<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:97998.wais]
THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG TRADE ON BORDER SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 29, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-250
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
97-998 WASHINGTON : 2004
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DOUG OSE, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas Maryland
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio Columbia
------ ------
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Nicholas Coleman, Professional Staff Member and Counsel
Malia Holst, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 29, 2004.................................... 1
Statement of:
Barker, Luis E., Chief Patrol Agent, El Paso Sector Border
Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security; Kenneth Cates, Associate Special Agent
in Charge, El Paso, TX, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; Errol J.
Chavez, Director, New Mexico High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area; Luis Garcia, Director of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department
of Homeland Security; Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent in
Charge, El Paso Field Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice; and Steve
Swingle, Acting Aviation Group Supervisor, Albuquerque Air
Branch Office of Air and Marine Operations, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security....... 14
Williams, Captain Richard, commander, District 4 (Las
Cruces), New Mexico State Police; and Sheriff Juan
Hernandez, Dona Ana County Sheriff's Office................ 77
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Barker, Luis E., Chief Patrol Agent, El Paso Sector Border
Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 17
Cates, Kenneth, Associate Special Agent in Charge, El Paso,
TX, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 24
Chavez, Errol J., Director, New Mexico High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area, prepared statement of.................... 32
Garcia, Luis, Director of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security,
prepared statement of...................................... 41
Gonzalez, Sandalio, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Field
Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department
of Justice, prepared statement of.......................... 48
Pearce, Hon. Stevan, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Mexico, prepared statement of................. 9
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, prepared statement of.................... 4
Swingle, Steve, Acting Aviation Group Supervisor, Albuquerque
Air Branch Office of Air and Marine Operations, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,
prepared statement of...................................... 55
Williams, Captain Richard, commander, District 4 (Las
Cruces), New Mexico State Police, prepared statement of.... 80
THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG TRADE ON BORDER SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Las Cruces, NM.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:07 p.m., at
the Las Cruces City Council Chambers, 200 North Church Street,
Las Cruces, New Mexico, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representative Souder.
Also present: Representative Pearce.
Staff present: Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member;
David Thomasson, congressional fellow; and Malia Holst, clerk.
Mr. Souder. Subcommittee will now come to order.
Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. I'd first like
to thank Congressman Steve Pearce for inviting us to come back
to this region to continue studying the problem of drug
smuggling along the Texas and New Mexico border. I've
appreciated Congressman Pearce's leadership and support on drug
issues at the House of Representatives, and I look forward to
meeting with him in the months ahead.
Since the summer of 2001, this subcommittee has been making
a comprehensive study of law enforcement at our Nation's
borders, including a field hearing last April in El Paso. There
have been some major developments since that hearing in how our
Federal Government approaches the drug trafficking threat, most
notably the reorganization of the former Customs Service and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the new
Department of Homeland Security.
The Southwest Border remains the primary conduit of illegal
drugs into our country, with up to three-quarters of narcotics
coming across it. The Las Cruces-El Paso area in particular has
been the site of some of the worst drug smuggling activity in
the country for decades, and the problem is not going away.
Drug seizures here have risen significantly during this decade,
even as they fell in other parts of the country. It seems that
almost every week, law enforcement agents discover huge
quantities of drugs in this area, especially at the El Paso
port of entry. Drug smuggling and the related crime have taken
a toll on the environment and the quality of life for local
residents, besides presenting a threat to the entire Nation.
Because of the very real threat posed by drug smuggling
here and everywhere else in the Nation, Congress made stopping
that smuggling one of the primary missions of the new
Department of Homeland Security. Taken together, the Border
Patrol agents, the former INS and Customs inspectors, the
Customs special agents, and the former Customs pilots
represented America's front line against drug traffickers.
Without them, we will have little or no defense against
smugglers. Thus, it is vitally important that these agencies
remained focused on the narcotics threat.
Today's hearing is intended to focus on how the various
Federal agencies with counternarcotics responsibility--
including the Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement divisions of the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration--are meeting
the problem of illegal drug smuggling. In particular, we need
to closely examine how well these agencies are coordinating
their efforts with each other, and with their State and local
law enforcement partners. It is my hope that at this hearing we
will learn what steps DHS, DEA and other agencies are taking to
improve coordination and cooperation in counternarcotics
efforts. I also hope to hear about what new initiatives our
Federal agencies have put in place to stay ahead of the
traffickers. President Bush has made reducing drug trafficking
and abuse of our country a top priority for his administration,
and DHS and its partners are vital to achieving that goal over
the long term.
These issues are all very important and extremely urgent,
and we look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
ways to address them. I again thank Congressman Pearce for
joining us today, and for the assistance that he and his staff
have provided to us in setting up this hearing. We also welcome
six representatives of the Federal agencies primarily
responsible for dealing with drug smuggling in this region. We
welcome Mr. Luis Barker, Chief Patrol Agent of the US Border
Patrol's El Paso's Sector; Mr. Kenneth Cates, Associate Special
Agent in Charge of ICE's El Paso Division; Mr. Errol Chavez,
Regional Director of the New Mexico Regional Partnership of the
Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, a
program with the Office of the National Drug Control Policy,
i.e. the drug czar, intended to foster cooperation between
Federal, State and local law enforcement; Mr. Luis Garcia,
Director of Field Operations at CBP's El Paso Field Office; Mr.
Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug
Enforcement Administration's El Paso Division Office; and Mr.
Steve Swingle, Acting Aviation Group Supervisor of the
Albuquerque Air Branch of the ICE Office of Air and Marine
Operations.
When examining border policies we must of course also seek
the input of representatives of the State and local agencies
who also have to deal with the border drug threat. We welcome
the Honorable Louise Peterson, Hidalgo County Commissioner;
Captain Richard Williams, Commander of District 4 of the New
Mexico State Police; Sheriff Robert E. Hall of Hidalgo County;
and Sheriff Juan
Hernandez of Dona Ana County. We thank everyone for taking the
time this afternoon to join us for this important hearing.
With that, I'd like to yield to my friend and colleague,
Congressman Pearce.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. Pearce. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder. I appreciate
the subcommittee's interest in holding a public hearing in
southern New Mexico about its border security problems here in
Las Cruces, New Mexico, the Second Congressional District,
which I represent. Your willingness to travel the long distance
to the southern New Mexico border and assess its critical
security situation demonstrates your understanding of the
pressing challenges this area faces, as well as your leadership
in seeking solutions to these problems. I'm also pleased the
committee will hear from some of our Nation's finest, hardest
working Federal, State, and local border law enforcement
officials and community leaders.
Mr. Chairman, America's borders must provide a strong
defense against all illegal activity including the trade of
illegal drugs, the flow of illegal immigration, diseases and
other forms of contraband. This country's current and future
prosperity and security depend on a border that operates
securely and effectively.
But at the same time that we establish security we must
maintain a friendly border, one which allows commerce to travel
freely with its legitimate commerce, one which recognizes that
families have family members on both sides of the border and
have desires and needs to be on both sides of the border
frequently.
Much of that prosperity is shaped and built in large
measure by international commerce, tourism and immigration.
Immigration originates right here in the southern part of our
district. Commerce and tourism add to our economy's vitality.
Total annual trade with Mexico more than doubled through the
1990's to reach more than $248 million. In fact, Mexico has now
surpassed Japan as a U.S. trading partner. This commerce is
critical to business in Southern New Mexico. Moreover,
immigration continues to keep our country demographically young
and enriches our culture. That is why it's crucial trying to
balance making our borders impermeable to activity that
subverts our laws with accessibility for legal activity that
positively contributes to the American economy and society.
President Bush's leadership in consolidating our border law
enforcement agencies into the Department of Homeland Security
was the first step in reaching this very important balance.
Since the Border Patrol functions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service have been absorbed into the Department
of Homeland Security's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
our Nation's borders now have a 40,000-person bureau focusing
exclusively on security at and in between ports of entry, a
standardized inspection process, and a unified chain of command
between existing operations.
Also, the incorporation of the investigative and
intelligence resources of the U.S. Customs Service, the
Immigration & Naturalization Service, the Federal Protective
Service into the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Bureau unifies more than 20,000
employees who focus on the enforcement of immigration and
customs laws within the United States.
The U.S. Congress has also risen to this challenge by
ensuring that the new Department has the tools it needs to
operate secure and efficient borders. The Fiscal Year 2005
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which funds the Customs
and Border Protection, provides $9.6 billion for border
protection and related activities, an increase of $630 million
over fiscal year 2004 enacted levels. $74 million has been
allocated for border security technology, including
surveillance and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Notwithstanding these efforts, there remains a significant
need for greater attention and additional resources to the
Mexico-New Mexico border.
As Customs and Border Protection augments its efforts
through additional money, agents and technology to the more
high-profile southern Border States such as California, Arizona
and Texas, New Mexico's border law enforcement agencies are
left understaffed and under-prepared for the increased drug
trafficking and human smuggling resulting from the crackdown in
other States.
In 1994, INS announced a new Southern Border Strategy to
combat activity by placing thousands of new Border Patrol
agents in key high-migration centers. The problem was that the
focus was placed on major population centers, so activity
shifted away from the large cities to the rural, remote areas
like what we see here in Southern New Mexico.
Today, after $19 billion spent for border security and
technology in the last 2 years, DHS has increased its emphasis
on Arizona border security through its Arizona Border Control
Initiative. This Initiative invests $10 million in the Tucson
Customs and Border Protection region to hire more border
agents, improve technology and provide unmanned aerial
vehicles, the UAVs. As a result, more than 2,000 Border Patrol
agents will be assigned to that region. This makes an average
of six agents for each mile of border in Arizona.
However, with only 425 agents in New Mexico, there are
fewer than 2 agents per mile of border. Yet, increasing
pressure against illegal activity on the Arizona border will
result in increasing drug and human trafficking spilling over
into New Mexico. In fiscal year 2004, that is just since
October, agents in Lordsburg, New Mexico have made 141 percent
more apprehensions than all of last year. Agents in Deming
report a 15 percent increase. Border Patrol agents in the El
Paso sector, which includes all of Southern New Mexico, have
already confiscated 130,000 pounds of marijuana since October
of last year.
The influx of illegal activity spurred by the stratified
allocation of border security resources is not only creating a
strain on Federal law enforcement agencies in New Mexico, but
on local communities and the Federal judiciary system here in
New Mexico as well. Our local governments' budgets are
consistently strained by the disproportionate costs related to
the incarceration of illegal immigrants held for drug and human
smuggling. While 17 New Mexico counties have recently been
awarded $679,000 from the Department of Justice's State
Criminal Alien Assistance Program, the funds do not cover the
entire cost of incarcerating these individuals.
Furthermore, illegal immigration and narcotics cases are
almost exclusively driving the increase in caseload for the
Federal court here in Las Cruces, which already has the fourth
highest criminal caseload per judge in the Nation. In fact,
illegal immigration prosecutions currently account for 85
percent of all criminal cases in the Las Cruces District.
Accordingly, I believe a proper examination of the impact of
illegal activity on border security in Southern New Mexico
should include the urgency for additional Federal judicial
resources as well.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I'm hopeful that the unique,
pressing challenges to New Mexico's southern border security
presented to the subcommittee today will encourage much more
focused attention and a greater commitment of Federal resources
to this region so that New Mexico's southern border is an equal
partner in contributing to America's security and prosperity.
In short, we must succeed in creating a border that
interdicts people engaged in illegal activity, while the same
border must be friendly to the people who have legitimate
reasons for coming and crossing to either side of the border--
to visit family, to conduct commerce, or just engage in tourist
activities.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for bringing this valuable
subcommittee into New Mexico to look at this increasingly
important problem for us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearce follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
For those of you who may not be familiar with this
particular subcommittee and our mission, we're part of the
Committee on Government Reform, which is historically called
the Government Oversight Committee. I chair on the Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources and it has
multiple missions, but historically spends somewhere between 50
and 65 percent of its time particularly on the drug problem,
because 23 different committees in Congress have overlapping
jurisdiction. And this was an attempt to consolidate in one
committee the overall question of how you tackle the drug
issue.
Therefore, increasingly, in addition to oversight, we've
been given legislative jurisdiction and authorization
jurisdiction. The biggest example is the drug czar's office at
the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which would be the
highest jurisdiction. Also, a national ad campaign and
increasingly smaller bills where, rather than multiple
jurisdiction, committees are putting it into one committee.
So we're unusual in the sense we're authorizing in the
oversight, and that we've done a variety of different types of
hearings, many very high-profile hearings, during the last
administration, and even in this administration, which you'll
be seeing more of in the next few weeks on Iraq, but also on
Waco and everything from the Travel Office and Whitewater
investigations.
Therefore, it's the tradition, and always has been of this
committee, to swear in all witnesses. The truth is, we have had
prosecutions in this committee for perjury because this is the
way we track what the government is doing, so that's the reason
you'll see a little bit different process in how the committee
works.
So first let me take care of two procedural matters. I ask
unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to
submit written statements and questions and answers to
questions provided also be included in the record. Without
objection, so ordered. And second, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members present be permitted to participate in the hearing.
Without objection it is so ordered.
The first panel is composed of six representatives of the
Federal Government. And it's the tradition of this committee,
since it's a Federal oversight committee, to always have the
Federal witnesses in the first panel: Mr. Barker of the Border
Patrol; Mr. Cates of ICE; Mr. Chavez of HIDTA; Mr. Garcia of
CBP; Mr. Gonzalez of DEA; and Mr. Swingle of AMO.
It's our standard practice to ask witnesses to testify
under oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
We thank you all and your agencies for your work, and we
would like, when you start, if you could state your name and
spell it for the public record, the court reporter. And we'll
start with Mr. Barker.
STATEMENTS OF LUIS E. BARKER, CHIEF PATROL AGENT, EL PASO
SECTOR BORDER PATROL, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KENNETH CATES, ASSOCIATE
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, EL PASO, TX, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ERROL J. CHAVEZ,
DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA; LUIS
GARCIA, DIRECTOR OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; SANDALIO GONZALEZ,
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, EL PASO FIELD DIVISION, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND
STEVE SWINGLE, ACTING AVIATION GROUP SUPERVISOR, ALBUQUERQUE
AIR BRANCH OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Barker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Luis E.
Barker, B-A-R-K-E-R, first name L-U-I-S, Luis.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, I am pleased
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
El Paso Border Patrol Sector's law enforcement initiatives to
secure the U.S. border in New Mexico and West Texas, with
regards to the extent and the impact of narcotics trafficking,
interdiction and our interaction with all the Federal, State
and local agencies to address this concern. Again, my name is
Luis Barker, I'm the Chief Patrol Agent for the El Paso Sector
of the U.S. Border Patrol, a branch of the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security.
