<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:94837.wais]
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM: THREAT CODES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-166
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ------ ------
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
------ ------ JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
------ ------
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 16, 2004................................... 1
Statement of:
Connor, Charles D., senior vice president, communications &
marketing, American Red Cross; Michael Wermuth, senior
policy analyst, RAND Corp.; Dr. James Jay Carafano, senior
research fellow, defense and homeland security, Heritage
Foundation; and Kenneth B. Allen, executive director,
Partnership for Public Warning............................. 67
Hughes, General Patrick, Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randall
Yim, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team,
U.S. General Accounting Office; and Shawn Reese, Analyst in
American National Government, Congressional Research
Service.................................................... 6
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Allen, Kenneth B., executive director, Partnership for Public
Warning, prepared statement of............................. 112
Carafano, Dr. James Jay, senior research fellow, defense and
homeland security, Heritage Foundation, prepared statement
of......................................................... 98
Connor, Charles D., senior vice president, communications &
marketing, American Red Cross, prepared statement of....... 70
Hughes, General Patrick, Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared
statement of............................................... 8
Reese, Shawn, Analyst in American National Government,
Congressional Research Service, prepared statement of...... 42
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Wermuth, Michael, senior policy analyst, RAND Corp., prepared
statement of............................................... 85
Yim, Randall, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 19
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM: THREAT CODES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Schrock,
Ruppersberger and Tierney.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy analyst; Robert A.
Briggs, clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Andrew
Su, minority professional staff member.
Mr. Shays. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations hearing entitled,
``Homeland Security Advisory System: Threat Codes and Public
Responses,'' is called to order.
After a series of vague warnings and alarms, the utility of
the Homeland Security Advisory System [HSAS], is being
questioned by State and local officials, first responders and
the public. Even Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge recently acknowledged the need to refine the code, five-
color scheme that seems to me to be losing both its credibility
and its audience.
Seeing no difference between a perpetually elevated state
of risk, code yellow, and a high risk of terrorism at code
orange, Americans risk becoming color blind to the signals that
are supposed to prompt public awareness and action.
Since inception of the alert system 2 years ago, the threat
level has been raised and lowered five times, flashing between
yellow and orange whenever the volume of intelligence on al
Qaeda went up or down, but the lack of specificity as to the
time, place or nature of the perceived threats provided no
basis upon which to calibrate appropriate public or private
responses. As a result, governments and critical industries
broadly increased security measures and incurred substantial
costs. At the same time, exhortations to carry on as usual in
the name of economic normalcy dulled any sense of urgency in
the public at large.
The Homeland Security Act charges the Under Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection to administer the HSAS and to provide
specific warning information and advice about appropriate
protective measures and countermeasures to the public. The
current system does not yet appear to meet the statutory
requirements for specific information or specific advice.
Whether due to an excess of caution about intelligence sources
or a reluctance to ask for changed public behaviors and
sacrifices, the codes and warnings in use today may be a better
barometer of political realities than public safety risks.
When a blizzard or hurricane is forecasted, the public is
not advised to be brave for America and stay in the eye of the
storm, but when the threat of terrorism is elevated, citizens
are advised to go about their lives as if no real peril
approached. We need to make terrorism alerts at least as
targeted and accurate as storm projections.
This week, the Select Committee on Homeland Security will
consider legislation to improve Federal preparedness grants. A
subcommittee of that bill directs the DHS Secretary to revise
the alert system to include with each warning more specific
designations of regions or economic sectors at risk. But other
refinements could also add to the immediacy and the utility of
any publicly disseminated terrorism threat codes.
So we asked our witnesses--and we're very grateful to all
our witnesses--to discuss the principles of effective risk
communication that should guide public alerts and warnings and
to suggest how to improve the Homeland Security Advisory
System. We appreciate their being here today, and we look
forward to their testimony.
At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished
vice chairman, Mr. Turner.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to thank you
for your continued efforts on reviewing the preparedness of our
country and its appropriate response for the continuing
terrorist threat that we have.
I appreciate you holding this hearing on an issue that is
very important not just for first responders or those who have
responsibility such as at our airports for looking at the
issues of security but also for everyday Americans who look at
the system for guidance.
I would characterize that most of the responses that I have
received from airport security personnel, first responders or
even people just out in the community or businesses that might
have responsibility for protecting important infrastructure is
that, as they look at this system, their question continues to
remain, now what do we do, and I think that it is important for
us to have the discussion as to how the system can be better
correlated given a nexus, if you will, to specific responses
from the community. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time, I would ask unanimous consent that all
members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening
statement in the record, and that the record remain open for 3
days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
And without objection, so ordered.
At this time I would recognize our first panel: General
Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Randall Yim, Managing
Director of Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. General
Accounting Office; and Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst in American
National Government, Congressional Research Service.
What we'll do is we will start with you, General Hughes,
after I swear you all in, and just say that I'm really looking
forward to this first panel. I particularly appreciate, General
Hughes, your candor when you testified before the Select
Committee. I found your testimony on the issue that we're
discussing very helpful, and I appreciated that, and I
appreciate you being here as well as Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese.
As we do with all our witnesses, if you would stand, raise
your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Note for the record all our witnesses
have responded in the affirmative.
The way we'll proceed, General Hughes, is that we have a 5-
minute clock. We will roll it over to the second 5 minutes and
I would hope that you would stop sometime in between that
second if you haven't within the first, but technically we
allow 10 minutes for your testimony but hope it will be a
little less.
Thank you. General Hughes, you're recognized.
STATEMENTS OF GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INFORMATION ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
RANDALL YIM, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE
TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND SHAWN REESE, ANALYST
IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
General Hughes. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Turner. I'd like to thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear here today. I do think this is an important topic.
On March 11, 2002, President Bush created the Homeland
Security Advisory System [HSAS], as a tool to improve
coordination and communication among all levels of government
and the private sector and, most importantly, perhaps, with the
American public in the fight against terrorism. The advisory
system is binding on the executive branch and suggested,
although voluntary, for State, local, territorial and tribal
governments and the private sector. The advisory system is the
foundation for building a comprehensive, flexible and effective
communications structure for the dissemination of information
regarding the risk of terrorist attacks and protective measures
to all levels of government, homeland security professionals
and the American people.
The system, created by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 3 and now, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of
2002, administered by the Department of Homeland Security,
identifies a flexible framework for communicating, addressing
and mitigating terrorist threats to the Nation utilizing a
threat-based but risk-managed system. During periods of
heightened concern, the framework provides the ability to
change the threat condition on a national level but also
affords the opportunity to target communications to particular
geographic locales, industry sectors and other affected
entities.
The latitude provided by HSPD-3 allows the Department to
address unforeseen situations and continue to refine the
advisory system as the need arises. This flexibility is
critical to the success of the advisory system and essential to
its effective implementation.
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security on
March 1, 2003, the advisory system evolved into a framework
that married the analytic assets of the intelligence community,
which includes the Department of Homeland Security, with the
Department's unique responsibility to assess the Nation's
vulnerabilities and implement protective measures.
Since its creation on March 11, the HSAS threat condition
has been changed on five separate occasions. In each instance,
the condition was raised from yellow to orange, but the
circumstances surrounding each decision to elevate the threat
condition varied.
We recognize that a decision to change the threat condition
has significant economic, physical and psychological impacts on
the Nation. Therefore, decisions made by the Secretary, in
consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, to change the threat condition are made only after
careful consideration and close coordination with other Federal
agency heads, including other members of the Homeland Security
Council.
In the future, as the Department matures and our
implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory System
continues to evolve, we will work diligently to provide
information that best suits the needs of Federal, State and
local officials, the private sector and the public. We look
forward to working with the Congress on ideas to improve the
system.
HSAS is simply a tool, one of the many means to an end
we're all working toward, which is to secure the homeland.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll be pleased to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, General.
[The prepared statement of General Hughes follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Yim.
Mr. Yim. Chairman Shays, Vice Chairman Turner, members of
the subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity to
participate in this hearing examining the Homeland Security
Advisory System.
On February 4, 2004, Admiral Lloyd, the Deputy Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security, described the advisory
system as a blunt instrument and a work in progress, pointing
out for the first time this past December that the advisory
system specifically identified economic sectors and
geographical regions subject to heightened alerts. He and
members of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security
agreed that such specificity was critical to maintaining the
credibility and usefulness of the system, and these remarks are
consistent with the comments we at GAO have received from State
and local governments and the private sector.
We last testified before this committee on February 3rd,
describing the key characteristics of effective national
strategies for homeland security and comparing and contrasting
the extent to which several national homeland security
strategies contain such characteristics. Our purpose was to
assist in continual improvement and refinement of these
strategies.
Just as with our previous testimony, we hope that our
preliminary observations of the advisory system will identify
key characteristics of effective public warning systems, issues
and factors to be considered and balanced when determining what
information is to be disseminated and assist in continued
refinement of the system.
As with the national strategies, the true value of the
advisory system will be the extent to which it is useful as
guidance for, and actually used in implementation of
prevention, vulnerability reduction, response and recovery
measures by the relevant parties, including the general public.
Of course, as General Hughes noted, the Homeland Security
Advisory System is not and should not be considered the only
means by which threat and response information is disseminated.
It is but one of many tools, as he said, used to increase our
national preparedness. We hope that our testimony will be
useful in sharpening this edge and increasing its
effectiveness.
Specific threat and vulnerability information is received
by Federal agencies and used by the executive branch in
determining when to raise or lower the threat advisory systems.
The key issues then are to what extent, when and with whom such
information should be shared.
In your request, this committee suggested a link between
sharing information and the ability of the recipients to act
upon this information. While each threat advisory reflects a
unique fact and circumstance influencing the what, the when and
with whom issues, risk communication strategies that have
evolved in numerous contexts have common characteristics that
may be useful in assisting evolution of the advisory system.
Effective risk communication can and should not only assist in
prevention, but also in implementing actions to reduce
vulnerabilities, prepare for enhanced response and recovery
should an attack occur.
On the other hand, poor risk communication can lead to
complacency, misallocation of valuable limited resources and be
disruptive and expensive for the affected parties. Preservation
of credibility and public confidence are important
considerations in any refinement of the advisory system.
My written statement describes the operations of the
system, but, per your request, my oral remarks will focus on
the types of information that should be conveyed to the general
public.
Terrorist threats, as I said, present unique facts and
circumstances and are still relatively unfamiliar to the
general public. This uniqueness and unfamiliarity must be
acknowledged and recognized in devising refinements to the
system. If these terrorist threats are unique, then unique or
specific information should be provided to the extent that it's
available.
Most would agree that the refinements in the system this
past November were more useful, focusing on specific sectors
and geographic areas, but unlike more familiar advisories about
weather, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, or infectious disease,
specific terrorist threat warnings may allow terrorists to
alter their tactics or targets in response or increase general
anxiety in the public for those clearly not at risk. So we must
acknowledge and account for the fact that some information
available will not be widely distributed.
Further, due to the nature of terrorist organizations and
the types of threats, threat information may be vague, may be
limited or simply unavailable. Thus, the general public needs
to be educated so that they understand that false alarms arise
from inherent uncertainty rather than from poor professional
practice, that to a certain extent false alarms are inevitable,
and we must guard against a cumulative apathy among the public
during what I would term prolonged periods of preparedness.
Finally, we have to acknowledge a fact of life, that,
despite everyone's best intention, the threat of terrorist
activities will cause both rational and not-so-rational
responses. So, despite our best efforts, there will be
unintended social, psychological and economic consequences.
But, as an important point, when designing effective risk
communication strategies, that we understand and acknowledge
that these effects will occur and design our strategies
accordingly to convey information to those receptive, and have
the ability to act upon that information, while at the same
time understanding that some will receive this information and
act or not act upon it in less than optimal ways.
So what does this mean for refinement of the advisory
system? As this subcommittee and the chairman has acknowledged,
we want to convey information that will increase our national
preparedness. That is, we expect some action as a result of our
warning. There has to be, then, some connection, some nexus
between the information to be shared and the ability and
receptivity to take positive action, forcing our planners not
only to be intelligence and fact-based providers but, to a
certain extent, social and psychological scientists, quite a
difficult task.
Risk communication experts generally agree that effective
warnings should specify the nature of the threat, when and
where it is likely to occur and over what time period, provide
guidance or actions to be taken and perhaps, above all, assure
that the information is consistent, accurate, clear and
provided frequently.
This is much easier said than done for terrorist warnings,
but if we focus on the nexus between information and the
ability to act and the receptivity to act upon it, then some
patterns emerge, such as more specific information can and
should be provided to those specially trained to receive and
act upon the information such as firefighters, emergency
responders, and we've seen that in the hazardous materials area
where much more specific information is provided to
firefighters in case they must enter a building that contains
potentially toxic materials.
For the general public and the private sector, State and
local governments, the same principles can apply. Specific
information that is useful in making risk management decisions
should be conveyed so that the resources and intentions are
focused on the highest priorities, and the capabilities of
these parties to act are enhanced.
For example, there may be vague threat information about a
public sporting event. An individual may still wish to attend,
but take some simple precautions such as notifying others that
they are attending, carrying contact phone numbers or just
simply thinking about the evacuation or escape routes in the
event of an emergency. A private business may wish to review
and update its emergency shutdown procedures or be sure that
people are current on the evacuation routes.
These are all examples of sharing information that is
useful for, linked to the capability of the recipients to
receive and act upon that information, resulting in what
Admiral Lloyd calls a tactically actionable product.
The linkage then between information and capability to act
appear to be what other risk communication experts in the
second panel discuss when they talk about the psychology of
risk and risk management perception related to control, to
choice, the potential for personal impact, the risk benefit
tradeoffs and trust and a focus on the link on capabilities
between information. I think it really affects the trust issue,
trust that the information is accurate and useful, trust that
the information is being conveyed to those with expertise and
the ability to act upon it, like the law enforcement and
emergency responders, and trust that the false alarms are due
to inherent uncertainty in dealing with terrorist threats
rather than a lack of competence. As I said, the credibility is
of utmost importance to maintain.
In closing, let me end with a few suggestions. If we want
to foster a closer link between information sharing and
capabilities, then we need to do a better job of capability
assessment. We do not have a good inventory on the types of
infrastructure, equipment, people skills that can be brought to
bear in a major homeland security emergency or for the major
missions of prevention, response and recovery vulnerability
assessment, either horizontally across the Federal Government
or vertically between the Federal, State, local and private
sector.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 was not designed
to make changes in the advisory system. However, it mandates
that the Department and other Cabinet agencies inventory, use
high techniques to map and model, again, to get a basic
understanding of the capabilities that the existing
infrastructure within the country can be brought to bear should
a crisis arise or we wish to prevent a terrorist attack. That
type of modeling inventory should be combined, again, as one of
many tools with refinements of the Homeland Security Advisory
System.
