an exclusively long term climate
change issue. Our work has focused on providing robust, reasoned,
independent analysis of the business impacts for precisely this reason.
To my mind, the inherent characteristics of climate change as a
potential risk issue for ordinary people all work against taking
action: it is rather ethereal and therefore doesn't seem `real' (you
can't touch, feel or see it, unlike, say, asbestos); the risk is
perceived to be long term, and is therefore instinctively discounted;
it is an issue which affects the collective, as opposed to the
individual, which again leads people to discount it as a threat to
personal well-being; people are generally familiar with it, and
therefore don't feel especially worried; and it seems to be out of any
one person's control. Long-term, illusory, scattered and unmanageable
risks that affect everyone are simply not regarded as matters of any
great urgency.
Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. On the issue of environmental and economic vulnerability,
I believe that the evidence presented by the IPCC (selected passages
presented below) and other sources of similar international standing is
sufficiently worrying to warrant action and indicates that indeed our
vulnerability to extreme weather conditions is increasing:
<bullet> According to the IPCC, the Earth's average surface
temperature will rise 1.4 to 5.8oC (2.5--10.4 oF) between 1990 and
2100. Sea levels could rise between 9 and 88 cm over the same period.
The decade of the 1990's was the hottest of the last century and is
warmer than decade in the last 1,000 years in the Northern Hemisphere.
<bullet> According to December 2000 World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) statistics, 2000 was the 22d consecutive year with
global mean surface temperatures above the 1961-1990 normal. 1999 was
the 5th warmest year in the past 140 years, bested only by 1998, 1997,
1995 and 1990.
<bullet> Severe weather events also continued to increase in size
and number. Record rainfall and flooding in Western Europe, severe cold
conditions in East Asia and Russia, heat waves and drought in China,
Central Asia and the Middle East, and mudslides and typhoons in
Southern Africa and Latin America all reached significant proportions
over the course of 2000.
<bullet> Recent IPCC figures for climate-related influences on
healthcare costs, vector borne diseases, coastline erosion, crop yields
and other metrics all point toward increasing negative impacts on Earth
ecosystems.
______
Responses by Dr. Martin Whittaker to Additional Questions from Senator
Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. Innovest has not prepared forecasts of this nature and I
would be reluctant to do so without sufficient background preparation.
I can only refer you to the IPCC, which has recommended to UNFCCC
signatories that atmospheric GHG concentrations should be stabilized at
550 ppmv of CO<INF>2</INF> equivalent (or twice pre-industrial levels),
which would require a 60 percent cut in GHG emissions relative to 1990
levels\1\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ IPCC Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis.
Response. I am not aware of any reliable analysis on this
particular subject.
Question 2. What economic analysis is there for the impacts of
implementing Kyoto and reductions beyond Kyoto on the Canadian economy?
Response. The Government of Canada does not have an official
estimate of the economic impacts of meeting its Kyoto target. That
said, the Federal Analysis and Modelling Group has estimated that
impacts,on GDP could be (in the worst case) up to 3 percent between now
and 2010; over the same period, the country's GDP is expected to grow
30 percent. In other words, Kyoto could shave up to 3 percent off GDP
growth over the next 8 years and result in 450,000 jobs lost. This,
approximates to a reduction of roughly C$11 billion, or C$400 per
capita. On the other hand, the best case scenario according to AMG is a
`slight positive' effect on GDP and the net creation of 65,000 jobs.
Cost estimates from other sources (academic and specialist research
houses) tend to range from 0.2 percent to 2.5 percent GDP reduction,
and a March 2002 Industry Canada report estimates that costs will be in
the region of 1.5 percent of GDP, or about C$17 billion in 2010.
In terms of direct costs relating to reducing emissions, AMG
describes 2 approaches; in one, expenditures to reduce emissions minus
the energy efficiency gains under a carbon `cost' scenario of C$10-25
per tonne would result in net benefits of about C$3 billion per year.