Let me begin by thanking you and your colleagues, on behalf
of all CBP, for your continued support, as we pursue our
primary mission of preventing the entry of terrorists and their
weapons of terror; and enforce laws that protect America's
homeland by the detection, interdiction and apprehension of
those who attempt to illegally enter or smuggle persons or
contraband across our Nation's sovereign borders. The
challenges for securing our borders and protecting our homeland
are many and ever changing. CBP's goal is to increase our
operational effectiveness to the point where the likelihood of
apprehension is high enough to be an effective deterrent. We
continue to improve our capabilities by adding or shifting
resources as required. Although the strategy of deterrence was
developed with immigration issues in mind, it has equal effect
on narcotics smuggling.
The El Paso Sector is responsible for securing the 289
miles of border between the ports of entry in Texas and New
Mexico. To accomplish this, we have established four Border
Patrol stations in the two westernmost counties in Texas, and
eight stations in the State of New Mexico. This sector's vast
area of operations is divided into three main corridors: The
Deming Corridor, the El Paso Corridor, and the Fabens Corridor.
Narcotics smuggling is active in all of these corridors.
The border area we secure is unique in that we must control
both land borders across New Mexico, and a water border defined
by the Rio Grande River. In many areas only a barbed wire
fence, if anything, marks the border. As a deterrent, we
continue to place lighting, fencing, and vehicle barriers in
many areas such as Sunland Park, New Mexico and Deming. This
has proven to be effective in controlling illegal entries,
especially of vehicles carrying contraband, to include
narcotics.
Although physical barriers and lighting assist in border
control, additional technology has proven to be a great
deterrent and a ``force multiplier'' for our Agents. Remote
Video Surveillance Systems, sensors, radiation pagers, night
vision equipment, density meters, and other tools are a great
asset. In addition, better data on criminals, or wanted
subjects assists us in locating subjects and in determining
their true identity.
Large population centers on both sides of the border helps
make the El Paso area ideal as a major hub for smuggling of
people, narcotics and other contraband. Highways, hotels and
other infrastructure attract both legitimate trade and travel,
and unfortunately those adept in illicit activities. To
maintain control of the border, we use both forward
deployment--that is patrolling immediate border--and secondary
operations such as traffic checkpoints and task force
initiatives with other agencies. We have agents that liaison
with the DEA; the FBI; Joint Terrorism Task Force; the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, HIDTA office; U.S. Marshal's
Task Force; U.S. Attorney's Office; and State and local law
enforcement, including the Sheriff's Office.
Furthermore, we work daily with officials from the Mexican
Government through our Mexican liaison Unit to address our
concerns of the border. We have been very successful in
identifying, apprehending and prosecuting law violators through
these efforts.
We continue to employ every available means at our disposal
to combat illegal activity which occurs in this area. Besides
coverage on the border, we maintain six permanent traffic
checkpoints, five of which are in the State of New Mexico.
Checkpoint operations are an essential component of our
enforcement strategy, and from fiscal year 2002 to the present
they have accounted for 18 percent of our narcotics seizures,
and virtually all seizures involving cocaine and heroin.
The purpose of these checkpoints is to detect and
interdict, terrorists, undocumented immigrants, contraband and
weapons of mass effect. As a result of these checkpoint
operations, we frequently encounter violators of law and
persons wanted for crimes such as narcotics smuggling, murder,
and assault. Improvements in information access and the
expansion of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System, or AAFES have assisted us greatly in
this regard. With these resources, we have identified 2,613
criminal aliens in fiscal year 2004, some 300 of which were
wanted for various crimes ranging from assault to weapons
violations.
Over the past three fiscal years, 2002, 2003 and 2004, we
have interdicted large quantities of narcotics. Historically,
this has been the norm and we anticipate that this will
continue, as efforts to dismantle cartels such as the Carrillo-
Fuentes cartel continue. The principal narcotic seized has been
marijuana. Since October 2003, agents have seized approximately
156,777 pounds of marijuana, 511,000 pounds since fiscal year
2002. We have also seized approximately 1,521 pounds of
cocaine, 3,505 pounds since fiscal year 2002. And 22.5 pounds
of heroin, 22.5 pounds since fiscal year 2002. Cocaine and
heroin seizures have been on the rise and have more than
doubled since fiscal year 2002.
As I've stated, cocaine and heroin are mainly interdicted
at our checkpoint operation. Most narcotic cases are prosecuted
federally, and those that fall below the Federal threshold are
prosecuted by State and local authorities. This is possible
because of the close working relationship developed in our
counternarcotic efforts.
A key component of our counternarcotics effort is our
canines. We have 57 canine teams assigned to the stations and
checkpoints. They are on call 24 hours a day to assist agents
in the field and other agencies as requested. These teams have
been highly effective in both detecting people and narcotics.
With regards to narcotics, during the same time periods
previously mentioned, fiscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004, our
canine teams have assisted in the seizures of approximately
299,000 pounds of marijuana, 3,348 pounds of cocaine, and 23
pounds of heroin. In May 2004 alone, one canine handler
assisted three local and one Federal law enforcement agency in
separate callouts. This resulted in the seizure of 1,285 pounds
of marijuana, 89 pounds of cocaine, and $5,678 in currency.
Interdiction efforts often cause smugglers to resort to
extraordinary measures to avoid apprehension. They are more
likely to flee from agents and use violence, by using their
vehicles as weapons, or use of firearms to protect their cargo.
On October 12, 2002, a female agent assigned to the Fort
Hancock Station was shot in the leg while attempting to
interdict a narcotics load. She survived and has returned to
full duty. Despite the desperation of the smugglers, our agents
continue to be vigilant in protecting our borders.
I would like to add that the men and women of the El Paso
Sector are committed to the safety and security of the Nation's
borders, no matter the threat--whether from terrorists,
undocumented immigrants or narcotics smugglers. I'm extremely
proud of the commitment and professionalism of these men and
women and the important role they play in our national
security. And I also assure you that this degree of dedication
and vigilance will continue, despite operational challenges.
I am confident also of your continued support, and I thank
the subcommittee for this opportunity to be present to provide
my testimony today. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you might have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barker follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you. Our second witness is Mr. Cates,
Special Agent in Charge, El Paso ICE division of Customs
Enforcement.
Mr. Cates. My name is Kenneth Cates, C-A-T-E-S. Good
afternoon, Chairman Souder and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you to discuss the
``Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security.'' My name, as I
said before, is Kenneth Cates. I'm the Deputy SAC of the El
Paso District, and I represent U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, which is the largest investigative arm of the
Department of Homeland Security. ICE is charged with the
mission of preventing terrorist and criminal activity by
targeting the people, money, and materials that support
terrorist and criminal organizations. One of our key goals
within that larger mission is to detect and address
vulnerabilities in our border security. These vulnerabilities
include the threats posed by criminal organizations engaged in
the smuggling of illegal narcotics and other contraband across
our Nation's borders.
ICE's combined capabilities, bringing together the
expertise and the authorities of the former U.S. Customs
Service and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service,
make it a powerful weapon in the fight against smuggling and
narco-trafficking organizations. This expertise is further
augmented by the assets and the abilities of the ICE Air and
Marine Operations. With these newly combined investigative
authorities and expertise, ICE is uniquely positioned to
address the threats posed by criminal smuggling organizations.
Consider, for example, ICE's creation of a unified
smuggling division. Prior to our reorganization into DHS,
enforcement authorities for drug and contraband smuggling and
enforcement authorities for human smuggling were the exclusive
province of separate agencies. Unfortunately, criminal
smuggling organizations do not observe the same careful
divisions of labor. Motivated by profit, they may smuggle
narcotics 1 day and human ``cargo'' the next, shifting their
tactics in response to demand, profit margins, and enforcement
patterns. By combining these authorities and investigative
expertise, we can now target these organizations much more
effectively, whether they are trafficking in drugs, weapons,
illegal aliens, or even terrorists.
Moreover, with its financial investigations capabilities,
ICE is able to follow the money trails that support these
criminal smuggling organizations. Under Operation Cornerstone,
our comprehensive economic security initiative, ICE has the
ability to follow the money trails that support smuggling,
criminal, and terrorist organizations. With Cornerstone, ICE
brings to bear one of the most sophisticated financial
investigations Divisions in law enforcement to detect these
financial schemes, disrupt the flow of money, and dismantle
these criminal organizations.
In coordination with our counterparts from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection and the DEA, we are utilizing these newly
combined law enforcement capabilities as a part of a focused
and integrated strategy to combat the flow of illegal narcotics
and contraband across our Nation's borders--particularly here
along the Southwest Border.
For many years, the Southwest Border region has been a
preferred point of entry for many drug smuggling organizations,
and a result of this has been a major focus for drug
interdiction. The ease with which narcotics can be smuggled
into the United States underscores the seriousness of this
vulnerability. The U.S. Southwest Border stretches across 3300
kilometers and boasts an extensive network of Ports of Entry
and border crossings, as well as a number of documented areas
where unofficial crossings occur. Established routes,
organizations, and methods used to smuggle one commodity, such
as narcotics, could easily be exploited to smuggle others, such
as people, bulk cash, small arms, contraband, or even weapons
of mass destruction.
I would emphasize that these smuggling and narco-
trafficking organizations are flexible and adaptive. When we
increase seizures at one point, they frequently shift their
operations elsewhere, where there is less perceived resistance
from law enforcement. I will emphasize also these criminal
smuggling organizations are often highly sophisticated. Along
with their criminal experience, they have developed an acute
knowledge and awareness of U.S. border security and enforcement
operations, so that they can change their tactics in response
to new enforcement patterns.
One particular area of concern is the increase of
methamphetamine usage and investigations along the Southwest
Border. It is believed that due to the increased seizures and
enforcement operations along the Northern Border, as well as
pressure being placed by Canadian law enforcement on
importation of pre-cursor chemicals, we may be seeing more
methamphetamine smuggling investigations along the Southwest
United States. ICE investigators, working in cooperation with
Federal, State, and local law enforcement, will continue to
track trends and developments in the methamphetamine trade.
Despite the decrease in reported seizure numbers from
fiscal year 2003 to currently in 2004, we must not be
complacent in believing that drug smuggling organizations will
not continue to probe our Nation's borders for easier methods
and routes to smuggle narcotics into the United States. I can
assure you that we will continue to carry on our mission of
securing our Nation's borders and protecting our homeland from
threats posed by criminal and terrorist organizations.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
the members of the subcommittee for the privilege to testify
before you today. It's my pleasure to answer any questions that
the committee may have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cates follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I thank you for your testimony.
Next is Mr. Chavez, regional director of the New Mexico
partnership of the HIDTA.
Mr. Chavez. It's Errol Chavez, E-R-R-O-L, C-H-A-V-E-Z.
Chairman Souder, Congressman Pearce and distinguished members
of the subcommittee and honored guests, it is indeed my
distinct pleasure to appear before you today. Again, my name is
Errol Chavez, the Director of New Mexico High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area, HIDTA. On behalf of the members of the New
Mexico HIDTA, I would like to thank this subcommittee for your
continued support of the HIDTA and its mission.
There is a notable increase in the amount of narcotics
entering into the United States through New Mexico. Recent
narcotic seizures are directly linked to the impact that the
Mexican and the U.S. Governments are having on the heads of the
Mexican cartels. The results of our enforcement efforts have
lowered the level of control of at least two Mexican cartels,
while increasing the level of control of two Mexican cartel
leaders, Ismael ``Mayo'' Zambada Garcia and Vicente Carrillo
Fuentes, thus increasing the amount of narcotics entering the
United States through New Mexico.
While the amount of marijuana entering into the United
States remains constant, other narcotics trafficking is on the
rise. This is evidence that a growing amount of cocaine is
being funneled through New Mexico for distribution throughout
the United States. Methamphetamine production in Mexico is also
increasing and is entering through New Mexico for the U.S.
market. Heroin continues to be readily available. In New
Mexico, the impact of narcotics trafficking has become
increasingly significant.
The entire State of New Mexico is affected by these Mexican
cartels and each of the drugs they traffic through the State.
Marijuana seizures continue to be made around the State. The
marijuana market is dominated primarily by Mexican traffickers,
but there is also evidence that marijuana is being grown in New
Mexico. Marijuana is also being grown in California and Arizona
and does cross New Mexico's borders, but is usually destined
for the northeastern coast of the U.S. multi-ton marijuana
seizures occur annually along the Southern New Mexican Border
and the three interstate arteries, I-40, I-25 and I-10.
Marijuana is smuggled into New Mexico at the ports of entry
and between the ports of entry. The exact location of the
smuggling varies depending on the enforcement efforts of the
Border Patrol Agents and the Customs and Border Protection
Inspectors. In comparison to the other Southwestern Border
States, New Mexico has fewer Border Patrol agents assigned to
patrol the border between New Mexico and Mexico and fewer CBP
inspectors to man the ports of entry, thus allowing smugglers
more opportunities to smuggle narcotics into New Mexico, and
therefore increasing the threat to New Mexico.
Cocaine seizures are on the rise in New Mexico. The
noticeable increase in cocaine-related activity is directly
related to increases in law enforcement efforts in California
and Arizona.
Methamphetamine is of major concern to New Mexico as it is
still the most favored drug for abuse. In general,
methamphetamine is produced in Mexico in its purest form and
then smuggled into the United States in bulk quantities, where
it passes through New Mexico for distribution into other parts
of the United States. Methamphetamine also comes into New
Mexico for personal use from mid-level distributors from
Arizona and California.
Additionally, methamphetamine is produced in small
quantities in New Mexico by users, but in such small amounts it
only reaches the personal use level. The number of
methamphetamine laboratories has more than doubled from 1998
through 2002. Most of these laboratories were small operations
designed to produce two ounces or less at a time, making
methamphetamine more available. Nevertheless, the growing
threat of small clandestine laboratories cannot be overlooked,
especially given the environmental and health-related issues
associated with methamphetamine lab by-products, the high costs
and manpower requirements involved in each cleanup, and the
increasing number of residential fires associated with
methamphetamine laboratories.
While a significant amount of narcotics simply passes
through the State for distribution elsewhere, a reasonable
amount remains in New Mexico for local distribution and
consumption. Two counties in Northern New Mexico, Rio Arriba
County and Santa Fe County rank one and two in the Nation for
heroin overdoses per capita. Heroin abuse has been a persistent
problem for generations, but the addict population continues to
grow steadily as a result of the location of the main supplier.