Finally, if we focus on capabilities, let us not
underestimate the capabilities of the general public. I, like
many others, continue to be astounded and grateful for the
capabilities demonstrated by the public during September 11th,
during the days following, from acts of heroic rescue to
incredible acts of kindness during response and recovery, to
heroism in preventing even greater acts of terrorism.
So I would close by just noting that the capabilities of
the general public may be much greater than we think, so let's
not shortchange the public by assuming too little about the
types of information that are useful for increasing our
collective national preparedness.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I'd be pleased to answer any
questions.
Mr. Shays. I thank you.
First, the substance of your statement, as was the
substance of General Hughes, was quite outstanding, but I have
never in my 16 years looked at a statement so well organized
and so consumer friendly the way you have done it. I'm going to
take this statement and give it to my staff as an example of
how I would like to see its work done. It's really
extraordinary.
Mr. Yim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Very, very helpful.
Mr. Yim. I give great credit to my staff. I'm just the
spokesperson.
Mr. Shays. Well, I understand, but you all have developed a
system of trying to make things clear, and it's very helpful
and an excellent statement as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yim follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Reese.
Mr. Reese. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Turner and members
of the subcommittee, I thank you for inviting me to testify
before you today.
The committee asked me to discuss four points concerning
the Homeland Security Advisory System: the process the
Department of Homeland Security uses in determining the threat
level; the notification process that the Department uses to
disseminate a change in the threat level; the information
provided to the public when the threat level changes; and the
lack of protective measures for States, localities, the public
and the private sector.
As General Hughes said, Secretary Ridge, then Director of
the White House Office of Homeland Security, announced the
establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System on March
12, 2002. This advisory system has five threat levels. At each
threat level the system prescribes protective measures that are
mandatory for Federal agencies but only recommends them to
State and local governments.
Since the inception to the present, the system has never
been lower than elevated or yellow, and has been raised to
orange five times, with the Nation being at orange for a total
of 87 days.
If I correctly understand it from statements by Secretary
Ridge, the process DHS uses in determining the system's threat
level has three steps: First, DHS receives intelligence reports
from a variety of entities within the U.S. intelligence
community.
Second, upon receiving these reports, the Department
considers the following: whether the information is credible,
whether the information is corroborated, whether the reported
threat is specific and imminent and the gravity of the
potential consequences of the threat.
Third, in consultation with the Homeland Security Council,
the Department decides whether the threat level needs to be
raised or lowered.
Once the decision is made to raise the threat level, DHS
notifies State and local governments, the public and the
private sector through a variety of communications systems.
State and local governments receive notification through such
systems as the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System and conference calls to Governors, State homeland
security advisers and mayors of selected cities. Selected major
industries receive notification through such systems as the
critical emergency operations communications link; and,
finally, the public is notified through a DHS public statement.
These public statements provide general reasons for the change
in threat level, but they do not offer specifics.
The Department has said that intelligence reports indicate
an increased probability of a terrorist attack. In the written
statement I submitted, there is a table that lists the reasons
and dates of the five changes from yellow to orange. The only
time DHS has provided specifics on possible targets was on
February 7, 2003, when the Department stated that intelligence
reports suggested possible al Qaeda attacks on apartment
buildings, hotels and soft-skinned targets, but no geographical
location was identified.
This leads to my final point, which is what some say is a
lack of clear guidance on protective measures for States,
localities, the public and the private sector.
As I noted earlier, the advisory system has mandatory
protective measures for Federal departments. These measures,
however, are only recommended for States and localities, but
these measures do not address the issue of what actions the
public should take during heightened threat level. The only
recommended actions the public received during the five orange
alerts was to remain vigilant, report suspicious activities to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to carry on with their
daily lives with a heightened sense of awareness.
In summary, the advisory system in its present form does
not provide specifics on why the threat level has been changed,
nor does it provide clear guidance on actions States,
localities, the public and the private sector need to take
during a heightened threat level.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman and I will welcome any questions
you or the committee might have.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Reese; and we
appreciate the work of the Congressional Research Service.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reese follows:]
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Mr. Shays. General, I particularly want to thank you for
participating with this panel instead of just asking to be
separate. That is very appreciated. I think we'll be able to
understand this issue better because of it.
We are going to recognize Mr. Turner, Mr. Schrock and then
myself for 10 minutes, 5 minutes and then a rollover for 5
additional minutes. If someone is asked a question and you want
to respond to it as well, even if you were not requested to
answer, please feel free to jump in as well.
OK. Mr. Turner, you have the floor.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Being a former mayor, I talk a lot to individuals who are
responsible for local protective functions, police, fire or
important infrastructures such as water systems. Also, the
security personnel at the airport. What I hear from them, which
is echoed in many of your statements, is the lack of direction
upon the elevation of the threat level.
In the materials that we have there are obviously some
protective measures that are listed, but many times there is a
lack of specificity as to what one should do that has
responsibility for important infrastructure. For example, local
water authority. The threat level was raised. They know they
need to increase their security. They need to do something, but
they don't really know what necessarily to do. They don't know
if enough, if it's not enough. Also, then they worry when the
threat level is lowered that lessened security during a time of
lowered threat may not really be in the best interest of
protecting the community or in responding to the threat.
While one of you acknowledged that the lowest we had gone
is yellow, which is elevated--but even in looking at the
protective measures between yellow and orange, orange says
restrict facility access to essential personnel. Yellow doesn't
necessarily provide that.
Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese, could you please talk for a moment
about the issue of that lack of nexus, Mr. Yim, that you had
mentioned for advice to the local officials and their important
infrastructures, if you have knowledge of some of the things
that they're doing and the lack of direction that they're
receiving on what they should be doing. Because I know this is
very troubling to them.
Then, General Hughes, if you could speak as to, you know,
why don't we have more specific standardized recommendations to
them, more specific direction that--as this code goes up and
down, where they might feel that, one, they're rising to the
obligation or, two, that they have, you know, a greater
direction as to what it means. Mr. Yim.
Mr. Yim. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
I think the general perception is that the color-coded
system is too generic; and, as a result, it's not refined
enough to be able to provide that specific information. So as
we evolve the system, we can conceive of different people with
different expertise receiving different information instead of
everyone receiving exactly the same. That would go a long way
toward curing some of the specificity issues.
So, for example, as we mentioned, if there is to be some
link between the types of information you receive and your
ability to react and respond to it, then we can or should be
providing more specific information to the firefighters, to the
first protectors, that are trained to use that information,
allocate the resources appropriately and to act upon it.
I'm sure that we can devise some manners when we have
security issues surrounding how much information to disclose,
if we're limiting the recipients, that perhaps the Federal
Government would be a bit--feel a bit more comfortable
conveying more specificity to those targeted-type groups.
I think it's important, however, that one of the reasons
that we tend to default to more general warnings is often we
don't have a good sense of what exactly are the capabilities of
the recipients of that information to respond. As I said, we
have not done a good assessment nationally of the capabilities
of the respective State and local governments to not only
respond, but also to prevent terrorist attacks, to assess their
vulnerabilities and reduce their vulnerabilities.
So I think, to a certain extent, both the assessment and
the warnings will evolve hand in hand as we have a greater
sense of the capabilities that the State and local and private
sector and public can bring to bear in prevention and response.
As that capability evolves over time, as people get more
sophisticated in what they need to do, then I think the
warnings also need to evolve and provide greater information to
them. We're clearly not there yet. We don't have a good sense,
and we default then to, as I said, this generic warning system,
which almost universally people feel is not that useful.
The only other point I would make on specificity is that
let's not go too far in specificity in limiting the recipients
of that information. We should not presume who would find the
information useful. For example, if we want to target
geographical areas and limit the information to just those
residents of New York, we may miss people that are doing
business via IT or remotely with New York or who are planning a
trip to New York that may want to make risk-management
decisions based on threats to other geographical areas.
So there is going to be a difficult balance between
providing generic information that raises the country's general
sense of alert, because we can't always anticipate who would be
affected by that information, and providing specific
information to those trained to use their resources wisely and
to act upon that information.
Mr. Reese. As we've all stated, numerous State and local
officials have said that the information that's been provided
to the threat level change has been generic. Secretary Ridge
has also stated that sometimes the information has seemed
generic but there has been a need to provide information to the
general public and to selected critical infrastructure and the
private sector and State and local officials. There is a need
to announce a change in the threat level.
I am not privy to any information that the Department sends
out other than what is sent in the public statements to the
public, so I will just kind of focus on that.
There seems to be a desire to get a one-glove-fits-all
situation, or protective measures that if it works well in New
York then it should work well in Los Angeles. I would say the
disadvantage to DHS giving specific protective measures or
information would be that it doesn't foster State and local
governments possibly to do their own threat and risk
assessments.
So I think, on one hand, we do want more information to be
sent out so people can properly prepare, but on the other--and,
as you know, CRS, we try to do the advantages and
disadvantages. We want to ensure that we don't hamper State and
local officials.
Another issue that State and local officials bring up is
when the threat level goes up there's an increase in cost that
the government incurs. So if it's a specified threat that is
geographically targeted, then, naturally, we'll--and we'll use
New York City as an example. If New York City is targeted,
naturally, we wouldn't want Los Angeles to incur costs more
than they need, but it is universally--with the State and local
officials and individuals that work in emergency management,
there does seem to be a lack of information that causes people
to question what they're supposed to do and when they're
supposed to do it.
Mr. Turner. General Hughes.
General Hughes. Well, first, I found Mr. Yim's and Mr.
Reese's comments to be instructive in several ways. I thought
they were very good. But the issue that I'd like to point out
to you is the struggle to try to find balance between greater
specificity and broader information available to the public on
the one hand and on the other hand generating some kind of a
reaction in the official State and local, private sector
environment and, by the way, in the American public that is
broad enough to encompass the general threat; and that's what
we strive for at the Department of Homeland Security.
I will just make the flat statement that, as we now
administer this system, it is specific, and we do communicate
specifically with places that are specifically targeted. We do
not do that in the public domain in general for obvious
reasons. If we did that in the public domain, we would then
give away our knowledge base and we would probably end up
disclosing some of our protective and defensive measures. In my
view, that would be a very foolhardy thing to do, so----
Mr. Turner. So, General, are you saying that communities
that don't have a specific directive with respect--should
consider themselves lucky in that they are not faced with the
imminent threat that you're obviously trying to manage?
General Hughes. Once again, I urge you to have in your
minds somehow a balance. But, generally speaking, I think what
you just said is right, that the nature of the threat that's
communicated to the country at large versus the nature of the
threat that is communicated specifically to places, times,
circumstances that we have information about are sometimes very
different.
But if I may explain two issues here. The nature of the
threat can be specific and often is and not rise to the level
that requires us to change the broader threat condition. That
is, in effect, this morning there are threats in the United
States today about specific cities, specific places, specific
events and specific conditions, but this morning they have not
risen to a level of concern and to a due consideration for
broader change across the country. When they do, as they did in
December 2003, then after due consideration we need to make the
broader change.
And I have to explain the last piece of this idea, sir.
When something is threatened in New York City, the idea seems
to be that you can divorce that from events in Seattle, but you
cannot. The two are inextricably interconnected now
electronically, by transportation, by the features of our
social order. We are interdependent; and, indeed, the vector
that the threat comes from may not be precisely known.
In some cases, when we have to raise the nature of the
threat to encompass the Nation, the country, we're doing so
because we may lack specificity, but we have enough general
information to cause us to rise to that level of concern.
I'd like to just close my answer on this issue by stating
that the idea that these colors, the threat conditions that we
use here, stand alone without any interior specific actions is
a flawed viewpoint. We do have many different variations on the
theme of specific, direct communication and coordination and
specific activities that we can undertake within any of these
general threat conditions here on this chart.
So I just--I wanted to get that point across, that the
basic premise here and some of our conversation seems to me a
little flawed.
Mr. Shays. Can you make that last point again? I'm missing
it.
General Hughes. Yes, sir. We seem to refer to these colors
and the conditions they represent as if they are singular, and
they are not. Each of them has a complex background, some of it
based upon judgment and specificity of the conditions. So if
Secretary Ridge, as an example, in due consultation reaches a
decision to raise the threat level from yellow to orange, there
are very specific acts based on intelligence that cause that to
happen.
There may also be a broad general condition that results
from that. The color level is an example, manifestation of the
broad general condition, but the specificity interior to that
change is very precise. We talk to people directly. We give
them the knowledge that we have in some form. Often, by the
way, right now especially in this last raised alert condition,
we were able to give information that is very closely held in
the Federal Government to State and some local authorities for
the purposes of explaining what was going on; and they knew in
far greater detail than they had in the past what the threat
was about.
Mr. Shays. I would just make a point to you that you're
basically saying to us that this code system is based on
substantive determination, and that I can accept. But what I'm
going to be wrestling with when I have a chance to talk to you
is what does the public have a right to know? In other words,
you're saying to us when you went to code orange, which is
elevated, you in essence were saying something pretty
significant and people better listen, because it wasn't based
on a best guess. Then the question is, what does that really
mean to the public?
Mr. Turner, your time had run out, but do you have any
closing comment you want to make?
Mr. Turner. Thank you for asking, actually. I thought the
General's point was very important when he indicated about the
vector of a threat.
For example, we know in the World Trade Center that the
threat to New York did not emanate in New York, and I think
that's very important. That's an issue that, in just reading
these materials and looking at specific threats versus general
threats, that we might not all be aware; and it was I think a
very important point.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your indulgence,
I'd like to have an opening comment. Then I have a couple of
questions.
First, let me thank General Hughes, Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese
for their efforts in enhancing the security of our Nation.
Ensuring our Nation maintains maximum security and vigilance
while protecting our liberties is a challenge and
responsibility for which we are all accountable. This task must
be accomplished in a reflective manner of efficiency,
expediency and comprehensiveness; and I recognize that this is
an unprecedented task.
As we proceed, our growing pains will be felt and the
learning curve will be challenging. Progress will come from
innovative ideas, innovative technologies, technological
improvements and old-fashioned American ingenuity. However, in
our desire to have in place the very best security advisory
system we can, there is a dangerous risk in waiting for the
perfect system. It is incumbent upon us to provide the
resources and material support for the growth and continued
improvement of this system.