In the other, the additional costs to do with transactions, downtime to
adjust business configuration and other anticipated indirect
expenditures associated with the shift toward lower carbon fuels are
factored in. In this approach, under the same carbon price scenarios,
costs are estimated to be in the order of C$1.1 billion per year, or
about C$40 per person.
A recent popularly discussed report issued by the Canadian
Manufacturers Exporters Association, a group opposed to Kyoto
ratification, pegged the costs of Kyoto to the Canadian economy at
450,000 jobs by 2010 and describes a multitude of negative consequences
for ordinary Canadians ranging from having to drive in smaller cars and
refit their homes with expensive energy conservation equipment to
paying more taxes.
Question 3. What are companies doing in other countries to mitigate
their business risk?
Response. As you might expect, companies' actions to mitigate
business risks depend on their reasons for wanting to act in the first
place. We have identified several reasons why businesses feel it
necessary to take mitigative action.
(a) Compliance (or Anticipated Compliance) particularly in Canada,
Europe and Japan; A recent study among Canadian natural gas utilities
showed Enbridge Consumers Gas as the only company to achieve a net
greenhouse gas emissions decrease (30 percent) between 1990-7. In 2000,
ECG introduced a program to promote energy-efficient equipment in the
residential marketplace. Since 1996, the firm's demand-side management
program has reduced customers' emissions by 364,000 tonnes of
CO<INF>2</INF> equivalent. Dupont Canada, partly in expectation of
future emissions constraints, report that CO<INF>2</INF> equivalents
(including CFCs) have decreased from 160 billion lbs. in 1998 to 120
billion lbs. 1999, and the company aims to achieve a 65 percent
reduction in GHG by 2010 from 1990 base year.
(b) Improved efficiency; Deutsche Telekom, for example, reports
that it has saved over DM 8 million in energy costs and reduced carbon
dioxide emissions simply by adjusting the output of air-conditioning
systems. Pasquale Pistorio, President and CEO of STMicroelectronics (an
Innovest `AAA'-ranked firm), reported returns on energy conservation
efforts within 2 years and estimated savings of nearly $1 billion on
energy costs between 1994 and 2010 due to use of clean energy
alternatives and efficiency measures. And NTT, which will need roughly
4.7-billion kWh of electricity in 2000 and is Japan's largest single
purchaser of electric power, is pursuing an energy conservation vision
that aims to produce savings of 100 billion yen over 10 years over a
business-as-usual scenario, thereby reducing indirect greenhouse gas
emissions.
(c) Reputation; In Othello, Shakespeare's lago notes that `He that
filches my good name . . . makes me poor indeed'. Many leading firms
have also recognized the true value of reputation and the importance of
climate change to this reputation. ABB, the Swedish engineering and
power equipment firm, has already adopted product specifications around
greenhouse gas intensity to help distinguish its products in the market
place, and Electrolux, BP, Baxter and Suncor have associated their
brands very closely with climate friendliness.
(d) Voluntary Targets: The flip side of the reputation issue, many
firms are walking the talk and demonstrating their climate credentials
by setting themselves voluntary targets. Entergy, which is clearly not
yet formally obliged to reduce emissions, purchased 10,000 metric tons
of carbon dioxide allowances for under $5 per metric ton as part of its
recently announced efforts to voluntarily cut greenhouse gas emissions
over the next few years working with Environmental Defense. By virtue
of this action, Entergy will be able to lock in relatively cheap
emissions reduction credits and take significant steps toward meeting
its voluntary targets.
(e) Concerns over exposure to changing weather conditions; Natural
gas companies have begun to hedge their exposure to warmer weather
(which depresses demand for natural gas used in heating) through the
purchase of weather derivatives. Food product firms are also
particularly exposed on this front. Due to warm weather and severe
storms, Central American farmers harvested their banana crop earlier
than normal in late 1997 and early 1998, increasing production by 13
percent. Prices fell as the fruit flooded the North American market,
forcing down Dole's margins. In March 1998, Dole's stock price dropped
12 percent in one day. Continued extremes in weather resulting from
climate change could also have serious repercussions on food markets
due to direct damage to operations. Hurricane Mitch caused massive
damage to Honduras, in part because of mudslides exacerbated by
deforestation in the region. Both Dole Foods and Chiquita suffered
extensive damage to operations in that country which reduced profits
and pushed stock prices downwards.
