<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:98048.wais]
VISA REVOCATIONS II: STILL POROUS, SLOW TO FIX
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 13, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-253
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DIANE E. WATSON, California
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Thomas Costa, Professional Staff Member
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 13, 2004.................................... 1
Statement of:
Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. General Accounting Office; Tony Edson, Managing
Director, Office of Visa Services, U.S. Department of
State; Donna A. Bucella, Director, Terrorist Screening
Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of
Justice; Robert M. Jacksta, Executive Director, Border
Security and Facilitation, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and
Robert Schoch, Deputy Assistant Director, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security................................................... 12
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bucella, Donna A., Director, Terrorist Screening Center,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of
Justice, prepared statement of............................. 35
Edson, Tony, Managing Director, Office of Visa Services, U.S.
Department of State, followp question and response......... 93
Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...... 15
Jacksta, Robert M., Executive Director, Border Security and
Facilitation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of..... 45
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 6
Schoch, Robert, Deputy Assistant Director, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Letters dated July 12, 2004.............................. 79
Prepared statement of.................................... 54
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
VISA REVOCATIONS II: STILL POROUS, SLOW TO FIX
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Duncan, Schrock, Kucinich,
Ruppersberger, and Watson.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A.
Briggs, clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Andrew
Su, minority professional staff member.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
hearing entitled Visa Revocations II: Still Porous, Slow to
Fix, is called to order.
Entry by a non-citizen into the United States is a
privilege, not a right. For a variety of reasons, a request for
a visa may be denied. If those reasons arise only after a visa
is issued, it can be revoked. The discretionary process of visa
revocation is an important tool used by the Departments of
State and Homeland Security, DHS, to protect our borders.
But when a visa is revoked after the alien has arrived
here, what happens? Thirteen months ago, at a hearing on visa
revocation as a counter-terrorism tool, the General Accounting
office, GAO, described a process riddled with flawed
communications within and between agencies. Poor coordination
and haphazard followup meant suspected terrorists who entered
the United States were not being tracked or removed. Parallel
inconsistent data systems treated visa revocation actions
differently, creating confusion about the number, as well as
the status of aliens no longer welcome here.
We were assured the problems would be fixed. We were told
new procedures were being implemented to share visa revocation
information quickly and effectively. We were assured the
language of the visa revocation instrument would be reviewed to
close the apparent loophole making the revocation effective
only after the alien left the United States.
We asked GAO to audit compliance with those commitments.
More than a year later, GAO reports some progress in
strengthening revocation processes, but finds continual delays
and disconnects plaguing the system. Information about visa
revocations based on terrorism concerns can still take weeks or
months to appear on watch lists used at the border.
DHS may not investigate some aliens who enter or remain in
the United States on a revoked visa. Additionally, discussions
of a regulatory change to permit removal of an alien holding a
revoked visa seem stuck in a legalistic and bureaucratic
quagmire.
Border security against terrorists depends on multiple
layers of protection. One of those layers, the visa revocation
process, remains partially blind and needlessly porous to
incursions by individuals who might pose a grave risk to our
security. We continue to look for a far sharper use of the visa
revocation tool to turn away, or if necessary, remove anyone
intent on abusing the privilege of visiting our shores.
We know all our witnesses share that goal, don't have any
doubt about that, and we look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. At this time the Chair would recognize Mr.
Kucinich and ask if he has a statement.
Mr. Kucinich. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you to the witnesses.
It's disappointing that are holding another hearing on this
matter. Last June when the subcommittee held a hearing on visa
revocation problems, we were told by GAO that anywhere from 100
to 200 U.S. aliens, who we suspected terrorists, could be
freely entering and moving around inside our country. Yet in
many instances, we could not take any actions to investigate or
even locate these individuals.
How could this be the case? Once again, agencies in the
U.S. intelligence community did not talk to one another or even
share information about suspected terrorists with each other.
There were different lists of suspected terrorists, different
lists of immigrants who had their visas revoked, even different
lists on which all of these people were still in the country.
The subcommittee was told that the problem would be fixed,
that better communication between the State, Homeland Security
and the FBI would resolve these problems. We also expected that
a regulatory solution could be worked out by those agencies so
that suspected terrorists could be immediately deported from
the United States, even if the terms of their entry visa had
not been violated.
Over a year has passed now, and the GAO tell us that many
problems remain with our visa revocation process. While an
informal process has been established now to notify
intelligence screeners of individuals on a terrorist watch
list, delays and communication problems persist. By the time a
border inspector or immigration investigator begins to look for
a suspect, weeks may have gone by.
I understand that GAO even found instances where it took 6
months or longer for State and DHS personnel to simply match
the names of terrorists or suspected terrorists with
individuals whose visas had been revoked. This is simply
unacceptable. I don't know if any of these individuals are
terrorists or not, but what I do know is it should not take 6
months or more to locate these persons.
So I would just like to submit the rest of the record for
the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time, the Chair would recognize John Duncan, the
gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this important hearing. I know just a week and a half ago, the
Washington Times had a major story that said suspected
terrorists are not kicked out of the United States after their
visas are revoked, even though Congress last year asked the
Department of Homeland Security to fix a legal loophole that
has allowed more than 100 people with links to terrorism to
skip deportation.
One of our first witnesses sums up this situation and says
that we have backlogs and long delays in screening names of
terrorists against the State Department's data base. Current
visa holders and delays and backlogs in transmitting
recommendations to revoke individual visas, delays and backlogs
in revoking individual visas after receiving a recommendation
to do so, delays in requesting that field offices investigate
individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds who may be
in the country. This is a very serious matter, and it's not a
problem, a situation of money. Because we're giving all of
these departments and agencies all kinds of money and big
increases in appropriations to handle these types of problems.
I remember, the INS is not here with us today, but I
remember after it was pointed out that 15 of the 19 terrorists
involved in the September 11 incidents were here illegally that
one of our colleagues, Congressman Gallegly from California,
was on 60 Minutes. The INS had claimed that it was underfunded
and he pointed out that we had given INS a 250 percent increase
in funding over the previous 8 years, which was about 10 times
the rate of inflation. So there's plenty of money around, but
apparently, there are still some problems that need to be
worked on. So I look forward to hearing these witnesses, and I
appreciate your calling this hearing. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. At this time, the Chair
will recognize Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. First thing, I want to thank you for
bringing this issue back to the table. We know that GAO is
going to be releasing a report today about where we need to go
with respect to visa revocation process. I think it's about
time we all stopped the blame game. We need to identify the
issues that are there and then move forward.
I'm interested today in hearing where we need to go in the
future and what we need to do to fix the problem to address the
issue. Hopefully that's what the testimony will show today, so
that we can start implementing. Because we all want the same
thing, and that's our national security. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished
gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Schrock. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank
you for holding this hearing and my friend, Mr. Duncan, said it
all, and he said it very well.
I read the notes last night from the meetings we've had in
the past, and it seems like we're asking the same old
questions. You heard Mr. Ruppersberger say a report's coming
out today on where we ought to go. There ought to be a report
coming out today on where we've been and how this thing has
been fixed. I think we're getting tired of waiting. This
terrorism thing isn't going to get any better, and I'm hoping
the witnesses today will come up with some concrete answers
that will get us an idea of where we are, because it's clearly
gone on entirely too long.
I guess if the chairman has to have these hearings every 2
or 3 months, he'll have to have them every 2 or 3 months. But
this thing's got to get resolved and it's got to get answered.
I appreciate you all coming today and certainly look forward to
hearing what you have to say.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time I'd ask unanimous consent that all members of
the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in
the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record and
without objection, so ordered.
At this time, we will announce our one panel, our only
panel. I appreciate all of them coming and allowing us to
crunch you into one table here. Mr. Jess T. Ford, Director of
International Affairs and Trade Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office; Mr. Tony Edson, who is the Managing
Director, Office of Visa Services, U.S. Department of State;
Ms. Donna A. Bucella, Director, Terrorist Screening Center,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice;
Mr. Robert M. Jacksta, Executive Director, Border Security and
Facilitation, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. Robert A. Schoch,
Deputy Assistant Director, National Security Investigations,
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
At this time, I would ask our witnesses to stand so I may
administer the oath. Please raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record that all our witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
I think we'll go down the list as I called you. So I'll ask
you, Mr. Ford, to put that mic in front of you, speak nice and
loud.
STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND
TRADE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; TONY EDSON, MANAGING
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF VISA SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;
DONNA A. BUCELLA, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ROBERT M.
JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BORDER SECURITY AND FACILITATION,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; AND ROBERT SCHOCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I'm
pleased to be here today to discuss the report that we are
issuing today on the visa revocation process and the steps that
the Department of State and Homeland Security and other Federal
agencies have taken to improve the use of this process as an
anti-terrorism tool.
In June 2003, we reported that agencies lacked written
procedures to ensure that appropriate personnel are notified
and take specific actions when the Department of State revokes
visas on terrorism grounds. As a result, lookouts were not
always posted. Other agencies were not always notified of visa
revocations and there were potential investigative gaps on
individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns who
were in the United States.
We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, develop specific policies and procedures for
interagency visa revocation process to ensure that information
is transmitted to the appropriate immigration and law
enforcement agencies in a timely manner. We also recommended
that they develop a specific policy on actions that immigration
and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and
locate individuals who remain in the United States after their
visas have been revoked.
At your request, we examined whether the weaknesses in the
visa revocation process identified in June 2003 were being
addressed. The Departments of State and Homeland Security took
some actions in the summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses
identified in our June 2003 report. State and the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection Office, a component of DHS, developed
procedures outlining their respective processes for handling
visa revocations.
However, our analysis of visas revoked based on terrorism
concerns from October through December 2003 revealed that
weaknesses remained in the implementation of the visa
revocation process, especially related to timely transmission
of information among the Federal agencies. For instance, we
found delays sometimes occurred in screening names of suspected
terrorists against State Department data base for current visa
holders.
We found delays in transmission of recommendations to
revoke individual visas. We found some delays in the revoking
of individual visas after receiving a recommendation to do so
from the terrorist tracking center. We found delays in posting
appropriate lookouts used to alert border inspectors of the
revocation. Also in notifying DHS of visa revocations.
And finally, we found that there were delays in
investigating individuals with visas revoked on suspected
terrorism grounds who may be in the country. For example, based
on our sample, we found that it took over 2 months for
immigration officials to initiate investigations on individuals
identified. We also found that agencies involved in the visa
revocation process had conflicting records on how many visas
were revoked for terrorism concerns, and whether individuals
who held these visas may be in the country.
Our review of visa revocations showed that DHS has located
individuals in the country whose visas were revoked because
they may be suspected or actual terrorists. DHS officials told
us that some are still being investigated, three have been
arrested on immigration charges and others have been cleared.
With respect to an alien already present in the United
States, the Department of State's current visa revocation
certificate makes the revocation effective only upon the
alien's departure. Therefore, according to DH officials, if
U.S. Immigration special agents locate an alien for whom State
has issued a revoke certificate that states that the revocation
is effective upon his departure, they would be unable to place
the alien in removal proceedings based solely on the visa
revocation.