The primary source of supply for heroin is located in Nayarit,
Mexico.
The magnitude of the heroin problem was best described in
1999 at the culmination of the Drug Enforcement
Administration's Operation Tar Pit. Over 200 heroin
distributors were arrested in 17 States, all of which were
linked to the Nayarit source of supply. Since the arrests,
statistics clearly show that the overdose rate in New Mexico
dropped for a short period of time, but is now approaching peak
levels despite valiant efforts to address the heroin problem.
In order to adequately combat the heroin dilemma in New Mexico,
added personnel and funding resources are desperately needed.
As a result of the implementation of North American Free
Trade Agreement, known drug traffickers are exploiting
commercial trade to facilitate their drug smuggling activities.
Drug traffickers are now directly involved with well-known
legitimate trucking firms that are less likely to be targets of
law enforcement scrutiny. They are using trade consultants to
determine what merchandise moves most quickly across the border
under NAFTA regulations. They are also owners or controlling
parties in commercial trade-related businesses within the
Mexican transportation infrastructure.
Once an international drug smuggler succeeds in importing
contraband into the United States, the Southwest Border becomes
a gateway for narcotics destined for major metropolitan areas.
Drug traffickers obtain warehouses in Texas and Southern New
Mexico to ``stash'' the drugs and then recruit drivers from
these areas to transport the drugs to various destinations
throughout the United States.
The response from my Federal law enforcement agencies----
Mr. Souder. Wait, Mr. Chavez, we're going to need to have
you summarize this last section.
Mr. Chavez. Yes. I was going to skip a page, as a matter of
fact. My emphasis, if I may, is to discuss the lack of staffing
by Federal agencies on the Southwest Border. The Drug
Enforcement Administration does maintain a presence along the
border, but because of the number of newly identified
investigations, the work that is being done by the Border
Patrol and the increased flow of narcotics has resulted in the
Drug Enforcement Administration being understaffed and not
capable, and experiencing difficulty in responding to all of
the requests. Therefore, the HIDTA's trying to create these
task forces so we can have a multiple effect in force--in
developing these investigations.
If I may, as a matter of conclusion, New Mexico is
expecting a shift in the smuggling patterns of the Mexican
cartels operating along the U.S. Southwestern Border with
Mexico. More drugs are expected to pass through New Mexico for
distribution throughout the United States. This does not mean
that more drugs will be smuggled into the United States, but it
does mean that more drugs than ever will be funneled through
New Mexico.
To address the increase in drug smuggling and the rise in
criminal activity in New Mexico, the Federal Government should
continue to emphasize the importance of enforcing the narcotics
laws and provide the necessary staffing and resources
desperately needed along the entire Southwest Border. Federal,
State and local police agencies in New Mexico are performing
and coordinating their duties well, but are all severely
understaffed and lack resources to adequately contribute in the
Nation's effort to stop the narcotics from entering the United
States.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chavez follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you. And all of your full statements will
be in the record. And we'll probably have some more questions
about the Santa Teresa area, and a few other areas.
Next witness is Mr. Luis Garcia, Director of Field
Operations, El Paso Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
DHS.
Mr. Garcia. Good afternoon. My name is Luis Garcia,
spelling L-U-I-S, G-A-R-C-I-A, and I am the Director of Field
Operations for Customs and Border Protection in El Paso, TX.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for this opportunity to appear today to discuss the efforts
of the Customs and Border Protection Officers under the El Paso
Field Office in interdicting narcotics arriving in the United
States through the various ports of entry in Western Texas and
New Mexico.
The CBP's El Paso Field Office is responsible for the
management of five ports of entry, encompassing 10 border
crossings, spread along more than 550 miles of border with
Mexico. These five ports of entry are staffed by nearly 1,000
inspection officers, including 86 canine enforcement officers.
During fiscal year 2003, these officers seized more than
223,000 pounds of marijuana, 3,100 pounds of cocaine, and 200
pounds of heroin. These figures represent 24 percent of all the
marijuana, 4 percent of all the cocaine, and 5 percent of the
entire heroin seized at all the ports of entry nationwide last
fiscal year.
This fiscal year, approximately 40 percent of the marijuana
seized at the ports of entry under the El Paso Field Office has
been found in commercial trucks. This method of smuggling has
been a growing threat for several years now and we have
introduced several forms of non-intrusive inspection technology
to address the threat.
Every port in western Texas and New Mexico through which
commercial trucks enter the United States has at least one
large-scale unit capable of inspecting complete trucks at a
minimum rate of six trucks per hour. Obviously, this does not
permit us to examine all trucks with this technology, but
additional units are being added. At this time, approximately
one of every five trucks arriving through the port of El Paso
is processed through this non-intrusive inspection technology.
Inspection rates at the smaller ports are much higher.
We have entered into partnerships with shippers, importers
and transporters in an effort to more effectively address both
the terrorist threat and the smuggling of narcotics through our
ports of entry. One of the latest forms of these partnerships
is called Free and Secure Trade, or FAST. Under the FAST
program, the shipper, importer, transporter and driver are all
vetted before program participation is allowed. We know with
whom we are working and they know what is expected of them. And
as a further means of ensuring compliance, non-intrusive
inspection units are dedicated to the FAST program so the
arriving FAST trucks can be inspected at a much higher rate
than non-FAST carriers.
Currently in El Paso, 60 percent of all arriving FAST
shipments are x-rayed upon arrival. We want to be very sure
this program is not compromised. With dedicated equipment, we
are able to inspect at a much higher rate and still process and
release the shipments much faster than we do those shipments
that are not part of the program.
The port of El Paso also receives commercial shipments by
rail across two bridges from Ciudad Juarez. We now have non-
intrusive inspection technology installed at each of these
bridges and are inspecting all arriving trains as they cross
the bridges.
If we find 40 percent of the marijuana in the commercial
trucks, where do we find the balance of the marijuana, along
with the cocaine and heroin? Nearly all of it has been found in
private vehicles. The five ports of entry under my Field Office
process--on average--more than 45,000 private vehicles every
day. From this, we average 4.5 narcotic seizures per day, or
one seizure for every 10,000 private vehicles that we process.
Since our non-intrusive inspection technology is aimed
toward the large loads in commercial trucks where the average
seizure is 2,400 pounds, nearly all loads in the private
vehicle environment are found due to the hard work of
individual inspectors and canine officers working with our
highly trained narcotic detector dogs.
I don't want to give you the impression that we work alone,
ignoring the valuable contributions of other agencies with whom
we work in our counter-drug activities. Our ICAT dedicated
intelligence unit has elements from both Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and, from within the CBP, the Border
Patrol, working alongside our inspectional personnel.
We know that technology alone will not stop drug smuggling.
It never has. It never will. The hardworking, dedicated men and
women that I am proud to lead are our best means for
interdicting drugs and for deterring the smuggling
organizations. Were it not for the efforts of these motivated
public servants, an additional 113 tons of marijuana, cocaine
and heroin would have been on the streets of the United States
last year. The men and women of Customs and Border Protection's
Office of Field Operations, assigned to the ports of entry in
western Texas and New Mexico, working in cooperation with CBP's
Border Patrol between the ports of entry, as well as with ICE
agents, have made a difference. And they will continue to do
so. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Mr. Sandy Gonzalez, Special Agent in
Charge for DEA El Paso Field Division. It's good to have you in
front of our subcommittee.
Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it
is my pleasure to again appear before you. My name is Sandalio
Gonzalez. That's S-A-N-D-A-L-I-O, G-O-N-Z-A-L-E-Z, and I am the
Special Agent in Charge of the El Paso Field Division of the
Drug Enforcement Administration. On behalf of DEA Administrator
Tandy and the men and women of the DEA, I thank the
subcommittee for your continuous support of the DEA mission.
Throughout our 30-year history, the DEA has taken a
leadership role in fostering cooperation among law enforcement
agencies combating this scourge of drug trafficking. The drug
trafficking threat facing Southern New Mexico far exceeds the
capabilities of the DEA or any other single law enforcement
agency. Effectively targeting drug trafficking organizations
and successfully disrupting their organizations requires
partnerships among government agencies at all levels. DEA
promotes these partnerships in order to establish effective
mechanisms to bring about this cooperation.
Our Las Cruces resident office is a HIDTA-designated task
force, and it is responsible for the 12 southernmost counties
in New Mexico. One of its primary missions is response to the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection checkpoint seizures and
arrests, as well as significant seizures made at the two New
Mexico Department of Motor Vehicles ports of entry is Southern
New Mexico. This mission alone consumes about 60 percent of our
agents' time. The DEA also focuses significant resources toward
identifying, targeting and dismantling priority drug
trafficking organizations at the local, regional and
international level.
In order to accomplish this mission, we depend upon
significant contributions from our local, State and Federal
counterparts in terms of intelligence, manpower, and resources.
DEA continues to foster cooperative investigative endeavors
throughout Southern New Mexico, and has been especially
successful in conducting long-term investigations with HIDTA
task forces in Southern New Mexico. We all want to cooperate
and share intelligence. The challenge is how best to promote
cooperation and intelligence sharing in our unique environment
in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
All Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies in
Southern New Mexico are faced with the same challenges.
Geography, limited law enforcement presence, a support system
that is currently overwhelmed as a result of the substantial
increase in immigration and drug trafficking prosecutions, and
a multi-faceted nature of the drug trafficking threat in the
region. Our Las Cruces office operates both under the auspices
of the HIDTA program, as well as on an agency-to-agency basis.
Las Cruces is comprised of a cross-section of local, State
and Federal task force officers. The multi-agency staffing lays
a solid foundation for enhanced cooperation. Were it not for
the enhanced resources and manpower provided by all local,
State and Federal agencies, the DEA would be hard pressed to
effectively conduct both this border referral and major
conspiracy investigative mission.
An example of cooperation between the DEA Las Cruces Office
and its law enforcement counterparts in Southern New Mexico is
the investigation and severe disruption of a local cocaine
trafficking and distribution organization operating in Las
Cruces and Dona Ana County.
In the fall of 2002, the DEA, FBI, New Mexico State Police
and the Las Cruces-Dona Ana Metro Narcotics Unit, identified a
significant cocaine trafficking organization based in
Michoacan, Mexico. We realized that we were targeting the same
organization, and HIDTA, through enhanced liaison and
intelligence sharing, pooled our intelligence and investigative
resources to target this organization. Utilizing HIDTA, OCDETF,
and Special Operations Division resources, we were able to
obtain 37 Federal and 71 State level indictments against this
organization. The impact of this operation remains evident to
this day, as the current purity level of cocaine being sold in
Las Cruces and Dona Ana County is now nearly half of what it
was prior to the onset of this operation. None of the
participating agencies could have achieved this success on
their own.
The Las Cruces office also leverages border referral
investigations by conducting controlled deliveries of seized
narcotic loads to their destination cities. These controlled
deliveries are time-sensitive and require extensive
coordination, both within DEA as well as other law enforcement
agencies.
An example of such coordination was a controlled delivery
of cocaine conducted by the Las Cruces Office to Colorado
Springs, Colorado. An integral part of this controlled delivery
was the effective coordination and use of ICE Airwing assets to
transport our agents and the cooperating defendant to Colorado.
This operation resulted in the arrest of two additional
subjects and the seizure of over $300,000 in cash.
The long-term effects of this controlled delivery continue
to pay dividends for our DEA counterparts in Colorado, and none
of this would have been possible without effective coordination
and the participation of the ICE Airwing. DEA fully supports
the mission goals and objectives of the New Mexico HIDTA
program to enhance and coordinate New Mexico's drug control.
We are an active participant in the New Mexico HIDTA and
its Intelligence Center. We support the New Mexico HIDTA
Intelligence Center's mission of fully integrating New Mexico's
counter-drug law enforcement information architecture and the
sharing of intelligence, not only in New Mexico, but throughout
other jurisdictions in the United States.
While law enforcement in Southern New Mexico has improved
over the past years, we can do better. We fully support the
ongoing efforts of the New Mexico HIDTA to increase cooperation
and intelligence sharing in its comprehensive strategy for
increasing intelligence collection and dissemination
capabilities. Our citizens deserve nothing less than our
ongoing efforts to combat drug traffick-
ing.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee today, and I'll be able to answer your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gonzalez follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Our last witness on the first panel is Mr. Steven Swingle,
Acting Aviation Group Supervisor of the Albuquerque Air Branch
Office of Air and Marine Operations, ICE Division of the DHS.
Mr. Swingle. Thank you. My name is Steve Swingle, S-W-I-N-
G-L-E, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Air
and Marine Operations.
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pearce, distinguished
subcommittee members. It's a pleasure to appear before you
today and to share an operational view of the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Office of Air and Marine Operations on
``The Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security.'' Let me
begin by expressing my appreciation for your interest in this
critical national security matter and for your continued
support of the men and women of the Department of Homeland
Security who put their lives on the line daily to secure our
borders against smuggling organizations and potential
terrorists.
ICE's Office of Air and Marine Operations protects our
Nation's people and critical infrastructure by using an
integrated and coordinated air and marine force to deter,
interdict, and prevent potential acts of terrorism arising from
the unlawful movement of people and goods across the borders of
the United States.
AMO's three core competencies--air and marine interdiction,
air and marine law enforcement, and airspace security--provide
critical, rapid, and flexible support to the Department of
Homeland Security's counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and
counter-smuggling operations at sea, on our borders, over our
cities, and across our Nation's interior.
As an air and marine law enforcement agency, AMO employs
133 aircraft and 72 marine assets to meet many of the Nation's
critical homeland security needs. The majority of AMO's 1,000
personnel are operationally deployed--primarily along the
southern border. Major AMO facilities are located in Texas,
Florida, New Mexico, Arizona, Louisiana, California and Puerto
Rico. In addition, the first two of five planned Northern
Border Branches are being launched in Bellingham, Washington,
and Plattsburgh, New York this year. Currently, AMO branches
across the country provide personnel and assets on temporary
duty to enforce airspace security over Washington, DC, and for
other sensitive locations and events throughout the Nation as
designated.
Also, in support of Presidential Decision Directive-14, AMO
routinely deploys internationally to conduct counter-drug
missions in source and transit zones.
The focus of today's hearing is drug trafficking on the
southern border. I would like to highlight how AMO contributes
to the fight against narcotics trafficking. In fact, AMO's
legacy mission was born in the fight against illegal movement
of drugs and people by air and sea--mainly across our Southwest
Border.
While AMO has been tasked with new missions in the post-
September 11, 2001 strategic environment, the agency remains
dedicated to our legacy missions because those threats remain
as urgent as ever.