(f) Competitiveness drivers and the need to innovate; In the U.K.,
Johnson Matthey's ``smart'' technologies, which contribute to climate.
protection by facilitating smaller, lighter and more energy efficient
products and processes, typify the kind of innovation opportunities
that climate change is creating. In the mining industry, Inco's nickel
hydride battery technologies, which contribute to climate protection by
facilitating smaller, lighter and more energy efficient hybrid
vehicles, are a prime example of how climate change concerns are
causing established, `old-economy' companies to reexamine their
business mix.
I would be happy to provide more details of individual company
activities and initiatives on climate change, drawn from Innovest's
data base on corporate environmental positioning.
__________
Statement of Jack D. Cogen, President, Natsource LLC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you
for inviting me to testify. My name is Jack Cogen and I am the
president of Natsource LLC, an energy environmental commodity broker
headquartered in New York City with offices in Washington, DC, Europe,
Japan, Canada, and Australia. My testimony will address the financial
risk associated with climate change policy.
At the outset, I want to acknowledge that there are legitimate
differences of opinion as to what should be the nature, degree and
timing of policy responses to the risk associated with climate change
itself. However, the role of Natsource is to work with clients who
decide it is in their best interest to evaluate the extent of their
financial exposure under possible greenhouse gas policies. Our clients
make the threshold decision that they are at risk financially. After
that, the next step for them is to analyze the extent of their
financial risk and develop strategies that make sense for mitigating
that risk. Natsource contributes its policy and market expertise to
helping clients assess and manage risk.
The client base of Natsource includes multinational corporations as
well as foreign and domestic firms. Natsource assists them in
quantifying their financial exposure under different policies that
might be adopted to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Our experience
indicates that companies consider a variety of factors when they weigh
the degree of risk they face and what to do about it. The primary
factors are (1) the probability they will be subject to emission
limitation policies, and (2) the potential direct and indirect cost of
those policies to the company.
Natsource provides analysis, strategic advice, and market
intelligence once a company decides to undertake a comprehensive risk
assessment. Generally, we help clients assess their financial exposure
by identifying policies that might be adopted; assigning probabilities
to those policies; quantifying the net emissions ``shortfall'' or
``surplus'' the company faces under each policy; and estimating
potential compliance costs based on the company's emissions profile,
internal reduction opportunities, and our knowledge of various
commodities available in the greenhouse gas emission markets.
Multinational companies face an especially complicated risk because
they operate across multiple jurisdictions with different policies. In
addition, many of these companies must evaluate the effect of climate
change policies on the market demand for their products in different
countries.
If potential compliance costs are substantial and the probability
of emission limitations is significant enough, the next step for many
companies is to develop a cost-effective risk management strategy. This
involves assembling an optimal mix of measures for reducing or
offsetting emissions. These include internal and external emission
reduction projects, internal emission trading programs, and external
trading markets.
Companies choose to undertake emission reduction measures in spite
of or because of policy uncertainty for a variety of reasons, including
to reduce future compliance costs, gain experience in the greenhouse
gas markets, maintain or enhance their environmental image, and place a
value on internal reduction opportunities.
Greenhouse gas markets are evolving and will continue to evolve
over the next several years. In the future, these markets will function
more smoothly and with lower transaction costs as greenhouse gas
policies become clearer and markets become more liquid. Even now, more
sophisticated financial instruments such as call options are being used
as a hedge against risk.