I've heard your testimony, read the reports and am becoming
educated as to the difficulties you are encountering. I
sympathize with the regulatory, physical and even the
logistical obstacles that you face.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, we witnessed
American resolve as we had never seen before. On all fronts,
Americans were thinking outside the box. Americans know how to
make things happen, and we succeed when we're challenged.
Americans have an inherent right to be informed of the threats
we face and should be provided sound information and accurate
and available intelligence. With the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 3, the American public is assured of
that right, be it through Federal, State or local authorities.
It is our obligation to see that right is provided.
Secretary Ridge himself has correctly expressed concerns
over the credibility of the system. We are all remiss if day by
day efforts are not made and implemented which enhance the
system's credibility. God forbid this country should sustain
another terrorist attack in the future, but the reality is we
had better be prepared.
We have had 2\1/2\ years since September 11 and have made
incredible leaps forward, but we are not there yet. I fear
there has not been sufficient education of the American people
regarding our advisory system. I would encourage a variety of
public service announcements to educate Americans.
As a kid, I remember the air raid sirens and the blank TV
screens hissing the tests of the emergency broadcast system. I
think the General and I can relate to that. We knew what that
meant, and we were informed. Perhaps we need to make a similar
outreach effort in this age of global terrorism. We must not be
a government that cries wolf, but we must be a government of
leadership and accountability. I have no doubt that your
continued efforts will be successful.
I wish to express my thanks to the witnesses again and the
many dedicated personnel who have kept this country free from
further attack. Their work is to be commended and your
continued efforts to be encouraged.
Question, besides the patent answer of give us more
funding, what is it that Congress can do for you to help
improve the Homeland Security Advisory System? If more money is
the only answer, please lay out for us why, and I mean
specifically, what that additional money will buy for the
taxpayer.
General, Mr. Yim, Mr. Reese.
General Hughes. Well, thank you very much. I really
appreciated the reference to the Civil Defense System and the
long-ago insignia of the triangle on the circle. That's
certainly a very poignant memory for me.
Mr. Schrock. We knew what it meant, and we remembered.
General Hughes. We did remember, and I still do to this
day.
I think the nature of the threat then, of course, primarily
couched in terms of the former Soviet Union and the larger
national strategic threat, is still a national strategic threat
but couched in a much different way, kind of an ill-defined,
fuzzy, nonpolitical entity out there that is striking us now as
opposed to potentially striking us. So I see the threat as very
imminent in many ways.
With regard to your direct question, what can you do for
us, well, I think what you're doing in the course of your work
is vital. You are, by holding these kind of hearings and by
engaging with us, assisting to inform and educate the American
citizenry, and I think that's vital.
I don't think I am in a position to tell you that we need
more money. We need your support, and we need your
understanding of the difficulty of operating this system, and I
appreciated your comments in that regard.
I think that your approach here to try to clarify the
system is the same as the Department of Homeland Security's. We
have made changes, and that term is kind of interesting. We
have not radically changed the system, but we have made small
tune-ups. We have identified procedural mechanisms that we have
changed or put into use, and other steps have been taken, and,
in some measure, some of those steps may have been informed or
motivated by your work. So I would just like to say I can't
tell you we need any resources right now. Your understanding
and your involvement are critical, and I appreciate it and
thank you for it.
Mr. Yim. Thank you, Mr. Schrock.
I think, with all due respect to all of the difficult tasks
the Department faced, one of the things that the Congress can
do is really hold the Department's feet to the fire in terms of
doing vulnerability and capability assessments and making those
assessments complete within a reasonable period of time.
The new Homeland Security Presidential Directive gave a
year deadline for the Department to do these critical
infrastructure assessments and to set national preparedness
goals. The Congress needs to be an integral part of the
development of those national preparedness goals, assessments
of the capabilities, not only at the Federal level but at the
State and local and the private sector so that Federal programs
can be designed--they are grant programs or tax policy or
whatever programs--to stimulate enhancement of those
capabilities. As we improve the capabilities of the various
sectors to respond, then I think, as I said before, we will
continue to evolve then the usefulness of the information that
can be provided that would link the type of information to the
capabilities of the recipients of that information.
So I think there is a public education component, but
there's also a tremendous oversight component I think, and
that's GAO's role on behalf of the Congress but also in terms
of designing Federal programs to stimulate the desired
behavior. Because I think it will be absolutely clear that the
Federal Government cannot own or fund 100 percent of everything
that will need to be done in the Nation for homeland security.
Mr. Schrock. I think I've heard you say that before.
Mr. Reese.
Mr. Reese. Sir, as you know, CRS doesn't make policy
recommendations, but in my written statement I did provide some
options should Congress decide that they would want to refine
the Homeland Security Advisory System, and it's basically the
two identified in my written statement.
What I'd like to identify now is vagueness of warning and
lack of protective measures. Some options for vagueness of
warning would possibly be have DHS just provide general
warnings, not to use the Homeland Security Advisory System,
which they've done twice last year. On September 4, 2003, and
November 21, 2003, DHS released public statements, general
warnings. They were via public statements, and the system's
warning was sent out to State and local governments. This
addresses the concerns that have been asserted that it causes
misunderstanding at the local level, but it would not address
the issue raised by those who say DHS does not give enough
specificity in the terrorist attack warnings, because, again,
it's just a general warning, not a specific warning.
The second option for that would be increased specificity
of warnings when the threat level is raised. This is something
that DHS says is a goal. They want to be able to issue high
alerts to designated cities, geographical regions and
industries and critical infrastructure.
Next issue would be lack of protective measures. Some
cities have already--some regions and cities, when going to
orange, have already adopted some protective measures on their
own. Surveillance cameras are activated. Law enforcement
officers are granted--not granted time off, and so on.
There's two policy options that Congress could look at. One
would be just continue as is, allow the State and local
governments to decide, conduct their own threat and risk
assessments and decide what they need to do; and then the other
one would be Federal guidance for State and local governments
to the public and the private sector.
The American Red Cross has a list of protective measures
for the public schools, businesses, neighborhoods, at the
different threat levels. This could be something that DHS could
look at but, again, may not be as effective. If DHS were to
provide specific guidance to State and local, the public, it
may not be as effective if it was done at the State and local
level.
Mr. Schrock. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Let me
just make one more comment to our witnesses.
This is a huge, huge issue with me personally. I represent
the port of Hampton Roads, Norfolk, VA, area; and I worry about
what they could do to our massive commercial port and the
largest naval facilities in the world. Then I see what happened
in Spain the other day and what the, ``knee jerk reaction was
at the polls.'' I really worry about that. Because what that
election told me was the terrorists won, and we simply cannot
allow that to happen anywhere. So anything we can do to enhance
this not only for this country but share with other countries
as well will be most appreciated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Tierney has agreed that I can go next, and then I'll
recognize him.
One thing I do know is that the folks in the Department of
Homeland Security want a system that works well. I think they
know it is a work in process.
For me, the testimony that we have from Kenneth Allen, when
he says in his testimony, the most important point that emerged
from the PPW workshop, the workshop they had in 2002, was the
conclusion that the Homeland Security Advisory System is a
threat assessment system and not a complete warning system. The
five colors tell the public that something may happen, but it
does not identify what and where, and it does not warn citizens
when an attack is imminent.
Would any of you disagree with that statement?
General Hughes. In my written testimony I address that
issue and in the verbal testimony I gave you today I addressed
that the Federal Government, the executive branch, especially
the Federal Government, takes the homeland security advisory
mechanism as directive in nature, and it compels us to act, but
the State, local and private sector take it as suggestive, that
is, the system that we currently operate under. So we do not
compel the State and local and private sectors under this
system to take specific actions by law. I think that's somewhat
constructive.
By the way, my experience so far is that we receive very
good cooperation under this system from the State, local and
private sector. I certainly know that there are complaints
about some of the issues associated with the system.
Mr. Shays. I think you're speaking, General, more of what
I'm asking. I'm not asking whether the government is compelling
anyone to do anything, whether it's Federal, State or local.
What I'm asking is whether you agree that it's a threat
assessment system and not a complete warning system.
General Hughes. Well, I think that goes to exactly the
issue that I tried to reply to. To me, if it were a complete
system, this system might have some compulsory effect
throughout our country in all of the levels of our social
order.
Mr. Shays. Yes. But even if we went one level down and
didn't compel action--I realize in a storm warning we can tell
people they've got to get off the Outer Banks, but in the
system we have, we don't even warn people to get off the Outer
Banks.
General Hughes. We do, sir.
Mr. Shays. Not in this system.
General Hughes. With regard to the Homeland Security
Advisory System?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
General Hughes. I think--first of all, I think drawing a
parallel--direct parallel between the weather warning or
alerting system and the homeland security system is a little
bit different. I mean, the nature of the terrorist threat is
about a direct attack on some critical feature of our
government, our country, our culture, versus the kind of
indirect and uncertain work of Mother Nature with regard to a
large storm or natural effect.
Mr. Shays. See, I feel in a way that the weather threat is
more certain than the terrorist threat.
General Hughes. Indeed, at times it may be. I guess the
issue is whether or not the Department of Homeland Security
should be in the business of engaging in warning the country
about weather and about devastating storms that are
approaching.
Mr. Shays. And we do that----
General Hughes. We do that in general terms.
Mr. Shays. No, we do that in very specific terms, I think,
General.
We anticipate a storm. We anticipate it is going to be in
this area. We would not only tell the law enforcement folks and
the first responders about it, but you, the general public,
should take specific action. You need to leave this area. You
need to board up your house, you need to do the following.
I don't see any of that in the system that we have as it
relates to terrorism.
General Hughes. Sir, if I may just say--by the way, I kind
of mixed the message there. I meant, we, the Department of
Homeland Security, don't do that in specific ways about the
weather.
Mr. Shays. But can I back up a second? FEMA is part of----
General Hughes. FEMA is part of that. It is a response
mechanism. But the National Weather Service----
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. That part you are saying is
Commerce.
General Hughes. In direct answer to your question, though,
I think we do have exact parallels to what you are talking
about. We do change actions, the actions of people, everyday
people at airports, at ports of entry, at transit points. We
change the condition in which they act often in connection with
threats to the homeland.
To me, it is very similar to asking people to evacuate.
Mr. Shays. I am not sure we do it consistently then. When
we went from--and let me say that one of the challenges that I
have, which is--I understand why the colors confuse people.
Green is low. Blue is guarded or general. Yellow is elevated or
significant. Orange is high. Red is severe.
In other words, you have--under threat risk, you have
green, you say is low, blue is guarded, yellow is elevated,
orange is high, red is severe. We are only going between
elevated and high.
General Hughes. So far.
Mr. Shays. Yes. But, you know, there are some parts of the
country that probably should be guarded or low, frankly. I mean
there are. And you have some--probably places in Montana, you
know, and they intuitively know that. And there are some places
in Montana that may be the other way, depending on--but what I
wrestle with is, when I am told as a Member of Congress what
the threat is, I am thinking to myself, whom do I tell? I know
what the threat is. I know we are concerned about a dirty bomb.
I know that we are concerned that it may be exploded in four or
five cities. I know that it may happen at a point in which
there is a large gathering of people.
So I process that information and I say, you know, I don't
know if I want my daughter going there.
And I also know that we were concerned that there might be
a hijacking of a plane with some pretty horrific results, from
Europe. Now, I know that. So when I had school kids' parents
call me and up and say, we are thinking our school kids are
going to Europe, I have to wrestle with whether what I know, I
warn them; or whether I just say, no, just do what you normally
would do.
Well, I know I am not letting my daughter go there. She can
go to South America, she can go to Asia, she is not going to
Europe, at least with my recommendation, while you are at code
orange. And you know why I am saying that?
And what I also know is that others who had the same
warning told me that they would react the same way, and they
told their friends. So we told our friends what not to do, but
we didn't tell the public.
Walk me through why the public doesn't have a right to know
what we are concerned about.
General Hughes. Well, first, I think the premise that I
would like to begin on is that our issue is to warn the public
to the degree that judgment dictates that we warn the public,
but not to incite the public to unnecessary actions. We try to
do that in the system by carefully characterizing the nature of
the threat and carefully administering it.
I would just like to say that I am from Montana, by the
way.
Mr. Shays. I saw you smile.
General Hughes. The nature of the modern environment here
is that some group or person can originate from a place distant
from the point of attack like, perhaps, Montana, and could
indeed, if the vigilance and alertness and warning level were
high enough in Montana, be found out before they get to a point
of attack elsewhere, let's say, Los Angeles as an example.
And so the nature of this is, when the condition seems to
rise to a level of national concern, we apply these gradations
that you talked about here on the chart.
Mr. Shays. But let me just be candid with you. There are no
gradations, in my judgment. We just go from one to the other.
There is a yellow and an orange. We aren't using the others. We
aren't.
General Hughes. Well, I see it differently. In my view, we
are going from an elevated condition to a high condition. And
in the English language that is a relatively reasonable
gradation. Higher means that you are at greater imminence.
Mr. Shays. OK. It seems to me, but what it says to me is--
we are already at elevated and we are going to high; that says
something to me in the general public that I am being told by
the Department to discontinue doing what you normally do.
General Hughes. Once again, sir, that is the specificity I
was talking about with the way we administer the system.
In broad, general terms, in the most recent case where we
went from yellow to orange, there was no need for us to give
specific guidance to the broad population of the United States
beyond what we did in raising the threat level condition.
But we did give, sir, much specific guidance to those
places, those sectors, those elements of our culture which were
specifically affected with regard to the threat information we
had.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this then. What you are really
suggesting is that our system is so good that if you tell the
authorities, the public that has no need of concern because it
is a foolproof system, that they will catch whoever is going to
do it.
I don't think the Department would want to be in the
position of making that statement.
General Hughes. I hope I didn't say that. I am trying to
illustrate to you the problem we have, and I do think it is a
challenge, which Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese have talked about, too,
finding balance in this presentation to the American public.
What I would like to say is that I think we have done a
good job in the most recent case especially. We are learning as
we go along. I think Mr. Turner and Mr. Schrock both noted the
evolution of this. We are indeed learning as we go along about
how to administer this system.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say this--and, Mr. Yim, I am over my
time, and I thank Mr. Tierney. But what I want to say to you
is, if in fact we went to code orange, as we did based on a
dirty bomb and some other things, and if in fact there was a
dirty bomb explosion and people had been gathering in a public
place, to what extent would the Department have been--not
duplicitous--to what extent should it be held responsible?
If my child had gone to a public place that ultimately had
what we were concerned might happen, who would be at fault?
General Hughes. Well, I think that we would, if we have
information about that specific place. But we did not have that
kind of specific issue in most cases.