In particular, existing smuggling routes and networks
represent a new threat. As the United States continues to
harden legal points of entry against potential terrorists,
there are very serious risks that traditional smuggling routes
and networks are vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists who
seek to covertly move operatives and weapons into this country.
Smuggling networks are in the business of moving people and
goods. These are multi-million-dollar criminal enterprises
dedicated to the illegal movement of tens of thousands of
illegal immigrants and tons of illicit cargo into our country
without detection.
It takes little imagination to understand how easily such
mature delivery systems could facilitate the movement of
terrorists and their weapons into this country.
In order to continue providing AMO personnel with the best
tools, training, safety and equipment, AMO has approved a new
modernization plan. It is a comprehensive capability-based
systems acquisition strategy designed to improve AMO
operational effectiveness and to reduce overall life cycle cost
in the most effective manner and in the minimum amount of time.
It is a strategic plan that provides an overview of the
current state of AMO infrastructure and outlines the necessary
acquisition of platforms, sensors and logistic support to meet
new and legacy missions and responsibilities of AMO.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
again for the opportunity to highlight the Office of Air and
Marine Operations within Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
AMO remains a critical tool in the national effort to secure
our borders against smuggling networks and potential
terrorists. It would be my pleasure at this time to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swingle follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you. Before I start the questioning, I
should have noted at the beginning that this subcommittee held
hearings in San Diego, multiple times actually; Arizona,
Nogales and over in El Paso. We've been down from Laredo to
McAllen. And this is our first time into New Mexico, which is
partly because it is closely related to El Paso, but, as you
clearly stated, has its own problems. In the kind of open zone,
when you squeeze one part you move problems around. And we felt
it was important to get that.
But this is also part of an ongoing investigation that we
continue to look at in the Southwest Border, because there's no
question the Southwest Border is our primary transit zone for
narcotics, overwhelmingly our primary transit zone for
narcotics, and we're trying to integrate that.
I also serve on the Committee on Homeland Security and on
the subcommittee on Border there. And we've been having some
very tense questioning about integration questions and how
narcotics is fitting into the mission, including just 2 weeks
ago at a subcommittee hearing there.
So I have a series of questions that I want to try to sort
through today that won't be as New Mexico-focused here, but
first on some general policies and how you're approaching it in
this section of the border.
A number of these are directed first to DHS divisions. And
I'll start with Mr. Barker. For your division and your agents,
where does drug trafficking stand in the priorities? Is it a
high priority? Do you view your primary mission as to stop
terrorists, to stop illegal immigration, to stop drugs? How do
you handle that?
Mr. Barker. The primary mission is preventing the entry of
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. But as we see it in
the Border Patrol, our missions, really, and how we perform
these functions have not really changed much in terms of our
deployment since September 11. We look at all our enforcement
strategies as one that's capable to stop all of them.
Our secondary mission before the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, was drugs. That's still a very high
priority. We feel that our deployment, as we say, will take
care of anything that comes across the border, whether it's a
terrorist, weapons smuggler, narcotics smuggler, and the like.
It is a very high priority, and you can see by the
statistics it's being doggedly pursued. Considering the fact
that we have seen the shift, especially in the Fabens Corridor
and the Deming Corridor, we see that as a very high priority.
That cannot be separated from that priority that we put to the
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Garcia, when you're checking a vehicle, if
you put a bomb-sniffing dog on the drug, can you also put a
drug-sniffing dog on the same one, or does it tend to be
mutually exclusive?
Mr. Garcia. Our canines are trained for different types of
processes. We have chemical detection dogs as well as bomb
detection dogs and narcotics detection dogs.
Additionally, all our officers that are on the front lines
carry a personal radiation detector device on their person.
Mr. Souder. So when dealing with the psychology of how your
individual agents are working with this, when they're seeing a
truck and they have a radiation device, and then if--do you
have bomb-sniffing dogs at your border crossings?
Mr. Garcia. We have them assigned to El Paso. At the moment
the two positions are vacant, but we do have two.
Mr. Souder. Wouldn't you see a subtle change occurring in
what your agents view as their priority if each one is carrying
radiation devices and you have the bomb-sniffing dogs, as
opposed to what was historically a much more drug-oriented
mission.
Mr. Garcia. Our priority, top priority, is terrorists and
their weapons coming across our borders, realizing that
terrorists are people, of course. Immigration and the narcotic
detection enforcement efforts kick in secondary to our primary
mission.
Mr. Souder. The ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr.
Cummings, points out that we have 20,000 deaths annually--since
September 11 we've had over 45,000 deaths in the United States
because of narcotics and zero because of terrorism. And we have
to make sure that in this mission we don't wind up switching
over hunting for weapons of mass destruction, which may or may
not ever occur at the Southwest Border, not to mention other
types of things.
I don't think there's any one of us who wants to see any
atomic materials come across or borders that could wipe out 2
million people, but somewhere we've got to make sure that we
don't play what all of you who have been in this service know,
and that is, when the Federal Government says, ``X is a
priority,'' everybody goes running toward that priority. And
for 2 to 5 or 6 years, we reorient toward missing children, we
reorient toward this, whatever the thrust is, and then go back
and say, ``Whoops, we missed this big problem over here.''
And we need to know at the Federal level what kind of
pressure we're actually putting on when we say, ``Oh,
everybody's going to be checking for this.'' What was dropped
as well? Because if we don't see these, often in political
terms it is a mutually exclusive choice.
Now, yes, the machines you have are going to pick up both,
and you're going to be able to see that. But there are some
choices, and we need to understand what, A, is happening at the
grassroots level with those choices; and secondarily,
psychologically, what it does with the individuals if they
think that the pressure is on one item and that there's not as
much focus on the other.
You look like you wanted to respond.
Mr. Garcia. At our ports of entry, it's a natural funnel
for people coming directly into the ports of entry. We don't
see a conflict between our terrorist priorities with the
narcotics, with our trade, everything that funnels into one
particular mode into the other. We look for terrorism, we look
for narcotics, we look for legitimate trade coming across, make
sure that people are documented to be entering the United
States. So we don't see a conflict at all at our ports of
entry.
Mr. Souder. OK. Let me ask either Mr. Barker or Mr. Cates
or Mr. Garcia or Mr. Swingle, have any of you had any
interaction with Roger Mackin.
Mr. Swingle. No, sir.
Mr. Barker. No, sir.
Mr. Cates. No, sir.
Mr. Garcia. No, sir.
Mr. Souder. Have you seen any memos in your organization
from Mr. Mackin?
Mr. Garcia. I don't recall seeing a memo with his name,
sir.
Mr. Souder. Do you know who he is.
Mr. Cates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barker. No, sir.
Mr. Garcia. No, sir.
Mr. Souder. His policy was created in the Department of
Homeland Security coordinating narcotics efforts inside the
Department of Homeland Security. And we're trying to sort out
why that isn't getting through in the Department of Homeland
Security. And how that's handled. So you answered my question.
Next, I wanted to ask one more question before yielding to
Mr. Pearce. One of the concerns is how you're coordinating the
operations inside the Department of Homeland Security as it
relates to narcotics.
So let me ask the first question of both ICE and CBP. And
maybe you can start with this, Mr. Cates. Do you still report
drug seizures differently in the different divisions of
Homeland Security?
Mr. Cates. No, sir. The way we report drug seizures has not
changed. We still have a unified statistical collection system
that both ICE and CBP utilize.
Mr. Souder. So if the Border Patrol seizes it, or whether
ICE seizes it, or whether Air and Marine seizes it, there
wouldn't be any kind of way, if I wanted to find out who was
doing what to find it?
Mr. Cates. I'm not sure I understand your question.
Mr. Souder. One of our concerns is whether there is--we
know for a fact there's a competition between your different
agencies. The question is that you need to justify your budgets
and your purposes. At the same time, particularly after you see
the 9-11 commission report that is coming out and other things,
there is going to be an outcry about our lack of integration
inside the department.
And in the area, to what degree is your reporting system?
Do you still have the ability for your superiors or for
Congress to figure out who is making the seizures inside the
Department of Homeland Security, or is it seamless inside your
own organization? I know you have a joint report as Department
of Homeland Security, but, in fact, if I were to boost one of
the agencies over another, can I figure out who's making the
seizure, which indirectly gives you an incentive to keep it
separated?
Mr. Cates. I would tell you that I believe that the
reporting, since the mergers actually are far more accurate--we
still utilize in ICE, as do our counterparts in CBP, the former
Treasury Communications Enforcement Network, which is the
initial documentation of all seizure actions and all follow-on
actions.
And now, with the advent of the Border Patrol joining in
DHS, they also have adopted that system and are now also
engaged in their reporting through that one unified system.
So the system itself is very, very reliable and very
accurate in showing the origin of every individual seizure, and
then every follow-on action, you know, that might add to it or
enhance it in some way.
So the merger of these agencies and the transition to that
one unified reporting system, I think, actually significantly
enhances the accuracy of reporting and prevents, in most
instances, any sort of duplicitous reporting and claiming of
seizures.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Swingle, is that right.
Mr. Swingle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. When the Border Patrol Agency or the ICE agency
or your agency initiates a drug process, do the other subparts
get immediately notified so you-all know you're working a case?
Mr. Swingle. On a local level, we do. We do share
intelligence. We have an intelligence officer that is
responsible for working with the other agencies, CBP, OI, our
own investigation arm, and we do attempt to coordinate that
information.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Barker, is it mandatory if any of your
agents come into a drug case that it's immediately notified
inside the other agencies in the Department of Homeland
Security, so you can see whether it's part off an ongoing case?
Mr. Barker. Our immediate notification is to turn it over.
Depending on the memorandum of agreement we either turn it over
to the counterparts within DHS or through DEA. It all depends
on where the seizure occurred.
But it's not for any follow-on investigation, because we do
not have the investigative authority. It has to be turned over
for that follow-on. And we rely on the agency to who it's
turned over to determine whether the case ends there, whether
there's going to be controlled delivery, or whatever follow-on
investigation comes. But our notification is strictly to turn
it over.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Gonzalez, if anybody in DHS initiates a
drug bust, does DEA get notified so you know whether it's part
of an ongoing case?
Mr. Gonzalez. We are notified if the seizure occurs at a
checkpoint, and we respond. Depending on whether it meets the
Federal guidelines for Federal prosecution, we take the seizure
and try to develop the case, or we turn it over to the local
authorities.
Mr. Souder. But not if it's an ICE or Marine.
Mr. Gonzalez. Correct. We only respond to the Border Patrol
checkpoint.
Mr. Souder. Do you tell ICE and Air and Marine if you're
working on a drug case? In other words, there are lots of
concerns about whether things are going to be compromised? But
you're all Federal agencies, and as we have more and more
agents--terrorism questions, for example, most of the FBI, it
means we have fewer people working narcotics. Mr. Cates, did
you----
Mr. Cates. Mr. Chairman, there are mechanisms involved.
Both DEA and ICE have interfaces between our national computer
systems so that, for instance, were a CBP inspector to make a
narcotic seizure on one of the bridges, an ICE agent would
respond and initiate that investigation.
Through our mandatory protocols for computer and
intelligence query, if that particular suspect was somehow on
record with DEA, we would be notified principally through the
offices of the El Paso Intelligence Center, that DEA has some
interest or some history. And, conversely, the DEA agents in
any active investigation get a notification that there has been
activity on that subject. Now, it's not always exactly
realtime, but it does take place.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chavez, I know that's one of the purposes
in the HIDTAs, that you're trying to do an Intelligence Center.
And let me broaden that. In addition, in New Mexico and working
with El Paso, one of our frustrations has been that the
Southwest Border HIDTA has also, let's say, had a few conflicts
between the States, and approximately between Douglas and
Deming and El Paso. We can't afford to have those kind of
things. So do you want to add to how you see the seamless----
Mr. Chavez. Yes. The Investigative Support Center in Las
Cruces is designed to do exactly what you're asking. If there
is an agency working on a particular investigation, we do have
a deconfliction purpose in which all participating agencies of
the HIDTA and nonparticipating agencies can call to the
Investigative Support Center to deconflict.
Mr. Souder. Can call, or is it mandatory?
Mr. Chavez. It's mandatory for members. And for non-
members, they can call. We are encouraging all members of the
law enforcement community, and nonmembers, to use the
Investigative Support Center to deconflict their investigation
and allow us to conduct a pointer system that will point them
to other agencies working on investigations that they are
inquiring about from an intelligence perspective.
We are also linked to the other HIDTAs along the Southwest
Border, and we're establishing programs that will allow us to
query their data directly from New Mexico, whether it's in
Arizona or California or in Texas, that would allow us to
deconflict with their investigations so that there would be a
complete coordination.
We're in the process now of getting new programs in place
that will allow us to do that, a new system in place for a
Watch Center, new equipment. And we're at a stage, the first
step, in linking the entire Southwest Border for investigative
purposes and interdiction.
Another point to be made is that the agencies are given
credit not only for seizures, but referrals. If they have an
investigation and they are not working to develop that
investigation, they can refer that information to another
agency. And HIDTA does keep count of--because of our interest
to have an impact on our investigation, so we are more attuned
to looking at outcomes and not productivity.
Mr. Souder. Your statement that you just made is eminently
logical. I've been in Congress for 10 years and on this
subcommittee for 10 years and I remember Barry McCaffery saying
years ago that this was his goal in front of our committee 8
years ago, that this is what we've been spending tens of
millions of dollars on the Southwest Border with Federal agents
and State and local. And you're saying we're trying to
integrate through the HIDTAs on the Southwest Border.
You've been in this business for a long time as well. Would
you like to editorialize a little bit on what you think the
problems have been and how we can make it actually happen?
Mr. Chavez. With my 31 years with drug enforcement, having
been assigned to offices in Mexico City for 3 years and the
Agent in Charge in San Diego, the Special Agent in Charge in
Phoenix for a year and a half, as well as working within the
State of New Mexico, and particularly now with the HIDTA, I see
a desperate need to open up the doors so that we can be linked
to other agencies throughout the Southwest Border. And by
opening up the doors, I mean to have direct access to the
intelligence that is available.
For too long there have been agencies who have been trying
to hold on to that information because they were going to be
given credit for their efforts, but now with this new design of
how we're going to give credit--we will feel its impact,
because we want to be focused in our efforts to target the most
significant violators that will bring in the drugs into the
United States.
It's clearly a question of whether we are going to work
together as a task force or work independently. And we are
pushing to work as a task force jointly, openly, and have the
confidence in our fellow law enforcement agents.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Pearce.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like
to request unanimous consent that Mr. Hall and Ms. Peterson's
testimony would be added. They were not able to make it in to
testify on the second panel.
