<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:96314.wais]
DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS CONGRESS GETTING FOR ITS MONEY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-208
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ------ ------
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DOUG OSE, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas Maryland
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio Columbia
------ ------
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director
Nicholas Coleman, Professional Staff Member and Counsel
Tony Haywood, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 21, 2004................................... 1
Statement of:
O'Connell, Tom, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense,
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Rear Admiral
David Kunkel, U.S. Pacific Command; and Brigadier General
Benjamin Mixon, U.S. Southern Command...................... 14
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 11
Kunkel, Rear Admiral David, U.S. Pacific Command, prepared
statement of............................................... 31
Mixon, Brigadier General Benjamin, U.S. Southern Command,
prepared statement of...................................... 37
O'Connell, Tom, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense,
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, prepared
statement of............................................... 16
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana:
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
Prepared statement of General Sattler.................... 55
DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS CONGRESS GETTING FOR ITS MONEY?
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, and Norton.
Staff present: J. Marc Wheat, staff director and chief
counsel; Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member and
counsel; John Stanton and David Thomasson, congressional
fellows; Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel;
and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.
Mr. Souder. The subcommittee hearing will come to order.
Good morning. Because of the consistent jurisdictional
focus of this subcommittee on the President's National Drug
Control Strategy, we pay very close attention to demand
reduction, treatment, and drug supply and interdiction
initiatives. Our oversight activities continually evaluate
departmental authorizations, appropriations, and the efficiency
and effectiveness of departmental efforts. The President's
budget request, now before Congress, asks for approximately
$12.6 billion for the Strategy in 2005. The Department of
Defense is to be appropriated almost 15 percent of that sum.
The most compelling reason for my tenacity in this regard
is the loss of life due to drugs in my district and all over
this great Nation. This year, more than 21,000 Americans died
from drug-related causes. We have never lost this many
Americans annually to a single military or terrorist campaign.
This staggering statistic is significant when placed in
perspective: we have lost in excess of 600 brave Americans in
Iraq since Operation Enduring Freedom began, which is about 2.9
percent of those lost to drugs over the same period of time. We
have lost more Americans to drugs than were killed in any
single terrorist act to date. It is vitally important that we
maintain vigorous efforts to control the sources of supply for
narcotics and to interdict them before reaching the United
States.
The Department of Defense has been appropriately authorized
to conduct counternarcotics missions and was designated the
lead department for many counternarcotics command, control,
detection, monitoring, and training responsibilities in the
1989 DOD authorization bill, among other authorities. The
Department has been appropriately funded in fiscal year 2003
with a final budget authority for DOD narcotics activities of
$905.9 million. Fiscal year 2004 saw an increase in the
narcotics budget to $908.6 million but the fiscal year 2005
budget request is $852.7 million. In addition, the Department
requested and received $73 million in supplemental funds for
counternarcotics activities in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility. It remains unclear to me how that appropriation
has reduced the growth, processing, transshipment, and
availability or street price of drugs from Central Asia.
A significant problem is the allocation of national
resources to counternarcotics missions. Many of our most
significant interdiction assets are operated by the Department
of Defense. The subcommittee staff received briefings at the
Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West and at the U.S.
Southern Command that suggest that the redirection of national
resources away from drug control missions in the SOUTHCOM area
of responsibility to combat missions in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility have had dire negative impacts on drug
interdiction in the Western Hemisphere. Some detection and
interception programs have only a minuscule proportion of the
amount of resources that Government experts have deemed
necessary for an adequate detection and interdiction program.
This allocation of resources must be addressed vigorously and
quickly by the Department of Defense.
Our witnesses today have some of the significant
responsibilities for operational matters relating to narcotics
supply reduction and interdiction, and I appreciate very much
the opportunity to have them here to survey the status,
effectiveness, and spending priorities of these critical
programs. For example, many of these responsibilities are
carried out in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility
and specifically in the Andean Region. For several years, the
U.S. Southern Command personnel have been training Colombian
military pilots and the Counternarcotics Brigade. The expanded
authorities in Colombia allow personnel and equipment to be
employed against both narcotics and terrorist threats. This
year, the Department has requested an increase in the personnel
limitation in Colombia, to facilitate greater training
opportunities, among other things. It is clear that we are
seeing real and tangible successes in Colombia, and I very much
appreciate the Command's efforts to support the
counternarcotics efforts of President Uribe and Vice President
Santos, with whom I have had the opportunity to spend a
significant amount of time. The attorney general of the United
States has indicted members of both the FARC and the AUC for
using drug proceeds to support their terrorism.
I want to add one thing we learned just yesterday morning
in Detroit, as we held a hearing on meth. At one point two big
busts in Detroit were 40 percent of the meth precursors in the
United States being shipped to California for the super labs,
but the feeling of our Federal agencies is that the meth
precursor chemicals, trafficking has shifted--not that the
production has changed from Belgium and the Netherlands--but it
has shifted to the south and to the west, coming from Asia and
back up through the south. So when we effectively try to do
homeland security at the borders, looking more closely for
other things, and as we have transferred agents up to the
north, nearly a 50 percent increase in the Department of
Homeland Security to the north border and those big crossings,
we have another impact on counternarcotics, which puts more
pressure on the two commands we have here today if it is coming
through the Asian side or up through the southern side, and now
not down through Canada. We are not absolutely convinced of
that trend, but that is what we heard from the major Federal
agencies yesterday in Detroit.
We will consider the Department's response to rapidly
emerging new threats such as the connection between terrorist
and drug trafficking organizations. The resumption of large-
scale heroin production in Afghanistan breeds instability and
directly funds terrorist groups. The President has announced to
the world that terrorists and sponsoring nations are our
enemies. What efforts are underway to destroy the funding
source of these enemies? The eradication of opium poppy, the
interdiction of precursor chemicals traffickers, and the
destruction of the stockpiled drugs and processing facilitates
in Afghanistan directly carry out the intent of the Commander
in Chief's National Drug Control Strategy.
Today we will try to determine more precisely what has been
the focus of effort and the effect of the Department's
counternarcotics program worldwide and what steps can be taken
to ensure the adequacy of interdiction resources, and determine
whether resources will ever return to previous levels. Clearly,
our plate this morning is very full, and I welcome our
witnesses. From the Department of Defense we have Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, Mr. Thomas O'Connell, who also recently testified
before the subcommittee on the Andean Counterdrug Initiative,
and we welcome you back. The second panel, actually, we have
combined you into one panel and appreciate Mr. O'Connell
accommodating that. We have here representing the Combatant
Commands, where most of our supply reduction is authorized and
appropriated. Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon will speak for
the U.S. Southern Command and Rear Admiral David Kunkel will
speak for the U.S. Pacific Command. Unfortunately, our invited
witnesses from the U.S. Central Command, which would include
Afghanistan, was not available to testify, so we look forward
to receiving the testimony separately in the future.
Certainly there is no lack of important issues for
discussion, and I expect today's hearing to cover a wide range
of pressing questions. We welcome all of you and I look forward
to discussion.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I now yield to our ranking member, Mr.
Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In both the past and the current fiscal year the Department
of Defense received more than $900 million for counter and drug
activities that support the goals of the National Drug Control
Strategy. Roughly half of this money supports international
interdiction efforts, mainly focused on stopping the flow of
cocaine and heroin from the Andean Region and Mexico into the
United States.
Another important geographic area of focus is Afghanistan,
the world's leading producer of heroin and the primary source
of heroin destined for Europe. In both the Andean Region and
Afghanistan, proceeds from drug cultivation, production and
trafficking have been linked to terrorists, insurgent and
criminal activities that aim to undermine efforts to achieve
and sustain democracy and the rule of law abroad, and to harm
American civilians at home.
Imported legal drugs destroy thousands of lives each year
and destroy communities throughout these United States. The
attacks on September 11 brought home the fact that foreign drug
proceeds helped to advance the murderous objectives of
terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. DOD counterdrug programs
provide vital support for U.S. counterdrug and counternarco-
terrorism activities in the areas of interdiction,
intelligence, and detection and monitoring of drug smuggling
routes and transit zones, often working in conjunction with
Federal law enforcement agencies and allied militaries through
task forces like the Joint Interagency Agency West.
DOD also provides important support to domestic drug
control efforts such as through its internal demand reduction
efforts and by providing training and other support to State
and local law enforcement through the National Guard. Both
domestically and internationally, the drug trade threatens
stability, security, and the rule of law. And in both contexts,
the post-September 11 focus on terror poses challenges that
affect the way Federal dollars and resources are allocated to
fight the war on terror and the war on drugs.
In Afghanistan, where opium production has skyrocketed
since American forces removed the Taliban from power, the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes has stressed that the
war on terror and the war on drugs are in effect the same war,
that the drug trade is the primary threat to security and
stability in Afghanistan. If the Afghan drug trade is not
attacked aggressively, UNODC has warned that Afghanistan could
evolve again into a failed state, controlled this time by drug
cartels and narcoterrorist organizations. Such an outcome would
be disastrous not only for Afghanistan and its neighbors, but
for the United States and our allies who are in the cross hairs
of the terrorist organizations that would benefit from a
lawless Afghanistan.
A similar situation exists in Colombia, where we have in
effect collapsed the distinction between terrorist and drug
organizations because of the interdependency that exists
between the drug trade and the terrorists. A key distinction,
however, is that as deeply as we have become involved in
supporting Colombia's fight against narcoterrorism, American
troops in Afghanistan are on the front lines, and this is
unequivocally our war.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. military faces a difficult challenge
in managing its overlapping mandates to fight war on terror and
the war on drugs on the same geographic fronts. The witnesses
before us today are charged with managing that important
challenge. I look forward to hearing their testimony concerning
the role of the Department of Defense on fighting the war on
drugs, and I am interested in hearing their views on how the
military can or should adapt to fight the war on drugs and the
war on terror in a more synergistic fashion in light of the
clear linkages that have been established between the two.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me express my gratitude to the
men and women in uniform who are charged with carrying out the
military's mandates to protect our Nation from the twin threats
of drugs and terrorism. We are deeply indebted to them for
their courageous service to our Nation, and we thank them.
Thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to
the testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Before we move forward, I want to take a point of personal
privilege and salute an important member of my staff, John
Stanton. John came to our staff in December 2002 as a
congressional fellow from what was then the U.S. Customs
Service. It is now the U.S. Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement [ICE] Bureau of the Department of Homeland
Security. As our staff expert on narcotics interdiction and
related issues, John has provided us with excellent analysis
and a wealth of experience. His assistance in setting up our
subcommittee's hearings and briefings, his depth of knowledge
of source zone issues in Colombia, Central Asia, and other
regions, and perhaps, most important, his kindness and
generosity to all of us who work with him have been invaluable.
John's career of public service began in 1979 with the U.S.
Marine Corps, with whom he served 6 years. In 1989, he joined
U.S. Army Special Forces and attained the rank of Captain. A
graduate of the Emory-Riddle Aeronautical University, John flew
with Eastern Airlines, then joined the U.S. Customs Service as
a law enforcement officer and pilot in 1991. He has flown
missions in nearly every type of aircraft owned by U.S. law
enforcement and in such diverse locations as El Paso, TX;
Tucson, AZ; Puerto Rico, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.
Prior to joining our subcommittee staff, John was assigned
to the operational staff of U.S. Customs headquarters. During
his time there, John was placed in charge of air security for
the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City, UT, coordinating between
headquarters and agents in the field. Earlier this month, John
was recalled for duty as a member of the U.S. Army Reserve and
will be reporting to base next week. He is scheduled to serve
in Iraq as part of our Nation's ongoing efforts to establish
peace, justice, and democracy in that troubled region of the
world.
John, it has been an honor to work with you. Please accept
our heartfelt thanks for your service to this subcommittee and
our best wishes for your continued success and our prayers for
your safe return home.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative
days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing
record, and that any answers to written questions provided by
the witnesses also be included in the record. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents,
and other materials referred to by Members and witnesses may be
included in the hearing record, and that all Members be
permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without
objection, so ordered.
As you all know, it is our standard practice to ask
witnesses to testify under oath. Would you please rise so I can
administer the oath?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
We begin today with Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas
O'Connell. Welcome back to our subcommittee. We very much were
thrilled that your position was filled. We are glad you are at
the Department of Defense working with these issues and glad
you could come again to talk today. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENTS OF TOM O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; REAR
ADMIRAL DAVID KUNKEL, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND; AND BRIGADIER
GENERAL BENJAMIN MIXON, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
Mr. O'Connell. Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings, it
is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of Defense programs and policies that assist nations
around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I have
a longer statement to be placed in the record, but I would like
to briefly touch on the Department's counternarcotics efforts
at home and abroad.
Chairman Souder and Representative Cummings, let me thank
you for the excellent impressions of your opening remarks; both
of you were right on the mark. And I would like to also thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to join together as one
panel, and it is indeed a pleasure to serve with these two
distinguished flag officers.
Fighting narcotics is a complex process that requires
coordination and funding from all levels of government
agencies, local and State, law enforcement, and the foreign
countries we assist. We are increasingly aware of linkages
between terrorist organizations, narcotics trafficking, weapons
smuggling, kidnapping rings, and other transnational networks.
Terrorist groups such as the FARC in Colombia, al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, and groups around the world can finance key
operations with drug money.
The Department of Defense, with our counterparts in the
Department of State and other Government agencies, seeks to
systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks both to halt
the flow of drugs into the United States and bolster the
broader war on terrorism. The Department has requested roughly
$853 million for these efforts in fiscal year 2005. While this
is lower than the total $908 million appropriated in fiscal
year 2004, this is due primarily to the $73 million in funding
added to this year's emergency supplemental to support our
efforts in Afghanistan and in neighboring nations, and that is
much appreciated. Our baseline fiscal year 2005
counternarcotics budget request includes resources to continue
and sustain these efforts.
The Department is bolstering border security by providing
communications systems for the border police, building police
infrastructure in the border regions and improving information
between law enforcement and military intelligence. Our
activities are fully coordinated with, and in support of, the
United Kingdom and the State Department. To support similar
efforts in Colombia, the Department forwarded to the Congress a
request for reprogramming $50 million during this fiscal year.
I am pleased to report that the Department will maintain its
emphasis on Colombia by increasing our efforts in Colombia in
fiscal year 2005 by $43 million. This support will help
President Uribe and his military execute Colombia's Plan
Patriota as they extend a government presence in areas that
have been isolated for decades. The Colombian military is now
executing a well coordinated and joint military campaign
against the FARC. As you know, to better assist the Colombians,
we and the State Department have asked for congressional
support in raising the current personnel cap in Colombia.
In the Pacific Region, we are bolstering an already well
established counternarcotics program in Southeast Asia, where
our Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism,
extremism, drug trafficking, and a serious need for increased
maritime security.
Our international counternarcotics support is predominantly
in response to requests from our principal partners, the
Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration. It
includes deployments and programs to train and furnish
intelligence and operational support for drug detection
monitoring and provide equipment to partnering counterdrug
forces.
Domestically, the Department continues to work through the
U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard with the
Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies to
coordinate counternarcotics efforts in the United States. The
National Guard is an exceptional partner to law enforcement in
domestic counternarcotics missions, requiring militarily-unique
skills, including air-ground recognizance, intelligence
analysis, and training for law enforcement agencies. The
Department is maintaining our National Guard support to law
enforcement along the southwest border and adding linguist
translation centers in California and Washington to capitalize
on the language skills of our guardsmen in those areas.
In terms of the Department's demand reduction efforts, it
is our continuing view that illegal drug use is incompatible
with a service member's sensitive and dangerous duties. The
Department's demand reduction policy sets minimum testing rates
at 100 percent, meaning each service member is tested at an
average of once per year. Increased drug testing began in
fiscal year 2005, with a goal of reaching 100 percent testing
for all military and civilian personnel by fiscal year 2006.
This cost-effective drug testing, along with punitive
consequences for service members who are identified as drug
users will continue to deter drug use amongst military
personnel and help ensure the readiness of our armed forces.
I would like to thank you, Chairman Souder, Representative
Cummings and members of the committee, for the tremendous
support you have provided to the Department. I look forward to
answering your questions. And as an aside, I would just like to
add my personal thanks and best wishes to John Stanton, who
will be joining the Special Operations community. We salute his
past service and wish him well as he goes in harm's way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Admiral Kunkel.
Admiral Kunkel. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings,
and distinguished members of the committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Joint
Interagency Task Force West's counterdrug initiatives and the
role we play in helping the U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM,
achieve enhanced security in the Asia-Pacific region.
Joint Interagency Task Force West stood up in 1989 as a
subordinate command to USPACOM serving as its executive agent
in counterdrug programs. The command has a distinguished record
of providing DOD unique resources to Federal law enforcement
agencies in support of their efforts to detect and monitor drug
shipments and providing actionable intelligence, enabling U.S.
law enforcement to interdict those shipments. Specifically, the
command has directly contributed to the seizure or disruption
of over 240 metric tons of cocaine with an estimated value of
$5 billion. During fiscal year 2003, a ASPIC/USSOUTHCOM
agreement realigned responsibilities allowing JIATF West to
relinquish its counterdrug efforts in the eastern Pacific to
JIATF South in order to focus our resources entirely toward
Asia.
JIATF West provides support to various U.S. Country Teams
in embassies throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This support
includes unique analytical capability, as well as training and
facility improvements which enhance the professionalism and
capabilities of partner nation police and military units with a
counterdrug mission. Our goal is to facilitate effective
interagency cooperation and multilateral application of effort
to reduce and contain drug trafficking.
To further integrate JIATF West programs with other USPACOM
components, Admiral Fargo directed the relocation of JIATF West
to USPACOM headquarters during fiscal year 2004. This
relocation is ongoing and the JIATF West command staff will be
in place in June. We expect JIATF West to achieve full
operational capability in Hawaii by December of this year.
Let me conclude these remarks by saying we anticipate the
activities of JIATF West will expand significantly over the
next 5 years in conjunction with USPACOM's Theater Security
Cooperation Plan and Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and
these activities will complement Department of State programs
in the region.
Thank you for your support and the opportunity to testify
before your committee.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Kunkel follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
General Mixon, Southern Command.
General Mixon. Yes, sir. Thank you. If I may make an off-
the-cuff comment in reference to the effect of drugs on the
United States per your comment. We at U.S. Southern Command
view drugs and its movement into the United States as a weapon
of mass destruction, and we treat it accordingly. And I think
my comments will focus on that particular aspect.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cummings, distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for allowing me a few minutes to
make some opening comments.
We at U.S. Southern Command are fully committed to meeting
DOD's responsibilities in the fight against drugs and
narcoterrorists. We fulfill these responsibilities through
detection and monitoring programs, close interagency
coordination, and military support to partner nations. Our
programs cover the entire SOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
including Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin.
Our principal agent in the planning and execution of the
detection and monitoring effort leading to the end game, that
being interdiction and apprehension, is the National Joint
Interagency Task Force South, or JIATF South. JIATF South is a
one-of-a-kind premier organization of excellence for
multiservice, multination, and multiagency support to the
counterdrug mission. Their operations in conjunction with
USSOUTHCOM deliver an integrated approach to meeting DOD
mission sets in the war against drugs and narcoterrorists.
Colombia is the source zone of 90 percent of the cocaine
and 70 percent of their heroin here in the United States, and
much of our efforts are necessarily centered there. Still, we
recognize the importance of the transient zones of Central
America, the Pacific and the Caribbean, as well as the source
zones in Bolivia and Peru as our other focus areas. Our efforts
in Central America include daily interdiction efforts, where we
have conducted 18 major surge counterdrug operations last year.