State, DHS and Justice have been discussing how to resolve
this issue for the past year. And State and DHS officials
recently told us that they have reached informal agreements to
take necessary actions on a case by case basis. Since we
initiated our inquiry, State and DHS have taken additional
actions to address the weaknesses we identified from our
analysis. State and DHS believe these actions will avoid the
delays that were experienced in the past. In April and May,
State made significant revisions to its procedures and
formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases.
Between January and May, DHS took steps to develop additional
written procedures, improve the sharing of information on visa
revocation cases, and ensure that immigration investigators
were aware of individuals whose visas were revoked who may
still be in the country.
Finally, State and DHS began discussing how to address the
legal and policy issues regarding the removal of individuals
with revoked visas. In addition, the terrorist screening center
and interagency organization established under the FBI in
December 2003 recently took steps to improve the visa
revocation process, including developing written standard
operating procedures related to the screening of intelligence
information and training additional staff to perform this
function.
Nevertheless, additional measures are needed to further
improve the process. The written policies and procedures often
neither contain performance standards such as timeframes for
completing individual steps in the process, nor do they reflect
a fully coordinated approach in the process. As a consequence,
we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
conjunction with the Department of State, work jointly with
other appropriate agencies to develop a written, Government-
wide policy that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities
and sets performance standards for the agencies involved in the
visa revocation process.
We also recommend that DHS and State address the
outstanding legal and policy issues related to removing
individuals with revoked visas from the country, and by October
1st of this year, provide Congress with a list of actions that
they intend to take.
This concludes my opening statement and I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have to ask.
[Note.--The General Accounting Office report entitled,
``Border Security, Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate
Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process,'' may be found in
subcommittee files.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Ford.
Mr. Edson.
Mr. Edson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the ,
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on
the subject of visa revocations, where they fit into the
overall strategy of strengthening the visa process as an anti-
terrorism tool, and the improvements we've made in the
revocation process.
The use of the revocation authority is one element in a
multi-layered, interlocking system of border security measures.
We act when relevant derogatory information becomes available
after a visa has been issued to an applicant, who at the time
of visa issuance appeared eligible for the visa. Since the
attacks of September 11, we have used this authority to revoke
more than 1,250 visa based on information suggesting possible
terrorist activities or links.
When the terrorist screening center receives derogatory
information about an alien, the subject's name is immediately
entered into the Department of State's consular lookout and
support system CLASS, or name check system, into that data base
and into the Department of Homeland Security's IBIS data base,
prior to determining whether the subject has been issued a
visa. This safeguard prevents further visa issuance or
admission into the United States. The consolidated consular
data base of more than 70 million visa records is then checked
to determine if a visa has ever been issued to the individual
in question.
If it appears that a visa has been issued to a terrorist
suspect, the TSC forwards the derogatory information to the
visa office at the Department of State, which reviews the
information to ensure that it pertains to the individual who
was issued a visa. When we determine there is sufficient
evidence that links the visa holder to the derogatory
information, the visa is formally revoked.
In most cases, the revocation has been prudential, rather
than based on a definitive finding that the alien is
inadmissible. This is in part because at the time of
revocation, we're often unable to conclude with certainty that
the visa holder is the same as the subject of the derogatory
information.
Nevertheless, given the seriousness, given the terrorism
related nature of the information that may relate to the visa
holder, we deem it prudent to revoke the visa promptly after
the information becomes available and to rely on the visa
application process to resolve identity and other questions at
a later time, in case the visa holder reapplies.
We work closely with our partners in the revocation process
to make sure that the fact that a visa has been revoked is
disseminated to those in other agencies who need to carry out
followup action. However, it is important to note that long
before this communication and coordination takes place,
safeguards have been put in place to prevent the traveler from
entering the United States. Visa revocation usually takes
effect upon the departure of the visa holder from the United
States. This approach was agreed to a number of years ago among
the Department of Justice, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and State to minimize the likelihood that persons in
the United States would be permitted to block the revocation
process in our courts.
Since September 11, we have worked closely with the
Department of Homeland Security to evaluate when and under what
circumstances it might be appropriate and helpful to DHS for
the Department of State to make its revocations effective
immediately or even retroactively for persons physically
present in the United States.
We have agreed that revoking visas effective immediately
when an alien is at a port of entry allows DHS to deny entry on
the grounds that the alien does not have a valid visa. We have
also agreed that revoking a visa retroactively to the time of
issuance could be helpful to DHS in the case of an alien in the
United States by allowing it to place the alien in removal
proceedings on the grounds that he entered without a valid
visa.
Because these scenarios raise a number of legal issues,
however, we have agreed that States should revoke in this way
only on a case by case basis, at the request of DHS. DHS will
make such requests when it has confirmed that the presence of
the alien in the United States may pose a significant security
risk. We are also working with DHS on its efforts to draft a
regulation that would facilitate DHS in appropriate cases
removing from the United State an alien who has been admitted
by whose visa has been revoked.
Visa revocations are an important tool in maintaining the
security of our borders and our Nation. We and our colleagues
in the Department of Homeland Security are committed to
furthering our mutual efforts to keep persons who would do us
harm out of the country and to taking every step in our power
to safeguard our borders.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Ms. Bucella.
Ms. Bucella. Good morning, Chairman Shays, members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
missions and objectives of the Terrorist Screening Center as
they relate to the visa revocation process.
First, I'd like to say a few words about our overall
mission. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 ordered the
creation of the TSC, and our operations began on December 1,
2003. Our mission is to consolidate the U.S. Government's
approach to screening for known and suspected terrorists, and
to provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist
information in the screening process.
A year ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on visa
revocation. Chairman Shays noted that the Departments of State,
Homeland Security and Justice bring disparate practices,
informal customs, and clashing cultures to what should be a
seamless process. Since our inception, the Terrorist Screening
Center has facilitated communications and coordination among
these agencies through both physical and automated processes.
The TSC is a dynamic, multi-agency center, including
participants from the Department of Justice, Homeland Security,
State, and Treasury. Our consolidated data base, the Terrorist
Screening Data Base, contains information on known or suspected
terrorists, complied by the intelligence community, the FBI,
DHS and the State Department. Names and identifying information
from our data base are accessed daily by 18,000 agencies with
National Crime Information Center, NCIC, terminals and by State
Department consular officials.
Because our data can be accessed by any police officer in
real time, we have dramatically improved one aspect of the visa
revocation process: locating the subject. If a police officer
stops a vehicle for speeding, he will run the name of the
driver and often the passengers through an NCIC check. If one
of the vehicle's occupants is shown to have a terrorist related
revoked visa, the TSC assists in the identification process and
transfers the officer to the FBI's counter-terrorism watch for
an operational response from the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
How is this different from a year ago? Last year, the
officers simply issued a speeding ticket without knowing that
the driver or passengers might be known or suspected terrorists
with revoked visas. In fact, the encounter would have neither
been communicated to the intelligence community nor coordinated
with Federal law enforcement.
Another aspect of visa revocations is the coordination
among agencies. State Department assignees now screen visa
applications and revocations at our center, a function that was
earlier performed at the State Department. They have daily
interaction with DHS and DOJ personnel. This interaction has
paid off recently when a suspected terrorist arrived on an
international flight and went through routine screening. His
name was shown in our data base and the TSC was contacted for
further identifying information.
This particular case was coordinated by DHS and the State
Department personnel in real time, physically located at our
center, allowing the visa to be immediately revoked and for the
individuals to be denied entry into the United States. At our
center, the TSC State Department assignees alert their consular
affairs counterparts to review specific cases for visa
revocation.
The TSC, an inter-agency entity, is well positioned to
assist communications between agencies. In May, we chaired a
meeting of the U.S. Government agencies involved in the visa
revocation process to discuss ways to better coordinate the
Government's response after the State revokes a visa. Although
we began our operations in December, by March we had
consolidated 10 of the 12 data bases listed in the April 2003
GAO report. That data base, through the NCIC, is available to
appropriate screeners, including local law enforcement, border
inspectors, consular officials and others with appropriate
access.
We participate in the visa revocation process by
facilitating communications and coordination among agencies and
consolidating terrorist screening information into a single,
accessible data base. I appreciate the subcommittee's interest
in our activities, and I look forward to answering any
questions that you may have regarding TSC's operations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bucella follows:]
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Mr. Schrock [assuming Chair]. Thank you, Ms. Bucella. We
appreciate your being here, too.
Mr. Jacksta.
Mr. Jacksta. Good morning, members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear today before you to
update you on our efforts to formalize and reinforce the role
of Customs and Border Protection in the visa revocation
process. I am also pleased to be here with my colleagues.
CBP firmly believes that the visa revocation process is the
key component of the layered defense that we deploy in
conducting our primary anti-terror mission. For CBP, a great
deal of progress has been made on a number of fronts since June
of last year. I would like to provide a brief status update on
our efforts in this area before turning to our response to the
General Accounting Office's recommendations.
Prior to the arrival of international travel at air and
seaports, CBP screens these travelers using electronic
manifests provided by the carriers. CBP checks the names of
passengers and crew members in the Interagency Border
Inspection System, a name driven data base that includes
lookouts from the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice and the Department of State. CBP's
National Targeting Center also reviews manifests for potential
items of interest and can highlight passengers for additional
screening, or in certain cases identify passengers who CBP
officers will meet plane-side.
Beginning June 2003, CBP began training inspectors with
Customs and Immigration background to function as members of
joint rover and analytical units. These teams cover terrorism,
immigration and narcotics enforcement concerns in the passenger
environment. Additionally, these joint teams have received
counter-terrorism training since September 2003.
CBP has now delivered counter-terrorism response training
to over 1,700 CBP officers. This training provides procedures
to follow when a terrorist referral is made from an inspector,
an advanced lookout or a cold stop by a CBP inspector. We have
highly trained officers and we are working aggressively to
provide them with the additional specialized training they need
to meet our constantly evolving anti-terrorism missions.
Since we testified on the topic of visa revocations in June
2003, CBP has addressed the operational concerns identify by
GAO. CBP's role int eh revocation process is to prevent holders
of revoked visas from gaining entry into the United States. To
this end, we have taken steps to formalize internal procedures
for processing visa revocations, enhanced the automation tools
that support the process and ensure that information sharing is
timely is consistent.
The CBP verifies that visa revocations issued by the
Department of State are properly posted in our IBIS system, and
that any lead information is promptly provided to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement for investigation. CBP recognizes that
ICE is independently vetting visa revocations for lead
information; however, CBP suggest that our efforts, rather than
being redundant, offer an additional source of information
against which ICE can validate its findings.
CBP personnel now follow a written work flow outline for
visa revocations which includes specifications instructions for
verifying that the revocation has been posted in IBIS,
conducting the proper checks to determine if the subject may be
in the United States, consistently recording results of the
visa revocation process, and ensuring that ICE is notified
where CBP feels that the subject of the revocation is in the
United States.
It should be noted that the presence of ICE, FBI, TSA, and
CBP's National Targeting Center has greatly streamlined the
sharing of information. In order to improve and strengthen our
procedures for interdicting travelers who may be traveling on
revoked visas, CBP has identified visa revocation in our
automated targeting system and assigned them the highest risk.