Mr. Souder. No objection. So ordered.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Barker, last year I wrote to Mr. Hutchison
requesting additional resources on the Southern New Mexico
border. He wrote back saying 570 new patrol agents would be
deployed this year. How many of those have actually been
deployed, and how many actually came to New Mexico.
Mr. Barker. We have not gotten the resources this year. We
have not heard of the deployment for fiscal year 2004.
Mr. Pearce. How many of the 570 that he promised have
actually been deployed anywhere.
Mr. Barker. I know of no deployment.
Mr. Pearce. Could you find out and let me know? We
shouldn't have had to ask for it twice, but we will.
Mr. Cates, and I don't know if you're the right one to
answer, just if any of you know the answer, the functions that
you-all represent, how much of those function's dollars
actually are spent along the border of New Mexico, and what
percent does the border comprise of the entire border? I'm just
wanting to compare our border mileage compared to the dollars
spent. Does anyone know that relationship?
Mr. Cates. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Garcia. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Pearce. Can we find that out? Mr. Cates, on page 46 of
your testimony, you describe an acute knowledge and awareness
of the processes by the drug cartels. Just makes it harder,
makes them more effective. What processes do you have to
actually change that so that they don't understand exactly how
you operate and when you're going to do things that you're
going to do.
Mr. Cates. Well, both us and the Customs and Border
Protection officers are constantly working to vary our
routines, to apply changing investigative techniques or
inspectional techniques.
We are often limited by the fact that our operations are
fixed. You know, our ports of entry do not move. They are
susceptible to visual observation, how many lanes are open,
that sort of thing. There have been significant investment in
screening and deterrent activities such as that.
Mr. Pearce. How much would it take to put motion detectors,
Mr. Cates, all along the border--I mean, we are hearing
tremendous testimony about motion detectors and high-resolution
cameras. And how much would it cost to equip the border to
where we could see the border all at one time.
Mr. Cates. We in ICE don't perform that function. That is
probably addressed by the Chief.
Mr. Pearce. Chomping at the bit.
Mr. Barker. Yes, sir, that is technology that would impact,
you know, drug smuggling severely. In fact, if you look at New
Mexico, and especially in the Deming area, we have camera
sites. And unfortunately, the cost of the cameras, it's pretty
high.
Mr. Pearce. How high is the cost, just roughly.
Mr. Barker. I think it's somewhere in the range of 200,000.
Mr. Pearce. Per camera.
Mr. Barker. Half a million per pole.
Mr. Pearce. Half a million.
Mr. Barker. Yes, sir. And the reason it's that expensive,
you have two cameras per pole, 2 days, 2 nights looking in each
direction. But I think if you get an opportunity to go to the
Deming station, or even El Paso, you'll see the effectiveness
of these cameras. And, in fact, what it does, it channels the
traffic in locations where they think the camera cannot see.
We are in the process of getting further deployment. I
think there are 16 additional sites that were scheduled for
2004 and we understand that they're going to come early 2005.
Mr. Pearce. How many of those would it take to cover the
entire border, from Texas to--just roughly.
Mr. Barker. Geez. I think we have sites in New Mexico--I
think in this sector, I think we have----
Mr. Pearce. How far can they see? Just basically, how far
can a camera see.
Mr. Barker. Somewhere between mile and a half, 2 miles.
Mr. Pearce. OK. So every 4 miles, you'd have to have one,
at the extreme.
Mr. Barker. Yes.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Swingle, what's your operating budget for
133 aircraft.
Mr. Swingle. Actually, I'm not certain. That's a national
level thing. I'm not exactly sure what our budget is. I can get
the answer for you, though.
Mr. Pearce. What kind of aircraft do you fly.
Mr. Swingle. We operate civilian type jets, corporate jets,
citation jets, UH-60 Black Hawk.
Mr. Pearce. If you've got 133 of them, each a couple
thousand dollars, how many hours do you fly a month in your
fleet.
Mr. Swingle. In our area of responsibility here,
approximately 300 hours.
Mr. Pearce. How many.
Mr. Swingle. 300 hours.
Mr. Pearce. Per aircraft.
Mr. Swingle. Not per aircraft.
Mr. Pearce. How many aircraft do you have assigned to you.
Mr. Swingle. In Albuquerque we have five aircraft. And in
El Paso we have five as well.
Mr. Pearce. You get about 10 aircraft, you get about 30
hours per month per aircraft? Runs about $5 million, that
Citation that you're flying.
Mr. Swingle. When we equip them, probably a little more
than that.
Mr. Pearce. Sure. So you're looking at the operational cost
of a couple of thousand dollars per hour for 300 hours. 133
aircraft flying up and down, we should be able to have somebody
over the border all the time over every inch of the border. Why
do we still have the problems that we do.
Mr. Swingle. Well, we do a significant amount of patrol.
One of the problems that we have now is our commitment to
Washington, DC, for airspace security. That's kind of tapped
the resources, both in the Albuquerque and El Paso office,
which are sister offices of each other.
Mr. Pearce. How many aircraft do you have flying in
Washington.
Mr. Swingle. Well, more important than the aircraft are the
crews. We have at any one time two UH-60 Black Hawks and two
Citations that are stationed in Washington, DC. The problem is
the personnel that we take from this area to man those
aircraft. When we send them up there, we send them for an 8 or
9-day rotation, but with days off at the beginning, days off at
the end of that.
Mr. Pearce. Is one philosophy to use your people rather
than military people to fly combat air patrol over the capitol?
Seems like the function would be more military when you're
trying to defend the perimeter. And if we're cutting down, if
we're taking away resources and parking aircraft on the ground
because crews are somewhere else, it just----
Mr. Swingle. Right. Well, we do carry one unique thing with
us that the military doesn't have, and that's the law
enforcement authority. And when these aircraft are kind of
escorted out of that secure airspace, then there needs to be
some sort of action taken on the ground when they land. And the
military does not have that capability.
Mr. Pearce. It would be interesting if you could get me
that 133 aircraft and what it costs to fly them per year, both
in operational cost and then in purchase cost.
Mr. Swingle. Yes.
Mr. Pearce. Because myself, I'm not sure if you'd be as
effective as these motion detectors set up and down the
corridor.
Mr. Swingle. We do a completely different mission. I mean,
we're a multi-role unit, the Air and Marine Program. I mean, we
don't just detect and interdict people that are walking across
the border, or driving across. We still have our Air and Marine
interdiction mission, which is one of our core----
Mr. Pearce. The testimony here today, Cates, is that the
increase of drug trafficking and the increase of illegal
activities is going up. And at some point we have to ask if our
primary mission is actually--I'm not directing this at you,
it's far different from your role--but somewhere we need to
start asking if what we're doing is effective and if we should
change what we're doing. And then what we would change.
My last question, Mr. Chairman, would be, if any one of you
can tell me about where the total combined operational costs
were 10 years ago versus today in the total amount of narcotics
that--I don't guess you can measure what gets through, but just
narcotics and illegal activity that's interdicted. How much
more resources are we spending 10 years later versus what we
were 10 years ago, and how much more effective is it? Can you
give me a read on that, any one of you?
Mr. Chavez. If I may, I can attempt to answer that
question.
Mr. Pearce. OK.
Mr. Chavez. For the amount of money that's given to law
enforcement, it has not kept up with the amount of drugs that
have been coming into the United States, particularly for New
Mexico. We know that the cartel leaders are funneling their
narcotics through New Mexico. It creates a bigger problem for
us in the State.
But if you compare that to the budget that the traffickers
have, we're far, far behind, since they are dealing with
billions of dollars and we in law enforcement try to do our
work in the millions of dollars.
So to get an accurate count, it would be practically
impossible. To get a true reading of what's happening in
different States throughout the Southwest Border would be
impossible. We have to look at it from the bigger picture, look
at who the cartel leaders are, how big is their organization,
and how much control they have in smuggling their narcotics
into the United States.
A general statement would be that law enforcement is far
behind when dealing with cartel leaders that control Mexico,
control the narcotics.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Chairman, I will ask one more question. If
we're going to adopt a policy that would succeed, do any of you
have a recommendation? Because I think we can definitely say
that the policies that we have right now are falling further
and further behind. And if we're going to take some strategic
step that would really ratchet up our effectiveness, what would
it be.
You seem to be chomping at the bit again.
Mr. Barker. Because I also wanted to say something about
the question that you asked previously about sensors, and then
I'll come back to the last one.
The motion detectors, you can say we have some of that
right now, because we've got sensors arrayed on the border. I
think we have, like, 900 sensors, which is nowhere close to
what we should have right now. The only problem with a motion
detector is it tells you that there has been an event. It
doesn't tell you exactly what you have. So an animal can go
across it and it would prompt a response. And that's one of the
issues that we have with sensors.
In fact, I was looking at the figures. We have monthly an
average of somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 tickets, events,
that these agents have to respond to because of sensor
activity. What we are looking for as an agency is integrating
sensors and cameras, which is the ISIS system that started
that. If we're going to have motion detectors, they're going to
have to be integrated with something else to tell us it is a
legitimate hit or something we should not worry about.
So we do have that technology in the sense, right now, with
our sensors. And if we do that, we need to make sure that--or
else we're going to have agents responding to things that don't
deserve a response.
Mr. Pearce. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. My understanding from staff is that Air
Division is $257 million? Let me do a brief comment on Mr.
Pearce's last question, and then that sets up--I want to do a
couple more followup on how we collect the data.
Part of the problem, which you all know, is drug funding.
Like I mentioned with missing children or other things, we go
through fads. In Congress, in 1992, 1995, 70 percent of the
interdiction budget was cut by the last president. And to get
back to where we were in 1992, we'd have to take a 50 percent
reduction in drug use. So it isn't like there's a straight line
to track. It went down like that. Drug use soared, then we
worked the last 2 years--3 years.
We have had 3 years of 5 percent reduction. In the last 2
years of President Clinton, when they reorganized, we had some
reduction. We wiped out about half of what went up under
Clinton. But it's going like this, is our problem, because when
it reaches crisis stage, Congress runs toward it. But, unless
we have a stable approach--and one of our problems on the
Southwest Border, much like any other--which we're having in
Iraq, too, by the way--is that when you secure one zone, you
put all that money into one zone, then you've got to maintain
that and move to the next zone.
And what's happening is in places like Sells, Arizona,
where they're running through the Barry Goldwater in the
cactus, and east of Douglas and in New Mexico. And in parks
like Big Bend National Park, where the testimony is, it's
overrun. Padre Island, where we haven't had traditional
protection to the same rate. It funnels into those gaps.
At Sells, Arizona, while we were holding one of these
hearings, they had 1500 pounds of marijuana the previous year,
they had 1500 in the first 3 months of 2003, and during our
hearing they picked up about 1700 pounds. It's just kept trying
to run. Even though we had the whole law enforcement agency one
load of 500, one of 300, one at 400, one at 500 right there.
And it just became a question of how many people are you going
to stop? Because it was just pouring through. Now, we have
those same fears in this part of the border.
Now, Mr. Swingle, I just want to make sure, you testified
about TARS. We know we've given you a difficult task, because
in addition to trying to stop an almost unmanageable flow of
illegal immigrants, because we don't have a work permit system
that reflects the demand for work force in the United States,
therefore, you have all these people pouring through, mostly
for jobs, who have jobs already in the United States to some
degree, and therefore it's an unmanageable flow coming across
the border that's unseparated.
So you have that immigration question, which is sensors,
our flow and everything. And then the TARS, which are the
aerostats, are supposed to be able to catch the planes, low-
flying planes that are coming in. Because if we are successful,
which we are, but if we are successful in sealing more parts of
the border, then they're going to find gaps around it,
particularly if you're a drug dealer smuggling Arab terrorists
apart and unless we have some systems that can also catch low-
flying aircraft underneath it. Are there any aerostats in New
Mexico right now?
Mr. Swingle. Yes, sir, in Deming. Actually, we have the
southern land border pretty much covered, from Yuma, Arizona,
to Laredo.
Mr. Souder. And, yeah, the place that we were just at, in
New Orleans, they said basically from Corpus Christi to New
Orleans are basically----
Mr. Swingle. I think Congress intended to pursue that and
give us that radar net back in 1988 or so. But for some reason,
that got kind of sidetracked.
Mr. Souder. But they are working and functioning in this
section of the border.
Mr. Swingle. Yes, sir, they are. And Mr. Chairman, if I
could, you hit a very pointed point, in that it seems like a
lot of times that we do intend to kind of like chase rabbits.
If they get up over here, this is where we go, and then kind of
let our guard down with what we just stopped. And I, like Mr.
Chavez, have been in narcotics enforcement for almost 30 years,
and in New Mexico, and I've seen--it's very cyclic. And I've
seen it come full circle many times.
I think the approach is to keep the pressure on all facets
of it. If we were to let the TAR program, for example, go
tomorrow, the cartels and smuggling organizations are savvy
enough and structured enough that they would just exploit that
in a matter of seconds. I mean, it would take them 2 weeks to
start exploiting that. So we have to keep our guard up at every
area.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Pearce.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You commented that
Congress gets active as the problem reaches crisis stage, and I
would say that, from Mr. Chavez's testimony, we've reached
crisis stage. We've got two counties in New Mexico out of our
33 No. 1 and two in the Nation per capita in overdose on heroin
use. And for us, I think it's epidemic, and it's time for us to
get some attention.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I want to ask a question. Are any of
you familiar with this proposal that we heard at EPIC this
morning, Border Interdiction Support Center? Have you seen this
proposal circulating? That would be under DHS.
Mr. Barker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. It's to be supported at EPIC.
Mr. Barker. I've heard of it.
Mr. Cates. We've heard of it.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Barker, have you seen this.
Mr. Pearce. No, sir.
Mr. Barker. Mr. Cates.
Mr. Cates. I haven't seen that document. I'm aware of the
document.
Mr. Souder. Have you inputted into the program proposal
your agency.
Mr. Cates. No.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chavez.
Mr. Chavez. Likewise, I'm aware of the program, but I did
not have any input into the design of the program.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Ditto.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Gonzalez.
Mr. Gonzalez. I haven't seen that, but I am aware.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Swingle.
Mr. Swingle. I have not seen it.
Mr. Souder. This is a proposed fusion center for the
Southwest Border that would be under DHS, and it would pull
together working groups to try to coordinate Southwest Border
information.
Now, my first question would be is, Mr. Chavez, if you've
seen this, how does this differ from what the HIDTAs are trying
to do and what the national drug czar is trying to do?