Natsource recently completed the first comprehensive analysis of
the greenhouse gas trading market for the World Bank. The analysis
identified approximately 60 greenhouse gas transactions involving some
55 million tons of emissions. These numbers actually underestimate the
total number of transactions because they do not include internal-only
transactions and small volume transactions. Current market prices for
greenhouse gas commodities range from less than a dollar to over $9 per
ton of carbon dioxide equivalent, depending on the type of commodity
and vintage.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, a small but growing number of
companies are beginning to more carefully analyze their financial risk
under possible greenhouse gas policies. For a variety of reasons, some
companies have decided to take steps now to reduce emissions even
though final policy decisions, in most cases, are still pending. As a
consequence, these companies are able to take advantage of the most
cost-effective opportunities to reduce their financial exposure. As the
markets for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions in the United
States have shown, emission markets can provide an efficient way to
lower the cost of reducing emissions.
That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to answer
any questions you or other Members of the committee might have.
______
Responses by Jack D. Cogen to Additional Questions from Senator Smith
Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ``during the 20th century,
the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases have
increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.'' Do you agree
with that statement? Why or why not?
Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing
brokerage services and strategic risk assessment and risk management
advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or
research issues associated with climate change. Consequently, I am not
able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.
Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ``the primary cause for . . .
growth in impact is the increasing vulnerability of human and
environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in
climate per se.'' Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?
Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing
brokerage services and strategic risk assessment and risk management
advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or
research issues associated with climate change. Consequently, I am not
able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.
Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ``the present research
agenda is focused . . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate
future'' and that ``instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no
. . . we might be better served by addressing things like the present
drought . . .'' Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why not?
Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing
brokerage services and strategic risk assessment and risk management
advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or
research issues associated with climate change. Consequently, I am not
able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.
Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto
Protocol? Do you agree with the assertion that full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol would only avert the expected temperature change by
6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why not?
Response. Natsource does not have a position with respect to either
the ratification or implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Natsource's
expertise and the services and advice we provide our clients do not
include assessing the climatic consequences of implementing the Kyoto
Protocol. Therefore, I am unable to provide any opinion on possible
temperature changes.
Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention
paid to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-
billion ton iceberg known as ``Larsen B'' that has been attributed to
climate change. What scientific evidence is there that climate change
is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence
that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?
Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing
brokerage services and strategic risk assessment and risk management
advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or
research issues associated with climate change. Consequently, I am not
able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.
Question 6. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening
statement was a Swiss Re report titled ``Climate research does not
remove the uncertainty; Coping with the risks of climate change'' (copy
attached). Please explain why you agree or disagree with [certain]
assertions or conclusions from that report.
Response. The Swiss Re report offers ideas that many people will
find useful in the debate over climate change and others will dispute.
Natsource's expertise does not include issues associated with science
or research, so we are not in a position to either agree or disagree
with the conclusions of the report. The Swiss Re report states that the
firm ``is involved in the political debate about global climate
protection . . .'' Natsource is not involved in the political debate
over climate change. Rather, Natsource works with clients--many of whom
are involved in the debate--to help them assess and manage financial
risk due to policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
Question 7. Do you, believe that our vulnerability to extreme
weather conditions is increasing? Why or why not?
Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing
brokerage services and strategic risk assessment and risk management
advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or
research issues associated with climate change. Consequently, I am not
able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.
______
Responses by Jack D. Cogen to Additional Questions from Senator
Voinovich
Question 1a. Advocates for the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive
reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global
CO<INF>2</INF> concentration target of 550 ppm CO<INF>2</INF> by 2100
which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed
countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of
550 ppm by 2100 is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on
emissions for the United States by 2050? By 2100?
Response. Natsource's expertise does not include the ability to
evaluate the relationship between atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases and emissions caps. Therefore, we are not able to
provide any estimate with regard to emission caps.
Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact
of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you
provide this analysis?
Response. We are aware of general analysis of this issue conducted
by preeminent research institutes.
Question 2. What portion of Natsource's business is dependent on
the establishment of a trading scheme for CO<INF>2</INF>?