We remain strong partners with our Caribbean friends. We
have also deployed counterdrug training teams to Ecuador,
Bolivia and Peru as the primary source countries assisting
Colombia in their fight continues to be in the United States'
best interest and a top priority for U.S. Southern Command. In
close coordination with the U.S. Department of State, we
continue to provide a full range of support to the Colombian
Government, its security forces and its people. This includes
training and equipping of both the military and police,
assisting the Ministry of Defense with development of a modern
budget and logistic organizations, assisting them in their
narcoterrorist demobilization programs, and providing
humanitarian assistance to populations most dramatically
affected by this narcoterrorist war.
Two of our most successful training and equipment programs
remain the extensive support we have provided the Colombian
Army's Counternarcotics Brigade and the Infrastructure Security
Strategy Program, which has dramatically reduced the number of
narcoterrorist attacks on Colombia's northern oil
infrastructure. I would like to emphasize that all of our
training and advising programs operate under strict rules of
engagement that prohibits U.S. military personnel from actually
participating in combat operations. In other words, they
operate from a secure base.
The continuation of expanded authorities is the single most
important factor for us to continue building success in
Colombia. This legislation has allowed us to use funds that
were once only available for strictly defined counterdrug
activities to provide assistance to the government of Colombia
for a coordinated campaign against the narcoterrorist and its
legal eagle armed groups who fuel the drug trade. The granting
of expanded authority was an important recognition that no
meaningful distinction can be made between the terrorists and
drug traffickers in our region. All three of Colombia's
terrorist groups are deep into the illicit narcotics business.
Measures of effectiveness are very difficult to gage in the
counterterrorist mission, but over the last several years we
have seen some encouraging results. As you know, we recently
restarted the Air-Bridge Denial Program in Colombia. Since the
program restarted, there have been 14 aircrafts forced down, 11
of those destroyed on the ground, and 7.9 metric tons of drugs
seized.
In Colombia, the primary source zone country, our support
to the Colombian security forces has also resulted in good
results. Using calendar year 2002 and 2003 data, which roughly
corresponds to the inception of expanded authorities, the
Colombian security forces have experienced dramatic successes
in all fronts. A few examples: In 2003, the homicide rate has
been the lowest since 1987, approximately 52 per 100,000
capita; the capture of over a dozen mid-level members and one
senior level member of the FARC leadership; restoration of the
Government of Colombia's presence in all of Colombia's 1,098
municipalities; and a 48 percent reduction in the terrorist
attacks on Colombia's infrastructure. Most important, the
people of Colombia feel free to move about their country under
this new level of security.
As these indicators demonstrate, we have been increasingly
successful; however, we have been able to achieve these results
with a decrease in both surface and air interdiction and
detection assets due to the demands in prosecuting the global
war on terror worldwide. We have continued to be increasingly
successful due to a better information sharing, better
information flow, and improved granularity of information
coming from United States, European, Latin American law
enforcement agencies. Also, our European allies have provided
air and maritime assets to offset some of our shortfalls.
In conclusion, we continue to press forward successfully in
our fight against narcoterrorists in the drug trade. We are
encouraged by Colombia's success and recognize that they are at
a critical point in their history, which is central to our
counternarcotics fight. Under the leadership of President
Uribe, who enjoys a very high approval rating, approximately 75
to 80 percent of the population, the military and police have
regained areas long held by the narcoterrorists. They have also
dealt serious blows to the leadership of these groups and have
embarked on a strategic offensive to dismantle the FARC. Our
commitment to support them at this juncture is critical. We
will also continue our efforts in the rest of SOUTHCOM's AOR,
understanding that despite our focus on Colombia, our other
missions in the transient and remaining source companies will
be key to success.
I appreciate this opportunity to highlight the great
counternarcotics work done by the men and women at U.S.
Southern Command and all they are doing in the interest of
regional and United States and national security. I look
forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Mixon follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I want to thank each of you, and directly
through you, to thank the men and women in our armed forces who
are assisting us in these efforts. We very much appreciate the
successes we have seen in Colombia. In fact, Colombia, in many
ways, is a model for what we would hope would happen in Iraq;
that as we move in the development of a stable nation and a
democracy there, that our forces would, if anything, be
supplemental, supporting local police and military forces that
we supply our allies, rather than having to fight the battles
for freedom. And in Colombia, unlike what we saw in Vietnam in
many cases, or in Iraq right now, they are actually on the
front lines fighting and dying because of our narcotics use,
and it is our brave men and women providing the assistance and
technical training to do that, and it is a model really of how
it should work, and it is why we are at least seemingly turning
the corner in Colombia.
General Mixon. Sir, if I can make a comment on that. In my
visits down there, and I average about once a month going to
Colombia to work with their military, it is clear to me that
their military and their civilian administration does not want
the United States to pursue this fight. They appreciate the
assistance, they need the assistance and the expertise that we
bring to the battlefield, but they understand this is their
fight to win, and they want to be the ones that win the fight,
and not have U.S. forces doing the fighting for them.
Mr. Souder. I am going to ask unanimous consent to insert
into the record an unclassified statement from Major General
John Sattler, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of Operations U.S.
Central Command. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The prepared statement of General Sattler follows:]
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Mr. Souder. We are disappointed that CENTCOM couldn't be
here today, and I want to start this part of the questioning
with some questions to Mr. O'Connell regarding Afghanistan.
We recently held a hearing where we called in the
Department of State because our understanding was that we are
on the verge of the largest production of heroin that has ever
come out of Afghanistan. If this occurs on our watch, and we
understand that Britain has the primary responsibility for
eradication, it would be a shame. One of the things that came
forth at that hearing was a memo and guidelines. But first I
want to know, from the best you can say, how many labs and
warehouses with heroin have been destroyed in Afghanistan, and
where and when have we been aggressively pursuing that?
The eradication is under Britain, and that is what we
covered in our last hearing. Much of this gets stockpiled and
is in different places, and we at times know where it is, and
the question is what are we doing about it.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Chairman Souder, for your
question. It is not an easy one to answer with any great
accuracy, but I can tell you that we have recently queried U.S.
Central Command, and I do regret also that Central Command
could not be represented. General Sattler could not be released
from theater, and his deputy has a seriously ill father, but
they had every intention to appear and have in fact appeared
before.
I have met with General Sattler and, in fact, received
responses last night specifically to a listing of which labs
have been hit, on what date, and what amounts have been
confiscated to date. They go back into the early March
timeframe, so that is all the information I have insight into.
I will tell you that some of these lab attacks have been
extremely successful. The problem I have is that they have
classified their list of successes, and I would be happy to
provide that to the committee in either a closed session or
through the appropriate security procedures.
But we do have a procedure that has now been placed in
CENTCOM that has specific requirements for CENTCOM forces that
requires them to do certain things during discovery of drugs
during normal operations. As you know, we are not involved in
the eradication. They have a policy now where the DEA will be
notified, certain intelligence fusion centers will be alerted,
drug caches over 10 kilograms will kick into action several
activities by the intelligence fusion center there, the DEA and
UK forces, and they are encouraged and have specific procedures
to follow when encountering drugs and drug labs.
And I think I need to leave it there, again due to the
classification of the response from CENTCOM, but I would be
happy to provide that to you, sir.
Mr. Souder. I appreciate that. And we will look for such a
closed session. Let me ask a brief question, because I want to
do two followup questions with this.
Do we classify in Colombia where we have blown up
storehouses or warehouses, or is that information that is
available in a public forum?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, there are certain portions of that
information that we do in fact classify, simply to protect
where those locations were and where future operations might be
conducted. We do have unclassified versions of those briefings
that we do present to folks that come through U.S. Southern
Command that have an interest in drug interdiction, but to
answer your question, we generally do classify those, at least
initially.
Mr. Souder. Even if the operation is complete?
Mr. O'Connell. To my knowledge, that is correct.
Mr. Souder. Because there is not one of us that doesn't
understand the continuing operations problem. I have reserve
forces front deployed in Afghanistan from my home district, a
whole unit. I have just had more come back, people from my own
church, who were based there and are commanders, and I have no
desire to put anybody at risk. And I understand it is
politically difficult, but this is a different type of battle
than Colombia. At the same time, it is very hard for us to do
oversight and to make arguments. We can see information, but
some of this information would seem to be public. Yes, it is
politically sensitive when you attack these different labs or
destroy different areas, but so is it in Colombia politically
sensitive, because when we go in and remove a lab area or move
in, it creates farmers who are displaced, it creases people who
are displaced, and causes political problems for governments
that are supportive. And this is a fine balance and we are
trying to respect that balance. At the same time, we are
concerned and will look at the classified as to what our
policies exactly are here, and if in the classified briefing we
are not feeling that there is an aggressiveness with it, we
will back in a public forum to try to figure out how to balance
the continuing operations in what is perceived right now, at
least in the pass, a lack of aggressiveness on these issues.
Now, first off, we are very pleased to hear that there have
been some, and that is why I say we will do this in a
classified setting. But in your testimony, Mr. O'Connell, you
stated that terrorist groups such as the Taliban and other
extremist groups in Afghanistan support their operations with
drug money. By operations, do you mean buying weapons to kill
American soldiers? And how else would they be financed other
than narcotics? It is not by bake sales. In other words, part
of our argument is, look, obviously this heroin is part of the
war. And you seem to agree with that in your statement.
Mr. O'Connell. I do, Chairman Souder. The one thing I would
like to indicate in terms of the Central Command data, you are
exactly right, if a lab was destroyed, if drugs were seized,
there is no reason that should be classified. The problem with
this information is that in some cases the source or the tip
for the actual operation is in fact included in the entire
paragraph or the results. We could certainly extract that out,
and we will go ahead and do that. As I mentioned, this
information was received last night. It is classified in a way
that we are not used to in that some paragraphs are classified
appropriately, others seem to stamp the whole page, and we will
get to the bottom of that and provide you with the data.
Additionally, it will not be difficult to incorporate. In
fact, CENTCOM has already incorporated a reporting requirement
that will give you the type of data that General Mixon is able
to in SOUTHCOM. So bear with us. I understand the requirement,
and we will move toward that.