Mr. Chavez. I believe that program is structured for an
interdiction program, similar to Operation Cobija. And, as I
understand, all intelligence and operations of law enforcement
along the border would be coordinated through that center to
fuse the intelligence that is obtained from interdiction
programs.
The HIDTAs are involved also in investigations; so,
therefore, interdiction is just a part of HIDTA, but in
investigations where we focus on the major traffickers, the
cartel leaders, and further hold people accountable for what
they're doing so that we have an impact along the border. It
takes it a step further than what this program is designed to
do, as I understand it.
Mr. Souder. How do you see that as being different from
what EPIC does now?
Mr. Chavez. Well, within the State of New Mexico, the HIDTA
Investigative Support Center takes into account all of the
investigative activities from the task forces and is clearly
focused on New Mexico, but does share its intelligence outside
of the State so that it can expand on the investigations.
I hate to take it a step further, but I think there needs
to be better coordination with EPIC with everybody along the
Southwest Border.
Mr. Souder. Well, what gets confusing to us, and what's
scary is, I spend more time with this, and I'm confused, and my
staff is a little confused. I mean, we're not completely
confused as what we see is the Riverside Center tracking the
track. And they have certain functions. We see EPIC there, you
said in your testimony, which I agree with.
Director Waldridge is trying to figure out how to get
everything connected. There's a proposal here for another
subagency. You have drug intelligence centers in Johnstown, PA,
which interprets the data. We have the Laughlin, the local
agency, to tap into. And you start to get the feeling that
we're probably spending about, I don't know, sometimes 25
percent of our time calling up to the different agencies and
swapping information, when, theoretically, we ought to be
integrated enough that you can tap in and get the information
without having to go five different places, or input into five
different places.
Mr. Chavez. That's correct. And from the HIDTA, that is
exactly what we're trying to do, through the Investigative
Support Center, is bring all of the Federal agencies into the
center with their data, their base, and so, therefore, we can
access all of that data and focus on our problem, or our
program.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Gonzalez.
Mr. Gonzalez. I just want to make an observation. Of all
the centers that you mentioned, EPIC was the first one. All the
others came afterward.
Mr. Souder. Yeah. In trying to sort this through, one of
the advantages at this particular moment in time, and why we're
trying to plunge into this very aggressively, is that when
narcotics are the No. 1 focus, then everybody goes after
narcotics money. But right now, Homeland Security is the No. 1
focus, so every agency, even in EPIC--what they said this
morning is, 40 percent of their inquiries were terrorist
inquiries from the Coast Guard at EPIC, which is supposed to be
the Drug Intelligence Center.
And those of us who work with narcotics want to make sure
that there's some kind of firewall that's here, where we're
going to focus on drugs, and additionally is going to focus on
Homeland Security and terrorism. There are certain overlaps,
because the terrorist groups are funded by narcotic moneys. And
that's going to increase. And the groups are getting more and
more integrated as we look around. And every agent in the
country needs to understand that. But, as FBI moves more toward
other roles than narcotics and DEA emerges with that, clearly
we have merged a whole bunch of agencies inside the Department
of Homeland Security.
In narcotics, there are basically two major players on the
table right now, and has fused a lot more players than we had
before. So when we look at these different agencies, in my
opinion, there shouldn't be a proliferation of new things. What
we ought to be able to do is to figure out how to hammer the
existing ones we have together, or the rule that when a new
one's added, two go out. We don't have a bunch of money, extra
money, to throw at this, when we're having all sorts of holes
on the border, questions on how your agencies are going to be
able to obtain and bring new people in. And payroll questions
are nearly overwhelming the system.
Do any of you want to add anything, comments?
Mr. Gonzalez. If I may, I think it speaks to the
effectiveness of EPIC as to how it's being used after September
11. That should send a signal that, rather than bring on new
centers, that maybe what needs to be done is maybe expand EPIC,
or something along those lines.
Mr. Souder. Terrorism separated out. Mr. Swingle, could you
tell me a little bit what Air and Marine is looking at doing on
the New Mexico border from your Albuquerque center?
Mr. Swingle. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We continue to conduct our
patrols with UH-60's along the border, and our C-550
interceptor tracker jets.
But I believe, if I'm not mistaken, you're going to be
briefed this afternoon after this hearing on one of the new
initiatives that we have that we've discovered a way to exploit
some of this smuggling to identify and exploit some smuggling
rings. As I understand, it's at least a sensitive, if not a
classified issue. But I believe you're being briefed on it
after this hearing.
Mr. Souder. Are you proposing to move your headquarters to
the border? What is the reason for that?
Mr. Swingle. Of course, that is a national issue, and I
believe that there is a move afoot to do that, to bring it back
to the border. It was here at one time.
Mr. Souder. Why would you propose to do that?
Mr. Swingle. I suppose to get our reactionary time to the
border back down. But one would have to understand the purpose
of its move in the first place to see that. I did see that
cycle.
Mr. Souder. And what----
Mr. Swingle. Well, before the aerostats, quite frankly we
relied on the FAA radar in this area to detect targets. And, as
you know, before the aerostats there was a true air threat that
was real. And as a State police narcotics agent, air smuggling
investigator, we made at least one or two cases a week. That's
how rampant it was.
The radar environment was such, though, that we could not
detect these targets as they crossed the border until they were
many, many miles north of the border. So the El Paso Air Branch
at that time was always playing a catch-up game, if you will.
They were always having to chase the target, as opposed to
being able to come down from the north and intercept it.
There was a decision made to move the office up there,
which at the time was a very viable option and a good idea.
They did essentially the same thing in San Angelo and San
Antonio, moved the branch further north. But then shortly
thereafter, the aerostats came, and that changed the entire
complexion.
Mr. Souder. So now the planes are flying down from
Albuquerque to the border.
Mr. Swingle. We have a Citation stationed here, but,
because of our lack of staffing, we can't man them 7-by-24. So,
between the two offices, we crew our aircraft.
Mr. Souder. Let me yield to Mr. Pearce. Let me ask one
other question on the record, on the unmanned aerial vehicles.
The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee of Homeland Security has
recommended that money be appropriated to the Border Patrol and
Customs to develop unmanned aerial vehicles.
So that would be Mr. Cates. Is that who would have that?
Mr. Barker. It's my understanding that, even though you're both
in the Department of Homeland Security, your vehicles aren't
the same. Is there a reason for that?
Mr. Barker. We talking about aircraft.
Mr. Souder. Unmanned, UAVs.
Mr. Barker. They are new to us, and right now they're
deployed in Tucson. And it is something that Director Ridge has
made a commitment to. And we think it's a pretty good addition
to our air operations to have the UAVs.
Mr. Souder. Why are we paying for development of two
systems? Do we know of any reason?
Mr. Barker. I'm not aware.
Mr. Swingle. And I'm not certain at all. We do have some of
my colleagues from Tucson, Arizona that are going to brief you
on the UAV program, since it's operated out of Arizona. To be
honest about it, I'm not up to speed on it.
Mr. Souder. The Coast Guard is developing one as well, so
we'll followup. We're having a Washington hearing in about 2
weeks. We'll followup on that question. But, just so you know,
at our level we're getting increasingly concerned in what we
want to know. And we'll come back to you at some point and say,
``Look, is there an operational reason for this? Is your
function different than their function? It's different than the
Coast Guard, but can't you have one basic model that might have
some alterations? Do we really need to fund,'' quite frankly,
maybe at the congressional level.
I'm not saying it's not. Three centers have companies in
their districts that are developing these different things. But
we don't have time for this stuff anymore in this country, or
the money to do it when we're short in grassroots things, and
then we're winding up in the same department. Put Coast Guard,
Air and Marine on board, probably, then, all in the same
department, all developing similar type programs. We saw this
also on the FAST pass systems, which is getting much better
organized now that DHS is in one agency.
Mr. Pearce.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Chairman, I would ask anyone on the panel,
as we're looking at alternatives, again to look and watch the
border all the time, how much would it cost to use low-altitude
radar capabilities? In other words, that would be far more
effective, and I think you could cover a broader scope, you
wouldn't have to have as many sites for low-altitude radar. It
wouldn't measure the driving traffic. But in some of the remote
areas, it might pick up some of those targets. But any comments
about that.
Mr. Barker. A comment from the Border Patrol perspective.
Our mission is on the ground. How that would affect our mission
is unknown to me, because we would have to be able to see
things that are on the ground. Cameras, those are some of the
things that would be of interest and benefit to us, because,
you know, most of the things that we're going to be dealing
with are on the ground.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Chairman, I would just recommend that we
ask that question, too. Rather than airborne aircraft to pick
up the tracks of other aircraft, I think if you look at the
$257 million it takes annually to run 133 aircraft, that you
can put in a lot of radar, low-altitude radar for that, and at
least find your targets as they're crossing the border, and
probably can pick up the targets back into Mexico as you're
crossing that. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. With that, the first panel is
dismissed. And thank you all for your work. And if you'll thank
all the people working in your agencies and daily take risks
for the rest of us, we appreciate it.
Two of our witnesses on the next panel have submitted their
testimony because things have come up. So we have Captain
Richard Williams, Commander of District 4, Las Cruces, New
Mexico State Police; and Sheriff Juan Hernandez of the Dona Ana
County Sheriff's Office. Earlier I butchered that county name,
but I think most people here knew where I was talking about.
Just remain standing I'll swear you in.
Subcommittee stands in recess for 5 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Souder. We'll reconvene the subcommittee.
Subcommittee's reconvened. Back to order, whatever the correct
terminology is. Captain Williams and Sheriff Hernandez, if
you'll raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Let the record show both responded
in the affirmative. I don't think we've ever held a hearing
where we looked at the Federal issues without trying to talk to
our State and local people, figure out how this integrates.
After we've heard your testimony we'll have some questions
for you, so Captain Williams, if you'll start.
STATEMENTS OF CAPTAIN RICHARD WILLIAMS, COMMANDER, DISTRICT 4
(LAS CRUCES), NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE; AND SHERIFF JUAN
HERNANDEZ, DONA ANA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
Captain Williams. My name is Richard Williams, W-I-L-L-I-A-
M-S, I'm the district commander for the New Mexico State Police
here in Las Cruces. I would like to thank you for the
opportunity of testifying before you today, Mr. Chairman and
this committee.
On behalf of New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson,
Department of Public Safety Secretary John Denko, and New
Mexico State Police Chief Carlos Maldonado, I would like to
convey our appreciation for the Federal support and leadership
provided by New Mexico Congressman Pearce regarding this issue.
Allow me first to discuss the nature of the problem. The
Southwest Border continues to be a focal point for narcotics
smuggling operations. Albuquerque, Las Cruces, El Paso, TX, and
many other communities in New Mexico, have seen an increase in
drug smuggling operations as this region of the country is a
primary shipment point for drug trafficking organizations.
Contributing to the security problems are the inadequate
barrier or fencing systems which physically keep offenders and
vehicles from entering our country. Of the 180 miles of
international border of New Mexico, approximately 160 are not
properly fenced or protected. Additionally, there is a lack of
surveillance, monitoring technology, deployed along the border.
Even if the technology was in place, there is a lack of
sufficient law enforcement personnel and resources to respond
to incursionsites rapidly.
In 2000, New Mexico ranked 36th in population, yet third in
the crime index. A contributing factor to this disparity is the
abuse and trafficking of narcotics, along with the associated
crimes most commonly linked to illegal narcotics.
It is well documented that drug trafficking organizations
utilize the three ports of entry in New Mexico and the vast
geographical land area to bring vehicles and people across into
the United States carrying illegal drugs or undocumented
aliens.
The alarming reality is that other criminal organizations
can utilize the same tactics as the drug smugglers to bring
across terrorists who are willing and waiting to attack our
country. The entire Southwest region is at risk due to unsecure
nature and enormous geographical area to be protected. The task
of securing our international border is monumental, and cannot
be undertaken by one agency alone.
There are thousands of miles of highways in the State near
the Mexican border. New Mexico has three major interstate
highways traveling through the State that lead to numerous
destinations throughout the entire country.
The impact of drug-related and/or violent crime in New
Mexico has many aspects. Like the criminal drug trafficking
groups from South America that preceded them, organized crime
syndicates in New Mexico are extremely violent and routinely
employ intimidation and violence while conducting drug
transactions in New Mexico. There have been numerous incidents
that illustrate the ruthlessness of these organizations. Much
of the drug-related brutality that has become commonplace in
Mexico has spilled over to communities within our State.
Allow me to quickly discuss some of the methods of
operations used by drug smugglers. Backpacking is a common
method utilized by drug trafficking organizations along the
international border. A significant concern is that these
offenders are walking through rough terrain, quite often in
extreme heat with limited supplies of food and water.
A very recent concern is drugs like ephedra, which was
recently banned in the United States, are given to these
backpackers to enhance their performance as they journey across
the border into the United States. Backpacking smuggling
operations are just one method of transportation, and law
enforcement throughout the entire Southwest Border is still
interdicting narcotics shipments and commercial vehicles,
private vehicles, buses, airplanes, trains, and through the
postal and shipping industries.
Let me discuss some of the law enforcement's response to
drug trafficking problems in New Mexico. The State of New
Mexico has developed a statewide coordinated strategy utilizing
seven regional task forces to combat violations of the Federal
and State Controlled Substance Act.
Each one of the regional task forces experience drug-
related and social problems unique to their area of
responsibility. The New Mexico State Police Narcotics Section
is an active member in each of the regional task forces and
assists the regions with resources and personnel on a statewide
level.
The New Mexico State Police Uniform Bureau and the New
Mexico Motor Transportation Division diligently work
interdiction operations on a statewide level, and participate
in Operation Cobija. In Spanish, the word ``cobija'' translates
to blanket, and this operational name symbolizes the extensive
amount of resources deployed during operational periods.
On the local level, communication and coordination between
the Federal, State and local law enforcement is exceptional,
primarily due to the coordination of the regional task force
concept.
The New Mexico State Police Narcotics Section conducts
undercover operations that generally start at the local and
State level, and pursues the investigation to the regional and
international level. Many of the undercover cases are
eventually developed into Federal cases, as they are adopted by
our Federal partners and prosecuted in Federal court.
Coordination is the key to successful management of case
operations, and the New Mexico Investigative Support Center is
crucial to all law enforcement operations throughout the entire
Southwest Border. The services provided by the Investigative
Support Center are immeasurable and provide law enforcement
officers with critical information that facilitates furthering
the investigation to the source of supply level.