You speak there of a period of time and of a place and of a
condition or event. In some few cases, we have had that kind of
tactical information. But in most cases we had a broad, general
kind of threat condition, actually coming from different sorts
of--we use the term ``information streams,'' and they are
characterized differently. But collectively, when those streams
are brought together, the broad threat condition here in the
United States during December and January was complex enough
and high enough for us to change the color and issue specific
instructions, in some cases, you may recall.
Mr. Shays. But only to the authorities, not to the general
public. To the general public, they were told to do what they
normally do?
General Hughes. Yes. In some cases the general public may
have been the beneficiary of the actions of the official
government without generally knowing if there was a great
threat to them.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Yim.
Mr. Yim. Mr. Chairman, I think there are two quick points I
would like to make, because I do generally agree that it is
more the threat advisory, a threat assessment, than a warning
system, for, I think, some subtle reasons.
First, we often consider the color code as a point-in-time
warning system or assessment system when, in fact, an effective
warning system is a process, as I think some of your witnesses
following us will say. It is not just a point-in-time warning.
There are obviously differences between the weather and
terrorists. But if you think about how we handle weather
advisories, if a storm is very far off the coast, you are very
vague in the information about the landfall and points of
impact. As we develop more information, we can develop more
specificity and give greater information to those that are
potentially affected without needlessly warning or needlessly
causing anxiety to those that are going to be outside the path
of a storm.
The problem that we have, often, with the terrorist threat
advisory is, it is either on or off. It is either yellow or
orange, on or off, rather than considering it as a process. And
I think, as it evolves, more specificity can be given during
periods of orange alert. It is not just we declare orange alert
on May 17th, here is the information; you are not going to hear
from us again until we lower the alert level. I think that
process needs to be recognized.
The second point is, we tend to aggregate that. It is
clearly a question of balance, as General Hughes points out.
But it is also the danger of aggregating data. One of the
things that the Department uses when it determines whether to
go to orange alert is, they assess both the potential--the
risk, the potential of the threat, the probability of the
threat, and the severity of the risk should it occur. We
probably shouldn't blend that data together. Those are two bits
of information that are important for people to know.
So if you have a low consequence, a low probability event,
but a tremendously high consequence, you may take certain types
of preventive action. If you have a fairly high probability of
occurrence, but the consequence is relatively low, it is not a
weapon of mass destruction, you may take different types of
preventive or response measures.
The aggregation of those two concepts into the decision to
raise from yellow to orange, I think, exacerbates the problem,
making it worse.
Mr. Shays. I am going to say, there is no way, Mr. Tierney,
you are going to get the floor right away, just after this
statement. I don't pretend this is an easy issue.
For me, I stay up at night thinking what I would do,
General Hughes, if I was in your circumstance and we firmly
believed that there was the potential of a nuclear attack in a
city and that there was a potential cell that we thought had a
weapon, material, and that they were somehow planning in a
city.
I mean, if you tell the public, there could be a horrific
exodus that would kill literally tens of thousands of people;
and yet, if it happens and 100,000 people are killed, there
would be hell to pay. And I don't know the answer. But I do
know we've got to talk about it.
And ultimately the public has to have some sense of what
these warnings mean. They can't just be for the law enforcement
folks. So we have to find a way to have it make sense. And I
would also say, it just seems to me that we should try--and I
think the second panel is going to say this--we should try
somehow to have the warnings in natural disasters as well as
the terrorist disasters somehow have some uniformity in terms
of words, in terms of warnings that--and again, I think you are
going to learn from some of the second panel.
I hope your folks, as well as the first--and your own
comments, and maybe from us, I hope they take the information
from this hearing and process it.
Mr. Tierney.
General Hughes. May I just make one comment about your
statement there, Mr. Shays? I think that what you had to say
was very important.
I don't know how to explain this, but I take this very
personally, since I am the intelligence officer who delivers
the information to make this decision. And the thing that keeps
me literally awake and on edge was what you described, a
catastrophic strike against the United States that goes
unwarned.
And there are no easy answers to this, but I would just
like to let you know that I appreciate very much your
recognizing and verbalizing that point. And that is not
procedural so much as it is a matter of judgment, a matter of
the heart, a matter of feeling, a matter of intellect and
analysis, and a matter of condition and circumstance. It is a
vital piece of work that has been given to me to do, and I
treat it very, very seriously.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, General.
Mr. Tierney, thank you for your patience.
Mr. Tierney. You know, when you talk about all of this--and
I think the comments that the chairman made about what
individuals are supposed to take from this are well taken. But
if you put yourself in the position of the local law
enforcement or fire fighters or responders on that, what is the
status right now of our system in terms of a situation where
you go from yellow to orange, what specifically might, say, a
police chief in a coastal community like Newburyport, MA know
to do with respect to any given asset if it just goes from
yellow to orange? Is he to protect the seaport and against a
nuclear power plant just north of him, as well as chemical
facilities, other things that matter; or is there enough
specificity in there that he knows where to marshal his
resources?
General Hughes. Currently, we would deliver specific
information to the police or to first responders or to other
officials about a given location, a given sector of endeavor,
such as a nuclear power plant's operation, or other conditions
that we have specificity about, if we have it--if we have it.
And we would do that relatively precisely, and we would not
generally do that in public because to disclose that kind of
knowledge in a public environment would, first, give away the
fact that we have the knowledge and, thereby, potentially put
how we got that information at risk; and it would also
contribute to a broad, general feeling that would be
unnecessary, in my view.
We would accomplish the work of the authorities or the
safety of the citizenry in the specificity that we treat that
information with.
Mr. Tierney. So you are saying, if you went from yellow to
orange nationwide, that--and you had information that it was
something that might relate to a nuclear power plant in the
northeast, that is the information you would give to all
interested law enforcement and other first responders across
the country, so that others would not be in the same type of
cautionary situation as would those people in the northeast?
General Hughes. That is one way to put it.
The other way to put it--which is, I think, a little bit
less palatable, but it is the way in which we have to do it--we
would give that information only to the locale that we had
specific information about.
Mr. Tierney. So here is the thing that I am talking about.
That you give an alert from yellow to orange nationwide. Then
you let the people in Oregon know that there--you have
information specifically for them.
My police department is running around taking care of
everything--putting people on overtime, calling the Coast Guard
for support over there, calling the National Guard for some
other facilities or whatever. Are they right or wrong to react
like that?
General Hughes. They are right. And this is one of the
complex issues here. And I think I would like to use Madrid as
an example here. We are now under a condition of what I would
refer to as simultaneity. We cannot depend upon an attack to
come in a single place at a single time.
Mr. Tierney. I was talking about an incident where the only
information you had about any attack was with some specificity.
General Hughes. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. That is--the answer is still, you don't
communicate that to responders across, so that the Oregon
people are really heightened, and the other people can take a
different, more nuanced look at that, and they have to go full
out?
General Hughes. Yeah. I understood your question, sir. I
guess the issue for me is that maybe the premise here is a
little bit further than I would care to go.
If we had specific information about a problem in Oregon,
we would talk directly to the authorities in Oregon and not
raise the national threat condition, depending upon the nature
of the information.
Mr. Tierney. If you had information that related to nuclear
power plants, let's say----
General Hughes. Then we would talk to the nuclear power
plant sector.
Mr. Tierney. And not the others?
General Hughes. OK.
Mr. Tierney. So when you go from yellow to orange
nationally, then you have less specificity, you are doing that
because you have some information, but you are not certain of
the extent.
General Hughes. Before you came in, I explained in the case
of the December-January timeframe, we had both specific
information about specific issues of threat, and the threat
condition generally rose to the level that we decided we needed
to make a national change in the threat advisory system. And
that probably will occur again in the future.
And I might just say, sir, that in that case, generally it
would not be a single piece of specific information, but
several in different places.
Mr. Tierney. When you notify the local officials on that,
what communications system are you using now?
General Hughes. There are a variety of communications
systems to use. For State and local, we have the JRIES system--
--
Mr. Tierney. I was interested in looking at that. In fact,
that was going to be my next question, what is the
functionality of the JRIES system and how widespread is its
use? And how sophisticated are we in that technology?
Because I am aware of similar systems being used in the
military, developed out of MIT with General Myers and General
Kellogg; and we have looked at those extensively, and they are
working quite well in connecting military bases.
Now, I know they are being tried elsewhere. Are you
familiar with that? Is that the type of system that JRIES is
going to evolve into, and where are we in that evolution?
General Hughes. Indeed, sir, JRIES grows out of the
military system. It was begun by the military, and we have
begun to adopt it. We are proliferating it as rapidly as we
can. We intend to encipher some of it, especially to the States
and major cities, at the Secret level as rapidly as we can do
so, so that they have a greater body of knowledge available to
them.
Mr. Tierney. Simultaneously?
General Hughes. I think the answer that I would like to
give you is, we are not limited by the systems we can use,
there are so many, to include, by the way--and I thank my
colleagues for mentioning this--the fact that Secretary Ridge
and other officials of government do make public statements
using our national media to communicate the position of the
government.
Mr. Tierney. I understand. It was the simultaneity that I
was thinking of, of being very effective and very useful. And
the JRIES system, if we can raise that to the level that I
believe that it can accomplish, to me that is a powerful tool;
and you can get on there to address the people that you want,
with the specificity that you have, and people have a much more
detailed idea of what it is that they have to respond to, just
what knowledge that you have, you can keep it to a secure
group.
So if I am allowed, Mr. Chairman, just one last?
What is the status of that now in terms of your use? How
long--how far along the chain is JRIES?
General Hughes. I hate to give you a percentage of
fielding, but it is very far along. We are proliferating it
very rapidly out to the States and the major cities especially,
and to some local organizational entities. We have a plan to go
to the county level in perhaps not every county in the United
States right away, I don't want to make you think that this is
going to happen overnight, but over the long term we will
evolve to the county level.
We have other alternatives, other communications
alternatives that are in being now, that go especially to the
State and some localities and, by the way, to the private
sector. An example would be SIPRNET, the National Guard
communications systems, the national telephone system, which we
can use. We have provided secure telephones to State and local
officials in many cases, especially in major cities, and often
in the private sector those kinds of secure communications
means are available. We can use the Internet, and we do for
general information.
We really are not limited here. We are trying to make a
coherent system that everyone can understand and depend upon.
And in my view, I am the key player in that issue, and I would
say that by the end of this calendar year, we will achieve a
very coherent and very robust, broad system of communications
and interaction here in the United States that will not only go
from the government to our State, local, private sectors,
tribal and other territorial responders, but it will come back
to us from them, with their views, their local knowledge, their
input. That is, I think, a vital piece of this.
Mr. Tierney. Who is your principal contractor in the JRIES?
General Hughes. I don't think we have a principal
contractor for JRIES, because it is a governmental-owned
system. But we do have contractors associated with putting it
in place, a number of them.
Mr. Tierney. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
We are going to go to our next panel, but I want to say
this and get some kind of response here. I don't believe,
General, that anyone here is questioning whether we should have
gone to code orange. I don't even think--and so I am convinced,
trust me, I am so convinced that I responded differently based
on the code orange. It meant something to me.
What I would like you to do is just comment on what Mr. Yim
talked about in terms of risk communication experts generally
agree that effective warnings should be specific--the nature of
the threat, when and where it is likely to occur, and over what
period of time, provide guidance or actions to be taken, and
perhaps, above all, assure that the information is consistent,
accurate, clear and provided repeatedly.
I guess the issue that I wonder about is, do you disagree
with this recommendation, so it is--you shook your head so you
don't disagree?
General Hughes. No, I don't.
Mr. Shays. So the question is how we move forward? Is that
the issue?
General Hughes. Yes. I think--once again, I hate to use the
word ``evolution'' or learning and doing all the time, but I
think it is the right way to characterize this. I think Mr.
Yim's characterization with those words you just voiced are
generally right.
I do think--once again, we do find ourselves juxtaposed
against the need to secure some of the information we have and
to communicate it so that it can be used by appropriate
authorities and not alarm or unnecessarily excite the general
public. This is a matter of great judgment at times and can be
second-guessed and criticized.
As you said, you gave us credit for doing the best that we
possibly can, and we are certainly trying to do that. We will
learn, using Mr. Yim's construct here, more about how to
communicate specificity out to the larger country than we have
in the past.
However, the point of protection of the information
probably revolves around the degree to which we can be specific
and, at the same time, make sure that we don't further endanger
our public by giving away to those who would strike us some
kind of information that would allow them then to find a seam
or a gap and hit us where we did not expect.
Mr. Shays. I understand it is a fine line. But I would
suggest this to you, that it was known from almost day 1 that
we were having a problem with flights from Europe. We knew it,
the terrorists knew it, and the general public was hearing
about it kind of indirectly.
And I would just suggest to you that some of what we knew,
since the terrorists knew and the government knew, the only
thing you can argue is that we wouldn't want to disclose
sources and methods. But I don't think you necessarily have to
disclose sources and methods to disclose information to the
public that would then get them to decide whether or not they
want to do something.
I just make this point to you. If, in fact, we thought that
large--we were reading it in the newspaper and the newspapers
were correct, but it wasn't coming from Homeland Security that
large public gatherings were a very real target, then unlike
the way I responded publicly, which I would do differently, I
think the public would at least need to know that they should
make choices, that we think we protected this large public
gathering, that we are confident of what we have in place, but
you need to know it is a target, and so when you go, you go
with some risk--if it is to raise the flag, show you are brave,
whatever, but it might tell a parent, maybe they are not going
to send their 14-year-old child. And then I want to tell you
why I think this is important.
If, in fact, something does happen, you have more
credibility the next time. I will tell you, there will be hell
to pay if the public isn't warned about something that
everybody else knew about in government. Then they will never
believe you.
I will just illustrate it this way. When we were warning
right after September 11th that we could deal with smallpox,
that we had all of the resources necessary to deal with it, I
knew that was simply a lie. It was not true. When I
confronted--and I will say it more generally, I just simply
knew it was not true.
When I spoke to the individual involved, he said we were
trying to make the public feel more comfortable and to lower
their anxiety. My comment to him was, though, if there was an
outbreak and there was this lack of ability to deal with it,
they will never believe you forever, and then--no matter what
the government says. So I guess truth in this process is
important too.
And let me just close by saying, first, is there any
panelist that wants to make a comment? Is there anything that
you felt we should have asked that was not asked that you want
to put on the record? Anything based on what you have heard
said today that you want to put on record?
Mr. Yim. Just a 10-second comment, if I could, Mr.
Chairman.