Mr. Souder. And this is tough stuff, and nobody on this
committee wants to endanger any sources, or put any of our
troops at risk. What we want to make sure, and this is very
difficult for the Department of Homeland Security and the
military right now, is whether you have multiple missions, and
as Ranking Member Cummings has said repeatedly, too, there is
narcoterrorism and there are other forms of terrorism, and we
have all these priorities as we have said in the statement, and
we can't put so much of our focus on one that we neglect the
other.
Now, you were about to answer my question. When you say
operations, you mean they are buying weapons. If they are
supporting their continuing operations, they are buying their
weapons and supporting their troops. Is that not true? And is
it not integrated with the military battle?
Mr. O'Connell. It is true, sir, and it is just a fact of
life in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as people have said before,
was made by God for growing poppies. If you take any number of
figures with respect to the economic statistics in Afghanistan,
there are guesses or estimates anyplace between $4 and $14
billion for the total GNP of the country. There are estimates
concurrent with that that go to almost 60 percent of the actual
cash that is flowing through the economy, legal or illegal,
comes from poppy cultivation.
So with that nexus and the Taliban certainly previously
involved and certainly current involved, to some estimate, yes,
you cannot escape the statement that you just made, that
Taliban, al Qaeda and others derive some support from the
narcotics trade. To the extent, as you and I have discussed,
some of the intelligence estimates are just not as accurate as
we would like them to be, but certainly I would concur with
your statement.
Mr. Souder. And if they would have their largest in record
that would come out, because our problem in Afghanistan is not
that dissimilar to Iraq; it hasn't exploded, but it is starting
to.
Let me say for the record, too, yes, it is true some of
this information is coming through last night, but this hearing
has been scheduled for months, and we delayed it at one point
at the request of the Department of Defense and the military to
try to accommodate the questions. Then we sent these questions
in advance several weeks ago, only to be told yesterday that
the responses were going to be classified. I understand that we
don't want to have information get out to compromised sources,
but it is not like we suddenly dropped this hearing in the last
48 hours on the Department of Defense.
It is also true that there are other things going on in
that region, and we understand and appreciate that, but this is
a primary narcotics subcommittee, and we are trying to make
sure that this doesn't get lost. Having been on the ground in
Afghanistan, I know that, for a fact, there was not as much
focus as in my opinion there should have been on the heroin
interconnection. Now we see in different parts where some of
the warlords who are not necessarily the Taliban, but who have
historically helped us to some degree, much like what we see in
Iraq, where different subgroups are trying now to clink. They
don't want democracy; they want to overthrow democracy.
And in talking to President Karzi, one of his concerns and
the reason he is now seeing this interconnection is initially
we didn't want to be particularly disruptive of some of these
zones where the poppy was growing because we thought, well,
maybe these people will go along. Now we are finding out they
won't disarm. They shot the interior minister and one of the
cabinet ministers in Afghanistan. Where are they getting their
weapons from? Some of these people aren't classified as
Taliban, and by having a very tight definition here that says,
well, how much is Taliban funded, it is also the thugs who
don't want democracy there, and they are almost completely
funded with the heroin.
And while America is watching over in Iraq, we have a
similar problem developing in the outer zones outside of Kabul
in Afghanistan, that as they try to figure out how are we going
to have a census, how are we going to get a count for people to
vote, that if you can't get some semblance of order there and
get these groups disarmed who are buying their stuff with
heroin, we have to figure out how to get control of their
sources of money, as the President has said, not just that. And
I appreciate that the military is moving forward, but there is
really no difference, in our opinion, between a stash of
weapons and a stash of heroin, because they don't have the
stash of weapons if they don't have the heroin.
Mr. O'Connell. Chairman Souder, you are exactly right, and
I take full responsibility for I guess the nonresponse on the
CENTCOM questions. I will say that I could have come forward
with the CENTCOM information I had 2 weeks ago when I testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the same
question; however, this data is heartening to me because it is
the first time that we have seen this degree of granularity
into what is going on with respect to CENTCOM. And I think they
are getting the message. We are doing this together, and soon
they will be as good as Southern Command, I hope.
Mr. Souder. One last thing. And I apologize that some of
this information hasn't been shared with the committee, but
some of this we have been getting even late last evening. We
got this last night, this new counternarcotics directive. We
will insert this into the record. I may have an additional
question, but I would now like to yield to the distinguished
ranking member. This is the unclassified version of the
guidelines for the Department of Defense and CENTCOM on
narcotics.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. And the classified version is much
more specific and I think you would find moves us in the right
direction.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you all for being here. And, Admiral
Kunkel, I just want to, first of all, thank you for
acknowledging that these drugs, when they hit neighborhoods
like mine, are indeed weapons of mass destruction. You couldn't
have said anything more brilliant. In Baltimore, where I live,
we have 300 murders a year, and I would guess that 90 percent
of them have something to do with drugs. These are young black
men, for the most part, usually under 20, dead. We have 50
percent of our young men dropping out of school between the 9th
and 12th grades. They then, many of them, go to selling drugs.
I visit our shock trauma unit at the University of
Maryland, which is located at downtown Baltimore, one of the
best in the world, and there are literally 1,000 to 2,000 young
people shot but lives spared only because they have shock
trauma, and 95 percent of those had something to do with drugs.
I see neighborhoods where property values plummet, where people
can buy a house for $75,000 10 years ago, put $75,000 in it in
renovations, and can't sell it for $50,000 5 years later
because of drugs. And that doesn't even begin to deal with the
families that are destroyed, the court costs, the cost for
trying to repair lives. It just goes on and on and on. So I
really do appreciate your saying that.
I am just wondering, Admiral, what is the greatest
challenge to the Joint Interagency Task Force West? What is
your biggest challenge?
Admiral Kunkel. Our biggest challenge at JIATF West?
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Admiral Kunkel. Well, right now our challenge is our move,
moving and focusing entirely in the Western Pacific and, of
course, getting involved, totally engrossed in the initiatives
out in the Western Pacific, Regional Maritime Security
Initiative, and working with the Department of State on IAI,
Illicit Activities Initiative, putting that together and then
targeting the countries, specifically Cambodia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, all of which have groups of
terrorists involved with a drug connection.
Mr. Cummings. General Mixon, I am sorry, I was directing my
prior comments to you. I took my glasses off; I guess I need to
put them back on. But my comments were to you. And again I
thank you, General. General, have the expanded authorities
granted to the U.S. forces in Colombia enhanced our
effectiveness in fighting the drug trade in Colombia?
General Mixon. Yes, sir, absolutely. And I take your
initial comments to heart. The effects of drugs in this country
poses a significant challenge, and I view it myself as a loss
of treasure. These are young people that have potential, and we
in the military have capabilities that can interdict and at
least stop some of the drug flow coming into this Nation. So we
view it at U.S. Southern Command as an appropriate and
important Department of Defense mission that we pursue
aggressively.
To answer your question specifically, those expanded
authorities pertain exactly to the comments that both you and
the chairman made. There is a tight nexus between drugs, money,
terrorists, and all that activity. So with the expanded
authorities, it allowed us to go after those groups, the AUC,
the ELN, and the FARC in Colombia specifically, by assisting
the Colombian military to take the fight to them to take away
their resources, that first being the ability to produce, move,
and make money off of cocaine; but at the same time take away
and destroy those forces that are protecting those individuals
that are growing the coca. And we don't do this alone, we do it
in conjunction with the Department of State, which has
oversight over the eradication program in Colombia, and we have
seen significant success in the eradication effort. So expanded
authorities have in fact enabled us to be more effective
against the narcoterrorists.
Mr. Cummings. With regard to cooperation from the Colombian
Government, how is that coming?
General Mixon. My view is that the cooperation is very
good. They cooperate closely with Department of State in their
efforts. The counternarcotics brigades provide security and
military operations in the vicinity of the spray operations. In
addition to that, they are also intimately involved with their
police in doing independent operations against the
narcoterrorists and their drug production capabilities. Also,
the Colombian Navy has been very, very active along the coast
of Colombia in the transient zone, either with operations done
with U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy or unilateral operations in
pursuing the drug traffic. They fully recognize that they have
to take the FARC's and the other enemy forces' ability to fund
themselves away in order to win this war against democracy in
Colombia.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that has always concerned
this subcommittee is the whole idea that drugs produce so much
money. And we have seen it in Mexico and other places, where,
because of that money, a lot of times the local law enforcement
folk get involved in situations where they are being paid off
by some of these major drug producers and, as a result, make it
very difficult at times for our forces to be effective, and in
many instances put their lives in danger because of information
flowing to the wrong people.
Have you seen any of that or much of that, or do you think
that is something that does not happen too often now?
General Mixon. There is no question that there are huge
sums of money involved in this illicit business, and that
certain individuals within the various enforcement agencies of
these other countries could in fact be paid off, and I am sure
have been paid off. I would be foolish not to believe that. But
in my discussions with the DEA in Colombia specifically, they
are very careful in how they plan and conduct the operations in
conjunction with the police and who gets information. In other
words, they protect the information. As a result of that, they
have had better success over the last year to 18 months in the
destruction of labs and the interdiction of these drugs.
The narcoterrorists in this region are well financed and
well funded. They have the latest in equipment, global
positioning systems, satellite telephones, go-fast boats that
can just about outrun any other boat on the commercial market,
and when these boats make their way across the Pacific and the
Caribbean, if they simply make it to the in-state, they simply
destroy the boat and move the cocaine over. An organization
that can do that has a lot of money, so they can buy influence
and protection.
But I think we are making progress in Colombia. We need to
make better progress in Central America, and one way we can do
that is by building those institutions of democracy within
those nations to include the police force.
Mr. Cummings. How is that coming, your last statement? Do
you see strong police force, strong enforcement agencies?
General Mixon. I do within Colombia for sure. I do not have
as good a feel for the other nations of the specifics, but I
believe they are making progress. And certainly it is the focus
of every one of our agencies at work within those countries.
Working with the police forces and so forth is sort of on the
edge of what we do in the U.S. military, but my indications are
that they are improving. A long way to go, though, for sure.
Mr. Cummings. Do you find a similar situation, Admiral?