This places passengers suspected of traveling on revoked visas
on our start page, where they are identified as high risk
passengers prior to arrival. This enhancement to ATS allows CBP
personnel to easily identify these travelers.
Additionally, our National Targeting Center closely
monitors these high risk passengers and works directly with
local ports of entry to respond to exactly matches and to
resolve close matches.
Finally, CBP has developed a pilot program, the Immigration
Security Initiative, to further improve our effectiveness in
identifying terrorists, criminals and other inadmissible
passengers prior to boarding. In June 2004, CBP deployed four
officers to the Netherlands, a visa waiver country, for a 90
day ISI pilot program. Not only will CBP now have an
opportunity to examine passengers prior to boarding, but
airlines will have the opportunity to consult with trained CBP
officers during the check-in and boarding process.
Identifying and preventing the entry of persons, be they
using fraudulent documents to conceal their true intentions
about the purpose of their visit, or because they have had
their visa revoked is a key responsibility of CBP. Applying
GAO's recommendation to our process helps CBP to better fulfill
its mission at the ports of entry. The procedures work. A
review of the National Targeting Center activity log for the
last 12 months shows that they have stopped 72 people and
refused them entry into the United States based on revocation
hits.
In conclusion, CBP is dedicated to enforcing the visa
revocation program cooperatively with our colleagues. And I
thank you today for having the opportunity to testify and I
will address questions at the end.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacksta follows:]
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Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Jacksta.
Mr. Schoch.
Mr. Schoch. Good morning, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity today to update you
on the improvements made to the visa revocation process by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE.
Identifying and investigating individuals who pose
potential threats to the security of the United States is a
critical task in fulfilling ICE's mission of preventing
terrorists and other criminal activity by targeting the people,
money and materials that support terrorists and criminal
organizations. Strengthening the visa revocation process and
utilizing all of ICE's unique authorities to investigate,
prosecute and remove individuals with revoked visas from the
United States is an important tool in the war against
terrorism.
Central to the ICE national security mission is the
National Security Investigations Division within the Office of
Investigations. The National Security Division is comprised of
investigative units that apply traditional customs and
immigration authorities needed to effectively combat the threat
of terrorism and to enhance our national security.
As you are aware, the visa revocation process involves a
coordinated effort by many members of the Federal law
enforcement community. In June 2003, the Government
Accountability Office identified weaknesses in that process,
including difficulties in receiving the visa revocation cables
and a lack of specific derogatory information behind those
cables. ICE addressed these weaknesses. However, a followup
report by GAO released today identified the need for additional
coordination between DHS and the State Department and for the
implementation of performance standards, such as specific
timeframes for completing each step of the process.
I am pleased to describe the actions that ICE has taken to
address the concerns raised by GAO. ICE has thoroughly reviewed
our role in the visa revocation process and has implemented a
number of aggressive changes to increase the efficiency and
coordination of visa revocation investigations. The following
are key changes that have been made since June 2003: The State
Department now transmits daily visa revocation notifications to
ICE electronically via e-mail as they are issued, allowing for
ICE to initiate more timely investigations; The State
Department now provides a terror screening center [TSC],
reference number for every national security revocation based
on a TSC record that allows ICE to retrieve the specific
derogatory behind the revocation with certainty; The State
Department, the TSC and ICE now reconcile visa revocation lists
to ensure that all visa revocation cases have been received by
the investigating agencies; All national security visa
revocation cases identified by State Department are prioritized
by ICE. Those identified by the TSC as having a nexus to
terrorism are given the absolute highest priority and are
jointly investigated by ICE and the FBI through the Joint
Terrorism Task Force.
Over the last year, ICE has investigated hundreds of visa
revocation cases. Just last month, ICE agents in Atlanta
arrested the subject of a visa revocation referral on an
overstay violation. The subject, an Afghani national, is listed
in the TIPOFF data base, was identified by the TSC as a person
of interest. This case was initiated by ICE, coordinated
through the JTTF, all within approximately a 30 day time
period.
While some cases have led to arrests, many of the referred
cases are ultimately closed through the determination that the
subject of the revocation has either never entered the United
States, has departed from the United States or has been cleared
as not in fact being a national security threat. In cases where
the investigation concludes that the subject is not in the
United States, ICE ensures and coordinates with CBP and State
to ensure the proper looks are placed on these individuals.
As you are aware, neither existing regulations nor statutes
expressly provide for the removal of aliens based solely on
visa revocations. Revocation of a visa is not explicitly a
stated ground of removal under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. State Department's visa revocation certificate generally
states that the revocation shall become effectively immediately
on the date that the certificate is signed unless the alien is
already in the United States, in which case the revocation will
become effective immediately upon the alien's departure from
the United States.
Therefore, if an ICE special agent locates an alien in the
United States for whom State has issued a visa revocation
certificate, ICE would be unable to place the admitted alien in
removal proceedings solely based on the visa revocation that
had not yet taken place. However, State Department and DHS have
recently agreed that on a case by case basis, the Department of
State will consider issuing a superseding revocation
certificate to make the revocation effective retroactively to
the date of issuance of the visa. Such a change in the language
of the certificate may make it possible for DHS to place an
alien in removal proceedings.
DHS and the Department of State have also exchanged letters
to ensure that the two agencies are aware of operational steps
that each are taking when a visa revocation occurs. These
letters essentially define the roles and responsibilities of
each agency involved in the visa revocation process. DHS and
State are also considering formalizing letters into a
memorandum of understanding.
In summary, the Department of Homeland Security and ICE
have worked diligently to strengthen our Nation's security by
implementing new procedures and refining old procedures. We
continue to work closely with our partners in a mission to
assure that any and all threats are addressed and challenged by
our agency's full authority. We appreciate the extensive work
and cooperation by GAO in the review of the visa revocation
process. I thank you for the opportunity to be here toady and
speak to you and look forward to any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schoch follows:]
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Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Schoch.
I have a couple of real long questions, but I want to ask
Mr. Ford, I guess my key question is why does it take so long,
why does it take so long. Your testimony on page three says,
Immigration and Customs enforcement would be unable to place an
alien in removal proceedings based solely on a visa revocation
that has not yet taken place. Help me understand that, and why
that is the case.
Mr. Ford. Our understanding of the process is that the
revocation itself, based on the State Department's certificate,
does not really take effect until an individual actually leaves
the country, that they in effect--somebody that's here
illegally, their visa status doesn't change until they actually
leave. Therefore, the concern----
Mr. Schrock. Why?
Mr. Ford. Why?
Mr. Schrock. Doesn't the status change until they leave?
Why isn't it instant?
Mr. Ford. My understanding is, the interpretation of their
legal staff is that they----
Mr. Schrock. The legal status or legal staff?
Mr. Ford. The legal staff at the State Department, it is my
understanding their interpretation of the law is that they
can't or won't change the certificate to make it either
retroactive or to make it the day that they actually do the
revocation. Actually, I would prefer to have the State
Department comment on that, because this is, in my view, a
policy issue that probably needs to be discussed in terms of
whether or not that's the right kind of policy.
Mr. Schrock. Does anybody else want to comment on that? Mr.
Edson.
Mr. Edson. I think one of the issues is the distinction
between the visa, which is the travel document that allows them
to apply for entry at the border, and the admission by DHS.
We're revoking only the visa. So for an individual who's in the
United States, unless it were to be retroactive to the date of
issuance, it has no legal effect, since they're already here
and they're not using the visa at that point until they travel
internationally. But we are now in agreement with DHS on steps
that can be taken to reword that revocation certificate when
it's appropriate and when DHS feels it's useful.
Mr. Schrock. Is that something that a legislative fix will
solve?
Mr. Edson. I think we have the fix now. The DHS is looking
at other changes on the regulatory-legislative side. But we
have a way to work together when DHS sees it to be in their----
Mr. Schrock. As I heard Mr. Ford say, some people interpret
or fail to do such and so, and does it need to be so specific
that they'll know what it is exactly and they don't have to go
in there and interpret it for themselves?
Mr. Edson. Our preference, if I could, the revocation
process is a very blunt tool. We use a very low standard of
evidence when we revoke visas. We revoke most of them
prudentially just because we feel it's prudent and not because
we've actually proven a thing.
We are concerned that we not tie the hands of the Secretary
and DHS in using this tool bluntly and broadly. We'd like to be
able to continue to do that, and we are a little concerned
about things that would open it up to further judicial review
or more specifically, if we always had to revoke in a
particular way, i.e., retroactive back to the date of issuance,
we're concerned that we might find ourselves using or being
forced to use a higher standard of evidence in these cases.
For example, we recently revoked five people's visas based
on a single piece of derogatory information that clearly
referred to only a single person. We had no way to know which
of those five it was, so we went ahead and revoked them all
because we were able to do that. If we had to use a higher
standard of evidence we'd have to spend more time trying to
figure out which of the five with those matching names was the
appropriate person.
And that's the sort of concern we're facing.
Mr. Schrock. This is probably along the same lines, and
it's a long, convoluted question, so bear with me. I understand
we face serious legal ramifications and obstacles in removing
an alien who's already in country and has his visa revoked. And
I recognize that the Immigration and Nationality Act calls for
a judge to conduct proceedings to determine if the alien has
been removable, and that the alien has rights to question
witnesses, which I think is ridiculous, see evidence and so
forth.
I further recognize that intelligence and law enforcement
organizations will be reluctant to disclose such potentially
classified information due to releasing sources and methods.
Where or how can we meet in the middle to get a better grip on
this situation and frankly, expel potential terrorists and
aliens who are here for whatever reasons, criminals, suspected
terror connections, whatever, and have come to meet the
criteria for having their visas revoked after they enter our
borders? It seems like we're being a little too lenient on some
of these people.
When I had cancer, they cut out a whole bunch of stuff
around the cancer, just to make sure we got it all. If they had
taken out just the cancer part, they might have missed some of
it. Thank God they didn't. Maybe that's what we're dealing with
here. I don't know. Tell me.
Mr. Edson. I'd like to comment briefly, and then maybe if I
could, defer to my colleague from ICE. But the situation you
describe is precisely why we think the working arrangement
we've come to at DHS is the best way to go. So on a case by
case basis, if it looks as if the evidence is clear and the
risk to the United States warrants revocation retroactively, on
balance against the down sides that you just mentioned, then
DHS would request that of us and that's what we would do.
Mr. Schrock. Does anybody else want to comment?
Mr. Schoch. I can comment. On any situation where we had a
person we identified, our agents are out working, we identify
this individual as being in the United States, I think first we
would look at the status. We currently do this in all of our
cases, whether or not this person is still conforming to the
status they were admitted for. That's first and foremost.
If they are in status and there is a national security
concern that remains, then we can also, and working with the
intelligence and law enforcement community, we can get certain
information that can be declassified, and we can go in and work
with national security removable grounds that exist today. That
would be second.
We have recently, as was pointed out by the State
Department, we recently have this agreement that I think also
is a stop-gap measure that helps us tremendously in that on a
case by case basis we can now go back retroactively and now we
have somebody who is presently in the United States who has not
been admitted with a valid visa, gives us the grounds to put
that person in proceedings. We have three different ways to
handle that situation.