I think we should err on the public's right-to-know side,
because the public has a great appetite for information. I have
a great appetite for information. If I am not going to get it
from a credible source, I may get it from a source with much
less reliable information. I would rather receive it from the
Department of Homeland Security than receive it from the
Internet.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Any other comments?
General, you are great to be here. Thank you for
participating in this panel. It has been very helpful. And we
know that you clearly want to make this system work better. I
believe in the system, the process, I know it has to work
better though.
Mr. Reese, thank you as well. Mr. Yim, thank you.
We are going to announce our second panel: Mr. Charles D.
Connor, senior vice president, communication and marketing,
American Red Cross; Mr. Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst,
RAND Corp.; Dr. James J. Carafano, senior research fellow,
defense and homeland security, Heritage Foundation; and Mr.
Kenneth B. Allen, executive director, Partnership for Public
Warning.
All four of you, if you would, stay standing.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record, our four witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
You have all been here for the questions and responses and
statements of the first panel. Feel free to incorporate that in
your statement; feel free to depart from your statement. That
will be part of the permanent record. And I want to let you
know that we really thank you. We think this is a very
significant issue, and we appreciate your participation in our
trying to understand it better.
We will start, as you are sitting, with you, Mr. Connor,
first.
STATEMENTS OF CHARLES D. CONNOR, SENIOR VICE RESIDENT,
COMMUNICATIONS & MARKETING, AMERICAN RED CROSS; MICHAEL
WERMUTH, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP.; DR. JAMES JAY
CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, DEFENSE AND HOMELAND
SECURITY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION; AND KENNETH B. ALLEN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC WARNING
Mr. Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, for your gracious invitation to testify this
morning. My name is Chuck Connor, and I serve as senior vice
president of communication and marketing at the American Red
Cross national headquarters here in Washington.
The American Red Cross is a nationwide network of nearly
900 chapters and 36 blood services regions dedicated to saving
lives and helping people prevent, prepare for and respond to
emergencies.
With 1.2 million volunteers and 32,000 employees, the Red
Cross annually mobilizes relief to families affected by nearly
70,000 disasters. We also train almost 12 million people each
year in life-saving skills. The Red Cross is the largest
supplier of blood and blood products to more than 3,000
hospitals across the Nation. We also assist victims of
international disasters and conflicts at locations worldwide.
One of our most important partnerships is government at
every level--Federal, State and local. Government relies on the
American Red Cross to address the huge challenges of public
preparedness, particularly in the all-hazards environment we
spoke of today. We believe that everything the Red Cross can do
in this important area relieves some of the burden on
government agencies and first responders.
As the Department of Homeland Security has assumed the huge
responsibility for domestic security, it has correctly focused
on operational procedures. Conversely, it is our responsibility
at the Red Cross to prepare the American public.
In January, Red Cross president and CEO, Marty Evans,
issued a strong wake-up call to the American public to get
prepared. Despite growing concerns about terrorism and man-made
disasters, Americans have generally failed to take the most
basic steps to ensure their own safety.
According to a study the American Red Cross commissioned
last year, close to 60 percent of Americans, fully 175 million
of our fellow citizens, are entirely unprepared for a disaster
of any description. In February 2003, the Red Cross launched
the Together We Prepare Campaign. This program challenges
individuals and communities to take responsibility for their
safety and that of their families at home, in school, and in
businesses and neighborhoods.
By following five basic steps we can all move toward
greater safety. Those five steps are: make a plan, build a kit,
get trained, volunteer, and give blood. Mr. Chairman, please
mark your calendars, our next blood drive in the House is
scheduled for April 15th.
We believe that the more empowered and self-sufficient you
and I feel, the more immediately effective we can be in a
crisis situation. The bottom line, regardless of the
responsibilities of government, in the end, all of us must take
charge of our own destinies.
The strategic direction of the Red Cross is to be America's
partner and a leader in mobilizing communities to help people
prevent, prepare for and respond to disasters and other life-
threatening emergencies. A critical part of this effort
includes public education regarding the meaning of each alert
level within the Homeland Security Advisory System, and the
immediate actions required to ensure safety and security.
As you know, the White House issued Homeland Security
Directive 3 in March 2002, which established the five threat
conditions for a possible terrorist attack. General
explanations were given for preparedness activities for each
level, but these were intended mainly for government agencies.
However, across the country, there arose questions of, what
does a condition yellow mean to me or my family? What does this
mean for my business or my children's school?
Working with the Office of Homeland Security at the time,
the Red Cross developed and released specific disaster
readiness guidelines for individuals, families, neighborhoods,
schools, and businesses. Each color-coded threat category was
further expanded to provide recommendations for each of these
different audiences. These Red Cross-developed guidelines have
been incorporated into the Department's own public
communications.
As part of our expanding preparedness and response role, we
are continuing to keep America informed of the Department's
terrorist threat level recommendation and the appropriate
actions to take if the level is raised or lowered. And I
believe you will see the chart on the wall there, which is
germane to what we are talking about here.
Once notified of a status level change, the Red Cross
implements procedures and protocols to ensure that the
organization can provide a swift, efficient and supportive
response in case of an incident.
Similarly, the public looks to the Red Cross as a primary
source of emergency preparedness information. When a change in
status takes place, the Red Cross communicates practical
emergency preparedness information to the public through
national news releases and the communication resources of our
Nationwide Disaster Services Network.
Preparedness information empowers all of us who use it to
be more responsible for our own security and that of our
family. This vital education effort befits our stature as
America's premier disaster response organization.
In a world where the forces of nature and man too often
collide, the Red Cross is truly a beacon, showing Americans the
way to safety. We owe it to ourselves, our families, our
communities to prepare for the unexpected.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to
appear before your panel. I would be pleased to answer
questions later.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Connor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Connor follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Wermuth.
Mr. Wermuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members,
for the opportunity to be here today to address this important
issue.
Mr. Chairman, according to my count, this is the fourth
time I have had the pleasure of being before this committee in
that many years. I would also say that before September 11th, I
could have counted on both hands the number of people who were
providing national leadership on this issue, and of course, the
chairman ranks among those people before September 11th.
My remarks today are going to be focused on relevant
research and related activities in connection with the
congressionally mandated advisory panel to assess domestic
response capability for terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction, also known as the Gilmore Commission.
In accordance with its statutory mandates, the advisory
panel delivered its fifth and final report to the President and
the Congress on December 15th of last year. The strategic
visions, themes and recommendations in that report were
motivated by the unanimous view of the panel, that its final
report should attempt to define a future state of security
against terrorism, one that the panel chose to call America's
New Normalcy.
In developing that report, panel members all agreed at the
outset that it could not postulate as part of its vision a
return to a pre-September 11th normal. It was the panel
members' intention to articulate a vision of the future that
subjects terrorism to a logical place in the array of threats
from other sources that the American people face every day,
from natural diseases and other illnesses to crime to traffic
and other accidents, to mention just a few.
That report focuses on conceptualizing a strategic vision
for the Nation that in the future has achieved in both
appearance and reality an acceptable level of capabilities to
cope with the uncertain and ambiguous threat of terrorism as
part of dealing with all hazards. In developing that strategic
vision, the advisory panel was guided by the recognition that
the threat of terrorism can never be completely eliminated and
that no level of resources can prevent the United States from
being attacked in the future.
The panel believes that the Nation is achieving a critical
understanding of the risk posed to America by terrorism, an
understanding that derives from America's inherent strengths,
the strength in our Constitutional form of government and, in
particular, the strength of our people.
As a group of American citizens with broad experience in
government at all levels and in the private sector, the panel
members can see from those national strengths an ability to
respond to the threat of terrorism with firm resolve and
through concrete actions across the full spectrum of awareness,
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
Its goal was to articulate a strategy to achieve a steady
state 5 years into the future, a vision shaped by a broad and
well-grounded American perspective on the threat of terrorism
and focused particularly, because of this panel's mandate, on
State and local response entities.
As part of that vision, the panel depicts a desirable state
5 years in the future in a number of specific areas, including,
among them, State, local and private sector empowerment;
intelligence, information sharing; and enhanced critical
infrastructure protection.
Of course, a true national alert system will have an impact
certainly in those four areas; and potentially in what the
panel addressed. But as you have heard from other witnesses,
the Homeland Security Advisory System, any true alert system or
warning system, however you would like to couch it, is only one
piece of a much more involved and complex process of
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, and
information sharing. As was mentioned by the previous panel of
witnesses, the actual status of response capabilities, the
assessment of vulnerabilities, which are part and parcel of
what the Department of Homeland Security is doing, as well as
those at the State and local level and the private sector, and
the responsibility and the authority to act.
After the panel described a future vision that included the
words, ``The national warning system has been refined to
provide more geographically and sector-specific information,
based on the actual or potential threats, as its vision of the
future.'' It went on, in a following section that it called a
Roadmap for the Future, to articulate a specific recommendation
based on the following conclusions.
The panel said, ``The Homeland Security Advisory System has
become largely 'marganilized,''' was the term that they used.
``This may be attributed to a lack of understanding of its
intended use as well as the absence of a well orchestrated plan
to guide its implementations at all levels of government and
within the public. The Governor of Hawaii chose to maintain a
blue level in February when the Federal Government raised its
level to orange. And the Governor of Arizona announced that his
State would likely do the same thing based on particular
threats.''
Organizations surveyed by RAND for the panel had a number
of suggestions for improving the Homeland Security Advisory
System. Between 60 and 70 percent of State and local
organizations suggested providing additional information about
the threat type of incident likely to occur, where the threat
is likely to occur, and during what time period, to help guide
them in responding to the change in threat.
And I have included, for the committee's information, an
actual extract of that survey of some 1,200 State and local
response organizations, as well as the tabular information on
how they responded based on their own disciplines.
The panel specifically said, ``We recommend that DHS revise
the Homeland Security Advisory System to include using, one, a
National Alert System to notify emergency responders about
threats specific to their jurisdiction; two, providing training
to emergency responders about what preventive actions are
necessary; and three, creating a process for providing specific
guidance to potentially affected regions or sectors when
threats are changed.'' All of that just affirms what you have
heard from other witnesses this morning.
But several points are really worthy of consideration here.
First, an alert process of this type is neither a total
solution nor a single point of failure. Second, it is, by its
own title, advisory. It does not require anything. Most
importantly, most importantly, any alert system will only be as
effective as the intelligence upon which it is based, making
that function especially critical. And without delving into
continuing deficiencies in the whole intelligence and
information collection, analysis and dissemination, I
respectfully call the panel's attention to the extensive
discussion of that subject contained in the advisory panel's
fifth report.
Mr. Chairman, State and local governments, as you well
know, and as other members of the subcommittee know, have a
threshold responsibility for public safety and health. And they
must do things that they determine are best for their own
jurisdictions within their own existing resource constraints.
With better assessments, with better alerts, based in large
measures on more comprehensive and focused threat information,
they will be able to make more well informed decisions.
As the committee has already heard this morning, there have
been changes in recent days. Over the end of the year holiday
period, the flights from Europe that the chairman talked about
earlier, all of those, in our opinion, are steps in the right
direction. I would even venture to say that perhaps the
advisory panel might not have been as specific in its
recommendation now as it was in the fall of last year, because
there are improvements that are headed in the right direction.
But the Federal Government still needs to do a better job.
It needs to do better about engaging States and localities and
the private sector in part of that process. The Terrorist
Threat Integration Center [TTIC], may--and I stress ``may''--
prove to be a valuable tool in that direction, but only time
will tell.
Some States and even some major cities have taken more upon
themselves to be able to make valid risk assessments based on
information that they derive from a lot of sources, and the
private sector is becoming more involved as well.
So, in conclusion, I would say that progress is being made.
DHS has indicated a new amount of flexibility and innovation in
the way that they are now handling the advisory system. There
are probably some other fairly significant things that could be
done. I did not include any specific recommendations beyond the
panel's recommendation in my testimony, but I do have an
opinion or two about maybe some specific things that could be
done if anyone would like to ask for that during the question-
and-answer period.
Mr. Chairman and members, again, thanks for the opportunity
to participate. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Wermuth, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wermuth follows:]
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Mr. Shays. And, Dr. Carafano, thank you.
Dr. Carafano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
inviting me to speak on this important topic.
I have a lengthy statement for the record which I will
submit. I would like to briefly summarize the high points of
that, which are why I think this is an important subject; the
good things I think which are going on, which I don't think
have been touched on enough; some concerns about the current
system; and then, I think, a look to the future of what we
really need to think about for the long term.
I think it's worth just reviewing and why this is important
is four reasons: First and foremost is, I think the HSAS could
be a key tool for welding the disparate national, Federal,
State and local systems we have into a national system, which I
truly think is the Federal role, is getting the resources where
they need to be, when they need to be, for what they think
needs to be done to protect American citizens.
The second is, I do think that a properly run system can
have an effect in terms of preventing, deterring and mitigating
terrorist acts. I think that is an important fact.
The third one, which has already been touched on, is there
are enormous physical implications for this. It is widely
reported it costs the Federal Government $1 billion a week to
let the system--the Conference of Mayors says it costs about $7
million dollars for local jurisdictions to do this. So every
time we change the level, the physical implications are really
large, and those need to be taken into account.
And, fourth, I think we really need to look at the long-
term psychological impact that this system will have on the
Nation. I strongly encourage further research in that area to
determine how Americans are really going to react to this
system over the long term.
Just very quickly in terms of the good things that are
going on, that I think deserves to be mentioned. The Homeland
Security Council is playing an increasingly important role.
They meet each time the level is changed. I think there is good
coordination, at least from the outside, across Federal
agencies in terms of coordinating Federal efforts to respond to
the changing alerts. I think that is important.
I think at the deputies level behind the scene, there is an
improving increase in coordination. I think that is good.
I think the Homeland Security Operations Center that the
Department of Homeland Security has established, is an
important asset. It plays an important role in managing the
implementation of the system. It is a credit to the Department
that they have stood it up, and the role that it plays. And I
do think the announcement that Secretary Ridge made of the
Homeland Security Information Network, which was mentioned in
the last panel, is important and most important because I think
it will provide a collaborative tool at a classified level that
allows key people at Federal, State and local levels to
communicate with each other, which in the end is really
important to making the advisory part of this system important.
I do have several concerns. On the Federal level, my
primary concern is with the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, and that I think in the future the TTIC
should play an increasingly important role in implementing
HSAS, in determining when it should be implemented and how it
should be implemented. As I talked about before, I am concerned
that TTIC is not under the Department of Homeland Security, I
don't think that is what the intent of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002--I don't think it allows the Secretary to actually
fulfill his role.