Response. Natsource is engaged in brokering transactions involving
energy-related commodities. These commodities include electricity,
natural gas, coal and emissions. Emissions brokering is provided by
dozens of other firms. Natsource has provided emissions brokering
services for SO<INF>2</INF> and NOx since the firm's establishment in
1994. These brokerage services contribute to the liquidity of emission
markets and, ultimately, to finding the most cost-effective strategies
for companies to reduce emissions. Natsource became engaged in the
emerging market for greenhouse gas emissions because clients sought our
expertise--and the expertise of similar firms--in assessing and
managing the risk they face because of the uncertainty of future
greenhouse gas policies in the United States and other countries. For
some companies, a risk management strategy for greenhouse gases
involves taking advantage of past reduction efforts (e.g.,
sequestration) and obtaining additional reduction credits through
various types of market transactions. These market transactions can
involve the purchase of various types of reductions, the purchase of
call options or the swapping of emission reductions between different
jurisdictions, to name a few. As I mentioned in my testimony on March
13, our clients decide they are at risk because of policies to limit
greenhouse gas emissions and we help them to develop and implement
strategies to mitigate their risk.
As far as Natsource's business with respect to CO<INF>2</INF>
trading is concerned, we have been involved in brokering a number of
greenhouse gas transactions in the United States and in other
countries. Many of these transactions have taken place either to comply
in the most cost-effective way with government policies to limit
greenhouse gas emissions, or to begin reducing emissions cost-
effectively in anticipation of expected policies to limit emissions.
This later type of risk mitigation is similar to the purchase of
business insurance. While Natsource has been involved in brokering
transactions, our main focus has also been on providing strategic
counsel on risk assessment and risk management. Currently, a very small
portion of Natsource's business is dependent on greenhouse gas trading.
It is unlikely that the public policy debate over climate change will
be concluded soon. Therefore, Natsource will continue to provide
strategic counsel to domestic and international clients.
Question 3. Has Natsource (including any of its staff) ever been
involved in advocating the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol?
Response. In order to provide the highest quality strategic counsel
to our clients, Natsource is pleased to have staff that have served in
senior positions in the U.S. Government under different Presidents. In
their official capacity as representatives of the U.S. Government, some
of these staff advocated adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. However,
Natsource neither supports nor opposes adoption of the Kyoto Protocol,
nor do any of Natsource's staff support or oppose adoption. Natsource
has clients with a variety of views on the Kyoto Protocol.
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East-West Center,
Honolulu, HI, March 28, 2002.
Hon. James Jefford,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Jeffords: Thank you for the kind invitation to share
some thoughts on the recently concluded first U.S. National Assessment
of the Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. I had privilege
of coordinating the Pacific Islands regional contribution to that
important endeavor and I am delighted to join my colleagues in the
Northeast and the other regional programs in summarizing some of the
insights we gained during the process. I have enclosed a copy of the
final report of the Pacific Assessment and I hope that you and your
staff will find it helpful in your efforts.
The Pacific Assessment explored the consequences of climate
variability and change for the American Flag Pacific Islands (Hawaii,
Guam, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands) and the U.S.-affiliated Pacific Islands that include the
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands
and Republic of Palau. The Pacific Assessment was supported through a
grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) with resources from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the U.S.
Department of the Interior (DOI). I was the Principal Investigator and
the East-West Center coordinated the Pacific Assessment in
collaboration with scientific partners from the University of Hawaii,
the University of Guam and NOAA (most notably the National Weather
Service Pacific Region and the National Centers for Environmental
Prediction of the National Weather Service), and the National Center
for Atmospheric Research as well as regional organizations such as the
Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Basin Development
Council and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme.
In addition to a scientific program of data analysis, research and
modeling aimed at developing a more complete understanding of the
regional consequences of climate variability and change, the Pacific
Assessment focused on the establishment of a sustained, interactive
dialog between scientists and decisionmakers designed to promote the
use of climate information to address critical issues in the region.