Mr. Schrock. Being basically an inpatient, does it take
this long, this long, this long? And if it takes this long,
why? Because a lot of bad things can happen when it takes this
long.
Mr. Schoch. I think the system we have in place now is
immediate, it's immediate.
Mr. Schrock. Good.
Mr. Schoch. We have BTS level that would talk to the State
Department, these actions would be taken immediately.
Mr. Schrock. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me get to the issue that the GAO
report stated that the State and DHS, this is for Mr. Edson and
Mr. Schoch, that the procedures regarding the visa revocation
are not coordinated and lack performance standards, such as
specific timeframes and process. Do you agree with that
statement, and if not, where do you think we are right now as
it relates to performance standards?
Mr. Schoch. Let me speak to, in March of this year we put
in place several different procedures, basically to audit and
make sure that we are meeting the timeframes that were
acceptable for these types of cases. We now, as ICE use the
TECS-II system, it's a tracking system that allows us to put
all of our cases in it. That was new to ICE that recently has
come into the fold. So we have put measures in place that
within receipt of the revocation from State, within 7 days our
headquarters has to get that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. How recently has that been in effect?
Mr. Schoch. I'd say within the last couple of months that
has been in place. We have also, the field, having now, as lead
is sent out to our TECS system, they have 7 days to also
respond back to us. We have very tight, measurable timeframes
that are put in place specifically to ensure that the field is
responsive, that we are responsive. And not to mention another
layer is every week we reconcile with the State Department to
ensure that what they're sending us is what we actually got.
And there's this weekly reconciliation to ensure that we are
getting what they are pushing to our agency as a referral.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you this, and again, Mr.
Edson or Mr. Schoch. It seems the information sharing
notification of visa revocation among agencies, especially your
two agencies, has been done internally or on an informal basis.
Do you believe that a Government-wide policy should be created
and be in effect to deal with this issue? And there are
advantages and disadvantages for that, too.
Mr. Edson. We've gotten to the point, I think particularly
with the creation of TSC, when TSC was stood up in December,
there are pretty consistent policies being followed now for
information sharing. We actually appreciate very much the
opportunity to work with GAO on reviewing our processes,
because they bring an auditor's eye to the process that we
don't always use.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And they bring accountability, which is
extremely important.
Mr. Edson. Yes. And they give us the opportunity to look at
things like the performance standards. We had over-used the
word ``immediately,'' or ``as soon as possible'' in our
standard operating procedures, and now have very specifically
indicated when things have to happen by the end of the same
working day.
We have very specifically worked out with ICE, CBP, the
National Targeting Center and TSC the methods, and we have
redundant, overlapping methods of communication for all of
these cases, so that we're, with those overlapping methods of
communication and the weekly reconciliations with different
agencies involved, and other things we've got in the works, a
consolidated, we developed a module for our own data base that
all of the agencies involved in this process will use for
reporting and accountability, so that we can track cases
together through the same module. It won't be multiple data
bases.
I think those things together are going to enable us not
only to share the information effectively, which we're probably
already doing, but to verify that it's being shared
effectively, to get at the core of the GAO report, and that's
our inability to actually have full, 100 percent assurance and
an audit trail.
Mr. Ruppersberger. A question for Ms. Bucella. I know in
the past that the intelligence community felt that the visa
revocation process was a vulnerability to the United States.
Since the last GAO report up until now, and what you're aware
of with the testimony we've heard today and the process and
procedures that have been in place, do you still feel, based on
your position, that the visa revocation process is still a
vulnerability to the United States as it relates to terrorism
and national security?
Ms. Bucella. Yes, sir. Initially, when we stood up, we are
looking at the Government's processes and procedures with a
totally fresh look. The Terrorist Screening Center, as I
mentioned to you before, is a multi-agency organization. The
one advantage that we really have is that we have
representatives from all the different agencies co-located
where we are.
So every time we would have an encounter, that is, someone
stopped on the road for a routine traffic stop, we would have
somebody there from State, somebody from CBP, ICE, DHS, and the
FBI. When the officer would pull the person over, we would find
out who this person is, and if there was a visa that had been
revoked, we'd say when was it revoked, and DHS, ICE and CBP,
when did they come into the country, where did they come into
the country and how.
And then what we require to do, that's when we found out
that there was in fact some vulnerabilities. We realized that
there was not a written process of how we had agreed on sending
information back and forth, and what we would do once we found
the individual. So we started a series of meetings back in, I
guess April we saw this vulnerability, in May, and we started
to talk on a pretty routine basis and came up with a written
business process which we shared, I believe with GAO, on what
we would do when we had information about a revoked visa.
When the State Department would revoke a visa, real time
right at our center, we would enter it through our CBP and ICE
people, right into IBIS and right into the CLASS system. So for
the first time, every Government agency had the information
real time. All they had to do was access NCIC.
And this was a hole that we decided we needed to work
together on. And we're endeavoring to do that. That is one of
the challenges that I believe we all have. But for once we are
all sitting at the same table, working a written business
process together.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. We have a lot of challenges out
there. And we have a lot of people working on a lot of issues.
It takes a lot of coordination. Unfortunately sometimes we get
caught up in our own little world, in our own projects, and we
forget about the integration of all information we need to get
to the people that can react. And the Terrorist Screening
Center, the purpose is to very quickly identify someone that
can be a threat to the United States.
Now, what do you feel needs to be done, from your
perspective, working with the Terrorist Screening Center, to
make things even more effective than they are now, and maybe
relate to Homeland Security and State? Because it seems to me
that's where we really have to bring that coordination together
and that integration.
Ms. Bucella. We as the Terrorist Screening Center have only
been in existence for about 8 months. And so what we are, as we
see an issue, we deal with it right then and there.
Fortunately, because of the structure of the Terrorist
Screening Center, I'm a DHS employee. That's who pays my
paycheck. But I am, the Terrorist Screening Center is
administered by the FBI. So I immediately report to Bob
Mueller, the Director of the FBI. So I don't have that
bureaucratic delay.
Because we have representatives, one of my deputies, my
principal deputy is from DHS, he was former CBP. My other
deputy is from the FBI. My other deputy is from the State
Department. They're all at levels that they can literally
penetrate into those organizations without dealing with the
bureaucracy and waiting for the delay time in receiving
information and getting information.
Unfortunately, we don't have the wisdom and maturity of
experience. That could be a good thing, and it could be a bad
thing. What we are doing now, though, is as we see an issue,
we're trying to fix it. But I believe that we are on the right
road. I will tell you, we don't have cables that come into the
Terrorist Screening Center. We have e-mail. E-mail comes in a
lot faster. We can just literally pick up the phone when
there's a visa that's been revoked and contract and coordinate,
which we do with the National Targeting Center, which is the
Department of Homeland Security's operations center. We are in
constant communication with them on a daily basis.
Mr. Ruppersberger. It seems to me that what you're focusing
on is where we need to be. Are we there from a technology point
of view?
Ms. Bucella. I don't believe we're there from a technology
standpoint.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Explain why you think that.
Ms. Bucella. When we stood up, we were announced in
September. My staff, probably about 10 of us were there in
October. But we had to be fully operational 24/7, call center
by December 1st, which we were. And we had to borrow and take
everyone's data bases so we had accessibility and the ability
to communicate real time with the different agencies, to
include the intelligence community.
We are now developing a data base which will be accessible
by other Government agencies as well as the intel community.
But that is under current development and probably will not be
done until the beginning part of next year.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The thing that worries us all, and we
look at September 11 and we look at the mistakes we've made so
we can hopefully correct those mistakes, but what really I'm
hearing today is that we still have a way to go as far as
stopping maybe a terrorist out on the road somewhere, getting
that individual, that police officer on the street, getting it
to the agencies that need to react on it.
Ms. Bucella. Let me clarify. I'm not waiting for us to have
the super-duper communications system. We're doing go-arounds.
So if I could, I'd like to explain to you how an encounter
works on the street and what we do as far as communicating with
not only everybody at this table, but the intelligence
community.
A law enforcement officer stops someone for speeding, for
example, going 100 miles an hour down the road. Right now, that
law enforcement officer either, on his vehicle if he has the
NCIC, or if he contacts his dispatcher, will put the person's
name into the data base, into the NCIC. There will be an
indication that will come up, please contact the Terrorist
Screening Center, with the telephone number. They will contact
us. Our staff, as a 24/7 call center, has representatives from
each of the different agencies and quite frankly, at our
center, I have CBP people accessing FBI data bases, and I have
FBI agents that are accessing CBP data bases. It truly is a
partnership.
That will----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Are you working with JTTF also?
Ms. Bucella. Yes, and I'll explain how they are the
operational arm. The law enforcement officer and/or the
dispatcher will call in and give us a name. We'll ask for the
date of birth and the passport number, country of origin. Right
now, those are the four sources of information that are not
classified that we can have in our data base.
However, because law enforcement is not involved
necessarily in the intel community, any information they
solicit from the individual we can add into our data base. For
example, height, weight, any kind of distinguishing marks, sex,
those types of things.
We then facilitate and help that law enforcement officer to
be able to identify that person is in fact the person that is
in our data base as a known or suspected terrorist. Name alone
is not enough. And just because they get the monitor to say,
please contact us, doesn't mean they have a terrorist. So we
listen to the information that they are sharing with us.
We also have accessibility to classified information. So
for example, if we have information from the former State
Department TIPOFF system, which has classified information, for
example, had distinguishing marks like, the individual has only
one right arm, we may say to the officer, please describe what
he looks like, height, weight, anything else. Well, he doesn't
have an arm.
We do not tell that officer, bingo, you've got somebody,
nor do we tell him the individual only has one arm, because we
are very cautious about not sharing classified information. If
it appears that person that the law enforcement officer is
encountering is in fact the same person that we have in our
data base, we then forward the phone call to CT Watch, Counter-
Terrorist Watch, at the FBI. They then give instruction or
advise that law enforcement officer----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And give us the time period that all
this is occurring.
Ms. Bucella. This happens probably on average within 10
minutes. And by the way, the only reason why they would get the
Terrorist Screening Center is that there has to be information
that this individual is related to terrorism. We do not have
the absconders or murderers, only if it relates to terrorism.
So the law enforcement officer then gets forwarded, we just
touch a button, they're conferenced in with the CT Watch, CT
Watch then gives them instructions, either arrest the
individual because there is an indictment, there is a charge
document, ask questions, and the questions that they can ask
them will be those routine questions in law enforcement, or
there could actually be questions that the case agent, and that
could either be from the intel community or from the law
enforcement community, would ask. If you encounter this
individual, what do you want to know. Well, I'd like to know
where he's been, I'd like to know, does he attend the
university of whatever. Those questions are then given to the
law enforcement officer. And the law enforcement officer
solicits that information.
The other category is detain the individual. If for
example, in the first example I gave, people driving 100 miles
an hour, fortunately they've violated, and this in fact did
happen in the United States, they violated a State law. And the
law enforcement officers could in fact arrest the individual.
If it appears that is in fact a person, the CT Watch dispatches
out the JTTFs at the local communities. There's probably about
86 of them around the country. And the JTTFs go out and assist
the law enforcement officer.