I mentioned a number of recommendations in the report. I
think in the end the IA portion of IAPA in TTIC need to be
fully integrated. I think they need to be under DHS. I think
the Secretary of DHS needs the legislative authority over the
TTIC similar to the kinds of things that the JCS has over who
can participate in the joint staff, that were implemented in
the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.
I do think that the problem with the system is at the State
and local and public level. I understand what DHS has said, but
the perception is that the HSAS is the key risk management
communication tool to the Nation. And the general consensus is
that it lacks useful guidance to actually be that. I mean, you
can say what you want, but the research shows that if a warning
is credible, specific, understandable and actionable, it is not
a warning.
I would recommend delinking the color code from the
warnings that we give to State and local and the public. I
think, as mentioned before, the State and local warnings need
to be regional and functional in nature.
As I mentioned, I think DHS has been moving in that
direction. After we changed back from code orange at Christmas,
they kept a specific alert on for the airline industry and
certain airports. I think that is a sign that they are moving
in the right direction.
I think the other key piece to this is, we really need
national performance standards, because State and local
governments are never going to be able to act appropriately
unless they know what is expected of them. And I am very
supportive of the Cox-Turner Bill. I think that would be a step
in the right direction, in putting in a requirement for these
standards to be in place, because I think they are a key part
of what we need to do to have a good system.
The public system, I think we need to move to a simple,
two-tiered system, a watch-and-warning system similar to what
we do for weather alerts. People are already conditioned to
that. I mean, we need a simple standard. We need to tell people
what we can when we can. We need to provide specific directions
and specific actions; otherwise, these warnings are simply not
meaningful.
I also think we need to have realistic expectations about
what we can expect. The research shows that, by and large,
unless people are conditioned to a disaster, if they have had
experience in a forest fire or earthquake or something, that
they tend not to prepare. And so we can put out all the
warnings that we want, but unless we have a really serious
education system in this country, it is unlikely that people
are going to do much with these warnings.
And even if we do have an extensive education system, it is
really questionable what kind of large impact it is going to
have in terms of raising public preparedness. And I just--I--as
we look to the future, one of the most important things you
need to think about is the back end of the system. We don't
spend near enough time on that. We are talking about getting
alerts to people, but what we need to do is start training the
next generation of leaders at the State and local level and
private industry, who know how to react to these alerts.
One of the things I did in preparing for this testimony is,
I screened about 100 Web sites from State and local governments
and various industries, and the results are uniformly
disappointing. Most people take the Federal color code system,
and they just put that page up on their Web site. They say,
here is what to do. So we are not training the next generation
of leaders who can really react to nuanced warnings officially.
And I have a series of recommendations in my testimony which I
will be happy to go into.
With that, I will conclude my statement. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Doctor.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. My name is Kenneth Allen. I am the executive
director of the Partnership for Public Warning. I appreciate
this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to talk
about the Homeland Security Advisory System, but most of all, I
want to talk about the public.
The objective of a public warning system is to provide
people at risk with timely and accurate information so that
they can take protective action. Effective public warnings can
save lives, reduce property losses and speed economic recovery.
Public warning empowers citizens by providing them with the
information they need during times of emergency to make
informed decisions and take protective actions. Four years ago,
the President's National Science and Technology Council issued
a report concluding that many in our society are at risk
because we do not have an effective national public warning
system. That message was confirmed on September 11, 2001.
On that terrible day, not a single national public warning
system was ever activated. The Partnership for Public Warning
was established in January 2002 by concerned emergency
management officials from around the country. Because public
warning is an issue that encompasses all levels of government
and relies upon a private-sector infrastructure, PPW was
created as a nonprofit, public-private partnership.
We are the only national organization addressing the issue
of public warning. And let me emphasize that many of our
members and many of the proponents of the creation of PPW were
the local and State officials and emergency managers involved
in this issue. In fact, the chairman of our board is the
director of the Florida Management Agency, so we are truly a
public-private partnership.
Less than 3 months after our creation, the government
proposed the Homeland Security Advisory System. We provided
comments on the initial proposal and have continued to monitor
it and evaluate the system.
In June 2000, we hosted a 4-day workshop with experts from
government, industry and academia to look at the proposed
system. The most significant finding was the one that the
chairman noted earlier, this is not a complete warning system.
It is merely a threat advisory system. It tells us that
something may happen, but it doesn't tell us what, where or
when.
The best description I have heard of the HSAS is that it is
America's ``mood ring,'' and even a mood ring probably comes
with more specific actions such that if it is black, you need
to get help. We need to address that issue.
As a result of the workshop, we provided recommendations in
2002 to the Office of Homeland Security. Last November, as
people began to look at the HSAS and Secretary Ridge talked
about making changes, we decided that someone ought to ask the
public and local and State government what they thought about
it; and we initiated our own request for public comment.
The comments we received included the following points: The
current system is too vague. It is inconsistent with existing
alert and warning scales. It would be more effective if it used
standard terminology and message formats. When there is a
change in the threat level, State and local officials should be
notified before the public is notified. One color does not fit
all. Advisories should be tailored to specific geographic
regions, industry sectors and other potential targets.
A terrorist warning system should be developed to
complement the advisory system. It should be linked to existing
alert and systems such as the emergency alert system, and NOAA
weather radio. And most of all, we should employ a multitude of
technologies to reach people when there is a risk.
After almost 2 years of operation under the HSAS, I think
it is clear from the record and this hearing that changes are
needed. A more useful system, an effective system, can and
should be developed.
We are not here today to criticize those who developed the
HSAS. This is a complex and difficult challenge; and we believe
that the system in place has been a good first step, and the
Department of Homeland Security is to be commended on its
efforts. It is time for us to work together, however, on a more
effective solution.
In my testimony, I have some of the elements of an
effective public warning system. Applying those elements to the
HSAS, we have the following recommendations: one, make the
threat advisory scale consistent with other existing threat
scales; two, refine the system to provide information on a
local, regional and industry-specific basis; three, provide
more guidance regarding the protective actions that citizens
should take; four, develop a public warning system for
terrorist threats to complement the threat advisory scale;
five, integrate the HSAS with existing public alert and warning
systems and move toward the national public warning capability;
and six, collaborate with State and local government, the
private sector and the public on the development of a more
effective terrorist alerting system.
The last two recommendations are the most important.
Americans do not expect their government to preserve and
protect them from all risk. The public, however, does expect
the government will at least provide timely and effective
information on imminent risk. Many, if not most, Americans
believe that an effective national warning capability exists.
It does not.
Existing national alert and warning systems are fragmented
and uncoordinated. Individuals at risk often fail to get timely
information, fail to understand or act on the information, and
often do not know where to go for additional information.
Those not at risk who receive warnings of little relevance
may come to view the system with skepticism if not distrust.
The HSAS is an example of this fragmentation. Instead of
building upon existing alert and warning capabilities, we have
created another system and layered it on top of what we already
have.
The solution is a national integrated public warning
capability that can be used to alert the public during all
types of the emergencies, from terrorism to national disasters
to accidents. We have done some work in that area, and I would
be glad to talk to the committee if you wish to pursue that.
But our final and most important recommendation is the need
for cooperation and partnerships. Protecting our Nation's
security must be a collaborative effort in which government,
industry and the public work together. This is especially true
if we were to develop an effective Homeland Security Advisory
System.
The Federal Government cannot develop an effective system
on its own; no organization or individual has all the answers.
Moreover, local and State governments, private industry and the
public must understand and implement a terrorism warning
system. To do so effectively, those stakeholders should be part
of the process to design and operate the system.
We urge the Department of Homeland Security to participate
in a collaborative forum with all of the stakeholders.
September 11th taught us that the unthinkable can happen.
Future tragedies, whether natural or manmade, are not a matter
of if but when. Lives can be saved and losses reduced through
effective public warning. Americans expect their government to
protect them and believe an effective warning capability
exists. It doesn't exist today, but we can put it in place
quickly if we work together. There is no excuse for further
delay. This is an important issue. We commend the committee on
its leadership in this area and look forward to working with
you. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
One of my staff in hearing the issue of, you know, we are
taking steps in the right direction, said it is hard to be
satisfied with steps in the right direction. As former Senator
Nunn points out, a gazelle being chased by a hungry cougar is
taking steps in the right direction. Survival is a matter of
velocity, speed, not vector direction. And I guess it is a
combination of a lot of things, but interesting.
Mr. Schrock. How do I top that? Thank you all for being
here. I want to start with Colonel Carafano. You mentioned that
the TTIC, you thought it should fall under the Department of
Homeland Security, but as a DOD function. Its product and
analysis is integrated with the DHS Homeland Security Advisory
System. If Secretary Ridge consults with his council before
raising or lowering color codes, why yank it out of DOD?
Dr. Carafano. TTIC, now as I understand it, is statutorily
run by the Director of Central Intelligence, and it is
actually--it is an interagency group, obviously. It has DHS
members. It's mostly CIA members. I think they're going to
potentially go to about 250, and over half of those will be
CIA. I think the intent of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is
that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for the
integration and dissemination of terrorist threat information.
It just seems to me that unless we have somebody that we
can put a finger in the chest and say, ``You are responsible
for this,'' unless he is in charge of the resources of the
organization and the membership of the organization, what the
organization does, that we haven't truly met the intent of the
law. And I know Mike has a different interpretation on who
ought to have the rose pinned on him for this. I will let him
chime in.
Mr. Schrock. Colonel Wermuth.
Mr. Wermuth. Jim and I have had this discussion before.
Mr. Schrock. Obviously.
Mr. Wermuth. I think the TTIC is appropriately placed
somewhere other than within a single department. In the first
place, the Department of Homeland Security doesn't own
everything, even at the Federal level. More importantly, it's
our experience in studying issues like this that when an entity
becomes part of a single department, that's how it's viewed.
It's part of that department. It doesn't tend to be viewed as
something that can provide services outside the department, and
clearly, the Department of Justice, Department of Health and
Human Services, DOD itself and other Federal entities, much
less States and localities, need some of the product that is
generated from an organization like a TTIC.
So I would suggest that a TTIC-like entity does need to be
placed not directly under a particular department of the
Federal Government but more freestanding to do the broader
strategic approach to fusing intelligence information, if you
will, fusing it and analyzing it and disseminating it.
At the same time, Jim is absolutely right that the
Department of Homeland Security needs more capability to take
that information, maybe to take information from a lot of other
sources, and process it, analyze it and disseminate it and make
it actionable within DHS's own mission, which is of course to
provide better alerts, better warnings, better advisories
across this entire spectrum to States, localities, the private
sector and perhaps the public at large. It's the level that,
from my perspective, it's the level you're talking about. We
need a broader, strategic, accountable organization like the
TTIC; DHS needs an operational organization to do the same
kinds of stuff for the execution of its own mission, both.
Dr. Carafano. If I could just add one point, one point on
which we both agree is--I think it's a great recommendation in
the commission report--there should be strong State and local
representation in the TTIC so when we implement these alerts,
we have people who understand what State and local people do
and we can translate that quickly into language that State and
local people can act on. I think that's a good recommendation.
Mr. Schrock. Mr. Allen, Colonel Wermuth talked about
marginalization in the Gilmore Commission report, that the
Advisory Panel states, ``The Homeland Security Advisory System
has become largely marginalized.'' Do you all believe that, and
what actions should DHS take to make this system more credible?
Mr. Wermuth. Well, for the reasons that the panel stated in
much more detail than I did in the testimony, it has become
marginalized because people now are not necessarily taking it
seriously or taking different kinds of action that you might
anticipate that they would take, for whatever reason, whether
it's resource considerations or just local politics. I mean,
there are reasons why States and localities might decide to
choose to do something or not to do something just based on
political realities.
I said in my remarks I didn't have any specific
recommendations beyond what the panelists said, but now I'll
offer one in response to Congressman Schrock's question.
I think we need two systems or maybe two components of a
system, and it has been talked about here already, but we need
a system that is a warning system for the people who have, as I
referred to it in my remarks, the authority and the
responsibility to take action. We need a system that is
directed to States and localities and those elements of the
private sector that are involved in critical infrastructure
protection that really provides a more targeted, more focused,
more specific level of threat information for those entities to
take specific action.
Then it would seem we need a more general system--and Jim
talked about this as well--that is directed to the public, that
says to the public--he said two tiers; I might suggest three, a
lower and a medium and a high one--that would say, at the low
end, ``You, the general public, are not expected to do
anything.'' We have governments and the private sector that are
taking actions in connection with certain things, one that is a
little bit higher than that, that says, ``You need to be more
aware of your surroundings and, perhaps, take some specific
actions,'' and a third level that says, ``Gee, at this level,
you really need to consider not traveling, doing things, you
know, to be more observant, more vigilant of your
surroundings.''
But it seems like this broad five-tiered system that
applies to everybody--all of the witnesses this morning have
agreed--that's probably not a good idea, that there has to be
more specific things focused on the segments of our society
that have both the authority and the responsibility to act,
governments and those elements of the private sector that we've
identified, the public at large, and I'm not sure you can
devise a single system that would apply across that spectrum.
Now, having said that, we ought to tell the public if we
have different processes, and we probably will eventually have
different processes. As some different processes have already
started being applied, let's tell the public about those, so it
doesn't look like we're telling governments and selected people
one thing and telling the public something else. Let's describe
all of the processes to our public and let them take that
information on board and do what they will with it, but it
doesn't seem to be helpful to expect the public always to react
to a change in threat levels when it really doesn't affect the
entire public.
Mr. Allen. If I could just add to that, I would agree. One
of the lessons of the risk communication is that different
audiences respond differently to different warnings, and we are
not--this is not one audience. State and local officials are
one. Private industry officials are another. The public is
another. Even the media is an important audience we should be
dealing with, and we need to recognize and develop a system
that can communicate with each of those effectively.
Second of all, and again, I will reiterate this again, we
need to integrate this with other systems. We have between 10
and 20 different threat scales in this country for different
hazards. Even in terrorism, the FBI has a four-tiered level,
and we had DOD Threatcon. It's very confusing for folks to know
which system applies.
Third, collaboration. Let's let State and local governments
work with DHS and the private sector to develop a system that
works for all of us.
And fourth and finally and a point that you made earlier
is, we need public education. When we grew up in the 1950's and
we had all of those civil defense programs and we practiced
getting under the desk, we knew what to do in the event of an
emergency.
When the Iron Curtain came down, somehow we lost sight of
all of that, and it's time, perhaps, to spend a little bit of
effort teaching the public simple things such as what does a
siren mean if you hear one go off. In different parts of the
country, it means different things. So public education is a
key part of what we need to do.