It is apparent that the U.S./Mexico border is an area of
concern for all law enforcement agencies in New Mexico and
Texas. The lack of resources, communication technology,
surveillance technology and barrier systems all contribute to
the problem. As California and Arizona take monumental steps to
secure their portion of the border, New Mexico and Texas cannot
be overlooked.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my testimony to this
committee by quoting a retired New Mexico State Police sergeant
on his assessment of the struggle regarding narcotics
trafficking. He said, The problems associated with narcotics
trafficking and the response of law enforcement is like rushing
the gates of hell with a few fire extinguishers and a water
hose. We just don't have enough personnel and resources to
impact this enormous problem. I'd like to thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
[The prepared statement of Captain Williams follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you for your testimony.
Sheriff Hernandez.
Sheriff Hernandez. Chairman, thank you, and Congressman
Pearce, thank you for being here, and also for inviting us to
here to speak to you-all today. Like Captain Williams and
everybody else has been telling you today, I mean, definitely,
there's a shortage of manpower here along the border for us and
stuff.
Another problem we encounter is, like with my agency along
the border here, our radio communication systems, there are
areas along the border down there where our radios won't even
work at all. We definitely need to get some more equipment that
will help us along the border.
My agency, we do have an excellent working relationship
with State Police. Also with Customs, Border Patrol, and DEA
and the FBI. You know, I do have personnel assigned to DEA. I'm
getting ready to give the FBI Task Force two more, and I also
have two assigned to the U.S. Customs Task Force, also, which,
you know, they do work issues with drugs and related issues,
and stuff like that.
Just this year alone, I do have four canine units, and--
well, actually, five, because I still work with mine. I still
get out there and work every once in a while with mine. We do
have canine units out there doing drug interdiction. So far
this year we have taken down over 4,000 pounds of dope here in
Dona Ana County itself, and a lot of that is turned over either
to DEA or Customs so that, you know, they can develop some
information from them. And a lot of them will do controlled
deliveries. Some have been going up to New York and Chicago,
you know.
But, actually, the Federal agencies, we also need a lot
more equipment here, like to do the wire taps and stuff like
that, also to help out. The Intelligence Center here in Las
Cruces, actually, is more supportive of the local law
enforcement projects than what we get from EPIC there in El
Paso, really. We get more information from them here than we do
from EPIC over in El Paso.
And Customs, for instance, you know, with their aircrafts,
I mean, they've always been very cooperative with me. I've even
had their home phone numbers and stuff, to where we need a
helicopter in the air to work something along the border, or
even do a surveillance and take aerial photographs of some
homes that are doing meth labs and all that, and all I call
them, and 15 minutes later they'll call me back, ``OK, we're
taking off. We'll meet you at the airport here in Las Cruces.''
They'll pick us up and we'll show them where we need the
photographs, or they'll track some subjects for us.
And I would like for them to get more support from the
Federal Government so they can buy a few more of the A-Star
helicopters, because those are the ones that have really been
the most helpful here to us, because, you know, they fly at a
certain height where you can't even hear them on the ground.
And then with a flare camera and everything else, I mean, it's
really helped us out a lot on getting us information, you know,
that we need to get when we're going to be doing some
operations and stuff, going after some dope dealers or going
into some homes that are being utilized making meth, and stuff
like that.
We also, you know, have an excellent working relationship
with Border Patrol, you know. We have done a lot of operations
with them along the border, and then also along the east mesa
over here. I do have some of my deputies, also, in ATVs and
stuff. And along with Border Patrol's ATVers, too, we've done
some operations along the border so we can start taking care of
some of the issues.
It's just going to get worse now, like everybody's saying,
with the operations going on in Arizona, to where, you know,
definitely the use of more personnel is going to be needed down
here. And that's it.
Mr. Souder. Thank you for your testimony. Can I ask you a
couple of questions, Sheriff, about Dona Ana County? Does that
county cover the whole New Mexico/Mexico border?
Sheriff Hernandez. No, sir, Luna County and Hidalgo County
cover the western part over there, also.
Mr. Souder. So is Santa Teresa in your country?
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes, sir, Santa Teresa is in my county.
And we have been helping Customs out there also, at the Santa
Teresa port of entry. I have been assigning my personnel to
help them out, also, on inspecting vehicles and, you know,
coming across.
Mr. Souder. How many people live in your county?
Sheriff Hernandez. Pardon me.
Mr. Souder. How many people live in your county?
Sheriff Hernandez. We have well over 180,000.
Mr. Souder. So is Las Cruces in the county, also? So it
goes from where to where?
Sheriff Hernandez. It goes all the way from Las Cruces
north.
Mr. Souder. Even farther north, then.
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes, sir. It's 50 miles north of here,
still.
Mr. Souder. And the counties to your west, they're the ones
that border Arizona, then.
Sheriff Hernandez. Well, Hidalgo County borders Arizona,
and Luna County is between Dona Ana and Hidalgo County.
Mr. Souder. In those counties, I assume there's a lot less
population, and they don't have as many local sheriff resources
to tackle it. Do you help them? What is your relationship with
them?
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes, sir, I was going to bring that up.
See, they're pretty short on personnel. Also, those counties
are, well, pretty poor also, so they don't have enough
personnel. So what I have done is, I got with the sheriffs from
not only Hidalgo County and Luna County, but also Otero County,
which is a county over here to the east of us, and we signed
that Memorandum of Understanding to where we have cross-
deputized all of our people.
So that if my guys are along the border over there and,
say, Border Patrol runs into some problems there at Luna County
and they're requesting assistance, Luna County doesn't have the
personnel to send them, then my guys can just go ahead and
respond without us having to go through all of the procedure of
them having to contact the sheriff in Luna County, then him
having to contact me, and then giving them the authorization
for them to go.
So with the Memorandum of Understanding that we have now on
cross-deputizing everybody, it's like, you know, Border Patrol
or Customs or whoever, State Police might call us, you know,
also, and my guys can just go ahead and go into the next county
and assist them with whatever is going on.
Mr. Souder. You said you had two of your officers currently
in the FBI Task Force. Is that a particular case type thing, or
is it a category like certain types of crimes, or is it
tracking a certain group?
Sheriff Hernandez. The FBI is looking at, you know, certain
things and everything else. DEA, they handle the narcotics
stuff. And Customs, they do a lot of the narcotics, also. The
ones that I have assigned to those task forces.
Mr. Souder. So you have two with the Customs Task Force. Is
that correct?
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. And two with FBI?
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes.
Mr. Souder. And you've got some with DEA, too?
Sheriff Hernandez. I have three with DEA. I've got two
regular deputies, and then also one canine officer assigned to
them over there, also.
Mr. Souder. And the two with Customs, are they doing
narcotics as well?
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. With the State Police, with Captain Williams,
how far does your zone go north?
Captain Williams. My area is District 4, and it encompasses
all of Dona Ana County, a very small portion of Otero County,
which is in the Chaparral County, which is a small little
community. And then also we take parts of Sierra County, about
5 miles into Sierra County. And that's primarily our area. It's
about 4,500 miles.
Mr. Souder. So the State Police are split at the border as
well? You have a different district that takes you west?
Captain Williams. Yes, there's another district to the west
of us, and that's Captain King's district, and he's seated
right here.
Mr. Souder. And are the two of you integrated.
Captain Williams. Yes. It's kind of interesting. If you'll
give me a few minutes, let me tell you. What we have is, we
have a uniformed bureau, narcotics section and criminal
section. Each one of the uniformed bureau is broken down into
12 districts throughout the entire State. We work with District
12, which is the Deming area. And then, of course, there's a
Las Cruces area, we're District 4. And then on the other side
of us is the Alamogordo area, which is another district in and
of itself. So we have the uniform responsibilities, so we have
the responsibility of investigating car crashes, handling
domestic violence. And we also help out with some of the border
operations and some of the interdiction operations throughout
the State.
We also have units that are specialized, though, and that's
the Criminal Investigations Unit that handles major felony type
homicides and major felony cases.
We have a Narcotics Bureau here as well, and the narcotics
section is based--there's a portion here out of Las Cruces. And
we have agents assigned to a DEA Task Force. We also have
agents assigned to the local Regional Task Force. And then we
also have agents that work regular primary New Mexico State
Police cases as well.
Mr. Souder. I'm going to yield to Congressman Pearce for
some questions, and I'll come back.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you.
Captain Williams, on the Cobijas, that's where you pretty
well would interdict a lot more things than you would on a
regular routine day-to-day basis. Is that correct?
Captain Williams. We really try to enhance our enforcement
operations during the operational periods, and really try and
saturate the area with saturation patrols.
Mr. Pearce. So you would interdict more things than normal?
Captain Williams. That's the attempt, yes, sir.
Mr. Pearce. Do you do any forecast out of that, of how much
is actually getting through on your best estimates using the
maximum that you interdict in a Cobija?
Captain Williams. What we've utilized to help us forecast
this is the Investigative Support Center, and they've told us
what some of the prime days are. Focus-based on that
intelligence. As far as tracking, the statistical data that we
gather from them, we do enter all that information with the
Investigative Support Center. What we'll do is, our narcotics
agents aren't even allowed to draw a case number unless they've
already contacted the Investigative Support Center and notified
them as to what they're doing.
Mr. Pearce. So, based on the interdictions during these
high-intensity periods, how many narcotics get through every
day that we don't interdict, and low periods of low activity?
Captain Williams. I think that would be very difficult to
measure, because there are some times where we're very
successful at interdicting narcotics, and there's days where
we're out there and we're stopping a lot of vehicles and we're
writing a lot of tickets, but we don't get anything. So I think
that would be very difficult to measure, as to what gets
through and what we don't get.
Mr. Pearce. What's the extreme difference between a regular
intensity day and a Cobija?
Captain Williams. What we'll generally do, as far as
manpower.
Mr. Pearce. No, as far as the interdiction. I'm just trying
to get some feel to what gets through that we don't interdict
on a daily basis.
Captain Williams. You know, I don't have the exact numbers.
Mr. Pearce. Just approximately.
Captain Williams. What comes through? I would imagine that
we may interdict 5 percent of what comes through.
Mr. Pearce. OK. That gives me closer than any number I
could get. I appreciate that, and I understand that it's really
a rough guess.
Sheriff Hernandez, you know, we met with law enforcement
officials way back last year, and I got a letter shortly after
that from one of the sheriffs, I think, in Hidalgo County, and
he was saying that the people were becoming more brazen. They
pull them over and threaten them, ``If you keep trying to do
your job, we're just going to rub you out.''
If there were one thing we could do from this committee to
change the threats and the risk that you face out of here on
the local level, what would that thing be?
Sheriff Hernandez. Well, you know, probably if you could
change the laws, as far as us being able to enforce immigration
laws. That would probably help us out, you know. Because right
now, basically, you know, we run across illegal immigrants or
something, we have to bother the Border Patrol for them to come
and take care of them and stuff, you know.
Mr. Pearce. OK.
Mr. Souder. Has that ever been looked at.
Mr. Pearce. I'm not sure. We've had the question about
using law enforcement officers anywhere or picking up or
detaining illegal immigrants, and that's been, I think,
routinely rejected. But I'm not sure what the status is.
Sheriff Hernandez. Just the other night, Congressman, I had
two of my canine guys on State Road 9 along the border, and
they spotted a vehicle coming across, you know, through the
desert out there. When they tried to pull it over, they got
into a pursuit, but they did put out the stop stick, flattened
the tires. It turned out it was a vehicle full of illegal
aliens that were being smuggled across the border. It's another
thing that we are encountering down there on that highway quite
a bit.
Mr. Pearce. And for either one of you, when Federal border
law enforcement officials, any of the ones on the panel
previously, get information from you-all about local illegal
activity, how long does it take them to respond? In other
words, you call them for help, for their assistance, how long
does it take them to actually get involved?
Sheriff Hernandez. The Border Patrol?
Mr. Pearce. Any one of them, Customs, Border Patrol, any of
them.
Sheriff Hernandez. It doesn't really take them really long,
because one thing we have done, Congressman Pearce, they have
our radio frequencies, and not only in their units, but also in
the aircraft, to where we can just go ahead and directly follow
them. And they also monitor us. And one thing I like about
Customs and Border Patrol, they see my guys on a traffic stop
and whatever, they'll hover right over the top of them with the
helicopter, you know. They'll shine the lights on them and
stuff to make sure everything is OK.
Mr. Pearce. Do either of you have any requests or
suggestions as far as the coordination between State, local and
Federal border enforcement officials? Is there something that
we could do that would enhance that, or assist you in any way.
Captain Williams. Can I answer that? I would imagine that
the Investigative Support Center is a very good tool. I would
like to see that, personally, enhanced. Our officers have been
able to use that for deconfliction purposes. And in addition to
that, we also see information intelligence sharing bulletins
that they give to us quite frequently, and that helps us
enhance our enforcement operations. And we know it gives us
recent trends and gives us knowledge on what's going on in the
current drug organization. So it's been very helpful.
Mr. Pearce. That's all my questions, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the opportunity.
Sheriff Hernandez. I concur with Captain Williams there,
Congressman. Like I said, from our local Intelligence Center
here, it's like I was telling you earlier, we get more
cooperation from them than we do from EPIC over in El Paso. A
day doesn't go by that I do not get, you know, information from
our center here as far as, you know, certain things to be on
the lookout for and stuff and officer safety issues and stuff
like that, you know.
And we also get information from them here as to what sort
of consignment methods these drug smugglers are using nowadays
and everything else. So it has really been very beneficial to
us out here.
Mr. Souder. Captain Williams, did you say that the other
superintendent, or the other person from the State is here as
well?
Captain Williams. Yes.
Mr. Souder. Can you come forward? I need to swear you in.
Will you state and spell your name for the record?
Mr. Keene. Richard Keene, R-I-C-H-A-R-D, K-E-E-N-E.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Again, you represent the whole section, right?
Captain Williams. Yes, the whole section of the border.
Mr. Souder. And you are the one----
Sheriff Hernandez. I'm in the middle.
Mr. Souder. I asked a question at the Department of
Homeland Security, and DHS responded that it was true and gave
a little bit more detail. I wonder whether any of you are
familiar with this and how it's coordinated and what we can do
to address this question? There are packages that are sold to
immigrant groups that range from $4,000 to $15,000, currently
more like $8,000 to $15,000. In 7 days you're guaranteed entry
into the United States or you get all your money back. There is
a section in New Mexico that it is $40,000 for an Arab to get
in. And that's testified under oath by the Department of
Homeland Security. Are you familiar with that?
Captain Williams. I'm not familiar with that, no, sir.
Mr. Keene. No, sir.