The law enforcement officer may not ever know who had the
original case, may not know that DIA or the CIA is looking at
this individual.
Mr. Ruppersberger. One other thing I want to ask you, and I
ask you, Mr. Chairman, for a little more time. There are two
issues. First thing, if someone's going 100 miles an hour and
you catch them, and that's fine, that's reactive. How about the
issue of being proactive as it relates to your organization,
the Terrorist Screening Center? Someone that's not going 100
miles an hour, are you investigating those individuals whose
visas have been revoked and that we also are attempting to
find? How are you doing that?
And the second question, because I know my time, would be
volume. I know one of the problems we have is volume. NSA, look
at the volume they deal with. How, based on the program from
your perspective, working both in Homeland Security and in FBI,
how are we dealing with the volume as it relates to this issue.
Maybe Mr. Ford might want to come in on that. That's the end of
my questions. Thank you.
Ms. Bucella. I'm going to answer the first question first,
sir, because that deals with those individuals that haven't
violated a State law. Those individuals that haven't violated
State law, the law enforcement officer gathers that information
from the individual. If that person, if there's a revoked visa,
what we do is then, through the JTTF, I need to clarify that
the Terrorism Screening Center is, think of us as a
clearinghouse or pointer system. We do not investigate.
We have the operational arm, which is the JTTF, which could
in fact be someone from CBP, ICE or the FBI. They then send out
leads, because we want to make sure, for example, if that
person whose visa has been revoked, who now is in the United
States, what are they doing, where are they. The JTTF will send
out a lead to either do a threat assessment on that individual
or to start an investigation. That coordination is done between
ICE and the FBI on a daily basis. First.
Second, volume. As far as volume, right now since we have
been in existence since December 1st, we have responded to
approximately close to 6,000 calls in total. Of the 6,000 phone
calls that we have----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Are those 6,000 calls from police
officers stopping somebody or what?
Ms. Bucella. Could be. Could be police officers stopping
somebody, could be somebody applying for a State job, could be
somebody that's putting bond up for an individual, it could
be----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Every citizen?
Ms. Bucella. Excuse me?
Mr. Ruppersberger. Just John Q. Public?
Ms. Bucella. No, no. We only deal, our interface is only
with law enforcement.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK.
Ms. Bucella. So that is the volume that we have right now.
We are increasing that volume based on the amount of data that
we have in our system. But we do not, in our data base, have
the derogatory information. That is the reason why they're
there. That stays with the different agencies, whether it be
the intelligence community, State Department, or CBP or ICE or
FBI. But we do have accessibility to that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK, Mr. Ford, you're batting cleanup.
You've heard the testimony here today. The purpose of this
hearing is to make the issue that we're dealing with better.
We're trying to learn from past mistakes. Moving forward, we
need to implement now. Based on the testimony we've heard
today, where are we as it relates to GAO?
Mr. Ford. I guess I want to put this in a little context,
since I testified on this issue a year ago. I think that since
we've pretty much been looking at this issue now for almost 2
years, clearly the level of response on the part of the
executive branch on this issue has deeply increased from where
we were, say, 2 years ago. When we conducted the work last
year, many of the handoffs, the communication between the
agencies, the problems in notifying people on a timely basis
was more egregious than we believe it is today.
The analysis that's in our report was based on a sample we
took from October to December 2003. The TSC was stood up in
December 2003. So prior to that time, there wasn't this
coordinating mechanism in place. Many of the actions taken by
the agencies since we've done our analysis in our view are
steps in the right direction.
I think the one area that we still believe needs more
transparency is the, a clearer statement, and we think it
should come from DHS as the lead agency, to ensure that all of
these improvements in the visa revocation process are properly
codified, and in fact, we think they need to have performance
standards that lay out how long it should take to properly
notify one agency or another in the process. And we shouldn't
have to run into the same problems we did----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And would those performance standards be
for both Department of Homeland Security and also State?
Mr. Ford. Absolutely. We think everyone involved in the
process needs to step to the plate in terms of taking action on
a timely basis. The reality of it is that what we are trying to
prevent here is a suspected terrorist that may enter the
country legally, may be here, from doing something harmful. And
the best way to deal with it, to counteract that, is to alert
the appropriate officials on a timely basis. So we think those
kinds of metrics should be included in the policies and
procedures.
So we think a lot of things we're doing are the right kinds
of things. We haven't seen the metrics yet, but if they are in
fact putting those in place, those are in our view steps in the
right direction.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Given that visa revocation that is
occurring while the applicant is overseas are not subject to
judicial review, our Chairman Shays has a bill that he's
introduced that would also use that process in individuals in
the United States, that if they are revoked, they would not be
subject to judicial review. What is your opinion of his bill as
it relates to this process?
Mr. Ford. Well, the GAO has not, we don't have a view on
that institutionally. We've heard some discussion from the
executive branch witnesses here about, I guess you could say,
the pros and cons of statutorily trying to fix this problem. I
guess we're going to have to bow out on that. We don't have a
view on whether that's the right way to go. We just know that
it's an issue that law enforcement was concerned about. In our
view, that needs to be addressed, and a policy needs to be
established whether----
Mr. Ruppersberger. It seems to me it's a good process, and
it's a good idea, because it's going to make something happen.
Thank you.
Mr. Schrock. Before I yield to Chairman Shays, let me ask
one thing. Ms. Bucella, I thought I heard you say, not having a
right arm is classified. Did I misunderstand you?
Ms. Bucella. No. There is some information that is gathered
from our intelligence community that is source protected. For
example, if there was an individual that was only dealt with by
someone who was a source, but the bad guy didn't know about it,
and the only way they would have known about it is if they had
seen the person and this person has spent much of his entire
career not being seen out in the public, then not having an arm
may actually be source protected and classified.
Mr. Schrock. Chairman Shays.
Mr. Shays [resuming Chair]. I thank the chairman, and I
thank the committee for their good questions, and our
participants here.
Basically, I have two parts to try and sort out. The issue
of the granting of visas, and then when we've made a mistake,
how we revoke them. I want to know, first, have we made a lot
of progress or a modest amount of progress in getting
information to the right people in such a timely basis we never
even issue the visa? And then, when we've issued the visa and
we determine it shouldn't be granted, then I want to talk about
that. So maybe Mr. Ford, you could jump in.
Mr. Ford. OK. I want to make sure I understand your first
question. Before a visa is issued?
Mr. Shays. Right, and the information we get to the right
people, so they can make an intelligent decision. It seems to
me when a visa is granted and it shouldn't be, that should only
occur when information, when we didn't have information. But
when we grant them a visa, when we had information but we
simply failed to get it to the right people in time, then
that's something that obviously I want to correct first. let's
not even give them the visa.
So can I get an assessment of how we're doing there?
Mr. Ford. Well, let me comment first of all on the process
that the State Department employs for approving visas itself.
An applicant must meet the standards in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. A consular official oversees, makes a judgment
whether that person is eligible to receive a visa.
Now, if the State Department has some information regarding
an individual, or if the consular official has some suspicious
that this individual may be a person of concern, in that case
they would go back to the headquarters and basically have that
person screened by a security official here in Washington. They
may or may not grant the visa on that process. They have a
technology system that allows them to send electronically
information back and forth. That's real time, they can make a
decision at that time whether a person should get a visa or
not.
If a person does have a visa, is granted a visa, then the
process changes, because at that point in time, the person is
legally entitled to enter the United States, or at least come
to our border. And the visa revocation process, if the State
Department gets information subsequent to the issuance of the
visa that indicates, hey, maybe we'd better not let this person
in here, we'd better revoke the visa, then what they want to do
is immediately get that information to the port of entry so
that the DHS-Customs officials can stop them from entering.
If on the other hand, if the individual is already in the
United States, then the problem becomes law enforcement
following up and finding out whether that individual in fact is
a person of concern. And that's what needs to be, that
information needs to be timely presented.
Mr. Shays. I'm seeing three steps. I'm seeing one, what can
we know first, to not even grant the visa. The second is, we've
granted them the visa, they haven't yet entered the country,
and then the third is, they're in the country, go find them.
Then what do you do? We don't have a legalistic issue in the
first two stages, is that correct? That individual has no legal
rights. If they came to the border of the United States, they
flew in and they were not granted visa, they can be shipped out
right away, no lawyers get to--I'm seeing nodding of heads. Is
that correct?
Mr. Ford. That's my understanding.
Mr. Shays. Anybody disagree with that? OK.
Ms. Bucella. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Well, are you in a position to be able to assess
the first two parts of that stage before I get to the whole
issue of revoking a visa once they're here? Are you comfortable
in assessing how well they're doing or not doing?
Mr. Ford. Well, we haven't looked at the approval process
for visas, we haven't looked at that recently. We have done
some work a couple of years ago where we looked at the process
prior to September 11.
Mr. Shays. OK, so the approval process, how about once it
was granted up to the border? Because we had interesting dialog
in our last hearing about that.
Mr. Ford. Again, in the course of conducting this work, we
took a limited sample. We tried to find out the extent to which
persons may have been stopped at the border. Based on
information from our sample, we found that DHS had done a good
job of stopping people when they came to the border when they
had the information.
Mr. Shays. Anybody want to comment on this issue?
Ms. Bucella. Right now, if there's information on an
individual, the CLASS system, which is entered into when
they're approving a visa, or even reviewing the person's name,
the CLASS system and IBIS----
Mr. Shays. Is that State Department?
Ms. Bucella. State Department is CLASS, IBIS is DHS. They
are updated now on a daily basis, where previously they were
updated, I'm not quite sure, either on a weekly basis or
biweekly basis. But they're updated right from the Terrorist
Screening Center on a daily basis now.
So as to your first example, should you even give them a
visa, at least the information as to what they need to look at
in determining whether or not this person is or is not a known
or suspected terrorist is available right then and there.
Mr. Shays. So in theory, as soon as they realize they've
made a mistake, granted a visa, that's State, they are going to
put that in the system immediately. And in theory then, it is
available at our border.
Ms. Bucella. Yes, real time.
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct, sir, and if I can just add a
little bit onto that. What happens is that, my understanding is
that information is real time, the connectivity between the
Department of State data base and the data base that's used by
our officers at the port of entry. With advanced information on
the international air travelers and the commercial vessel
operators, we get that information, we do the query before they
actually arrive at the port of entry, and that allows us to
take appropriate action where necessary to meet the flight at
the plane side. And if we have someone who's identified as a
possible high risk terrorist that we can actually grab them
right at the plane side and do our inspection in the Federal
inspection areas.
So there is a process in place. If the name is in the
system, we will respond and we'll stop that person at the
border and take the appropriate action.
Mr. Shays. I just would make a point, that in theory, this
should work pretty well. Steps in the right direction, though,
Senator Nunn pointed out that a deer running from a hungry
cougar is taking steps to get away, and so it really demands
that there be some speed in this process of steps in the right
direction.
How much time do I have left? [Laughter.]