The research and dialog activities supported through the Pacific
Assessment have identified a number of specific actions that can be
taken to reduce climate-related vulnerability and enhance the
resilience of Pacific Islands in the following critical areas:
<bullet> Providing access of freshwater resources;
<bullet> Protecting public health;
<bullet> Ensuring public safety and protecting community
infrastructure;
<bullet> Sustaining agriculture and sustaining tourism as two
particularly significant economic sectors; and
<bullet> Promoting the wise use of coastal and marine resources
(including coral reefs and fisheries).
More than 200 individuals representing the scientific community,
Government Agencies, businesses, NGO's and community leaders
contributed their insights and expertise to the Pacific Islands
Regional Assessment process and the findings and recommendations
reflected in the final report are already being used by each of those
stakeholder groups throughout the region.
Perhaps the most important recommendation to emerge from the effort
was that the Pacific Assessment should be a continuing process of
research and dialog with the overarching goal of nurturing the critical
partnerships necessary to develop climate information to support
decisionmaking. We have taken this recommendation to heart and are
actively seeking resources to address some of the critical research and
information gaps identified during the Pacific Assessment process
including:
<bullet> improving our understanding of climate-related extreme
events;
<bullet> enhancing Pacific Island efforts to reduce vulnerability
to patterns of natural climate variability such as El Nino and,
thereby, enhance regional capabilities to adapt to long-term climate
change;
<bullet> improving our ability to document and model climate
processes and consequences on local, island and regional scales;
<bullet> developing reliable projections of climate variability and
change on various timescales; and
<bullet> enhancing our understanding of the consequences of changes
in climate on the region's unique ecosystems and natural resources,
including the consequences of those changes for critical economic
sectors such as tourism, fisheries and agriculture.
Like our colleagues in other regions, we are committed to securing
the resources required to help establish a Pacific regional climate
information service--an integrated scientific and decision support
system that will support the development and application of new
scientific insights in response to the information needs identified by
the governments, businesses, resource managers, public interest groups
and communities that participated in the Pacific Assessment.
We would, of course, like to see a similar commitment on the part
of the U.S. Global Change Research Program Agencies that supported the
first National Assessment. While we seen promising indications of
continued interest in Pacific Assessment activities within individual
Agencies such as NOAA and EPA, the absence of a clear national,
interagency commitment to sustaining this important regional assessment
process discouraging and unfortunate.
In welcoming the regional participants to the Pacific Assessment's
November 2000 Workshop on Climate and Island Coastal Communities, East-
West Center President Charles Morrison offered the following thought:
The impacts of the 1997-1998 El Nino are fresh in our minds,
and the latest reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change confirm what all of you already know--changes in
climate matter to individuals, communities, businesses and
governments who call islands home. Your valuable natural
resources, traditional ways of life, critical economic sectors,
community support infrastructure and, to a great extent, your
future depend on developing an effective response to the
challenges presented by climate variability and change.
Similar statements have emerged from the Northeast and other
regional assessments conducted as part of the first National
Assessment. Changes in climate matter to this region, this Nation and
the world. As the individual and collected programs initiated during
the first National Assessment process demonstrated, the scientific
community, governments, businesses and communities around this Nation
and throughout the world can meet the challenges and capitalize on the
opportunities that changes in climate present to us when we combine our
individual expertise, insights and assets in a continuing program of
shared learning and joint problem solving. The first National
Assessment represented a critical step in the emergence of such a new
climate partnership. The interest that you and your congressional
colleagues have shown in continuing the National Assessment process is
encouraging and I'm sure that my regional assessment colleagues join me
in expressing our willingness to work with you and the Agencies of the
U.S. Global Change Research Program in this important, shared endeavor.
Thank you, again for the opportunity to share some of my thoughts
on the National Assessment process. If you or your staff have any
questions or would like to discuss this matter further, please do not
hesitate to contact me.
Alona pumehana,
Eileen L. Shea,
Climate Project Coordinator.
<all>