Admiral Kunkel. Yes, sir. In fact, we have been working
with the Thais for at least the last 5 years. At a very low
level corruption is pervasive. And not only in Thailand,
especially in the Philippines. Our activities in the
Philippines, I would say of the lower levels we have to be very
careful how we approach the law enforcement agencies. However,
I would say this, and I seem to spend more and more time in the
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia than I care to, but the
higher levels, with the authorities they have, I am talking
about the law enforcement, and especially the Philippine DEA,
recently established, the people that I have met are very
committed and dedicated to eradicating the drug problem,
because they certainly see connection to the Abu Sayyaf, the
terrorist organizations in their country, which affects their
national security, which in turn concerns the United States, of
course. So they are committed to working with us and receiving
our training to fight the narcoterrorists.
Our efforts, I believe, are paying benefits. We are hoping
to establish Coast Guard-like authorities in these nations.
Their ability to counter the threat, especially from the sea,
is very limited. They have no common operating picture. They
look to us for advice and training, and we are looking to
assist them as necessary.
I only mentioned two countries there, the Philippines and
Thailand, but we are doing the same efforts in Cambodia and
Indonesia, especially. However, those are long, long journeys,
and it will take time. And we are just now beginning to get
into the Philippines, which I see, and according to Admiral
Fargo, anyway, we are looking for a 20-year plan. This is not
an easy road.
Mr. Cummings. I just have one more question, but, Mr.
Chairman, I am just curious. I heard your comments to the
Assistant Secretary. Do you plan to bring the Assistant
Secretary back at some other time?
Mr. Souder. What our intention is, is to work with some
sort of a classified briefing to see what kind of information
we get on the classified briefing. And then if that is
sufficient, we won't have another hearing; but if need be,
CENTCOM and the Assistant Secretary would come in for another
hearing.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Well, then I have just have one
other question of the two military gentlemen.
We in the Congress are always trying to figure out how we
make sure that the taxpayers' dollars are spent effectively and
efficiently, and that is one thing I think we all agree on. And
at the same time, we try to figure out is there something that
you need from us that would help you to be more effective and
efficient in what you do. Do you feel like you are getting the
support you need and the authority you need to accomplish what
you are trying to accomplish? General?
General Mixon. Yes, sir. There is, of course, nobody in the
military or other places who would not like to have more
resources. But having said that, we live in a real world and we
have a global threat that we are dealing with. So I believe
that the amount of funding that we have been provided, for U.S.
Southern Command, for the mission is appropriate, and we are
making good use of the taxpayers' money.
We are working closely with DOD as they reposition assets
that have been involved in the global war on terrorism in other
regions, to provide those assets to us so that we can prosecute
the end game more effectively against the narcoterrorists as
they move drugs up both the Caribbean and the Pacific. That is
an asset that DOD will work out with us.
But we appreciate the money that has been provided to us,
and we believe it is adequate. Most importantly, the expanded
authorities that Congress has granted have been key in the
successes that have been achieved. Those expanded authorities,
along with the authority, when approved, to increase the cap to
an additional 400, will put us in good shape, I think, to
continue to pursue the war on drugs in Colombia.
And I emphasized the word authority as it pertains to the
cap. We certainly do not foresee immediately advancing the
numbers of U.S. military in Colombia to the requested authority
of 800. We went forward with a number of 400 so that in the
eventuality we foresee additional support to the Colombians
under the existing ROE, that we would have that flexibility and
would not have to continue to come back to the Congress
incrementally and ask for numbers.
In the best of circumstances, if we were to supply the
maximum amount of support to the Colombians, that expanded
authority number would only go to 723, anyway. At the present
time we are slightly below 300 U.S. military in the country.
Expanded authority, the additional cap, adequate money, all of
those things, we believe we have the resources available to do
our mission.
Mr. Cummings. Admiral.
Admiral Kunkel. Thank you. That was a question I was not
really anticipating, but in our focus coming out to the Western
Pacific, we found that Admiral Fargo has looked to JIATF West
because of what we bring to the fight; it is a joint work all
services, interagency, of course, the law enforcement, and we
are trying to put in place a model like that into these
countries. So as we go into the countries, working with their
law enforcement agencies, doing some mill-to-mill, but mainly
law enforcement agency work, that we find that our business is
expanding. And that would be in the future that we may be
requesting further fiscal authorities.
But when I talk about fiscal authorities, what I am really
talking about here is you use counternarcoterrorism. As the
money comes from Congress down to eventually JIATF West, we are
looking for detection and monitoring of counterdrug flow, and
how do you use that money to do your mission. And when you are
looking to build intelligence fusion centers, for instance, in
the Philippines and Indonesia, Thailand, you know, we are doing
brick and mortar work. Some of our drug money is using brick
and mortar work applied toward that. And when you talk about
the payback to the United States, that measure of effectiveness
is not as easy to put on the table as we did in the Eastern
Pacific with cocaine flow.
But our measure is just as important in fighting the global
war. If we can combine those countries' intelligence centers,
have them work together in these countries, and create a common
operating picture so that we know where these drug boats are
going and we have the ability to stop them, the partner nation
or the United States can stop them and keep the drugs
eventually from coming to the United States, that is what we
are about. So we need to, I guess, clarify those lines of
authority.
Congress, of course, gives us the money and we look at it--
I should say some of us in Pacific Command look at it you can
only spend it on drugs. Well, it is more than drugs. It is
about counternarcoterrorism. It is not just drugs. And
sometimes we look down that soda straw saying it is only drugs.
Well, it is not. It is money laundering, as the general said.
It is a weapons trafficking. Certainly it is drugs, and it
feeds them all. We need those expanded authorities. That would
say to JIATF West that would be the key.
I wouldn't want to come back here and have to testify and
say I spend my money on brick and mortar, and someone tell me
what about drugs, and then try to explain that nexus, because
it is certainly there.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you all very much.
Mr. Souder. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
calling this hearing.
Gentlemen, the stakes have been raised tremendously in your
work. The stakes were already very high with the work you were
doing, simply to keep narcotics from flowing into this country
and flowing worldwide. Now with a focus on narcoterrorism, the
stakes are higher than anyone could have anticipated just a few
years ago. Now, we have terrorists who can get us both ways:
they can get funds for their own operations and they can import
poison into our country to debilitate mostly young people. You
have really got us at both ends now; you are financing your own
operations and you are debilitating the population through
drugs. That must be a lovely set of conditions for them.
Mr. Cummings spoke about the effects in his own community.
The effects are nationwide. Kids in suburban affluent
communities look like they are as much in love with drugs as
desperate kids who are into drugs for money, and in the inner
cities of the United States there is no economy. The
grandfathers and the fathers of these young men that Mr.
Cummings spoke about had manufacturing jobs. Well, particularly
their cities are without jobs. Men without jobs will create
their own economy, and the economy in many of our inner cities
is a drug economy, a gun economy, and they are killing the
inner cities of the United States. They have murdered the
African-American family. The mandatory minimums that come out
of the drug wars are largely responsible for the fact that 70
percent of Black children are born to never-married women, and
men without jobs, of course, do not raise families, they do not
father children that they own. It is an absolute catastrophe in
the inner cities of the African-American communities.
It is difficult to know how much the Taliban and other
terrorist forces are funded through the narcotics trade, I
understand that. But we in this country, with our own efforts
since September 11, and I want to commend the administration
for the efforts it has taken to close off the usual bank and
other monetary transfers. For example, in this city Riggs Bank,
a very distinguished bank, now is on the carpet because of its
relationship with Saudi Arabia, which of course it has had for
decades. But finally there is a crackdown on just letting the
Saudis do with money whatever they want to do, because we don't
know where in the world that money gets.
But as we close off the usual funnels for money, does this
not make drugs perhaps the most commodity available for
terrorists today, given the high demand for drugs, particularly
in advanced societies? If you want to get money for terrorism,
I am asking, isn't the best target the drug trade?
Mr. O'Connell. Ms. Norton, was that question directed at
me?
Ms. Norton. I think all of you are qualified to answer the
question.
Mr. O'Connell. OK. Let me commend you on your statement. I
don't know if you were here to listen to the opening statements
of both the chairman and Representative Cummings, but yours was
equally as excellent and as prescient about how critical this
problem is to our Nation.
You can talk about the tragedy that is taking place in the
inner city and even in suburban locations. I had occasion,
prior to taking this job, to do work in North Dakota and
noticed the tremendous problems they are having there with
crystal meth, a whole new difficulty that the country has not
faced before. But there are faces and real people on the other
end of this war, the brave men and women, as an example, in
U.S. Southern Command, that are in the jungles in Colombia that
have gone to extraordinary lengths to train the Colombian
forces so that they can be effective against the traffickers
and against the terrorists; the young Coast Guardsmen who are
out in extremely dangerous conditions, my son included, to try
to do the best they can and interdict this flow that comes to
our shores. It is nearly an impossible task, and very
frustrating.
And for me as a public servant, to listen to you, and I
understand, having lived in this area for a long time, the
misery that the District and Baltimore and other places go
through. It is a tremendous scourge on our society. I don't
know the answer, I am not a social scientist, but my heart goes
out to you. I feel proud that the Department, I think, is
turning the corner and will make a much more concerted effort
to look at how we can actually play as full team members, use
our resources wisely, and get at this effort.
Ms. Norton. I am on the Homeland Security Committee as
well, and I appreciate very much the needle in the haystack
problem that we have given to all of those who are involved in
your work and your efforts, but what I am trying to get at is
focus. The focus was, I think, legitimately on closing off the
usual funnels of money. And I think we have begun to do that,
and that is why I pointed to Riggs Bank. And I am wondering now
whether the focus, if we are interested in funding alone. Let
us just look at the question of funding of terrorism, shouldn't
it be on narcotics.
Mr. O'Connell. I think you are exactly right, ma'am, a
large portion of it should be. Is our intelligence into those
transactions as good as it should be? Probably not. On the
Islamic side, I am sure you are aware of the HAWALAs, the
secret transfer that takes place in certain parts of Islamic
society, which makes it extremely difficult to track these
essentially credit schemes that are done with a wink and a nod
and really done by tradition. We are making some progress
there.