I'd rather do a second round, but you haven't gone. You
know what I want to do? I'll defer, but I want to get into the
whole issue of the chart on page 14. I want to make sure, do
you all have this chart? I'm going to be asking each of you to
respond to the whole issue of, the State has lists of revoked
visas, 338. DHS, ICE has 347, and DHS Customs and Border
Protection has 336. But what's interesting is, they are
different. The list would be bigger if we added them all up
collectively. In other words, I need to have that sorted out
and explained to me, if we're moving in the right direction,
why that would be a different list.
But I'd like to defer to my colleague.
Ms. Watson. Yes, I had a couple of questions. In reading
the analysis of the GAO report, it says that communication
problems across systems persist. I was listening very closely,
probably you've answered most of this. But you report that
there are still no written procedures for sharing visa
revocation information among agencies. So I'd like Mr. Ford to
respond to that.
And in some cases, the revocation of visas takes 6 months
or more. That's the second comment I'd like to hear. And then
why shouldn't the revocation be grounds for removal and why
should not, when we locate a person whose visa has expired, or
we have some suspicion that person is connected to terrorism,
why should they not be immediately removed from U.S. soil? Mr.
Ford, can you lead off, please?
Mr. Ford. OK. I believe your first question had to do with
the policies and procedures and place. Actually, I want to put
this in some context.
Ms. Watson. If I may just interject, I notice it was in
your report of 2003.
Mr. Ford. Yes, that's correct. That's where I was going to
begin. We've found from our work from last year that each of
the agencies, they did have policies and procedures, but they
weren't very clear. There wasn't much of a linkage between each
of them in terms of how they were supposed to work together. We
made a recommendation in 2003 that they develop such policies
and procedures.
Subsequent to that, the Department of State in fact did
develop standard operating procedures for visa revocations,
soon after that report was done. DHS, some components of DHS
developed some policies and procedures after that. But most of
the recent changes that are designed to tighten this process up
have occurred after the first of this year, generally from the
spring of this year.
So you have to kind of track this from last year up to
where we are now. There are many more policies and procedures
in place that we were advocating a year ago that are now in
place with the agencies.
Your second question had to do with, I believe it was why
it took 6 months for the Department of State, I'll just tell
you that was based on the sample that we conduced from October
to November, excuse me, from October to December and I guess
I'll defer to the State Department on why it took them that
long, in one case it took that long.
Ms. Watson. All right, somebody from State can address
that.
Mr. Edson. Actually, if I could, on the written standard
operating procedures, one thing that we have started working
on, actually almost finished working on, taking our cue from
this latest GAO report, is coordinating the SOPs of the three
agencies involved here at the table, putting them in a
consolidated flow chart, so that we all are fully aware in
writing of what the other players are doing in this process.
That was a good recommendation and we're working on it.
Ms. Watson. Great.
Mr. Edson. On the revocation, in the report there were a
couple of cases mentioned. It was a small sample that the GAO
reviewed. There were reasons for the delays. In one case, the
individual, when the case was sent over from TSC originally,
TIPOFF originally, it was reviewed and it was determined that
it would not be revoked. Six months later, additional
derogatory information was made available. At that point, the
visa was revoked. But the gap between the original referral and
the revocation was 6 months.
In another case, the visa was actually revoked in the field
by our officers for non-terrorism grounds. Six months later,
terrorism information came up. We felt that it was the safe
thing to do to revoke it again, just to create a paper trail
that was explicitly linked to terrorism. So there was a 6-month
gap in there as well.
But those cases, I'm not saying that all cases are that
clear. But in those cases, in any event, there were clear
explanations, it was an accounting gap rather than a gap in
action. There was nothing waiting for 6 months.
Ms. Watson. Ms. Bucella, I heard you say that you can
identify in a rapid fashion. I am just thinking that we need to
be able to have information, and now we have the technology at
our fingertips, because these people have been here a while.
And they are planning probably as we speak. We need to move as
quickly as possible, so I would hope that these long gaps would
some way be eliminated and we can move very quickly.
Can you comment on that again, Ms. Bucella, on the time it
takes you to get the information from your agency to the
others?
Ms. Bucella. Because of the unique position that we have,
we have State Department representatives at our agency as well
as Homeland Security, and a multitude of, whether it's Coast
Guard, CBP, ICE, Secret Service, we have FBI there. Because we
have the accessibility to everybody else's data bases, we are
able to update and upload the information real time, right from
our center.
So we don't have to wait for cables to go back and forth
between the different agencies and maybe they don't get to
where they need to get to. But we do it right from the same
data base that's going to be accessed by those inspectors at
our border, if we put the individual's information in because
we found out from the State Department the person's visa was
revoked, we put it into the IBIS system. They access the IBIS
system right at the port and so the inspector will see right
there that this person's visa has been revoked and they can
deny entry right then and there. So there's not that lag time.
And quite frankly, I can't comment on how long it took for
the information to get to the original agencies. I can only
speak to how long it's taking now, since the TSC has been in
operation.
Ms. Watson. I argued loud and long when we were developing
the Department of Homeland Security and where the visa
investigations and where the visa granting authority ought to
be. I opted for the State Department because of the training
and the experience. I know we depended greatly in my embassy on
the consul that took care of visas. These people develop
another sense to be able to detect that.
Can you then instantly approach and get information from
their data base, say in an embassy 10,000 miles away and
there's a decision made, can you put your hands on that same
information, Ms. Bucella?
Ms. Bucella. If they put that information into the CLASS
system.
Ms. Watson. Are they doing that now, State Department?
Mr. Edson. We use a consolidated global data base of all
our visa transactions, all of our posts, immediately reflected
in a corporate data base back here in Washington, a
consolidated data base. That's accessible from the TSC.
Ms. Watson. Very good. The other question I have, do we
have any idea how many visitors with possible links to
terrorism are here in the United States, and do we have any
numbers to demonstrate improvement in the system? Are we
catching them? And are we deporting them or whatever?
Ms. Bucella. I can tell, since the Terrorist Screening
Center, the way we operate is there has to be a routine law
enforcement encounter, or there has to be some sort of a
screening process, whether somebody's applied for a job, or
some type of clearance. But I could not give you how many
people are here. I can say that since we've been in existence,
just on the known or suspected international terrorists we have
encountered here in the United States in excess of 500 since
December 1st.
Ms. Watson. We are hearing about cells that possibly have
been here in the United States for decades. I know I got a call
from someone who said that men in robes and wraps around their
head, and this is 10 years ago, would come and meet in the
apartment next to me late at night. She said she was always
wondering why they were meeting so late at night. So I gave
that information as I heard it on to the authorities. And I do
believe, from the way she described what was going on that
there could be a connection.
I know it's almost impossible for you, because you don't do
the investigative work. But in other agencies, they are, I'm
sure they are operating on tips of this kind. Does anyone else
want to comment about what you think?
Mr. Schoch. If I can just comment first on the visa
revocations themselves. Any referral that we get from the State
Department is aggressively pursued to its end. Be it we take an
administrative action, there might even be a criminal action
possibly that result, or we clear the person. So that in this
whole process, and there are many departments involved and
agencies within, on any referral which basically starts with
the State Department, where they notify us that there's been a
visa revocation, we exhaustively look at every and all of those
leads. And we're confident that we're looking at those and
investigating those to the end, to where we can take an action
or no action if necessary.
Ms. Watson. That information then is shared across the
agencies, and we talked about procedures. But is it your
feeling, Mr. Ford, that those procedures need to be
strengthened?
Mr. Ford. I think our view is that we want to see, the
comment was made that currently, the procedures of the three
agencies are now talking to each other, and they're going to
share them. I think we want to see that and make sure that
everybody is fully aware of what everybody else is doing, and
that the next time there's a hearing on this issue, everybody,
we won't find the same kinds of problems we found in the
current report.
Ms. Watson. I thank you, and let me give my time back to
the Chair.
Mr. Schrock. Well, the artificial Chair would like to make
a comment. [Laughter.]
Kind of a followup on what the Ambassador was asking. Can
we ask for the following documents for the record, letters
between State Department and DHS, agreeing on rewording the
revocation in specific cases, and the flow chart that details
the steps of all involved agencies? Thank you.
Let me ask one----
Mr. Shays. Just to clarify, so we're aware, who is going to
give us which of that? State and----
Ms. Bucella. We'll give you the business process that we've
documented now.
Mr. Shays. And the letters?
Mr. Schoch. Both DHS and State.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Schrock. One of you was comment earlier about
information such that if somebody lands in an airplane, you can
yank them right off the plane. What about ports, shipping
ports? Mr. Ruppersberger represents the Port of Baltimore, I
represent the Port of Hampton Roads. It's been a problem where
I live. People have jumped ship. Fortunately they've been able
to find them. Is the same process in place for that?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes, sir, the same process takes place whether
at the airports, the land border locations or seaports. In the
seaports, we work very closely with the Coast Guard.
Mr. Schrock. OK. Port security is my No. 1 issue and has
been for a long, long time, continues to be and will probably
continue to be, because that's, the massive military presence
in Norfolk and of course the commercial port is of great
concern to me.
I understand the difficulties of pursuing, questioning and
apprehending these aliens who have had their visas revoked,
especially since the agencies charged with doing so have
limited resources and frankly are still underinformed as to the
reasoning for the revocation, whether it's terror related,
criminal or simply administrative.
In any event, what programs are being utilized to engage
the public in helping Government agencies with these
identifications and ultimately removals? For example, have we
considered utilizing the Federal air waves to broadcast the top
10 aliens wanted, similar to a John Walsh type show or anything
along those lines, photographs on milk cartons have played a
significant role in finding lost and apprehended children. I
frankly think an informed American public would respond
favorably and effectively to such programs that are in the
interest of national security. Any comments? I know you don't
want to get into the milk carton business.
Mr. Jacksta. I can make a quick comment that, at a number
of our ports of entry, we do have various posters up in place
of individuals that have been identified not only for terrorist
related activities, but other types of criminal activities that
may come across specific locations on a regular basis. In
addition to that, we also have Web pages we can go to where
there are pictures of individuals and it allows the general
public to pull up information if necessary.
Mr. Schrock. I don't know about any of you here in this
room, but I get things in my mail at least once a week about
this big having two children's names or adult's names. You know
what, I read those things now. I never did before. But I do
now, and I'm just wondering if you had something like this for
the terrorist element if people might be more inclined to look
at that, and that might help as well. I mentioned we have the
ports of entries also, it's not unusual for us to receive
letters from the general public about issues or concerns or
people they've identified. And we work very closely with the
JTTFs and ICE to followup on those. So if the public does get
something to us, there is a procedure in place.
Mr. Schrock. This is for State and DHS. In what types of
cases will the State Department agree to change the wording of
the revocation certificate? It's loaded, isn't it?
Mr. Edson. The answer is, when we're asked by DHS. That's
the agreement we reached, is when DHS feels it's appropriate,
that the risk to national security is such that it
counterbalances the down sides of a request, and we've
identified in our exchange of letters formal channels of
communication, the people who should be doing this.
Mr. Schrock. Well, let's turn that around. When will DHS
ask the State Department to agree to wording of the revocation
process?