Mr. Schrock. Let's follow on to HSAS for a minute. Since
the creation of the HSAS, a number of issues have arisen and
two, I think, that stand out: the vagueness of the warnings and
the system's lack of protective measures. And various
recommendations have been to refine the system, adding
specificity to the alerts, and developing protective measures
for the public.
Mr. Allen kind of touched on this, but how can we add more
specificity about the nature of the threat when alert levels
rise, and why don't we have recommended, standardized
protective measures for State and local governments, private
businesses and the public?
As Mr. Allen said, a siren going off in my hometown means
there's a fire. In Kansas, it could mean a hurricane--I mean, a
tornado. So how can we put that all together? Because there are
so many things out there, nobody knows what to believe.
Consequently, everybody ignores everything.
Mr. Allen. You're absolutely right. And of course, in some
places, a siren means gather all of the volunteer firemen.
Mr. Schrock. True.
Mr. Allen. Clearly you don't want to reveal sources of
intelligence, and I don't think anybody is asking for that, but
there are a couple of ways to deal with the issue. One is to
create a codified process that the public understands. In other
words, that we understand and the State and local officials
understand how decisions are being made about raising or
lowering the threat levels, what are the protocols and criteria
used in that process, what are the protocols for communicating
with people.
Right now the raising and lowering of the threat level is a
black box to most in the public. We don't know what goes on
inside that black box. We don't know what goes into that
decision, and then we aren't sure what's going to be
communicated and when. So you can deal with a lot of the
problem by providing more information right up front about how
decisions are made, how and when they are going to be
communicated.
And then as you get down the road, you do need to put a
process in place to share information with the public. We know
from history that people generally do not panic, that they
would prefer to have more information than less information.
And most of all, as somebody said, let's not underestimate the
intelligence of the American public, and let's share with them
as much as we can.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'd like to get more into the TTIC issue
and where the information goes. Are you familiar with the
analysis and coordination centers that certain States have
developed? It just so happened last week I visited the Maryland
analysis and coordination center, and I think, from my
observations, it's working very well, because what you have
there, it's more like a strike force concept. You don't have to
worry about the bureaucracy and who is in charge, but you have
FBI. You have CIA. You have NSA. You have State and local. You
have Customs. You have Immigration. You have all of these
groups. And what has been effective, I think, is that it's up
and down. Information is flowing up and down.
Now, how would you analyze that--and that was really put
together, I believe, out of necessity, because there was a lot
of frustration, especially on the local level, that information
was not coming from the hierarchy of the Federal level. How
would you analyze that operation? And I understand Maryland's
operation, I think, was one of the first, but it's being looked
at and being implemented in other States. How would you analyze
that as it relates to TTIC?
Mr. Wermuth. I would say that certainly Maryland's effort
is great. California, of course, has one that they call their
California Terrorist Integration Center. The city of New York,
of course, is another example of how a major municipality is
handling the issue.
I would just say that all of those are important pieces of
this entire process. A lot of them have been developed, as you
said, Congressman, as a matter of necessity, because States and
localities felt like they were not getting enough information,
and they had to do a better job at either the State or local
level for coordinating it. But it goes back to the
recommendation that the advisory panel made about the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center. That's why it's important from the
panel's perspective, why, in our view, the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, the Federal-level entity that looks at this
strategically, has to have representation from organizations
like the Maryland analysis center, like the California center,
like New York, embedded into their staff on a day-to-day basis
so that you have this complete perspective, not only from the
Federal level but also from the State and local level.
Mr. Ruppersberger. But do you see a duplication of effort
occurring between that and this group?
Mr. Wermuth. Not at all, because when you divide this, if
you will, in military terms--strategic, operational and
tactical--you need all of the elements. And the New York
operation is tactical. The Maryland operation tends to be both
operational and tactical, because it's working with the
Maryland community. Same thing in California.
So all of these are complementary efforts. It's my same
opinion about the TTIC being separate and independent so that
it serves all of the customers, but other entities needing
their other capability at the operational level inside
departments. The Department of Treasury just formed a new
intelligence and analysis center for money operations, for
financial transactions by terrorists. I think all of those
things are important, not duplicative but complementary
depending on what the level of activity that you're talking
about, tactical, operational or strategic.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's get--yes?
Dr. Carafano. If I could follow on that. I really think the
State and local analysis centers are essential, and they're
really the missing piece of the puzzle and the piece that will
allow us to get away from the blunt instrument we now have.
Because what you need is--if you have these analysis centers
that can really take the information and interpret it to
understand what should be done in that local situation, then
DHS can move away from the blunt instrument, and they can pass
more focused analysis to the regional and the functional areas,
and then they can do their analysis to interpret if it's
applicable for them.
So I think these are complementary with TTIC, and I think
something like HSIN, the Homeland Security Information Network,
which could provide a bridge between TTIC and DHS and these
other organizations so they can talk collaboratively, will
really allow us to have a much, much more nuanced system.
Mr. Ruppersberger. You said that you think those systems
like the one that I visited in Maryland are very good, but
there are some concerns about TTIC. What would your
recommendation be? Is it because you don't have one boss,
because you have a combination of FBI, CIA? And yet, in the
analysis center, you have the whole group together. What would
your recommendation be to make it more effective so that
Secretary Ridge could be in a position to make the proper
recommendations and get the right intelligence?
Dr. Carafano. First of all, I think TTIC will always have
to be an interagency organization. It should never be anything
but an interagency organization.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. I agree.
Dr. Carafano. And second, I think you have to have one guy
in charge, you have to have one guy responsible, and I really
think that should be the Secretary of Homeland Security.
My third recommendation would be to then give him the tools
to ensure that the other pieces of the Federal system cooperate
appropriately, and the model I would use is what we use for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. When we passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act
and said the Joint--the chairman gets to decide who is on his
staff, and you have certain education requirements. You have
certain experience requirements. You have certain accreditation
requirements, and then he has certain budgeting authority.
So if he has all the tools to make the other Federal
agencies, then I think you've built a system for the long term
and, most importantly, you have a chest that you can put your
finger in and say, ``This is the guy that's responsible for
bringing it all together, connecting the dots and telling
everybody what they need to know and when they need to know
it.''
Mr. Wermuth. The only point of disagreement there is in the
placement of the TTIC, as I mentioned earlier. The Advisory
Panel believes the TTIC ought to be separate and independent
from my Department. And in fact, if you want to pin the rose on
a single person, this panel recommended that what it calls the
National Counterterrorism Center, that we think probably will
help serve as a model for the TTIC, really ought to report not
to the Director of Central Intelligence but directly to the
White House. So clearly you can pin a rose directly on an
individual there, the guy in charge of all of the Federal----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Where is the funding going to come from,
the White House? You're going to have to have the resources.
Where are the resources going to come from?
Mr. Wermuth. You might very well have to have a separate
appropriation for an organization like this. You could do it as
part of intelligence authorizations. Because it's an
interagency organization, it could also be part and parcel--as
it is right now, with the TTIC--it could be part and parcel of
other agency appropriations that help to fund an entity like
that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's get to the--is the light still
green?
Mr. Shays. We did another one.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The issue as far as--is it information
coming in and not properly analyzed? Is it information that's
there and not getting to the right people? Let's focus on what
the real issue is with TTIC.
Mr. Wermuth. It's all of the above. Before the TTIC, before
other perhaps similar types of interagency entities, various
agencies were collecting information, analyzing information in
some cases, disseminating information without either having a
willingness to share or having an understanding of what needed
to be shared with other entities.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me get back to my original question
because of the time.
Why is the coordination centers--why do they seem to be
working very well while there are still issues with TTIC? Would
you analyze the two and why you feel one is working better than
the other right now?
Dr. Carafano. I think, quite honestly, if you talk to most
State and local governments, they will say that there's more
information going into the system than coming out. And there
are lots of reasons for that, connectivity, security
clearances. How do we share information? It's a learning
process. I'd be reticent to say there's one reason why we're
not communicating down as well as I think we're communicating
up, and I think that all of these things are really going to
have to be addressed before you see a marked improvement.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me get to another area. I was a
former county executive, during September 11, and went through
sending our police officers into overtime to synagogues and FBI
buildings, Social Security buildings, those type of things. I
see the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported last year that it
cost U.S. cities approximately $70 million per week in extra
overtime, security, personnel costs, and I think the Heritage
Foundation estimates that it costs the Federal Government $1
billion per week.
Do we need--what would you recommend as far as a procedure,
as it related to geography and specificity? Now, again, I know
that there is a lot of different intelligence, there is a lot
of chatter, but in the end, our intelligence is pretty strong
in a lot of areas. The issue of specificity and locale, for
instance transportation versus an issue involving an airplane
issue or whatever it is, that we need to continually--when we
hear the chatter, when things go up--to throw it out to the
whole country. And that is No. 1.
And second, then what would the recommendation be, if we
could get to a geographical issue or specificity, how would you
implement that? Through code colors or what?
Mr. Allen. I don't have the specific answer for you,
because I think it's going to depend on the region and the
sector. Industry sectors might----
Mr. Ruppersberger. My question is for the whole country, is
it--do you think it would work to declare a certain area in the
East Coast and not declare California? Because then all of a
sudden----
Mr. Allen. I think it would work the same way the State
Department can advise you that certain nations of the world are
unsafe to travel in or travel to them at your own risk. I think
if we develop a specific system targeted at specific geographic
and industrial sectors and we educate the public as to what it
means--I mean, I think a lot of this comes from the confusion
on the part of the public as was discussed here. What does it
mean when the threat level goes up? Does it mean everyone is
affected the same? I think we can develop a much more effective
system that's targeted at the specific threats because----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Automatically, all local jurisdictions
and most States, they are spending millions of dollars that
maybe we don't have to spend.
Mr. Allen. Well, one of the things we heard today, for
example, is that DHS does try to communicate with State and
local governments, and where they have specific information, as
I understood, what they were saying was, ``After we send out
the general notice, we will call those where we have specific
information.'' So maybe it's a matter of putting a protocol in
place that if you're a local community and you don't get a call
within the hour, you know that there is no specific threat
targeted at your jurisdiction.
Mr. Ruppersberger. But most people will cover themselves by
doubling up and pulling the people in overtime. It happens.
Believe me, that's reality. The numbers are there.
Mr. Allen. It is reality, but remember, no system is going
to be mandatory, but each community and each citizen, all we
can do is provide them with as much information as possible to
make informed decisions.
Mr. Ruppersberger. You can keep talking. I can't. But the
specificity--I'm just asking--well, fine if we can. It depends
on who the chairman is. He's a good chairman.
What I'm getting to, is it realistic to think that we could
come up with a plan that would deal with the issue of
specificity, geography so that if in fact we know--and we can
have, our intelligence is a lot more specific in certain
arenas--that California, as an example, doesn't have to spend
overtime when in fact you might need to do that on the East
Coast, that's kind of what I'm--is there--do you all feel that
there's a possibility to come up with a system like that? Would
that be confusing? Would that--because once it goes, believe
me, all--you know how elected officials always want to be re-
elected. They are going to make sure they cover their bases.
Mr. Wermuth. It will never be perfect but better than it is
now. Because of the ambiguity of terrorist threats, you'll
never be able to devise a 100 percent system, but we can do it
better and less costly at the State and local level,
absolutely.
Dr. Carafano. I would just like to say, I think it's
important to de-link in the minds of the public and the State
and local governments the HHS color-coded system from what they
do every day. I think it works fine at the Federal level
because you're coordinating centralized agencies, but I think
we need to get people to think we're organizing the Federal
Government effort; and for State and local governments and the
public, we need to provide them watches and warnings that are
applicable to them, and I do think that is an achievable
system.
Mr. Allen. I agree, it is achievable. Collaboration and
education are the two key components, but we can do that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK.
Mr. Shays. I thank you, gentlemen. I'm going to ask all of
you this question, including you, Mr. Connor, but I'm going to
also have a specific question for you, Mr. Connor. I want to
know how you transform from a threat assessment to a real
warning system. I mean, I know we've been talking about it and
it's in your testimony, but I want you to give me the first and
second, say, the third most important steps DHS can do. I want
you to think about that, and first ask you, Mr. Connor, you had
mentioned in your testimony the work of the Red Cross in
preparedness lessens the burden on Government agencies and
first responders and yet the organization relies primarily on
charitable donations to perform this important work in support
of Government at all levels.
I want to know, what additional resources do you need to
continue to be successful in your effort to prepare the
American public and to respond to the 70,000 disasters in any
given year?
Mr. Connor. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Red Cross, through its
nearly 900 community based chapters nationwide, is on the scene
with first responders immediately following disasters, both
natural and manmade, and as part of the first-response
community, we provide direct support to fire, police, EMS, and
we are integrated into State and local disaster preparations
and training. Yet we are unable currently to apply directly for
first-responder funding to meet these requirements we
discussed. We must rely currently on local municipalities to
include us in their grant applications.
Mr. Shays. And why is that?
Mr. Connor. Pardon me, sir?
Mr. Shays. Why is that?
Mr. Connor. I am advised that this is currently, if I'm not
mistaken, the DHS interpretation of the statute. They've had--
they have a narrow interpretation of first responder, and it
is, as I understand it, fire, police and EMS, if I'm correct in
that. And so they are the entities that have the eligibility to
apply directly for grants and not Red Cross, currently.
Mr. Shays. How do you describe your relationship with the
Federal Government?
Mr. Connor. We are a Federal instrumentality. The President
appoints our chairman. We have several Cabinet members who are
ex officio members of our board of Governors but we are not a
Federal agency. We rely, almost to the 100 percent extent, on
donations of that nature.
Mr. Shays. Yet you have an actual specific role to play
when disasters----
Mr. Connor. We do. We are listed, if I may--we are in the
National Response Plan, and we have the role for mass care,
which is spelled out in the Federal----
Mr. Shays. And of course, you wouldn't want to change that,
but the issue is, should you be allowed to----
Mr. Connor. Correct. Our point is, we have a lot of work to
do. We are committed to be partners with DHS at the national
level and the local level. We really want to do this. It takes
resources. And to the extent we could be eligible for grants
directly, that would be helpful----
Mr. Shays. So the issue is not that you would get a grant
but at least that you would be eligible----
Mr. Connor. That's correct. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. No. That makes sense.
Mr. Connor. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Let me have all of you, including Mr. Connor,
let's start with you, Mr. Allen--I mean, first off, we
basically all agree here that we have a threat assessment, but
we don't really have a warning system yet, and that's the
nodding of heads--can't be recorded, is all yes. OK.
Now, so how do we move from threat assessment to a real
warning system? Tell me the first few steps. Give me two. You
can give me one. You can give me four.