As you know, there are assets of the Department of Defense
that have been directed to work this particular issue.
Certainly NSA has been extremely successful. We have had good
success working with the CIA's crime and narcotics centers. We
work closely with DEA. So as we move forward, are certainly
recognize, in fact the Secretary of Defense has specifically
asked me to look at those things that we are currently doing,
what can we do more effectively on that side; and we have given
him answers back. We are participating. We have to be careful
about the legal restrictions imposed on the Department of
Defense. But you are exactly right, and I am pleased at the
direction we are moving; I think it is the direction you are
urging us to move, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I think we are going to be more and more
dependent on the work you do. I don't see why terrorists should
bother with anything but narcotics these days, given the
demand.
I have one more question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
I was very impressed when I was briefed by SOUTHCOM. I was
on a congressional delegation to Guantanamo. We stopped in
Miami and we were briefed by SOUTHCOM, and I was just
astonished at the progress that has been made in Colombia. I
remember how controversial Colombia was, and all kinds of
concerns about what the military was doing in Colombia. And if
ever there was a story of success, it seemed to come out of
SOUTHCOM; the expanded authority, to be sure, the coordinated
campaign. What was most impressive is somehow how the military
is working with, and here is where leadership becomes
important, with the leadership in the country and with the new
institutions that apparently the country is building from the
ground up, the new democratic institutions. So that you see a
transformation in the country itself on the ground, which in
turn leads to the defeat of the narcotics culture.
This was so impressive. Whenever you see anything
impressive like that has come out of a lot of controversy and
yet proved itself as successful as our briefing indicated, one
cannot help but ask how much of this is transferrable, for
example, to Afghanistan, where you similarly have a country
that needs to be rebuilt from the ground up in all of its
democratic institutions. It took us some time to understand
that is where you had to be, you had to be with the political
institutions, you had to be with the local institutions on the
ground. And now that we are there, and not simply treating this
as a military matter, we are seeing, apparently, in Colombia,
something that can only be called a success.
Is this something we can expect perhaps to be transferred
in other parts of Latin America, but not to Afghanistan? Is
this capable of being replicated in Afghanistan, where we are
now having such trouble?
Mr. O'Connell. I would like to be able to tell you yes, we
can take that wonderful work done by U.S. Southern Command,
take those principles, and transfer them over there, but I am
afraid that is not the case, ma'am. There are many, many
differences, some you are certainly aware of that you learned
when you were down in Colombia. And I echo your comments about
the wonderful work done by Southern Command, by President
Uribe, the Colombian military.
But we face a different set of circumstances. Certainly, in
terrain, the type of drugs grown, the nature of the central
government, the nature of the surrounding countries and their
particular interests, the almost total dependence on narcotics
in terms of the economic flow in Afghanistan, some of the
religious aspects all tend to argue against being able to
transfer those things. But there are certain basic things, such
as the work by U.S. Special Forces, the reconstruction teams in
Afghanistan that have made a difference. I would like to say
yes, but I am afraid in most cases it is not.
The one common denominator is going to be our courage and
our skill, and I think our military is up to the task. In the
case of Afghanistan, we have a major ally that we are
supporting in the case of the UK, who are the lead for
counternarcotics in Afghanistan. We also work closely with the
Germans as they train the police, with the Italians as they
work on the court system, and other countries.
So certainly a different model, but we will do our best. It
is an excellent question, not easily understood as to why you
just can't take success in one country and transfer it to
another.
Ms. Norton. I appreciate the thoughtfulness of your answer.
The last thing we need, particularly as Americans, who perhaps
are accused of this as a kind of cookie cutter approach, you
know, what works here, let us take it to Iraq, let us take it
worldwide. We can't even take our version of democracy
worldwide. I would urge you all to look at what in fact is
genuinely transferable, though. I certainly believe the whole
notion of working with indigenous institutions and political
institutions is important. We do have in Afghanistan the kind
of leader that you have in Colombia, so at the top you are all
right, it is just all that is in between.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Thanks. And to reiterate that point, I think in
President Karzi and his cabinet, what we don't have is a 200
year democracy like we have in Colombia. What we have as
commonality, however, is their narcotics ability to undermine
that democracy. We don't have as much economic diversity as
Colombia has. But Afghanistan has had periods in time where
they haven't had narcotics dependency, and it is how to get
them weaned, and not let them get hooked on heroin again, so to
speak.
I have a series of questions that are very important for
this hearing to get into the record. I am not going to get
through all these. We will have some written followup questions
to build this, but let me approach a couple. I often say if you
are not ADD when you become a Congressman, you are one after
you are done. So even in this sphere I am going to be covering
a number of types of questions, but they are things that we
have been working on in this community and they are very
important to the narcotics efforts.
First let me sort through a little bit of the JIATF
changes. As I understand, JIATF West moving to Hawaii from
Alameda in northern California, that there has also been some
changes in transfer of how the zone of the eastern Pacific will
be handled. Could you explain that briefly?
Admiral Kunkel. Yes, sir. It is pretty complicated even to
explain, but----
Mr. Souder. The bottom line is the area around Mexico and
California are going to be still under JIATF West or will that
be----
Admiral Kunkel. No, sir. The bottom line is that in the
past it was basically the eastern Pacific was divided along the
92 longitude; anything east of 92 was JIATF South, anything to
the west of 92 was JIATF West. And it was an agreement between
USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM that that 92 line would basically
disappear, and at that point JIATF South would have the entire
vector coming from south to north into the United States ceded
to them. And then, of course, NORTHCOM plays as far as their
AOR and the unified command plan. So JIATF West is basically
now focused entirely to the west; JIATF South has all of the
cocaine flow coming from south.
Mr. Souder. So we won't have the problem of a boat coming
off Colombia and how the pass-off is going to come when they go
out and get something in the eastern Pacific, whether they land
in Mexico or California.
How will it work west to east? Now if heroin is coming
across, you have them in Hawaii. Where does the transshipment
point pass-off occur going from JIATF West to JIATF South?
Admiral Kunkel. It is now delineated basically 500 miles
offshore, to put it bluntly, 500 miles offshore. So my common
operating picture, once it is established, coming from
Southeast Asia, I am aware of a boat or whatever. If I cannot
have interdiction forces in place, detect and monitoring, if I
can't get the interdiction forces in place, of course, we pass
them off to JIATF South, and that should board JIATF North, if
there is one, NORTHCOM, and it should be seamless.
Mr. Souder. Now, my understanding is based on the success
of what we have seen with JIATF South and West, is that JIATF
North is looking at a similar system. Do you know where that
stands or what is happening with NORTHCOM?
Admiral Kunkel. It is not my lane of the road, so I don't
know.
Mr. Souder. Mr. O'Connell, do you know anything on that?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. We are working with Assistant
Secretary McHale, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense
in the Defense Department and General Eberhart as to exactly
how that will work. I think part of that equation, sir, is the
move of JIATF West, the integration of JTF Bravo and their
efforts. Any changes in the unified command plan will certainly
come into that, and that is currently under discussion. We will
certainly, to the extent that we are intimately involved with
JIATF South and JIATF West, will do everything we can to
facilitate General Eberhart's decision, and Secretary McHale
and Secretary Rumsfeld as to whether or not JIATF North is
stood up, where it is, and what specifically its
responsibilities are, because it will overlap with some of the
Homeland Defense responsibilities of U.S. Northern Command.
As you know, sir, the Defense Department is charged to use
its C4I networks to conduct our monitoring and detection, and,
again, that is out of my lane but in my area of familiarity,
and we will do everything we can do make sure that effort by
Northern Command and by the Department is as seamless as it can
possibly be.
Mr. Souder. Admiral Kunkel mentioned Indonesia,
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand in particular. If it comes
north, through Korea or Japan or Russia, and up over the top to
Alaska or toward Seattle, who will be watching? Is that what
NORTHCOM would stand up? Are you currently watching that zone
if it is transiting through the ocean or by air over the top of
the ocean?
Admiral Kunkel. Mr. Chairman, in fiscal year 2003 we were
directed by DASDE to establish a technical analysis team in
Japan, which JIATF West has stood up, along with the DIA, to
start focusing our collection efforts toward North Korea, and
working with the Japanese, especially the Japanese Coast Guard.
We are there now, we are starting those efforts, but I must say
we are really taking baby steps at this point. We are aware of
that vector going north, and to pass it off to law enforcement
agencies, especially the DEA in the United States, or Customs,
those two agencies in particular, and then eventually, of
course, to NORTHCOM. So JIATF West has it to the west, and as
it approaches we pass that off.
Mr. Souder. My philosophy, and pretty much the philosophy
of those who have been involved in the narcotics efforts for
some time, which includes Speaker Hastert and others who have
been focused on this, such as Congressman Kolbe Foreign
Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, get it where we can
eradicate, which is predominantly State Department backed up
with resources from SOUTHCOM and the training. If you can't get
it there, as it starts to move through, get it before it hits
our shores. You know, it gets wider and wider, and the
intelligence is absolutely critical in this process. Also, just
like in Homeland Security Committee, as we work, as you harden
one target, they move to a more vulnerable entry point, as I
mentioned about Detroit.
Also, it isn't necessarily true that it is always going to
be cocaine or heroin, or this HIBC stuff that is coming in. Now
we are seeing the crystal meth particularly in the rural areas,
but seeing the first signs of it hitting our urban areas, which
could become like a crack epidemic, just like that. We held a
hearing in Orlando, FL on OxyContin, and oxycodone, which
showed we actually have more deaths from overuse of
prescription drugs than we do from cocaine and heroin. We are
trying to concentrate on that because these big shipments
coming in from people who are overproducing it, it is going to
be just like variations of tracking cocaine and heroin, but a
different type of challenge.
Just like as if you are fighting war, it is clear that men
and women in the armed forces will crush anybody who stands up
to fight them right now, so the enemy is not fighting
regularly. Well, the drug guys are doing similar type of
things. Now, part of that, a critical part, is intelligence.
And I wanted to ask a couple questions about these TARS and the
aerostats. So if I could ask Mr. O'Connell first, because the
JIATFs don't work if we don't get the intelligence.