Sheriff Hernandez. I'm not, either.
Mr. Keene. I haven't heard about that.
Mr. Souder. Never heard of that at all.
Mr. Keene. No.
Mr. Souder. Have you been involved in any cases or seen
where Middle Eastern immigrants have come across your border in
New Mexico?
Captain Williams. We have not interdicted any cases where
there's Middle Eastern immigrants coming across, no, sir. We
have interdicted cases, though, where there's undocumented
aliens from Mexico coming across, but nothing from the Arab
countries.
Mr. Souder. It's not your primary responsibility, it's the
Border Patrol's primary responsibility, but we have a hole in
our system if for $40,000 anybody from the Middle East can get
in or get their money back. And you're partly the hole. And the
fact that it's on the record, it's something that's been known
for some time, but I'm not sure precisely where it is. We
wouldn't want to announce exactly, although if we announce it,
we can moderate it.
Mr. Pearce. Just following up with that, I guess Captain
Keene, we've had information in discussion with the officials
that run the hospital in Luna County at Deming, and they tell
us that, routinely, there will be--Federal law requires that if
we have an immigrant come to the border, present themselves
with a medical condition of any kind, the local hospital or
local county has to pick them up at the border and transport
them to the nearest facility that does what they need. If they
need heart surgery, they go to Denver or Albuquerque or
whatever.
And we're understanding that more and more people are
asking for that medical assistance and getting in the planes,
being transported somewhere, and they're getting out and
running the last two or three blocks; they've got somebody
waiting to pick them up. So they're using our own system
against us. Have you encountered cases like that and feel it is
as persistent as the Deming hospital tells us it is?
Mr. Keene. Congressman, I've been in Deming since 1995, and
I have seen and heard of that going on.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. When you pick up somebody on a narcotics
charge, either State Police or local, does that go on--and let
me just say up front, I'm basically more moderate on
immigration questions. I favor legal work. I actually favor
amnesty to a certain degree, which is very controversial. I get
flak in my district. Nevertheless, we have to have control of
our border or we're not safe, and we need to figure out how to
have immigration laws that are workable. But then we have to
enforce the laws that we have. And one of the ways you abuse
your rights, whether you're an illegal or a legal, is if you
bring in narcotics.
When you make an arrest for somebody on narcotics, does
that get into our system so that it shows up when they get
picked up again? Basically we have testimony--we also have
jurisdiction over the Justice Department--that last year,
that--and we had it again in Washington from Mr. Aguilar, and
from east, that I think they said in El Paso--trying to
remember--do you remember what the number was? I think it was
14 times somebody has to be picked up before they're held in El
Paso, if it's 14 times. But if they have a drug charge, you
assume that it would be different than if you would just be
picked up and released. But part of the question is, when you
pick somebody up on a drug charge, does that get into the
system?
Captain Williams. Generally what we do with interdiction
cases, it depends on the size of the case and whether it meets
the threshold or not. If it's a smaller amount, we will
typically handle that at the State level with State Police
narcotics agents. That information is turned over to the
Investigative Support Center. And my understanding is that they
are the ones who share that information with the Federal
agencies.
If it is a larger amount of narcotics, generally we try and
turn that over to the Federal agencies, DEA or someone like
that, to adopt the case and prosecute it federally. And that
information is as well turned over to the Investigative Support
Center.
So we put a lot of faith in the Investigative Support
Center to disseminate intelligence for us, and all seizure data
and arrest data is handed over to the ISC.
Mr. Souder. We had testimony, again this morning, that
illegals are--we do a good job of checking when we pick them up
whether they have a criminal record, although apparently
breaking immigration laws isn't considered a criminal record.
But the question is, what level are the drug laws? What if it's
a misdemeanor, felony, dealing? And how does that get into the
record as far as detaining?
Captain Williams. I don't believe you're going to see very
much of a record for misdemeanor type offense. Now, the
majority of the backpacking type operations, to just use those,
those are the majority of the felony weights, anyway. So those
are large enough to be dealt with.
Mr. Souder. Do you have a ballpark guideline? Because we
had testimony in El Paso that it takes a major load, their
prison's full, they don't prosecute. How are your prisons? Are
they full and is that impacting who you pick up?
Captain Williams. That's not impacting on who we pick up. I
mean, if we come across a load, we're going to pick it up
regardless of what's going on in the prisons system.
Mr. Souder. Even knowing that they wouldn't prosecute?
Captain Williams. We'll push--every load we get, we try and
get that prosecuted. Generally our District Attorney's office,
our local District Attorney's office, works very well with us
on prosecuting these cases. Now, that doesn't mean, though,
that they won't try and plea bargain it or come up with a
different solution afterwards. But we do send everybody in for
prosecution.
There would be one exception, and that would be if we were
trying to further the investigation or to take the
investigation to the next level, we may hold prosecution at
that point. But for the majority of the cases they are
prosecuted, yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Sheriff Hernandez, how full is your jail?
Sheriff Hernandez. We have quite a few inmates there, yes.
But one thing I was going to tell you, Mr. Chairman, is that,
like last year, I did bring in the U.S. Consulate down here
to--and we gave our deputies a training as far as what the
immigration laws are and what we were required to do as far as,
say we did pick up somebody, you know, doing something illegal
here in the United States. And, you know, we've been following
those guidelines and stuff, the laws that are set, you know the
U.S. Consulate told us we had to follow and stuff as far as,
you know, having to notify. Like if, you know, we arrest them,
we have to actually give them the opportunity to--ask them,
``Do you want us to notify your Mexican Consulate or not?'' You
know, if they tell us no, then we don't. But if they say yes,
of course we have to notify the Mexican Consulate that we have
picked them up.
Mr. Souder. It's one of our measures to try and figure out,
when we squeeze one area, where is it moving? And I don't mean
when I was asking questions--are your jails full is one way you
tell whether it's moved, whether an area has been flooded, and
whether or not they have nowhere to put people and whether the
prosecutors will prosecute them.
And it's suggested the focus is still, it's so easy to get
across at El Paso they haven't quite hit the desert as hard as
going across El Paso, because their jail's full. And they
testified twice that they don't basically go after anybody
under 200 pounds. 200 pounds is a big load, so that means it's
easy enough to run through there, that they aren't putting as
much pressure. But, the reason I ask the question about the
Middle Eastern immigration, is suggesting the more isolated
areas we may have, in effect, bigger loads moving through or
terrorist groups moving through, because it's much harder to
find them.
Now, you mentioned, of course, Sheriff Hernandez, that you
had two ATV vehicles.
Sheriff Hernandez. No, I've got more than that.
Mr. Souder. OK. Two that are dedicated for----
Sheriff Hernandez. No, we deal with some ATV operations
with Border Patrol along the border.
Mr. Souder. OK. And did you get those through a Federal
grant? Do we assist in the border with that kind of equipment?
Because we have all kinds of equipment.
Sheriff Hernandez. No, sir, actually, we might call it
Federal funds, because it was actually moneys that I gathered
from seized assets from these dope dealers that we were busting
and everything else, and then selling, you know, their vehicles
that were given to us by the Federal Government.
Mr. Souder. I see.
Captain Williams. If I can, Mr. Chairman, my understanding
is, the New Mexico State Police Narcotics Section has just
purchased, I believe it's three or four ATVs, and they were
purchased through Federal funds. I believe it was through
HIDTA. And those are going to be used for interdiction
operations along the border as well.
Mr. Souder. I just want to make sure it's flexible enough
for different areas to accommodate that.
Do you have any additional questions?
Mr. Pearce. No questions, but I would like to make some
closing comments when you arrive at that point.
Mr. Souder. Well, thank you all for your work. Clearly,
we're watching very closely, because when we push one area--and
clearly, as we push Arizona more, we're watching New Mexico
very closely, in addition to huge gaps in the Texas area.
Because focus has been more California and Arizona for the last
few years. And continue to work through Congressman Pearce and
others, your senators, to gain attention to make sure it's
there. I know they've been active in the Senate side as well,
and we thank you for your efforts in your local law enforcement
and taking the risks that you described in your testimony.
Sheriff Hernandez.
Sheriff Hernandez. Well, one thing I was going to say, Mr.
Chairman, is that if you-all would really support our
Intelligence Center here, we would really appreciate it,
because, like I said, we do get a lot of information from them,
and it's really been helpful to us.
Mr. Souder. That's the HIDTA Intelligence Center.
Sheriff Hernandez. Yes, sir, uh-huh.
Mr. Souder. And you don't have a RISS program here where
you put--are you part of a RISS--you know, R-I-S-S network? Are
you part of that?
Sheriff Hernandez. I believe the Intel Center is.
Mr. Souder. So that feeds into the HIDTA center.
Captain Williams. Right.
Mr. Souder. One of the major functions, and why we funded
the HIDTAs, is to have them coordinate. And most are
increasingly putting in an Intelligence Center that then
interacts with EPIC. As you can hear from the first panel,
we're having a little bit of discussion as we get this
proliferation of these agencies on how many we need, does each
agency need their own, which ones work. HIDTA was supposed to
be an interaction between Federal, State and local, and that's
its purpose. Now, it may interact with EPIC and RISS as opposed
to you then directly interacting with EPIC and RISS. But we
need to make sure garbage in, garbage out. Getting information
in and out.
Southwest Border HIDTA, in particular, is--we have tried to
make even further adjustments in the latest DCP, Drug Czar's
Office, because the Southwest Border, as you mentioned, has 60
percent, which may be low, as far as the drugs went.
Let me ask one other question. Any of you know anything
about the heroin up in Santa Fe? Is that Colombian heroin or
Mexican heroin?
Captain Williams. My understanding, that was Mexican
heroin.
Sheriff Hernandez. Mexican heroin.
Mr. Souder. And how many deaths are we talking there, do
you know?
Captain Williams. One year when I worked narcotics up
there, they had 26, I believe, in Rio Arriba County, and that
was in a year span. That's been a few years back, so I don't
have recent statistics, but that's quite a significant amount,
because that county itself is not populated.
Mr. Souder. Seattle has more, but, I mean, Seattle's a lot
bigger, and it's not that many more.
Captain Williams. I tell you what, Rio Arriba County has
had some significant problems with their heroin problems, and
they've taken steps in local law enforcement and at Federal and
State law enforcement to attack that problem through undercover
operations. And it just continually seems to stay there and
fester in that area.
Mr. Souder. One other question. We just did a meth hearing
over in Arkansas, and while you're having the growth, Arkansas
is having an absolute explosion, as we are. I think we're up in
the 1400 labs, versus 29 just a few years ago.
And we had written testimony from the HIDTA director that
showed clearly that the most potent stuff is Mexican, and
California superlab stuff coming in. But at the local police
level, Sheriff Hernandez, have you had any local lab cleanups
that you've had to deal with?
Sheriff Hernandez. When we have meth lab stuff like that,
we turn it over to the State Police, because they have a meth
lab unit and stuff. So they go ahead and take care of that for
us.
Mr. Souder. Because you have a meth lab--is it----
Captain Williams. Statewide unit.
Mr. Souder. How long did it take? How long are your
officers at the scene?
Sheriff Hernandez. Usually when we go after a meth lab,
see, we already know that it's there, so we already have the
warrant and everything else to go hit that residence and stuff.
And the State Police is notified already before that. So they
are already responding there with us.
Mr. Souder. At this point you have roughly the number of
lab cleanups you need to be able to handle the flow so that you
don't have--in Arkansas we were hearing 8 hours until the lab
could get there.
Captain Williams. What it's also doing, going out in a
proactive manner. So they may already be there when they're
getting ready to start the cleanup. And they may have been the
ones who interdicted, along with the local police and the local
sheriffs.
One of the things that we have, though, is we have had, and
maybe it's not an explosion, but we have had a significant
increase in our meth lab operations here in New Mexico as an
entire State.
Mr. Souder. Crippled your local police department is what
happened, because it takes so many people. The cost of cleaning
up if it's a small methamphetamine lab, total, are only 8
percent of our national problem, and even in the big States
where it's exploding, it's not the majority of the drug
problem. But the problem is it's like 90 to 100 percent of the
local law enforcement problem and the State Police, because it
takes so long to clean them up and prosecution.
And we heard from prosecuting attorneys how it takes, even
just to try, the prosecuting attorneys take twice as long to
prosecute the cases, that labs trying to identify the stuff
have to have more chemicals to try to prove what it is. It is a
much harder process, although it's not the major drug problem,
it is an exploding problem. If we ever do control the border,
we're going to wind up producing more meth.
Captain Williams. Sure. One of the things that's most
alarming about methamphetamine is what it does to the
individual, the person who's hooked on it, because they can go
four, 5 days without sleeping. They can be high anxiety. They
can become extremely nervous and paranoid to that point. And,
actually, I brought it up in my written statement. We've even
had law enforcement officers killed by people who were what we
call tweaking, where they've been up for several hours and they
were highly anxious and they're panicking.
So that's the most scary part to us as local law
enforcement, along with all the other concerns, including the
environment and the property values and what it does to a
neighborhood and things like that.
Mr. Souder. Have you seen it in Albuquerque and the bigger
cities?
Captain Williams. We're seeing it just about everywhere in
the State.
Mr. Souder. Well, thank you all for your testimony. I yield
to Mr. Pearce.
Mr. Pearce. In closing, I, of course, would like to thank
the city of Las Cruces and Mayor Bill Mattiace for having us in
the facility here.
And as far as some of the things that have come up, Mr.
Chairman, if we're going to look at the border expansion of
Santa Teresa and expanding the capabilities, maybe moving part
of the El Paso Field Office functions out there, like has been
discussed, I would be very supportive of that. I feel like that
border could be used to handle much more traffic and stop some
of the congestion that we're finding right there in the middle
of El Paso. Possibly give us a better chance to look at more of
the packages coming across.
As far as the UAVs, we've got some of the research
occurring here in Las Cruces. Of course, we would like to
accommodate anything that we can do there.
My office has secured funding for airport expansion at
Santa Teresa. We feel like, if the branch of Air and Marine
activities decided to relocate there, that some of the
expansions that we're causing to occur would give it even
greater capability and it would be a more suitable spot, and
certainly provide more access and quicker access to the border.
So, after listening to the testimony today, I would
encourage any of those things that you can oversee or cause to
happen, that we would move that to the next step and see if
it's actually plausible and feasible.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for coming to the
district and having a discussion that I think is extremely
critical to all of New Mexicans, as well as all of America.
Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Well, thank you for your leadership. I look
forward to working with you on those projects, because we're
certainly going to be focusing increasingly on that section of
the border that you have in your district.
With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
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