Mr. Allen. Can I give you an example, Mr. Chairman? Let's
say that there is a threat that there's going to be an anthrax
attack or a dirty bomb here in the Washington, DC area, and the
government has elevated the level to severe, and then they get
more information that it is a real likelihood that something is
going to happen. In a warning system, some of the steps you
would go through in the decisionmaking process, the first might
be to notch it up by notifying the local officials to keep an
eye out for this sort of behavior or to watch this sort of
activity and provide them specific information to the extent
you can.
But let's say, again, that, at some level, you're going to
go and say you have to notify the public. Currently, there is
no capability within the HSAS or within the DHS threat system
to provide an actual public warning to the public. In other
words, if they were going to notify us, there's not even a
linkage between the HSAS and the NOAA weather radio or the
Emergency Alert System, our two national warning systems to get
information out. There should, at a minimum, be a linkage--if
there's going to be a public warning, that we have a process
and a procedure to notify citizens over television and radio
via EAS and NOAA weather radio. We do not have that.
Second of all, we need to have decided in advance what are
we going to tell citizens to do. It's no good warning them if
you don't tell them what you're going to do. Do you want them
to shelter in place? Do you want them to evacuate? So we need a
plan prior to any of this happening.
But the first step would be to develop that linkage between
the threat assessment and the threat warning and the systems
that we already have in place to communicate with the public in
times of emergency. That would be the first step. And there's a
lot more we could do, but let's keep it simple.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. We intend, as this committee, to
write a report on what we're going to recommend to DHS
because--and we are going to use a good deal of what we've
learned from the first and second panel. You've provided some
rich information. I do want to encourage you to feel free to
continue to dialog with the committee, all of you, in terms of
recommendations. That would be helpful.
Doctor.
Dr. Carafano. I would establish a public system, a two-
tiered system of watches and warnings. In order to issue a
watch or a warning, you would have----
Mr. Shays. Let's start again. You're talking too quickly.
Dr. Carafano. I would establish a public system that would
consist of a two-tiered system of watches and warnings, and in
order to issue a watch or a warning, you would have to provide
information that was credible, specific, understandable and
actionable. If you couldn't meet those four criteria, then
issue a press release or something else.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to come back to your comment. I'm
going to give you a specific example, and tell me what you
would want the public to know.
Mr. Wermuth. There needs to be some distinctions made
between threat assessments and warnings. Unfortunately, the
lexicon, even within the Federal Government, about what really
is a true threat assessment is different depending on which
agency you talk to; so in the first place, we need better
definitions. But I would offer that we need various types of
threat assessments to start with, strategic threat assessments,
who are our enemies, what are their motivations, what are their
capabilities. And then with that information, you can make some
more strategic decisions about the application of resources.
Warnings, on the other hand--and I think Jim and I agree
here. In fact, I think from what I've heard, all of us would
agree warnings have to do with actionable intelligence,
something that causes you to say not only is there this threat
but it is this specific and here is what you ought to be doing,
perhaps within a range of various activities depending on who
your sector is.
So to me, a threat assessment is something at a higher
level. A true warning system has to be based on something more
current, more actionable, more tactical, if you will, than
broader threat assessments about who our enemies are and what
they intend to do and what they have the capabilities to do, so
that then you can overlay that with your vulnerabilities in
performing a good risk analysis for the application of
resources and other kinds of activities.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to come back, Mr. Wermuth, and want to
know how specific they would have to be in an example I'll give
you.
Mr. Connor.
Mr. Connor. Mr. Chairman, the Red Cross's emphasis is on
preparing the public for all hazards, kinds of affairs, and we
understand this debate, and we think it's properly left in the
Federal arena. Whatever the outcome is, we want to be helpful
to DHS in whatever system is----
Mr. Shays. Well, let me ask you this, though, do you think
the public needs to be warned about potential terrorist
threats, or do you think it should just be threat assessment?
Mr. Connor. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that is a question
for the Red Cross.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. I'm comfortable. So now, let me
give you a specific example. Let's just suppose that we believe
that the Europeans aren't doing a good enough job of making
sure terrorists are able to get onto airplanes. Let's assume
that they may use a biological agent on the plane and that we
think that is a very real possibility. Let's also assume that
we're concerned about a dirty bomb being detonated when a large
group of people are gathering and that we surmise that it may
be in 5 to 12 cities.
And we have decided to respond by warning all the officials
about this concern. We are asking the Europeans to put marshals
on airplanes. We are asking them to do a better job of
checking. Let's assume that we are going into our cities to try
to determine whether there is in fact any hint of radioactive
material and that we are particularly guarding those larger
events.
Let's also assume that we have such a concern that there
might be an outbreak, that we even have sharpshooters at large
public gatherings.
Now, tell me, if I'm being told that and that's what I know
as well as a Member of Congress, what do you think the public
has the right to know?
Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, well, you didn't pick an easy
example.
Mr. Shays. I thought I picked a damn realistic one.
Mr. Allen. But a very realistic one. From the point of view
of the partnership, we would err on the side of telling the
public more information than less, enough to let them make
informed decisions about whether or not they want to go to a
large crowd gathering.
Mr. Shays. Or travel at your own risk.
Mr. Allen. Or travel at your own risk.
We would also hope that the decision on releasing that
information or not is made collaboratively in a process in
which State and local government officials also have a right to
play a role and that it's just not DHS and the Federal
Government making that decision.
But we think that--we believe that it's the basic precept
of our society. The public has a right to know, and unless
there's a reason from an intelligence perspective not to, we
would err in sharing it with the citizens and letting them make
their own decisions.
Dr. Carafano. I think everything you just stated would be
the perfect basis for a usable warning to the general public,
certainly much, much more useful than going from one color to
another. Everything that you describe, there are things where
individuals can take actionable things on their own behalf to
protect themselves, and I think that would be a foundation for
a perfectly valid announcement.
And I would add, I think DHS's press announcement where
they talked about concerns about airlines in late February and
stuff, I think that came closer to the kind of thing that we
would be looking for, but I don't think there's anything that
you just said that wouldn't be perfectly appropriate in an
announcement.
Mr. Wermuth. Let me use your examples to explain what I
think is the difference between threat announcements or threat
analysis and warnings. In the airline example, I think we could
and should tell the American people, on a regular basis if
necessary, that we know that terrorists are still interested in
commercial airliners and that we think some of our European
allies are not providing enough security measures at airports
to prevent them from getting onto airplanes. That's kind of a
threat advisory. Right? People can process that information and
make decisions about whether to travel or not.
It rises to a warning level when, as we did around the
holiday season and again around the first of February, say we
have specific information that terrorists may be trying to
board flights out of Heathrow and out of Paris coming in this
direction. That rises, to me, to the level of a warning that
says, ``You may really want to consider not flying on some of
those routes, because we have specific actionable
intelligence.'' That's the distinction between the two.
But I would agree with my colleagues here on the panel,
that I think the public has a right to know. In the dirty bomb
instance, you don't have to tell the people exactly how many
people you have as sharpshooters, for example, what kinds of
weapons that they have, but perhaps you ought to say we're
concerned enough that we're providing additional security
forces that have the authority to interdict potential
terrorists, including the possible use of force at arms.
I just think that information is important enough to
disseminate to the public and then let them make a decision.
They may still decide to go to that sporting event or that
public gathering, whatever it happens to be, but tell them
enough where they can make an informed decision without
necessarily talking about either intelligence sources or
methods or for that matter enforcement methods, on the other
hand.
Mr. Shays. I'm just struck by the fact that you're
basically saying what seems to logical to me and so respectful
of the public, and yet that was really a real life example.
That wasn't a made-up example. That was a real-life example
that occurred in the last few months.
Mr. Ruppersberger, I'm going to have a few more questions,
so if you want to join in?
Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to get back to TTIC, because I
know it's important, and it's just not working as well as it
should. Is there anything that you would recommend to us as far
as legislation is concerned on how we might be able to fix
TTIC?
Mr. Wermuth. That it be a mandate: full-time representation
in the TTIC from State and local entities of the Maryland type,
of the California type, of the New York type. Whether you allow
States and localities to pay for that or whether you provide
direct Federal funding through grants or otherwise, that would
allow some of these entities to provide their full-time
representation, I don't think that entity is ever going to have
the full picture, is ever going to be as effective as it could
be, unless it has that kind of representation; and it can't be
a quarterly meeting with a few State and local representatives
coming to the TTIC and sitting around the table. It has to be
full-time, every day.
As one person described it, you'll learn more when you're
talking to your colleagues around the coffee pot than you will
in exchanging pieces of paper or having advisory meetings.
Mr. Ruppersberger. From a legislation point of view, do you
think there's a need for legislation to reform it or to dictate
something?
Mr. Wermuth. It may very well be that it would require very
specific legislation or at least broader authority for Federal
grants to be used by States and localities, if they choose to
do so, to send representation to the TTIC, particularly those
States in major metropolitan areas that perhaps are at higher
risk, from everybody's viewpoint at higher risk, and we could
sit here and name some of those.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Dr. Carafano.
Dr. Carafano. I would legislate the requirement for State
and local participation in TTIC. I would legislate something
similar to the Goldwater-Nichols requirements for JCS for
participation in TTIC. I would do all of the funding for TTIC
through the DHS so that DHS got basically a go/no-go on how the
funds and other agencies participating in TTIC will be spent.
And then finally, I would do a technical amendment to the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. I would take TTIC, and I would
take the IA portion of IAIP, merge them into one organization
and put them under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
Mr. Shays. Thanks, gentlemen. I'm not going to keep you
here much longer, but I need to--this doesn't seem as difficult
for me as I think it probably is, because I just start with the
basic premise that the public has a right to know. But what I
do wrestle with is, then, when don't they have a right to know
or when would I cause more harm than good.
Tell me, if you were in the position of having to do not
only an assessment, a risk assessment, but a warning, what
would become the most difficult tradeoffs for you that would
maybe suggest that the public would not have a right to know?
And you all have had to have thought about it. I mean, it
just--you're in this line of work.
Mr. Wermuth. That one, of course, is difficult, but all I
can do is to say, without having a specific example, there are
not many scenarios that I can think of where you wouldn't want
to tell the public something. I know the situation you're
talking about right after September 11th when the question was
asked, ``are we prepared for biological attacks,'' and what the
answer was to that question on national television--I think the
rationale behind not telling the public in that case is
absolutely the wrong rationale. We have to trust the American
people to take this information on board and process it.
Whether it's natural disasters or emerging natural infectious
diseases or a deliberate attack, I think we can tell them what
you would, as a citizen, want to know without necessarily
disclosing intelligence sources and methods or perhaps all of
the steps that governments at all levels are taking to help
protect them, because that might disclose things to the bad
guys. You have to tell them what the threats are and what that
means to them in terms of risk. I think it's wrong to take any
other approach.
Mr. Allen. General Hughes said that making those decisions
about what to share is a balance, and I would agree with him to
an extent, but I think the balance needs to be shifted a little
bit.
Hopefully, we will never be--have the difficult decisions
that I guess they had during World War II in the bombing of
Coventry when they decided not to share that information in
order not to divulge the source of the intelligence.
Mr. Shays. That's a great example, isn't it?
Mr. Allen. It is a great example. And the only example I
could think of when you wouldn't share it is when the potential
loss to the Nation is greater from sharing it than not sharing
it, and I truthfully can't conceive in 99 times out of 100
where that would be the case.
So I think that the balance, again, needs to be shifted to
the side of informing the public, letting them make their own
decisions about their lives and their families.
The President said we're at war on terrorism, but unlike
other wars, where we had an ocean between us and the
battlefield, it's here, and I think we're all combatants in
that war. And I think, as combatants, we all have a right to
know whatever we can to protect ourselves and our communities.
So I would err on informing people.
Dr. Carafano. I agree. I think that the two concerns are,
one, compromising sources or methods and, two, doing something
that might facilitate a terrorist attack and might make it
easier. I think those would be my two primary concerns.
Mr. Shays. You all, again, are such experts, I want to ask
you this. Could what happened in Spain happen in the United
States?
Mr. Wermuth. Certainly. It's part and parcel of this entire
public information, education process. I think governments at
all levels have an obligation to tell people we cannot protect
you against everything all of the time. You will never be 100
percent secure in any number of contexts within our society,
whether it's within your freedom of travel, whether it's within
your ability to communicate with each other through
increasingly sophisticated communication systems. We ought to
be explaining that to the American people.
It really is the basis of what the Advisory Panel described
as its new normalcy. Be straightforward with the American
people. We can't protect you against everything. Yes, there are
risks with train travel in the United States, but just because
we're vulnerable, as this panel would say, doesn't necessarily
mean that there is a threat out there that exists to exploit
that vulnerability.
Could it happen here? Yes. But that's what makes
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination so
critically important. It's not just because we're vulnerable or
the things that scare us to death. It's understanding who the
enemy is, what their motivations are, what their capabilities
are and being able to take action on that depending on what the
threatened attack is at any point in time. But to me, the
answer to the question is, sure.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Carafano.
Dr. Carafano. I agree.
Mr. Shays. And the answer is, yes, again?
Dr. Carafano. Yes. I would agree.
Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Allen, as well, is saying he would
agree.
I would also put into perspective we lose about 120 people
every day in automobile accidents. It blows me away every time
I think about it. You know, the number last year was 440,000,
and so we do know there are a lot of things we do at risk. It's
just nice to know it, and, I mean, nice--I just think it's
important to know it.
Let me ask you, is there anything that we should have asked
that we didn't? Is there anything that you would have liked to
have responded to that we didn't ask? Anything you want to put
on the record?
Mr. Connor. Mr. Chairman we would love to put in the record
our thanks to Mr. Ruppersberger for his great support of the
Red Cross and his statement on the floor of the House last week
for March as Red Cross month. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. That's probably the most important thing that
happened all day today, that you thanked him.
Dr. Carafano. I'd just like to reiterate a call that I
think we need to pay much more attention to educating the next
generation of State and local and Federal leaders on how to do
preparedness better, how to do response better, and it's a
serious education challenge that I don't think we've fully
taken on.
Mr. Allen. I just want to commend the chairman and this
committee for addressing this issue, the whole issue of public
warning. I think it's because so many people are involved, and
nobody has been in charge of it. And somebody needs to pay
attention to it, and we commend you for doing so.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. We're not going to let up on it, and
we do know we have people of good will, but we do think
politics is kind of interfering, in some cases, with good
judgment, regretfully, and I just think that we just need to
keep plugging away at it, and I thank you all for providing us
tremendous data and information and opinion. Thank you.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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