The Tethered Aerostat Radar System is an example of the
detection system now run by Department of Defense. The system
was originally authorized in 1986 Omnibus Drug Act and was
envisioned for 14 unit picket line on the southern approaches.
Unfortunately, it was only implemented to a maximum of 12 and
has now been withered down to 7, leaving key southern
approaches unprotected. In fact, the Defense Department
suggested it only benefits from a single balloon located in the
Florida Keys.
Why has TARS capability slipped to half of the
congressional authorization, and what has been done with the
appropriated funds for the other half?
Mr. O'Connell. Once again, I wish I can give you a snap,
precise answer, Mr. Chairman. As you cited, the program was
originally scheduled for, I believe, 14 sites. I think 12 were
eventually done; the systems were up and the maintenance and
connectivity were there. I believe it was determined that only
8 sites would cover the desired area. That included, I believe,
the site in Puerto Rico as well.
Right now there was a cut last year that Congress directed
I think of $6 million to the Tethered Aerostat Program. I will
be brutally honest and tell you that we are in the middle of I
don't want to say a spat in the Defense Department, but an
honest disagreement between U.S. Northern Command, who has one
sense of how the tethered aerostats ought to be used and my
department and the JIATF South into who should operate those,
maintain, and fund those, where do those funding lines go.
Should it better go to Department of Homeland Defense? I don't
know. I have my opinion, the Department perhaps has a different
opinion. But we hope to have a resolution shortly so that we
are not sending an internal Defense spat up to the Hill.
So that is about the best I can give you on that, sir.
Mr. Souder. Well, let me say that I appreciate the openness
and honesty on that answer, because that is not easy for a
person in your position to say that. But if it is about to come
here, we need to be prepared, and my guess is is that as we
improve a porous border on the southwest, which we have no
choice of doing if we are really going to have a Department of
Homeland Security. It is not that our men and women aren't
working hard there, but the fact is if a million illegal
immigrants can get through a year, probably some terrorists
can, too. As we try to improve that border and the holes in
that border in southwest Arizona, some of the other sections of
Texas and other places, it becomes apparent that it isn't going
to be able to be controlled just by land border system or a
high flying system, in that the low-flying planes and other
ways of getting in are critical.
Also, we have, in my opinion, without getting too specific,
from the land border, if you take the water border looping over
to Florida, some questions in there that are very difficult for
us to get answers to as far as what is coming in. And if we
don't have this aerostat system, we need other questions of
what is happening as we track the people, or have a tip coming
out of Colombia, or out of Mexico. We need to be able to see
them before it hits my hometown.
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I am going to impose on my colleague
the Admiral here in a moment, but there are lots of issues
here. We have other capabilities which are the relocatable over
the horizon radar, which look farther out. As you know, the
aerostats generally look out to approximately 250 miles. If
they are at 10,000 feet, they are looking down. So that is one
segment of the airspace you certainly want to cover. There are
other alternatives in the segment you just talked about. There
are always tradeoffs in terms of expense, reliability.
And I would ask the Admiral, since he is not only a skilled
aviator, but has worked these issues before, if he would have
any comment on that particular segment that you described
geographically.
Admiral Kunkel. Thank you, sir.
I will revert to my Coast Guard, put my Coast Guard hat on,
away from the JIATF director. When I flew out-bat missions
several years ago, we need that picture, to have that common
picture. If you have a radar picture out there, in order to get
the interdiction assets to the right spot, it is a needle in a
haystack. You know, we have Coast Guard ships and aircraft out
there now, and if you don't have an overhead either aircraft
platform or have an aerostat or something to give you that
picture, it is a needle in the haystack. And I have done that
too many times to where you go out on patrol and you find
nothing. I have also done it very effectively given the proper
resources like an aerostat or an overhead E3 or P3.
Mr. Souder. Continuing along this line, we had a big
discussion about what to do after we lost Panama, and then
compounded by moving out of Roosevelt Roads Air Station in
Puerto Rico. The F16 Coronet Nighthawk was supposed to be part
of the justification for moving into Curacao in the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba. Apparently it isn't anymore, and it is
unclear to us what is being done on Curacao in an
interdepartmental narcotics base, because many of the things
being based there aren't being used necessarily for
surveillance at this point.
Mr. O'Connell, General Mixon, whoever would like to comment
on this, I would like to hear what type of aircraft you have
there, what do you see replacing the Nighthawk; do we have
adequate resources right now, given the changes that are
occurring, and a little bit of that evolution.
General Mixon. I am not intimately familiar with the
Nighthawk capability other than to say that I have been told
that it was not as effective as they thought it would be, and
so it was not actually present when I assumed my
responsibilities last summer as the J3 U.S. Southern Command.
But having said that, we have other assets from all agencies,
DOD, BICE, and also foreign militaries that work out of those
what used to be called FOLs, now CSLs, Coordinated Security
Locations.
We fly approximately 400 sorties of all types out of those
three locations and about 1,500 on-station hours. Results from
flying from those locations, about 56 metric tons of cocaine
and about 3 metric tons of marijuana either seized or
disrupted. So those locations meant Curacao and Cumpala have
been key to the replacement of that capability out of Howard
Air Force Base in Panama.
From the standpoint of assets, I mentioned earlier that
what we are looking for now is a reinvigoration of the assets
from DOD, P3s, and we expect potentially AWACS to be available
this summer, after they have recouped from the global war on
terrorism, that will enhance our interdiction effort. Once we
put all of the assets together, both an aerial platform for
interdiction and a surface ship that has rotary wing aircraft
on it, and we tie those together, we call that MPA, our chances
of interdiction goes up to about 70 percent.
So the answer to your question specifically, good use out
of the CSLs, large numbers of sorties coming out of there, and
we believe even more effective use of those once DOD assets are
returned to the full drug end game effort.
Mr. Souder. So in banking on the return of those assets
from the war on terrorism, do we have additional assets coming
in to replace the diverted assets over on the war on terrorism,
or are you banking that things are calming down in Afghanistan
and Iraq?
General Mixon. I didn't mean to imply that things were
calming down in those two theaters of operation, because they
are out of my area, obviously, but we have seen the return of
the AWACS aircraft, they have been refitted over the last year
and we do expect the return of that asset this summer. The
other assets pertain, the P3 in particular, to the overall life
of the aircraft, and the Department of Defense has come up with
a plan for the use of those aircraft.
Fortunately, during the interim we have received excellent
support from BICE and also from other nations participating in
the interdiction effort, and we have been able to at least
sustain a good interdiction program, but we believe it will be
much better once we see these assets returned. And we also have
good commitment from both U.S. agencies involved in drug
interdiction and other governments that are involved in that to
sustain the effort in our area of responsibility.
Mr. Souder. Well, we will continue to follow this up as we
have the various meetings, as we visit SOUTHCOM and so on, but
I want to put on the record with this hearing, because it may
be a while until we get into that again, this committee
historically, under the past administration as well as this
administration, has expressed its concern about diversion of
assets. We understand that there are very critical problems
around the world that you have to deal with, but this comes
back to why it is so important to have Mr. O'Connell, in his
position, to be an advocate inside the Department of Defense to
say remember narcotics is part of the mission too. As Ms.
Norton said, we don't see this going down, and particularly in
the type of narcotics funding terrorism. This idea that we are
going to have traditional war fronts, rather than rogue nations
or terrorist groups that don't have national boundaries. It is
a different type of warfare. If we don't cutoff their funding
and their places that you can't do that if you don't get at the
narcotics.
We can't constantly have narcotics be number 21 in mission
and have the intelligence resources pulled away and then think
that we are going to catch the people. At some point Congress
has to say, and you have to help take the lead and say look, we
don't have enough resources to do your missions. And that part
of the focus of this hearing is to call attention to those
resource requirements. I have severe doubts that resources are
sufficient, even if there is no diversion on domestic soil that
needs an AWACS. Assuming that there is no outbreak in North
Korea or Indonesia that needs an AWACS, assuming things go
reasonably well in Iraq and Afghanistan that we don't need an
AWACS, that we will get something back this summer. And the
question is at some point we can't always be the junior partner
in this. AWACS were diverted in the last administration for an
oil spill in Alaska, they were diverted for Bosnia.
This isn't new under the Bush administration. It is a
problem of saying look, maybe we don't have enough of these
things to help get a dedicated AWACS to the narcotics effort
because we have all this money being spent on JIATF, East,
West, now maybe North, but if you don't have the data, what in
the world are we doing? What if you have gaps in the data and
you are trying to follow somebody?
Now, I know everybody is working hard to fill the gaps, but
now let me ask another question, along similar lines, but a
different type of question. Has anybody requested more oilers?
Part of the problem is that if these guys float in the water
and out-wait us? I can't even think of the magnitude of the
problem in the Pacific, let alone the Caribbean. One question
is if we can see them? If we are following, do we have our data
to feed into JIATF? OK, now let us say we have the data sources
to see them. Do we have enough resources on the water and in
the air to do that? And one key element of it is refueling with
adequate oilers, both in the East Pacific and in the Caribbean.
General Mixon.
General Mixon. Yes, sir. If I may go back just a moment to
the question you made in your earlier comment. Certainly, Mr.
O'Connell is our strongest advocate in DOD. Since his arrival
there, we have been open and frank in our discussions with him,
and he has gone forward numerous times to support our mission.
And I am confident in telling you today that if in fact we see
a depletion of assets to be a threat to our mission, I am
convinced that General Hill will bring it to the attention, to
include your own. So I am confident in that.
Mr. Souder. Because we are spending over $1 billion right
now in the Andean Region. And if we are spending all that money
down in Colombia and it gets out because we didn't put the in-
between in, we are wasting a fair share of that.