Mr. Schoch. I think initially, as we start out this, we
will look at very limited, in the most egregious of situations,
where we can't take any action administratively based on the
removable grounds that exist presently. Possibly we cannot
declassify national security information because of sources,
compromising sources and so forth. I believe in the most
egregious situations we would exercise this option now, to go
back retroactively and use this.
Mr. Schrock. OK, for the State Department. Does the State
Department support the DHS draft regulation regarding removing
individuals from the country based on a visa revocation?
Mr. Edson. I haven't seen that draft in many months. I
wasn't working that issue particularly, so I can't comment on
that.
Mr. Schrock. All right. You just killed the rest of my
questions. [Laughter.]
Mr. Shays. That's why he's the witness, because he hasn't
seen it. [Laughter.]
But you know what, the answer is very serious. We do need
an answer. And we should be prepared to give an answer to that
question.
Mr. Edson. We'll take it and respond for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8048.061
Mr. Shays. Yes. I think what we want is a response in the
next week as to what the position is, so someone looks at it
and tells us their position.
Mr. Edson. Essentially from the beginning our position on
this has been that this is a DHS function, and is not directly
related to the visa function at all. DHS manages removal from
the country. That's the short answer. But we'll get you
something more formal.
Mr. Shays. But we're all from the same country.
Mr. Schrock. Let me just ask one final question of State
and DHS. Is a legislative change required to allow immigration
officials to remove aliens with revoked visas from the country?
Do we need to do it legislatively?
Mr. Schoch. I think at this point, as you know, DHS in
earnest is looking at a regulatory fix. As you pointed out,
myself personally and speaking on behalf of DHS and ICE, I
think it's an option that we should explore. I think there's
probably a lot of complex issues and policies associated with
the regulation. I don't think we should lose this opportunity
to at least look at it and entertain it.
Mr. Schrock. Exploring says to me, studies which take
forever and ever to get done.
Mr. Schoch. Yes, again, I would really have to seek more of
their opinion from our Office of General Counsel as to the
specifics in more detail on just what we would have to look
into. But I think in general, it's something that we should
probably look into.
Mr. Schrock. Is there any sort of statutory authority that
you could recommend?
Mr. Schoch. I don't think anything comes to mind.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I want to pursue the question on the GAO report
entitled, ``Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to
Eliminate Weakness in the Visa Revocation Process.'' Turning to
page 14, basically State has one list of the revocation number
of 338, you have DHS at 347, Immigration and Customs which are
basically the cops in this program, the Border folks have 336.
GAO did an interesting way with the circles. All of you have
320. State has two that are not listed in the other two. DHS
has, ICE has three not listed with either. And Border has zero
not listed with either.
You look at it and you find that DHS has 12 that are with
State, but not with Border, ICE has 12 with Border that aren't
with State. It sounds a little confusing, but the bottom line
is we have different numbers. Why wouldn't this number be the
same? And what are your agencies doing to reconcile these
different numbers?
Mr. Edson. This was one more aspect of the GAO report that
we found helpful, and we have, as was mentioned earlier,
created a unified, a single reporting and recording mechanism
for us to use and regular audits will cross-check the numbers.
The way that these cases are listed, there are overlapping
watch listings for all these individuals that are generated by
the TSC or by the State Department or by DHS. So we believe
that the security of the system is sound. An auditable, a
verifiable audit trail, though, would give us all more
assurance. That's why we'd like to have these numbers matching.
Mr. Shays. I'd like to have, I guess what I'm having a hard
time, liking it to happen and why it isn't happening is my
problem.
Mr. Edson. In this case, GAO took a sample that was time
constrained and began on a date, ended on a particular date.
Our interaction with those, matter of fact, State started the
process with two disparate lists. We ran a report of the number
of cases in the watch list system with a revocation code and
subsequently ran a report of the number of cases that were
revoked with the formal signature on the revocation certificate
during that time period. The entry into the watch list system
happens immediately. Deliberation occurs before the revocation
certificate is generated and signed. So there were some cases
that fell outside of the timeframe on those two lists, and the
numbers did not agree on the two lists. It would only have
agreed when both the watch listing and the revocation took
place during the time period.
We feel that is probably the bulk of this.
Mr. Shays. But even that, why would it have to take more
time? Is it kind of like cars when they're at a red light, the
first car goes and the second waits until the first one has
left, and it's like this slinky? Why wouldn't they all move at
the same time?
Mr. Edson. We enter the watch list entry, the visa
revocation watch list entry immediately just to indicate that
we are reviewing a case for possible revocation to provide an
alert to DHS. The revocation itself is a deliberative process,
involves getting access to the classified derogatory that
underlies the lookout from TSC or the referral froM TSC.
Sometimes it involves further research and review of legal
issues. We don't always revoke the cases that are referred to
us by TSC. Almost always, but not always. So there's a period
of a couple of days, a couple of weeks, where the deliberation
is going on before the revocation certificate is signed.
In that interim period, however, the cases have already
been watch listed by TSC as possible terrorist cases. We have
already watch listed it as a revocation case under review. So
it's that gap that I think is responsible for some of the
difference in numbers.
Mr. Shays. And it needs to take a couple of weeks?
Mr. Edson. It needs to take several days, a couple of days.
We're getting access to classified material, it doesn't come
over--sometimes there's a lag in there in getting access to the
material and reviewing it. Again, the case has already been
watch listed. The individual cannot enter the United States.
And the derogatory that we get for revocation is also getting
passed to DHS, in the event that it's extremely serious and
specific derogatory information, so that they're able to act on
it.
Mr. Shays. Wy did it take State at least 6 months, and as
much as 17 months to revoke visas in at least three cases? I
would like to know the cases, but is that something you can
speak to?
Mr. Edson. These are the three cases out of the GAO report
that we checked on. I don't want this to sound like an excuse,
but there actually are reasons in these three cases. In one
case, the case was referred to us originally, we declined to
revoke, 6 months later got additional derogatory information
and then did revoke, so the gap between referral and
revocation.
The other two were cases that were revoked overseas first,
for non-terrorist grounds and then subsequently revoked for
terrorist grounds. So there's that gap.
Mr. Shays. Anybody else want to respond to these?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes, sir, I do. First of all, I want to say
from DHS' perspective at CBP, we're also concerned about the
numbers. Obviously we're going to go back and take a look at
this, work with GAO to find out exactly what the problems were.
Because I think we all agree that we can't have people being
missed and can't be on separate lists. So we'll take that back
and work on it.
But there are a couple of things that we've already
institutionalized to get going on it. The first one is that
because of this concern and the initial observation we've
established a mechanism now between Department of State, DHS
and the two agencies, CBP and ICE, to verify on a weekly basis
how many new revocation records have been established by
Department of State, so there's no confusion on the exact
number every week that's added to the system. So that's one of
the first thing.
The other thing I think is important to note, although the
person may not be in the system as a revocation, the fact is
that the derogatory information will probably be in the IBIS
system. So the person would be stopped. The question is whether
you would be able to do, at the border, if you can revoke the
person's visa and send them back. That's what we're working
with Department of State, to have that capability that if we
discover someone at the port of entry through another
mechanism, through another data base or through the inspector's
questioning that might be identified as someone who's related
to terrorism, that we can work with Department of State to have
the visa revoked right then and there, and have the person
returned.
So I want to get on record to say that even though the
record may not show a revocation, the system, the data bases
available, will allow us to hopefully identify the individual
and still stop them at the border.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Schoch, do you have----
Mr. Schoch. Yes, to add to this that again, just expounding
on what Mr. Jacksta said, we every week reconcile the list now,
to make sure that whatever we've received is exactly what State
Department has. We also have a full time person at the NTC----
Mr. Shays. You're not doing it like a checkbook, where you
can't figure out why it doesn't balance, you just accept it?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Schoch. No, what we do is we have actually a
spreadsheet, and we go through and----
Mr. Shays. And you try to figure out where the difference
is?
Mr. Schoch. If there are differences, exactly, we work
through the discrepancies, so that we don't get to this point
where we have these numbers reflected as they are today in this
report.
Mr. Shays. When I think of the challenge we have here, I'm
thinking I accept it logically and then another part of me
says, this is crazy, it's a no-brainer. If you can revoke, if
you can decide not to give someone a visa, they don't have a
hearing, correct? You make an administrative decision.
If someone at Border Patrol can decide to not allow someone
to enter, even though they have a visa, it's decided in a sense
administratively, it's decided by that individual, based on the
documents they have, without a so-called legal process, why
does a legal process occur once someone's in the United States?
What triggers that legal process in the minds of all of you
that suggests that somehow we have to handle this differently?
Mr. Schoch. If I can just comment, if somebody is picked up
based on that revocation, and let's say we have now employed
this new----
Mr. Shays. They're in the United States of America.
Mr. Schoch. They're in the United States.
Mr. Shays. As our guests, as a privilege.
Mr. Schoch. Correct. And we've gone now retroactively. They
are entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge. They
have a hearing.
Mr. Shays. And that is based on statutory law again, or on
regulation?
Mr. Schoch. On statutory law.
Mr. Shays. OK. And it is outside the typical, it's not part
of our civil or criminal justice, it's part of DHS immigration
process?
Mr. Schoch. Correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. And just fairly quickly tell me what that
means. What are they entitled to?
Mr. Schoch. They are entitled to go before an immigration
judge.
Mr. Shays. With counsel?
Mr. Schoch. Right, with counsel, not appointed, but counsel
that they have to acquire themselves.
Mr. Shays. Are they incarcerated during that time?
Mr. Schoch. We basically make a determination of detention,
whether or not they meet the criteria of being detained. It is
possible that they will be detained. They have a right to a
review of that before the immigration----
Mr. Shays. Do we have the delays like we've had where
people literally, in some instances, they ask for political
asylum and they're given a hearing a year later and they're
just allowed to go into the countryside? Is this process at
least quick? Or could it take months or longer?
Mr. Schoch. I think it can take months sometimes.
Mr. Shays. See, I don't understand that at all. I mean, we
don't have that many where we might have to revoke. So for me,
it would strike me that, you can't kick them out without this
process, and maybe I can accept the fact that somehow they got
through the system, so we blew it. But so now, they're entitled
to privileges that they didn't encounter when they were
requesting or when they came. So I understand that. And I also
understand the reality that they may be living with an American
and the American's making plain that, it can be a family member
and all that.
But what I don't understand is why it would take so long.
So someone explain to me, if we've identified this as a
concern, why the heck is this part of the process taking so
long? Anybody able to answer?
Mr. Schoch. I would just add that they're entitled to go
before the immigration judge. They may have petitions pending.
They may seek asylum. There are various things that trigger
throughout that proceeding that could delay this, not from day,
but could turn into months. I don't know specifically, I can't
give you a hard and fast on how long it does take.
I can just tell you from my experience with our cases, once
you go through the immigration administrative system there, it
could take months.
Mr. Shays. OK. And we could put legislation in that would
basically just say once it's been denied, they go home without
that process, and it wouldn't take any time. There would be
some civil liberty issues, I gather, from some. Anyone else who
wants to comment?
Let me just end with this. How many of these individuals
may still be in the country, those who have revoked visas? I'd
like an answer from all three.