General Mixon. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Connell. Mr. Chairman, if I could sort of take the
heat off General Mixon. We are keenly aware in the Department
of the strain on resources, particularly ISR resources. You
asked particularly about what we used to call the forward
operating location at Curacao. And we have closed Roosevelt
Roads. That creates a singular problem in how we used to
address the whole surveillance issue in the Caribbean Basin. We
have a capability there of 12 aircraft, various mixes, 2 large,
4 medium, 6 small, that all perform counternarcotics missions,
either detection monitoring, intelligence surveillance, and
recognizance. But this can include a mix of P3s, EP3s. We have
Air Force E3s, the AWACS that you just described, KC135
tankers, EC130's, Coast Guard HC130's, Immigration Customs
small jets, C12s, and other antisubmarine patrol aircraft. In
addition, we are certainly relying on assets from some of our
allied nations: U.K., the Dutch, in some cases the French.
It is a difficult mix. I have specifically addressed this
with the J3 of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Schwartz. He
has carefully looked at our requirements for this summer
against what we think will be needed in other theaters.
Additionally, the Deputy J3 of the Joint Staff accompanied me
to JIATF South, where we met with General Hill, Commandant of
the Coast Guard, and looked specifically at how we can maximize
our intelligence, surveillance, and recognizance capabilities
as a government, as a team, particularly for the summer season.
I am not convinced that we have the maximum solution
possible, but I am convinced that with the current constraints
we are under, we are doing the best we can. And that is my best
call on that one, sir.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
General Mixon.
General Mixon. Yes, sir. Getting to the specific question
about the refueling operations you asked in your second
comment, the Navy has supplied refueling ships, they have been
made available because there are refueling operations and long
legs that the drug traffickers will use. In addition to that,
the United Kingdom has apportioned one of its top-of-the-line
oilers for the refueling effort, and also we are doing work and
have agreements with the Peruvian Navy to also provide oiler
capabilities. So we try to get a balance. And I think what is
important about this is not only the U.S. effort, but also the
effort of the other nations involved in drug interdiction so
that they carry a portion of the burden.
So I hope that answers the question on refueling operations
that you asked a moment ago.
Mr. Souder. Let me raise two more things. We held a hearing
in Arizona, and staff has been down that section of Arizona
from Tucson west, probably all the way over to Yuma, maybe even
El Centro, is one of our more vulnerable segments in the United
States because it is so desert: not as many traditional roads,
hard to patrol. But the Barry Goldwater Range covers
approximately the western third of the land border of Arizona
and Mexico. The Range also claims significant land north of the
border. This Range is used for air-to-air and air-to-ground
testing. As the U.S. Border Patrol has become more effective
preventing and intercepting illegal immigration in the buildup
areas, more and more human and contraband smuggling has
migrated to the austere areas such as the Goldwater Range.
Apparently the DOD agents for the range, the U.S. Air Force
and the U.S. Marine Corps, have refused to allow Federal law
enforcement agencies access to air and land along the border.
As a result, we haven't been able to control the illegal
immigrants and drugs entering that area as effectively as
others. We held a hearing in Arizona, as I mentioned. Some of
the DHS witnesses testified at the magnitude of the smuggling
problem and how critical access to the border area is. They
also informed me about a phenomenal number of people who die in
this area from exposure.
I understand briefly from our discussion, Mr. O'Connell,
that there has been some negotiation and movement, but up until
now the Luke Air Force Base and the Pentagon refuse to
promulgate a memorandum of understanding between DOD and DHS
for law enforcement access to the Range in the immediate area
of the border, for example, allowing a fly zone for the planes
that we move along the border, which, by the way, our fighter
jets aren't supposed to be down in that section anyway. Are you
prepared to take responsibility at the Department of Defense if
you don't allow us to go after the flow across the border? In
other words, is it going to be farther into the Range before
there is some sort of a way to do the intercept?
Mr. O'Connell. I thank you for your question, sir. I was
alerted last night by members of my staff that this was an
issue, and in terms of the research that I have been able to
do, we did check with Northern Command, we checked with JTF6,
the operational alliance in El Paso, we checked with the Border
Patrol office in Yuma, and we asked to speak to both Air Force
and Marine Corps representatives and asked specifically has
there been any refusal to allow Federal law enforcement on the
Range, or are there any specific restrictions. With the
exception of a minor safety belt that I am not specifically
familiar with in terms of the depth, the people in Yuma say
that there is now not a problem, that there is cooperation.
I certainly am sensitive how you, as a representative,
would be very upset if this were the case. I can only tell you
that my limited investigation has indicated that if there was a
problem, it is solved. And if that is not the case, I will
personally get back to you. But that is the best information
that I have at this time.
Mr. Souder. Part of the problem in that area is there
aren't roads, so there is a minimal way to get there, even in
the area where Organ Pipe National Monument is, where we had
the ranger killed and where they had to shut down the third
best hiking trail in that whole region because so many drug
runners are going through the park. That area is comparatively
developed, compared to over where we practice bombing, as it
should be. The problem is, as we seal these areas, we are not
only going to have the drug smugglers moving over to where
there is no resistance, they are going to be walking in the
middle of the bombing range, and all of a sudden we are going
to have public hearings about whether we are, in our testing,
hitting illegal immigrants, who will be portrayed in the most
sympathetic ways, not as narcotraffickers. And one way to do
this is to have, like the rest of the border, a fly zone where
we can put the ICE planes to be able to track that, because I
know the military wants a flexibility maximum, but this is an
international border. They can't come up that close to the
border, anyway, without risking international law violations.
Obviously, we don't want to have our own planes colliding.
We don't want to have our drug enforcement and immigration
people running around and restricting our ability in one of the
premier places with which to train our military personnel. But
you can't have a border with gaps in it. We are having similar
problems with the National Park Service, with the Fish and
Wildlife Service in parts of this, because if we harden one
target, they are going to move to the softer target. And if you
will look at this and continue to work so that we can make it a
continued thing. I know there have been discussions, but we
have to get some kind of resolution. I know the Arizona
delegation is really nervous about this issue.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. If you would allow me to take that
as a question, I promise Mr. Newbury of my staff will be back
to you and your staff on what specifically we know, what things
we can do. I share your concern, and we have it for action.
Mr. Souder. And I want to thank all of you. We will
probably have some additional written questions, and, as you
know, we have an interactive relationship, and try to both get
staff and members to each of your JIATFs and SOUTHCOM because
you are so critical.
One thing I want to add for Mr. O'Connell is one of our
concerns, and you can hear the frustration here. It is a kind
of a battle that has to be continued, especially with all the
challenges that you have, that in the White House National Drug
Control Strategy it mentioned DOD twice on counternarcotics, on
page 31 and 51. Yet you have one-twelfth of the
counternarcotics budget and you have 174 percent of the budget
in counternarcotics that ONDCP has to do the national ad
campaign, to do all the HIDTAs, to do all that side of the
stuff. You are a major player in counternarcotics, and we need
that acknowledgment out of the Department of Defense and out of
the White House of how major a player it is.
And I have one question I didn't get asked that we
definitely will put forth, but it has so many parts to it. I(n
my area I don't have an active base, but I have tons of Guard
and Reserve, and National Guard has been doing lots of missions
in drug support and other types of things, and as we
increasingly use our Guard and Reserve like they are regular
military--I mean, I have one Guard unit deployed in Iraq, 750
people for 15 months. I have a Reserve unit going over right
now to Afghanistan that hasn't been deployed since Leyte Gulf,
and they are going to be gone for over a year. Most of these
people had other jobs, they were doing partial support of other
things, and part of the thing is how is that impacting the
narcotics area. I don't think these things are fully thought
through as a national strategy, that, oh, this is how we were
using them over here because we see this crisis over here, and
we just need to make sure that narcotics is at the table. JTF6
in El Paso has historically done a military training mission,
and it is a great way for Guard-Reserve units to be trained all
over the country, but while they are training, they are doing
narcotics missions and border missions, so it's a twofer: we
are training and fighting narcotics. And to make sure that that
stays in the mix. We are banking on you in your position.
Also, if you can help us with the Secretary of Defense
Office and Legislative Affairs to make it a priority that we
can work with CENTCOM here on the narcotics efforts. It is a
major concern of this committee, myself and the ranking member
and the other members of this committee, that the heroin boost
out of Afghanistan does not come on our watch, and that,
second, we don't believe that we can stabilize Afghanistan
unless we are aggressively understanding that the heroin is
interrelated with the subgroups in Afghanistan. And it is not
just the Taliban, it is any group that wants to challenge the
authority of a democratic institution, including crooks on the
street, regional thugs, anybody that is interrelated.
We look forward to getting the classified briefings. But
the one thing you are hearing about the 9/11 Commission, which
I voted against and do not support, at the same time, what the
American people are hearing is that we don't preplan enough. In
Afghanistan, we can see this coming. It is absolutely happening
on the ground. The focus right now is on Iraq, but they are
farther along in some ways in democracy in Afghanistan, but it,
in many ways, is an even tougher country than Iraq. They don't
have oil, they have narcotics. Heroin is their oil. And that
whole region of this country, we were depending on the good
faith of regional sublords to dominate, and they aren't
cooperating all of a sudden, they are fighting Karzai. You have
religious and ethnic divisions in Afghanistan that are just as
tough, if not tougher, than we have in Iraq, and all of a
sudden, if the attention turns back over there and they say to
us in Congress, where were you? How did these people get these
guns? How did these people get this set up? How come we have
these armed insurgents here who are attacking and killing our
men and women from back home, and we say, well, they get their
money from heroin. Well, what were you doing when they produced
the crop? What were you doing when you had them in their
warehouses and you didn't hit them? That has to be made clear
to our military.
I believe there has been tremendous progress. In the last
stretch here we need to accelerate that process. I know that
the State Department is focused, DEA is on the ground now. It
isn't just a military question. You can't do it all, the Brits
need to be focused more on it, and we put a little pressure on
them as well. And we will continue to work with you, but we are
really banking on you to help us with some of that too inside
the Department of Defense.
Mr. O'Connell. I feel the responsibility, believe me.
Mr. Souder. I thank you all for coming, and thank you for
your leadership. We very much appreciate it. The job of an
oversight hearing is to try to identify some of the gaps, but
we are really trying to help you make sure you have adequate
resources in the areas of your responsibility and will continue
to do so.
With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at
the call of the Chair.]
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