Mr. Schoch. I will start. ICE has investigated, thoroughly
investigated every, thoroughly investigated, either we have
continued to investigate or have investigated every referral
that we get from the Department of State. I don't have an exact
number, but I assure you that every case where we cannot take
either an administrative action based no a removable ground
that's available to us, we would seek some assistance from
State, using some type of retroactive----
Mr. Shays. Why would I feel comfortable with you not
knowing the answer to that question? Why should that make me
feel like that's acceptable? I mean, we're having a hearing on
revocations. I would think that would be one of the basic
answers.
Mr. Schoch. Sure. Most of the cases that we do get that are
referred to us that have visa revocations are found not to be
in the United States, a vast majority of those cases. Those
cases that end up going to the field are later determined to
have departed or they are later determined not to be the person
or a person of national security----
Mr. Shays. OK, that doesn't really answer the question. Are
you saying there's nobody?
Mr. Schoch. I'm saying the cases we have looked at now that
we don't have any persons that we would deem a national
security threat.
Mr. Shays. That's not what I asked. The question is, how
many people are here under revoked visas?
Mr. Schoch. I wouldn't have that number available to me.
Mr. Shays. Do you know, Mr. Jacksta?
Mr. Jacksta. No, I don't, sir. I can tell you that when we
get the name of a visa revocation from the Department of State,
we go through our systems and determine if anybody possibly
entered the United States. We use our data bases and our
systems and that information is passed over to ICE for
investigation.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Bucella, do you have that number?
Ms. Bucella. We've only looked at it since the 6 months, so
I don't have the cases that GAO looked at. But in the 6 months,
we've looked at 332; 118 have expired visas. Revoked visas are
147.
Mr. Shays. Hold on a second. Put the mic a little closer.
Ms. Bucella. I'm sorry. During the 6-month period from
December 1st to June 9th, we looked at 332 cases which included
expired visas, revoked visas and pending revoked visas. There
were 118 expired visas, revoked visas there were----
Mr. Shays. So the 118 means they didn't even attempt to
come into the country?
Ms. Bucella. Yes. Expired visas?
Mr. Shays. I need to understand. We don't want bad
information.
Ms. Bucella. Right. We believe that there are 44 in
country. That's the bottom line. From the numbers that we
looked at.
Mr. Shays. OK, so it's your numbers, you think you have 44.
Ms. Bucella. But that's, we are not looking at the total
number of visas. We're only looking at those visas that we
looked at from December 1st through June 9th of this year.
Mr. Shays. Just walk me through why I should feel, I mean,
I'm getting uneasy. I was feeling better, I was feeling like
maybe the deer was running away from the cheetah faster than
cheetah. But it seems almost like this is a basic question and
I'm not getting, I don't feel a sense of concern or urgency or
anything here. I just feel like--well.
Ms. Bucella. One of the processes is trying to determine
where these individuals are. One of the challenges that we
believe happened was that while these people were, the question
was whether or not they were in country or not. ICE then had to
first determine who was looking at the individual, who had the
derogatory information. Right now, based on the FBI's
relationship with ICE, FBI is turning over their files to ICE
real time so that they can first figure out if it is in fact an
FBI matter. Or we are sharing our information with ICE as to
whether or not the underlying derogatory information is with
another agency and which agency that is.
Mr. Shays. Would you define the 118 number again? I'm
unclear as to what that means. You have 118 that are----
Ms. Bucella. Expired visas.
Mr. Shays. Elaborate. What does that mean, that they came
to the United States and they----
Ms. Bucella. They could either, they were in the United
States and left, or they never came into the United States, the
time period for the visa had expired.
Mr. Shays. OK, and those are revoked visas?
Ms. Bucella. No----
Mr. Shays. They were revoked beforehand?
Ms. Bucella. No, no. That's a different number. There are
three different kinds. There are expired visas, there are
revoked visas, and then there are those visas that are pending
revocation. That means that they're gathering up the derogatory
information.
Mr. Shays. I was really asking about the revoked and the
pending. I just didn't understand why expired related to my
question. That's why I was confused. Why does it relate to the
question I asked? The question I asked is, how many revoked
visas do we still have, that are still in the country? In other
words, individuals who have revoked visas that are still in the
country. I don't have an answer to that question.
Ms. Bucella. Forty-four.
Mr. Shays. Forty-four. OK, now, you're saying 44, and Mr.
Schoch is saying basically zero. Walk me through the
difference, Mr. Schoch.
Mr. Schoch. Well, if I can add, it's definitely not zero.
The number is constantly updated. If I was to throw out a
number to you today, I would not want to be telling you the
wrong number than what it's updated.
Mr. Shays. So if you were to make a phone call right now,
there is someone who could answer the question of how many you
have?
Mr. Schoch. I know today based on the investigations that
we have conducted, we know exactly how many people have revoked
visas who may be in the United States----
Mr. Shays. OK, hold on 1 second. Ambassador, do you have
any more questions? Because if you do, I'll give him time to
call up somebody here.
Ms. Watson. No, I was following your line.
Mr. Shays. OK, let me do this. Would somebody on your staff
make that call right now and we'll adjourn as soon as we get
that number. So will someone pursue that?
Mr. Schoch. We're going to pursue it right away.
Mr. Shays. OK. Congressman Moran has an office over here,
you can just make a call.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Chairman, I was getting ready to leave,
because I understand we're going to have two or three votes.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Ms. Watson. That can be given to us.
Mr. Shays. I'm willing to wait. I'm not going to adjourn
until we get the number. But if you have some questions, I'd be
glad to fill in.
Ms. Watson. No, I was following yours. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, what else do we talk about here while
we're waiting? Mr. Ford, what do you have? How are you acting?
What's important about this dialog and what isn't? I want the
chaff from the wheat in this dialog.
Mr. Ford. Well, it seems to me that if in fact they're
tracing the visa revocations, they ought to be able to tell you
how many they suspect are still in the country. I also think
that they ought to be able to tell you the disposition of their
investigations in terms of how many people were cleared, how
many people were judged to be people of concern. And it seems
to me that they ought to keep that record in a way that on a
daily basis they would know that kind of information.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask, Mr. Jacksta and Mr. Schoch, why
wouldn't that, it seems logical to me, so why wouldn't that be
true? How would you disagree with what Mr. Ford said? Mr.
Jacksta.
Mr. Jacksta. I would begin, sir, by indicating that we
clearly want to identify the individual at the port of entry
when they arrive, and we want to stop them right there. If they
get into the United States and they didn't have a revoked visa
but later on, information is obtained and the visa is revoked
and they're in the United States, we need to find them and
identify who they are.
The process is that when a visa is revoked and we receive
it, we go through our data base systems to see, based on the
information that we have, did the person arrive at our port of
entry. Then what we quickly do is we look to see if there's
information that indicates that the person left. Those people
that have not left, are still in the United States, are
referred to ICE and then at that point they take over the
investigative side of the house.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you. Mr. Schoch, do you have some
comments on that?
Mr. Schoch. Just to let you know, I have some preliminary
numbers, and I can followup with these. We have 37 that were
referred to the field, 37 cases presently in the field and
we're reviewing 20 currently. And I will say that a large
number of the 20 reviewing do not get out to the field, because
most of these people have either found, most of them have been
found to have not entered or to have departed.
Mr. Shays. OK. Of the particularly egregious cases, do we
then, even if they have left, do we try to track who they have
been interacting with?
Mr. Schoch. That's correct. That's why these cases are
handled by the Joint Terrorism Task Force, so we're not just
looking at that individual, but anybody that they may have
touched, their footprints, and absolutely exhausting any type
of a lead that may come out of that, on associates or----
Mr. Shays. So just relate now the 44 versus 37. I can
understand the difference between 20 and 37, but what's the
difference between 44 and 37?
Mr. Schoch. Well, the 37 could jump up to 44.
Mr. Shays. But you don't mean 20 in addition to the 37?
Mr. Schoch. That's right, they're at headquarters.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry, I thought that was 20 out of the 37.
Mr. Schoch. No.
Mr. Shays. OK. Do you have any questions?
Ms. Watson. Mr. Schoch, the 37 that are in the field now,
are we constantly following and monitoring their actions and do
we have geographical locations that we could trace their
whereabouts? How do we track them in the field?
Mr. Schoch. We first of all have a lead tracking system
here at headquarters that gives us specific timeframes when to
call up, when to be looking again at what field action has
taken place on those, as well as we use a TECS system, TECS-II
that actually is a case management system. It provides for a
refresher every 30 days from the field. The field has basically
7 days when they receive the lead to act on it. Then they have
every 30 days thereafter, they have to update us with
additional information.
So we have a very tight control over exactly what's
ongoing. We have an agent at headquarters devoted just to this,
that they are looking at exactly what investigation has been
done, almost a quality control, if you will, to look at exactly
what measures have been taken, investigative measures that have
been taken.
Ms. Watson. Are there any clustering of these 37 around New
York and Boston?
Mr. Schoch. I would have to look into that. I don't know
that to be a fact.
Ms. Watson. What keeps coming back to haunt me, and I'm
sure the rest of us, is that those involved in September 11,
particularly those who went to flight school, I think it was
down in Florida, 6 months after September 11, their visas were
approved for them to take flying lessons.
So time is of the essence. If we have 37 people in the
field, we need to be tracking them very closely. We've heard
rumors, and we've seen a heightened alert that we might be
attacked around the November election or around our
conventions. Though I would think that actions need to be
speeded up and we need to do our due diligence and make it a
top priority.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Is there anything, Mr. Ford, or anyone else,
that you need to put on the record? Is there any information
that we've asked that would not be, the answers would not be
accurate and we could come to some false assumptions? Is there
any correcting of the record that needs to be put on? Is there
anything you are prepared to answer that we should have had the
good sense to ask but didn't that needs to be part of the
record? Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. I don't really have any comments, Mr. Chairman. I
believe at least from GAO's perspective, you've asked a lot of
questions that are germane to the issue. I don't really have
anything more to add to that.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Edson.
Mr. Edson. In the discussion on numbers, a visa can be
revoked for any grounds under the law. We've been discussing
terrorism here, but that, I think it is important to bear in
mind that revocations cover the whole spectrum of immigration
law. Sometimes that can cloud the numbers.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Bucella.
Ms. Bucella. Nothing.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Jacksta.
Mr. Jacksta. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Schoch.
Mr. Schoch. No, sir, thank you.
Mr. Shays. I believe all of you have a very difficult job.
I think you are working night and day to deal with this issue.
I realize that we have a policy issue as it relates to the
rights of people once they appear to be here. And that is
something that Congress has to decide. And given we've
overstepped our bounds in terms, in my judgment, calling people
enemy combatants and some other challenges, I'm sure this will
become even a more sensitive issue.
But I am struck with the fact that it's difficult to
reconcile that we can say no at the beginning, we can say no at
the border, but once they're here we can't. If we're the ones
who screwed up and we think it's a problem, I just don't know
why we can't act more quickly. It does strike me that if we
think someone is here on, basically and shouldn't be here, that
we should be acting quickly to deal with at least that part of
the question.
But I have a lot of respect for what each of you do and I
thank you very much for your participation. Thank you.
At this time, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
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